Appendix: Summary of proposition conclusions for each country case

Table A Summary of proposition conclusions for each country case.

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<th>Propositions</th>
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✓ = country case mostly supports
✗ = case does not support
- = missing data

Table A summarises overall patterns of support for our propositions. Each tick or cross represents not one data point, but an inference from many different conflicts within that case, from many transitions to violence and away from it that occur at different times in different spaces within that one country since World War II. All countries have a broad pattern of support for the propositions except Bhutan, for which support for our propositions is strongly challenged. All propositions have an overall pattern of support except Proposition 5 on security dilemmas as a driver of violence; after Partition, Proposition 5 is mostly not supported across the region. Across the entire period since the end of World War II, however, even Proposition 5 has half the country cases in support. So
it is premature to discard Proposition 5 for future hypothesis testing on new Peacebuilding Compared cases. Its replacement, Proposition 5(a), on democracy as a driver of domination, has greater, though not perfect, support. The differences are not so great as to make it worthwhile to list separate results for the original Proposition 8 and for Proposition 8(a), with the emphasis on humiliation added. The addition of that emphasis on humiliation does, nevertheless, notably strengthen the explanatory power of Proposition 8. Now we provide a brief narrative summary of our empirical findings for each country case on each proposition in turn.

**Proposition 1: As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.**

*India supports.* With both rioting and insurgency, politicised breakdown of pacification has a history of frequent repetition, yet being quickly repaired when a state monopoly of force reasserts domination of violent defiance with effective policing. Wilkinson (2004) shows how Indian police can shut riots down when they do their job. Kashmir is the big exception, where defiance effects consistently exceed deterrence effects. In Kashmir, armed force is massive, but does not monopolise the space.

*Pakistan supports.* US drone warfare in Pakistan against the Taliban is a classic example of defiance effects exceeding deterrence effects in spatial contexts where no force can monopolise coercion. The jihadist imaginary that brought so many in Pakistan to support the resistance of the Afghan Taliban to the NATO invasion has helped defiance effects to consistently exceed deterrence effects for insurgency inside Pakistan.

*Bangladesh supports.* Violence has cascaded in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as militarisation and coercion have cascaded. On the other hand, 1997 was a moment when defiance took a major step backward when the high levels of coercion that only India’s army had at its command were deployed to force the CHT insurgents to hand in their weapons and embrace the peace process.

*Sri Lanka supports.* Erroneously, the young Marxists of the Janathā Vimukthi Peramuņa (JVP) calculated that, by threatening military families, growing sections of the military might defect to them. Instead, the JVP triggered a cascade of slaughter of their own cadres. On the other side, the armed
conflict was likewise a strategy of harnessing the defiance of those who had already been attacked: ‘The JVP concentrated on recruiting members from houses set on fire and families in which brothers or fathers were killed or a female harassed or raped’ (Gunaratna 2001: 295). The Tamil Tigers case is also a fit with this proposition. Defiance cascaded until a stable state monopolisation of armed force was re-established during the past decade.

_Bhutan supports._ Nepalese Maoist defiance on infrequent occasions has overcome deterrence, but, overwhelmingly, the Proposition 1 dynamic is evident in deterrent effects that exceed defiance effects in a society where there has never been a serious fragmentation of a monopoly of armed force.

_Afghanistan supports._ As coercion escalated with the 2001 invasion, both deterrence and defiance increased to the point where deterrence of the Taliban exceeded defiance effects between 11 September 2001 and 2003, and perhaps even until 2005. From then on, as the Taliban regrouped and retrained with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support, they ceased viewing themselves as outmatched by the combined might of NATO powers and the Northern Alliance. For at least the past 13 years, defiance effects have exceeded deterrence effects and violence has cascaded.

_Nepal supports._ Operation Romeo against rural leftists in 1995 was a classic example of a punitive campaign that could not sustain deterrence effects that exceeded defiance effects. The political machinations of the king in making the police—rather than the army—do most of the fighting in this war condemned it to fail in securing deterrence that exceeded defiance.

_Myanmar supports._ Bamar, British, Japanese and junta dominations of Myanmar’s core were all accomplished by levels of deterrence that suppressed defiance. The defiance of the Communist Party of Burma collapsed after it no longer had the support of a power greater than the junta (China). The Myanmar army, however, continues to find it impossible to sustain a level of deterrence that exceeds defiance of their coercion in many more far-flung parts of the country that continue to be under the effective control of ethnic armies. Deterrence has always exceeded defiance in the core of the country, while, in many parts of Myanmar’s hard-to-control periphery, proud traditions of ethnic defiance have always exceeded deterrence.
Proposition 2: Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

India supports. Cascading of both violent and nonviolent imaginaries is most evident in Kashmir. Gulami (slavery) and azadi imaginaries cascaded. Islamic imaginaries linked Kashmir to Palestine (as in ‘stone-pelting’ and azadi in the intifada). Scripts such as jihad, martyr, stone-pelter, azadi and intifada became transplants from one insurgency to another in mutually reinforcing narratives of Muslim oppression by imperial powers and religious domination by Hindus, Christians and Jews. More widely, Paul Brass’s (2003) ‘institutionalised riot systems’ involve a conversion specialist who is usually a politician who crafts a violent political imaginary, ‘converting’ potential triggers into a riot imaginary, into riots escalated by news networks. Partition was a contagion of violence. Naga insurgency was modelled by other insurgencies. A contagion of communal violence occurred as violence entrepreneurs in one part of the country emulated scripts learnt in other parts of greater India, horizontally from insurgency to insurgency and vertically (as in the Assam insurgency cascading down to the Bodo insurgency, cascading to one Bodo faction fighting another). Support for separatist insurgency inside Pakistan also cascaded down from India (particularly in East Pakistan and Balochistan) and from terrorist bombings in major Pakistani cities organised by Indian intelligence—in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for insurgency inside India. The split of India and Pakistan contributed to the cascading of further partition imaginaries across greater India.

Pakistan supports. The Pakistani state promoted violent imaginaries and jihadist imaginaries through its education policies, with education through extremist madrasas. The state’s wider jihadisation of politics started from the early decades of Indian confrontation over Kashmir. The jihadist imaginary was the genie the ISI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) let out of the bottle because they believed in the 1980s that only radical Islamists would have the fanaticism to throw themselves across the border at the Soviet war machine in Afghanistan. Pakistan also supported the Afghan jihad to motivate jihadist attacks across the border into Indian Kashmir. The Pakistani state eventually learned that even when they could shut down jihadist armed groups, they could not shut down their jihadist imaginaries.
**Bangladesh supports.** A militaristic imaginary of the state, of praetorianism and coups, was modelled from Pakistan to Bangladesh through modelling institutions such as cadet schools. The Awami League forming its own paramilitary organisation that challenged the military opened cleavages with the military that led to the first military coup in Bangladesh. Just as coups and insurgencies have implemented violent imaginaries in Bangladeshi history when cleavages have widened, so a politics of nonviolence has frequently surged in response to the opening up of cleavages.

**Sri Lanka supports.** The JVP uprisings were classic mid-twentieth-century insurgencies in that a Marxist imaginary cascaded violence. Suicide vests that were invented by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cascaded globally, mainly by Islamic jihadists. The violent imaginaries they represent cascaded when architectures of extreme coercion began to crack and when cleavages in Sri Lankan society began to open. The JVP’s opening of cracks in state coercion created opportunities for LTTE violence, and vice versa.

**Bhutan supports.** Diffusion of nonviolence cascades through the modelling mechanism more than does diffusion of violence. Indeed, imaginaries of nonviolence cascade profoundly across Bhutan’s history.

**Afghanistan supports.** Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders found they could imbue a new generation with a jihad imaginary in Pakistani madrassas. Modelling widely diffused a jihad imaginary that conceived jihad against US forces in Afghanistan as noble work. Jihad against communism, as cracks began to open in its power structure, was a model for jihad against NATO capitalism when cracks began to open in its domination of Afghanistan.

**Nepal supports.** A distinctive feature of the Nepalese case is cascading of a violent feminist imaginary of insurgency. This was driven by systematic state rape that fractured the legitimacy of the state. The feminist imaginary also changed the outcome of this conflict in more decisively feminised ways than for any other conflict in Peacebuilding Compared to date. Yet, in the end game, it was a nonviolent imaginary, which was also quite feminised, that cascaded massively and decisively in 2006 to peace and a moment of major political transformation.
Myanmar supports. Each time the architectures of coercion—by colonial power or by junta power—have begun to crack in Myanmar’s history, violence has cascaded. Yet, it was the nonviolent resistance to this fracturing architecture of coercion that ultimately prevailed as a reaction to it. This was the triumph of the National League for Democracy (NLD) assuming power in 2016.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

India supports. Partition of India and Pakistan resulted from a variety of deliberate tactics by the British Raj to divide the minority Muslim community from the Hindu majority in the self-rule movement. Religious animosities that were prised open failed to preserve colonial rule, and instead cascaded to violence. At Partition, violence was greatest in Punjab, where the Raj, during and after the mutiny, concentrated its recruitment of ‘martial races’ as mercenaries to be set against the ethnic other. Fear concerning these cleavages became a resource for violence entrepreneurs who mobilised around them to attack, rape, murder and drive out the religious other. Similar dynamics were fuelled by India with the partition of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

Pakistan supports. Sometimes the Pakistani state and military worked in alliance with the Taliban, the United States, Iran and *lashkars* (civilian militias armed by the military) in the Swat Valley to open up cleavages and unsettle power balances. On other occasions, they worked against each of these actors in alliances with their enemies. These complex shifts in alliance structures cascaded violence.

Bangladesh supports. Violence has particularly escalated in the history of Bangladesh when internal cleavages connected up to cleavages between India and Pakistan or India and Bangladesh. The biggest war in the history of Bangladesh, in 1971, is an example of this, as is the country’s biggest insurgency, in the CHT in the late twentieth century.

Sri Lanka supports. The JVP argued that the Sri Lankan Government was allowing the country to be held hostage to Tamil division and Indian imperial designs. There was paradox therefore that the LTTE had provided weapons, landmines, explosives and training to the JVP to weaken the Sri Lankan military, which would have to fight on two fronts. The LTTE threat cascaded through the intentional agency of LTTE strategists of violence to the JVP becoming a more credible threat. The next
paradoxical cascade was of the Government of Sri Lanka replenishing the firepower of its principal enemy, the LTTE, so it could kill 1,200 Indian peacekeepers. Sri Lanka had become a country with wars across multiple cleavages among four major combatants: the Sri Lankan military, the Indian military, the JVP and the LTTE. Some of these combatants chose to escalate violence not only against enemies, but also against ‘friends’. They did this to goad their friends to resist their enemies. As a result, cascades of violence became convoluted and virulent. Organised crime then saw opportunities to enrol political parties to their projects, even to seek to take them over.

**Bhutan does not support.** There are many cleavages in Bhutan, but none of them has so substantially unsettled power imbalances as to cascade widespread armed violence.

**Afghanistan supports.** Jihadists put in play formidable dynamics of cascade–cleavage–alliance that cascaded violence and unsettled power balances, recurrently and in different combinations across the past four decades.

**Nepal supports.** The cleavages that opened up were between the king and the political parties and, ultimately, between the king and the Government of India. In the initial rise of the insurgency, the depth of local village-level cleavages between upper-caste landlords and the lower-caste landless was decisive. The Nepalese case therefore supports Autesserre’s (2010, 2014) and Kalyvas’s (2003) analyses on the importance of how local cleavages enrol national and international ones, and vice versa.

**Myanmar supports.** Our Myanmar narrative is of ethnic armies that have aligned at different times with and against each other and with and against master cleavages over colonial, junta, communist and anti-communist (Kuomintang) control of spaces. Myanmar’s master and secondary cleavages have experienced ever-changing realignments that have unsettled power balances and recurrently cascaded conflict.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

**India supports.** Disintegration of a single armed force obviously occurred at Partition and helped cascade violence. These circumstances continued after Partition in parts of India’s periphery, most persistently in Kashmir. With both rioting and insurgency, politicised breakdown of pacification
has a history of frequent repetition in the face of legitimate armed force temporarily walking away from its peacemaking obligations, yet being quickly repaired when armed state force reasserts domination of the space.

**Pakistan supports.** Pakistan has become the most extremely violent society in Karstedt’s (2014) data, particularly because of the dynamics of the way the Pakistani Taliban has disintegrated pacification and triggered extreme state violence.

**Bangladesh supports.** The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) gained a foothold in the Rajshahi Division for the same reason the Taliban won a foothold in rural Kandahar province in 1994. There was a rule-of-law vacuum—an absence of any effective governance in these spaces—that attracted the most brutal of forces. India’s earlier support to insurgents in the CHT and before that to the militarised Awami League created more fundamental fragmentations of the state monopoly of armed force that cascaded more deadly violence than jihadist groups such as the JMB have ever cascaded in Bangladesh.

**Sri Lanka supports.** The state monopoly of armed force began to fragment from the 1970s, creating an extremely violent society that has become less violent in recent years under a re-established state monopoly of armed force.

**Bhutan supports.** No disintegration of a state monopoly of legitimate armed force has occurred in Bhutan and no major armed violence has occurred, as would be expected in these circumstances according to the proposition.

**Afghanistan supports.** The disintegration of the communist monopoly of armed force by the mujahidin almost four decades ago ended the last semblance of a monopoly of armed force in Afghanistan. Consequently, violence was incessant across these four decades. Post-2001, Afghanistan certainly experienced little semblance of a state monopoly of armed force. Northern Alliance armed capability was factionalised, at cross-purposes, under the control of disparate warlords and never really under the control of president Karzai. President Bush and president Karzai were fighting different enemies.

**Nepal supports.** A militarised police controlled by the executive government and an army controlled by the king did not make a great formula for pacifying Nepal. Fragmentation of the state monopoly of force became
profound and was compounded by political parties controlling violent youth wings that terrorised political opponents. This fragmentation of the monopoly of force continued to cascade violence after the peace of 2006.

**Myanmar supports.** Wa State illustrates the limits of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify Myanmar. The United Wa State Army is a criminalised drug and weapons trading organisation backed by China, and is untouchable by the Myanmar military. Wa State is a de facto Chinese colony that is unregulated by Myanmar state power. Between Wa State and a pacified core of the country lie many semi-pacified regions where the state monopoly of force is fragile and violently contested by organised crime and ethnic militias.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

**India supports.** Partition fuelled security dilemmas over where India ended and Pakistan began. Many communities felt they must drive out the religious other to create the fact on the ground that their religious group dominated their district. They believed that, if they did not, the religious other would soon drive them out.

**Pakistan does not support.** The Pakistani side of the Kashmir Line of Control has not been awash with violence to the degree of Indian Kashmir as a result of the ongoing cascade of violence prompted by the security dilemmas of Partition. Baloch insurgents and Bangladesh Liberation War fighters alike took up arms to push back domination, not because they were in a security dilemma. Pakistan is more afflicted by violence than India as a result of a more widespread militarisation of violence, the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and its morphing into armed criminality and the rise of insurgency in Balochistan. These conflicts do not readily lend themselves to explanation in terms of security dilemmas, however.

**Bangladesh does not support.** State violence against the Awami League in 1971 and against CHT indigenous peoples later in the century hardly occurred because the state was in a security dilemma. Rather, this happened as a militarised political choice. Insurgents fought back against these waves of violence because state forces attacked them.

**Sri Lanka supports.** Assassinations on both sides in the failed JVP uprising of 1971 motivated both to settle scores in 1987. The security forces argued that the government had erred in not wiping the JVP out in 1971. This
perception also encouraged the security forces in 1987 to believe that, ‘unless we wipe them out first, they will wipe out not only us but also our families this time’. This perceived security dilemma magnified and cascaded common criminal threats into an imperative for war. The JVP prematurely resorted to armed struggle against the government because of its analysis that, if they did not strike first, the state would wipe them out in the way that the Indonesian Government had wiped out its communist party in 1965.

_Bhutan does not support_. There has been no significant security dilemma dynamic that has left people feeling insecure.

_Afghanistan supports_. Afghan national and NATO security forces put the Taliban in a security dilemma by murdering or sending to Guantanamo Bay so many talib who tried to surrender in 2001–03. The Taliban continues to put surrendering talib in a security dilemma by letting them know that, if they do surrender, they will be killed. This means they have to fight locals who might kill them before they surrender.

_Nepal does not support_. This civil war was caused not by a security dilemma, but by domination that engendered Maoist resistance, though one might say that women fearing rape joined the war at a later stage because they were in a security dilemma that motivated them to fight before they were raped.

_Myanmar does not support_. Propositions 1–4 provide a better account of the root causes of conflict in Myanmar than the security dilemmas invoked in Proposition 5. At times, when there has been fear of ceasefires being broken with ethnic armies, subsidiary security dilemma dynamics have had moments of relevance.

**Proposition 5(a):** *Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.*

_India supports_. This revised proposition was written in response to the way democracy has been an instrument of domination in Kashmir, widening cleavages and creating niches for violent opposition as the alternative to the ballot box.
Pakistan supports. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s resumption of civilian government in the context of the militarised Pakistani state brought to power a man who was a greater extremist on militarisation of the state than Pakistan’s military rulers, more enthused about firing up civil war in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and Balochistan and more committed than the military rulers to acquiring nuclear weapons. This was simultaneously a populist strategy for winning votes and one of trying to prevent a military coup. Anomic conditions have motivated major parties to forge alliances with criminal gangs who help them strongarm their way to electoral domination.

Bangladesh supports. At the end game of their careers, the most senior Bangladeshi generals only make it right to the top by backing the incumbent dynasty or the dynasty they believe will win the next election. Once they take sides in dynastic politics to boost a surge to the top, they might last at the top only as long as that side keeps winning elections, unless they are clever in the way they change sides at the right moment to assist the successor dynasty back to power. This interplay between democracy and militarisation helps build a democracy that is a driver of domination. The militarised two-party system is also reinforced by money politics. Our interviews with business leaders and lobby groups indicate that they best serve the interests of their business by not supporting third parties and by making large payments when asked by both dynastic parties. This symbiosis between military politics and money politics engenders a two-class system or a ‘two-networks’ system. The depth of the Bangladeshi class structure is bifurcated into a military class who do military politics and a business-political class who do money politics. Together, they help democracy deliver domination.

Sri Lanka supports. Majoritarian violent populism had electoral appeal in Sri Lanka and was an obstacle to peace and a driver of a politics of domination during the decades of conflict until 2015.

Bhutan does not support. Democratic institutions have not been drivers of violence on any large scale.

Afghanistan supports. There might perhaps be some support for this before the communists came to power, but, once they did, and under the Taliban, there was no democracy that could be a driver of conflict. Since 2001, we have seen there is plentiful evidence of electoral competition opening cleavages, of political leaders enrolling and supporting non-state armed
groups or bits of the armed state, of political adversaries in democratic contests being falsely outed to one armed group or another to get them killed, eliminating them as a source of electoral competition.

_Nepal supports_. Political parties controlling militarised youth wings in Nepal terrorise political opponents, especially at the time of elections, and mobilise violence against village leaders who refuse to organise their village to vote for their party sponsors. This has cascaded violence and domination.

_Myanmar too early to call_. The NLD’s electoral victory in late 2015 and assumption of power in 2016 have given Myanmar only months rather than years of democratic experience in more than half a century. Given that the elected NLD Government has such limited control over the army, one might have hoped that Myanmar would prove a case where democracy would not be a driver of domination. Management of the Rohingya crisis gives pause to that hope. Militarised violence against Rohingyas has been politically popular in Myanmar and the international community has been shocked that Aung San Suu Kyi has not spoken out against it. Time will tell whether we will look back on it as violence that was worsened by democratic populism that trumps rights. At this stage, the state of the evidence makes that likely.

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

_India supports_. At Partition, Muslim refugees cascading from India to Pakistan, and Hindus from Pakistan to India, travelled long distances to areas where they became the ethnic other. Refugee camps created hardships as well as food and land shortages for locals in many districts where refugees settled. This resulted in cascades of ethnic violence, sometimes years or decades later, between refugee communities and the local ethnic group. One devastating example was Biharis who migrated to East Pakistan in 1947, where they suffered marginalisation.

_Pakistan supports_. The Baloch army was decimated by herding large numbers of displaced persons—mostly women and children—on to the plains and attacking them, thereby drawing the Baloch fighters down
from the hills to defend their families. Afghanistan’s wars caused floods of more than 6 million refugees into Pakistan. This dramatically upset traditional balances and historically harmonious relationships with Hazaras in Balochistan, for example. The major reason for death in armed conflict and terror incidents being concentrated in border areas is millions of Afghan refugees destabilising these areas, with the madrassas near the border accounting for most recruits for the Afghan jihad.

Bangladesh supports. Many of those targeted for belonging to a group perceived to have supported Pakistan in the 1971 war fled to West Pakistan, where they became unwelcome refugees, cascading further internal conflict there. Thousands of non-Bengalis, mainly Biharis, killed and were killed and more than a million who had fled their homes ended up huddled in refugee slum settlements inside Bangladesh. In 1997, India stopped food supplies to hungry CHT refugees in India and inflicted violence on them to pressure them to return to Bangladesh and join a CHT peace deal.

Sri Lanka supports. In 2009, the Tamil Tigers sent a female suicide bomber to mingle with a group of escaping refugees; this operation killed 20 soldiers and eight refugees and justified counter-violence against the refugees. The example is just one illustration of support for Proposition 6 from the murderous end game of the civil war. It is a proposition with recurrent explanatory power in this case.

Bhutan supports. Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal became nodes of Maoist armed resistance, distribution of weapons and crime.

Afghanistan supports. Refugee camps for Afghans in Pakistan may have, across time, accommodated as many as 6.2 million people (Maley 2016: Ch. 3). We have seen that young people in these camps were systematically targeted for recruitment by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and often vilified and punished by their enemies.

Nepal does not support or only weakly supports. Refugee camps were not critical sites of Maoist recruitment or targeting in this conflict. Refugee and IDP numbers were low compared with most major civil wars. There were periods when whole communities moved away from their villages to fight from the hills, but this was mostly transitional, as Maoists retook most such villages.
Myanmar supports. The Rohingya crisis is an example of grave contemporary risk from refugee exclusion—indeed, a case where many not unreasonably regard it as a genocide against refugees by a targeted group. Rohingya refugee targeting could fuel an ever-widening cascade of violence unless a politics of reconciliation, inclusion and practical help with food, health and safety is embraced.

Proposition 7: Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

India supports. Cascades of violence created an anomic culture in Kashmir that denies legitimacy to the security sector. The Indian state intentionally constructs anomie in Kashmir—for example, by funding many newspapers to sow confusion over who is in charge, what the rules of the game are and what are the facts. They do this systematically on Facebook as well. The general atmosphere of anomic violence provided cover for revenge killings or for the settling of longstanding property disputes by driving individuals off their land.

Pakistan supports. Anomie is an intentionally created normlessness that is a cornerstone of Pakistani militants’ strategy. ‘Eliminating the socially and politically influential to create a social vacuum’ is an example, as is ‘coopting criminal gangs of the area’ to create chaos that the Taliban can fix with Sharia law and also so the criminals can ‘give them an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of law enforcement agencies in a particular community’ that they set out to destroy (Hussain 2013: 17). Political parties reinforce anomie by forging alliances with insurgent groups, with the mullah–military complex and with organised crime groups who mobilise force to help them win elections.

Bangladesh supports. In the CHT, we found a state military that allowed enough pacification to justify its presence and enough anarchy to allow itself to profit from organised crime. Military leaders profited from semi-unsettled conditions of anomie. In more anarchic spaces such as the CHT, armed men can get away with revenge. Anomie creates spaces where resentments that have nothing to do with the war—about a property dispute, a sexual relationship or a gesture of disrespect—can trigger a revenge attack.
Sri Lanka supports. The JVP was called the ‘night government’. People did not know what the rules of the game were during all three of Sri Lanka's major armed conflicts, and people struggled to decide who to support and who to be seen to follow in regions of shifting control.

Bhutan supports. There was no disintegration of a monopoly of armed force and no significant cascade of anomie, as would be expected under this proposition in these circumstances.

Afghanistan supports. We have seen that anomie was the very condition in Kandahar province that brought the Taliban to local power from 1994 in circumstances where security had disintegrated. We have also clearly seen that in Afghanistan no one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. We have seen that anomie has cascaded further violence.

Nepal supports. Nepal was a classic case of Durkheimian anomie. Not knowing what the rules of the game were and not knowing who was in charge afflicted everyone, particularly in areas in transition from government control to control by the United People's Revolutionary Committees. Anomie also afflicted the security sector and this cascaded violence.

Myanmar does not support. It has always been clear who is in charge of the core of the Myanmar state and what are the rules of the game. The master cleavages opened up by the Communist Party of Burma and the NLD were rebellions to overturn that clearly articulated order. Rebels proposed clearly articulated alternative orders. There are some anomic regions of the periphery of the country, but, again, most of the conflict there is motivated by a clearly articulated alternative vision of a federalist Myanmar. Peripheral pockets of anomie may therefore be better seen as results of the contestation of those alternative visions rather than as causes of it.

Proposition 8(a): Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation, domination and humiliation. Militarisation, domination and humiliation recursively risk further cascades of violence.

India supports. Kashmir's initial violence cascaded militarisation, domination and humiliation. In contrast, the initial violence was moderated in Tamil Nadu and pacified through inclusive powersharing and negotiated concessions, which became a positive model for pacification
of cascades in north-eastern India. That conceded, the Kashmir cascade was massive. One interstate war cascaded to four more interstate wars, to nuclearisation of confrontation and to an internationally cascading Kashmiri insurgency. The rapid militarisation of Pakistan cascaded to a greatly increased militarisation of India, especially in Kashmir. When global jihad spiked, communal violence in India—the starting point of our cascade—also spiked. Obversely, India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons cascaded to Pakistan doing likewise and, in turn, cascaded nuclear secrets between Pakistan, North Korea, Libya and Iran, and cascaded a new domination of the world by fear of nuclear terrorism.

Pakistan supports. Starting with the Kashmir conflict after Partition, much of the militarisation in South Asia was ‘intelisation’, with Pakistan's ISI the most aggressive agency in intentionally seeking to divide other societies in the region by supporting violent projects of internal dissent. Other regional intelligence services, particularly India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), responded in kind, promoting violent insurgency inside Pakistan. The humiliation of Pakistan’s military defeat in Bangladesh motivated a restoration of Pakistan’s martial dignity by all-out war in Balochistan during the 1970s.

Bangladesh supports. Because military politics and money politics cascaded across time and across space (from Pakistan) in the history of Bangladesh, violence cascaded down to a civil war in the CHT, and from the instability there across to insurgencies back in India, where all these cascades began, and into Myanmar. Smaller indigenous groups who have been deprived of literacy often feel they are treated contemptuously, as primitives, by the Chakma. The Mru resistance to the Chakma through the Mru Bahini militia illustrates one upshot of this humiliating domination.

Sri Lanka supports. Sri Lanka cascaded enormous violence, militarisation, domination and humiliation. The residues of these cascades remain strong in Sri Lanka today.

Bhutan supports. There have been only limited cascades of militarisation in Bhutan and no cascades of it to war and crime. Hence the condition of low cascading of militarisation and absence of cascades to war and crime supports the proposition.

Afghanistan supports. We have seen that militarisation, domination and humiliation have cascaded recursively with further cascades of violence without end since the 1970s.
Nepal supports. War militarised a police that cascaded torture, rape, disappearances and other forms of domination to brutalise the oppressed people of rural Nepal, driving forward recruitment into the People’s Liberation Army. This cascade also militarised the youth wings of political parties. After the 2006 peace agreement, armed groups morphed into 119 armed criminal gangs involved in kidnapping, extortion and robberies in the Tarai. Rape was a key instrument of militarised humiliation.

Myanmar supports. It is clear that violence, militarisation and domination have been mutually reinforcing in the history of Myanmar since World War II and indeed for much longer. This, in turn, has cascaded humiliation, as we see vividly today with the plight of Rohingyas.

Proposition 9: Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascade from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

India supports. Kashmir reveals a diversity of less visible war–crime cascades down to the creation of organised criminal gangs, assassination of alleged informers, a personal revenge culture, a gun culture, a rape culture, a culture of torture and an anomic culture in which domestic violence, crime and suicide have escalated. Insurgency cascades to state crime (such as disappearing people, fake encounters), which in turn cascades insurgency, which cascades political assassinations, which cascades more state crime and more insurgency.

Pakistan supports. Many examples of attempted and actual assassinations of top political figures escalated long-term patterns of violence and cascades of militarisation across Pakistan and beyond. Insurgency also cascaded to crime with insurgents or hardmen pretending to be former insurgents cashing in on anomie to establish organised crime groups. Narcotics trafficking funds Taliban and Al-Qaeda purchases of weapons from the same black market pool that is used by common criminals.

Bangladesh supports. A terrible feature of the 1971 war was the militarisation of rape. There were more than 25,000 officially recorded cases of forced impregnation (D’Costa 2011). In the CHT, as the number of army posts and Bengali settlements increased, rape of women and children increased. As political parties in the CHT became more criminalised, police and military informants allege that each party used firefights with the other as an excuse to eliminate their own in ‘crossfire’. Likewise, critics of the
military allege that the military finds the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) – United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) conflict a useful pretext for military murder of troublesome members of both groups. The military then blames the killing on the other group. The military extorts healthy rents from illegal logging, tobacco, tourism and other businesses that operate in the CHT. The wives of military officers have often ended up beneficiaries of land in the CHT stolen from those driven off it or illegally purchased national forest reserves. In these ways, war and crime have mutually cascaded.

*Sri Lanka supports.* The LTTE was involved in transnational crime, took relief goods from local and international donors and then sold them to the black market and forcibly took lands from minority communities—as did the state military. Our Sri Lanka chapter is the one in which we most systematically work through the multiple ways in which crime cascades to war and war to crime.

*Bhutan does not support.* Crime-to-war or war-to-crime cascades have not occurred in the modern history of Bhutan.

*Afghanistan supports.* The crimes of gangs in Kandahar cascaded to a new surge of civil war that brought the Taliban to power. Al-Qaeda’s crimes of 11 September 2001 cascaded to the NATO war against the Taliban. That war cascaded to criminalisation of the Afghan state and perhaps contributed to the criminalisation of some other regional states such as Iran. Box 9.1 illustrated crime–war–crime cascades at the local level with shocking power through the story of the 2011 killing of an Uzbek *mullah* and two women in a NATO night raid. Stories of this kind are many in Afghanistan.

*Nepal supports.* For the security sector, the war strategy defined rape of Maoists as patriotic rather than shameful. This rape accelerated and feminised the conflict. War allowed drug trafficking and many other crimes to cascade out of control.

*Myanmar supports.* War-to-crime cascades are especially strong in Myanmar, with spikes in the drug trade and other organised criminality historically associated with spikes in armed conflict. Beyond attacks on state security forces by armed groups often sparking spirals of revenge killings, there is, however, more limited evidence of individual crimes sparking war.
Proposition 10: When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

India supports. India’s support for the CHT insurgency, followed by withdrawal of support many years later, illustrates Proposition 10’s cut-and-run tactics. Colonial withdrawal and Partition after World War II were also a devastatingly mismanaged form of cut and run by an external power that felt it no longer had the security sector resources to manage a secure sequencing of disengagement.

Pakistan supports. The North-West Frontier tribal areas have been to Pakistan what Vietnam was to the US military and Afghanistan to the Soviet military. On many occasions in history, right up to 2015, the Pakistani military has attempted military surges to dominate the North-West Frontier. On none of these occasions has it succeeded in establishing a state monopoly of armed force. Every time, ‘the costs of shutting down the violence came to exceed the benefits of winning’, so the economics of war dictated an accommodation with tribal militias that left the tribal frontier lands a launching pad for future cascades of violence. Even the Pakistan military attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which were motivated by repeated attempts to assassinate president Musharraf, attempts launched by Taliban and Al-Qaeda-affiliated armed groups based there in the early years after 2001, were so unsuccessful that Musharraf himself ‘concluded that he had no option but to negotiate with his would-be killers’ (Gartenstein-Ross 2010: 29). These military surges tended to be taps turned on when new fires started, but turned off when the fire got hot.

Bangladesh supports only weakly. Bangladesh supports this proposition in only a limited way. One motivation for withdrawing financial support for the CHT insurgency and for starving and inflicting violence against indigenous CHT refugees to force them back to Bangladesh may have been to cut costs and reduce local frictions associated with the refugee population housed in India. It was also about reducing international friction with Bangladesh. The main reason in 1997, however, was that the new Awami League Government was seen as more friendly to India than
its predecessor. It became the right time to cut support for refugee camps for insurgents because India came to have less interest in destabilising Bangladesh.

**Sri Lanka supports.** The behaviour of Indian peacekeepers after they lost 1,200 troops and quit Sri Lanka fits Proposition 10. At a local level, before 2009, there is also some fit with a cut-and-run interpretation within the Sri Lankan military when desertions were cascading under withering LTTE attacks on particular fronts.

**Bhutan does not support.** The dynamic of war followed by festering violence driven by cutting and running from the war never happened in Bhutan's recent history. This also means the history of Nepal neither refutes this proposition nor supports it.

**Afghanistan supports.** From 2014, if not before, the United States, following the lead of many of its allies, concluded that it should cut and run because the costs of continuing to fight no longer seemed to justify the benefits.

**Nepal does not support.** There was no cut and run by an interventionist imperial army that found the war too expensive. The only cut and run was by the international diplomatic community in its support for the king. The denouement of this conflict was about conflict transformation led from Nepalese civil society.

**Myanmar does not support.** China has always interfered formidably in Myanmar, though not by invasion in recent centuries. This has been more a case of governance of Myanmar at a distance. Nor did the British Empire really cut and run; it was pushed out militarily by the Japanese. No power vacuum was left for them to return to after Japan was defeated and General Aung San stood ready to take over.