CASCADES OF VIOLENCE
WAR, CRIME AND PEACEBUILDING ACROSS SOUTH ASIA
CASCADES OF VIOLENCE
WAR, CRIME AND PEACEBUILDING ACROSS SOUTH ASIA

JOHN BRAITHWAITE
AND BINA D’COSTA
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<td><em>Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958</em> (India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMP</td>
<td>Awareness, Motivation and Pathways</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANU</td>
<td>The Australian National University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>BBC</td>
<td>British Broadcasting Corporation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BJP</td>
<td>The Bharatiya Janata Party (India)</td>
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<tr>
<td>BNP</td>
<td>The Bangladesh Nationalist Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRA</td>
<td>Bougainville Revolutionary Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CEO</td>
<td>chief executive officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHT</td>
<td>Chittagong Hill Tracts (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CID</td>
<td>Criminal Investigation Department (Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMDP</td>
<td>Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (Nepal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COIN</td>
<td>counterinsurgency conceived as comprehensive civilian and military efforts to contain insurgency and address its root causes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPI-M</td>
<td>Communist Party of India (Marxist)</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPN-M</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CPN-UML</td>
<td>Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DGFI</td>
<td>Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DRC</td>
<td>Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
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<tr>
<td>ECOWAS</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States</td>
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<tr>
<td>EPDP</td>
<td>Eelam People’s Democratic Party (Sri Lanka)</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>EVAW Law</td>
<td>Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (Afghanistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FATA</td>
<td>Federally Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)</td>
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<tr>
<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>gross domestic product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HDC</td>
<td>Hill District Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>HSZ</td>
<td>high-security zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICC</td>
<td>International Criminal Court</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>internally displaced person</td>
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<tr>
<td>IED</td>
<td>improvised explosive device</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMU</td>
<td>Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Organization for Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IPKF</td>
<td>Indian Peacekeeping Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>IR</td>
<td>international relations</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRA</td>
<td>Irish Republican Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter-Services Intelligence (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir</td>
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<tr>
<td>JI</td>
<td>Jamaat-e-Islami</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKLF</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front</td>
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<tr>
<td>JKNLF</td>
<td>Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMB</td>
<td>Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JMJB</td>
<td>Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRB</td>
<td>Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force of Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSD</td>
<td>Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (or Jasod) (National Socialist Party Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSS</td>
<td>Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (United People's Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts) (also known as PCJSS)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUH</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (Organisation of Indian Islamic Scholars)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI-F</td>
<td>breakaway faction of Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUI-S</td>
<td>Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JVP</td>
<td>Marxist Janathā Vimukthi Peramuna (People’s Liberation Front Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KDP</td>
<td>Kurdistan Democratic Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLA</td>
<td>Kosovo Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPK</td>
<td>Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPSS</td>
<td>Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LGBTIQ</td>
<td>lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTTE</td>
<td>Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Tamil Tigers Sri Lanka)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILF</td>
<td>Moro Islamic Liberation Front (Philippines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MMA</td>
<td>Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MONUSCO</td>
<td>United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUF</td>
<td>Muslim United Front (Jammu and Kashmir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NASA</td>
<td>National Aeronautics and Space Administration (United States)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NLD</td>
<td>National League for Democracy (Myanmar)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCHA</td>
<td>United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PATA</td>
<td>Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PBSP</td>
<td>Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (Proletarian Party of East Bengal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCJSS</td>
<td>Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts) (also known as JSS)</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCP</td>
<td>Pahari Chhatra Parishad (Hill Students’ Forum Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDP</td>
<td>Peoples Democratic Party (Jammu and Kashmir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PGP</td>
<td>Pahari Gono Parishad (Hill People’s Council Bangladesh)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td>Kurdistan Workers’ Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PML-N</td>
<td>Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POW</td>
<td>prisoner of war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PPP</td>
<td>Pakistan Peoples Party</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSA</td>
<td>Public Safety Act 1978 (Jammu and Kashmir)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTI</td>
<td>Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PTSD</td>
<td>post-traumatic stress disorder</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PYD</td>
<td>Democratic Union Party (Syria)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAW</td>
<td>Research and Analysis Wing (Indian intelligence)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPA</td>
<td>Rwanda Patriotic Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPF</td>
<td>Rwandan Patriotic Front</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RSS</td>
<td>Raštriya Swayamsevak Sangh (National Volunteer Organisation, India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAARC</td>
<td>South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDF</td>
<td>Syrian Democratic Forces (Kurdish)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIK</td>
<td>Shërbimi Informativ Kombëtar (Kosovo National Intelligence Service)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGI</td>
<td>Social Institutions and Gender Index</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPLA</td>
<td>Sudan People’s Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TMVP</td>
<td>Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNSM</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TTP</td>
<td>Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistani Taliban)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UAE</td>
<td>United Arab Emirates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UBA</td>
<td>United Baloch Army (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNITA</td>
<td>National Union for the Total Independence of Angola</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
UNMIK  United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force (Macedonia)
UP  Uttar Pradesh (India)
UPDF United People’s Democratic Front (Bangladesh)
US  United States
VHP  Vishwa Hindu Parishad (World Hindu Council, India)
WHO  World Health Organization
WMD  weapons of mass destruction
YPG  People’s Protection Units (Kurdish)
Foreign terms

adivasis  indigenous peoples
azadi    freedom from domination or slavery
badal    revenge, to seek or take revenge against wrongdoers in Pashtunwali/Pakhtunwali
beggar   forced rural labour
fatwa    ruling on Islamic law
gulami   slavery
hartal   strikes and shop closings
Hujra     traditional Pashtun sociocultural club
ikhwanis renegades, pro-government militias in Jammu and Kashmir
intifada Palestinian revolt against Israeli domination and occupation
jihad    struggle
jirga     Pashtun decision-making assembly of leaders
jizya     tax on non-Muslims
kashars  the young, the poor, minority lineages or powerless tribes
lashkars civilian militias armed by the military
loya jirga grand jirga
madrassa Islamic religious school
malik     traditional elder or chief of a village/community in Pakistan, also could mean owner/ruler in India, Bangladesh, Nepal
mashar   tribal elder in Pakistan
mullah   Islamic cleric
CAScadE of ViolEneCE

*Muslahathi* reconciliation committee in Arabic and refers to hybrid
committee *jirga* and restorative justice committees held inside
Pakistan police stations

*Panchayats* village councils (India and Nepal)

*Pashtunwali* traditional Pashtun unwritten ethical code

*sardars* Baloch feudal leaders

talib Muslim student, also used for individual member
of Taliban

*ulama* Muslim scholar

*ulema* body of Muslim scholars

*zamindar* landlord
Preface

This book has been a winding journey towards 10 propositions about how violence cascades and why it matters to understand this. Initially, John Braithwaite’s collaboration with Bina D’Costa was to complete the coding of a Peacebuilding Compared case study for the Chittagong Hill Tracts. John learnt that Bina was deeply knowledgeable about Bangladesh, having been born and educated there before she moved to study in the United States. Hers was a Partition family, while members of the family remained in India, her parents made Bangladesh home, and her relatives lived in Pakistan. She speaks and understands several of the South Asian languages, including Bengali, Hindi and Urdu. She had done extensive prior research in Sri Lanka, worked in Nepal and then became a researcher of the entire South Asian region’s politics.

As we worked together, the appeal of a study of cascades of violence across South Asia became increasingly compelling. We enjoyed our fieldwork bond and each acquired a respect for the complementary disciplinary skills of the other—Bina as a regional politics and international relations scholar of South Asia and John as a comparative criminologist of violence and a scholar of interdisciplinary peacebuilding. Each also acquired a fondness and admiration for the family of the other in supporting us in our research together. Our love and appreciation go to those beautiful, long-suffering families.

We wish to express our appreciation to the Australian Research Council for funding this research program over 13 years across two Federation Fellowships and several Discovery grants. The United Nations also assisted at times with transport, security and accommodation in return for presentations to their staff. We have been nurtured by the persistent support of The Australian National University (ANU), particularly the College of Asia and the Pacific and the School of Regulation and Global Governance (RegNet), and the wise counsel of so many ANU specialists.
in countries and disciplines in which we are not experts. We particularly appreciate the insightful assistance we received during our South Asian fieldwork from Camille McMahon, Kate Macfarlane, Deb Cleland, Naing Ko Ko, Seung-Hun Hong, Kamalesh Adhikari, Ali Wardak, Ali Gohar, Naveed Malik Khan, Sultan Azam Temuri, Suvaid Yaseen, Rahmanullah, Mushtaq Billal, Mong Marma, Prasenjit Kabil Chakma, Malathi de Alwis, Ruki Fernando, Kaushalya Kumarasinghe, Govinda Sharma ‘Bandi’, Kashiram Dangi, Bhadra Sharma, Brigadier General Abul Basher Imamuzzaman, Fassihudin, Marzio Da Re, Christopher Woods, Hassan Rezaei and Sari Braithwaite. Beyond South Asia, we are especially appreciative of assistance relevant to this book provided by Tamim Rashed, Daban Najmadeed, Aleksandar Marsavelski, Furtuna Sheremeti and Symphorien Pyana. Special thanks to the thoughtful and helpful critiques of Michael Cookson, Miranda Forsyth, Alan Hajek, Lia Kent, Andrew Schuller, ANU Press referees and also the wonderful Frank Bongiorno and the Social Sciences Board of ANU Press and our splendid copyeditor, Jan Borrie, and editor, Emily Hazlewood. Most of all, thank you to some 4,000 anonymous interview informants who gave amazingly generously of their time across the past 13 years and often shared delightful hospitality as well, and to others on the record who are acknowledged by name throughout the text.

John Braithwaite
Bina D’Costa
Part I: Cascades on a broad canvas
Introduction: Cascades of war and crime

This book is about the phenomenon of violence. The explanatory framework uses the cascade concept. Drawing on a broad range of conceptualisations of violence, we demonstrate why the cascade idea matters in making sense of contemporary conflicts worldwide. A distinctiveness of the contribution is an integration of international relations (IR) perspectives with insights from political theory and criminological theory. We do not mean the book is an ‘application’ of criminological theory to the field normally occupied by IR. Rather, we merge the study of war with the study of crime during and after armed conflict in pursuit of an understanding of crime–war. The cascade idea organises our integration of concepts from criminological and political theory. One reason for this project is the way the literature on war has moved in recent decades to emphasise the criminalisation of the state and the criminalisation of whole economies through crony capitalism, ‘deep states’ (Filiu 2015) where intelligence and security operatives hold the key or ‘shadow states’ (Reno 1995) where business tycoons who buy the state can be more crucial.

As in the cascading of water, violence (and nonviolence) can cascade down from commanding heights of power (as in waterfalls), up from powerless peripheries and undulate to spread horizontally (flowing from one space to another). Writing about cascades in the social sciences reveals that a phenomenon such as violence can cascade through the agency of human actors and through physical flows—for example, cascades of mass killings, suicide bombs and cascades of bodies of refugees (Gladwell 2000;
CASCades OF VIOLENce

Rosenau 1990; Sikkink 2011; Sunstein 1997). Cascades of objects such as improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or killer robots can provide hospitable contexts for cascades of violent action. Yet, there is critical cognitive content in how action cascades. Imaginaries of violence and nonviolence cascade.

One generalisation affirmed in this book is that empires can pacify large spaces for long periods—as the Ottoman Empire did across North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans—but, when empires break up, violence cascades (Ferguson 2006). Similar dynamics can be seen with big stable states that begin to fracture, such as Indonesia during the Asian Financial Crisis, cascading many ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007). Some of the conflicts in Part II of this book reveal the ‘unsettling of power imbalances’ that create new security dilemmas for postcolonial state projects. We analyse cases such as longstanding violence in Afghanistan as being only partly about the breakup of the Soviet empire; very local cleavages, power imbalances and anomie in Kandahar province also constituted the geopolitical importance of the Taliban. The book tells the story of the cascading of violence as recursively related to how other phenomena cascade. Cascades of violence are conceived as recursively related to cascades of militarisation, cascades of domination and cascades of refugees, among other cascades.

The final chapters begin to explore the implications of a cascade analysis for violence prevention. The data reveal cascades of violence to be driven by complex interactions between macro-cleavages (including global ones) and very local cleavages (Kalyvas 2003, 2006). We revise 10 starting propositions in a way that suggests that preventive diplomacy—both great power and United Nations (UN) diplomacy—and local smothering of sparks often work, especially when combined as interscalar prevention (Böhmelt 2010). Our conclusion is, however, that diplomacy is required that is sensitive to averting the humiliation and preserving the dignity of local actors, from chiefs to child soldiers, who have prized open the local cleavages. It must do this while also preserving the dignity of national leaders. We pinpoint how places in South Asia have accomplished this.

Promises of dignity and carrots for joining a peace are not enough, however. Security sector reform must also deliver legitimacy and credibility to an armed force that can subdue armed factions that toy with trashing a peace (Toft 2010). Where state militaries cannot supply that legitimacy and credibility, credible guarantees from international
diplomacy and UN-sanctioned peacekeeping must do so (Walter 2002). We conclude that there is strong empirical evidence that greatly increased investment in UN peacekeeping might significantly dampen cascades of violence. Lessons are drawn from places where peacemaking and peacekeeping performance has been disappointing in the past, from Kashmir to Srebrenica to Rwanda. Cascades of domination through militarisation that drive cascades of violence can only be tamed by long-term engagement with an ugly mechanics of security sector reform. While we show in Chapter 11 that cascading a politics of nonviolence can also do much to tame militarisation, Gandhian politics that remains aloof from security sector reform is not enough.

Achieving the Sustainable Development Goals agreed by the UN General Assembly that came into effect in January 2016—including to reach specific targets, to end poverty and protect the planet by 2030—will not be enough to conquer the domination that drives cascades of violence. Chapter 11 uses our data to make new sense of the confusing state of the evidence on the relationships between poverty, inequality and different kinds of violence. Yes, we argue, continuous struggle to halve global poverty and inequality again and then again is important for a less violent world. Even though low gross domestic product (GDP) predicts war but not crime, and national inequality predicts crime but not war, Chapter 11 argues why tackling poverty and inequality in a complex way at multiple levels can reduce both crime and war. Part of the integrated social justice strategy required involves making power accountable at many levels, especially the power of the security sector, and tackling domination and humiliation at the local level, the national level and the level of global imaginaries and global institutions. Most importantly, these strands of a web of peace must be joined up to form a fabric of prevention.

Indonesia is a good example of a society that has performed reasonably well at the structural level in reducing poverty, in democratising and in countering terrorism and violence. Only a small handful of developing economies have less inequality than Indonesia as measured by the Gini coefficient. Yet, the Peacebuilding Compared data (Braithwaite et al. 2010a) show that when a local ethnic or religious minority—in North Maluku, for example (Chapter 3)—feels dominated by being excluded from a fair hearing over a land dispute with political institutions and legal institutions controlled by another group, small town wars (van Klinken 2007) can result; and small town wars can cascade from local domination to national militarised violence. Likewise in Indonesia and Timor-Leste,
abuse of power by tiny cabals of cronies with military connections is a form of domination at the very top that has recurrently ignited violence, notwithstanding Indonesia’s creditable macro-equality (Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2012). These earlier Peacebuilding Compared data from Indonesia and Timor-Leste show why we specify domination reduction, rather than inequality reduction, as a more insightful way of seeing what is required to tame violence. We conclude that brute structural remedies to inequality can only address some of the interactions among local, national and international imaginaries of domination and injustice.

In sum, our policy conclusions are about the importance of redundancy in local and global prevention of cascades of all forms of criminal and militarised violence, disruption of those cascades once they start and restoration of ‘Awareness, Motivation and Pathways’ (AMP) (Honig et al. 2015) to nonviolent dissent. And we must likewise prevent cascades of domination and militarisation, strengthen alternative paths to them and strengthen checks and balances that humble their power. We can be multidimensional, plural and experimental in weaving this kind of fabric for the social control of violence.

While this book draws on insights from conversations that took place in South Asia over the past eight years, it is not only a South Asian story. Instead, our modest attempt is to explore how cascades of violence are about cascades of domination that have global implications. How do seemingly distant wars that cascade across Africa and Europe influence conflict dynamics in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan and vice versa? This book tells a story of how local identity politics is constructed and, in turn, constructs global identities and global grievances.

The key idea of this book—that violence can beget more violence—is not new. Indeed, it is ancient. We seek a richer understanding of the cascade idea, however, through a contemporary inductive method. This book develops and revises 10 propositions to explain patterns of violence that are evident beyond South Asia in contemporary warfare. Our ambition, therefore, is a bigger-picture story, a grand regional story and a globally relevant story of how cascades of violence spread and how they can be prevented. The next section lists the 10 cascade propositions that are the focus of the book.
10 propositions

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and internally displaced person (IDP) flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.
Proposition 9: Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

Proposition 10: When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

If readers wish, they can jump straight to the Appendix, at the end of this book, which counts and summarises support for each proposition for each country case in Part II. It also provides a short narrative of why the evidence for a particular country case does or does not support that proposition. It can be seen from the Appendix that the above 10 propositions were revised a little in the final round-up of the data, but not too greatly, with only one proposition (5) being dropped entirely and replaced with a new one on democracy as a driver of domination, 5(a). Proposition 5(a) loomed as a more important pattern by the end of the study in 2017 (compared with the interim list above, which was finalised, after much earlier adjustment, in 2014 after pondering the history of the global cascades discussed in Part I and our South Asian data up to that point). The Appendix shows that the pattern of empirical support for these propositions is strong, but the qualifications are many, making that support far from consistent. Of the possible 88 comparisons of eight country cases for 11 propositions (with the addition of the new Proposition 5(a)), 74 are counted as supporting the proposition, 13 as not supporting it and one is coded as a hole in the data because it is too early to call.

There are, however, far more than 88 data points in the South Asian part of the data from the Peacebuilding Compared project. In the case of Pakistan, for example, evidence concerning our propositions sometimes points in quite different ways for the civil war in Balochistan compared with the armed conflict between the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Taliban. Moreover, what is true of the conflict with the Taliban in the Swat Valley is often quite different from the story of the Taliban conflict at another time in another place closer to the border with Afghanistan.
For Pakistan’s conflict with India over Kashmir, there are many transitions from peace to violence and back to another period of peace during the 70 years of that conflict, including five interstate war–peace transitions, many failed UN peacekeeping initiatives, more than 150 rounds of failed peace talks between Pakistan and India and many sequences of moves on their nuclear chessboards. Even before that, conflict dynamics were different at the Partition of India and Pakistan in East Pakistan compared with those in West Pakistan; and, in West Pakistan, the Kashmir frontier story is different from the Punjab frontier conflict. So the case of Pakistan is not an $n$ of 1; it is a case with hundreds of degrees of freedom.

India is a case with many more degrees of freedom than Pakistan. It includes a greater number and diversity of armed conflicts. India also includes a much larger number of cases, such as the post-Partition conflict in Tamil Nadu that led to some violence, but never to war in India, even though it was critical to understanding Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka’s civil war with the Tamil Tigers. This is why we think it is a methodological error simply to read the summary in the Appendix and believe that one has grasped the dynamic empirical story of our cascades of violence and nonviolence across space and time, and across the fuzzy boundaries of South Asia. We conceive South Asia as an interconnected region that diplomats of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) are attempting to turn into a complex adaptive system, rather than simply an assemblage of discrete states. As discussed in the next section, states are important, but we can reify them too much. We must be careful not to turn names such as India, the Indian state, Indian society or Indian culture into things. Rather, such names are complex bundles of relationships and, only by ‘placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding’ (Wolf 2010: 3).

What is to be done?

Implications of the research in this book are for greater investment in local peacemaking and reconciliation, and in UN peacekeeping, to douse local ignition points of conflict before they spread. The book shows that resilient peace and nonviolence can cascade and grow by testing them against the very worst conflicts. Hence, we conclude that the same ignition points that sometimes cascade violence also can cascade nonviolence. We see
restorative justice and reconciliation politics as useful to flipping cascades of violence to cascades of nonviolence. Gradually expanding peace zones and safe corridors for the escape of refugees is also important.

Good welfare policies for refugees, in our analysis, become more than simply a humanitarian imperative. They are also a war and crime prevention imperative. For example, investment in high-quality education for millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan could have prevented their recruitment into madrassas funded by Al-Qaeda, where they were indoctrinated to become suicide bombers and Taliban.

Appreciating the complexity of how cascade risks unfold should cause major powers to transform their diplomacy in ways illustrated by the formation of the United Nations after 1945. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yugoslavia (as in World War I), major powers acted competitively to advance their interests or to stay out of peacemaking where they ‘had no national interest’. This book shows that the United States, the European Union, Russia and China all lost more than they gained in the above conflicts. Short-term realism actually defeated their longer-run interests. All could be better off today had they been less ‘realist’ and more cooperative in striving for consensus over how to respond preventatively to the early sparks in Sarajevo (in 1914 and 1989), in Kabul (especially in 1988 and 2001), in Baghdad (iteratively, starting in 1990), Libya (2011) and Damascus (2011).

Chapter 12 argues that most violence prevention strategies fail most of the time, but trying one strategy after another, from a repertoire of very different strategies, works. While we fail to generate a general theory of cascades (we identify only recurrent patterns), we do generate a meta-theory and a meta-strategy of responsive layering in Chapter 12. A policy mix of escalating plural interscalar supports for peace, and deterrents for war, works if the iterated strategy mix is mobilised quickly to prevent cascades before they get out of hand. Once full-blooded warfare has cascaded to an existential struggle, however, escalation of deterrence generally does not work for two reasons. First, it evokes ‘liberty or death’ imaginaries that mean military escalations increase defiance more than deterrence. Second, while military deterrence can ultimately exceed defiance if the investment in it is huge and if concerned publics are willing to wade through the blood required, the publics of major powers rarely stomach this, and rarely consent to fund it. So major powers repeatedly err in making too small a peacemaking investment early on; they then
intervene militarily or supply arms that frequently make things worse and then pull out to leave the mess to the rest. This book hopes to educate major powers to behave with greater long-run rationality and ethicality in future. Chapter 12 argues that states can be assisted with this complex challenge by the participation and creativity of more minds sounding early warnings and touting preventive diplomacy ideas through open source preventive diplomacy—a preventive diplomacy wiki.

The book argues that structurally more equal parts of the world enjoy less-criminalised states, militaries and local institutions and suffer less violence from both war and crime. Gender discrimination is a particularly important structural factor in explaining violence. Gendered domination generates violence, which generates more gendered domination. Also important are inequalities between destitute landless people and their often criminal landlords, between homeless Aboriginal Australians and European criminals who stole their land at the point of a gun, between poor people who pay tax and crony capitalists or Western bankers who do not, and contextually endless other modalities of inequality. These structural inequalities demand structural remedies, the most important of which are separations of powers to render governance that is criminalised by money politics or tyrannies of the majority more accountable to the disenfranchised. Hence, our conclusion is that domination is the more fertile concept for explaining violence than inequality, with militarised domination and criminalised domination of governance particularly critical modalities of domination. Yet struggles against domination and discrimination must be contextually attuned and responsive to what are subjectively salient inequalities. Twenty years ago, few in the West would have conceived humiliation and discrimination against Muslims as a major risk factor for violence that required an antidiscrimination politics of inclusion. The Allied powers were much quicker to learn from the geopolitical humiliation of Versailles that Germany needed the politics of inclusion (the Marshall Plan and the European Union).

Policies are needed to combat anomie (normlessness). Vacuums of social order attract the most terrible of tyrannies, as is shown in Part II to have happened with the Taliban in Kandahar and other parts of South Asia. Norms about the shamefulness of violence are particularly critical, particularly for sexual and gender-based violence. So are norms about who has the legitimate right to bear arms that protect us against violence in
moments of normlessness. Finally, consensus about separations of powers that protect people against domination, that call the powerful to account, is critical.

No society conquers anomie perfectly in these ways to minimise domination and violence. Yet examples are plentiful of societies that have done reasonably well at it and that experience low levels of violence from crime and war. Many heavily militarised societies that were infused with a politics of domination, corruption and extreme inequality in the twentieth century have become more egalitarian, less dominating, low-violence societies in recent decades, including Japan, Germany, Italy, Spain, South Korea and Taiwan. It is harder for highly militarised societies such as Russia, Pakistan or the United States, where violence and domination are less tempered (Krygier 2015; Braithwaite 2017a) and less shameful, to deliver low levels of violence to their citizens.

Finally, we argue that conditions of complexity require creativity from civil society in resisting domination and violence. Model mongering (Chapter 3) that is creative with complexity, and resilient in the nonviolence of its resistance, is a fundamental policy prescription of this book.

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1 This is true even in the face of the welfare states such as Spain and Italy suffering major blows during the austerity of the past decade.

2 Some would view Taiwan as a controversial entry on this list because it has by far the highest homicide rate of all these countries, perhaps because it has higher levels of gun ownership than all of them. Yet, in general, Taiwan has an extremely low crime rate and its homicide rate fell to two per 100,000 in 2013 from 8.5 in 1997, when it had a homicide rate similar to the United States (Guomindang 2015). Like South Korea and Japan, Taiwan (from the 1950s) benefited from one of the few highly redistributive land reforms of the twentieth century that made all these societies much more structurally equal and less corrupt than Asian comparators (You 2014).
Key concepts

South Asia

Map 1.1 Map of South Asia.
Source: Based on Map No. 4140 Rev. 4 December 2011, Department of Field Support Cartographic Section, United Nations.

Both South Asia and India, the focus of detailed empirical analysis in Part II, are geopolitical expressions. South Asia is a more recent construction that encompasses seven diverse yet interrelated sovereign
states of very different sizes: India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives (Alamgir and D’Costa 2011). The idea of India goes beyond the borders and boundaries of the sovereign state of India. Through the primordial (Geertz 1963, 1973) bonding of blood, language, tradition and norms, the South Asian states are tied by thousands of years of history and culture. This book argues that they also have important ties to Afghanistan and Myanmar through shared imperial dominations and shared identities such as Baloch, Pashtun and Naga that cross national boundaries and that have been the focus of major wars across South Asian boundaries. Afghanistan has often been investigated as part of Central rather than South Asia and Myanmar as part of South-East rather than South Asia. Nevertheless, a cascades theory requires us to be open to geographical fuzziness in our orienting concepts. Originally, Bhutan and the Maldives were excluded from our analysis because they did not share in major wars that cascaded across South Asian borders. By the time we completed our work, we realised this was a poor judgment, so Bhutan is included in the final analysis (Chapter 9). While August 1947 and March 1971 were unique moments of departure in history that saw the genesis of Pakistan and Bangladesh, the origin of their political and cultural complexes conflates with India’s past. Both Pakistan and Bangladesh were, after all, parts of India until 1947. While most scholarship on Partition focuses on the incision of India, the familiarity of these states as identity communities going beyond national borders has not been appropriately explained or addressed (D’Costa 2011). In this book, we trace these complex relationships across territorially defined borders.

**Violence**

Endorsing the Hobbesian principle that violence is a natural condition of society, Christian lay theologian Jacques Ellul (1969) believed that violence is pervasive in all cultures and across all times. This book opts for a broad conceptualisation of violence. Much has been written about organised violence, war and conflict (Shaw 1984; Wimmer and Min 2006). Sociologist Siniša Malešević (2010: 226) observes that there is a commonsense view—and an assumption in much of military history—that in war it is much easier to kill another person than to die for others. Violence includes our core concerns in this book—acts of crime and acts of war—yet extends even to suicide, which is violence against the self. Put simply, we employ a truncated form of the World Health Organization definition of violence:
The intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, [or] psychological harm. (WHO 2002: 80)³

The breadth of this definition leaves space for diverse ways of conceptualising violence. As the distinction between war and organised crime becomes increasingly blurred, it becomes important to have a framework sufficiently broad to come to terms with situations where a peace agreement is signed or armies cease doing battle with each other, but where the number of people who are killed and wounded increases, the number of refugees rises and the subjective sense of feeling threatened by violence grows.

Cascades

Cascades and hotspots

The cascade metaphor has a long history in geology (Kun et al. 2014) and physics. Water is not the only matter that cascades; a spark causes fire to cascade up a mountain, down a gully and across a plain. In particle physics, a shower is a cascade of secondary particles produced as the result of a high-energy particle interacting with dense matter. In medicine, infection happens through particles that activate other biological particles to spread through cascades called contagion. The cascade concept has been used productively in the social sciences—in Cass Sunstein’s (1997) norm cascades, Timur Kuran’s (1998) repetitional cascades and Kathryn Sikkink’s (2011) cascades of criminal enforcement for crimes against humanity. The most influential book of the genre has been Malcolm Gladwell’s (2000) about how social phenomena cascade past ‘the tipping point’. Gladwell argues that ideas and social phenomena spread ‘just like viruses do’ (2000: 7). At first, only a few actors cascade, but, if some of them have the qualities of what Gladwell calls connectors, mavens and salesmen, they can pull others with them until a tipping point is passed. Connectors, mavens and salesmen are not so different from the range of modelling actors we discuss under Proposition 2 in Chapter 3.

³ We do not broaden violence so far as to include the causation of ‘maldevelopment or deprivation’, as the WHO does. This is because ‘maldevelopment and deprivation’ have relevance to independent variables in our analyses.
The cascade metaphor has been employed in a range of ways. For example, in his discussion of ethnic violence, James Rosenau (1990) stressed that the image of turbulence developed by mathematicians and physicists could provide an important basis for understanding the idea of bifurcation and related ideas of complexity, chaos and turbulence in complex systems. He classified the bifurcated systems in contemporary world politics as the multicentric system and the state-centric system. Each of these affects the others in multiple ways, at multiple levels and in ways that make events enormously hard to predict (Rosenau 1990, 2006). At the end of the journey of this book, in Chapter 12, this leads us to the conclusion that cascades of violence are phenomena that benefit from diagnosis through the lens of complexity theory. Rosenau (1990: 299) replaced the idea of events with cascades to describe the event structures that ‘gather momentum, stall, reverse course, and resume anew as their repercussions spread among whole systems and subsystems’. Phenomena such as violence cascade through the agency and imaginaries of human actors and through physical flows—of armies, weapons and refugees. Such cascades of objects can enable cascades of violent action.

Sambanis (2001) found that a country that has neighbouring states at war is more likely to experience a civil war itself, as did Gleditsch (2002, 2007), Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) and Ward and Gleditsch (2002).4 Alex Braithwaite (2016) and Houweling and Siccamac (1985, 1988) show that interstate militarised conflicts cluster in both space and time to produce hotspots. Braithwaite and Li (2007) also show quantitatively that terrorist incidents cascade and cluster at and from geographical hotspots. Braithwaite and Johnson (2012) further found that, within one country (Iraq), IED attacks were clustered in space and time and these hotspots behaved in a manner similar to that observed in the spread of disease and

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4 See also Sambanis’s (2004: 270–1) qualitative analysis of cases supporting the conclusion of cross-border contagion. Hegre et al. (2001), however, fail to find an association between a country suffering a civil war and one with neighbours who have had a civil war. The empirical work at the conclusion of the Peacebuilding Compared data collection not only will allow a retesting of these different empirical results on new data from the twenty-first century, it also will allow limited quantitative analyses of cascading at the subnational level. For example, one of the Sambanis’s (2004: 270) case studies is of Aceh’s insurgents being influenced by the rise of an insurgency in East Timor. When Indonesian President Suharto decided to invade and annex East Timor, an influence on his imaginary was some years earlier as a general leading an invasion of West Papua, which ultimately triggered events that led to its reunification with Indonesia. These are both examples of imaginaries cascading from one province to another within the same large country. Likewise, we see in Chapter 5 that India at the time of writing has many different Maoist insurgencies—afflicting rural areas of half of India’s states. This can only be interpreted as a South Asian cascade, mostly internal to India, in the twenty-first century in which perhaps the only other state in the world to have had a really substantial Maoist insurgency has been neighbouring Nepal.
crime. Terrorism is also exacerbated by hotspots in the sense that the exit of foreign fighters from hotspots is associated with heightened terrorism at home (Braithwaite and Chu 2017). Similarly, the exit of state troops back to the homeland after foreign wars is associated with heightened homicide at home, much of it domestic violence. Ghobarah et al. (2003) show that homicides and suicides increase after nations experience civil wars and that homicide also spikes after war in countries contiguous to the country that has experienced a civil war. Much of this domestic violence and self-violence cascade is perpetrated by the children of fighters as much as, or more than, by the fighters themselves. Wilkinson’s (2004: 44–45) Indian data show that Hindu–Muslim riots and casualties in them are predicted by the incidence of riots in that town in the previous five years. Finally, Chenoweth and Perkoski (2017) find that one of the best predictors of countries experiencing mass killings is the experience of mass killings in their past, and Harff (2017) concludes that past genocide in a society increases the likelihood of cascade to a future genocide.

Alex Braithwaite (2016) interprets his data on international cascades and international clustering of violence from hotspot to hotspot as being about the targeting of state weakness and third parties’ perceptions of state vulnerability. In our South Asian data and in the decisions of Rwanda and Uganda to invade Congo in 1996, discussed in the next chapter, there are certainly moments when targeting a perception of state vulnerability applies. We conclude, however, that a more interscalar interpretation of these cascades has more explanatory power than an international one. We find very local dynamics of fear, hatred and revenge to be important in this. As Stanley Tambiah (1996: 214) interprets the Indian evidence: ‘intermittent ethnic riots form a series, with antecedent riots influencing the unfolding of subsequent ones’. This is also true of our interpretation of the cascading of nonviolence. Here, global imaginaries of nonviolence and freedom from tyranny are important alongside local and national ones. Importantly for our analysis, Alex Braithwaite et al. (2015) show statistically that nonviolence, like violence, is a contagion phenomenon that cascades globally. In the Arab Spring, however, the global cascade of freedom and nonviolence is not the only global imaginary in play. In all the Middle Eastern uprisings, from the 1979 Iranian Revolution to Egypt and Syria in 2011, tyrannical jihadist imaginaries of a caliphate were alive on

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5 Based on our qualitative data, we also posit more specificity about the kinds of weaknesses that are important at different scales. These are the disintegration of empires, the disintegration of national or local monopolies of armed force and the disintegration of local normative orders (anomic).
the streets beside advocacy for nonviolence and freedom. In between them sat the advocacy of the Muslim Brotherhood for Islamised democratic institutions. Beside them stood advocates for local autonomy for Coptic Christians and especially for Kurds (but also for many other minorities). Alongside all of this were Shia and Sunni Muslim divides being coopted by external Shia and Sunni funders. It was usually the imaginary that could draw on superior organisational bases that prevailed over all the others to impose a new domination.

We are wrong to think of the cascade of nonviolent revolutions to overthrow communism in 1989 as totally different, as a simple triumph of freedom. It was the Taliban who ultimately prevailed in the overthrow of communism in Afghanistan. Across Eastern Europe there was a contest between a neoliberal imaginary that favoured shock-therapy privatisation and a social democratic imaginary that urged caution and gradualism in the transition to a mixed economy. The latter, mixed transitional economy part of the social democratic imaginary was paradoxically adopted by China, where communism did not fall at Tiananmen Square. Perhaps as a result, the Chinese economy has since performed at a far superior level than the post-communist economies that went all the way with untempered neoliberalism. Yet China utterly rejected the political freedom aspects of social democracy. To add paradox to paradox, many authoritarian capitalist economies from China and Bangladesh to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have consistently outperformed (in economic growth) the neoliberal economies this century. Some of the old Soviet Bloc countries, including Russia itself, Poland, Hungary and others, have been attracted to an authoritarian capitalist model. Today, we can think of many of these post-communist societies as having suffered a tyranny of neoliberalism or authoritarian criminalisation of their states—often both—alongside an escalation of violence. This might have been avoided by listening to the now marginalised people-power voices for a more tempered liberalism (Krygier 2015; Braithwaite 2017a).

The interpretation of the statistical patterns of cascading violence in this book is not just about the cascading of war from one country to another. It is more about war cascading from hotspots within one country to

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6 The neoliberal shock therapy privatisation, the criminalisation, the authoritarianism and the violence are related because quick and dirty privatisations were corrupted into the hands of mafias and former nomenklatura (Communist Party apparatchiks). A deep state was then rebuilt, substantially by a former KGB official in Vladimir Putin, who knew how to harness the criminal business elite.
other hotspots in that country and to hotspots across borders inside other countries. One referee pointed out that the cascade metaphor is essentially a word picture, so one must be careful that metaphors ‘do not always or accurately establish a similarity between one domain of experience with another’. The violent harm of war between two armies cascading to self-harm among veterans or suicidal children of veterans is a good example of cascading to a radically different kind of harm. When Che Guevara (2003: 350) wrote ‘create two, three, many Vietnams’, this certainly involves an imaginary of a cascade dynamic. Yet it does not mean Che imagined that other revolutionary struggles would unfold in the same way as Vietnam.

Vietnam is an example that informed the development of our approach: it was a national war in the 1960s and 1970s, cascading to an international, cross-border war in Cambodia. This was followed by Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia and China’s invasion of Vietnam in 1979. A more useful way of viewing this complex event is that a war in Vietnam cascaded across to hotspots in Cambodia as armed groups fighting in Vietnam were chased across the border into Cambodia. Eventually, the Vietnam War spread to so many hotspots in Cambodia (and Laos) that the United States surged to a tonnage of bombs dropped on Cambodia that surpassed all the bombs of World War II, causing huge refugee flows that in turn cascaded to genocide.

This is a classic example that influenced the development of the 10 propositions that shape this book (discussed below). It is discussed further in the next chapter. Hence, the research process began to formulate our 10 propositions from what we already know about such geopolitically prominent cases as Vietnam. Progressively, we injected more specificity into the propositions during our early years in the field studying South Asian conflicts.

A brief summary of the involvement of various actors in the complex series of wars cascading from Vietnam could be explained through the cascades framework in the following way. Local and national Cambodian political figures under pressure from these events became aligned to differing degrees with Vietnam and the United States. The Khmer Rouge was both anti-Vietnamese and anti-American. Local Cambodian political leaders who were aligned against Vietnam increasingly attacked the large numbers of ethnic Vietnamese who had long lived in Cambodia. Cambodia became increasingly fragmented. It suffered a genocide led by
the Khmer Rouge in which Cambodian ethnic Vietnamese were among those targeted in large numbers. Many fled across borders as refugees, mainly to Vietnam. The next stage of this cascade was Vietnam invading Cambodia to defeat the Khmer Rouge. That was only the beginning of a proliferation of further war cascading across countless Cambodian hotspots, which only began to stabilise with a large UN peacekeeping deployment in 1992.

Plate 1.1 Mass grave being exhumed at Choeng Ek, Cambodia (date unknown).
Source: Choeung Ek Memorial, Cambodia.

Complex cascade lenses

In this book, we observe cascades through a global institutions lens, the lens of empire, a regional South Asian lens, national lenses, lenses at varied levels of localism and more. Shahar Hameiri et al. (2017), like Jamie Peck (2002: 340), argue that labels such as local, national, regional and transnational are not levels of analysis that can be seen as distinct arenas of research in the social sciences. They are also more than sets of binaries (such as local/national) that are subjects of hybridities (MacGinty and Richmond 2015; and see the various contributions in Wallis et al. 2018).
In our method, we agree with Hameiri et al. (2017), Peck (2002) and Wallis et al. (2018) that such ‘levels of analysis’ must be understood in dynamic, relational terms. Contestation of power ‘that may be located at different scales and involved in complex, tactical, multi-scalar alliances, explains the uneven outcomes of international intervention’ (Hameiri and Jones 2017: 54). Failures of peacebuilding can be explained, for example, by theorising peacebuilding as ‘statebuilding’ or as ‘international relations’, by neglect of the interscalar. In this book, cascades of violence are in focus as one of many possible approaches to seeing how interscalar cascades of power reveal some specifics of why interventions that lack an interscalar imagination fail. We do not go so far, however, as to agree with Hameiri et al. in relation to our global, empire, regional, national and local cascade lenses when they say: ‘Rather, they are part of a single social whole, existing not “in mutual isolation but are always interconnected in a broader, often-changing inter-scalar ensemble”’ (Hameiri et al. 2017, quoting Brenner et al. 2003: 16). The idea of an interscalar ensemble is congenial because cascades have an inherently interscalar dynamic (see also Karstedt 2017 on ‘multiple scales’). We do agree, moreover, that looking at an interscalar dynamic as a ‘social whole’ can be a revealing way of seeing cascades. Yet it is only one way.

The politics of scale is not just a spatial phenomenon. Our understanding is advanced by one lens that focuses on what a military high command does and another that focuses on how privates rape privately or on what sergeants do on a small scale; the military action revealed is not always a social whole. Transitional justice scholarship has a rather consistent bias towards seeing military action more as a social whole coordinated by a high command than it is. And national armies do not always have wider spatial scale than non-state armies. Non-state militaries can be tiny and localised, transnational—such as Boko Haram, Islamic State, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) coalitions of the willing—or regional—such as African Union peacekeeping. The Islamic State imaginary can have wider scale than its military conquests. We see best by zooming in and out on many scales and to the interscalar.

We prefer an adaptation of Gareth Morgan’s (1997) lens metaphor to which we frequently return in this book. Our adaptation of Morgan is an adjustable lens that can be attuned to see and hear the local, and a lens that can be widened to national, regional, global or other levels. Adjustability must be even more complex than the extremely wide lens of seeing an ‘interscalar ensemble’ as a ‘social whole’. Our lens must be able to follow
the actions of intermediaries who connect one level to another, following
the dynamics of how connectors make interscalar movement of cascades
happen. This allows the research to see processes of interscalar hybridity
that infuse the global into the local and vice versa. When an anthropologist
focuses their lens on one village or one kin group, they can work in a spirit
of hybridity, by, for example, studying how global human rights norms
percolate down to the village and how village experience bubbles up to
inform and even change the UN human rights regime through the agency
of intermediaries who have a ‘double consciousness’ of the local and the
global (Merry 2006). They study how local actors hybridise by creatively
adapting human rights ideas, and how they find a way of channelling
them through indigenous discourses to reshape social relationships.
Unfortunately, anthropologists cannot see this hybridity very clearly by
focusing their lens only on the village. They must also pitch their tent in
New York and Geneva, as Sally Merry (2006) did, widening the focus of
their lens to global institutions. Only through research at the level of both
lenses, and by adjusting to see the dynamics of how connectors (or ‘model
mongers’; Chapter 3) make the interscalar happen, can one see how the
global can be ‘vernacularised’ into the local and the local into the global.

Admittedly, a global institution such as the UN Security Council is
a committee of 15 people with whom one can sit; the anthropologist can
observe them through a lens adjusted to the short focal length of the room
where they pontificate together. To truly understand the global, however,
one must also understand the other tables at which those 15 individuals
sit in their national capitals, the tables of more nuanced conversation at
which their staff sit in Geneva, and more. There is profound value in
anthropological research that collects data only at the village level; there
is great value in IR research focused only on the work of the Security
Council, as there is in mainstream political science that studies the politics
of states. And there is innovative value in the focus of Hameiri et al. (2017)
on an interscalar ensemble as a social whole.

Our methodological hypothesis is, however, that the richest seeing
is iteratively multifocal. It focuses narrowly on many local sets of
relationships. It then adjusts to a much longer lens to see if there is
a pointillist pattern across that galaxy of locales (as in our transnational
hotspot cascades clustered around nodes such as eastern Congo, Serbia
and Kashmir). The lens can then be adjusted to a national level to study
political decision-making in Washington, DC, for example. After that,
regional lenses such as South Asia or greater India that defines some
shared level of identity, shared historical experience of empire, shared institutional infrastructure (e.g. SAARC) and shared cascades might offer valuable insights, as might a regional imaginary that goes global, such as Maoism. Finally, we aim also for a book that adjusts to the maximum focal length of the interscalar. This caps off a social science method for iterating across variable lenses, from local lenses that allow thick description (as in our description of police station reconciliation committees in north-west Pakistan) to interscalar ensembles in which our view of thickly described data points blurs. Of course, critics of such widely iterated adjustment will say it conduces to flawed and partial oversimplification. By seeing everything, we see nothing. We conceive our own work as partial and radically flawed by inevitable howlers because of the limited breadth and depth of our digging down through time for data. It is radically incomplete, and likely to remain so in 2030, when we hope to shut down Peacebuilding Compared. Still, we think it is a worthy, flawed ambition for a social science that adds cascade complexity to our ways of seeing.

A final matter we want to put right in relation to the vaunting methodological ambition in this book is that we do not see our methodology as superior to that of Hameiri et al. (2017). Our criticism simply arises when they characterise what they do as comprehending an often-changing interscalar ensemble that is part of a single social whole. How singular such holism might be depends on the issue. Methodologically, we actually see them as doing something rather similar to what we do, though they may have done it better. For example, their book has chapters focused on national and provincial levels with titles that include ‘Cambodia’, ‘Solomon Islands’ and ‘Aceh’. We learnt much through the focusing of their lenses iteratively in each of those chapters on a national or a provincial level. This insight included national–provincial interaction that explained much enrolment of the local by the provincial in Aceh (in which provincial elites emerged as potent after the war) and by the national in Cambodia and Solomon Islands (national elites who harnessed domination by democracy, as with Kashmir elites in Chapter 5 of this book). In fact, Hameiri et al. (2017) spend a lot of time focusing on the state level of scale. This is because states turn out in their data to be master rescalers because of their command of the international law idea of sovereignty. When aid donors seek to pass power down to the local, masters of states, such as Cambodia’s Prime Minister, Hun Sen, are effective at rescaling that power back to their control. The Khmer Rouge was a master scale manager when it executed genocide. Hun Sen was a master defector from the Khmer Rouge to global powers. He then
learnt how to rescale their global power to his control, to manage scale by appropriating domination by the very democracy demanded by those global powers. We learn much from Hameiri et al.’s (2017) narrowed focus on specific peacebuilding intervention projects, from the interscalar focus in their conclusion and more. We just think they are in error at the moments in their analysis when they describe their method as ultimately about seeing interscalar social wholes. The thicker descriptions embedded in their text would be a blur if that were mainly what they did.

It must further be said that our seeing would be impoverished if it were only seeing at different levels of scale. Cascades are ever-changing dynamics that have time as well as spatial dynamics, and many other dimensions. Cascades of violence cluster in time as well as space (A. Braithwaite 2016). Gareth Morgan’s (1997) contribution to social science is to pick up multiple lenses of divergent theoretical character so we can see a phenomenon as many things at once. In this book, we look not only through lenses adjusted for different scales, but also through substantively different lenses of diverse theoretical tints (realist critics will see our nonviolence lens in Chapter 11 as rose-coloured!). For example, Proposition 1 involves a deterrence/defiance theory lens, while Proposition 2 involves a diffusion/modelling theory lens.

We see the research of Hameiri et al. (2017) in practice as also iterating between different substantive theoretical lenses. We admire their contribution, and Karstedt’s (2017), because they show us how to iterate between multiple scales and the interscalar. Hameiri et al.’s (2017) focus on interscalar conflict and fragmentation is illuminating. We learnt from their critique of the ‘political economy turn’ in development studies as ‘scale-blind’ in its emphasis on how state politics, political economies and elite ‘political settlements’ mediate the implementation of aid programs. This scale-blindness ‘implicitly accept[s] that the spatial and social scope of their political economy analysis aligns with the territorial borders of states and the societies living within them’ (Hameiri et al. 2017: 238). Hameiri et al. correct a limitation of Morgan’s (1997) work. Morgan (1997) advocated a diversity of lenses for viewing a phenomenon of basically one scale: the organisation.7 We therefore admire the corrective of work from other organisation theorists such as Stewart Clegg (1989) who study

7 While Morgan (1997) is most definitely an organisation theorist, this sentence nevertheless oversimplifies things, because his work embraces insights about organisations that emerge from the level of individual psychology and from international relations, when he discusses an organisation-theory take on the Cuban Missile Crisis.
1. INTRODUCTION

phenomena of more variable scale such as power that can have a national, provincial or organisational character as in rule (or rules that indeed embrace the global through international law), a superstructural character of domination that might be capitalist, more specified dominations that have a gender, race or class character, power that circulates through discourses or imaginaries and circuits of power that have an interscalar character (see Chapter 11). In sum, we see cascade analysis as one form of interscalar analysis that has the particular kinds of dynamic specificities represented by our 10 propositions.

How the cascades concept is developed in the plan of this book

In Chapters 2 and 3, we use the wars from 1993 onwards in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) as another cascade that shaped the development of our 10 hypotheses based on the Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork already completed there. We use the DRC cascade in the next two chapters to flesh out in a little more detail the phenomenon just introduced for Vietnam of armed conflicts that spread from hotspot to hotspot within and across borders in progressively more dangerous interaction with international conflicts. Congo is seen as an attractor of cascades from far and wide in the way Syria also is today and Germany was during the Thirty Years’ War that ended with the Peace of Westphalia. Chapters 3 and 4 seek to explain the broader relevance of the book by explaining more carefully the nature of each of our 10 propositions and how their significance can be seen in many other conflicts beyond South Asia that have already been coded for the Peacebuilding Compared project. This is a long-term project that involved conversations with many different interlocutors in various conflict zones of the world. Part I of the book helps evolve the narrative of the Peacebuilding Compared project. It draws insights from previous publications of the project (Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012). It also draws from D’Costa’s deep involvement with interlocutors within South Asian civil society (D’Costa 2011, 2014, 2016). Part I is entitled ‘Cascades on a broad canvas’.

The approach of this book is to explain how our 10 propositions grew inductively from the South Asian conflict data and from the wider Peacebuilding Compared database at the point it had reached by 2017. When the Peacebuilding Compared dataset is complete, for the most important conflicts from the end of the Cold War to 2030, we will retest
the propositions across all these armed conflicts to draw out circumstances for which the propositions are false and revise them. The first task, however, is to explain cascades theory as an aid to understanding how to create a more just and peaceful world. This we address in Chapters 2–4 by taking a big-picture view of why cascades might help peacemakers to see the history of the past century in a more fertile framework.

After Chapters 3 and 4 take us back to a proposition-by-proposition account of potential plausibility, Part II examines how cascades of violence have spread and halted in India, with a particular focus on Kashmir (Chapter 5); Pakistan and Afghanistan, particularly the Pashtun8 and Baloch regions of those countries (Chapter 6); Bangladesh, particularly the Chittagong Hill Tracts (Chapter 7); Sri Lanka, both its communist and its Tamil insurgencies (Chapter 8); and Nepal, Bhutan, Afghanistan and Myanmar (Chapter 9). While Part I is about ‘cascades on a broad canvas’ that includes the world wars of the twentieth century, Part II is targeted regionally to ‘South Asian cascades’ that actually transcend South Asia since World War II.

We hope it becomes clear why the 10 propositions in Part I were developed in part through working inductively from the data presented in Part II. Part III reviews and revises the current state of play with the development of the propositions in light of the data in Part II. In Chapter 10 and the Appendix, Part III revises the 10 starting propositions after an overview of the level of support for them in our data. Chapter 11 considers how to prevent cascades of violence, how to nurture cascades of resistance to violence and domination and how to promote cascades of nonviolence. Chapter 12 concludes with policy ideas for responding to the complexity of the task of suppressing cascades of violence. It offers a complexity

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8 Writers have used different spellings such as Pashtuns, Pukhtoons, Paktuns and Pathans to describe several hundred distinct tribal groups. The terms Pashtun and Pukhtoon/Pakhtun refer to two separate confederations of tribes primarily living in Afghanistan and Pakistan who speak Pashto and Paktho, two dialects of an Iranian language. Pashto became one of the official languages of Afghanistan in 1936. Pashto/Pakhto is also widely spoken in Pakistan; Pakhto is spoken predominantly in Peshawar and Pashto, a softer dialect, is spoken further south. The Abdali or Durrani tribes in Kandahar and Heart region, the Ghilzai tribes in the Nangarhar–Paktia region of Afghanistan and the eastern tribes of Pakistan speak the Pakhtun dialect (Rammohan 2010: 5). Other tribes—the Afridi, Khatak, Orakzai, Waziri and Mahsud—were designated as hill tribes by the British and increasingly, for the sake of convenience, were categorised as Pashtuns (Rammohan 2010). Although we have retained our interlocutors’ respective (preferred) spellings of Pukhtoon/Pakhtun when directly cited, in this book we have consistently used the term ‘Pashtuns’ (Allan 2001: 548).
theory take on how to respond in a practical way to the policy challenges of regional and global violence through a preventive diplomacy wiki. This rounds out Part III’s conclusions and implications.

Throughout Part I, we consider counterfactuals about wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Libya, south into Africa, the DRC (formerly Zaire), Yugoslavia, Vietnam and World Wars I and II. Were there diplomatic paths not taken that might have interrupted cascade dynamics? Chapter 2 discusses the counterfactual method that is illustrated for the first time in that chapter. The next section considers the other major methodological questions in our work.

**Peacebuilding Compared methods**

We bring together evidence from multidisciplinary scholarship on peacebuilding, conflict and nonviolence, and the insights of stakeholders such as activists, policymakers, practitioners, leading voices from civil society, members of state and non-state armed groups, intelligence agencies, refugee leaders, human rights and women’s rights advocates, those from marginalised communities and young people. Following a diagnosis of the cascading character of the history of global violence since 1911 in Part I, in Part II, we consider political and social discourses and strategies of violence and nonviolence in South Asia since 1945. We also consider the challenges that states have encountered and created for themselves and look to the challenges that non-networked and well-networked respondents argue are important for our attention in the coming decade.

To explore the theoretical underpinnings of our 10 propositions, we turned to those involved in developing political, social and religious platforms. We asked these stakeholders to identify the key challenges and opportunities for peacebuilding in South Asia. Our sources were mostly individual interviews, some with two or even three people, and small numbers of focus group discussions that are counted as just one interview in the interview counts we report in each chapter. Where we rely on our interview data, sometimes we include quotations from interviews, but more often we use statements that none or some of our interviews supported a particular claim. Our apologies are offered for those moments of our narrative where we have failed to be as explicit as we should be about exactly how we are relying on so many interviews to advance our
interpretations of so many histories of violence. There was also quite a lot of participant observation (for example, of peace negotiations, of peacekeeper training and peacekeeper patrols, of war crimes trials, of life in refugee camps and of diplomatic work in the corridors of the United Nations) and searches of websites, UN Security Council resolutions, draft peace agreements and the scholarly literature. The most important dimension of our methodology for gaining insight and preventing a single view from dominating our interpretation of the data is our method for identifying and documenting multiple and varied voices and silences.

We conducted interviews beyond South Asia with political activists in exile, refugee groups and sometimes exiled members of insurgency groups in Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, the Gulf states, both Congos, Switzerland, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia and via email. We have delivered lectures in universities and think tanks across South Asia and shared our initial findings with experts on the ground. This particular strategy has sharpened our analysis. In each case study country, we have partnered with young researchers and journalists who have accompanied us during our field visits. These researchers, who are acknowledged in our preface, with some exceptions where they did not want such politicised work to be acknowledged, have served not only as our assistants, but also as informants, collaborators and, in more than a dozen instances, as co-authors of papers. At the points in our narrative where we rely on or rerun analyses from those papers, we acknowledge them.

Political and human rights activists with a range of ages and working in a range of organisational contexts were interviewed. They were differently positioned within their local socioeconomic and political spaces and in global politics: some were able to move about freely and others were confined, some were more theoretically oriented and others were more substantively oriented. Many eagerly shared their analysis of the substantive concerns of their communities. Some were from state-accepted groups, while others challenged political norms or were socially outcast. Our interview subjects were disproportionately those whose views have not been publicised.

Some of our interview subjects were internationally known advocates of their communities, some had national reputations and some were unknown beyond their locales. Some had garnered support from national or international sources, others had not and still others eschewed any funding. We did not focus on finding only those who were known to us
before arriving in the field location. We focused instead on identifying those whose critical perspectives we would not have been able to know had we not travelled to these field locations. We followed up with many who did not have time to be interviewed in detail and checked in with them in our later visits or via email.

None of our sources was interpreted as being a collective voice representing others. While offering their own perspectives, they often supplied evidence for why their account could be taken to speak for many and not just themselves. In addition, there were many silent informants (again, who are not included in our interview counts). We often documented this silence in interviews conducted with senior leaders and others present. In one interview in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, for example, one of the interlocutors hardly spoke and always deferred to the senior leader. This seemed to be in deference to the other’s title. In some other cases, it seemed to be a result of personal style. In these cases, we have carried out informal conversations with those silent informants, even if only in being escorted out, but often in a more comfortable and intimate setting (during meals, for example).

In South Asia, development discourse has been strongly influenced by the international development community, which includes international organisations (the United Nations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund), international non-governmental organisations (such as Oxfam, Care, Save the Children), highly sophisticated, professional and large non-governmental organisations (NGOs) within states (for example, the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee) and transnational networks. National and local NGOs wanting to access resources, provided by either their international partners or the state, had to learn how to articulate their concerns in the rhetoric donors understand, often at the expense of their own activities. Grassroots activities with people have also been outsourced to community-based organisations. Many of these international and national organisations play an active role in peacebuilding work. As such, we have visited and interviewed local NGOs and national and international organisations (such as Save the Children in Kashmir, Oxfam in Islamabad, the UN Development Programme in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and Action Aid in Yangon) when appropriate. Indeed, we have interviewed all the types of actors discussed in this paragraph. Throughout this book, we do not merely reflect or represent the views of singular or plural others, but rather join their effort by offering political and analytical insights that we were able to glean from taking
their thoughts together and situating these in a larger picture of cascades of violence in South Asia. Hence our fieldwork notes record political and analytical interpretive memos of the authors alongside a record of what was said.

This book was initially developed as part of the Peacebuilding Compared project and then took on a life of its own. Peacebuilding Compared commenced in 2004 with the aim of running for 20 years—currently conceived as 26 years because of our slow work rate! Peacebuilding Compared seeks to study all the international peacekeeping operations and all the geopolitically significant armed conflicts across the world since the end of the Cold War. Serious fieldwork is being conducted in the region of each of these conflicts and beyond in other relevant locales such as the UN headquarters in New York. Approximately 4,000 conflict stakeholders had been interviewed up to May 2017 in 2,355 interview files during some 50 months of fieldwork. All but 32 of these interviews were summarised from handwritten notes into a fieldwork note database using voice recognition software. There was more than one interviewer for three-quarters of these interviews. Those not entered into the database but left at the level of handwritten notes were mostly cases where admissions of culpability for atrocity crimes were an issue. South Asian cases discussed in Part II of this book accounted for 645 of the interview files, conducted

9 The overwhelming majority of interview files are records of one interview with one person. Approximately one-third are single interview files with more than one person, with two people in the majority of these cases. Occasionally, for an interview with a newspaper editor, for example, the editor invited a group of senior journalists to help answer questions, or an interview at a police station or military base was with a group of officers. A small number of these interview files actually involved multiple interviews where we would sit down at a police station, military base or UN mission and one person after another would arrive sequentially to have a discussion with us in the course of a day. Some of the interview files are actually a whole day out on patrol with half a dozen peacekeepers chatting with each of them over breakfast or in the car and chatting with those with whom they spoke in the course of their day of peacekeeping. There were six days spent flying off to a peace negotiation, for example, or some specific incident with a group of UN and other peace operation officers in a helicopter. There are interview files that record conversations with multiple insurgents and prison staff recorded during a half-day at a prison or with multiple insurgents recorded during a day spent at their military base. Some of our 2,355 interview files are a record of a day walking around a refugee camp and sitting down for cups of tea for shorter and longer conversations with a variety of people. Other files are records of meetings with groups of activists or student leaders. If three students did most of the talking at one of these focus group discussions, we were inclined to count the group discussion as one interview with three individuals. So while there is precision about the number of 2,355 written interview files, there are some rather arbitrary counting judgments in the estimate of approximately 4,000 people interviewed so far, and that number does not include the large number of people with whom we had briefer conversations.

10 On why two is the optimal number of interviewers for this kind of research, see Braithwaite (1985).
mostly in 16 fieldwork trips to the region during the past decade. Prior to that, Bina D’Costa, as a regionalist born in South Asia, spent many years travelling, studying and interviewing people for other research projects across the region. Each chapter in Part II includes a footnote explaining the interviews done there. Much of the Peacebuilding Compared interview data that were not collected in South Asia were relied on for the analyses of the United Nations, NATO countries, both Congos, Rwanda, Libya, Iraq and other countries with relevance to explaining the development of the cascades propositions in Part I.

While quantitative research will begin to become an important part of the project a decade from now, during its first 13 years, the method has been qualitative. So far, Peacebuilding Compared has been oriented to inductive inference from qualitative data that maximise the diversity of contexts of war and peace. In this book, a great diversity of data points in space and time from peace–war–peace transitions across South Asia are studied. With a project of such breadth, the most important sources are secondary, with hundreds of documents consulted for each armed conflict and cited throughout the text. Primary documents that ranged from constitutions to ceasefire agreements to emails published by Wikileaks were revealed as important by a reading of the existing literature. Those documents led to conclusions about who were strategic actors who should be interviewed during the fieldwork; in turn, those interviews iteratively led to conclusions about new documents to be read and other actors to be interviewed. Many strategic documents of a very local character were shared and photographed during the interviews.

While the interview data are recursively responsive to gaps in the documentary record in this way, certain categories of actors have been interviewed in every Peacebuilding Compared case. Political and military leaders of states and insurgencies are always interviewed, usually at a high level, though we never prioritise incumbents because theirs are inevitably frustratingly short interviews. Retired leaders are better informants in terms of willingness to give long interviews and to be frank. Peacebuilding Compared to date has interviewed dozens of past and present prime ministers and presidents, dozens of insurgency leaders and hundreds of past and present government ministers. Nearly 100 generals have been interviewed. They have been more difficult to access across Peacebuilding Compared, but particularly in South Asia, where only 14 were interviewed.
Consistently across conflicts we have interviewed police commanders, civil servants (including very senior ones such as the civilian head of defence in India and of intelligence in Iraq and other countries), UN leaders, newspaper editors and leading journalists, business leaders, religious leaders, judges/prosecutors, human rights activists, women's NGOs, peacebuilding and development NGOs and leading analysts of the case. Where they still exist, we always visit a refugee camp (because Proposition 6 is explicitly focused on refugees). On many occasions we have spent the best part of a day at a refugee camp interviewing many people. In the simplified way we have now adopted for counting interviews, the fieldwork files from these visits are counted as one interview. Hence, our fieldwork database is even more dense than the large number of interview informants suggests. We always write to the US and Australian ambassadors seeking an interview and often to European Union or other diplomats strategic to the particular case. The US ambassador agrees barely half the time, though again this was an area where South Asia was difficult, with zero out of seven serving US ambassadors agreeing to an interview. In most countries, however, the US ambassador passed us on to a senior political officer whom we were able to interview.

Every single approach to a Chinese or Russian ambassador for a Peacebuilding Compared interview has been rebuffed, though we did interview one Chinese general and some colonels who were peacekeeping specialists. We compensate for these biases by prioritising documentary sources with opposite biases that give us insight into how Russian or Chinese diplomats think or how the Taliban thinks. This, however, can never satisfactorily correct for that bias, which is profound.

Securing meetings with the Taliban is an interesting example of our research challenge. More than a dozen Taliban were interviewed during three trips to Afghanistan (two with Ali Wardak) up to the level of the former foreign minister of the former Taliban government, plus interviews with strong Taliban political sympathisers in Quetta and Peshawar in Pakistan. This was achieved by three methods: seeking out former senior Taliban who had come in from the cold to be watched in Kabul; meeting with members of regional peace committees of Afghanistan’s High Peace Council and observing regional negotiations by the United Nations with key regional players and Taliban who were discussing the surrender of their weapons and reintegration; and interviewing Taliban in regional prisons. These are all methods we have also used for interviewing insurgents in countries beyond Afghanistan.
The method used for interviewing Taliban in regional prisons was that Ali Wardak and John Braithwaite dropped in on a regional prison governor in a conflict zone, with Ali saying that John was a distinguished criminologist who happened to be in town and would be interested to meet the prison governor. Over a cup of tea with the governor, Ali asked if we could give a gift of food to little children serving sentences with their mothers. Ali had experience of the hardships of prison babies based on his own imprisonment during the time of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. After agreement on a tour of the prison, John would naively ask if there were any Taliban prisoners. The governor would say yes and agree when further asked if it would be possible to chat with them. This secured an hour chatting with several Taliban, including the most senior leader of the 87 Taliban in one prison. The Peacebuilding Compared qualitative data collection may be distinctive in having had strategic conversations about peacebuilding with both senior White House staff and with the Taliban. After Ali Wardak’s published work with John Braithwaite for Peacebuilding Compared (discussed in Chapter 9) won a prize, current Afghan President Ashraf Ghani wrote to Ali about how he valued the research and advised that his presidential website would recommend that senior people in his government take note of the research. This generated more data. Iran is an important regional player in the Afghan conflict. It has resourced and trained Afghan armed groups and funded Iranian citizens from the Republican Guard and Holy Shrine budgets to infiltrate and fight in Afghanistan, and it has its own Baloch insurgency that cascades into Pakistan’s Balochistan insurgency. In two trips to Iran so far, we were able to obtain interviews with three grand ayatollahs, with a very senior officer of Iran’s High Council for National Security, with two former ambassadors, senior advisors to presidents, members of the Expediency Council, many retired military officers and many insurgents. In a fraught case such as Afghanistan, we can claim to have enjoyed some (perhaps limited) degree of respect for the sincerity of the independence of the research from opposing regional governments, from insurgents and from UN and NATO leaders alike.

More than 700 variables are coded for each conflict, with many coded as ‘contested’. Of course, many things can be ‘consensus’ codes—for example, it is not contested that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE, the Tamil Tigers) were defeated militarily in 2009. In later quantitative analyses it will be possible to assess if results are indeed less robust when contested codes are used, as opposed to codes that are matters of consensus among analysts. Chapters 10 and 12 discuss
applying the contestability of the codes to a subjective logic approach to data analysis at the end of the project (Jøsang 2016). Peacebuilding Compared relies mostly on the micro and macro research of others to complete these codes, with our own fieldwork concentrated on questions for which previous research adequate for that coding has not been done. Even so, ‘don’t know’ or ‘more research needed’ codes remain common in our data. ‘Too early to call’ codes drive a particularly large number of holes into the data. Previous Peacebuilding Compared books have discussed in more detail these coding methodologies (Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2012).

Our ANU ethics approval requires anonymous quotes for a project in conflict areas where informants could potentially be at risk, except when informants specifically say they want to be on the record. Where we quote informants by name, which often happens for political leaders, this is the case.

A book in three parts

The purpose of Part I of the book is to explain where our 10 propositions came from as we contemplated the wider canvas of cascades in Peacebuilding Compared. The purpose of Part II is to get systematic about evaluating the cascades in just one region of the world, South Asia. One point of the future work of Peacebuilding Compared is to get empirically systematic about cascades for the rest of the globe.

Part I of the book, ‘Cascades on a broad canvas’, develops the idea of cascades of violence and their prevention from a consideration of the largest cascades of violence the world has seen during the past century. Only enough of the histories of World War I, World War II, the wars of the Great Lakes region of Africa and of the Middle East across to Afghanistan and Kashmir are described to show that they are huge cascade phenomena. Just enough of their narratives are laid out to reveal how many possible complex points of cascade prevention there were in these wars. We complement insights from our South Asian fieldwork with our fieldwork from other continents and wider scholarship on the history of war and peace across the globe since 1911, to develop inductively 10 propositions about cascades of violence. Chapter 2 enlivens the contemporary relevance of cascades by considering how the framework
might cause us to think differently about geopolitically important conflicts of the present in places such as Iraq, Syria and Libya. It explains in more detail the inductive journey towards the cascades.

The main focus of Part I is on three of the most massive cascades outside South Asia. The first is the largest cascade of conflicts of the past half-century: a cascade of African wars with the DRC as its most central node. The others are the two largest cascades of the past century: Balkan wars cascading to World War I through to late-century Balkan wars; and World War I itself cascading to World War II and cascading to many postwar conflicts and ethnic cleansings in the mid and late 1940s. One of these, the Chinese civil war, was one of the bloodiest wars in human history, as was the Korean War, to which it in turn cascaded.

Part II, ‘South Asian cascades’, is then a rather more fine-grained telling of the narratives of more recent South Asian cascades that can be told by actors in them who are still living. Yet, this telling is still nowhere near as fine-grained as we could manage in a study of a single society. More than a few dozen wars across seven South Asian countries are discussed in Part II and more than a dozen are analysed with some intensity. At times, ours is a pointillist canvas, narrating stories from fieldwork interviews across many hotspots to reveal patterns.

Part III, ‘Refining understanding of cascades’, revises the 10 propositions in light of that pattern of evidence collected by mid-2017 and then considers their policy implications. It considers cascades of nonviolence as an alternative path to cascades of violence. Biblical insights on ‘turning the other cheek’ propose one possible path to nonviolence. Indeed, most of our core insights are ancient and can also be found in Islamic thinking about the importance of mercy and forgiveness, and in Buddhism, Hinduism, Judaism, Taoism, Confucianism and the animist belief systems of many stateless societies. Yet, most of these belief systems are not pacifist. Rather, they conceive of ‘a time to embrace, and a time to refrain from embracing’, ‘a time to kill and a time to heal’ and, indeed, ‘a time of war, and a time of peace’ (Ecclesiastes 3). This book can be read as an attempt to specify the beginnings of an explanation of why at most moments the imperative is to heal, to reconcile and to prevent. At the same time, it is an attempt to specify the nature of the exceptional circumstances in which it is right for us to kill in spite of the risk that killing tends to induce more killing. We argue that the first step towards that world of understanding is to abandon the static ways of thinking about deterrence that are the
cause of so much of the wanton, wasted suffering that afflicts the world. The final chapter argues that, in light of the complexity revealed by the cascades studied, developing evidence-based strategies to combat cascades of violence is less important than developing a practical meta-strategy. This means a strategy to responsively order promising strategies. That is the limited theoretical contribution of our final chapter.
Transnational cascades

This chapter is about why it matters to understand the cascade concept. By thinking counterfactually about cascades of violence, we can better understand how the great conflicts of the twentieth century—World War I, World War II and cascades of civil wars that were Cold War proxy contests—might have been prevented. It starts by considering geopolitically prominent wars that continue today in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, Syria, Libya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). We consider whether these were and are preventable when confronted with the historical imagination of the cascades of violence framework. For all these geopolitically central conflicts, we ask if there were diplomatic paths not taken that might have interrupted cascade dynamics.

The ambition of this chapter is to help readers see conflicts that are familiar to them through a new lens. The hope is that looking at major wars through the cascade lens will help readers see them anew from an angle that invites preventability. We do not claim that the cascade lens is the best one for getting the most useful view of violence, and certainly not the only one. Even though our cascade account in the next chapter sets itself against critical characteristics of realist international relations (IR) theory, we still think there are valuable things we can learn from complementing a view of violence through a cascade lens with the different view of a realist lens. Likewise, we see value in multifocal viewing through the lenses of many other IR theories (Morgan 1997): neorealist, complex independence, Marxist, constructivist, postcolonial, dependency, feminist, green and even neoliberal, of which we have been frequently so critical in past writing. Readers will see us pick up some of these lenses quite
often throughout this book to move from a unifocal view to a bifocal to a multifocal cascade lens on violence. We are interested in the proposition that adding the cascade lens helps us to see violence more clearly. Because we end up in the final chapter with a complexity theory account of how to make good use of the cascade lens, the question of whether the cascade lens is the best possible lens does not interest us.

Why the cascade idea matters: Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and Congo

Thinking counterfactually

To help understand cascade dynamics, in this book, we consider qualitative and quantitative analyses of what happens when cascade conditions are present versus what happens when they are absent. Two key questions frame the usefulness of this approach. First, if we think counterfactually, does this advance our knowledge about causal understanding of political events? Second, could we distinguish plausible, insightful arguments from implausible and weak ones? In different ways, counterfactual thinking (Climo and Howells 1976; Fearon 1991; Ferguson 2011; Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968; Weber 1949) helps us see the relevance of cascades.

Counterfactual analysis asks diagnostic questions such as whether a war would have occurred in the absence of a proximate cause that seemed to start it. Logically, this is as reputable as the counterfactual inference of a judge deciding whether, in the absence of a bullet that entered a heart, a death would not have occurred. Investigation of contextual data about things that did happen may be required, such as the victim’s death from a heart attack before the bullet arrived. Diplomats are more comfortable

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1 For a detailed analysis, see Tetlock and Belkin’s (1996) Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics. The weakness of a counterfactual approach is that it does not deal with reality. It imagines a case where the presumed explanation is absent. One strength, however, with counterfactual analysis is that everything else that is relevant is identical. No amount of matching or controlling for third variables can guarantee that everything else is appropriately identical with the alternative of comparisons of real cases with and without the explanatory variable. Another strength is that counterfactual research can expand our policy imagination beyond roads that have actually been taken.

2 Moreover, Fearon (1991: 195) argues—rightly, we think—that ‘counterfactuals cannot be avoided in non-experimental hypothesis testing’. Hence, it is best that in the study of the onset of wars we take counterfactual thinking seriously and do it well.
analysing events that actually happened; yet, as a logical matter, when they do this they tend to be as counterfactual as the reasoning of the judge (Fearon 1991).

Contemplate this counterfactual. Would the world be a less dangerous place had the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) not invaded Afghanistan as a response to the attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001? What if a more minimalist form of violence had been launched instead? An example would have been a Special Forces attack on Osama bin Laden and his inner circle in September 2001 instead of planning an invasion for October. Before the NATO invasion, US intelligence knew exactly where bin Laden was much of the time (Weiner 2008: 473). After Kabul and Kandahar came under attack, it did not, and it did not get another chance at a Special Forces assault on a confirmed location until the US Navy SEALs killed bin Laden in May 2011.

A similar counterfactual is whether the world would be a less violent place had US president Bill Clinton launched such a Special Forces assault before 9/11 as a response to the 1998 suicide attacks on US embassies in Africa. The day before the 9/11 attacks, Clinton revealed in a speech to a private audience recorded by an Australian politician that he did have the intelligence on bin Laden’s location. He could have ordered his assassination, but was worried about American and Afghan casualties: ‘I could have killed him, but I would have had to destroy a little town called Kandahar in Afghanistan and kill 300 innocent women and children,’ Clinton said. ‘And then I would have been no better than him’ (Clinton 2014). The methodological strength of this counterfactual is that the surrounding data (Clinton’s recorded briefing) lend plausibility to the counterfactual as a path that tenably could have happened and could have made a difference.

Nils Christie (2010) has proposed a more radical counterfactual. It involves a restorative justice response to 9/11. His suggestion to the leadership of the Norwegian Nobel Prize Committee was to send ‘victims rather than bombs’ to Afghanistan. Its methodological strength was not that it could have been easily executed, but the way it opens our policy imagination to a road not taken—one radically different to the options that were considered.
Immediately after 9/11, Taliban leader Mullah Omar was instructed by a *jirga* (council) of Afghanistan’s leading religious scholars to offer to hand bin Laden over to a third Muslim country that might try him according to Sharia law. Leaders of two of Pakistan’s Islamic parties claim they negotiated bin Laden’s extradition to Pakistan, where he would be held in Peshawar and face an international tribunal that would decide whether to try him or hand him over to the United States. They claimed that both bin Laden and Mullah Omar had agreed to the extradition (Pilger 2002: 103; see also Gunaratna 2002: 227). Others say Mullah Omar only ever agreed to the proposition that bin Laden should be prosecuted (Gopal 2014: Ch. 1). Saudi Arabia was approached to explore prosecution there, as bin Laden was a Saudi citizen. Saudi Arabia had previously asked for bin Laden to be extradited to his homeland to be tried for the African embassy bombings of 1998. Former Pakistani foreign secretary Riaz Mohammad Khan (2011: 326) is convinced that, in the late 1990s, ‘Osama could have been extradited to Saudi Arabia with effective diplomacy’.3

Nils Christie’s restorative justice path not taken was for selected survivors and family representatives of victims of 9/11 to travel to Kabul to discuss the Taliban offer of independent Sharia justice for bin Laden—to put to the *jirga* their sorrows, needs and perspectives of a crime alleged to have been perpetrated by the Saudi citizen who enjoyed Taliban protection. One hope of such a restorative encounter—sitting in the circle of the *jirga* with the religious scholars—was a meeting of minds on how a worst possible outcome for both sides would be another war. The circle would inevitably have discussed that such a war would ravage again the longsuffering people of Afghanistan and could be ‘another Vietnam’ for the young American soldiers who would lose their lives, their

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3 After 9/11, however, Saudi Arabia spurned the extradition option partly because its ally, President Bush, was firm in conceiving the Taliban as an accomplice to the attack on the United States because it had provided a safe haven for bin Laden. Hence, another road not taken was for Bush to have pressured the Saudi leadership to push for extradition. Bush’s moral universe of the time was that all nations must declare themselves ‘for us’ or they would be ‘against us’. Bush was immovable in believing that, through its actions, the Taliban had already declared itself ‘against us’. The US argument that an invasion of Afghanistan was a legal war of self-defence depended on the claim that Afghanistan not only harboured bin Laden, but also refused to hand him over (Byers 2005: 65). Evidence was and still is missing that the Afghan Government knew of the plans to attack the United States and was determined not to surrender bin Laden after these plans were executed. What was needed was a face-saving diplomacy for the Taliban, who were responding to US demands to ‘give up bin Laden’ with pleas to ‘give us some evidence of guilt so we can justify handing bin Laden over’, which Bush dismissed with ‘we already know he is guilty’ (Griffin 2010). The war was undoubtedly illegal in any case: in the law of war, harbouring a terrorist and failing to prevent a terrorist attack on another country do not mean a state is an aggressor against the state targeted by the terrorism (White 2014: 41).
legs or their marriages. It was brought home to John Braithwaite that repeating the errors of Vietnam was a fear among victims’ families; he was living and teaching in southern Manhattan on 9/11, saw the first plane swoosh down Fifth Avenue and was standing in the street watching as the second smashed into the World Trade Centre. He attended candlelight vigils for peace with those families. There was quite a bit of support in New York for averting a military response until all the media proprietors rallied around the war president. Braithwaite gave talks in September and October 2001 at New York University, Harvard University and elsewhere in the United States, where some members of the audience certainly insisted on the imperative for a deterrent response when he argued against a rush to the invasion of Afghanistan.4

The counterfactual analyst can agree that it would have been politically difficult to prevail against that will to deterrence once President Bush had met with the major media proprietors and asked them to prepare the people of America for war. They did so by making news broadcasts surprisingly partisan for a free press, adorning bulletins with the national flag, the airwaves constantly trembling with the national anthem, touting the stars and stripes and banning dissenting voices such as Noam Chomsky from major networks in a way that never happened during the Vietnam War. Even given the political untenability of the restorative alternative, the counterfactual analyst contends we learn for the future by asking if Americans would be better off today (with more legs, a lower suicide rate, a lower deficit) had they followed this road not taken. Was it worth a campaign that devastated Afghanistan again, that killed more NATO soldiers than the number of civilians killed on 9/11 and a greater number of NATO-country suicides (Fazal 2014) and that left NATO countries less fiscally capable of recovery from the Global Financial Crisis?

Reversing cascades back to Iraq, 1990

The counterfactual thinker wants to push back further through the cascades of violence. For instance, were the current messy wars in Iraq inevitable or a result of unwise Western diplomacy? The counterfactual diagnostician of cascades rewinds the tape to a meeting between the US Ambassador to Iraq and Iraqi president Saddam Hussein on 25 July 1990.

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4 These were updated as a written paper in 2002 for the British Criminology Conference and, also in 2002, for the Australian Member Committee of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific, which were subsequently published as Braithwaite (2005).
Saddam left that meeting thinking that if he invaded Kuwait, the United States would only bluster. Saddam saw US interests as wanting an Iraq that balanced Iran rather than a Shia-dominated successor that would support Iran. Resonating with our Proposition 10, Saddam also said to the US ambassador: ‘Yours is a society which cannot accept 10,000 dead in one battle’ (Byman and Waxman 2002: 143). Saddam expected President Bush to indulge some ritualistic international condemnation, but he thought the United States would not do anything to stop him, just as it did not stop its ally Indonesia from invading East Timor. Iraqi politics professor Saad Jawad, currently affiliated with the London School of Economics, argued in email correspondence with us, as did a former Iranian ambassador (Interview in Tehran, 2016, No. 051611),5 that this was a clever trap rather than diplomatic incompetence. This was because Israel was concerned to ‘do something’ about the massive military capacity Saddam had at that time; the United States and the United Kingdom were keen for Israel not to do anything rash and so assured Israel that they would take care of the problem.6 Whether through deceit or incompetence, the road not taken here was for the US ambassador to have signalled unequivocally what the United States was ultimately prepared to do: invade Iraq to reverse Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. Of course, it would also have been imperative to say that the United States would prefer to reverse the invasion through diplomacy and/or the progressive escalation of sanctions until Iraq pulled out, but it would do whatever it took. From the perspective of preventing cascades of violence, it was awful diplomacy to allow Saddam to believe that the United States would not do whatever it took when it was prepared to invade if necessary.7

Before invading, the United States also might have given Soviet premier Mikhail Gorbachev more time after the occupation of Kuwait to persuade Saddam that, unless he withdrew, he would suffer a terrible defeat. Gorbachev (1998: 59–60) said:

5 Another senior Iranian interviewee from the High Security Council said there was no evidence available to them, however, that there was any US trap for Saddam in Kuwait (Interview in Tehran, 2016, No. 051604).
6 It is certainly clear that the United States was sufficiently committed to the objective of destroying the Iraqi army to commit a war crime to achieve it. We refer to the ‘turkey shoot’ in which, after Saddam complied with US terms for withdrawal from Kuwait, the US attacked the retreating column in open country. This is the international criminal law equivalent of a police officer shooting a criminal in the back after they have been told to put down their gun and walk away.
7 For a transcript and commentary on the feeble US signalling at this meeting, see Salinger and Laurent (1991: 47–62).
There was not enough time for the last effort. Of course, no one can assert confidently that it would have been fruitful. However, I still have a feeling that we rushed, that we missed something.

Gorbachev contrasted this rush with US president John F. Kennedy rejecting the counsel of his team and giving Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev ‘one more chance’ at the height of the Cuban Missile Crisis.8

It was the basing of US forces in Saudi Arabia after Operation Desert Storm that so incensed Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden had been a US ally until then (against the Soviet-backed regime that still clung to power in Afghanistan in 1991). This persuaded bin Laden to turn to violent jihad against the American and Saudi regimes. Had the United States projected a firm resolve to Saddam in 1990 to escalate step-by-step to whatever level of sanction or military mobilisation was required to prevent his occupation of Kuwait, might 9/11—and therefore a war lasting 16 years so far in Afghanistan—have been prevented? Might the second Iraq invasion, in 2003, and everything that cascaded from it also have been prevented? Would a cascade of violent jihad across the Muslim world have been prevented?

Iraq, 2003

When George W. Bush’s cabinet decided to invade Iraq, it had a single-layered objective: regime change. The president’s single-layered thinking was on display under the ‘Mission Accomplished’ banner on the US aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003. The war had succeeded in removing Saddam from power. President Bush was not in the business of weighing that gain against lives that might be lost by cascading criminal violence on the anarchic streets of Iraq and by 14 further years of virtually continuous civil war (so far) among various armed factions in the new Iraq.

8 Returning to Iraq, Gorbachev said: ‘[W]e lacked not only time then, but probably imagination too … [With] a self-confident despot … compelling graphic demonstration would be helpful. In 1945 Albert Einstein, Leo Szilard and other physicists recommended to President Truman that he not bomb Japanese cities but demonstrate a nuclear explosion on an uninhabited island and invite Japanese leaders and representatives of other countries to observe. Quite probably, such a demonstration would have shown the Japanese the uselessness of further resistance and persuaded them to lay down their arms. However, Truman did not listen to the scientists’ advice, wishing to demonstrate US military might to the Soviet Union, which already at that time was beginning to be perceived not as an ally but as an enemy’ (Gorbachev 1998: 59–60).
Because cascade analysts see cascades layered within cascades, they like to ask counterfactual questions inside cascades, which are within wider cascades. Hence, we can ask did the second President Bush (George W.) err in diagnosing the costs and benefits of an invasion of Iraq in 2003 by calculating too simply in terms of the costs and benefits of regime change? It seems the Bush White House was single-layered in its analysis in this way (Woodward 2002, 2004). Was Bush’s focus too narrowly on estimates from his defence secretary, Donald Rumsfeld, that only a modest invasion force would be needed, that American losses from the invasion would be low? Did President Bush give enough weight to the costs of managing the descent of Iraq without a police force into an anomic world of looters, kidnappers and armed criminal gangs? Would Al-Qaeda (and later Islamic State) be attracted to fill this vacuum of social order with their particular kind of order? We explain in this book that the 2003 invasion of Iraq is not a rarity as an interstate war with low casualties that cascaded to massive casualties through internal violence from crime and civil war (see Hagan et al. 2015). Survey research suggests between 150,000 and 600,000 deaths in Iraq due to conflict in the first three years after the invasion (Green and Ward 2009b: 610). The Brookings Institution estimates that the 3,000–4,000 deaths a month during this period had fallen after the ‘surge’ to 500 a month two years later (O’Hanlon and Campbell 2008: 4).
The 1990 war in Iraq cascaded to other problems, including the slaughter of Kurds in the north of the country and Shia in the south, who had been urged by the United States to rise against Saddam. An Iraqi nuclear weapons program that had in fact been dismantled by diplomacy, sanctions and UN weapons inspection became an excuse for cascading to another invasion by the United States and its allies in 2003, led by George H. W. Bush’s son, President George W. Bush. The war has also seen gendered and sexed power relations that pervade domination by state security sectors in times of war. Saddam’s former torture and execution chambers were taken over by the US military forces. Abu Ghraib prison became a torture zone, where abuse and sexual humiliation of the Iraqi detainees by American military personnel and private contractors were justified and sanctioned by the broader US foreign policy objective. Green and Ward (2009a, 2009b) also note a sharp increase in honour killings in Kurdistan and beyond as a result of the war, widespread murder of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) people and sexual abuse of children by the Badr and Mahdi militias, among others.

We used to have a government that was almost secular: It had one dictator. Now we have almost 60 dictators—Islamists who think of women as forces of evil. This is what is called the democratization of Iraq. (Yannar Mohamed, quoted in Green and Ward 2009b: 622)

The biographies of the key players in the US decision to invade Iraq in 2003 reveal that they did not consider a cascades analysis of what would happen. In his book, Rumsfeld (2011) argued that the actions in Abu Ghraib were isolated incidents caused by some ‘rotten apples’. Western generals were ignored, especially by Rumsfeld, when they warned that an invasion that was not resourced with a follow-through civil policing strategy would see Iraq descend into anarchy. In the event, the number killed on all sides in the war was tiny in comparison with those killed by the kidnapping, murders, bombings and internecine fighting of armed criminal gangs in the years after the war. Far fewer of the unparalleled endowment of antiquities at the juncture of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers were lost to smart bombs than to the pillage of looters in the days after the invasion; looting of antiquities continues as an important funding source for Islamic State at the same time as destruction of antiquities is part of its symbolic politics (Caulderwood 2014).
President George W. Bush did not weigh the possibility that the invasion would actually accelerate terrorism around the world. Saddam had been a staunch opponent of Islamists and specifically of Al-Qaeda. The
‘humiliation’ of the first Gulf War at the hands of the senior Bush had already had the effect of motivating the Al-Qaeda network. The second Gulf War hugely motivated second-generation recruitment to multitudinous terror networks. Islamic State’s third Gulf War has energised a renewed surge of recruitment to terror and a cascade from Iraq to Syria. More broadly, the first Gulf War not only cascaded to the second, both wars also cascaded to multiple forms of violence that were worse than the violence of the two short invasions. As Amin Saikal (2014: 152) put it:

Paradoxically, the war succeeded in creating what it claimed it would destroy. Before the war, as was argued correctly by opponents of the US invasion, Iraq was not a theatre for operations by Al-Qaeda and its sympathisers. It was the United States and its allies, through the mismanagement of the post-invasion Iraqi crisis, that managed to create the right conditions for such a development.

The previous evidence from quantitative political science renders unsurprising the outcome in Iraq and Afghanistan to date. Hegre et al. (2001: 38–9) showed in the American Political Science Review (before the NATO adventurism of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya) that regime change that shifts from ‘an old autocracy to a new semidemocracy … increases the risk of civil war almost nine times’. If the regime change shifts the state to full democracy, the risk of civil war is only slightly elevated in the first year or two after the change; thereafter the risk is lowered. When statebuilding projects in former autocracies such as Iraq, Afghanistan or Libya turn them into semidemocracies, statebuilders might take satisfaction in their work. No one expects societies with such authoritarian histories to turn into full democracies within a decade or two. In fact, when a regime change is militarily coerced, rapid transition to full democracy almost never happens. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) study of 323 cases since 1900 shows that change through peaceful people power is the modality of regime change that delivers the best statistical prospects of transition to full democracy. Enduring democracy is an organic creation from within, often starting from the bottom up in smallish towns and cities; rarely in history does it emerge from the top down in states that are coerced to adopt it.

9 Hagan et al. (2015: 187–8) conclude from their empirical study that coalition violence cascaded in this way: ‘[T]he roots of the Arab Sunni insurgency were the perceived and reported unnecessary attacks by US/coalition forces on civilians that increased cynicism about the role of these forces in Iraq, and that in turn mediated and intensified the widespread acceptance of attacks on these forces that were the hallmarks of the Arab Sunni insurgency … [They were] understood as collective punishment of the Arab Sunnis as the defeated group in the Iraq War.’
Cascading back to Afghanistan and Pakistan

Just as George W. Bush's second Iraq war was a result of a failure of preventive diplomacy before George H. W. Bush's first Iraq war, so we argue that George W. Bush's 2001 Afghanistan war was a result of failures of preventive diplomacy by George H. W. Bush in Afghanistan at the end of the 1980s. The campaign—initiated during Jimmy Carter's presidency—of supporting mujahidin, including Osama bin Laden, to fight the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan made a significant contribution to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Soviet premier Yuri Andropov said publicly that were it not for the imperative to concentrate on winning the war in Afghanistan, he would have crushed the Solidarity movement in Poland militarily, as the Soviets had previously done successfully in Hungary (1956) and Czechoslovakia (1968). During George H. W. Bush's presidency, in 1988–89, the mujahidin's campaign led to a humiliating withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

Then there was the prospect of this globalising jihad cascading to the destabilisation of Pakistan and to a threat of nuclear terrorism there by the Pakistani Taliban (see Chapters 5 and 6). The safe haven for terrorism in Afghanistan, which the West had been fighting to eliminate since 2001, was replaced with one in Pakistan that became the world headquarters for Al-Qaeda. A renewed Afghan Taliban insurgency was launched from Pakistan that persists, stronger than ever, at the time of writing. Renewal of the formerly defeated Taliban might one day see it return to share power or even take it as the West wearies of fighting them.

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, a successor post-communist regime of former communists assumed power. They were no angels but were no worse than some of the ex-communists who came to power in Eastern Europe and Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The country’s leader, Dr Mohammad Najibullah, was, in particular, no angel. He had been head of the secret police of the former communist regime. Nevertheless, he was committed to transition from communism to social democracy and he acknowledged that he would not be an acceptable leader of Afghanistan for the mujahidin. During the four years he retained power (until April 1992) after the Soviet withdrawal, he wanted to initiate a reconciliation process that would see a transition to powersharing with the various mujahidin groups who continued to fight the Afghan Government. Diplomatically, this seemed a realistic approach because Pakistan’s president, Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, had called for
a reconciliation government in 1987, a year before the Soviets started to withdraw, and, in 1988, he offered his public support for Soviet troops to oversee transition to a reconciliation government to avert bloodshed (Khan 2011: 6). Gorbachev had been attracted to this since 1986, but wanted a speedy withdrawal timeline and could not agree on the details with Pakistan. Najibullah also appealed to the United States to help provide a transition for his country to become ‘a bulwark against the spread of fundamentalism’ (Gargun 1992). Various mujahidin groups, which did not include the Taliban at that time, were determined to keep fighting until their group prevailed over others.

The mujahidin destroyed the country by fighting each other for the spoils of power until the Taliban pushed through the ruck to enforce order. The Bush administration was triumphalist about the mujahidin victory over the Soviets. With Soviet withdrawal, they had achieved their single-level objective of defeating the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It had been achieved at considerable financial cost. The Bush administration wanted to cut those costs—false economy for the long-term financial interests of the United States. So America walked away from Afghanistan in 1989, effectively outsourcing Afghan diplomacy to Pakistan, which proved a well-funded but unfaithful agent of US interests. The Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency played a lead role in putting in power a radical Islamist Taliban that it hoped would be an ISI client.

According to a counterfactual cascades analysis, George H. W. Bush might have done better by Afghanistan and by US interests by putting US diplomatic weight and financial support directly behind the kind of transition from communism that it had supported in many post-communist countries, with former communist leaders little better than those in Afghanistan. Obviously, this would have meant taking up Dr Najibullah’s offer to be a transitional leader who would step aside for a new powersharing government with the ultimate goal of a further transition to future governments elected by the people, as happened in other post-communist societies.

Gorbachev would have found this a much more attractive transition than the ongoing war that was bound to be won in a few years by the mujahidin once the Soviets had pulled out. For Najibullah, it would have been a more attractive outcome than what eventually happened to him: he was castrated and hanged from a post. For the mujahidin, it would also have been a win because they would have inherited in Kabul a city that
was not in ruins. It could have been win–win–win–win for the parties. George H. W. Bush’s administration lacked the vision for a preventive diplomacy that joined forces with its allies and with Gorbachev to impose a ceasefire. That ceasefire might have been followed by a transition to democracy and Western development assistance at a level similar to that provided to post-communist regimes in Europe. Much tragedy might then have been prevented. Gorbachev still had huge leverage through the formidable funds he continued to provide Najibullah, especially to his military effort to hold off the mujahidin. The tragedy that joint Bush–Gorbachev diplomacy might have prevented included the rise of the Taliban, 9/11 and 28 further years so far of terrible warfare in Afghanistan. We see below that the same tragedy of a missed opportunity for joint Bush–Gorbachev preventive diplomacy occurred in Yugoslavia.

Plate 2.3 Women’s rally, communist Afghanistan, 1980.
Source: Originally published in a photobook about Afghanistan by the Communist Government Planning Ministry. Unknown photographer.
The international intervention in Afghanistan has also been a gendered process (D’Costa 2016). US first lady Laura Bush, in a November 2001 radio address from the White House, noted that ‘the fight against terrorism is also a fight for rights and dignity of women’ (Bush 2001). The West touts the considerable advances achieved for women in Afghanistan since 2001—for example, in education for girls—as an accomplishment of its war there. While there has been some progress for women and girls since 2001, it has been much less than the former Afghan communist regime made in that area. By 2014, Afghanistan was still ranked only 101 of 102 countries on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI 2016). The preventive diplomacy road not taken for women and girls was to avert the catastrophic damage the Taliban takeover did to women’s rights. There was broader culpability for this failure of transition: ‘the donor community and the United Nations, which for a long time had been attentive to Afghanistan, held back, literally writing off Afghanistan as a failed state beyond redemption’ (Khan 2011: 326).

Democratic Republic of Congo, 1996

As low as the initial invasion costs were to change the Taliban and Iraqi regimes in 2001 and 2003, and as high as the cascade costs were of regional destabilisation, suicide bombings, civil war and kidnappings in comparison, Afghanistan and Iraq–Syria are not the most extreme cases of this phenomenon. The invasion of Zaire that Rwanda and Uganda led in 1996 with other states, and with internal support from opponents of the regime of president Sese Seko Mobutu, effected regime change quickly, with probably fewer than 4,000 battle deaths. But the successful regime change cascaded into civil war and other forms of regional armed violence that continue today. There is no doubt that exaggerated estimates exist in the literature for the numbers killed in the DRC since 1993 (see Goldstein 2011), as is also true for Iraq and Afghanistan in this period, but it does seem likely that the DRC’s many conflicts have been more deadly and diffused across more countries. War also cascaded to an escalating incidence of rape, estimated from a large national survey published in the American Journal of Public Health (Peterman et al. 2011) to have afflicted 430,000 women aged 15–49 in one year (2007), increasing to higher
levels in the next few years. Some of this was mass rape associated with war; much of it was common criminal rape that we now know also escalates as a result of war. Commentators have used official statistics to argue that rape is not as bad compared, for example, with levels in the United States (e.g. Goldstein 2011: Ch. 10). Our fieldwork suggests such commentary fails to take account of an under-reporting of rape in the DRC that bears no comparison with a country such as the United States; the worst rape occurs in districts beyond the reach of state officials who record crime. While war deaths in the DRC have been overcounted, rape, genocide, state crime and many other crimes have been undercounted compared with surrounding African countries because of the sheer inscrutability of remote parts of Congo that were the cockpit of many regional wars.

As with its opposition to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, France was the major power that most strongly opposed tacit US support for Rwanda and Uganda’s invasion to depose Mobutu (Dunn 2002: 59; Reyntjens 2009). France’s view was that, while Mobutu was a corrupt tyrant of the worst kind, his removal would stir local civil wars that were already simmering. Few listened to France, whose African diplomacy was in bad odour after the deplorable role it played in the Rwandan genocide. But France was right in this instance; it would have been better to wait for the ageing, sickly Mobutu to die and then be replaced through an intensive campaign of diplomatic, Catholic Church and civil society support for constitutional renewal and democratic succession. There was also a plan to prevent the war—a plan that was supported by African leaders such as Nelson Mandela at a Nairobi summit. The plan was backed by UN Security Council Resolution 1078 of 9 November 1996. It involved moving refugee camps, which were threatening Rwanda, a long distance away from the Rwandan border and positioning UN peacekeepers between these new camps and the Rwandan army. According to Reyntjens (2009: 82–3), the United States and Canada (which had offered to command the multinational force), gamed this plan by pretending to support it and promising to supply peacekeepers. The United States and Canada then insisted that peacekeepers could only be deployed on condition that they not be mandated to separate and disarm combatants! This was precisely

10 We also know that there are massive levels of rape in the DRC of girls under 15 and women over 49 and a rate of male rape that is sometimes found to be as high as one-third of the female rape rate. Humiliation of men—for example, by anal rape with the barrel of a rifle to signify their subjugation—is not only about degradation with similarities to the suffering of female rape victims, but also, in a similar way, a strategy of war to destroy enemies.
what the African Union, the European Union and non-governmental organisation (NGO) and UN players had correctly diagnosed as necessary to prevent war. When the crunch came, the United States tacitly supported a Rwandan invasion that was a clear violation of international law.

Plate 2.4 Rwandan Hutus in the Goma refugee camp, eastern Zaire (now DRC), 1994.
Source: Mikkel Ostergaard/Panos.

The error was the same with president Bush’s 2003 diplomacy in invading Iraq and with president Clinton’s diplomacy in deciding to allow, indeed encourage—through the actions of the Pentagon and US intelligence agencies—its ally/client Rwanda to lead the invasion of the DRC in 1996 (Dunn 2002: 58–9; Reyntjens 2009: 57–79). It was the error of a single-level analysis of regime change rather than a cascade analysis. With Iraq, that single-level analysis was: ‘What will be the costs and benefits of an invasion to replace Saddam with our new client?’ With the DRC, it was: ‘What will be the costs and benefits of an invasion to replace Mobutu with a new client of our client (Rwanda)?’ Both US presidents failed to factor beyond the likelihood of a militarily decisive and low-cost initial invasion. Their advisors failed to fully factor in what might be the terrible cascades that the initial military conquest could unleash.
Libya, 2011

Another US administration, this time Barack Obama’s, made the same analytic error in 2011 in Libya. Today, inside Libya itself, the turn of events has been much worse than even African Union leaders feared. Violent jihadist groups affiliated with Islamic State came to control large swathes of Libya and possess massive firepower, including very large numbers of sophisticated missiles capable of shooting down aircraft—civilian or military—anywhere the missiles are deployed around the world.

Libya was no easy foreign policy dilemma after the nonviolent Arab Spring uprising was hijacked into a civil war by a combination of rebellious elements of president Muammar Gaddafi’s armed forces, tribal militias turning against Gaddafi and regional provocateurs from the Arab world pouring arms into the hands of their favoured dissidents. We do not criticise the decision of the United States and the UN Security Council to support NATO airstrikes against the massive armoured column heading towards Benghazi to put down the uprising there on 19 March 2011. Even though prior and subsequent events showed that when Gaddafi did reconquer cities, he did not engage in mass civilian slaughter, ‘the responsibility to protect’ made it hard to ignore an unstable leader with Gaddafi’s murderous past when he warned that he would teach the dissidents in Benghazi a lesson. After NATO aircraft had decimated that column and turned it back, however, the West did not seriously explore options other than ramming home the considerable military advantage the annihilation of that column had delivered, pushing on to crush the regime through a revolution that ended with the rape and murder of Gaddafi himself.

African Union leaders claimed in Peacebuilding Compared interviews in 2012 and 2013 that they already had Gaddafi in a position where he was agreeing to stand aside in a negotiated transition. In 2015, we learnt from leaked recordings of Pentagon negotiations with Saif Gaddafi and other Libyan leaders that US Secretary of Defense, Robert Gates, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mike Mullen, were opposed to a war of regime change. We also learnt that there was no US intelligence indicating a risk of mass atrocity against civilians (see also Puri 2016). Until Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who was determined to achieve regime change, shut down all Pentagon communication with Gaddafi, the emerging Pentagon consensus was to accept Gaddafi’s proposal, which was:
‘The Libyans would stop all combat operations and withdraw all military forces to the outskirts of the cities and assume a defensive posture. Then to insure the credibility with the international community, the Libyans would accept recipients from the African Union to make sure the truce was honored,’ Mr. Kubic [retired Rear Admiral Charles Kubic] said, describing the offers. ‘[Gaddafi] came back and said he was willing to step down and permit a transition government, but he had two conditions,’ Mr. Kubic said. ‘First was to insure there was a military force left over after he left Libya capable to go after al Qaeda. Secondly, he wanted to have the sanctions against him and his family and those loyal to him lifted and free passage. At that point in time, everybody thought that was reasonable.’ (Shapiro and Riddell 2015)

According to Alex de Waal (2013: 379), the African Union roadmap could have stabilised a peaceful democratic transition had it been given a chance by Western and African spoilers and the International Criminal Court (ICC), which acted as a spoiler by announcing an intent to prosecute Gaddafi just as the African leaders were negotiating his exit (Bartu 2014: 2). From a cascades of violence perspective, the advantage of the preferred African Union resolution was that it would have kept Libyan state structures, including security sector structures, in tact for transition to a new democratic leadership (Proposition 4). The cascade analysis of African Union diplomats and senior presidents, such as those of South Africa and Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), was fear of the formidable Libyan security sector disintegrating and the sundry transnational armed groups under its wing fleeing south to destabilise countries beyond Libya. As Alex de Waal (2013: 369–70) put it, Africans saw the militarisation of the Arab Spring in Libya as ‘threatening a lawless mercenarism that could easily spill across borders’. De Waal (2013: 369–70) quoted Chad’s president, Idriss Déby Itno: ‘beware of opening the Libyan Pandora’s Box.’

NATO leaders rejected this cascade analysis in favour of a clear and simple regime change narrative. Sadly, the African leaders’ fears were realised. Mercenaries from Chad, Mali, Niger and Nigeria, after acquiring new skill sets fighting for Gaddifi, abandoned him as the military tide turned and fled south. As African Union leaders had explicitly warned NATO would happen, these fighters carried large parts of Gaddifi’s massive arsenal with them. This included advanced weapon systems and surface-
to-air missiles.\textsuperscript{11} Few countries in the world had a quality and quantity of military hardware superior to Libya. At one point, according to official intelligence interviews, Libya had more Mirage jets than the French air force. Small, battle-hardened armies in possession of an arms bazaar connected up with other dissident military organisations either to seize control of thinly defended regions (prompting civil war) or to dominate smaller districts militarily to extort, loot and push protection rackets. This cascade of former Libyan fighters afflicted Mali, Chad, Niger, northern Nigeria and the Central African Republic. This cascaded to Islamist group Boko Haram coopting most of the chaos that was started by insurgents not affiliated with Islamic State and to civil war in Cameroon as well. It was more destabilising for some of these countries—such as Mali, whose government fell as a result in March 2012—than for others. The Mali civil war even managed to bring ethnic Tuareg troops who had been fighting with Gaddafi together on the same side with jihadists who had fought against him (Rifkind 2013: 18). By 2015, UN reports had documented numerous sightings of Libyan ammunition much further afield in Africa than these countries immediately to Libya’s south. Marsh (2017) concluded that most of the cascade of Libyan arms occurred in 2012 and 2013 and was greatly reduced in the years since.

From a Western perspective, Libya had oil and Gaddafi’s regime was geopolitically significant. From an African viewpoint, Libya was a small country of 6 million people, while Niger, Cameroon, Mali and Chad were much larger countries, of 19 million, 24 million, 18 million and 14 million people, respectively. Nigeria had a population of 182 million and, between 2013 and 2014, it experienced the sharpest increase in terrorism deaths ever recorded. The most deadly terrorist group in the world, according to the 2015 University of Maryland Global Terrorism Index, was not Islamic State, but Boko Haram, headquartered in northern Nigeria, which accounted for half of the 20 most deadly terrorist attacks

\textsuperscript{11} According to the distinguished investigative journalist Seymour Hersh, who was responsible for breaking the story of the My Lai massacre during the Vietnam War and the Abu Ghraib prison torture scandal during the Iraq War, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) also ran a ‘rat line’ via Turkey out of the US Consulate in Benghazi to divert arms captured by the factions they supported in Benghazi. Those weapons went to the armed opposition to the Assad regime in Syria (Cockburn 2014). While these weapons initially went to armed groups supported by the West, ultimately, a large proportion of these groups’ weapons fell into the hands of Islamic State and Al-Qaeda–affiliated groups that overwhelmed them. Some were quite likely transferred directly by the Americans to these groups when they pretended to be US allies. The Hersh story was based on what had been a highly classified and secret annex to the report of the US Senate Intelligence Committee on the attacks by jihadists on the US Consulate in Benghazi in which US ambassador Christopher Stevens was killed.
in 2014. Many credible sources such as UN Security Council reports, *The Washington Post*, *The Guardian* and *Al Jazeera* now confirm that Boko Haram received significant weaponry from the collapse of Libyan armories. In 2015, the group almost certainly reversed the cascade by sending (modest) numbers of troops to fight for an Islamic State takeover of Libya—the ‘gateway to Rome’, as their propaganda put it (Barsocchini 2015; Gutteridge 2015). The African states were therefore livid with NATO that its adventurism had cascaded into their backyard and into a complex of issues much bigger than a containable Libyan transition.

Another accomplishment Africa wanted to defend was one that it shared with South America: the distinction of being a continent where nuclear weapons had begun to spread, but where non-proliferation politics had succeeded in restoring the nuclear-free status of their continents. This is a crucial accomplishment for Africa as the most conflict-riven continent in recent times. It was secured by persuading Gaddafi, with enormous help from European and American diplomacy, to dismantle not only the nuclear program he had been developing in collaboration with Pakistan, Iran, Syria and North Korea, but also most of his chemical and biological weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program. There is dispute, however, whether this had gone as far as those negotiating with Libya believed. In the eyes of its advocates, this package was to be associated with the rising influence of the more liberal and peaceable Saif Gaddafi, albeit with significant pushback by Libyan hardliners, and the strong expectation that Saif would soon succeed his father as head of state. The Gaddafi family was in genuine fear of the rise of Al-Qaeda–affiliated groups and had been ruthlessly effective in suppressing them.

Finally, the rapprochement of Gaddafi with his former enemies had long since resulted in him relinquishing his role as the world’s most diversified funder of anti-Western terrorism, from Indonesia to the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Northern Ireland and right across Africa and the Arab world. Gaddafi and his son Saif had become what we call in Chapter 3 ‘model modernisers’, who ‘rethought what it meant to be a successful country’ (Rublee 2009: 158). Gaddafi observed how insurgents he had supported with weapons and money—such as Nelson Mandela, Gerry Adams and Yasser Arafat—were getting results by engaging diplomatically with the West. It was on the nuclear weapons front that all these diplomatic accomplishments began to unravel. This
was disappointing to African strategic thinkers and some Western ones. As Richard Haass (2014: 1) put it, the abrogation of this preventive diplomacy in favour of regime change:

coming as it did a few years after Qaddafi had been induced to give up his unconventional weapons programs—probably increased the perceived value of nuclear weapons and reduced the likelihood of getting other states to follow Qaddafi’s example.

In other words, rogue regimes will have learnt the lesson from Libya that no matter how outrageously we (rogue regimes) flout the international rules of the game, Western regime-changers will not dare move against us while we have WMD. It is an ironclad law of international relations that no matter how big the crimes of a state with nuclear weapons, the ICC will never indict its leadership. The West only pushes for regime change and ICC indictments of leaders of pariah states such as Libya and Iraq after they have abandoned their WMD programs. Therefore, if we want to be a state that stands relentlessly against the West, against the UN Security Council or for the caliphate, we must take a page out of Israel’s playbook, acquire a credible WMD program and never succumb to diplomatic pressure to surrender it in the naive way of Gaddafi and Saddam.

North Korean generals say not only in private communications detected by Western intelligence but also in public speeches that no country with nuclear weapons has ever been invaded. We have not seen empirical evidence that leaders of rogue states do think this way, rather than just saying it. It is a speculative theory of impetus for the cascade of WMD, but surely a speculation about risk that must be weighed in the balance when considering whether the right path was taken in Libya’s violent regime change.

From the moment Gaddafi was killed, jihadist units began to parade openly under the Al-Qaeda flag in Libya’s largest cities. They operated large training camps to prepare fighters for deployment in the civil wars against Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria and against the US-backed regime in Iraq. During fieldwork interviews in Libya as long ago as December 2013, Islamist leaders told us that more than 1,000 Libyan fighters they had trained in Libya had already been killed fighting in Syria. Jihadist groups gained control of many oilfields. Libyan oil production has collapsed to very low levels for a number of years at the time of writing.
Violence escalated further when regional players—Qatar, Egypt and Sudan—pushed the cascade by providing military support to their preferred internal Libyan clients.

**Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, from 2014**

Part III of the book draws on the learnings from Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) analysis of 323 struggles for regime change (or other maximalist systemic change) between 1900 and 2006. Their data show that nonviolent struggles enjoy twice the success rate of armed struggles. Hence, Western backers of Arab Spring regime-changers might have argued more earnestly with them and their funders that eschewing violence was more likely to achieve long-run success with their objectives. Instead, the West moved rather quickly to arm them. Chenoweth and Stephan’s data suggest that nonviolence is also more likely to secure a regime change that ushers in sustainable democratic consolidation (as opposed to replacing one tyrant with another).

A problem with the Arab Spring has been that both the security/intelligence apparatchiks of the ‘deep state’ in countries such as Egypt, Syria and Yemen (Filiu 2015) and violent Islamist groups, including those backed by Al-Qaeda and later Islamic State, learnt from the quick success of nonviolence in toppling undemocratic regimes by a mostly nonviolent democratic crowd. Similarly, Qatar learned that it could move in to back the Muslim Brotherhood, which was sometimes violent, sometimes not, sometimes democratic, sometimes not, across many states. ‘Deep states’ even secretly released from prison, armed and funded hardline Islamists in the hope of persuading the West to back their dictatorships (Filiu 2015). These groups had an interest in harnessing disorder to their violent projects (Proposition 7). Al-Qaeda cells in Iraq set out to provoke Shia communities to blame a nearby Sunni community and engage in retaliatory attacks. Al-Qaeda’s bombing of the Samarra mosque in Iraq, one of the holiest shrines of Shia Islam, was a prominent example of such an intentionally created cascade of violence (Kilcullen 2013: 139). The Arab Spring uprising in Syria began with a commitment to nonviolence as strong as anywhere in the region. Radical Islamist factions also joined the uprising against Assad, with an agenda of turning it into an armed struggle they sought to dominate. Qatar bears some responsibility for intervening early with a great deal of funding for arms for Assad’s opponents, thus cascading violence in ways not dissimilar to their contribution to turning
Libya from a nonviolent to a violent revolution. In both Libya and Syria, there were Arab businessmen and intelligence officials from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states who were keen to fund groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda. Perhaps they were simply careless in funding many comers who were willing to fight Assad, as was the United States—which was therefore willing to turn a blind eye to such recklessness by its allies. The United States became wilfully blind to the arms Turkey and Gulf states provided to the most successful group fighting President Assad, the Al-Nusra Front, also known until July 2016 as Al-Qaeda in Syria and Al-Qaeda in the Levant. Turkey probably sees Al-Nusra as a group that has been willing to engage in savage fighting against Turkey’s enemy, the other effective fighting force against Assad (and Islamic State), the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG). At some point, the United States started to train and arm the ‘moderate opposition’ to the tune of $500 million, with arms that ended up in the hands of the immoderate and trainees who could not be accounted for on the battlefield (Puri 2016: Ch. 2). The aim of some Gulf-funded spoilers from 2011 seems to have been to destabilise nonviolence and provoke the Syrian military into committing atrocities (Chakrabarti 2013; Jha 2012). In the upshot, this cascaded to Al-Qaeda in Iraq moving into Syria with a success that crushed the democratic opposition to Assad and cascaded to the Islamic State conquest of much of Iraq and Syria in 2014 and 2015.

This, in turn, helped a cascade to civil war in Turkey. In interviews with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leaders, we asked why the peace agreement that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed with the PKK in 2013 disintegrated (Interviews in Iraq, No. 041754). They claimed that Erdoğan started to insist (from 2011 in fact, before the 2013 agreement) that the PKK not provide military support to the Syrian Kurds. Erdoğan’s attempts to enforce this were the beginning of the end of the Turkey–PKK peace agreement. By mid-2015, when the Turkish peace agreement collapsed, the PKK was mobilising huge support for the Syrian Kurd defence against Islamic State. Others point to additional factors, such as the PKK failing to demobilise sufficiently inside Turkey; failing to move all their fighters out to Iraq’s Kurdistan, as agreed in 2013; the rising electoral power of the Kurds inside Turkey, which Erdoğan saw as a threat after the new, predominantly Kurdish People’s Democratic Party won 80 seats in the July 2015 election, forcing Erdoğan to assemble a minority government for the first time since 2002; and vocal PKK opposition to Erdoğan’s acquisition of stronger presidential powers (Akyol 2015).
Mismanagement of the civil war in Turkey in turn helped the cascade to a military coup attempt and then to President Erdoğan succeeding in a referendum to overturn checks and balances against authoritarian rule of Turkey.

Towards a long-run geopolitics of cascade prevention

So what went wrong with the ‘civilising project’, as Elias (2000) saw it, from 1914? Does a cascades analysis have anything to offer in explaining how the extreme surges of violence during the past 103 years might have been prevented?

These years since 1914, we contend, have a more complex geopolitics of violence than the previous century. From 1914—in fact, from 1911—both cascades of violence and cascades of nonviolence grew. This is what makes it a methodologically strategic century for developing an inductive understanding of cascades of violence and nonviolence. The nature of the medium-term trends has become more uncertain than they were at the time of Pinker’s (2011) work. Battlefield deaths increased sharply from 1911 (the Libyan and Balkan wars) and did not begin to descend back towards nineteenth-century levels until the 1990s—although Syria, Iraq and many other smaller conflicts such as Yemen, Ukraine and renewed fighting in the DRC are driving battle deaths up again at the time of writing (Allansson et al. 2017). Violent deaths rose in a period when those who are shot and stabbed on battlefields and in domestic crimes benefit from stupendous progress in the speed with which medics get them to hospitals to save their lives. Improved ambulance services caused a sharp rise in the ratio of wounding and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) suicides to killings during the past century (Fazal 2014).

The next section moves from widening our lens beyond South Asia to a limited temporal widening. It positions the past century as unusually bloody (Ferguson 2006; Hobsbawm 1995) and as preceded by a much more peaceful century after the defeat of Napoleon (from 1812 to 1911). It was a post-Napoleonic century that can be conceived as a high-water mark of Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilising process’—a century in which the lives lost to warfare declined and in which civilising institutions such as the Red Cross/Red Crescent and the Geneva Convention on the rules
of war grew, a labour rights and wider human rights movement matured, abolition of slavery globalised and an anti-mercenary norm consolidated (Percy 2007). It was also a century in which crime declined as social movements against capital and corporal punishment, and advocacy for the more humane treatment of state prisoners, grew (Braithwaite 1989: 111–18).

Sleepwalking into a violent century

One of the most insightful and careful of more than 10,000 books written on the history of the descent into World War I is Christopher Clark’s (2012) *The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914*. We summarise only key aspects of its complexity in the next few pages and then use the summary to consider a secondary war-prevention analysis of its narrative from a cascades perspective. This sets up our big-picture narrative of cascades from World War I to other great conflicts of the next century. This elaboration is critical to reflect on the paradoxical nature of the cascade framework. A cascades analysis that instructs us in a dynamics of how violence can beget further violence seems at first a counsel of pessimism—not so when we iterate between the cascades analysis and a narrowing inquiry into preventive paths not taken. When we consider paths not taken at every level of the cascade, a politics of hope is enabled.

Cascades analysis provides an alternative way to normatively narrow the field of vision. Instead of asking who should be singled out for blame for causing the war, it asks who missed opportunities to prevent it. This leads to a long list of entries if we do the secondary cascades analysis of Clark’s narrative. From a cascades perspective, the more entries on this list, the more useful the diagnosis becomes. This is because each entry opens our eyes to a new way of seeing possibilities for a diplomacy of cascade prevention. It is an iterative form of normative narrowing that invites the cascades analyst to shuttle backwards and forwards between a focus on different paths not taken to preventive diplomacy. Multilateral processes of interaction can be diagnosed to animate multiplex war-prevention insights. On the negative side, complexity and chaos make the world difficult to understand; on the positive side, they mean preventive analysis is possible that identifies many of the right kinds of butterfly wings to flap (alongside some wrong ones) to tame the climate of violence.
Plate 2.5 Front page of the *Domenica del Corriere*, an Italian paper, with a drawing by Achille Beltrame depicting Gavrilo Princip killing Archduke Ferdinand of Austria in Sarajevo, 1914.

Source: Wikimedia.
An important feature of *The Sleepwalkers* is that it does not treat the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, Bosnia, on 28 June 1914 as merely a spark that lit a war made inevitable by larger structural forces. On that view of history, had the spark in Sarajevo not lit the conflagration, some other spark would have (MacMillan 2013). Clark’s comprehensive diagnosis of the way events unfolded to war, in contrast, convincingly argues that the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand, successor to the throne of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was much more than a pretext for a war that would have been justified by some other pretext, if not this one. Serbia and its terrorist assassins, in Clark’s (2012: xxvi) analysis, were no mere objects or victims of great power politics; Serbian nationalism was a historical force in its own right and its nationalists made the most important early moves to war. Clark endorses ‘some of the most interesting writing on the subject’ (e.g. p. xix, footnote 19), which argues that ‘far from being inevitable, this war was in fact “improbable”—at least until it actually happened’. Henry Kissinger’s (2014: 81) more recent diagnosis adds to that ‘interesting writing’:

[T]he war that overturned western civilization had no inevitable necessity. It arose from a series of miscalculations made by serious leaders who did not understand the consequences of their planning, and a final maelstrom triggered by a terrorist attack occurring in a year generally believed to be a tranquil period. In the end, the military planning ran away with diplomacy. It is a lesson subsequent generations must not forget.

Clark (2012: xxix) shows that rather than being structurally inevitable, war was improbable. Most decision-makers on all sides considered war improbable, with some good reason, until the final days of the crisis. ‘The people, events and forces described in this book carried in them the seeds of other, perhaps less terrible, futures’ (Clark 2012: xxix). Factors such as the structure of the Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria–Hungary and Italy) and the Triple Entente (Russia, France and the United Kingdom) were crucial to understanding the war, but Clark’s journey through its unfolding finds World War I was less a consequence of long-run deterioration, and more ‘of short-term shocks to the international system’ (2012: xxix).

Another important structural variable in the Clark analysis is the unsettling of alliance balances caused by the disintegration of empires. This book will come to conceive such unsettling as anomic in Durkheimian terms (Proposition 7). There is contingency, however, in how war contributes to such disintegration. Disintegration of the
ancient Chinese empire became an occasion for jostling between major powers for a share of it. Russian penetration of northern China in the 1890s ‘triggered a cascade of local and regional conflicts that culminated in the Sino–Japanese War of 1894–5’ (Clark 2012: 137). With Japan's defeat of China, Japan thenceforth not only was a rival with Russia for domination of northern China, but also emerged as a major power. China's defeat also triggered a race for concessions by great powers seeking to bite further chunks off China, which was too big for them to utterly swallow. ‘The negative energies generated by the race for China, in turn, heightened tensions in Europe’ (Clark 2012: 137; see further Neilson 1994).

For Clark, though, the decisive (anomic) unbalancing was the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The beginning of World War I was in Africa. Perceiving the weakness of the Ottoman Empire, and wanting to join as a late starter in the race for colonies, Italy attacked and annexed the former breadbasket of the ancient Roman Empire, Libya, in September 1911. Perhaps half the Libyan population perished during the war of protracted resistance by Arab tribesmen (Simons 2003: 133). ‘This unprovoked attack on one of the integral provinces of the Ottoman Empire triggered a cascade [Clark chooses that word] of opportunist attacks on Ottoman-controlled territory in the Balkans’ (Clark 2012: 42). Libya flashed a green light emboldening multiple incursions into
Ottoman territories—‘breaking the ice’, as one British observer of the time put it. Serbia, Montenegro, Bulgaria and Greece, in loose alliance, launched parallel attacks on the Ottoman Balkans. This first Balkan war (October 1912 – May 1913) cascaded to a second Balkan war (June–July 1913) in which the belligerents fought with one another over the spoils won in the first. The biggest winner was Serbia, whose acquisitions included Kosovo—‘mythscape of Serbian national poetry’ (Clark 2012: 43)—which had been lost to the Ottoman Empire in a Serbian defeat on Kosovo Field in 1389. A creaking architecture of geopolitical alliances that had been containing local wars was swept away.

Clark finishes his book by asking the culpability question. He concludes that it is unproductive to attempt to settle who was to blame and problematic to presume that the objectives of one state were right, and another’s wrong. Clark (2012: 560) contends that ‘prosecutorial narratives … narrow the field of vision’ to the neglect of ‘multilateral processes of interaction’:

> The outbreak of war in 1914 is not an Agatha Christie drama at the end of which we will discover the culprit standing over a corpse in the conservatory with a smoking pistol. There is no smoking gun in this story; or rather there is one in the hands of every major character. (Clark 2012: 561)

A smoking gun in the hands of every major character is an interesting way of seeing Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, Pakistan and the DRC today. It is an interesting way of seeing a cascades theory. The thing about a chain of conjunctures that leads to an unlikely catastrophe is that preventive action at many links in that chain might have broken it. There were multiple nodes of decision-making along the chain of decisions to World War I. At each one, concerted efforts at preventive diplomacy might have interrupted the chain of causation.

What, then, is our secondary reading of Clark’s narrative that opens our policy imagination to how preventable, as opposed to how inevitable, was World War I? How can we awaken sleepwalkers of UN, EU and local diplomacy today to the iterated options for committed preventive diplomacy for disrupting a dynamic chain of conjunctures that can lead to war, or away from it? How can we focus on one preventive diplomacy option, then another, until this or that decision-maker acts to avert the war trajectory?
Preventive options

Consider the first link of Clark’s chain of conjunctures: Italy’s 1911 invasion of Libya. It was not that no one saw a potential cascade and no one warned Italy. Italy was warned that it had an opportunity to prevent a destabilisation that would come back to harm it and the rest of Europe. The German ambassador in Constantinople alerted the Italian ambassador that an Italian invasion of Libya could bring down the Young Turk regime and ‘trigger a sequence of disorders’ that would destabilise the region—a warning also issued to Italy by the Austrian foreign minister (Clark 2012: 246).

A warning, however, was not a concerted diplomatic campaign to put Italy under pressure to change course. Social change needs more than a warning that induces awareness of a risk; it needs ‘Awareness, Motivation and Pathways’ (AMP) to change (Honig et al. 2015). Indeed, most of Europe’s powerbrokers acquiesced in, or even encouraged, the course Italy took in Libya. So why would Italy have been motivated to consider an alternative pathway to its interests? Clark points out that Italy was balancing both desirable and ‘undesirable consequences’ that might cascade from its invasion, so tipping that balance might have been possible if traditions of preventive diplomacy had been more mature than they were in 1911. A state as powerful as Britain decided not to alienate Italy by opposing its occupation of Libya.

The Austro-Hungarian Empire initially resisted provocation by the terrorism of the Black Hand; it had no desire to invade Serbia, ‘an act that would have amounted to geopolitical suicide’ (Clark 2012: 364). The Black Hand terrorist movement was as much a threat to the authority of the Serbian Government as it was to peace in Europe. Had the Serbian Government nipped it in the bud early, the assassination that provoked Vienna to precipitate that very geopolitical suicide by attacking Serbia might have been averted. Moreover:

The interlocking commitments that produced the catastrophic outcome of 1914 were not long-term features of the European system, but the consequence of numerous short-term adjustments that were themselves evidence of how swiftly relations among the powers were evolving. And had the trigger not been pulled, the future that became history in 1914 would have made way for a different future, one in which, conceivably,
the Triple Entente might not have survived the resolution of the Balkan crisis and the Anglo-German détente might have hardened into something more substantial. (Clark 2012: 364)

While Clark points out paradoxical consequences of all the moves made, the main game for preventing catastrophe was more assertive diplomacy by both Germany and the United Kingdom to strengthen détente between them. Every player in the Great War was a terrible loser who never would have ‘drifted into war in August 1914 … could they have foreseen the world of 1918’ (Kissinger 2014: 83). Other leaders could see much more to gain than could the leaders of the United Kingdom and Germany, however. Serbia and Russia made important territorial gains from the war and in filling the geopolitical vacuums left by the demise of the Ottoman and Austro-Hungarian empires, even though Russia in the event reaped its 1917 revolution. France wanted revenge on Germany for its defeat in the Franco-Prussian war of 1870–71 to revive its great power stature and to regain Alsace-Lorraine from Germany. Germany and the United Kingdom allowed themselves to lose a generation to a war in which they had so little to gain compared with these lesser powers. They were the most geopolitically powerful actors before the war. They were in the best position to work with each other for a détente to calm their allies. They failed to prevent themselves from being led by the quests for territory and dignity of Serbia and quests of other lesser powers that responded to Serbia’s predicament. Another path to peace not taken: Anglo-German collaborative détente.

Instead, the cascade was that the Austro-Hungarian Empire marched on Serbia, Russia then joined to defend Serbia from Austria-Hungary and Germany then had little choice but to mobilise to defend its only major ally, Austria-Hungary. This drew in France, which was keen to settle its score with Germany in the best circumstances possible for France (in alliance with Russia and Serbia and with good prospects of drawing in the British Empire when Germany attacked Belgium to enter France). The British Cabinet was indeed reluctantly drawn in and, in 1917, the United States was engaged to end it. Far away from Serbia, Australia attacked and occupied Germany’s New Guinea colony, among other far-flung colonial cascades of conflict. Japan likewise seized the opportunity of German preoccupation in Europe to seize German colonies in the Pacific and, more importantly, in China. The rules of the game had become dangerously unsettled. Anomie globalised. Other intermediate powers such as Turkey and Italy were drawn in.
We can deploy Clark’s text to move back down from this high politics of preventive diplomacy to the most micro level of prevention: the utter bungling of security for Archduke Ferdinand’s visit to Sarajevo. Despite the fact that there had been warning of a potential attack, troops did not line the curbs of the street, as was usual for a cavalcade in an open car along a predictable route. The special security detail normally present had mistakenly been left behind at Sarajevo railway station. After a first bomb failed to hit its mark, the Archduke foolishly proceeded with his itinerary only to be killed along with his wife by a back-up assassin (Clark 2012: 369). In the era of modern terrorism, the micro-management of security is critical to preventing wars of revenge—wars of stupid resolve to be seen as not being pushed around by terrorists. Washington’s invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 was no less foolish than Vienna’s of Serbia in that regard.

A preventable assassination by unprofessional teenage assassins having occurred, there was little the Government of Serbia could do to prevent celebration of the murders by Serbian nationalists in coffee houses and in the media. Serbian leaders could have condemned those who were making heroes of the terrorists. They chose not to. Serbia could have conducted an internationally credible investigation of the Black Hand and arrested its ringleaders, but did not. Failure to do these things, and failures of great powers to insist that these things were done, infuriated the Austrian press and people who put Vienna under pressure to opt for a military response. We can see the parallel with the preventive diplomacy failure of the Afghan Government to be more proactive and decisive by arresting bin Laden in 1998 and 2001 and failing to be more public about its gestures towards making him available for an internationally credible criminal trial.

Even in the face of Belgrade’s failures, Vienna might have followed the advice of undersecretary of state Arthur Zimmerman of the German Foreign Office to avoid throwing ‘humiliating demands’ back at Belgrade. Instead, the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia—while mild compared with brash American ultimatums of recent decades—was what Winston Churchill described as ‘the most insolent document of its kind ever devised’ (Clark 2012: 456). Austria–Hungary would be at war with Serbia if the demands were not acceded to within 48 hours.
In spite of this sequence of failures to take preventive diplomatic paths, as the 48-hour deadline approached, there was alarm among the Serbian leadership at the prospect of an Austrian attack. They were minded to accept all the Austrian demands, but, ultimately, they did not do so and World War I was indeed the result. One reason they did not was pressure from the only ally who could save them, Russia, in the form of a telegram reporting that the Russian foreign minister ‘condemned the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum with disgust’, declaring that any state that acceded to such demands would commit ‘suicide’ and, furthermore, unofficially assuring Serbia that it could count on Russian support in a showdown (Clark 2012: 462).

So there were two paths to peace not taken here. One was the decision of the Serbian Government not to go further than it did in accepting Vienna’s ultimatum, especially when it came to easy concessions in relation to investigating the assassination. This was compounded by the decision of the Russian hawks to seize the moment to pass assurance to Serbia that it would back militarily a decision to stand on its dignity. The second path to peace not taken was the decision of the tsar and other Russian leaders not to pull their hawks back at that moment. The tsar failed to stop Russia from signalling war by massing troops. This was Kissinger’s lesson about preventing military planning from pre-empting diplomacy. That, in turn, connected to further failures of preventive diplomacy by Russia’s Triple Entente allies, France and the United Kingdom. They failed to apply concerted pressure to persuade Serbia (and Russia) to respond more apologetically and compliantly to Vienna. The reconciliation road not taken cost the Russian Empire 2–3 million lives and the tsar his throne.

Many of the decision-makers in this chain of events felt they were in a security dilemma (Proposition 5): perhaps war is inevitable, so it will be better if we strike them on our terms now that we are ready, rather than waiting for them to strike us later when they are stronger. Stephen Van Evera (1984) has described this as ‘the cult of the offensive’ that was a cause of World War I—that is, the (mistaken) belief of leaders that they had a better chance of victory in World War I through offence than through defence.

These security dilemmas were worsened by the fluidity of power within state executives that were in complex processes of transition from monarchy to parliamentary democracy. In this book, we come to identify this as anomie over not only what are the rules of the game but also who
is in charge: the president, the parliament, the prime minister or the king? New media pressures from proprietors who had learnt that bellicose appeals to national dignity sold newspapers were also buffeting states; none of them had been on twenty-first-century ‘peace journalism’ courses! Power within each executive had a tendency to migrate from one node of governance to another. To different degrees and at different times, in states such as Austria–Hungary and Russia:

> Power to shape foreign policy flowed around a loose human circuitry within the hive-like structure of the political elite, concentrating at different parts of the system, depending on who formed the more effective and determined alignments. (Clark 2012: 240)

In Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as Austria and Russia, the sovereign no longer made a final call, but sometimes came into play to blur power relations. Mistrust, paranoia and a misunderstanding of the intentions of other powers were rife, fuelling these security dilemmas.

When hawks momentarily monopolised signalling on both sides of a conflict, rapid unexpected escalation frequently occurred. Later innovations in diplomatic communication, such as hotlines between decision-makers whose roles each side clearly understood, were advances that might also have broken the chain of actions leading to the Great War.

**Contemporary preventive options and cascades**

We now move from the beginning to the end of the twentieth century and to the current century to see why the cascade reading of *The Sleepwalkers* remains relevant. This is advanced by considering the war diplomacy of the three Bush administrations in the same conflicts discussed in the first half of this chapter. First, we consider the former Yugoslavia, then Libya, then the cascades from the two World Wars and then Congo and Africa’s great postcolonial cascades. The chapter concludes with an introduction to cascades in South Asia, using cascades in the Middle East and Afghanistan as a bridge to them.
Preventing Yugoslavia, 1990

Christopher Clark makes the point in *The Sleepwalkers* that, in the 1980s, historians and Westerners in general were prone to see the onset of World War I as a conflict of a distant era, of monarchs in hats with ostrich plumes, lead characters that barely resonate with modern politics. Yet Clark shows that, by 1914, seemingly powerful monarchs such as Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany, Tsar Nicholas II of Russia and George V of the United Kingdom were figureheads of modern executive governments. One way Clark helps us to see differently the cascades of violence of the Balkan wars is by taking the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand more seriously as a preventable spark. When Clark makes us see the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo, Bosnia, as the work of a transnational terrorist group with thousands of members—the Black Hand—he helps us see 1914 through a post-Yugoslavia, post–Al-Qaeda lens. The Black Hand project of a greater Serbia that conquered Muslim regions of the Ottoman Empire with significant Serb populations, such as Bosnia and Kosovo, was the project of Serbian president Slobodan Milošević in the late 1980s and 1990s. The cascade in Yugoslavia was from a short, minor independence war in Slovenia to a more major one in Croatia, to an even more terrible one in Bosnia and another in Kosovo that involved Montenegro and Serbia in attacks on Croatia and other former Yugoslav republics. These conflicts ‘ended’, as in World War I, with decisive US intervention: the US–NATO bombing of Serbian positions in Bosnia and then Belgrade itself.

Yugoslavia’s wars of the 1990s could have—should have—been prevented, before they broke out, by the European Community, the Soviet Union and the United States working together to warn Milošević that they would not allow him to pursue ethnically divisive Serbian chauvinism towards his goal of a greater Serbia. The defeat of Muslim armies by the adventurism of a Christian army in Bosnia and Kosovo was the last thing the world needed. Warning Milošević off could have been achieved by weight of great power diplomacy without dropping a single NATO bomb. Mikhail Gorbachev supported Milošević because Serbia had long been a pan-Slavic Russian ally, in a way Croatia and Josip Tito (a Croat–Slovenian) had not. Moscow saw Milošević as the best hope of holding Yugoslavia together, rather than seeing him in the more accurate way Western diplomats did. This more accurate Western view was of Milošević as the principal driver of a looming violent disintegration of Yugoslavia. One can perhaps excuse Gorbachev and his policy circle for this analytic error. He was in a weak
position, at risk from his own military, preoccupied with holding the Soviet Union together, and was prone to see a collapse of Serbian hegemony in holding Yugoslavia together through the lens of a precedent for a collapse of Moscow’s hegemony in holding the Soviet Union together. One can excuse Europe to a degree as well: it was distracted by the implications of the end of the Cold War for a new architecture of European foreign policy, it was arguing its way towards the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and was far from settling the very idea of a unified European Union with such a thing as EU foreign policy. It learnt much from Yugoslavia on why it needed such a policy to prevent cascades that spread from instability in the Balkans.

It is harder to excuse the failure of preventive diplomacy of the US administration of George H. W. Bush. By 1989, Bush was, according to Wikileaks and many other sources, in receipt of advice from the CIA of the risk of major war in Yugoslavia. The CIA was so firm in this analysis that, by 1990, it issued a National Intelligence Estimate that Yugoslavia ‘will break up’ and ‘this is likely to be achieved by ethnic violence and unrest that could lead to civil war’ (Marolov 2012: 9). While Gorbachev, by 1990, had become the weakest premier in the history of the Soviet Union, Bush was the most powerful US president history will ever see, with the end of the Cold War and in advance of the rise of China and a unified European foreign policy. He had the authority to persuade Gorbachev (who needed Bush desperately) to work in concert with him and the European powers to persuade Milošević to sheath his sabre. Diplomacy was needed that could be read as the resolve of the international community. That resolve could have been to signal support for deploying a large international peacekeeping force to position troops between Serbia and other republics if necessary to prevent escalation to war. Ultimately, the international community did deploy hundreds of thousands of peacekeepers, NATO and Russian, who remained in the former Yugoslavia long into the twenty-first century. NATO went even further and deployed the new smart bombs of American airpower. This was the tragedy of the presidency of George H. W. Bush. In circumstances in which the United States in the end would feel compelled to deploy military power in Yugoslavia after a cascade of war had spun out of hand, America looked inwards in 1990, failing to signal in advance a willingness to do what it ultimately did. Bush failed to assert preventive diplomacy. That diplomacy could have signalled the reality that, if push came to shove, the United States would use its military power to restrain Milošević. The international community
not only failed to prevent the initial war between Croatia and Serbia, it also failed to position troops to prevent the further cascade of Croatian and Serbian armies attacking Bosnia to carve it up. Later, it did learn this lesson by moving UN peacekeepers in early to prevent a cascade of the Kosovo conflict into a Macedonian civil war. Ultimately, joint NATO and Russian peace enforcement deployment that seemed difficult in 1989 became imperative a decade later when it happened in Kosovo. As UN and US diplomat David Phillips (2012: 208) said of the subsequent risking of UN peacekeepers in Macedonia: ‘The UN Preventive Deployment in Macedonia (UNPREDEP) was a model for preventive diplomacy.’

In sum, just as the Balkans crises cascaded after 1911—preventably—to much worse, so with the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries diplomacy of the three Bush administrations we see sleepwalking into cascades of violence from one Yugoslav republic to another, from one form of armed violence in Iraq to another, from one war to another in Afghanistan and from terror to more cascades of terrorism. Like the protagonists of 1914, Western powers in these recent conflicts were also ‘sleepwalkers, watchful but unseeing, haunted by dreams, yet blind to the reality of the horror they were about to bring into the world’ (Clark 2012: 562).

Preventing Libya’s violence

NATO-driven regime change to oust Muammar Gaddafi in Libya was, for most UN Security Council members who voted for decisive military action, more about a responsibility to protect civilians than regime change (Puri 2016). But we concluded that the Security Council debate was thin on the risk that concerned many African Union diplomats—that war in Libya would spill into the larger African states to its south. In this case, we do not necessarily argue that Security Council members erred in voting the way they did. We simply note that, to a degree, the Security Council members were sleepwalking when they voted. The purpose of this book is to awaken sleepwalkers to look for the kinds of signals of cascade risks that the African Union leaders were signalling, but to which NATO diplomats

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12 This was the same tragic error that we saw in the diplomacy of the first Gulf War. The United States, which was in fact willing to go to war to prevent the invasion of Kuwait, failed to signal this inexorability to Saddam in advance of the mobilisation of his army. Of course, it can be a grave error to signal willingness to fight if a state has doubtful commitment to doing so, and it can be an even graver error to go to war. Yet, from a cascades perspective, there is no more foolish error than failing to signal willingness for war when a hostile act will in fact trigger a firm commitment to war.
were blind; though not all—NATO’s preeminent stateswoman, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, kept Germany out of the Libyan fray and Germany abstained from the Security Council resolution for a no-fly zone over Libya (Nelles 2011). Abstaining on the grounds of awareness of the problem and sympathy with the African Union’s alternative diplomacy does not comprise all three elements of AMP—Awareness, Motivation and Pathways to change (Honig et al. 2015). Instead of abstaining, Germany needed to mobilise its Awareness to Motivate other states to help lay that alternative Path of the African Union to a bloodless resolution.

Preventing cascades from world wars

Great power geopolitics at the level of scrambling NATO aircraft over Belgrade, Tripoli, Kabul and Baghdad has some elements in common with the sleepwalking into preventable cascades of violence of World War I. World War II was a cascade from World War I. Just as France pushed into World War I to restore the dignity it lost in its defeat by Germany in 1871, so Adolf Hitler pushed into World War II to restore the dignity lost at Versailles,13 as his bristling over Versailles in Mein Kampf makes very clear.14 One of our anonymous referees advanced the excellent contestation of this interpretation of German history by invoking Germany’s next cascade to peace: ‘One could argue that the utter humiliation of the German people in World War II actually contributed to their pacification and stopped the cascades of violence.’ The same point could be advanced for Japan, which became so nonviolent as the number-two economy in the world after 1945. Chapters 11 and 12 of this book are about how to go about making this reverse cascade into nonviolence happen more frequently. As Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi argued, domination, humiliation and violence create special opportunities to reciprocate violence with gifts of nonviolence. Our interpretation of why a defeated Germany cascaded violence after its defeat in World War I is that Germany was treated punitively, with Versailles being a degradation ceremony. In contrast, rituals of reintegration embraced Germany and

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13 In terms of the theory of defiance–deterrence we will introduce in Chapter 3, the Treaty of Versailles was ‘[t]oo punitive for conciliation, too lenient to keep Germany from recovering’ (Kissinger 2014: 83).
14 Hitler (1930: 483) argues in Mein Kampf that the Versailles treaty was ‘the greatest villainy of the century’. He described the German politicians who signed it as ‘miserable and degenerate criminals’ (or ‘the November criminals’). ‘Each point of that Treaty could have been engraved on the minds and hearts of the German people and burned into them until sixty million men and women would find their souls aflame with a feeling of rage and shame’ (p. 483).
Japan after World War II, the most important of which was the Marshall Plan to rebuild defeated economies and support the building of welfare states (Ahmed et al. 2001). Soviet policies towards Germans in Eastern Europe were not so reintegrative, and we will see how this cascaded rape, ethnic cleansing and many forms of violence to Germany’s east and south. Our research describes cascade patterns that are pregnant with complex possibilities for reversal by the jujitsu that is the strategy of nonviolence. This is because, as explained in the previous chapter, there is critical cognitive content in how action cascades: it can cascade with imaginaries of violence or with imaginaries of nonviolence.

The Russian Revolution was in many ways enabled by the enormous costs of Russia’s war with Germany: Germany cascaded violence intentionally through German agents smuggling Vladimir Lenin back into Russia from exile to create havoc (Snyder 2010: 16). Timothy Snyder (2010), in turn, conceives Joseph Stalin’s mass murder of millions of his own citizens in the 1930s as helping Hitler to justify his terror against communists and social democrats (before moving on to Jews and other groups). In turn, again on Snyder’s (2010) account, Hitler’s slaughter of German communists helped provide a justification for Stalin’s Great Terror inside the Soviet Union: ‘the direct physical liquidation of the entire counter-revolution’ (Order 004478, 31 July 1937, quoted in Snyder 2010: 66).15

Just as World War I cascaded to the Russian Revolution, World War II cascaded to millions of further lives lost in the civil war that brought Chairman Mao Zedong to power in China:

When the Japanese prime minister Tanaka Kakuei, in 1972, apologised to Chairman Mao for what his country had done to the Chinese during the war, Mao, who was not without a macabre sense of humor, told his foreign guest to relax: It is us who should thank you, he said; without you we would never have come to power. (Buruna 2013: 84)

15 Snyder (2010: 5, 258) concludes that the mutual cascading of mass atrocity between Stalin and Hitler cost 14 million civilian lives before the Russian and German armies went to war against each other in 1941. The master cleavage of World War II then interacted murderously with secondary and tertiary cleavages with a morphology comparable to that described for primary, secondary, tertiary and quaternary cleavages in Myanmar’s recent conflicts in Chapter 9 (Propositions 2, 3 and 5). For example, Snyder here refers to subsequent cascades that then occurred after Germany and Russia went to war against each other: ‘In occupied Belarus, Belarusians killed other Belarusians, some of them as policemen in the German service, some of them as Soviet partisans. In occupied Ukraine, policemen fled the German service to join nationalist partisan units. These people then killed tens of thousands of Poles and fellow Ukrainians in the name of a social and nationalist revolution’ (Snyder 2010: 267).
The German surrender in 1945 accelerated historical change in the global character of armed violence. In hotspot after hotspot in Yugoslavia, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Romania and beyond, both Reich German and ethnic German populations were ethnically cleansed (Ferguson 2006: 583). This cascade of violence was the combined effect of unregulated local vengeance and Soviet policy, perhaps enabled by Churchill's proposals at the Moscow Conference of October 1944. Possibly 13 million Germanic people were uprooted, with 2 million losing their lives in the process (Ferguson 2006: 584). This was only part of a wider process of 31 million people being uprooted across Europe between 1944 and 1948—a refugee crisis whose numbers were higher than today’s refugee crisis. This included Bulgarians driven out of eastern Macedonia and western Thrace, Greeks fleeing Macedonia and western Thrace, Greeks fleeing Turkey, Muslims fleeing Greece, Serbs ethnically cleansing Croats, Magyars expelled from southern Slovakia, Ukrainians driven from Poland, Ukrainian slaughter of Poles and Poles fleeing Russia. There was even a fully fledged pogrom against Jews in Kielce, Poland, in July 1946, among other cleanings (Ferguson 2006: 584; Lake and Rothchild 1998: 166–8). European states were greatly ethnically homogenised through this postwar bloodletting.

Knock-on wars followed to decide who the real winners of the two world wars would be in the Balkans and beyond; from the Greek civil war between Western-backed and Soviet-backed factions of 1946–49, which cost more than 100,000 lives, to much more bloody conflicts, such as the Chinese civil war and the Korean War, which was over whether Korea would come out of the war as a communist satellite or a US client. Both these wars took more than a million lives and both count among the 20 most deadly wars of recorded human history.

Yet, the biggest postwar cascade lay south of China and Korea. It arose from the ruthlessness of the Soviet Union’s consolidation of a new empire from 1945 and its pursuit of a catch-up nuclear weapons program.

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16 This was the so-called Percentages Agreement, in which, according to an aggrandising account made public by Churchill, Churchill proposed one-on-one with Stalin a division of Europe into spheres of influence. Churchill wrote on a piece of paper now held by the United Kingdom’s Public Record Office (PREM 3/66/7 (169)) that the Soviet Union should have 90 per cent influence in Romania and 75 per cent in Bulgaria; the United Kingdom would have 90 per cent influence in Greece and it would be 50/50 in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Stalin ticked it and passed it back. Churchill, however, did not mention in his autobiography that the next day the Soviets renounced key parts of the agreement when Churchill put it in writing and foreign ministers Vyacheslav Molotov and Anthony Eden did the serious negotiation of more nuanced, detailed and quite different understandings of what would happen in different parts of Europe (Kolko 1990: 145).
This was the Cold War between the superpowers. The United States and the Soviet Union were too afraid of nuclear weapons to fight each other directly. At this level, mutual deterrence at last exceeded mutual defiance (Proposition 1). But Cuban troops and the iconic imaginary of Che Guevara across Latin America and in Africa counted among the many agents of defiance in this Cold War (Proposition 1). As empires broke up, decolonisation interacted with deadly policies of civil war provocations against postcolonial regimes that aligned with the opposite side in the Cold War. The Cold War in the north became hot wars of the south. The tragedy in the south was that ‘the United States did almost as little for freedom as the Soviet Union did for liberation’ (Ferguson 2006: 617). Even more evocatively, Niall Ferguson suggests that people expected the third world war to become Third-World wars.

The Cold War was therefore one of the dynamics that drove the hotspot-to-hotspot and ethnic character of new wars, as distinguished from the interstate character of old wars (Kaldor 1999). Rivalry played out in this way meant that great powers could not mobilise to suppress defiance below deterrence in the south among lesser powers (Proposition 1). Nor could the United Nations do this when either the United States or the Soviet Union vetoed any resolution to deploy UN peacekeepers to suppress a civil war that disadvantaged their adversary. Only the end of the Cold War briefly brought two more peaceful decades in which there was enhanced cooperation among Russia, the United States and Europe to suppress civil wars. In the aftermath of the NATO hijack of the UN Security Council to support a war of regime change in Libya, the 2014–15 civil war in Ukraine and the abysmal failure of Washington–Moscow cooperation over Syria, the Moscow–Washington relationship was again an enemy of peace. Does this mean the UN Security Council can no longer collaboratively tackle catastrophes such as those in Syria, Iraq and Libya? It remains to be seen whether the rapprochement of US President Donald Trump with Moscow might end the risk of a new kind of Cold War.

Was there a failure of preventive diplomacy after 1990 in cornering Russia by expanding NATO into its old Eastern European empire instead of embracing Russia into a reintegrative new architecture? Had this been done, might it have been possible to reform the Security Council veto of permanent members so that the United Nations could act effectively in hard cases such as Syria? Instead of zero-sum moves to enhance NATO power at the expense of Moscow, were there not win–win options that expanded the power of both Russia and the West to solve pending
problems together? This embrace was accomplished with Germany and Japan at the end of World War II by rejecting the zero-sum politics of Versailles. Towards the end of Gorbachev’s premiership, the West did indeed seem to be heading towards a Marshall Plan mode of Russian reintegration. The attempted military coup against Gorbachev seemed to be the beginning of the end of Russian reintegration. It was not extended to Gorbachev’s successors.

In the civil wars inside developing countries that became the dominant form of warfare after the Korean conflict, cascades within cascades of violence were also very evident, as we saw in our earlier discussion of Congo’s wars and the ‘bloodlands’ that separated Hitler from Stalin (Snyder 2010; Propositions 2, 3 and 5). Many of these non-interstate wars were initially inside Asian and Latin American states, but, by the late twentieth century, they were particularly concentrated in Africa.

**Preventing Congo’s wars**

The Congo wars were the worst of them because they saw ‘up to 14 foreign armies’ fighting on Congolese soil, according to Autesserre (2010: 49). There were at least eight foreign countries with armies, plus Congolese state and non-state armies, plus the private military corporation Executive Outcomes (ICG 1998), mercenaries from Eritrea and Ethiopia (possibly with the blessing of their governments, possibly not) and mercenaries from Serbia and France (Reyntjens 2009: 62, 65, 114–15). Because Uganda fought in the DRC, Uganda’s enemy Sudan got involved and both launched raids on one another’s territory from Congo. This is one reason for Reyntjens (2009: 43) perceiving a cascade whereby ‘the Great Lakes conflict tended to merge with two others, the Sudanese and Angolan civil wars’. In 2017, Sudanese militias and organised crime groups are also worsening the great contemporary cascade from Libya by fighting as mercenaries in the Libyan civil war (Amin and Muhammed 2017), in the wake of Sudan being the largest African state fighting force during the 2011 Libyan war of regime change. For Uganda and Angola, one reason for entering the war in the DRC was to suppress one or more of its armed insurgency groups hiding in Congo. They were disappointed with the cascade that resulted: the general availability of arms inside the DRC meant these Ugandan and Angolan resistance movements actually strengthened in the course of the war (Muchai 2002: 188). In the case of Angola, this cascaded to reignition of a dormant civil war at home.
These states (Sudan, Angola and Uganda) were also involved in cascades of violence involving other warring states in north-east Africa: Somalia, Kenya, Ethiopia and Eritrea. To the north-west, fighters from as far afield as Chad fought in the DRC. Libya did not send fighters but had multifarious covert involvements. These had an impact on how African countries reacted to the uprising to overthrow Gaddafi. This was related to why Sudan made particularly important contributions of tank and infantry units on the side of the 2011 Libyan rebellion, as did Qatar, with Egypt coming in on the opposite side to Qatar in the fighting currently under way in Libya.

To the immediate north of Congo, DRC refugees and fighters were pursued into the Central African Republic (to which Ugandan armed groups also fled) and refugees and fighters from Congo-Brazzaville’s quite separate wars between 1993 and 2002 were pursued by its armies in the opposite direction, into the DRC (Clark 2008). The two major armed groups of the Angolan civil war—the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and Angolan government forces—fought on different sides of the wars of the DRC and of Congo-Brazzaville. More than that, they fought each other in battles on the territories of both Congos. Congo-Brazzaville itself fought its rebels (supporters of former president Pascal Lissouba) in the DRC and DRC fighters in Congo-Brazzaville. Uganda also fought its rebels in the DRC, as did Sudan. Likewise, the two sides in Burundi’s civil war and in Rwanda’s civil war fought one another inside the DRC’s territory.

In sum, the civil wars of six foreign countries were fought inside the DRC. This was at the same time as many of Congo’s own civil wars cascaded. These were so numerous and cross-cutting that they are hard to count. The essence of why there has been more suffering caused by violence across a galaxy of hotspots in eastern DRC and across its borders during the past 23 years compared with any other region of the planet is that it has suffered so many dozens of diverse kinds of wars. It was a maelstrom of privatised criminalities and state criminalities cascading, one into the other.

Just as the war Libya fought with Chad meant there were implications for Libya when Chad became involved in the DRC, so the mobilisation of armies from Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe—former frontline states in the war with South Africa—had implications for South Africa. Just as Che Gueverara had fought in Congo in the 1960s with president Laurent
Kabila, who seized power from president Mobutu in 1997, so Cuban fighters fought in the frontline states against South Africa. South Africa and Tanzania stayed out of the fighting in the DRC initially, but both sent peacekeepers who are now prominently taking sides in peace enforcement operations authorised by the United Nations in which thousands of fighters have been killed (mainly from the Congolese army and non-state armed groups). Since 2014, troops from many countries under the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) have fought aggressively and proactively against armed groups that are refusing to surrender. Even the US military had soldiers and drones deployed, particularly in pursuit of Joseph Kony, commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which operated in north-eastern DRC, Uganda, Sudan and South Sudan, but, more recently, mainly in the Central African Republic. After many years chasing a now-diminished Kony, the United States and Uganda gave up in April 2017.

Hence, we can conceive of Africa as afflicted with a set of interacting cascades of warfare, with the DRC being the most important hub of pan-African cascades. We have seen that these cascades have stretched from Zimbabwe and South Africa in the south to Sudan and Libya in the north, and from the Indian Ocean in the east to the Atlantic Ocean in the west.

These African cascades are important because fighting continues in a large proportion of the countries mentioned in the paragraphs above. These cascades of war are not ‘world wars’: they do not engage total war by a transcontinental power such as the British Empire; they engage only non-African states such as France and the United States with modest war-fighting engagements, and have not concentrated killing as intensively as World Wars I and II or the Indochina wars of the 1960s and 1970s. They have, however, lasted longer. So our diagnosis is that it is more productive to conceive of killing as cascading from north to south to east to west across Africa, hotspot by hotspot. This is a better analysis than classifying Nigeria as afflicted by a war in its north today and Niger as conflict-free because direct war deaths do not cross some quantitative threshold to become a national ‘civil war’.

Séverine Autesserre (2010, 2014) put her finger on the paradox of all this transnational complexity. Diplomats struggle to study its many strands; they master long lists of names of states that sponsor fighting groups in the DRC. As important as the transnational strands are, this process of
imperfect diplomatic mastery of the facts leads to the false conclusion that the DRC’s problems are predominantly international conflicts between different states of the region.

Autesserre’s research shows that Congo’s problems start as local ones that diffusely interact with transnational complexity. She does not use the terms hotspots or cascades. Yet her diagnosis of the roots of Congo’s conflicts is of cascades across local hotspots, rather than a national DRC conflict that internationalises. Local land, political, ethnic and other conflicts in eastern Congo were certainly harnessed by actors from other countries in Autesserre’s narrative. Like Kalyvas (2003, 2006), Autesserre’s explanation is about local cleavages that interact with transnational forces. Sometimes in her narrative, the international forces that enrol and are enrolled by (Latour 1986, 1987) the local are not states, but bits of states (such as a Ugandan army faction). What Autesserre most strongly resists is a dominant international relations narrative of a sequence of civil wars in the DRC that start when Hutu génocidaires flee Rwanda after that country’s genocide in 1994. That particular narrative continues that Hutu militias conducted raids back across the border against President Paul Kagame’s new Rwandan regime. Ultimately, Rwanda rallied its ally Uganda and other African countries to work together for regime change, to clean out nests of foreign militants in the DRC and to exploit its natural resources to their advantage. The civil war of 1996 under this dominant narrative is thus essentially an international war.

Autesserre rejects this dominant international relations narrative by pointing out that armed conflict inside eastern DRC over very local grievances began long before the Rwandan genocide. The problem with the dominant narrative is that it promotes a diplomatic fable that the essence of peacebuilding in the DRC could be the signing of international peace agreements by heads of states. Often international peace processes for the DRC, Autesserre finds, have done little to reduce killing; sometimes killing and refugee flows increased in the aftermath of peace agreements and in the aftermath of UN peacekeepers being deployed to enforce them. Twenty years on from the first civil war to depose Mobutu, the DRC is still not a ‘post-conflict’ society. The international community’s post-conflict peacebuilding did not begin to make a major difference until 2014 in the DRC because it sprung from this dominant international relations narrative. With Autesserre’s critique making a contribution, UN peacebuilding in the DRC since 2014 has made a better contribution
than in the past. This is because it is more focused on resolving, hotspot by hotspot, some of the local grievances that were root causes of conflict—such as land disputes—long before the conflict internationalised.

Peacebuilding in the DRC has moved to a model of establishing local ink-spots of stability and civility and then expanding those ink-spots and connecting them one to another. From all this we learn that one deep danger of a cascades analysis is that it can mesmerise with myopic internationalism. This is why our starting framework insists on a micro–macro foundation and on the fundamental importance of many different levels of micro–macro cascading up, down and sideways.

While World War I was more driven by international diplomacy than Congo’s wars, our argument has been that Autesserre’s insight is still relevant to Europe’s ‘bloodlands’ (Snyder 2010). One of the significant levels at which an effective strategy for preventing World War I might have worked was disarming local terrorism and addressing the local grievances of the Black Hand. With the DRC, it is not that international peace agreements are unimportant; indeed, they are extremely important as nodes of cascade prevention. It is just that if we do not also invest in resolving particular land disputes at particular hotspots, in disarming little gangs as well as large armies at the hotspots, spot fires will reignite and spread spot to spot. In Parts II and III, we seek to develop some principles of cascade prevention that have this Autesserrian quality.

In the terms of this book, we conceive the DRC as the most important node or cockpit for cascading violence out and in from a Great Lakes regional cluster of violence that includes Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi, but also countries that share a border with the DRC but are not included in the Great Lakes cluster—Angola, Sudan (now South Sudan), Republic of Congo (Congo-Brazzaville) and the Central African Republic. Yet it is a DRC node and a Great Lakes regional cluster that cascade violence much more widely right across Africa.

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17 At the time of writing, this is very much at risk and violence in the DRC is on the rise again as a result of President Kabila refusing to step down after his constitutionally mandated term as president.
Syria, Congo and the Thirty Years’ War

After our field research in Congo started seven years ago, we thought of it as unique, not because of how widely it cascaded violence, but because of how it became such a complex attractor of so many foreign conflicts. Our lens was focused at first on how genocide in Rwanda cascaded to a counter-genocide in the DRC, how Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army cascaded conflict from Uganda to many regional countries, including the DRC, and how these and many other conflicts enrolled and were enrolled by very local Congolese armed conflicts. We then came to see it as unique because the civil wars of six foreign countries were fought inside the DRC. Syria has exploded since then. While far fewer people have been killed and raped in Syria and Iraq than in the African Great Lakes cascade, it still appears a young conflict that is quite a way off becoming ripe for peace. How did Syria come to stand alongside Congo as a conflict that became an attractor for many foreign conflicts? We rely on our Peacebuilding Compared interviews in most of the countries that sent large numbers of fighters to Syria to attempt a preliminary answer to this question.

Syria started as a nonviolent Arab Spring uprising against the tyranny of President Assad’s regime. That was an attractor for Al-Qaeda (its affiliate, the Al-Nusra Front) to convert Syria into a violent node of struggle for the caliphate. In turn, that cascaded to conflict between Al-Nusra and other Salafist militias supported by various Gulf states, particularly Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which hated Assad and Al-Qaeda. While many funders from these states sought to outflank Al-Qaeda with more ‘conservative’ fighters, Islamic State entered the fray to outflank Al-Qaeda’s shared battle against Assad with more ‘radical’ and ‘barbaric’ warriors for the caliphate. Islamic State fighters arrived from many Western countries and China, but in particularly large numbers from Libya and Tunisia and from Russia and former Soviet republics. The United States, the United Kingdom and France then joined the project of converting the democratic struggle into a civil war by attempting to arm the Free Syrian Army of pro-democracy defectors from Assad’s army, but in fact arming many others. Early in the war, the Free Iraqi Army was recruited from Anbar province and crossed the border into Syria to fight. The CIA funded training and logistics camps for Syrian opposition fighters in Jordan and Qatar. The analysis of the Syrian Kurd Democratic Union Party (PYD) leaders we interviewed (Interview, 2017, No. 041747) was that in 2011 and 2012 the United States had the power to prevent the cascade of war in Syria before it got
out of control, but it was not interested in doing so; it was more interested in regime change to remove President Assad. Western diplomats we interviewed questioned whether the United States had the capability in 2011–12 to control the regional forces marching to the drumbeat of war.

When Libyan Islamist militias became aware of the United States shifting weapons from Libya through Turkey to Syria after their defeat of Gaddafi, they got involved in capturing these weapons and joining the fight on the side of Islamic State. Later, Russia joined the civil war in a much bigger way than the United States to counter the influence the United States was exerting on the battlefield. This cascaded to a new kind of Cold War conflict, in parallel with the civil war in Ukraine, during Obama’s presidency. President Trump says he wants to end this contest through building a good relationship with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Russia targets both Islamic State and Al-Nusra. Through pretending to moderate its religious politics in comparison with Islamic State, Al-Nusra has garnered support from NATO allies Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This is one of many complexities for rapprochement between the United States and Russia.

It has been reported that late in the war, China has become much more strategically aligned with the Russian position than simply supporting Russian vetos of UN Security Council resolutions on Syria. China has provided weapons, negotiated aircraft sales and provided technical people on the ground for the ‘rebuilding’ of Syria and training for Assad’s forces. Much speculation in UN corridors goes to alleged secret North Korean arms supplies to Syria trans-shipped through Chinese ports. Human Rights Watch (HRW 2014) has video of chlorine gas cylinders manufactured by the Chinese state company Norinco used in chemical weapon barrel-bomb attacks in Syria. China is reportedly concerned to clean out concentrations of Chinese Uyghur Islamic State fighters from Xinjiang province who are fighting in Syria. China believes some of them have been trained in Syria and then sent back into China to foment terrorism. China’s more assertive engagement with the war is consistent with its recent placement of special forces on the ground in Afghanistan to fight Xinjiang Islamists there.

Much earlier than Russia’s arrival as an important combatant, Iran perceived a security dilemma: all its enemies were beginning to cascade into a war against its only Arab ally, Syria. These enemies included Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and the United
States. So Iran quickly became the country with the largest number of foreign troops on the ground in Syria in the form of its own Republican Guard and Lebanese Hezbollah fighters, who had long been its proxies against Israel.\footnote{As one influential advisor to the Government of Iran put it: ‘Hezbollah’s rockets do our deterrence’ (Interview in Tehran, 2017, No. 041717). This advisor saw Hezbollah as the vital Iranian asset and Syria as valuable for supplying that asset. There was no possibility of a military solution in Syria by 2017 for any of the players, including Iran, he believed. Yet, as in other interviews in Iran, Iran was conceived as having an interest in deterring anyone, especially the United States and Israel, from indulging regime-change adventurism in Iran. Such deterrence was accomplished through Hezbollah threatening a new Lebanon war against Israel, through threatening to stir conflict in Iraq, Bahrain or Yemen or by lighting a spark somewhere else in the region. Yemen he conceived as a ‘quagmire’, where Iran’s substantive interests were slight, but where it had an interest in ‘leverage against the Saudis’ (Interview in Tehran, 2017, No. 041717). Surprisingly, in some of our interviews with strategic elites in Iran there was some guarded degree of optimism that President Trump could prove the ‘dealmaker’ president who could do a deal that gives Iran the guarantee of security to persuade them to stop cascading regional violence in this way. This was tempered with pessimism that the United States allows its allies to sponsor terrorists when the terrorists threaten US adversaries: ‘The West does not want to think deeply or inquire deeply into the infrastructure of terror and the infrastructure required to defeat it. They think in an instrumental way. Let terrorism grow if it is not a threat to my national interests. Not a direct threat’ (Interview in Tehran, 2017, No. 041717). The head of a regional Kurdish intelligence agency has a similarly surprising degree of optimism about possibilities in the longer term for some kind of regional grand security bargain that embraces Israel and Iran into mutual security guarantees: ‘Iran has a bigger dream of … finally getting support and acceptance from major powers. That is more important to them than the smaller opportunity of being able to make it easier for Hezbollah to cause trouble in Israel. Iran craves guarantees of protection from greater powers’ (Interview in Iraq, 2017, No. 0417490). In a similar vein, a Western ambassador to Iran said: ‘Iran is ready to kiss and make up with the Saudis’ (Interview in Tehran, 2016, No. 051611).} Israel then could not resist opportunities that presented themselves to attack the forces of their most dangerous enemy when Hezbollah was operating in Syria close to Israel’s border. The war also supplied Israel with opportunities to hit Iran’s military supply routes to Hezbollah and logistics bases inside Syria for transit to Lebanon. The Shia armies of Iran and Hezbollah becoming the most formidable forces for defeat of Islamic State and for the defence of Assad motivated Gulf states, Israel and the United States to put ever more resources into funding forces opposed to both Assad and Islamic State. The Kurds became the most militarily decisive of these in routing Islamic State. Now Syria, in parallel with Yemen and Iraq, was a massive proxy war for the religious leaders of the Shia and Sunni. In fact, these proxy wars were three-way conflicts among Islamic State Sunnis, anti-Islamic State Sunnis and Shia armies.

Hence, the dominant Western media narrative of the Syrian war has some truth, but is crudely oversimplified. This narrative sees the war as one in which all sides oppose Islamic State, with Iran and Russia supporting Assad and the United States and Saudi Arabia leading the opposition to
Assad. All sides for years played the game of accusing each other of being soft on Islamic State (for example, allowing them to escape rather than killing them) while killing allies in the fight against Islamic State.

Iran also feared that in time another important enemy, Iranian Kurdish insurgents (who were mostly in exile in Iraq), would join the fighting in Syria. This fear was ultimately realised, even though the Syrian Kurds for a long time desperately tried to stay neutral in the civil war. When they suffered savage attacks from Islamic State, they saw no option but to throw their 60,000-strong army into the battle (with formidable logistical and air support from Germany, the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada and Russia). Hundreds of US soldiers were in 2017 reportedly on the ground in Syria training Kurdish YPG militia. The Syrian Kurds received support from some 160,000 Iraqi Peshmerga fighters and large numbers of Iranian and Turkish Kurd fighters.

This brought Turkey into the war. Turkey had also tried to stay on the sidelines for a long time, though it provided weapons to some of the same Salafist militias supported by some Gulf states. Kurdish fighters who cascaded into Syria from Turkey, Iran, Iraq and the West consolidated into the most effective army against Islamic State. This massively effective militarisation of the Kurds threatened Turkey, which bombed them from the air and with artillery from the ground, indulged in cross-border operations to kill them and supported Al-Nusra’s Al-Qaeda forces when they killed Kurds.19 Just as Islamic State and Al-Nusra fought on the same side much of the time against Assad’s army, and also fiercely fought each other at times for supremacy as flag-carriers for the caliphate, likewise Kurdish forces mostly worked together but sometimes fought each other. Battles broke out for Kurdish supremacy between the Turkish-led and Syrian-led PKK-sponsored Kurds (who received help from Iran) and those led by Iraq and sponsored by the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) (who received help from Turkey, Germany and the United States). This fighting was about the pretensions of KDP leader Masoud Barzani to supplant the Turkish PKK leadership and the Syrian Kurd leadership to become the godfather of the historical struggle for greater Kurdistan.

19 In interviews with senior PKK (Turkish Kurds) and PYD (Syrian Kurds) (Interviews, 2017, Nos 041754 and 041747), it was also alleged that Turkey had sent hundreds of truckloads of weapons to Islamic State fighters who were attacking the Syrian Kurds. They described weapons they captured from Islamic State with Turkish identifiers. But other sources did not confirm this.
Factionalism within the Palestinian civil war has also been fought out inside Syria. Many Palestinian refugees in Syria supported the Arab Spring uprising against Assad. Many of them were killed by the army of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command. This was a faction led by Ahmed Jibril, who, from 1968, split with Yasser Arafat for accommodating Israel too much. The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command fought with Assad’s army during the civil war. More specifically, a great battle raged for control of the region around the Yarmouk Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus between the Syrian army and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command on one side and the Free Syrian Army and the Palestinian fighters of the Liwa al-Asifa, or Storm Brigade, on the other.

Plate 2.7 Crowded conditions in Yarmouk, a Palestinian refugee camp in Damascus, 2017. The people here are lining up for food.

Another neglected conflict has been what we can now call, and the United Nations has now called, the genocide against the Yazidis in northern Iraq and Syria. Genocides against peoples who do not have a large diaspora attract limited interest from the West. There are only 500,000 members of this religious minority on the planet. Islamic State’s genocidal slaughter
of Yazidi men and the sexual enslavement of 3,500 Yazidi women follow a succession of genocidal attacks on Yazidis by extremist Sunnis across the history of the Ottoman Empire—for example, in 1640 and 1892 (Allison 2017). Yazidis from surrounding countries such as Iran cascaded in to defend their fellow Yazidis from Islamic State.

In sum, Syria is like the DRC in the way more than a dozen foreign armies have been attracted by the opportunities to fight hot wars with each other on Syrian soil, while indulging only in cold wars on their own soil. Syria is unlike the DRC in that so many major powers have at least special forces on the ground: Russia, the United States, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and perhaps even China has more than just intelligence officers in the country, as do probably some more major powers. Syria is also unlike the DRC in that the air forces of so many countries have massively hit targets in Syria with horrific consequences for civilians—including the air forces of Syria itself, Turkey, Israel, Russia, the United States, Jordan, the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia and probably others.

On further reflection, we must conclude that seemingly never-ending wars such as those in the DRC and Syria, where many other countries are attracted to fight their own proxy wars on the soil of a battle-torn country, are not so unique in human history. The Thirty Years’ War (1618–48) involved many European states fighting one another in a war fought almost totally on the soil of what is today known as Germany.20

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20 I am grateful to one of my 2017 Iranian interviewees for drawing the comparison between Syria and the Thirty Years’ War. He was a former intelligence official and former advisor to an Iranian president who started by saying that Israel was a big winner from the disintegration of Syria, after discussing how Israel’s most effective enemies in Libya (notably Gaddafi), Egypt and beyond were also gone as a result of the Arab Spring and the Arab League had disintegrated into political impotence: ‘Most of Israel’s enemies have gone through fighting each other. Assad is on the way to being gone. Turkey is divided against itself. Saudi Arabia also must be seen as having fundamental internal division between the royal family, which wants to accommodate the new, and the religious establishment, which is against all accommodation to the new. In this complex political stand-off, to keep the show together, Saudi Arabia needs a scapegoat. Iran and its alleged hegemonic ambition is that scapegoat … Instability in Saudi Arabia is not in the interests of Iran. We have a strong consensus on that. Instability in Saudi Arabia would be worse for everybody. And we don’t want that … The current situation in the Middle East is like the Thirty Years’ War of Europe. It was ended. Its outcome was the establishment of a system of nation-states. What we worry is that this 30 years’ war in the Middle East could result in the demise of nation-states. Syria is obviously a prime candidate. Kurdistan is another issue. Even Iraq’s territorial integrity is in danger. At best, the West does not care. Almost all wars begin with optimism of the high command. They say, as was said by military commanders in the Syrian war, that “the downfall of Bashar al-Assad is only a matter of weeks” [he mentioned the name of a Western general who said this years earlier] … There is a stalemate in Syria now. The challenge for all the players is how to achieve disengagement without disintegration [note re Proposition 10].’ (Interview in Iran, 2017, No. 041718).
The national armies of major powers Sweden, France, Spain and Austria fought, as did the imperial army of the Holy Roman Emperor and the armies of German Protestant states. As in Congo, however, here, so many of the worst atrocities were committed by mercenary armies who were paid to be proxies of states. The United Kingdom, the Dutch Republic and Denmark funded many mercenary Protestant militias. It was a war that cost the lives of probably 20 per cent of the German population (HISTORY.com 1996). What started as local conflicts over Protestant or Catholic control of a region attracted financial support from major Protestant and Catholic powers and then morphed into a full-blooded war in which the armies of the great powers slugged it out on German soil.

The Thirty Years’ War was ended by the grandest of grand bargains in human history: the Peace of Westphalia that created the contemporary state system of sovereignty and mutual respect for religious difference—a quantum step towards Europe’s civilising process. We have seen that the DRC also took significant steps towards civilising violence by grand bargains signed by many African states, but that local peacebuilding that spread one ink-spot of peace to connect to another has also been vital in the gradual process of civilising violence there. We are authors who are ignorant about whether the grand bargain of Westphalia was complemented by valley-to-valley Protestant–Catholic reconciliation during the seventeenth century that bequeathed a religiously tolerant Germany to European civilisation. Learning whether or not this did happen would be a worthy research project from a cascades of peace perspective.

People who pretend that they understand wars such as those in the DRC and Syria and the Thirty Years’ War tend to be charlatans. Honest analysts admit they grasp only some small parts of the complexity. Complex attractors that cascade in foreign wars are hard to end because peace in any part of the battlefield will disadvantage one combatant or another. Local peace zones such as the de-escalation zones agreed by Russia, Turkey, Iran and Syria in 2017, and the newer de-escalation zone agreed between Putin and Trump later in 2017, are positive peacemaking initiatives. Yet, cross-cutting complexity makes them hard to sustain against spoilers. Hence, we suspect that a combination of grand bargains, de-escalating peace zones and local reconciliations in responsive interaction are needed with such wars of wickedly cascaded complexity. Our analyses of Afghanistan and Kashmir (particularly in Chapter 5) begin to explore that hypothesis.
Preventing cascades in South Asia

This book seeks to show why cascade explanations inform a different way of thinking about the geopolitics of the most serious wars across the globe at the time of writing. Our South Asian analysis in Part II concludes that the DRC and Afghanistan may have been replaced with Pakistan between 2007 and 2012 as the most violent country on the planet if one counts all the forms of violence that cascade to and from war: state crime against civilians, torture, disappearances, homicide, suicide bombing, drone attacks and more (Karstedt 2014). This was before Syria exploded to become the most violent country.

Our diagnosis in Chapter 4 and Part III of this volume is that some profound cascades of nonviolence were in play up to 1914. We think that, at least until 1914, Pinker (2011) is right that not only Europe (Eisner 2003), but also Asia (Broadhurst et al. 2015; Spierenburg 2008, 2013: 69–72; ter Haar 2000) experienced perhaps nine centuries of long-run decline in the rate of violence from killing by war and crime (including state crime).

The focus of the current book is neither on cascades of violence across the African periphery of the global system nor on cascades from warmaking through NATO or Russian power at the geopolitical centre. Their importance was only in helping us to formulate our 10 cascade propositions and as a lens for seeing their geopolitical importance. Rather, our detailed focus falls in between the African periphery and NATO/Russian geopolitics, on cascades of violence across the emergent powers of South Asia. These include three countries that count among the 10 most populous in the world—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—and two of the world’s nuclear powers. Obviously, these cascades will prove different in character from the three major cascades discussed in this chapter. One point of discussing them is to sensitise us to ways in which the cascades of violence we study are unique in comparison with other major cascades. To the extent that they are different, South Asian cascades are a misleading grounding for the development of explanations of any relevance beyond South Asia. The other three contemporary cascades briefly engaged in this chapter do show, however, that as large and prolonged as the cascades of violence are in South Asia, they are hardly uniquely large and enduring. Likewise, Europe’s Thirty Years’ War reveals the 30-plus years of war of Kashmir–Pakistan–Afghanistan as less than
unique. The enduring impacts of the pan-European–Ottoman cascades of World War I that continue today in parts of the former Yugoslavia, the pan-European–Asian cascades of World War II and the pan-African character of the cascades that continue in Africa all have great relevance to explaining why the 107 years since 1911 were so much more bloody than the century before. We explore in Part II how South Asian cascades also make a large contribution to that sad result. In Parts II and III, we also seek to diagnose, in more contextualised ways than in Part I, how cascades of violence in South Asia might have been prevented.

Alex Braithwaite’s (2016) study of 2,331 ‘militarised interstate disputes’ since 1816 excludes the intrastate wars that account for most of the cascading of violence we have considered for recent decades. Even so, his interstate militarised disputes since 1990 do form four major clusters discussed in this chapter. One is the Great Lakes region of Africa, another the Middle East (or, more widely, the disintegrated Ottoman Empire), another is the Balkans (and the disintegrated Yugoslavia) and the fourth is Kashmir–Pakistan–Afghanistan and their immediate South and Central Asian neighbours (A. Braithwaite 2016: Map 1.5). In the period before that (1946–89), Indochina and East Asia are strong clusters, as discussed in Chapter 1, as are Central America and the Caribbean, which will be discussed in Part III. When the interstate conflict data are taken further back, before the Marshall Plan and the consolidation of the European Union (back to 1816), Western and Central Europe become more central to the clustering of militarised hotspots (A. Braithwaite 2016: Maps 1.3, 1.12).

Finally, a reason to study the largest cascades since the 1911 Italian invasion of Libya is to begin the journey of discovery towards understanding cascade mechanisms that might be of more general import. In Part II, that journey begins in a more systematically grounded way. In the next chapter, it begins by considering the first five cascade propositions.
Towards a micro–macro understanding of cascades

This chapter makes a starting case for the first five of the 10 cascades of violence propositions. It also moves in sequence from the micro, which is emphasised in the first part of the chapter, to the macro of cascade dynamics. As in Chapter 2, here we lean not so much on our South Asian cases to explore the usefulness of these propositions. Rather, this chapter and Chapter 4 motivate the propositions as potentially useful for explaining cascades of violence in South Asia by reflecting on the other great cascades of the past century and the most salient contemporary conflicts in Libya, Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and the Great Lakes region of Africa, which were introduced in Chapter 2. The research completed in other parts of the globe for Peacebuilding Compared helped supply propositions that are a starting framework for exploring cascades of violence in South Asia in Part II. After much adjustment during the earlier phases of our South Asian fieldwork, the set of propositions in this chapter and the next were initially settled in 2014 in ways that were also influenced by the early South Asian data collection. Then, after consideration of all the data up to and including May 2017, and a micro–macro analysis of those data in Part II, the propositions were revised again in Part III.

The objective in this chapter and the next is to motivate our propositions. It is not to marshal all the evidence to show that these propositions are right or wrong. Rather, we use the Peacebuilding Compared dataset and the literature on the above geopolitically major cascades since 1911 to establish some inductive plausibility for them. Then South Asian
experience since 1945 is explored in Parts II and III systematically to assess whether that experience adds to the plausibility of the propositions or reduces their plausibility, and in what ways.\textsuperscript{1}

The first five propositions this chapter introduces are:

\textbf{Proposition 1:} As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

\textbf{Proposition 2:} Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

\textbf{Proposition 3:} Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

\textbf{Proposition 4:} Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

\textbf{Proposition 5:} Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

\section*{Building on micro foundations}

Our cascades of violence propositions contest rational choice as a micro foundation in a particular kind of way that does not entirely reject rational choice. Human beings do rationally fear violence. They pursue preservation of their lives. Yet, violence also triggers ‘reactant’ (Brehm and Brehm 1981) values such as revenge, resistance and courage. While an earlier Peacebuilding Compared volume focused on why realism in international relations (IR) theory can be a facile foundation for international affairs (Braithwaite et al. 2012), one cannot dismiss the pursuit of interests or flight from fears as unimportant in explaining war.

\textsuperscript{1} This is an approach to social science that is developmentally inductive. It rejects the hypothetico-deductive in favour of growing understanding from iterated inductive reflection and eliminative induction, as scholars delve more deeply into new sites of relevant data.
We make no claim for our micro foundations having universal explanatory power. Our hope is only that they salvage rational choice as an explanatory driver in a way that is less false and more nuanced than existing rational choice models. The micro foundations of this book are not modelled in any quantitative manner. Preserving the contextual nuance with which we seek to modulate rational choice explanation inclines us to forswear premature quantification of cascade diagnosis, at least at this stage of inductive theory development.

Defiant values that modulate rational action demand more prominence in our micro foundation when the suicide bomber is such a central actor in the narratives of this book. Suicide bombing proves to be a form of violence that cascades from South Asia globally, so we would prefer a micro foundation that makes sense of it. More generally, our Peacebuilding Compared interviews with hundreds of fighters find a dazzling diversity and particularity of motivation—from fear to hatred, greed, honour, identity, love of country, justice, sacrifice for comrades, excitement, revenge and many more. Hence, a theory is needed that encourages an empirically grounded search for an understanding of motivation at a particular hotspot.

A kind of micro research from Western psychology that is relevant to our project is the way Brehm and Brehm (1981) summarised the results of more than 50 experiments on what they called ‘psychological reactance’. Contemporary theorists of criminology, notably Lawrence Sherman (1993), and regulation, notably Valerie Braithwaite (2009), substitute the more elegant concept of ‘defiance’ for ‘reactance’. Braithwaite (2018) updates the considerable more recent evidence for the Brehm and Brehm framework.

When an army directs military violence against an enemy, we repeatedly see two opposing kinds of responses. One is surrender and submission in accord with rational actor accounts of deterrence. The second is defiance. Figure 3.1 summarises, in a simplified way, the results of the dozens of psychological experiments on which defiance theory relies. It represents the research finding that escalating coercion increases both defiance and deterrence. The psychological research suggests that, at low levels of coercion, defiance usually exceeds deterrence. Figure 3.1 expresses this as the resistance effect exceeding the capitulation effect at lower levels of coercion. The dotted line is the net compliance effect. Net compliance is represented as a sum of the resistance score and the capitulation score.
Figure 3.1 The effect of coercion on compliance as a net result of a capitulation effect and a defiant resistance effect.

Source: Drawn by John Braithwaite to loosely represent the experiments reviewed by Brehm and Brehm (1981).

Only when punishment bites very deeply, resulting in many actors giving up on resistance, does the deterrence effect exceed the defiance effect. Military commanders have a systematic tendency to underestimate defiance effects in comparison with the store they place in deterrence effects. In World War II, Hitler believed the indiscriminate bombing of the Blitz would undermine British will to stay the course. He was as wrong as the British Bomber Command. It induced ‘more defiance than defeatism’ (Ferguson 2006: 565) in the German people by firebombing civilians. The folly of prewar strategy was evident in Marshal of the Royal Air Force Sir Hugh Trenchard’s pseudo-quantification that ‘the morale effect of bombing was twenty times greater than the material effect’ (Ferguson 2006: 565). Vietnam war data show that where bombing most targeted civilians the insurgency of the Viet Cong was most strengthened (Kocher et al. 2011).

Chapter 8 reveals how the Sri Lankan military’s struggle against the Tamil Tigers was tentative and defeatist for decades. Most generals and diplomats believed that escalated military pressure would only result in more pushback from the Tigers; that more would join the 20,000 deserters from the Sri Lankan army during the first decade of the war (Gunaratna 2001: 368). This changed with new military leaders assuming
the self-belief that they could keep increasing the military pressure until all Tamil Tiger resistance collapsed and holdouts surrendered. That is indeed what eventually happened. Proposition 10 (Chapter 4) contends, however, that this often does not happen because the costs of such military determination can prove too high for political leaders. Tyranny ultimately does work, but at great cost, because the required coercion can be extreme or must be sustained for many years. Democratic publics often come to see the extremes of coercion required to shut down violence in a faraway land as morally unacceptable, a burden that their young soldiers should not have to suffer and a cost they spurn as taxpayers. They see this more clearly today than in early modern history because war is covered blow-by-blow on television and social media. Proposition 10 is therefore about how negative public opinion and the political economy of contemporary warfare make it increasingly impossible for democratic states to stick with violent projects until the point is reached where coercion is sufficiently maintained to secure deterrence effects that exceed defiance effects for long enough to consolidate peace.

Northern Ireland is a particularly well-researched example, including in the Peacebuilding Compared interviews. Surges in repression by the British military were consistently followed by increases in terrorism, though there is debate about whether Operation Motorman was an exception (LaFree et al. 2009; Loyle et al. 2014). Operation Motorman was the massive escalation of British troop mobilisation in which 30,000 troops removed barricades with minimal force to return no-go areas, particularly ‘Free Derry’, to state control (Sanders 2013). In the end, the British electorate was unwilling to support either sustained oppression or the losses of British troops. They preferred to embrace powersharing with the terrorists.

At the micro level, Brehm and Brehm’s (1981) laboratory experiments give a good account of why the empirical literature of criminology on the effectiveness of deterrence is so contradictory—failing to find the consistent effects of strong deterrents in increasing compliance with the law that rational choice theory predicts (Braithwaite 2018). Likewise, the political science literature on the effectiveness of government coercion

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2 Charles T. Call is one empirical researcher who recognised this in his data. His first summary point about patterns of recurrence of civil war is: ‘Among cases of nonrecurrence, two alternative paths stand out: inclusionary behavior, especially with regard to politics and the security forces; and exclusionary behavior accompanied by the rigid repression of regime critics and opponents’ (Call 2012: 207).
in reducing dissent, terrorism and insurgency is contradictory: it shows state repression to have every possible effect on challenges to it—positive, negative, no effect or shifting challenges to alternative modalities of resistance (Davenport and Inman 2012: 624). Perhaps the only consistent result is that indiscriminate counterinsurgency that hits the wrong targets is particularly counterproductive (Davenport and Inman 2012: 629; Kalyvas 2003, 2006: Ch. 6). Moreover, the evidence is clear that it is extremely difficult to hit many intended targets without also hitting a lot of unintended ones.

Based loosely on the experiments summarised by Brehm and Brehm (1981), Figure 3.1 illustrates that rational choice accounts of deterrence have little chance of explaining violence. For the most part, it is simply false that there is a monotonically increasing relationship between punishment and compliance. Likewise, we cannot take seriously a form of realist (or neorealist) international relations theory that aggregates large numbers of individual rational choosers into states that make rational choices. States are far too factionalised and organisationally diverse to be construed as simple agents of collective rationality.

Even realist and neorealist international relations theorists rarely deny the frequently observed phenomenon that coercion by a major power can induce collective defiance from weaker players that can be so strong as to thwart the designs of great powers. There is evidence aplenty that threats can induce defiance as well as compliance. Few neorealists assume that, even though the United States has a bigger deterrent arsenal than the rest of the world combined, it works for the United States to say to another country: ‘Do what we say or else!’ This is even accepted by conservative writers such as Michael Rubin who are opposed to dialogue with ‘rogue states’. Rubin (2014: 4) nevertheless conceives of Cuba, North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya as ‘backlash states’ that are ‘defiant’. Former US defence secretary William Cohen tweaked this definition of rogue states to construe them as regimes ‘immune to traditional deterrence’ (Rubin 2014: 4). While demands for compliance backed by passive deterrence work poorly in international affairs, when the United States dynamically escalates its deterrent power around a weaker country such as Cuba, it can achieve a deterrent result. This means patient dialogue first, but ultimately

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3 Neorealism (or structural realism) departs from classical realism’s analyses of international politics based on human nature and power relations to the structure of the system and security (see Brown 2009; Waltz 1979).
escalating to resolve by scrambling aircraft towards Cuba’s skies and submarines around its seas—as it did during the Cuban missile crisis—to get the deterrent result (dismantled Cuban missiles) (Braithwaite 2018).

Of course, dynamic escalation of deterrence in international affairs is a dangerous game because ‘little’ Cuba can mobilise powerful friends to dynamic escalation of their deterrent capabilities in response. Small-power Serbia also did this in triggering the escalation to World War I after the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand (Chapter 2). The challenge of building theories for the control of cascades of violence that are sufficiently dynamic to respond to the complexity of the phenomenon is tackled in Chapter 12.

In the context of the 2011 Libyan revolution, Braithwaite and Rashed (2014) have used their Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork in Libya to make the case that where deterrence is most needed, it is most dangerous; where reconciliation is most difficult, it holds out the greatest hope for the transformation of violence. Because dynamic deterrence is a dangerous game, we should use it reluctantly, with minimal sufficiency. With collective action, as with individual action, deterrence can be so extreme that it overwhems resistance. Powerful states obviously have superior military and diplomatic capacity to coerce such submission. Because deterrence matters, if only in extremis, the military capacity of powerful states often shapes history. Because defiance matters, powerful states do not get their way with weaker international players a large proportion of the time.

If deterrence worked like realist clockwork, our cascades of violence approach would have no explanatory power. As soon as any cascade of violence spread to the point where it became a concern to a great power, the rational great power would crush it. Quite the reverse is obviously the story told in Chapter 2. The Vietnam War cascaded out of control to the point where no amount of American blood or treasure, nor that of other formidable allies, seemed capable of crushing the Viet Cong. Then, after the great power gave up on the project of defeating this cascade of violence in Vietnam, it cascaded to an even deadlier genocide in Cambodia, to regime change in Laos and to the 1979 war between Vietnam and China.

The ambition of cascades of violence is to give an account of these phenomena because realist international relations theory explains them so poorly. Our argument in this section has been that getting micro foundations that are more realistic than realist international relations
Theory is one step towards an understanding of cascades of violence that might fill this explanatory void. The psychology experiments on defiance summarised in Figure 3.1 provide a micro foundation that we posit for the purpose after also reflecting on the support we see for this same pattern in our Peacebuilding Compared data to date. Summarised qualitatively, we therefore have our first cascades of violence proposition:

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

We saw in Chapter 1 that cascade explanations tend to be nonlinear, characterised by tipping points, and we will see in Chapter 12 that this is one characteristic that turns our work towards complexity theory. Figures 3.1 and 3.2 help steer us towards a tipping point understanding of when deterrence cascades to defiance—for example, when throwing Christians to the lions or martyring Muslims accelerates rather than deters the spread of these religions. It also helps us to see that, further along in Figure 3.1, there is another tipping point from defiance back to deterrence.

![Figure 3.2 The interactive effects of force and importance of freedom.](image)

Source: Brehm and Brehm (1981: 60).
Contextual variation in defiance

Rational choice, deterrence and defiance cannot be read off from foundational universals such as how the human mind works. There is no deadly simple societal mechanics of defiance from which cascades of violence are inexorable. The defiance experiments summarised by Brehm and Brehm (1981) show that defiance effects are most likely to exceed deterrence when coercion is directed at freedoms its targets care about deeply. It follows that a pure rational choice model of deterrence of the kind that helped Gary Becker (1992) win a Nobel Prize might offer a good explanation of the high efficacy of library fines or parking fines in reducing freedoms that citizens do not care too deeply about. Deterrence aimed at getting a person to change their religion or betray their country, however, has much steeper defiance effects in comparison with deterrence effects (see Figure 3.2), which means that even the most horrific forms of torture are not necessarily effective in extracting intelligence from terrorists. In these contexts of religious faith and nationalist fervour, there is emotional commitment to defiance. With regulatory compliance, Makkai and Braithwaite (1994) showed that, when emotionality is high among business chief executive officers (CEOs), as state deterrence rises, compliance falls; when emotionality is low (when CEOs are cool and calculating), as state deterrence rises, compliance rises. Because war so recurrently puts in contest freedoms and identities—national, religious, ethnic—to which individuals have profound attachments, warfare more often cascades violence than suppresses it.

Some cultural contexts show stronger defiance because defiance scripts are institutionalised in those cultures. Pashtun culture—the largest ethnic identity of Afghanistan and north-western Pakistan—is an honour culture that requires blood feuds in many circumstances. This is compounded by the institutionalising of gun-carrying in Pashtun culture, as in other tribal cultures of Pakistan encountered in this book—notably, the Baloch of Balochistan. In these rural tribal cultures, boys learn from their fathers to become a crack shot. Habits of gun-carrying start early, as does learning of male obligations to avenge blood. In the context of such institutionalisation, blood feuds multiply killings with a local efficiency that can quickly become a threat to regional peace. John Braithwaite spoke at the Quetta police academy in Balochistan, which was the site in 2016 of an Islamic State attack that killed 61 young police officers and wounded 123 others. He spoke about the importance of recruiting
female police officers, recounting how in the Australian military young women frequently top shooting courses. He personalised this by saying that his son was not a great shot in the Australian Army Reserve, but he was helped to improve by a female recruit who topped the shooting course. Afterwards, tribal men in the audience kindly let John know how sorry they felt for him for having such a son. When John responded that he himself was a terrible shot, sympathy for coming from such a multi-problem family became even more palpable!

As one sees in many parts of the globe, warlike cultures such as in Balochistan that put a strong emphasis on avenging honour can also be cultures gifted at peacemaking—providing institutionalised channels for peace. Westerners can learn much from them about how to interrupt cascades of violence. Bacha Khan is the most famous Pashtun peacemaker, leading a pre-Gandhian nonviolent struggle against British colonialism from 1910 that helped inspire Gandhi. His philosophy was to see both violent and nonviolent strands in his culture, as in all cultures, and then strengthen the nonviolent ones:

> Is not the Pashtun amenable to love and reason? He will go with you to hell if you can win his heart, but you cannot force him even to go to heaven. Such is the power of love over the Pashtun. (Bacha Khan, quoted in Gohar 2012: 141)

Bacha Khan developed principles to which his followers swore allegiance, including:

> I promise to refrain from violence and from taking revenge.
> I promise to forgive those who oppress me or treat me with cruelty.
> I promise to refrain from taking part in feuds and quarrels and from creating enmity.
> I promise to devote at least two hours a day to social work [volunteerism that makes jirgas work]. (Gohar 2012: 142)

So, while we perceive great cultural variation in adoption of revenge scripts and other kinds of defiance scripts, we do not see them as essential to any culture. Rather, scripts are institutionalised in cultural patterns that can steer away from cascades of violence by the institutionalisation of architectures of nonviolence by leaders adept in the culture, like Bacha Khan.
Revenge is honourable and mandated in Pashtun culture. This is communicated in ancient proverbs:

A Pashtun never forsakes revenge.
A stone of Pashtun (enmity) does not rot in water.
If a Pashtun takes his revenge after a hundred years, it is still too soon.

Pashtun culture (e.g. Naz et al. 2012; Taj 2011) provides insights into how various cultural practices such as Pashtunwali (the code of life) and badal (revenge) have been misinterpreted. Pashtuns believe that shame persists for victims of crime until honour is equalised through revenge (Gohar 2012: 106–7). The shame of one victim in a society brings dishonour on the whole tribe. Badal is viewed as a way of achieving justice: badal ‘is not a privilege but a right and duty of a Pashtun’ (Yousufzai and Gohar 2012: 36). Culturally approved alternatives to revenge that are honourable are therefore important. The most important of these is the jirga, a traditional justice mechanism where elders meet in a circle to reconcile disputes.
empowered to make in a restorative circle (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014). It is worthwhile to revisit some of this research, particularly with Ali Gohar, to give the reader a glimpse of the qualitative texture of our data that inform the micro foundations of cascades theory. Ali Gohar is one of the key advocates of the restorative jirga.

The French Revolution was more than a conflict ‘where there was no frontier between private vengeance and collective vengeance’ (Cobb 1972: 56). Yet this was critical to understanding why it was so bloody. The point of our micro examples is not to suggest that civil wars are no more than ‘feuds writ large’ (Kalyvas 2003; Loizos 1988: 648), but to illustrate that micro unravelling is partially an intentional project of powerful militias such as the Taliban and partially a pursuit of local private interests and grievances. Micro–macro impetus to civil war arises when these dual dynamics create vacuums of social order that a force such as the Taliban can fill. Here are just two Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork snippets from our research notes of traditional jirgas ending cycles of revenge or reducing the risk of future renewed cycles:

John Braithwaite and Ali Gohar attended a jirga at Sher Garh, Mardan District, just south of the Swat Valley. Jirga members told us how in 2006 they had to deal with enmity between two villages in which 13 people were killed, seven in one village, six in the other. The villages were deserted. The jirga appealed to them for peace and asked each to provide money on the table in the jirga. Normally more blood money would be paid in from the side that had lost only six. But the side that lost seven suggested equal amounts as a sign of respect for the elders. If one side resumed violence, the money would be forfeited … Because murder allegations were before the courts, they asked the judge for permission to reconcile the feud. The judge granted permission and the feud was brought to an end. This jirga had dealt with 80 murder cases in the memory of those present, all reconciled with the murderer being released from prison or without the murderer being sent to prison.

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Story of a Hindu doctor from Batagram (from Ali Gohar fieldnotes):

When Taliban in Swat were very active, I received a phone call from Taliban asking for pre-kidnapping ransom. First I took it as a joke and avoided the caller but then I started receiving calls more frequently and the caller started demanding Rs 7 million. Later my relatives and friends also started receiving calls from the same caller so as to convince me that they meant business … I informed the elders of the jirga about
the issue. The *jirga* of the areas was called, in which all influential people from different tribes participated. A decision was taken that if something happened to me, the *jirga* would act on my behalf not only to protect me but also to take revenge as per the prevailing custom and traditions of the Pashtun code. They also announced a warning to Taliban that if the caller was from their side, they were ready for any sort of encounter, as the *jirga* would not allow Taliban influence in Batagram area in any form and by any means. The *jirga* also sent a message to the government agency to protect me and my family and provide me immediate security. Media was invited by the *jirga* to highlight the issue and the decision of the *jirga* was announced and publicised in the media. Along with the security agencies, local *jirga* also took upon themselves to share the burden of guarding my home, business office and other movable and immovable property. This gave a strong message to the people who were threatening me on the phone. The phone calls stopped immediately and I am feeling safe now. (Just Peace International 2012: 58–9)

Jirgas also have some negative features. They are traditionally male dominated and provide either restricted or no access to women. Additionally, young people are often excluded. Young Afghans and Pakistanis with Western education tend to overlook the critical role jirgas play in community justice (D’Costa 2016). We revisit some of this discussion in Chapter 6. The pathway to an effective and inclusive jirga model would include a much deeper understanding of reconciliation practices at times of extreme violence.

Gohar and Braithwaite considered case studies from their fieldnotes of hybrid Muslahathi (‘reconciliation’ in Arabic) committees stopping spirals of violence (for more cases, see Braithwaite and Gohar 2014). These were cases where hybrid *jirga*-restorative justice processes with a rights focus were held inside the fortified walls of police stations after the Taliban had assassinated many *maliks* (‘traditional elders’) who had convened *jirgas*. The Taliban wanted locals instead to submit to the justice of Taliban courts:

The Havelian Muslahathi Committee (in Abbottabad, where Osama bin Laden was killed) dealt with a case that they believed involved great risk of escalation because men were being taunted for being so weak to allow the other party to take their land without fighting for it. The land was extremely valuable (more than one billion rupees) and the disputes surrounding it had been before the courts for 60 years. On three occasions, the parties had been to the Supreme Court over the land. In four meetings spread over one month, the Muslahathi Committee settled this as a priority dispute because they believed it could lead to serious
violence. One of the parties got more of the land than the other. But both parties were pleased to have it settled without losing the lives of family members. (Braithwaite fieldnotes)

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The cycle of violence that was being settled on the day we visited the Havelian Muslahathi Committee in 2013 involved a dispute over money. In order to recover what a family believed had been misappropriated from them, they stole a truck belonging to the other family. This was avenged by an attack in which the person who stole the truck was murdered. The murderer had been in prison awaiting trial for five months. For two and a half years the village jirga had been attempting unsuccessfully to settle this dispute. They had found it too hot to handle. So the parties agreed to try the Muslahathi Committee. The committee negotiated with them on possible lines of a restorative settlement for many meetings over four months. Finally … agreement was in place; so much so, that the media were in attendance to take photographs and interview the parties about the terms of an agreement that would end a feud the community was concerned could spin out of control. The Committee members were confident that because of the risk of violence the case posed, the murderer awaiting trial would be released on the order of the court with charges dropped. This was common. In fact, that day we also met the parties to another case involving a cycle of violence in which two had been killed and one seriously injured over rights to collect money at a bus stand. A payment from one family of Rs 22,000 had already been agreed in this case. Again there was a recommendation, which had been accepted by the court, that a man who had already served two years prison for murder would be released. They visited each other's homes after they reconciled and broke bread. (Braithwaite fieldnotes)

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A recent case described to us by the Mirpur Muslahathi Committee in 2013 follows:

There were two tribes who had a claim over land that was being used by a famous public school. There was a fight over who were the true owners. Ten to 15 people were injured in the battle with six suffering bullet wounds. This was a great danger to public health and safety. After an incident between tribes like this, any member of a tribe is justified and honour-bound in the eyes of the community to kill a suitable person from the other tribe. The Committee successfully resolved the conflict. The violence between the two tribes has ended and the school had certainty in its planning. (Braithwaite fieldnotes)
Cases like these, which are common as one moves from locale to locale, constitute a credible qualitative argument that reconciliation committees of both kinds reduce violence capable of snatching away many lives. Other cases described elsewhere (e.g. in Braithwaite and Gohar 2014) that saw large-scale fighting and the burning of houses show how dangerous cycles of violence were ended through the wisdom of Muslahathi committee members. These examples also illustrate Proposition 2: that diffusion of nonviolence occurs in complex ways.

At the same time, these data show how the Taliban can create a security vacuum by assassinating judges and maliks. Unless an alternative—such as the police station reconciliation committees—is put in place, in a revenge culture, violent feuds spin out of control in a way that delivers the opportunity to the Taliban courts to re-establish order (this is the anomie effect in Proposition 7; Chapter 4).

This kind of evidence is apiece with the historical evidence that the institutionalisation of courts in England made a large contribution to the massive drop in homicide rates from the eleventh century, and especially after the fifteenth century (Eisner 2003). The historical record from across Medieval Europe (Spierenburg 2008, 2013) is of a land where revenge killings were rife, blood feuds endemic and a road accident could spiral to interminable cycles of revenge. Tort law arrived in England to provide an alternative, honourable path in adjudication and compensation to revenge killing (Cooney 1997). Even nineteenth-century rural courts in England or in saloons in the wild west of the United States were participatory and male-dominated in ways more like Pakistan’s Muslahathi committees than Western jurists like to think!

Among the reasons an institution such as the Muslahathi committee can be effective in calming revenge is that it can draw on a variety of deeply institutionalised anti-revenge norms that are part of the jirga tradition. One is the Kanrai or Teega, a ceasefire/truce ritual (Gohar 2012: 67). This is about ‘parachute diplomacy’. Peacemaking jirga members with white flags go between the fighting parties, even under heavy fire, often accompanied by women. These women attend with heavy symbolism, either without veils or carrying the Holy Koran in their hands. The Teega is represented by the laying down of a stone to solidify truce. Another relevant ancient

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4 This section of the text on Pakistani jirgas is drawn heavily with adaptation from Braithwaite and Gohar (2014).
institution is of the Asthazai (diplomat). Diplomats are given safe passage during a conflict. They carry messages between communities in conflict, learning traditions of language use that defuse tension and prepare the soil for further communication. Western historians tell us that institutionalised diplomacy is a Renaissance invention that spread from Venice (Mattingly 1955).

Nanawaty is perhaps the most important of the ancient institutions for averting revenge. Nanawaty involves the combination of a repentance ritual and asylum. It means walking to the home of someone wronged with an attitude of humility, sorrow and apology, ‘giving space to the other person to respond with “grace”, so precious to Pukhto’ (Yousufzai and Gohar 2012: 32). If Nanawaty is granted, the perpetrator receives asylum from revenge by the whole community, at least temporarily, while mediation of restitution, public apology and restoration of honour for both sides proceed. Finally, Pashtun tradition provides for scaling up local jirgas to a loya jirga (grand jirga) when conflict wracks an entire region. For example, when all the tribal agencies of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan’s north-west get together to settle a big issue, it is called a ‘tribal loya jirga’. Shinwari (2017) has described efforts at the time of writing to form a cross-border jirga at the border of Afghanistan and FATA to defuse cross-border conflict and enable cross-border trade.

We see in Chapter 6 that tribal Balochistan suffers from both Taliban and Baloch nationalist insurgencies and from conflict between these insurgencies. One point that our Peacebuilding Compared interview informants made about Baloch independence fighters in the mountains was that a large proportion of them are there to avenge a relative killed or ‘disappeared’ by the state.

Responsiveness to Baloch culture therefore not only requires a top-down peace that addresses root causes such as expropriation of Baloch resources and discrimination against Baloch; it also requires local jirgas in which representatives of the state listen, pay ‘blood money’ and apologise for killing specific relatives, so that the individual fighter and their surviving relatives can honourably hand in their weapons and commit to peace. It also needs higher-level peacemaking jirgas province-wide that connect to national peacemaking and reconciliation processes. Following the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) Government’s reconciliation

5 We also discuss this in Chapter 6.
process in Balochistan, the government requested Mir Suleman Dawood, one of the self-exiled Baloch leaders, return to Pakistan. He had been given political asylum by the UK Government. Despite the political vacuum created by his exile and the Pakistani Government’s repeated requests, the ‘Khan of Kalat’, as Dawood is popularly known, refused its mandate and stressed the importance of the jirga. In his response to the Baloch Government delegation, Dawood noted, ‘only the Grand Baloch Jirga has the mandate to make an appeal to me about my return’ (Ali Shah 2015). The last grand Baloch jirga was held in September 2006, the first in 126 years, and was attended by 85 tribal chiefs and 300 elders. At that jirga, there were also discussions about taking the Baloch case to the International Court of Justice, which was not followed up. We revisit this process in Chapter 6.

Paths to peace are needed that are richly informed by contextual responsiveness to local society and to the micro foundation of one’s theory. Modelling is the first of these micro foundations that can scale up to global transformation. The next section explains how it grounds Proposition 2 of our framework.

Modelling

A widespread micro–macro foundation for cascades of violence is modelling. This we define as emulation that is not mere habitual mimicry, but emulation embedded in cognitions (Bandura 1986). These give modelling meaning as intended and valued emulation. Hence, when the Maoists in Nepal (Chapter 9) decided to call themselves Maoists, they followed a Chinese communist script of revolutionary struggle. This meant gradually building support among peasants in rural areas until the capital was surrounded by support for the revolution (as opposed to the Leninist strategy of directly seizing military control of the capital). In 2006, the Maoists moved cognitively to a more Gandhian model of nonviolent struggle when they decided to put down their weapons and join civil society in a massive people’s movement on the streets of Kathmandu and other cities. Maoists joined hands with civil society to demand abdication of the king in favour of a transition to republican democracy.
Our research challenge here is to understand how restorative justice or peacemaking through reconciliation (as in *jirgas*) might flip cascades of violence to the modelling of nonviolence. Just as we have seen that there is strong evidence of a propensity for violence to cascade from war in one country to war in neighbouring countries, there is evidence of a propensity for nonviolence to be modelled and to cascade. Braithwaite et al. (2015) showed that, on data for 1946 to 2006, nonviolent campaigns are contagious between autocratic societies. Latent opposition groups were especially encouraged to model foreign nonviolent campaigns when they had a weak history of domestic protest.

Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 578–99) have argued that we can perceive deep structural reasons for the people-power movements that swept communist governments from power in Russia, across Eastern Europe and right across to Mongolia, although stalling in Tiananmen Square. The collapse of communist economies is the most common deep structural reason proffered. While Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) argue that structural explanation has power in understanding the crumbling of communism, it cannot explain the sheer simultaneity of so many people-power mass mobilisations in a matter of months in 1989 across communist economies, some of which were performing at a very high level in comparison with others. Braithwaite and Drahos suggest that the simultaneity was evidence of a modelling phenomenon. In the terms of this book, it was a cascade of nonviolence that transformed the world.

The year 1989 was also a moment in history when a longstanding suppression of peoples by deterrence that had exceeded defiance—which had been reinforced on the streets of Budapest in 1956 and Prague in 1968—was lifted by reform in Moscow led by Mikhail Gorbachev. Defiance would not become contagious beyond a tipping point (Gladwell 2000) without actors whom we call model mongers (described below). Model mongers were ready with transformative imaginaries that could spread the ignition of mass protest. Social scientists of cascades need tools for analysing the interactions between the modelling foundations and the deterrence and defiance foundations of our propositions. Model mongers keep competing models bubbling on their modelling backburners;

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6 It is an ancient Christian idea that, when the most terrible and unjust violence occurs, special opportunities arise to transform human society to paths of love and generosity. As Saint Paul put it: ‘Where sin abounded, grace did much more abound’ (Romans 5:20). While it is an old Christian idea, it has been beyond the imagination of contemporary Christian states.
they bring them to the front burner only when the level of coercion slips below the tipping point at which defiance effects begin to exceed deterrence effects.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

Braithwaite and Drahos (2000: 581) define modelling as ‘actions that constitute a process of displaying, symbolically interpreting and copying conceptions of actions’. Braithwaite (1994) and Braithwaite and Drahos (2000) injected specificity into how modelling works by identifying different kinds of actors who promote modelling: model missionaries, model mercenaries, model misers and model mongers. We acknowledge reliance on these publications here and apply this modelling framework in our South Asian case studies.

*Model missionaries* are similar to actors whom Sunstein (1997) calls ‘norm entrepreneurs’, who change norms through ‘norm bandwagons’ and ‘norm cascades’. Model missionaries are actors motivated by belief in a model and who travel widely to spread word of that model. The spiritual leaders of Al-Qaeda and Islamic State were model missionaries who spread the imaginary of a dissident form of jihad that was extremely violent. Gandhi was an Indian model missionary of nonviolence who influenced faraway converts to nonviolence, who themselves became converts to the power of that model, such as Martin Luther King Jr in the United States. Nelson Mandela also said he learned much from the nonviolent struggles of Gandhi in his native South Africa. Gandhi, as we have seen, had himself been influenced by another missionary of nonviolence, Bacha Khan. Missionaries of ethnic hatred cascade modelling of violence against the ethnic other. Model mercenaries sometimes then reinforce that model of ethnic hatred because they have an interest in taking over the businesses or political offices of people who are ethnically cleansed (for Indonesian examples from Peacebuilding Compared, see Braithwaite et al. 2010a).

Model missionaries and model mercenaries change the way knowledge is spread in epistemic communities (Yang 2012: 30). *Model mercenaries* are national and transnational promoters of models who commercially exploit models. When we prepared for the Peacebuilding Compared project, we thought mercenaries would play a major role. In our coding of wars
so far, commercial military organisations have proved less important than we thought, including in South Asia. Of course, there is an older history of the Gurkhas from Nepal, for example, providing mercenary services to the British Empire. One of the empirical findings of this study is that in none of South Asia’s conflicts since World War II has a transnational private military corporation played a major role.

Al-Qaeda, in its propaganda messages, has accused Pakistani security and intelligence services of being America’s mercenaries. However, we use the term mercenaries here in a more straightforward sense (Simm 2013). For South Asia, we discuss multiple private armed organisations, which do not control resources and operate as central drivers/spoilers of wars as in the way Peacebuilding Compared has found in Africa. They are very different phenomena from transnational military corporations such as Executive Outcomes. Former military men have joined several private security companies, mainly in Pakistan. In circumstances where the security situation has deteriorated, these private companies have largely been contracted to protect private business interests or hired to provide protection to influential people. Despite the financial imperatives, neither the Pakistani Taliban nor the Afghan Taliban are mercenaries; they function as anti–state security institutions (D’Costa 2016).

The rise of Western private military organisations saw mercenaries such as Mike Hoare start up in Congo in the 1960s. By the 1990s, the leading companies, Executive Outcomes and Sandline, played decisive roles in major African conflicts such as in Sierra Leone and Angola. Sierra Leone illustrated what seemed to be a core emerging business model: private military corporations would exploit the ‘resource curse’ by seizing control of readily tradable and transportable resources (diamond mines in the case of Sierra Leone). Private military control of this asset guaranteed their payment even if their client became powerful enough after a military victory to refuse it. We expected this business model to proliferate because it seemed a logical outgrowth of neoliberalism, characterised by the private corporate takeover of state functions. This model went off the rails with the arrest of Mark Thatcher and others in Africa and in the Bougainville civil war (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 49). Both national and regional players such as Australia decided to prevent mercenaries from further destabilising their region. Sandline officers found themselves arrested by the Papua New Guinea military and their supply aircraft forced down by the Australian air force and impounded in Australia. Executive Outcomes went bankrupt and closed its doors in 1999; Sandline followed in 2004.
The anti-mercenary norm (Percy 2007) was a norm cascade that surged after the American Revolution and went into reverse between 1960 and 1997. Thanks to catastrophes such as those with Executive Outcomes and Sandline, after 1997, the norm cascaded back to global relevance. In any case, the Iraq war supplied a more stable business model for former principals of these entrepreneurial private military corporations: as private contractors of security services subservient to the US military. By December 2008, private contractors made up 69 per cent of the US Department of Defence workforce in Iraq (Saikal 2014: 24).

Model mongers pursue their political agenda by experimental floats of large numbers of models. Our interviews suggest that model mongering can work well for reform groups with thin resources, such as women’s rights groups. Model mongers eschew detailed work such as drafting legislation for a novel governance innovation. Instead, they scan the international horizon for prepackaged models. They keep most of these model options on the backburner, bringing them to the front burner when a ripe moment arises, usually in a crisis. An activist group with meagre resources can run many campaigns with half-baked models. Models are distributed quickly at little cost. A large number of reports can be generated by advocacy campaigns. Mostly, no one reads this material; however, campaigns that do gather serious support, such as by being incorporated into the election platforms of major parties or the priorities of major donors, are then prioritised for more rigorous development and lobbying. This is what we mean by model mongering.

The models that fail to pick up serious political support are not forgotten under this political strategy. They are left on the backburner, continuing to appear in advocacy manifestos as needed reforms. Eventually, the point may be reached where this campaign can be put on the front burner under the banner that ‘Ours is the only country in the region that has failed to introduce this reform’. The model monger sees the domino theory not as a matter of structural explanation, but as an effect they seek to cascade through purposive lobbying, as when Che Guevara says ‘Create two, three, many Vietnams’ (Guevara 2003: 350). In seeking to make the dominos fall, the appeal of legitimacy and modernity, of not being ‘backward’ (see ‘model modernisers’ below), is among the model monger’s most powerful weapons.
The model monger’s strategy is not to push on a door until it begins to open. Politics from the modelling perspective is not about problems looking for solutions. It is about solutions waiting for the right problem (to justify their implementation), the right moment and the right donor. Social problems can sometimes be redefined so that a pet model becomes the right solution.

While conservative politics is about reluctantly scratching when the populace gets an itch, entrepreneurial politics is about scratching all over until a spot is found that makes a polity itchy. The Nepalese case (Chapter 9) shows nicely how Maoism as a model cascaded both violence and nonviolence as models of resistance, and cascaded both transformatively. These models have a power of their own that links countless minds beyond Nepal and countless computers through cyberspace. Maoists have power through using models and models have power through using Maoists. Modelling theory creates fertile soil for such evocative reversals. For example, Oliver Roy (2017) argues that the world does not face a radicalisation of Islam but an Islamisation of radicalism (as a model).7

Prepackaged models (templates) have enormous appeal to peacebuilding and statebuilding actors for a simple reason. Statebuilders have limited time and energy and a limitless range of issues on which they would like to be seen to be making progress. So Simon’s (1957) satisficing model of decision-making and administrative behaviour applies to them. They do not—cannot—search for the best solution to the problems they would like to do something about. Solutions that are good enough will do. Hence, when someone can deliver a prepackaged model that is good enough, they see it as an efficient use of their time to buy it instead of initiating a search for the best solution. This is how it can come to pass that 20 American states can copy almost verbatim a Californian law, with 10 of them even copying two serious typographical errors (Walker 1969: 881–2).

7 Roy (2017) empirically finds radicalised Islamists to be young and devotees of violent youth cultures that are also manifest in Western films such as Scarface or Rambo, in the philosophy of Malcolm X, in Southern icons such as Che Guevara and Joseph Kony’s Lord’s Resistance Army and in Eastern generational revolts such as the violence of China’s Cultural Revolution or the Khmer Rouge’s hatred of their forefathers. Islamic State suicide bombers are, for Roy, Islamist versions of the radicalism, the youth and the self-destructive violence of those who commit mass murders in American schools.
The more powerless, disorganised and poorly resourced an advocacy group is, the more likely it is that model mongering will be their best strategy. It is an approach that produces political victories for powerless groups. We see in Part II many examples of model mongering in pursuit of political agendas, such as demands for redress and accountability. Examples include models used for development issues by the indigenous advocacy groups in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) in Bangladesh, by networks of political prisoners in Myanmar and by numerous local women’s rights groups across South Asia. At the same time, it is a strategy that does not refute the proposition that powerful groups generally prevail over powerless ones. Most of the model monger’s models are put on the backburner most of the time because coercion keeps them there. Yet the strategy means that resources are not wasted on detailed development of losing campaigns. Model mongering minimises development costs and maximises reform opportunities by transmitting many models through political networks. Properly strategised model mongering activity has the ability to evolve in response to its own shortcomings and to the challenges that emerge at different times. Effective model mongers put in significant resources only when they see cracks begin to open in structures of coercion. The International Centre for Transitional Justice model mongers truth commissions and prosecutions of war criminals in this way. It does not waste resources on campaigns to prosecute Tony Blair or George Bush over Iraq because gaping cracks in the structures of coercion are not sufficiently open.

An important structural variable in model mongering occurs through interaction and observational learning. A theory of modelling that takes the model mongering of powerless groups seriously invites us to take a different view of the way power is exercised—a less pessimistic one, if you will. In addition to the reasons already adduced, this source of power for the powerless arises from the fact that persuasiveness depends less on the power of the promoter than on the power of the model. The power of a model that is taken seriously is that, by being taken seriously, it sets the framework for debate. The model monger has succeeded in putting on the table the terms of debate—the terms in the model. The model is the product of a cross-constituency consensus across ‘peaceland’ (Auresserre 2014), or so the adept model monger says. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that can pull the right model out of their top drawer are particularly likely to enrol the support of donors for the model when they can also draw on the power of a major disaster or a sudden political vacuum.
There is power in the choice within the model as to what the central issues are, what is left off the agenda by the model (Lukes 1974) and the terms of its discourse (Clegg 1989). There is power in what is said, what is unsaid and how the saying is framed. A model such as ‘transitional justice’ can seduce audiences wider than reformers can capture without the model because of the properties of the model. These wider audiences are the model misers and the model modernisers. Model misers and modernisers are persuaded not by the imperatives of solving the problems addressed by the model, but by the virtues of the modelling as modelling. It could be argued that the UN agencies in South Asia with their specified focus on justice through a broad range of policies, such as institutional reforms, reconstruction, gender mainstreaming and peacebuilding, are sometimes model misers and at other times model modernisers.

Model misers are adopters of models who have a preference for copying over innovating because of a desire to economise on model debugging and on marshalling political support for the idea. Thinking through new ways of doing things is costly in time, money and conflict. Reinventing the wheel can be inefficient. The centre has a comparative advantage over the periphery in developing new models; the periphery has a comparative advantage in adapting existing models to local conditions. Model misers are actors who decide that the resources are not available for a research effort to solve a problem from first principles. We might say that model misers are those who are happy to satisfice (Simon 1957) by rummaging through a garbage can full of models that are known to have been applied to similar problems elsewhere (Cohen et al. 1972). Model-following balances the advantage of debugging against the disadvantage of a less-than-perfect fit to local conditions. Any solution to a problem is likely to entail some defects that are universally agreed to be defects but that can be readily debugged with a little experience. Received models have the advantage of being cleared of these obvious bugs. This does not mean that they will not be full of features that are bugs in the eyes of one constituency and things of beauty in the eyes of others. Nevertheless, it is an undoubted advantage of buying rather than writing software that it is debugged, independently of the judgment of how well designed the software is for any given purpose.

Modelling is efficient in many contexts. But model misers risk becoming model morons when they attempt transplantation without local adaptation. In Chapter 12, we conclude this is a widespread problem with peacebuilding. Debugging removes the glaring bugs that seem
uncontroversially bad in any context. Yet new contexts breed new bugs. In previous centuries, the horizon that the emulator could scan in search of ideas was limited. The possibilities for an efficient search for ideas to copy have exploded with the internet. Public policy analysis and good strategic decision-making in business are not the art of muddling through, as Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970) would have us believe. They are the art of modelling through. The effective policymaker does not allow herself to be surrounded by a muddle; she is surrounded by an information system about the problem and evidence about models that have elsewhere been applied to analysing and solving such problems.

At the same time, it is true that model morons are common. The ubiquity of model morons is explained by the seductive exaggerations of model missionaries who are insensitive to context and cultural difference and the dollar appeal of model mercenaries. Furthermore, we see in the next section that the identitive appeal (Etzioni 1965) that has model modernisers in its grip can also readily account for the adoption of patently ineffective models.

*Model modernisers* are actors who adopt models from the centre for reasons of legitimacy, to harness the identitive power of being perceived as modern, civilised or progressive. Models are adopted when they appeal to identities held dear. Meyer and Rowan (1977) argue that the formal structures of many organisations reflect the myths of their institutional environments instead of the demands of their work activities. Meyer and Rowan (1977: 352) hypothesise: ‘Organizations that incorporate societally legitimated rationalized elements in their formal structures maximize their legitimacy and increase their resources and survival capacities.’ In the peacebuilding business, some of this legitimation is more colonial than ‘societal’: organisations on the periphery (including states themselves) maximise their legitimacy by demonstrating that they have incorporated the most ‘developed’ models into their governance structures.

Having an election overseen by an election commission is a symbol of progress and modernising reform (see Chapter 11). So, if you are a Congolese president, you compete with other African presidents in creating the appearance of free and fair elections, when Congolese elections are not; the appearance of being overseen by electoral commissions that are independent, when they are not. In earlier eras of the evolution of the state system, being seen as Christian was more important than having a constitution that provides for elections. Hence Davies (1997: 429) can
comment about a fourteenth-century royal marriage to form a union of Poland and Lithuania in model-moderniser terms: ‘Lithuania, still ruled by a pagan élite and anxious about the rise of neighboring Moscow, was looking for an entrée into the mainstream of Christendom.’

Meyer and Rowan (1977: 356) go further and suggest that, to thrive, organisations must not only conform to myths that are crucial to legitimacy, they must also maintain the appearance that the myths work. For example, many militaries followed the United States into Afghanistan or Iraq to become the kind of modern military that fights a ‘war on terror’ in a modern way. Debates raged over whether different versions of counterterrorism or counterinsurgency (COIN) were really the most up-to-date thinking for military modernisers. In this process of organisations maintaining the appearance that their legitimating myths work, the perceived efficacy of the modelling is reproduced—even when it fails.

Westphalian weaknesses and strengths

The Eurocentrism of dominant understandings of world politics creates challenges for a book like this as we move towards an understanding of Proposition 3. Barkawi and Laffey (2006: 332) reflect that traditional studies of international relations and security studies have rarely investigated how less powerful and more marginalised actors make sense of their historical and colonial experiences. The multiplex and integral relationships among less and more powerful actors are often investigated not for what they are, but for the use of great power politics. For realism, with its focus on great powers, one-sided analysis of this kind is foundational. For some critical approaches in the field of IR, the weak are of interest but primarily as ‘bearers of rights and objects of emancipation, that is, for their normative value in Western political theoretic terms’ (Barkawi and Laffey 2006: 333).

Hence, a learning about Afghanistan happens less because powerful states have been deeply interested in promoting peace in Afghanistan and more because of how it relates to great power rivalry and the balance of power in the world security theatre. Similarly, national liberation struggles in the aftermath of World War II were perceived through the prism of Cold War superpower rivalry. This myopia occurs in current analyses of armed resistance to great power domination as terrorism. In this section, we offer a little taste of our interpretation of colonial experiences of cleavage and conflict.
The state itself, networked into a state system, is one important model of modernity for pacifying spaces and enrolling state allies to warlike projects. This model was born at the Westphalia peace conference. It took place in a Europe that had been devastated by the Thirty Years’ War, from 1618 to 1648. Those 30 years of cross-cutting political and religious conflicts killed one-fifth of the population of Central Europe—from war deaths, disease and hunger. The Westphalian path out of the morass was a system of independent European states that would enjoy a monopoly of force in their own territory, but which agreed on a set of international rules of noninterference in other states with a different religion or politics. The Westphalian design was also for a balance of power that would check military ambition: no state should become so militarily powerful as to dominate all other states combined.

Colonialism saw European model missionaries carry the Westphalian blueprint with them to the Americas, Africa and Asia. In some of the colonised territories—for example, the Highlands of New Guinea—locals genuinely appreciated the arrival of a superordinate power that could mediate peace across a galaxy of intertribal wars and enforce peace agreements militarily when needed (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 56, 116; Diamond 2013: 148–9). Whether locals appreciated colonial gunboats or hated them, colonial empires mostly succeeded in pacifying large swathes of territory, just as earlier empires had pacified domestic conflict. Indeed, the largest sweeps of pacified space on the globe were empires that became states, such as China, Russia and the United States. The United States was a kind of empire asserted by military suppression of the local population and other colonial powers—the United Kingdom, Spain, France—that had formerly dominated large swathes of the territory and was consolidated by the Civil War among the states of 1861–65.

In Chapter 5, we interpret the Mughal Empire in India as an exception to this pattern. The reason for the exception is telling in terms of our cascades framework. Because the Mughal Empire was so powerful in the sense of having many more troops at its disposal than the British Empire had worldwide, the only way the British could defeat it was through a policy of military fragmentation. As a consequence, to this day, no one enjoys a monopoly of force in Kashmir and it is possible for Maoist factions to control significant rural spaces in a majority of India’s states (see Chapter 5). As a further consequence, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka are ‘extremely violent societies’ in many different ways (Karstedt 2012, 2014).
That part of the Westphalian blueprint that regulated noninterference in the domestic affairs of territory under the control of another state also limited inter-colony warfare slugged out by the gunships of European powers. At least, this was true once nodes and territories of colonial control were settled. Yet, as Niall Ferguson (2006) and Stacey Haldi (2003) concluded, when empires break up, balances of power are unsettled and war becomes likely—in particular, twentieth-century violence ‘was in large measure a consequence of the decline and fall of the large multi-ethnic empires that had dominated the world in 1900’ (Ferguson 2006: xii). This was illustrated in Chapter 2 with the scrambling for pieces of the disintegrating Ottoman and Chinese empires, in the onset of World War I and in the demise of the Habsburg Empire as a consequence of that war. Revolutionary model mongers, such as Mao in China, saw cracks begin to open in the imperial coercion that subdued defiance below deterrence (Proposition 1). In Chapter 5, we conceive the decline of the British Empire as critical for understanding its inability to manage communal violence between Hindus and Muslims in India in the 1940s. As British hegemony cracked, it likewise proved beyond the empire’s capacity to subdue fighting between Arabs and Israelis in Palestine, Sunnis and Shia in Iraq, Mau Mau and whites in Kenya, republicans and loyalists in Northern Ireland and Europeans and Africans in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

Pinker (2011: 132) claims that ‘zero is the number of developed countries that have expanded their territory since the late 1940s by conquering another country’, although China (which was a poor country then) conquered Tibet and then subsequently used military means to gradually push further forward its Himalayan frontiers with India and Pakistan. Zacher’s (2001: 137) data show how dramatic has been the drop in territorial wars, which result in the redistribution of territory, since the United Nations consolidated the sacralisation of arbitrary colonial borders. For a major power like France, war with another major European power, such as the United Kingdom, Germany or Russia, no longer makes sense in the way it so often did before 1945. Such a war today would devastate the major cities of both countries, destroy their economies and both would cease being major powers. Even proxy wars in other people’s countries ceased making much sense after Vietnam, though middle powers such as Iran and Saudi Arabia continue to ignite them without success from Yemen to Syria. It is cyberwar that is proving to make more sense today for combative major powers.
In this way, the Westphalian order came to define permanent borders for every corner of the planet. It is not that it is a better model than that of the city-state, the Bedouin tribe, the Mongol or Chinese empires, nor that it has lasted as long as these models. Rather, the Westphalian state is what model modernisers must do in conditions of modernity. Otherwise, they have no legitimacy, no seat at tables that settle world order. Nevertheless, the Westphalian order does have some pluses: it has cascaded pacification domestically and non-interference internationally.

The balance of power broke down when the Westphalian order came under challenge from varied visions of empire—from the Ottoman Empire, from the empire through which Napoleon sought to rule Europe, from the twenty-first-century caliphate of Islamic State. By 1812, however, the power of France and the Ottoman Empire was more or less constrained within the ‘Westphalian state plus colonies’ model. Even so, before, during and particularly after the relatively peaceful century from Napoleon to 1911 (see Pinker 2011: 118–22), the Westphalian state system continued to prove vulnerable to interstate conflict cascading through alliance systems (Haldi 2003). World Wars I and II surpassed all previous slaughter in the history of humankind because of violence cascading from one alliance partner to another. These histories are among those that inform Proposition 3, even though the contemporary cleavages that cause most slaughter discussed in Part II are infrequently defined by contested interstate boundaries:

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

**From state to local fragmentation**

In *Why Wars Widen*, Stacey Haldi (2003) found that the longer (interstate) wars persist the more likely they are to cascade to more states joining the fight. An interesting question is whether the empirical support for Haldi’s theory of predation and balancing, which she found in several centuries of data, would hold up for local civil wars. There is no shortage of analyses of single persistent wars cascading to a proliferation of more fighting factions, as in Casie Copeland’s comment on South Sudan that: ‘We have a much more chaotic situation on the ground than, let’s say, two years ago, when we had one government, one armed opposition’ (cited in Craig 2017: 1).
Haldi (2003) distinguishes between predation and balancing as motivations for states joining a war. She found that, when the political costs of losing a war are low, states are more likely to join wars because they wish to grab an opportunity for predation or an opportunity to gain a strategic asset (to take territory or hurt a longstanding foe, for example). When the political costs of losing a war are high, states are only likely to join for defensive reasons, to preserve a balance that protects them. Balancing means the attempt to prevent an adverse shift in a balance of power. This result could be tested in contexts such as exist in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). For village warlords who start out destitute, the costs of defeat of their fighters in battle are not high when warlords can sue for integration into the Congolese army. They are especially not high compared with the predatory gains from seizing gold or coltan mines. So predation drives cascades into war alliances in contexts where resources are rich and people are poor. Yet in Congolese contexts where a local balance of peaceful accommodation has been achieved, the arrival of a predatory warlord to upset that balance can motivate the formation of village militias (such as many Mai-Mai militias) to join in defence of that balance.

Contemporary wars frequently involve joint action of local with national or international actors, in which local actors are oriented not to national master cleavages, but to local ones. A cleavage is an ‘overarching issue dimension’ such as religious, ethnic or political conflict. The local politics of a cleavage may be quite different from the form it takes at the centre. Central actors pursue central power through alliances that connect the politics of a central cleavage to rather different interests than those that play out in local networks. Local actors enrol central actors to secure the advantages they care about, as well as vice versa. The essence of the politics of contemporary war and peace is not centralised power, but the interaction between the local, the national and the transnational. It can be the interaction that drives cascades of violence.

Propositions 4–10 explore a variety of variables that open up both master cleavages and fissures within fissures. Kalyvas is keen not to construe the politics of local actors (for example, at the village level) as mere local replications or manifestations of central cleavages. Kalyvas (2003, 2006: Ch. 11) further argues that the local and the supralocal interact in the onset of violence through mechanisms of cleavage and alliance.

At the time of writing, Saudi Arabia is fighting an attempted Iran-backed Houthi military takeover of Yemen. This revives an old proxy rivalry that dates at least to Saudi Arabia and Iran backing opposed mujahidin groups.
in battles for a share of the control of Afghanistan between 1992 and 1995 (Rashid 2010b: 199). Islamic State is also fighting the Shia Houthis. This is a manifestation of the current three-way cleavage across the Middle East—of Islamic State (and Al-Qaeda–related competitors) versus Iran-backed fighters versus Saudi-backed groups—wherein two of these recurrently concentrate their fighting on defeating the third at a specific locale. The two that combine are different in different places, depending on local factors; which two are fighting against the third is sometimes driven by balancing imperatives in a locale. So Syria differs from Yemen. In Syria, Islamic State and Saudi-backed groups both fight against the Iranian-backed Assad regime. Yet everywhere, the fundamentals of this three-way master cleavage are torn more widely apart, in combination with anti-American, anti-Russian and anti-Israel cleavages, Turkish–Kurd and other cleavages, to rip the region asunder. At the local level, however, the Yemen conflict is driven by local grabs for power by very local politicians with whom Houthi and anti-Houthi fighters ally.

This is a way of restating the themes of Autesserre’s (2010, 2014) work on conflict in the DRC (see also Chapter 2). Conflicts start out very locally in Autesserre’s narrative, but are then enrolled by national and transnational players (particularly the militaries of Rwanda and Uganda). Twice, Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame decided to enrol both local Congolese actors who were estranged from their president and supralocal actors such as the Pentagon (Reyntjens 2009: 57–79) to the project of regime change in the DRC. While Rwanda’s first successful project of regime change in Congo (Zaire) (1996) and its second unsuccessful one (1998 – present) caused a lot of killing, much more killing followed from subsequent cascading of violence, with local politicians and warlords enrolling the DRC Government, some faction of its army, the Rwandan army, the Ugandan army or some other foreign or Congolese army to their projects—in circumstances in which a centralised state monopoly of force had disintegrated. This leads to our fourth hypothesis:

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

The concept of the state defined as a territorial unit with a monopoly of force is rather too Westphalian for contemporary realities. Today, all Western societies have more private police than public police in the employ of the state; most have far more than twice as many (Johnston and
These ratios of private to public monopolisation of force tend to be much higher than two-to-one in post-conflict societies such as South Africa (Johnston and Shearing 2003). These numbers do not include corporate information technology staff, who are the frontline law enforcers against cybercrime and the cyberwarfare that we mentioned earlier as the emerging form of warfare among major powers. While most public police patrols are unarmed in many countries, large numbers of private security operatives patrol with guns.

In post-conflict Timor-Leste, our Peacebuilding Compared interviews at the two leading private security providers revealed that these were the two largest private employers in the country (Braithwaite et al. 2012: 147–8). There are other armed private groups in these spaces, such as private military contractors like Blackwater in Iraq—successors to organisations such as Sandline that enjoy less autonomy from state power than did Sandline. In the 1993–2002 wars in Congo-Brazzaville, the state military did not count among the three major combatant groups. Rather, these were three private militias under the control of each of the three major political leaders in the country (Clark 2008). Some of the funding for these private armies came from foreign states and foreign oil companies. In these Congo-Brazzaville wars, senior state military commanders became relevant only when they deserted with some troops to join one of the three major private militias. Finally, there are more fragmented terrorist movements active in both ‘peaceful’ and ‘post-conflict’ societies.

When we use the expression ‘state monopoly of force’ in this book, it is a loose usage to describe a non-monopoly that is actually a public–private oligopoly of armed force in which one legitimate armed force can pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups within the space. Our hypothesis is that when this capacity of a legitimate armed force to dominate all others disintegrates, violence cascades. Chapter 2 introduced this problem through its description of post-Soviet, pre-Taliban Afghanistan, post-Gaddafi Libya, post-Saddam Iraq and post-Mobutu DRC. In each of these four contexts, large private militias controlled much of the countryside, many of them with external sponsors such as Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency in Afghanistan; the United States directly funding the Sunni Awakening in Iraq; Qatar and Egypt funding armed groups on different sides in Libya; and Rwanda, Uganda and other regional states funding competing armed factions in
eastern DRC. A common thread across these four catastrophes is a leader who decided they could better dominate politically if the country lacked a legitimate monopoly of force that might mount a coup.

The president of the DRC cannot control the east of his country, so he hands feudal control over large chunks of it to rapacious private armies and units or factions of the state military who are strong enough to demand it. Gaddafi weakened the capacity of the central Libyan military by fragmenting it, with his sons having control over key units. Fear of a coup led both Mobutu and his successor presidents of the DRC to do something quite similar. The downside of being Mobutu’s state without a coherent army is that an ‘army with a state’ (tiny Rwanda) could effectively invade, enrol discontented local proxies and dominate its massive neighbour.

Former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki (2006–14) likewise fragmented and so enfeebled his military that, initially, comparatively puny Islamic State forces could overrun them in Sunni areas. Al-Maliki pushed aside competent Sunni commanders in favour of Shia officers distinguished by their determination to crush al-Maliki’s political opponents rather than for their determination or competence as military commanders. The rise of Islamic State can be explained in part by military social selection for venality, incompetence and cowardice. Al-Maliki established separate chains of military command that reported directly to him and then put in place the further insurance of funding his own private security forces. In Iraq, we saw the unedifying spectacle of different floors of the interior ministry controlled by different armed factions with disputes sometimes settled by assassinations in the ministry car park (Bayley and Perito 2010: 34). After the infiltration of the ministry by the Badr Brigade of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq in 2005 and the Sadrist Mahdi Army from 2006 to 2007, the police became a tool for sectarian interests (Saikal 2014: 170). Post-Soviet Afghanistan was different in that it was Pakistan’s ISI rather than a domestic leader, which fragmented any prospect of a monopoly of armed force. This was because, until the Taliban came along, the ISI did not like the look of any of the armed factions with a prospect of military domination.

Empirically, Monica Duffy Toft (2010) has shown why such societies are so conflict-riven. In her study of 116 civil wars since 1940, Toft found that credible security sector reform that delivered unified domination of a state’s territory by its security sector reduced recurrence of another
war after one war had ended. Toft argued that peace agreements deliver a variety of benefits to combatants: protection from physical destruction of themselves and their property, usually development and reconstruction assistance, as well as a share of top offices and lower-level jobs in postwar governments. If peace agreements deliver such benefits without the assurance of a credible threat of punishment, the peace will be vulnerable to cheating. It will also risk tactical ceasefires that are gamed as respite to refocus, retrain, rest and rearm. Toft (2010) finds the quantitative pattern of post-1940 conflict supports the hypothesis that peace agreements increase the prospects of peace only when they both credibly promise benefits and credibly threaten harm. If they promise benefits without threatening harm, they increase prospects of further war. If sticks are to be as credible as carrots, effective domestic security sector reform is required so that the military and police of the post-conflict state can punish spoilers of the peace. If necessary, UN peacekeepers can perform that role until the domestic security sector is unified for the purpose. The United Nations cannot keep doing this forever; part of its job must be the required security sector reform. One way or another, the implication of Toft’s analysis is risk of civil war unless the legitimate are made powerful or the powerful are made legitimate.8

8 John Braithwaite and his co-authors had not read Toft’s empirical results when a previous Peacebuilding Compared book was written (Braithwaite et al. 2012). The combination of having absorbed Toft now and the further engagement of Peacebuilding Compared with the recent data on war cascading to war in Libya, Iraq and Congo as a result of a want of a unified security sector that could disarm fighting factions causes us to reinterpret the data for that case (Timor-Leste). Timor-Leste is a tiny country of a million people with militarily powerful neighbours such as Indonesia and Australia. So, when the separatist forces of Falintil gained independence from Indonesia in 1999, Falintil’s policy was to be like Costa Rica and do without a military. What could little Timor-Leste achieve militarily if Indonesia or Australia decided to invade them again? In the end, the postwar Government of Timor-Leste reversed this policy and converted Falintil into a national army. Seven years later, UN peacekeepers were forced to return when factions of that army deserted with their weapons and sought to take over the state. Firefights also broke out in the capital between the army and heavily armed police. Ten police were killed and 30 wounded by the army as they surrendered under a UN flag. With a huge proportion of impoverished Timor-Leste’s budget going into the military, we were convinced that leaders such as Xanana Gusmao erred in reversing their previous policy of doing without an army. That conclusion and analysis were weak in their counterfactual analysis. We did not ask if cleavages of a similar kind might have opened up even had there not been an army. Might fighting, albeit with less sophisticated weapons, have broken out in any case? Then who would put that fighting down? Hence, John Braithwaite is now inclined to the more conservative, Toftian analysis. Where Timor-Leste and the United Nations erred was not in reversing the decision to do without an army, but in failing to make security sector reform work to create a unified security sector under democratic control. As in Iraq, Libya and Congo, in Timor-Leste, the roots of the problem were not internal to the security sector, but in the way the sector was politically controlled and used. Different political factions within the state harnessed cleavages the war left behind in the security sector to make factions of the security sector their personal political militias.
Towards a Micro–Macro Understanding of Cascades

Toft’s (2010) analysis must be qualified by caution against excessive spending on the security sector. There is considerable evidence that high levels of defence expenditure slow economic development (e.g. Dunne 2015; Galvin 2003; Nikolaidou 2012). More directly, Collier (2009: 113) found that states that have experienced a civil war are more likely to experience another if their military spending is high. While a security sector sufficiently credible to be a guarantor of the rule of law against internal armed groups is imperative, excessive security sector investment can be dangerous in the threatening message it sends to neighbours, in threatening a militarisation of the society internally (see Chapter 6 on Pakistan, for example) and in constricting economic growth. This book shows that, in the worst cases, militaries become guarantors of private monopolies or even monopolies controlled by military officers or units. Collier (2009: 115–16) further found that one of the most disastrous effects of militarisation of the economy is that military armories become the cheapest supplier in the illegal arms market, making military weapons cheap. Philip Killicoat found, when working with Collier (2009), that cheap weapons increase the risk of civil war.

In the DRC, the cleavage–alliance interactions that cause most killings involve bits of states (such as factions within the national army or foreign militaries) and dozens of local armed groups of fewer than 1,000 fighters, such as Mai-Mai militias—sons of the soil defending their villages from ‘foreigners’. These are the kinds of local cleavage–alliance interactions that become most devastating when Westphalian norms collapse in a region such as the Great Lakes of Africa. Yet World Wars I and II showed (as we saw in Chapter 2) that cleavage–alliance cascades can be even more deadly when the alliance partners that are enrolled to violence are Westphalian states.

Security Dilemmas

Once alliances begin to cascade behind violence on different sides of a cleavage, security dilemmas can arise that further accelerate cascades, as in the onset of World War I discussed in previous chapters. In a security dilemma, each side’s efforts to achieve its own security inadvertently threaten the other side. Security dilemmas arise when two or more actors each feel insecure in relation to other actors. None of the actors involved wants war, but, as each actor prepares to make itself more secure, the other
actors interpret its preparations as threatening. Cycles of unintended provocations can emerge that culminate in one actor mistakenly deciding that it is best for them to attack before they are attacked. Congolese village elders can meet to decide that unless we rise up to kill the Hutu or Tutsi ‘foreigners’ (refugees) in our district, they will kill us. This may be false. Local Tutsis, most of whom are not recent refugees from Rwanda but people who have long lived and been accepted in the district, may have no intention of attacking the indigenous Congolese ethnic group. Sadly, however, misperceived cleavages can cascade to more violence as local Tutsis call in the support of an armed group to counterattack with the backing of the Rwandan military. Terror and insecurity foster herding by people who cling to whatever belonging they think might protect them.

As a senior UN police officer in Bunia, DRC, said in a 2012 interview:

The politics in the district goes like the wind. If the wind blows for democracy, politics here goes for democracy. If the wind goes for militarisation, politics here goes for militarisation. People look out for the direction of the wind.

Hence, we can see our Proposition 5 as being partly about a herding cascade:

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Sadly, whether people flee or stand and fight in the face of these dilemmas, violence cascades. Hutu refugees who had fled Rwanda after the 1994 genocide against Tutsis opted for flight rather than fight in response to the 1996 advance of Rwandan-backed armed groups. Then the Rwandan-backed forces pursued them right across the DRC. This chase cascaded violence from hotspot to hotspot. It cascaded a countegenocide in which probably 233,000 Hutu refugees perished, most of whom had no involvement in the Rwandan genocide (Reyntjens 2009: 80–101). Many were cut down; many died of disease and starvation; 600 drowned in one terrible incident when they tried to reach safety by swimming across the Congo River. A Tutsi–Hutu genocide cascaded from a Hutu–Tutsi genocide (which, in turn, had cascaded from earlier genocidal cascades involving these two groups in Rwanda and Burundi). As this cycle cascaded through the chase across the DRC, other unrelated villages through which refugees passed were caught up in the cascade, as were the Congolese national military.
Part II finds this reflected in South Asian small and large conflicts. In Bangladesh, Biharis, most of whom were Partition refugees (*mohajirs*), were slaughtered when they were perceived to be pro-Pakistan. Plantation Tamils, originally brought in by the British from South India to work in the tea plantations, were feared and targeted by the Sri Lankan state because, without evidence, they were believed to be supporters of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). Nevertheless, our data on the recent history of South Asia in Part II suggest that cascades from security dilemmas of this kind may be less important to the present and future character of war for most of the globe than the formidable importance they had in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The micro cascades of herding violence that spread across Congolese spot fires in the early 1990s morphed into a more macro security dilemma in the late 1990s that cascaded even more terrible violence in 1998. We have seen that Rwanda, in particular, saw itself in a security dilemma with respect to Rwandan Hutu génocidaires who had fled to Congo. The engagement of Rwanda’s high command with the Israeli defence forces after its genocide affirmed the security dilemma. The Israelis advised offensive, pre-emptive war outside Rwanda’s borders (Roessler and Verhoeven 2016: 150). Philip Roessler (2016) argues that, after president
Laurent Kabila’s victory over his predecessor, Sese Seko Mobutu, backed by Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and Angola (with support from Ethiopia, Eritrea, Tanzania and other African states), Kabila was in a ‘coup–civil war trap’. Roessler (2016) shows empirically that such coup–civil war traps are widespread security dilemmas across Africa. The dilemma was that Kabila had to share power with ethnic rivals who had been part of his coalition to overthrow Mobutu, yet he had reason to fear that these rivals, such as eastern Tutsis, might mobilise their powersharing control of parts of the state in a coup d’état. Kabila therefore excluded those competitors, purging them from the powersharing deal.

Roessler (2016) shows that purges against former co-conspirators who worked together to take over African states are a recurrent African pattern of cascading from one form of power grab to another. Indeed, Roessler found that rulers are systematically more likely to exclude co-conspirators than other stakeholders from power. The judgment is frequently made that a coup d’état is the bigger risk (because the partner in power has their hands on some of the levers of power). The risk of civil war that can result from totally excluding ethnic rivals from power is then viewed as the lesser risk. It is easier to mount a grab for power from a base of control over one part of the state than it is to win a war as an excluded faction against the might of the whole state infrastructure. This is nevertheless a trap. Laurent Kabila was a common case of a leader who cascaded waves of civil war by exclusionary attempts at coup-proofing his state. As Roessler expresses it:

Though rarely analysed in this way, Africa’s Great War that erupted in the DRC in August 1998 is a paradigmatic case of a co-conspirator civil war. Original fieldwork in the DRC and Rwanda illustrates how the expulsion order by Congo’s President, Laurent-Désiré Kabila, against his comrades in the RPF [Rwanda Patriotic Front] in late July 1998 represented a preemptive strike to coup-proof his regime at the price of triggering the most devastating war since World War II. (Roessler 2016: 232)

The coup–civil war trap has been most acute in Africa in recent decades. In the previous 200 years, however, when new nation-states were recurrently being formed on the ashes of disintegrating empires in Europe, the Middle East and West and Central Asia, this trap was also a recurrent cascade (Wimmer 2013). Andreas Wimmer (2013: 3) has a particular theory of how the power imbalances caused by breakups of empires led to war: ‘A world of multi-ethnic empires, dynastic kingdoms, tribal confederacies and city-states’ was overturned for ‘a world of states each ruled in the name of a nation’. Each of these nations was socially
constructed in modernity as an ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 2004). Diffusion of the nation-state form of governance was itself a cascade phenomenon that was ‘both the cause and [the] consequence’ of ‘waves of wars’ (Wimmer 2013: 4). Across the globe, starting in Europe, with African decolonisation as the final frontier of the process, nation-states consolidated power mainly by dismembering the hegemony of empires that formerly controlled most of the planet. ‘Waves of wars’ of ethnic control then arose to define the character of the ‘nation’ that controlled each ‘state’ (Wimmer 2013). According to Wimmer, this process of the global diffusion of modelling France, the United Kingdom and the United States as the early successes of the nation-state form happened in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a successor process to Charles Tilly’s (1992) diffusion of the sovereign state in the three previous centuries. These were Tilly’s states that were ‘made by war and that made war’ from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century.

Roessler’s (2016) coup–civil war trap is now infrequent in the Middle East and Europe, although it still happens, as we saw with the breakup of Yugoslavia and Nouri al-Maliki’s 2006–14 regime in Iraq. Al-Maliki’s majoritarian Shia regime was theoretically designed to achieve conditions of peaceful inclusion of Sunni and Kurdish Iraqi power blocs. We have seen that al-Maliki’s fear of overthrow by them, however, motivated coup-aversion through progressive exclusion of his ethnic rivals from effective access to genuine levers of state power. Al-Maliki’s ethnopolitical exclusion, particularly through ‘Shiafication’ of Iraq’s security forces, replaced coup risk with civil war risk. It caused new cascades of civil war that are not yet extinguished (Roessler 2016: Ch. 11). Likewise, the Syrian Alawite regime’s exclusion of Sunni Arabs, Sunni Kurds and Druze from access to levers of power they might use to mount a coup was important to understanding the failed civil war launched by the Muslim Brotherhood (1976–82) that cascaded to the current Syrian civil war (Roessler 2016: Ch. 11).

Cascades from multilayered security dilemmas are thus fundamental to understanding the modern history of violence, even though a conclusion of this book is that the security dilemma may have already become less fundamental to understanding the future of violence, at least in South Asia.
Conclusion

This chapter has considered the limits of macro explanation in international relations without credible micro foundations. Micro dynamics of cleavage in most conflicts are grafted on to macro cleavages and vice versa. That theme has been engaged at many levels. Rational choice accounts that construe passive deterrence as potent and as a foundation for realist international relations theory are construed as less credible micro foundations than models that balance defiance—deterrence. Defiance to coercion can exceed deterrence—from suicide bombers back to the Roman Empire throwing Christians to the lions.

Outcomes are driven not only by whether defiance effects do or do not exceed deterrence effects, but also by whether deterrence is dynamic rather than passive. That is, deterrence tends to have more leverage when it gradually but inexorably escalates to the level required to change behaviour, but only after iterated dialogue is attempted first, ideally to persuade fighters of the injustice of war, followed by iterated non-war attempts at deterrence.9 Dynamically responsive deterrence (Braithwaite 2018) averts a rush to coercion, as we discuss in Chapter 12. It averts threats. Instead, it displays a responsive enforcement pyramid of deterrents through which a state or the United Nations is willing to escalate until peace with justice is secured. This inexorability is a set of facts about capability for escalation that are threatening in the background, but not actively threatened in the foreground of diplomacy. Through this responsive lens, we can understand why Saddam Hussein in 1990 opted for defiance. Diplomatic communication with him utterly failed to display inexorability of escalation until the sovereignty of Kuwait was restored. A year later, when the United States urged Shia and Kurds to rise up against Saddam, it is easy to understand why this led them to slaughter. There was no semblance of Shia and Kurd courage being backed by NATO willingness to escalate support for them. So, Saddam defied international pressure again, returning to the slaughter of his own people.

9 Henry Kissinger (2014: 288–9) is a dissenter from this view at least for non-nuclear deterrence: ‘The dilemmas of Vietnam were very much the consequence of academic theories regarding graduated escalation that had sustained the Cold War; while conceptually coherent in terms of a standoff between nuclear superpowers, they were less applicable to an asymmetric conflict fought against an adversary pursuing a guerrilla strategy. Some of the expectations of the relationship of economic reform to political evolution proved unfeasible in Asia.’ Kissinger is certainly right that escalation from war to more intensive war is unlikely to deter and will build counterproductive defiance unless there is a will to push on all the way to total victory, as in World War II or Sri Lanka in 2009 (Chapter 8, this volume). At least that is the interpretation proposed in this book.
Fear and greed certainly motivate, as do defiance and grievance. Defiance is particularly ascendant when actors experience humiliation during an existential defence of their identity. Modelling is driven more by the identitive power promoted by model mongers, model modernisers and model missionaries than by rational choice. Some join women’s rights groups that confront sexual and gender-based violence in war for economic and social benefits; most join because of the identitive power of feminist models of resistance. Fear commonly drives herding that defies rational choice, such as herding into security dilemmas. Keynes (1936) tried to instruct economics of this limitation of rational choice when he put his finger on herding (‘animal spirits’) as a cause of economic crisis. All this means one must study in a local way how these micro motivations cascade into something bigger. That is one thing we attempt in Part II.

This chapter has hypothesised that another reason attention to the micro is imperative for the peacebuilder is that the cleavages that animate local anger are usually not the master cleavages of the war’s grand narrative. One recent Congolese mini-war was triggered by an extramarital affair that cascaded to a murder and then a conflict in which men were castrated and hundreds killed (Gettleman 2016). The grand narratives of World War I tell us nothing about the cleavages that agitated the Black Hand in Sarajevo. Hence, we concur with Kalyvas (2003, 2006: Ch. 11) and Autesserre (2010) that international peace agreements that address the root causes of a war, as constructed by the big players, are limited unless complemented by local peace processes that address local cleavages hotspot by hotspot.

Effective peacebuilding is therefore neither determinedly micro nor determinedly macro. Rather, it listens; it has an ear for interactive micro–macro resolutions. Attending to the cacophony of shouting across micro–macro divides, it seeks to calm and caress the clamour into a symphony of shared purpose for peace. The music metaphor is apt because, as Bougainville peacekeepers have often repeated, the guns available to peacekeepers are less useful than the instruments in military bands that can attract people together when combined with good food (Braithwaite et al. 2010b). Astute peacekeeping seeks arrangements for the micro and macro governance of spaces that are granted legitimacy at those different levels. Then, and perhaps only then, a locally and nationally legitimate monopoly of armed force can regulate spoilers of the peace. Support and security for the refugees who pose such a risk of igniting a new war—the next proposition addressed in Chapter 4—also become possible.
In all this, we agree with Kalyvas (2003: 480) that a danger is an ‘epistemic preference for the universal over the particular’. Local cleavages among peoples who might not speak national languages are the hardest to access and paint on a regional canvas in this book. Equally, we must steer clear of analysis so obsessed with the defiant and the particular that it fails to conceive national militaries and great powers as capable of deterrence. Local cleavages are often harnessed by the military might of forces such as the Rwandan military for decisive regime change in places such as eastern DRC. Afghan tribesmen endlessly enrol great powers to their projects by telling foreign soldiers that their clan’s local rivals are Taliban (or anti-communists), when they are not.  

To understand how to prevent cascades of killing, we must grasp how macro cleavages and their master narratives are exploited for local advantage and how micro cleavages are exploited by larger actors.

This is a complex business in a case such as the African Great Lakes cascade, where there are so many micro and macro cleavages that have been attracted to fight it out in an anomic space with actors—local and international—enrolling one against another every which way. The positive reading of complexity is that it provides the peacebuilder with many points of intervention where, if only in one small area, an ‘island of civility’ (Kaldor 1999) might be settled and might begin to spread cascades of nonviolence (see Chapter 11).

It is true that effort ought to be made to ensure that post-conflict ‘building’ efforts maximise any circuit-breaking opportunity: one ought to avoid simply rebuilding or reconstructing undesirable hegemonies and cleavages in a society. This underlies the preference of some for the term conflict transformation over conflict resolution. External and national intervention can be effective and legitimate (and often necessary or inevitable). However, one intellectual motive of this book is exploring how exercises in externally driven or supervised transformation, especially when premised on prescribing institutions and procedures, risk the creation of parallel or empty states (or peace processes) removed from people’s everyday experiences of violence. Peacebuilding lessons on the importance of process over outcome and lessons on participation remind us that institutions and peace are best built by the people in the spaces where they fear violence, not built principally by outsiders for the people.

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10 Kalyvas (2003, 2006) discusses this example. Much evidence of it is to be found in our fieldwork notes from Afghanistan.
This chapter articulates how violence cascades to domination, and domination to violence. Because this is the most central cascade in the book, we develop it at some length, while also explaining in sequence Propositions 6–10. Violence that cascades to militarisation is particularly likely to cascade domination and more violence. In such cascades, material forces cascade to war. Invading armies and missiles are examples of cascading materiality too obvious to excite explanatory insight. Flows of refugee bodies are also cascades that are not quite so obviously implicated in the cascading of violence.

This chapter diagnoses refugee flows as important in the onset or escalation of many wars. It follows that the work of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) is crucial for cascade prevention. Previous chapters argued that a higher level of diplomacy exercised by leaders such as Bill Clinton and Nelson Mandela, and a more principled refugee diplomacy, might have helped prevent the first pan-African clutch of wars concentrated around the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996. This book finds it hard to imagine the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan without recruitment from Pakistan’s refugee camps. It is hard to imagine the rise of Al-Qaeda without Osama bin Laden
continuing to offer schooling to uneducated boys in those same refugee camps after the war with the Soviets was won. Defiant bodies cascaded as suicide bombers\(^1\) from those camps.

It was not just that those bodies had defiance; defiance had bodies. Defiance was an imaginary of God’s work that inhabited bodies to stand up to Western humiliation of Muslims. That was how their bodies were storiied as they flew themselves into the Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 11 September 2001. Cascading torture of bodies motivates war—a factor explored in particular in Chapter 8 on the Marxist uprisings and the rise of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Defiance is generated through bodies of dissenters challenging the authority of the sovereign state. Through the rhetoric of the war on terrorism, states attempt to reinforce their authority and regain control over those defiant bodies.

A neglect in our discussion of the Congo wars in the past two chapters was that hundreds of indigenous Congolese militias were motivated by many different senses of exclusion—by the ethnic other (for example, Hema by Lendu and vice versa), by immigrants from Rwanda, by patrimonial politicians in Kinshasa, by the army, by foreign armies and more. Yet there is also a deep structure to that multitude of exclusions. It is about cascades of cash. Cash cascades to war in the sense that cascades of money politics recurrently drive a politics of exclusion. The ‘other’ is excluded from patrimonial politics so there is more money for the in-group. Discrimination and domination cascade as a formerly excluded group deploys force to retake a space and then exclude the formerly dominant group. Militarisation cascades.

This is what explains why resource-rich DRC, once the most industrialised country in Africa after South Africa, is now last on the planet in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and last on the Human Development Index. There is perhaps no region that suffered more ruthless, brutal

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\(^1\) While we do not go into detail here, Martha Crenshaw (2007: 136), in her review of the literature of suicide terrorism, observes how individuals are mobilised for the purposes of making their bodies the ultimate weapon. Crenshaw reflects that there are differences in how the attackers are described. Diego Gambetta (2006) talks about suicide missions. However, other social scientists (e.g. Bloom 2005; Hafez 2007; Pape 2003; Pedahzur 2005) refer explicitly to suicide terrorism. Shaul Shay, a historian who heads the Israeli Defence Forces Department of History, uses the terms ‘suicide attack’ and ‘suicide terrorism’ interchangeably (Crenshaw 2007). Historian Raphael Israeli (2002) is adamant that the term terrorism be used to describe violence associated with Islam; he implies that relatively neutral terms such as suicide bombers are too weak and insufficiently condemnatory. Crenshaw observes that ‘the authors who define their subject as suicide terrorism are typically less sensitive to the need to compare suicide attacks to other forms of terrorism or political violence’ (2007: 137).
colonialism than the slave and plantation economy of the DRC (formerly Zaire). Extractive colonialism was followed by the most extravagant of all extractive postcolonial African leaders, president Mobutu Sese Seko. As with the Mughal and British empires in India (Chapter 5), Mobutu, in his 32-year reign, kept for himself steep tax collections that drove his people into poverty. Through his clever courtship of Western support, destabilisation of his neighbours, systematic corruption and grandiose economic schemes, he left Zaire on the brink of economic collapse. He then borrowed the country into deep debt, putting the borrowed billions into his personal investments in the West. He had his central bank print billions of bank notes to send more money offshore to his family patrimony.

One might have thought that, with nothing left to tax and the country hopelessly in debt, extractive options were closed off to the successor regimes of the presidents Laurent Kabila and Joseph Kabila. Not at all. The card they played was to sell off the resource future of their country to foreign mining corporations at bargain prices. They kept the proceeds for themselves and their vote buying. This ‘mortgaged the future of [the DRC’s] citizens as surely as if they had issued debt’ (Collier 2009: 76). That is what we mean by the deep structure of the calamity of the DRC being a sequence of cascades of cash into regime pockets. The cascades of militarisation that swept the current president to power, and keep him there, were causally prior to his cascades of cash, but also causally consequent on Mobutu’s cascades of cash. This chapter sees those flows of soldiers and flows of cash through the prism of cascades of domination.

This chapter introduces, in turn, Propositions 6–10 of the starting theory:

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.
**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

Cascades of bodies

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those whom they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

There is a literature that draws on Georgio Agamben’s (1998) work and provides a critique concerning people’s resistance, tortured bodies and refugees. Some of these analyses explain counterterrorism laws and policies that suspend ordinary laws to create a ‘state of exception’ (examples from South Asia are provided in Chapters 5, 6 and 8). Agamben (1998: 2) claims that the state of exception is connected to insurrection and civil war; modern totalitarianism is defined by means of the state of exception, eliminating ‘not only political adversaries but entire categories of citizens’ who, for some reason, ‘cannot be integrated into the political system’. He asserts that ‘the state of exception is not a special kind of law (like the law of war); rather it is a suspension of the juridical order itself’ (Agamben 1998: 4). His most significant contribution to this is his concept of ‘bare life’—the human without the rights and legal status of a citizen or ‘a pure
simple corpus’ based on *Homo sacer*, a figure in archaic Roman law. Here, he establishes symmetries between the state of exception and bare life: ‘Bare life remains included in politics in the form of the exception, that is, as something that is included solely through an exclusion’ (Agamben 1998: 11). He also talks about modern-day detention centres that are born of the state of exception (Agamben 1998: 174).

We will see that flows of bodies cascade violence in different ways from cascades of imaginaries of insurgency and counterinsurgency strategy (Proposition 2), and from imaginaries of security dilemmas (Proposition 5). The sheer concentration of bodies belonging to folk from one side of a cleavage creates both an opportunity for military recruiters and an embodied target for the adversaries of those recruiters. The latter is well illustrated by Rwandan President Kagame’s genocidal campaign to clear Hutu refugee camps in the DRC and by the recruitment activities of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda in those same camps to enrol young fighters to their project of liberating Rwanda from Kagame. It is also illustrated by the recent brutal targeting of Palestinian refugees for both violence and recruitment in Syria, discussed in the previous chapter, and their historical targeting in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, Jordan and elsewhere. The Hutu bodies were vulnerable to recruitment because they were poor and angered by domination; they were vulnerable to attack because they were being recruited and because they were stateless. Stateless people have no national army to defend them.

A modus operandi of the Rwandan army in the DRC, as it had been inside Rwanda itself in 1994, was to declare areas around refugee or IDP camps ‘military zones’ with prohibited access, deliberately excluding humanitarian agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the media. Then UN secretary-general Boutros Boutros-Ghali interpreted this Congo tragedy thus: ‘two years ago, the international community was confronted with the genocide of Tutsi by weapons. Today we are faced with the genocide of Hutu by starvation’ (Reyntjens 2009: 96). Worse, the return of humanitarian aid to these starving people was used as bait to draw them into killing zones. Once humanitarian agencies discovered the whereabouts of refugees who had fled their former camps, they sought permission from military units to let them in to provide aid. ‘Facilitators’

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2 See, for example, Green and Ward’s (2009a: 56) analysis of *Homer sacer* and the ‘purifying’ homophobic assassination of gay men and transgender people in Iraq.
who advised refugees where to go to receive aid were repeatedly agents of their murderers who lured the vulnerable to their slaughter (Reyntjens 2009: 96–7).

When hundreds of thousands of refugees flee into another country, they displace locals who do not want to live in or near a refugee camp. In time, refugees begin to take jobs from locals. Their desperate needs distort welfare budgets that in poor countries have so little to provide for the needs of poor locals. Hungry locals, of course, come to resent refugees who are being fed with their taxes—more so when they take their jobs. When refugees are trapped for a long period in a new country, a politics of exclusion tends to grow against refugees. This became a genocidal exclusion of Hutus from many hotspots in the DRC, fuelled by a politics of hate from the regime across the border in Rwanda—dominated by Tutsi survivors of Rwanda’s genocide against them by Hutus. Similar dynamics prevailed in Tutsi–Hutu refugee cascades across the DRC–Burundi border. Armed Congolese groups emerged with platforms such as ‘the total refusal to cohabit with the Tutsi refugee’ (Reyntjens 2009: 149).

The inclination to use force and the prevalence of violence among refugees—particularly in factional, ethnic and clan conflicts—have been described as refugee militarisation (Mogire 2011: 40). Rebel and militia groups use refugee camp resources and also impose taxes on refugees to support their insurgency. Burundian Hutu rebels use refugee camps in western Tanzania for such purposes. In Kenya, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) and Somali militia also obliged refugees to make financial and food contributions (Crisp 1999). States can also exploit refugees by manipulating them to join or support certain armed activities. During the Cold War, the interests of the West were served by the continued military use of refugees (Loescher 1992: 12–13). War by proxy resulted in an unregulated and constant flow of weapons and aid to ex–Rwandan Armed Forces troops who controlled refugee camps to launch attacks across the border against Rwanda’s new regime (Mogire 2011; UNHCR 1995). East Pakistani/Bengali refugees who were offered sanctuary in neighbouring India were also trained by India to return to Pakistan to fight for independence for Bangladesh during the 1971 war.

Osama bin Laden was a prominent mujahidin leader who created Al-Qaeda by setting up madrassas (religious schools) in Afghan refugee camps in north-west Pakistan, where 6 million people had fled. He offered
children an education they otherwise had no chance of getting. Note that an obvious anti-cascade strategy in the 1980s and 1990s would have been for Western donors to build better schools than bin Laden was able to provide in those refugee camps. Chapter 2 showed this to be one of the many roads not taken to prevent the cascade towards the attacks on the Twin Towers and the war on terror. We see in this book that, on a wider front, the refugee and IDP camp is critical for understanding the cascading of South Asian violence.

It is worth emphasising that, in this book, we articulate how refugee and IDP settlements become instrumental in supplying bodies to communicate certain kinds of messages and bodies to target. This instrumental nature of bodies in interned spaces is critical for our understanding of cascades of violence. Caution is needed about the risk of playing into nationalistic understandings of refugees as security threats, even when one’s analysis is about how such understandings are another way refugees become a target in wars. This line of thought has been criticised as securitisation—that is, particular groups are constructed as threats through speech acts and nondiscursive practices. Didier Bigo (2002: 65), for example, analyses the securitisation of immigration.

Soon after the Paris terrorist attacks in November 2015, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, António Guterres, said it was ‘absolute nonsense’ to try to blame refugees for terror attacks, stressing that they were its ‘first victims’ and could not be held responsible for what happened in Paris, Beirut and elsewhere. Throughout this book, we explain how people are victimised and marginalised by dominations through policies, strategies and leaders. Divisive ethnocentric practices and political mobilisation on historical claims and grievances repeatedly spiral towards conflict with other groups.

**Anomie**

*Proposition 7: Cascades of violence that dis integrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.*
Anomie of two forms is hypothesised as critical to the cascading of violence. One is classic Durkheimian anomie of unsettling the legitimate norms that apply in a particular territory (Durkheim 1952). The second is the unsettled nature of perceptions of who is legitimately in charge (Braithwaite et al. 2010a).

When no one knows what the rules of the game are, ambitious politicians are attracted to enrol armed groups to impose new rules of the game that favour them. A normative vacuum in a particular territory thus attracts the most tyrannical of forces. The unsettled nature of social order means that claims for power staked by those forces of domination are likely to be contested by other (sometimes even more tyrannical) forces. In sum, violence cascades to anomie of two types. And anomie cascades to violence. An underestimated path for peacemakers is to identify rule-of-law vacuums hotspot by hotspot instead of state by state. War might then be prevented by populating those hotspots with decent, locally deliberated normative orders. Peacemakers can identify monopoly of legitimate force vacuums to make either the legitimate powerful or the powerful legitimate. How this might be done has been one of the policy projects of Peacebuilding Compared (Braithwaite and Wardak 2013; Wardak and Braithwaite 2013). Re-establishing normative order in anomic spaces was what the police station reconciliation committees project in tribal Pakistan was about. It successfully dampened cascades of revenge killings (Chapter 2, this volume; Braithwaite and Gohar 2014).

David Kilcullen (2011) argues that the Taliban came to power in Kandahar province as an ‘armed rule of law movement’. It was able to do this because Kandahar was a much more disordered space than other regions of post-communist Afghanistan. Kilcullen takes us on a journey across time and space to show, starting with the writings of the ancient Greek Herodotus (1954), how military commanders with a small local base could expand that base during periods of Hobbesian (1651) anarchy by providing quality justice and security services to ever-widening circles of frightened citizens. Hotspots destabilised by successive waves of

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3 French sociologist Émile Durkheim (2014) introduced the idea of anomie in his book *The Division of Labour in Society* in 1893. Durkheim’s conceptualisation focused on the lack of normal ethical and social standards. When ordinary rules are broken down, people are unable to determine how to act with one another. In his 1897 book, *Suicide*, he also discussed how normlessness caused deviant behaviours such as depression and suicide (Durkheim 1952). In criminology, the idea of anomie is explained in relation to a person’s choice to commit crime. Criminal activity is chosen when a person believes that there is no reason not to choose it.
violence became anomic security vacuums that attracted violent tyrannies in Afghanistan, cascading from other regional players such as Pakistan. Residues of previous wars left many groups with a score to settle against others who had occupied their lands. The Taliban was able to begin on its path to power in Kandahar only after 1994 by offering to establish Islamic order in Hobbesian spaces exploited by many armed gangs. The Taliban was able to show farmers that it could make it possible to get their produce to markets without being shaken down by a multitude of armed groups along the road. The Taliban shut down their roadblocks. At one level, they made rural spaces safe for women who were being raped by armed men. Of course, the Taliban then used that domination of an anomic space to impose a new form of tyranny, not only on women.

**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

This proposition means that militarisation, domination and violence reinforce one another in feedback loops. Militarisation refers to a particular process of change in the state and in the relationship between the state and other actors across civil society. Broadly speaking, a state or society is understood to be undergoing a process of militarisation if there is: a) an increase in the size, cost and coercive capacity of the armed forces or police and security agencies in a country; b) a greater political role for militaries; c) an increase in reliance on organised force, domestically and abroad, to secure policy goals, rather than ideological hegemony and bargaining; d) a change in the culture in the direction of values and beliefs that more effectively support organised state violence and non-state violence; and e) increasing external offensive military alignment or alliance with other states or armies, or use of force externally (Tanter 1991: 22–3).

Tanter’s original categorisations implicitly accept a monopoly on violence by the state, but we have tweaked them slightly above to accommodate militarisation by non-state armies. Tanter (1991: 24) acknowledges that the assumption of a standard role for the armed forces against which militarised states could be measured is a general difficulty in defining militarisation. In our book, we approach this problem by investigating militarisation through the prism of domination.
Cascades of violence create not only flows of bodies into refugee camps but also flows of military bodies and military hardware into military camps that sit near the refugee camps. Chapter 7 is a classic instantiation of this, with the havoc and human rights abuses caused by Bangladeshi military camps near IDP settlements in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Enduring reproductions of militarisation are predicated on, and justified through, a range of ideological rationales of order and chaos, revolts and counterinsurgency measures that advance and legitimate military action (Lutz 2002: 723).

Part II explores the historical contexts of militarisation that led to the prevalence of military values and practices in South Asian societies. Seungsook Moon (1998: 90), in her analysis of the militarisation of South Korea, observes that, throughout the twentieth century, until the 1970s and before the rise of economic conglomerates, the military had been the single most powerful institution. She argues that during Japanese colonisation, the repressive state apparatus was extended to South Korean society through coercion and imposition. With their symbols, organisation, structures and weapons, the Japanese Empire’s armies were intimidating. These mechanisms of domination were replicated by the postcolonial nation and facilitated by the military build-up of the Korean War. Massive US military aid resulted in the expansion and modernisation of the military elites who dominated the politics of the Korean Peninsula for decades. South Korea’s example demonstrates that, in times of war, militaries become more politically influential; it becomes more difficult for political leaders to survive without the support of generals. It is also an encouraging case because, even as it has been faced with a neighbour as militarised as North Korea, it has become a considerably less militarised and less dominated society in recent decades. Militaries tend to bring to the governance table a military imaginary of governance as being fundamentally about a monopoly of force (Proposition 2). Militaries incline to the belief that political power grows out of the barrel of a gun because when militaries are in a position to exercise power it does.

4 Perhaps for the wrong reasons (fear of communism), South Korea became one of the few countries to become substantially more equal (and less corrupt) as a result of twentieth-century land reform. As a result of the government’s land reform program after the Korean War, the income of the landlord class (the wealthiest 4 per cent of the rural population) fell by 80 per cent, while income increased by 20–30 per cent for the poorest peasants (the bottom 80 per cent) (You 2014: 194). As the recent impeachment of the head of state by Korean courts illustrates, South Korea today is a society with a comparatively robust separation of powers and a lively pulse of political freedom.

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They have a hammer; they see nails they can hit to force society back together. At least this is a dominant military imaginary; there are countless military leaders with more nuanced thinking about power.

There is an intoxicating quality about military victory:

[T]he Rwanda Patriotic Army (RPA) went from war to war, and from victory to victory (from 1981 to 1986) on the sides of [President Yoweri] Museveni in Uganda, from 1990 to 1994 in Rwanda [leading to control of the Rwandan state], from 1996 to 1997 in Zaire [returning a minerals windfall worth more than the national defence budget]. (Reyntjens 2009: 4)

Finally, the RPA bogged down with its failed DRC regime change of 1998. Yet it continued to make profits by many subsequent incursions that settled for grabbing chunks of military control over resource-rich locales in the DRC.

Dominant military imaginaries are quite different from the way religious leaders behave during times of anomie. If religious leaders think that a certain military faction will win, and this military faction will support their religious group in victory, they often lend ideological support to militarisation. But, as opportunities for cascades of peace arise, religious leaders have other tools besides that hammer, and they use them. They can reinforce cascades of peace by seeking to tie people together through bonds of love, forgiveness, reconciliation and interfaith dialogue. Because of their skills with these other tools beyond hammering people back together, religious leaders contingently support cascades of violence (when they perceive that to sustain the faith existentially) and cascades of peacemaking. So the sacralising of a space by religious power is contingently violent or nonviolent. Only 13 of the 39 wars that have been coded for Peacebuilding Compared so far have been coded a ‘low’ fit to: ‘Sequence of religious leaders contributing to conflict by supporting violence followed by religious leaders becoming advocates of peace.’ So far, the militarisation of a space by a military with low legitimacy tends to be associated much more consistently with increased prospects of violence in that space.

Of course, there are many exceptions where military leaders have been educated and persuaded to become peacemakers in search of a path to submit their military power to the legitimate civilian authority of an elected government. These exceptions are crucial to the analysis of this book. A particularly notable exception is where military power is
harnessed to the legitimate authority of UN peacekeeping authorised by the Security Council. The exception within the exception—UN Chapter VII enforcement that kills civilians as collateral damage from peacekeeping—reveals the deep structure of the risks in militarisation. This risk is profoundly illustrated by the disastrous intervention of Indian peacekeepers in Sri Lanka (Chapter 8). All these possibilities lead to the proposition that cascades of violence risk militarisation, and militarisation risks further cascading of violence.

It is important to describe how we employ the term domination in this book. Political power that protects people and respects rights as it springs from a democratically legitimated rule of law is not domination. Because political power that springs from the rule of law is not arbitrary power, but power humbled by legal checks and balances, it is a form of political power that is not deeply feared by law-abiding citizens (Pettit 1997). Power that grows out of the barrel of a gun lacks these qualities. When a soldier ties our hands and points a weapon at us, checks against pulling the trigger are few.

The power of the judge’s order is real, but less dominating than the gun at our head because we might appeal to reverse the judge’s order before it is put into effect. Detention in a war zone is more dominating than arrest by police in a peaceful democracy because we fear so deeply that detention could be a prelude to torture, perhaps rape or being ‘disappeared’. Militarisation tends to cascade domination that cascades further domination and militarisation. So, vulnerable civilians crave minimally sufficient militarisation. When people on one side of a cleavage dominate those on another side through means such as military torture, this is likely to cascade to reciprocation.5

Domination can cascade to many forms of tyranny that feed back into domination. Exclusion is a common one. The evidence that ‘state-sanctioned discrimination’ is a correlate of civil war is particularly strong (Goldstone 2008: 5; Gurr 2000). Multiculturalism or ethnic fractionalisation is not the predictor; it is state-sanctioned discrimination against a group. Even so, in the Peacebuilding Compared project, we do not take for granted that this result, which has proved so robust with

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5 The micro foundations of our analysis in defiance theory give one account of why. If I am coerced by unbridled torture, I am more likely to resist by supporting the torture of my enemies. Indeed, my revenge might well be more bloody than the violence inflicted on me. I might seek to realise it by supporting or harnessing the most unbridled forms of militarisation.
older wars, will continue to hold for wars up to 2030. This hypothesis, alongside the others in this book, will be retested quantitatively in 2030. We certainly find the hypothesis to be qualitatively potent across South Asia in this volume.

In Part II, we see that the influence of military values and practices is reflected in heavily militarised places such as Kashmir, Peshawar, the CHT and Kabul. These are also deeply gendered processes that are generated through hierarchical interactions between the security sector and local communities. Sexual and gender-based violence is a form of exclusionary domination that we find recurrently associated with militarisation. This theme is rejoined when we discuss the hypothesis that crime cascades to war and war to crime (Proposition 9). Through arrest and forced disappearances, abuse, forced marriages, torture and rape of women and girls, domination is created and maintained in our South Asian cases.

Extraction is another mode of domination that cascades further extraction. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) argue that the extraction of resources and slaves was the business model for colonies such as Congo that became extremely violent societies (Hochschild 1998). Their governance institutions provided weak guarantees of inclusion. In contrast, inclusion characterised the governance institutions bequeathed to the white settlers of white settler societies such as the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) book accounts for why places such as Congo were afflicted with weak institutions designed to allow maximum extraction from indigenous peoples, and why white settler colonies such as Australia received institutions designed to build welfare for whites. One might have hoped that when black leaders took over, professing an ideology of building welfare for Africans, the violence from a politics of extraction and domination would end. President Mobutu of Zaire was a good example of a leader who came to power with such promises, but who was attracted to seek power precisely to sustain institutions of extraction and domination. So were the two presidents Kabila, father and son, who succeeded Mobutu. Extraction cascading down through history made president Mobutu one of the wealthiest people in the world and is helping the current President Kabila on to that trajectory of extractive path dependency. Extractive colonial institutional legacies are resilient because they bequeath criminogenic opportunity structures to successor elites. These opportunities tempt those who control the guns in a society.
Across South Asia, we find cascades of money politics to be a recurrent form of domination that becomes intertwined with militarisation. We explain this phenomenon more deeply in Chapters 6 and 7. Money politics means that ordinary citizens are dominated by both business power and political power that yield to money power. Citizens get not the government they say they want, but the government that money can buy. In eastern DRC, diamond, coltan, gold and tin traders buy both politicians and armed groups. Those armed groups literally enslave people to work in mines under their control. In another wider set of contexts, armed groups allow civilians to control mining but tax their production heavily. Slavery and taxation by armed groups are business models diffused by model mercenaries (Proposition 2). These are ways that military domination, political domination, business domination and modelling are intertwined in eastern DRC.

Proposition 8, therefore, helps us to understand something like the rise of Islamic State in Iraq, Syria and Libya. As in so many oil-rich states, in the history of Iraq, money politics has loomed large. So, too, have local perceptions that international conflicts in which ordinary people suffer have been about extraction of their resources by Western colonial powers, multinational oil companies (Sampson 1975) and minority Sunni tribes
like that of Tikrit’s Saddam Hussein extracting the oil wealth of Shia and Kurdish lands. External interests further prized open Shia–Sunni and Kurd–Sunni cleavages. Indeed, cleavages internal to these identities were also pulled apart. Militarised factionalisation matters because the quantitative evidence shows that the larger the number of armed factions in a civil war, the harder it is to broker a peace, particularly a sustainable one (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 94–101).

More recently, on a wider canvas, the formidable regional power of Iran on one side, with allies such as Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Assad regime in Syria, has increasingly been in conflict with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Egypt backed by other Sunni regimes on the other. This widening cleavage has promoted violent imaginaries of Sunni–Shia struggle in the region, suppressing older imaginaries of coexistence. US rule in Iraq after 2003 was alert to the dangers of this cleavage. Al-Qaeda in Iraq was exploiting it to build its power base; this eventually forced the United States to see this grave geopolitical risk. So, perhaps too late, the United States insisted on powersharing as something that must come from the 2010 election in Iraq; there must be Shia, Sunni and Kurd ministers with senior portfolios. But, of course, the electoral logic that the statebuilders had put in place meant that Shia politicians won most seats in the Shia-majority country; prime minister Maliki was Shia. As soon as Western forces departed Iraq in 2014, the progressive marginalisation of elected Sunni and Kurd leaders that had been under way turned into a rout. It was an example of the majoritarian domination by democracy that we consider in Chapter 10.

Things got worse when large rallies organised by Sunni tribes to protest their political exclusion were hit by Iraqi army attacks, murdering large numbers of protestors. Sunni tribal leaders had given democracy a try for four years but the powersharing understanding had been ruthlessly abrogated by Shia electoral majoritarianism. They had tried to assert their rights peacefully by democratic means, such as protests by unarmed citizens, and were slaughtered for this. Re-enter Al-Qaeda in Iraq. It was about to morph into Islamic State with a leader independent of Al-Qaeda and an ideology more savage and radical than Al-Qaeda’s. It seized the

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6 For example, Saikal (2014: 7) highlights the intra-Shia schism between the Iranian-supported Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (representing some of Iraq’s middle-class Shia) and the Sadrists (representing some of the more marginalised and lower-class Shia) that opened as a result of ‘the spilling of blood over time’ (see also Hagan et al. 2015).
moment to remilitarise Iraq and declare a new Islamic caliphate on a large swathe of territory that spread from the areas of Syria it controlled by then and across the Sunni belt of Iraq. It was able to attract a surge of support from local fighters to drive the Iraqi army out of the neighbourhoods where they had been murdering Sunni protestors. As the Iraqi army pulled back from these areas to regroup, Islamic State seized formidable American military hardware that had been left behind. This dynamic reached a crescendo when fewer than 1,000 Islamic State fighters seized control of the second-largest city in Iraq, Mosul. There, Islamic State looted enormous stockpiles of US-supplied tanks and other advanced weapons systems and the local banks and surrounding oil wells whose exports further funded the insurgency. Success bred success as Saudi, UAE, Kuwaiti and Qatari businessmen pumped more money into the nascent caliphate, although, by 2015, Islamic State in Iraq relied mainly on their own looted bounty. Alienated young Muslims from perhaps half the countries of the world flooded in to volunteer for this bold new Islamic State fightback.

In sum, a major new war was the result of a history of geopolitical humiliation, money politics, oil politics and extraction, followed by a pretence of democracy that was in reality a practice of exclusion; a closing off of legitimate means for Sunnis to articulate grievances; a history of militarisation of space that included masses of military hardware waiting to be looted; and external sponsors ready to further support remilitarisation of anomic spaces. This 2014–18 war contains ingredients common to many of the post-1990 wars from all corners of the globe that have been coded so far for Peacebuilding Compared.

At a more micro level, in the biography of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, we see how a particular institution of militarised domination—the US military prison at Camp Bucca—operated as a university for terror rather than as an institution for containing violence. This was not because Baghdadi was treated unusually oppressively in the prison. On the contrary, he made himself useful as a prisoner who was not classified as a jihadist or arrested for any serious offence, to be a bridge between the Americans and their captives. Through playing this role, the prison gave him an enormous network. On release, he used that network to expand Islamic State. Inmates left with phone numbers of key contacts

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7 The Islamic State leader also spent some time in Abu Ghraib prison.
inscribed on the elastic of their underwear. Baghdadi had been arrested for the crime of visiting the home of a man on the US wanted list at the time he was picked up. The prison was a university in insurgency for Baghdadi because it was full of former military and intelligence leaders of Saddam’s regime, who taught him much about war. One of its former inmates who had been a senior officer in Saddam’s military sponsored Baghdadi’s ascent to the Islamic State leadership. William McCants said of the 24,000 inmates who graduated from Camp Bucca:

If they weren’t jihadists when they arrived, many of them were by the time they left. Radical jihadist manifestos circulated freely under the eyes of the watchful but clueless Americans. ‘New recruits were prepared so that when they were freed they were ticking time bombs’, remembers another fellow inmate … peers would ‘teach him, indoctrinate him, and give him direction so he leaves a burning flame.’ Baghdadi would turn out to be the most explosive of those flames … [but there were many former Ba’athists and others at Bucca who joined Islamic State]: ‘If there was no American prison in Iraq, there would be no [Islamic State] now’, recalled [another Bucca inmate]. (McCants 2015)
Civilising crime-to-war hotspots

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

Historians do not always take seriously the proposition that crime cascades to war. In a sense, they are right that this should not be the most central element of cascades of violence theory. Yet perhaps historians should treat it more seriously than they do. Sparks that ignite conflagrations matter. At the height of the tinder-dry Australian bushfire season, the structural conditions are of large fires waiting to happen, awaiting the spark that causes the inevitable. Yet there can be no doubt that there would be more fires without education campaigns to dissuade smokers from throwing cigarettes from car windows and campers from lighting fires. There would be more fires if there were no rapid responses to lightning strikes and to electricity lines needing repair. Likewise, as discussed in Chapter 2, we could think of effective counterterrorism to protect Archduke Ferdinand from assassination in 1914 as a noteworthy path not taken to war prevention (Clark 2012). As Otto von Bismarck had said before it happened, ‘some damned foolish thing in the Balkans would one day cause a great European war’ (Evans 2013). It is dangerous to neglect spark prevention. It is a conceit that one could understand structural conditions so well that one could know that a war, especially a world war—even the next thing that might happen in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or the DRC—is so inevitable that it is hardly worth bothering with the sparks.

We use the Sri Lankan case in Chapter 8 to focus particularly systematically on the Proposition 9 cascade, although we find it to arise recurrently in all the country cases in this book. Gerlach (2010) argues that extremely violent societies are not violent in some cultural or essential way. Rather, societies transition in and out of extremely violent periods of their histories as a result of crises. Karstedt’s (2012) work on her Violent Societies Index shows empirically that extremely violent societies experience disparate kinds of violence that are highly correlated. For example, state coerciveness is a rather consistent response to violent challenges to the state (Davenport and Inman 2012: 622). Proposition 9 is about one dynamic that might be responsible for that empirical result: violence cascades across space and time from one kind of violence to another. For
example, in some Peacebuilding Compared cases, sexual and gender-based violence has significant explanatory power, such as in the Bougainville civil war (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 20, 41–2), where an incident of rape was one of the sparks that ignited armed conflict, further rapes turned the war to a new intensity and the war in turn cascaded to a frequency of rape not seen before the war (Braithwaite 2006). The DRC’s wars and the Bangladeshi war for independence from Pakistan were cascades to particularly extraordinary levels of rape—millions of rapes in the DRC (Peterman et al. 2011), hundreds of thousands of rapes in Bangladesh—often executed with the objective of cascading domination through impregnation) (Chapter 7, this volume; D’Costa 2011).

Rape also has the ability to accentuate and securitise identity differences through which crimes cascade. Women’s subordinate role often results in them being targeted both by the enemy and by their own communities. Feminists have questioned the binaries of casting women only as victims and men as belligerent perpetrators (Reilly 2007). Women’s labour and women’s bodies have always been integral to warmaking (Charlesworth and Chinkin 2000; Enloe 2000; Reilly 2007); women also become active participants in political violence and criminal networks. The routine rape of Chechen women by Russian soldiers is one key motivational factor for women to take up arms and become suicide bombers. To recruit more female operatives from Tamil areas, the LTTE used to show graphic images of Tamil women and girls being raped and tortured by enemy soldiers. The rape–recruitment nexus and the capacity for rape to transform the character of a conflict are central themes in Chapter 9 on the Maoist insurgency in Nepal.

Another turning point in the gender politics of war was 2015. The male-dominated armies that had caused the devastation in Syria and Iraq refused to honour their much-mouthed responsibility to protect the citizens of Kobani and Mount Sinjar from Islamic State, and to protect Yazidi and Christian women from sexual slavery. Kurdish women then arrived from all over Syria, Turkey, Iran and Iraq to fight in approximately equal numbers to the men. In crucial battles, the Peshmerga leadership made the decision to push forward with a majority female front line. They made the decision at the urging of women fighters to make a feminist point. They won where male-dominated Western infantry were afraid to go. They taunted Islamic State fighters with their courage and with their belief that they would not go to Paradise if killed by a woman. The depth of the courage of the Kurdish women was revealed by their training videos,
which John Braithwaite watched in Iraq, showing women how to kill themselves if captured, advising them that ‘girls must not allow themselves to be captured by Islamic State’. Now that these Kurdish fighters have completed the toughest fighting to defeat Islamic State, Turkish forces are surging into Syria to attack them at the time of writing, and the United States has simultaneously cut off their supply of weapons to them.

Rape can be an effective part of a genocidal strategy (Askin 2003). Feminist politics challenges the myth that rape is rare in war or peace. These histories are why we position a singular importance for rape in Proposition 9.

Meaningful prevention models are multilayered, starting with peacebuilding that tackles deep structural drivers of conflict such as militarisation, poverty, gender inequality, discrimination and domination of one group by another. One can never declare victory over deep societal structures such as these. They bounce back resiliently. Hence, we must also attend to proximate causes of a conflict. In Chapter 2, we saw that an important proximate cause of World War I was the ultimatum that Austria–Hungary issued to Serbia in 1914, and subsequent ultimatums by other governments. Because there tend to be many proximate causes with an unpredictably contingent character, it is quite a challenge for preventive diplomacy to be ready to address all of them as they arise. Few peacemakers have the vision before the event that a particular proximate action could become a provocation to war. The Swiss cheese model that comes to us from accident prevention (Reason 1990) captures the prevention idea. Each layer of prevention put in place is full of holes—like a slice of Swiss cheese. Regrettably, even with many layers of prevention, the holes in layers can align and mortal risks slip through one preventive net after another. Yet the more layers of prevention are put in place, the more likely it is that the weaknesses of one layer of prevention will be covered by the strengths of another.

Even if it were true that security sector reform could extinguish all sparks that ignite violence, or patch all cracks in the security sector so it never failed, criminologists point to another reason root causes such as systematic discrimination against an ethnic minority require remedy. It is unthinkable that African-Americans could mount a civil war against

8 For an earlier Peacebuilding Compared volume that applies the Swiss cheese model of relying on redundant fallible layers of social defence to armed conflicts in Indonesia, see Braithwaite et al. (2010a: 236–9).
America’s white majority, or Aboriginal against white Australians. When African-Americans do riot—as happened in Los Angeles and other cities in the 1960s and after police bashed Rodney King in 1991, and in Ferguson, Missouri, and other cities after incidents of excessive police force in 2014–15—the capabilities of the security forces are so overwhelming that escalation to civil war does not occur (Proposition 1). Urban riots are a tiny cost of structural inequality and discrimination compared with the routine bloodletting of a high crime rate. The evidence for this is discussed in Chapter 11.

Where resistance through warfare is not an option for an oppressed group that has no external sponsor supplying them arms, disengagement becomes a problem—disengagement from oppressed people’s own traditions and identity, from education, from employment and entrepreneurship and even from care and responsibility for children in circumstances where states unreasonably and repeatedly steal children from poor families (as we see in the work on domestic disengagement and defiance by Valerie Braithwaite 2009). The kind of structural factors, proximate factors and ignition points analysed in this book, and in the Peacebuilding Compared project more widely, might be seen as warning signs of disengagement from the social order that can disintegrate domestic peace. They are also warnings of defiance that might lead to riots and warfare to overturn the social order. Indeed, the United States and Australia bear large continuing costs in violence, especially domestic violence, murder and sexual assault (especially of children), as a result of their racial discrimination. These violence costs are greater than the one-off cost of many of the armed conflicts considered in this volume. Several times more US civilians—now approaching 1,000 a year—have been killed by their own police since 2000 than have been killed by terrorists.

Of course, most crime does not cascade to war. Most of us commit crimes in our lifetimes, sometimes major ones, without ever causing a war! Likewise, smokers dispose of cigarettes carelessly countless times without causing a fire that destroys a town. To date in the Peacebuilding Compared dataset, some kinds of crimes are repeatedly coded as sparking armed conflicts. Political assassinations, major terrorist acts, murder and rape in the context of ethnic/religious riots recurrently appear as important crimes to minimise for societies that seek peace. The argument that crime cascades to war is easier to make today because few would question that the terrorism of 11 September 2001 resulted in the ‘war on terror’ that included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, we always knew
that the biggest crimes in modern history involved the theft of whole continents that caused protracted frontier wars when it occurred with the European invasions of South and North America and Australia, and at the Berlin Conference of 1884 to carve up Africa among European powers.

Crime in the Peacebuilding Compared dataset is sometimes more than a cause of war; it can also crush the cause of peace. Amin Saikal (2014: 48–9) describes the impact on peacemaking of two serious crimes under Afghan law:

The [former Afghan president Hamid] Karzai and US policy of reconciliation and the efforts of the High Peace Council initially seemed somewhat promising. In January 2012, senior Taliban officials arrived in Qatar to open a political office in the country. This was seen as a potential breakthrough in negotiations between the Karzai administration, the Taliban and the United States. However, these efforts soon proved untenable in the aftermath of two critical events in Afghanistan. In February 2012, the media reported that copies of the Qur’an were burnt in a US military base. While this did not directly affect negotiations with the Taliban, with a spokesperson for the group specifying that ‘this issue will not affect [the] process in Qatar’, the killing of 17 civilians by a US soldier in Kandahar in the following month cemented the end of a short-lived experiment.

The conclusion that war cascades to crime is supported by Archer and Gartner’s (1984) result that homicide rates rise after nations participate in wars at home or abroad. Ghobarah et al. (2003) confirmed this cross-nationally for suicide as well as homicide. Monique Marks (2001: 89, 133) found in South Africa that former male combatants experienced anomie, powerlessness and emasculation that became a ‘slippery slide into the underworld of crime’. We have learnt from Iraq (Boyle 2014: Ch. 8) that violent death rates often go up after a war ‘ends’, with only El Salvador having a higher total violent death rate than Iraq between 2004 and 2009 (Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development 2011: Ch. 2). This result has also been discovered in a number of African and other conflicts where killing (Duffield 2001: 188), and even more so sexual and gender-based violence, can increase after a peace agreement is signed. Likewise, this occurred after some Latin American civil wars—most notably, the continent’s biggest recent wars in El Salvador and Guatemala, where a doubling of already extreme homicide rates at the end of the war delivered a higher death rate than during many of the peak years of civil war (Muggah and Krause 2011: 180; Richani 2007; Westendorf 2015: 8).
There can be various local reasons for this. A common one is that a peace agreement between warring armed groups gives them security from each other’s guns, which allows them to concentrate with impunity on pillage of civilian populations, the domination of which they divvy up in the peace deal. Or, if one party to the war withdraws completely from the space, the other party can resume its war aims with impunity against civilian populations, as when Serbian forces withdrew in the Kosovo peace, allowing ethnic cleansing and murder of Serbian civilians by armed Albanians, which had been impossible during the war (Boyle 2014: Ch. 6). This is one way of reading the effect of some peace deals and ceasefires in the DRC. A survey of more than 10,000 households in North and South Kivu reported the largest source of insecurity as ‘bandits’ (24 per cent), the second-most important source of insecurity was the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (21 per cent), followed by demobilised soldiers or deserters (13 per cent), armed non-Congolese groups (12 per cent) and armed Congolese groups (11 per cent) (GRIP 2011: 114). In other words, ‘war’ in the DRC is, first, common crime, second, state crime and, third, violence by non-state armed groups. An Oxfam survey yielded similar results for Afghanistan in 2008 (Waldman 2008: 12), where ordinary Afghans certainly feared being killed by the Taliban. But fears of warlords, criminal gangs, international forces, Afghan police, armed men hired to do the bidding of Afghan government officials and drug traffickers (which, were they combined with ‘criminals’, would be perceived as the top security threat) are all extremely high. Fears of the Afghan army, family violence and intertribal violence are also quite high. In Afghanistan, as in the DRC, the evidence is clear therefore that insurgents are just one part of a much larger fabric of fear.

Boyle (2014) identified the key variable for explaining how the severity of strategic postwar murder (such as assassination of political opponents or media critics) is whether or not the armed group that signed the peace accord had effective internal control over its own fighters. Post conflict, completely new bargaining contests elicit violence among factions and splinter groups of former armies, even within associations for the welfare of war veterans in cases such as Timor-Leste and Kosovo (Boyle 2014: Chs 6 and 7). A war that is anomic can become even more anomic for veterans once their military commanders step down and decommission their armed authority. Boyle (2014) suggests that if the internal control of former commanders over their fighters disintegrates totally, other crucial
parties for strengthening the peace architecture can conclude that there is no longer any point in negotiating with the former armed groups. Such cessation of negotiation with the veterans can become a new danger to the peace. These risks are particularly profound in Boyle’s data when the culture of violence as the means of pursuing factional agendas persists in combination with some factions never having agreed to the terms of the peace in the first place. Beyond politically instrumental violence, if fighters are totally out of control they are also more prone to mixtures of expressive violence, revenge and instrumental violence. An example is veterans occupying the luxury home and raping the women of an innocent Serb family after the war because ‘Serbs burnt our house’ (Boyle 2014: Ch. 6).

Richani’s (2007) analysis of El Salvador, with comparisons to Guatemala and Lebanon, illustrates the type of case where criminal gangs move in to monopolise social control ‘post conflict’ (see other sources in Chapter 11, this volume). The El Salvador case illustrates how both crime and contemporary wars cascade from local hotspot to hotspot, more than from country to country—as international relations theories would have it. Hence, the effect of a war in some part of El Salvador cascades to an impact on crime on the turf of a particular gang in some small part of Los Angeles. When those gang members return home to set up control of their own gang, it is over some very local hotspot of violence within El Salvador. Hotspots destabilised by successive waves of violence become anomic vacuums that attract violent tyrannies. We have explained that Kandahar was such a hotspot that enabled the rise of the Taliban in 1996. Violent crime is highly concentrated at hotspots; half the crime in US cities occurs at fewer than 3 per cent of their addresses (Sherman et al. 1989; Weisburd 2012).

The civil war in El Salvador caused a flood of refugees to the United States after 1980, including a cascade of unaccompanied children. The adult refugees were mostly unskilled peasants with little or no English who experienced widespread unemployment in the United States. This resulted in their recruitment into gangs and the drug trade, particularly in Los Angeles. Gang wars arose from the takeover of formerly Mexican gangs by Salvadorians with fighting skills sharpened by civil war. In the years after the 1992 peace agreement in El Salvador, the United States forcibly repatriated 130,000 immigrants back to El Salvador—43,000 of them with criminal records. This number continued to grow over the past decade. Returning gang members took over certain hotspots, making a number of coastal sites in El Salvador transit points in narco-
trafficking—something that never had been part of the local crime scene before 1990 in El Salvador. El Salvador’s prisons became particularly inflamed hotspots where assassinations of gang members were rife. After the 1992 peace agreement, El Salvador’s homicide rate skyrocketed, with more people killed per year than during the civil war. The homicide rate peaked at 138 per 100,000 in 1994 and 139 in 1995. Gang conflict was responsible for much of this homicide. While 85 per cent of homicides were of males (Ayala 2012), male violence cascaded to El Salvador also having the highest rates of femicide in the world (UN Women 2013) and of child murder (Lee 2015). Wikileaks (2011) revelations suggest the homicide rate might have spiked again in 2005 above civil war levels of mortality, to an even higher level than that acknowledged by the government. The true homicide rate is likely far more extreme than the official statistics suggest because a corrupt police and judiciary are routinely paid not to find ‘homicide’. Moreover, for a small country of 6 million people, El Salvador has the quite extraordinary number of more than 2,000 ‘disappearances’ in some years (Ayala 2012). The two major Salvadorean gangs are now transnational organisations spreading from hotspot to hotspot beyond El Salvador to Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, the United States and Canada, each gang with many tens of thousands of members and strategically networked with Mexican drug cartels.

Plate 4.3 Street gang members in prison in El Salvador.
Source: Giles N. Clarke/Getty Images.
Cascade dynamics explored in this book include violence that spreads horizontally in space from hotspot to hotspot, sometimes linking one hotspot to another, as ink-spots that expand and connect up, as well as vertically up through structural cleavages. This book concludes that twenty-first-century warfare is concentrated at local hotspots. Most places in the DRC, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Pakistan are as safe for a pleasant walk as the 97 per cent of addresses in US cities that are not hotspots of crime.

In consequence, peace is accomplished hotspot by hotspot more than state by state. Political settlements and a politics of reconciliation that are less myopically national and more oriented to a local politics of place are needed to resolve contemporary violence. This is also the message of the work of Kalyvas (2003, 2006: Ch. 11) and Autesserre (2010, 2014) on cleavages best studied in terms of their unravelling in a local politics of place and then connected up to national and transnational variables. It is also a theme of Gerry van Klinken’s (2007) book on ethnic, religious and separatist armed conflicts in Indonesia with the wonderfully suggestive subtitle Small Town Wars. He limited his hotspots to five provinces in Indonesia where communal violence occurred. Then he paired these examples to five main processes of contentious politics: identity formation, escalation, polarisation, mobilisation and actor constitutions, as suggested by McAdam et al. (2001).

‘Small town wars’ is both a post-Westphalian and a pre-Westphalian concept. At the height of Westphalian hegemony, from 1900 to 1941, the most deadly warfare and 80 per cent of all wars were interstate. From 1945 to 1976, this reversed sharply to a situation in which ‘85 per cent of all wars were on the territory of one state and internally oriented’ (Doyle and Sambanis 2006: 11). We might qualify this to predominantly ‘internally oriented’. While World War I started with an incident at a hotspot, Sarajevo, it spread through alliance structures as whole nations issued ultimatums. At every stage of modern history, the local politics of place is important to understanding warfare, as is state action. It is just that historians systematically overestimate the degree to which interstate wars are total wars that engulf the entire territory of a nation because historians
do not spend enough time on the ground during wars. The imperative to correct this has become more profound as growing proportions of post-1945 wars spread hotspot to hotspot more than state to state.9

Like international relations, criminology has a history of inattentiveness to the local politics of place. As a result, criminologists have been more concerned with violent displacement than with cascades of violence. Displacement is the idea that if we extinguish violence at one place, those who are structurally disposed to violence will simply move to commit crime at another place. The empirical literature mostly tends not to reveal displacement effects for violence and crime generally (Weisburd et al. 2011). Rather, when we extinguish crime at one hotspot of violence, crime also tends to decline in surrounding areas. This should have been a clue for criminologists to follow cascades of violence as a research question more important than displacement of violence.

We find war and crime cascades in this book to be bidirectional and complex. In the fieldwork for Peacebuilding Compared in Mindanao, Philippines, as in most of the other conflicts we have studied, we found plentiful evidence of women believing that war was a cause of their husbands returning from battle to inflict domestic violence on their families. We encountered stories of Mindanao mothers sending their daughters to work as domestics in Gulf states to protect them from the domestic violence of their ex-combatant fathers. Tragically, some of these girls were lost to their families when traffickers ensnared them into sex slavery. War cascades to domestic crime, which cascades to transnational crime. The Philippines is the largest exporter of guest workers to Gulf states, who come disproportionately from the most impoverished and war-torn region of the country, Mindanao. We also found cases of young mothers escaping the violence of their combatant husbands by travelling as domestics to the Gulf, then becoming lost to sex trafficking and forced labour and lost to their motherless infants.10 They become trapped in a complex net of exploitation.

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9 One evocative vindication of this is Hagan et al.’s (2015: 126–7) analysis of how a Shia organised crime group that controlled a suburb of Baghdad called Sadr City morphed into the Mahdi Army that radically destabilised Iraq.

10 Parrenas (2001) observes this phenomenon as the care crisis reproductive economy.
Islands of integrity and peace

Proposition 9 on crime–war is a challenge to extant criminological theory as well as international relations theory. Taking criminological theory more deeply into domestic space and away from violence, we see the challenge of regulating the crimes of Wall Street as one of civilising a space where criminalised cash cascades dangerously. The Wall Street challenge is how to imbue new norms into an anomic space with a high degree of mobility of aggressive young traders. Tackling corporate crime through effective local enforcement strategies—bank by bank, bank branch by bank branch—is as important as reforming international banking rules at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Braithwaite 2013). A change in international rules that has no follow-through to local enforcement is just an international ‘ritual of comfort’ (Power 1997). Without any change in global rules, local bank regulators in the United States might have prevented the Global Financial Crisis of 2008 had they cracked down branch by branch on banks with unusually high numbers of loan defaults once an explosion of fraud-driven loan defaults became visible on Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) databases in 2005 (Braithwaite 2013). Of course, Swiss-cheese style, it might have been more permanently prevented by structural changes to financial capital and its regulation. Corporate crime in banks is not just about Wall Street; Peacebuilding Compared finds it to be a recurrent challenge in local peacebuilding contexts during and after civil wars from Baghdad to Belfast, from Belgrade to Kabul and from Kathmandu to Zagreb (Green and Ward 2009a: 52; Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2018). We described in the previous chapter how the greatest extractive excesses of DRC president Mobutu used his central bank as their vehicle.

Likewise in the DRC, it is important to build peace mine by mine, village by village, just as it is important to build peace through UN Security Council resolutions in New York. A local politics of place is needed to connect these threads of analysis into a fabric of reform, whether that place is a mine, a village or a bank branch. Consider the common scenario in the Peacebuilding Compared dataset where corruption benefits a dominating group and disadvantages some religious or ethnic other, and where this is a grievance at the root of armed conflict. There is virtue in the 1990s Transparency International strategy of reforming a society pervaded with deep structures of corruption by establishing ‘islands of integrity’ where central anticorruption commissions can be found. Reform can also be at
the level of local islands of integrity whereby a town of 35,000 people, such as Bhaktapur in Nepal, signs an integrity pact with Transparency International so that it becomes a local anticorruption model that might spread to other localities that observe its benefits (Transparency International 1999: Para. 62).

Likewise, there was virtue in the approach of the International Force for East Timor in establishing ink-spots of security that gradually expanded and connected (Braithwaite et al. 2012). MONUSCO in DRC tracked the same idea with its strategy of ‘islands of stability’. There was a model of peace in Somaliland as an ‘island of civility’ (Kaldor 1999) that showed other locales the benefits of local reconciliations that expand trade as regions of peace expand. Kaldor (1999) argues that it is possible to find these islands of civility in nearly every war zone.

Peace was also modelled from islands of civility that were the only local spaces where women’s peacemaking groups that crossed the cleavages of the war could meet in safety in Maluku, Indonesia (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 26, 160–2), and Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 36–7). For Mindanao, we observed in our Peacebuilding Compared interviews that successive peace agreements since 1996 were far from a total failure, even though they were unravelled by spoilers who turned Mindanao back to war. This was because one of the initiatives that survived these peace processes was the many ‘peace zone’ agreements to which the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), the New People’s Army and the Armed Forces of the Philippines were all sometimes signatories (Avruch and Jose 2007; Iyer 2004; S-CAR 2015). These commentators argued that while the peace zones were far from the most important driver of the new peace agreement of 2014 between the MILF and the government, their expansion helped extend a foundation for the peace. We return to the promise of cascading nonviolence locally from peace zones in Chapter 11.

Settled, locally attuned rules of the game that are decent and that work well in the context of a particular hotspot that is unsettled in some way are all that is being suggested. This is not very novel. Because the modelling

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11 It is just a Chicago School portrait of the whole globe painted pointillist style; collective efficacy (Sampson et al. 1997) constructed community by community. It is Durkheim for hotspots, as opposed to Durkheim for so-called organic societies.
of violent imaginaries (Proposition 2) is one of the mechanisms that move violence from hotspot to hotspot, cascades from one locality to another can travel long distances.

Consider the Buddhist Sinhala nationalist imaginaries of organisations of authoritarian Buddhist monks such as Bodu Bala Sena (Buddhist Power Force), which, in Sri Lanka, have cascaded violent ethnic rioting against not only Tamils but also Muslims. Our interviews suggest that these Sri Lankan organisations were influenced by fraternal organisations of Buddhist Burmese nationalist monks. These organisations have led attacks to drive Rohingya Muslims from their homes with indiscriminate killings in Myanmar.

The displacement caused by the escalating pattern of targeting Muslims has cascaded refugees across the Indian Ocean and into Bangladesh, as discussed in Chapter 9. In 2012, Muslim rioters (some of them believed to be Rohingya refugees, according to our fieldnotes) left a trail of destruction in Ramu, Bangladesh, where 11 temples, including two 300-year-old temples, were torched. Then, 2013 saw retaliatory attacks by Muslims against Buddhist refugees (Proposition 6) from Myanmar who had fled to Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. These incidents led to wider regional concerns about violent imaginaries fuelled by the Myanmar conflict cascading to conflict between Muslims and Buddhists across Asia, particularly in Indonesia (to where Buddhist–Muslim Myanmar refugee violence has also cascaded). Malaysia was another cascade where resentment by Muslim majorities of the affluence of Buddhist, particularly Chinese, minorities has led to massive rioting and large-scale loss of life in the past (Purdey 2006). May 2013 saw an attempt by Islamists to bomb the Myanmar Embassy in Jakarta in retaliation for attacks on Muslims inside Myanmar (Coates 2013). Thus, violent imaginaries can travel far, as can the abused bodies of refugees, as they leap from hotspot to hotspot.

It follows from Proposition 9 that cascades can be interrupted by acting locally on fissures within fissures. Embedded within the grand narratives of dozens of Asian conflicts that construe their conflict as being about some grand cleavage (such as Acehnese separatists versus Indonesian nationalists) lurked a subsidiary fissure that motivated the slaughter or cleansing of Buddhist Chinese. One of these dozens of examples nested in the Peacebuilding Compared data is the Bougainville separatist civil war between Bougainvilleans and mainlanders of Papua New Guinea. The three local Chinatowns on Bougainville were ethnically cleansed, never to return, even though the war had nothing to do with grievances
against Chinese traders (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 28). Imaginaries of Chinese as economic exploiters of impoverished locals have cascaded great distances from one hotspot to another across Asia and beyond (Chua 2004). They can only be addressed by a very local ethnic politics of peacebuilding, reconciliation, inclusion and social justice. The same can be said of the way the 1999 civil war in Kosovo not only cleansed Albanians and Serbs, but also Roma in many localities during the war and its immediate aftermath.

Cascades of shamelessness

As cascades of crime to war to crime accelerate, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. Most of us do not decide against murdering someone who creates difficulties for us because we weigh up the benefits of eliminating them against the expected punishment costs of detection (Ahmed et al. 2001). Rather, we do not even consider murder as an option; murder is unthinkable to us. Our socialisation into the shamefulfulness of murder has put this option right off our deliberative agenda. Sexual and gender-based violence rates increase when violence against women is no longer seen as shameful. The politics of nonviolence of the women’s movement has had a profound impact in constituting violence as more shameful in recent decades than it was in the past. The incidence of these crimes has fallen in response to this feminist politics (Pinker 2011: 196–201). Sadly, this progress suffers setbacks in times of high crime and high war. Violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse for the cause.12 When conflict supplies justificatory scripts for rape and violence, these crimes of domination of women become less shameful. Proposition 9 is about why this further drives up the incidence of rape and violence.

As cascades of crime to war accelerate, the criminalisation of the state also becomes less shameful. In peaceful democracies, a criminal record tends to be fatal for a political career. When security dilemmas grip the imaginations of citizens, they want political leaders who can protect them from the dangerous other. Quite often they come to think that a hardened criminal is precisely the kind of political leader who can offer their group

12 When the Black Panther movement in 1968 was justifying violence in the struggle against white oppression in the United States and against the war in Vietnam, its leader, Eldridge Cleaver (1992), famously wrote in Soul on Ice that ‘[r]ape was an insurrectionary act’ (when directed at ‘defiling’ revenge against white women).
that protection from another ethnic or religious group. In our interviews with Iraqi community and religious leaders, they said people often joined Islamic State because they feared the violence or expropriation of their property by a political boss who dominated their village or town; they turned to Islamic State to warn off that political or party boss.

War also creates new criminal opportunity structures for political leaders who control states. Examples include corruption, embezzlement, contracts that favour a family business, crushing the competitors of a family business and coercing the central bank to print money to finance a family business. The scale of criminal opportunity in conditions of war can be beyond the imagination of what is possible in normal times (Marsavelski et al. 2017; Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2018). It takes criminals of extreme ruthlessness to lunge at the lure of criminalising a war state or its central bank. In these conditions, Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) theory of crime driven by illegitimate opportunity structures comes into play. Hagan et al. (2015) deploy opportunity theory in their analysis of the criminalisation of the post-2003 Iraqi state. In conditions of war, political control of states becomes less attractive to honest politicians and more attractive to the most ruthless of criminals. Another reason criminal hardmen seize opportunities to control states when warlike conditions permit this is that by controlling the state they can confer on themselves immunity from prosecution for their past crimes.

The emergence of merchant capital in the sixteenth century illustrates the relationship between illicit economic activity and primitive capital accumulation. The merchants and captains of the great seaports of northern Europe were ruthlessly criminal in their methods for supplanting those of Venice and Genoa. Long before the term ‘money laundering’ was coined, the Brentano (the influential Frankfurt merchant dynasty of the seventeenth century) employed this tactic (Bayart et al. 1999). In our own time, the opportunities offered to organised criminals by the globalisation of markets have direct links to warmaking and state-making (Tilly 1985). The interaction between the practice of power, war, economic accumulation and illicit activities of various types forms a particular kind of political trajectory that leads to criminalisation of states. Examples

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13 In conditions of civil war in anomic societies, false rumours about people and events are endemic. The media is captured by different factions in the conflict, to the point where it becomes hard to know what to believe. Consequently, if a leader seems to credibly promise protection to my group, I tend to disbelieve claims about his or her criminality.
from sub-Saharan Africa include rents obtained from the control of exports of gold, ivory and slaves and collaboration with extractive colonial powers (Bayart et al. 1999). Various terms have been used to describe such extractive criminality. Ayittey (1999: 157–8) uses ‘vampire states’, Bayart et al. (1999) use ‘criminalized states’ and Reno (1999) uses ‘shadow states’ in their analyses of violence and criminalisation in Africa.

The work of some of the most influential scholars of the politics of development connects in a non-criminological way to Cloward and Ohlin’s (1960) criminological insight. Commanders of criminalised states strip away institutions that might limit their opportunities by, for example, arresting or firing anticorruption commissioners or judges. Samuel Huntington’s (1991, 2006) work was fundamentally about how the corrosion or absence of institutions explains instability and violence (likewise, Fukuyama 2014). Criminalisation of the state conduces to what Michael Mann (1986, 1993) calls despotic power: the capacity to suppress dissent, rights, the media and opposition parties. Despotic power gives states the appearance of strength, but effective state strength comes from what Mann calls infrastructural power: the power to secure public safety by legitimately making and enforcing laws, and power to deliver peaceful growth through the infrastructure of education, health and other public goods. For Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson (2012), ‘criminalised states’ crush peaceful development because they are ‘extractive’, pushing aside inclusive institutions that enable peaceful development. For Douglass North et al. (2009), mafias and other organised criminal groups that strip states are examples of ‘limited access orders’ wherein a coalition of rent-seeking elites deploys political power to prevent both political and economic competition. For North et al. (2009), peace and development are unlikely in criminalised states because they are limited access orders.

This book can be read as both an attempt to infiltrate criminological theory into international relations and an attempt to infiltrate international relations theory into criminology. Crime and war share one fundamental characteristic in their empirical social science literatures. Ken Pease (1998: v) showed with crime that ‘victimisation is the best predictor of victimisation’. For example, the best predictor of one’s house being burgled in the next six months is whether it has been burgled in the past six months (see also Rey et al. 2012: 526). Likewise, one of the best predictors of whether a country will have a civil war in the near future is whether it has recently had one (Call 2012: 53; Collier 2009; Hibbs 1973). Crime and war share the features that they are cascading
phenomena within themselves. Crime cascades to crime (and war); war cascades to war (and crime). Self-reinforcing features of these phenomena cascade further because they are also mutually reinforcing. It is not just civil war that cascades to further civil war or interstate conflicts that cascade and cluster in regions and at hotspots in space and time (A. Braithwaite 2016); it is also that military coups cascade to further military coups. Collier (2009: 147) reports that the baseline risk of a coup attempt in Africa is 4 per cent per year. In the year after an attempted coup, the risk of a further coup is elevated to 10 per cent. In addition, the occurrence of a coup significantly increases the chances of a civil war (Collier 2009: 153). These associations are a special focus of Chapter 8.

The political economy of cut and run from cascades

Proposition 10: When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

The nine different cascade dynamics presented in the propositions that precede this one mean that cascades get out of hand—so much so that the wealthiest of states can decide that continuing to fight a long war becomes unmanageably expensive. North Vietnamese leader Ho Chi Minh put the political economy of defiance and persistence thus: ‘Kill ten of our men and we will kill one of yours. In the end, it is you who will tire’ (Record 1998: 37). After sinking a decade of blood and treasure into a war in Afghanistan that killed more than a million people, the Soviet Union cut its losses in 1988–89, leaving almost another million people to die in a cascade of subsequent wars that has continued from 1989 to 2018. The United States pulled out of a decade of war in Vietnam that killed a million people, leaving another million to die in a cascade of subsequent fighting, especially in Cambodia. France and Belgium opted out of the project of managing conflict that cascaded from their colonial policies in Congo, Burundi and Rwanda. The colonial policies that had a hand in these cascades were extractive institutions and state-sanctioned discrimination in favour of Tutsis over Hutu and other ethnic groups.
Many millions of Africans have lost their lives to a succession of Great Lakes regional wars and genocides from 1960. What can we do to prevent the legacy of withdrawal of external powers from Syria likewise becoming a seven-figure quantum of killings?

Afghanistan is unusual in that both of the greatest Cold War powers decided to cut their losses in the country. Afghanistan was the Soviet Union’s Vietnam. We saw in Chapter 2 that the US Government smugly saw victory in Afghanistan as sufficient in 1989 and so walked away from the mess the proxy war they contrived against the Soviets had afflicted on locals. With hindsight, we might perceive that presidents Gorbachev and Bush had interests that were more in alignment at that time than at any time before or since. Tyrant though he was, Afghanistan’s president Najibullah at least wanted to hand over to a transitional government of national reconciliation with participation from all major armed groups. The Soviet Union and the United States might have worked together to support such a democratic transition through the kind of aid that was provided to post-communist regimes in Europe. Instead, they allowed Pakistan to call the shots, backing a succession of mujahidin groups (who they thought could prevail militarily as Pakistani clients) until they decided to back the Taliban. Obviously, the Taliban power base that Pakistan nurtured cost the United States much more dearly than donor support for a peaceful 1989 transition in Afghanistan would have cost. If we consider the Russian cost–benefit calculus, Russia loses more young lives to heroin flooding in from Afghanistan each year than it lost in the entire Afghan war (Paoli et al. 2009: 238). While heroin deaths fell in the West in the early years of this century, in Russia they shot through the ceiling as a result of networks into a war-induced boom in Afghan opium production that peaked at 92 per cent of the world market (Paoli et al. 2009).

What the Soviets and the Americans left behind after their mutual cut and run were foreign mujahidin such as Osama bin Laden and the kind of anarchic rule-of-law vacuum in Kandahar that we have already described as enabling the rise of the Taliban in 1994. UN peacebuilding to deliver rule of law to Kandahar in 1989 would have been a wise investment, as would have been a joint demand from the great powers for an end to Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) interventions that were unravelling Afghanistan militarily. Saikal (2014: 2–3) conceives this as part of a wider, longer pattern across the four adjoining West Asian countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq:
[T]he region’s constituent states have been repeatedly invaded or intervened in by major powers such as Tsarist and Soviet Russia, Great Britain and the United States, with each seeking, often in competition with one another, to redirect the domestic and foreign policy objectives and priorities of the constituent states … Ultimately, none of these powers have been able to achieve their goals entirely to their satisfaction, and all have, at times, bowed out of the arena in one way or another, at high costs to themselves and to the subjected peoples. This proved to be the case first with the British, whose many decades of colonial domination and interference ultimately bore little fruit. The same proved true for Tsarist and Soviet Russia, whose empires collapsed and ambitions shrank during the Anglo–Russian rivalry from the mid-nineteenth century to the Second World War and, subsequently, during the course of the US–Soviet superpower competition.

In Chapter 2, we considered the cascading of violence from Libya south to Mali, Chad, Niger, northern Nigeria and beyond, east to Syria and Iraq, and the spilling of refugees north into the Mediterranean as a result of the militarised regime change in Libya in 2011. Perhaps what is needed is opposition to any military intervention in another country to effect regime change (as opposed to peace enforcement to secure civilian protection) unless the international community is prepared to fund more than a decade of continuous UN-sanctioned international military presence until a just peace and a legitimate post-conflict state are consolidated.

At present, none of the major powers is prepared to go all the way with such follow-through. This means that the economic logic of regime change is the cascading of so much violence from the international military intervention as to induce the profound likelihood of the politics of cut and run. Never mind the morality of leaving behind one’s allies in the regime change to the mercy of the victors in successive civil wars. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) leaves behind not just locals who supported their international intervention. It also abandons local feminists who championed women’s rights in the period before a patriarchal armed group cleans them up. It has been a morally and fiscally reckless and feckless politics of short-term populism in starting wars. It has bequeathed long-term abandonment of parts of the world to chaos.
Conclusion: Civilising or cascading process?

Many influential social scientists have sought to understand why our planet has experienced a long-run decline in the incidence of violence since the Middle Ages, if not longer (e.g. Broadhurst et al. 2015; Eisner 2003; Pinker 2011; Spierenberg 2008, 2013). Scholars in the tradition of Elias (2000) conceive this as a ‘civilising process’ (e.g. Pinker 2011; Spierenberg 2008, 2013), referring to data from the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland, England, Scandinavia and across Europe and Asia (Broadhurst et al. 2015; ter Haar 2000).

There are various alternative interpretations on offer to the civilising theoretical framework, perhaps the most common being the globalisation of the capacity of states to pacify spaces that contained many unregulated spaces before states assumed sovereignty over entire territories. Another alternative or complementary interpretation to the civilising process is that, at least since the second half of the nineteenth century, cascades of nonviolent struggle against domination have had a trajectory that has been upwards in the sense of taking more steps forward than backward. This chapter has mentioned the women’s movement as one particularly important example of a cascade of nonviolent struggle against domination. Global movements for the rule of law and human rights, for democracy, the labour movement, the disability rights movement, the environmental movement, the indigenous rights movement, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, intersex and queer (LGBTIQ) rights movement and the restorative justice movement are others that share with the women’s movement—and, most critically, with the peace movement itself—anti-domination agendas that Part III concludes have been fertile for the struggle against violence. Such social movements gave rise to new pacifying institutions such as the law of war, transitional justice, the League of Nations, the United Nations, Track II diplomacy, peacekeeping and reconciliation committees inside the walls of Pakistani police stations. At least all of these macro and micro mechanisms and institutions are among the alternatives to ‘the civilising process’ considered in this book.

Work in the civilising tradition documents not only a tenfold to fiftyfold long-run decline in the homicide rate, but also movements that ‘abolished’ socially sanctioned forms of violence such as duelling, slavery, executions, killing suspected witches, corporal punishment, mercenary armies and judicial torture. There were at least formal declarations of the abolition
of these dominations, though all proved resilient in finding new ways to keep creeping back. Norbert Elias (2000) interprets the European civilising process that began in the eleventh or twelfth century as driven by a growing capacity for impulse control. A sense of shame over impulses of violence and revenge increased through courtly manners as royal courts discovered their interest in pacifying the spaces they controlled. The shamefulness of violence, and other norms of impulse control, then progressively democratised to the middle class and later down to peasants.

This book addresses the question of whether or not this civilising process is in fact a cascading process. Whether scholars of Europe such as Elias himself are accounting for the decivilising reversals of the Holocaust or scholars of Cambodia (Broadhurst et al. 2015) are accounting for the decivilising reversals of the Khmer Rouge genocide, there is a struggle within the terms of that theory to accommodate such dramatic reversals. We conclude in Chapter 11 that the risks of cascades of domination and violence and the opportunities for cascades of nonviolence and liberation are always in contest at any historical moment.

In this book, the peace movement is important among these anti-domination movements because it has spawned an instructive literature on how to cascade nonviolent tactics (e.g. Ackerman and DuVall 2001; Roberts and Garton Ash 2009; Sharp 1973, 2012). The restorative justice movement also has distinctive importance because, as in the work of South Africa’s Archbishop Desmond Tutu, it assists with a theoretical account of why the ‘justice cascade’ (Sikkink 2011) of truth and reconciliation commissions can advance restorative justice, and what specific tactics of reconciliation this implies. Formal apologies by leaders are one implication, for example. From 1900 until the 1980s, apologies by political and religious leaders were practically non-existent, averaging fewer than five per decade for the entire world. By the twenty-first century, apologies by political and religious leaders had climbed steeply to 100 per decade (Pinker 2011: 544). Restorative justice as an explanatory theory of nonviolence responds in exactly the same period, showing that apology can reduce violence when the apology is viewed as sincere. Understanding the conditions required for apologies to be seen as sincere is central to restorative justice research (e.g. Ahmed et al. 2001; Braithwaite 2002: 81; Strang et al. 2013). Politically, the women’s movement was the most important of the social movements for cascades of nonviolence because, from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it was the women’s movement that had sophisticated political organisation for the promotion of nonviolence (Etchart 2015). It connected productively
to the peace movement and to the professionalisation of a diplomacy of mediation more than a century ago to suppress international violence, and to the restorative justice movement today in pursuit of nonviolent ways to suppress domestic violence.

Institutions of the United Nations such as the UNHCR have already proved useful for the purpose of preventing violence from crossing tipping points. We have seen how local tipping points that UN institutions failed to prevent locally—such as the outrage caused by the February 2006 bombing of the al-Askari mosque in Iraq—could induce global change to war and terrorism (Boyle 2014: Ch. 8; Hagan et al. 2015: Chs 1 and 2). The journey of this book is also about exploring how to make UN institutions more robustly effective than they currently are. In a case such as Iraq, structural international remedies and preventive diplomacy were also required. When violence begins to cascade, momentum towards domination and militarisation can cascade rapidly across tipping points, driven by the 10 dynamic propositions we advance for spirals towards extremely violent societies.

This book argues that cascades of nonviolence such as the Arab Spring in 2011 or the historical spread of the norm against killing prisoners of war create an opportunity for an organisation like Islamic State to jump into that space with an imaginary of reversing those cascades back to barbarism. Any anomic space is a niche of opportunity for practitioners of cascades of nonviolence and practitioners of violence alike. When the number of claimants for a chaotic space becomes large, it is also easier to reverse established civilising norms such as the ban on use of poison gas in warfare (Pinker 2011: 273), and to blame one of the other ruthless parties within the anarchic space—as we see with mutual recriminations against different sides for using poison gas against civilians in Syria (Dyer 2014). Such cascade hypotheses do not posit a long-run shift in the deep structure of human psychology in the way Elias does.

Nor are our hypotheses about medieval history. Our 10 propositions are not about the rise of courts that seek pacified spaces under their control, in preference to an order enforced by roving hot-headed knights. The hypotheses and empirical analyses of this book are about the past century. Hence, it is possible that the civilising process of Elias (and Pinker) provides a better account of the history of the longue durée, while cascades theory will supply a more inductively attuned theory for the past century and the next. In particular, cascades theory provides a good
account of why some of the worst genocides in human history occur so late in the trajectory of the civilising process in Armenia/Turkey, Germany (and Central Europe), Cambodia and Rwanda–Burundi–Congo (see also Balint 2012) and why there have been multiple narrower genocides against multiple groups in places such as Libya, Iraq and Syria targeting religious or ethnic minorities such as Yazidis during the current decade. This seems more helpful than seeing them as ‘setbacks’ in a process that is not quite inexorably unidirectional.

There are tipping points in cascades of violence (Gladwell 2000; Kennedy 2009). This book shows that the tipping point defined by Proposition 1 and Figure 3.1 is just one kind of tipping point in play. Hurting stalemates, in which both sides become worn down by war weariness, are another kind of tipping point that we code in the Peacebuilding Compared data (Mooradian and Druckman 1999; Sisk 1995; Zartman 2000, 2001a). The most important tipping points considered in this book arise when Nelson Mandela or Nepalese Maoists flip their strategy from an imaginary of armed struggle to an imaginary of nonviolent resistance.

It also follows from understanding how violence cascades that it is mostly a mistake to fight violence with violence. Only rarely is this the best or only recourse available to us. We might do better to focus on fighting violence through prevention attuned to interrupting rather than accelerating cascades. Violent means of pursuing simple policies such as regime change in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya or Syria must be contested critically against the question: ‘To what might violence in pursuit of that regime change cascade?’

Ultimately, this book simply argues that, in conditions of late modernity, cascades of violence and militarisation are under continual contest by cascades of nonviolence nurtured by social movement politics. Cascades of domination are under constant contest by cascades of liberation animated by anti-domination social movements of the kinds mentioned above. This is a struggle without end that ebbs and flows. It is a struggle in which the politics of state violence and domination do not consistently enjoy the advantages that realist international relations theory claims. Because violence cascades, it is imperative that we learn how to prevent it before it cascades too far. The world might learn—perhaps it is already learning—how to return to a long-run historical trajectory away from violence.
Part II: South Asian cascades
Recognising cascades in India and Kashmir

Diverse cascades

This chapter suggests that neither a ‘healing touch’ (Ahmed 2010) nor a determined Indian effort to broker a political solution, either in Kashmir or with Pakistan, has ever been accomplished by Indian policy, including during the thaw of 2002–07. Generations of lives have been lost to military overreaction and political underreaction. It shows how the communal violence of the Partition of India cascaded into violence inside Kashmir, into interstate war and to wave upon wave of insurgency across 68 years. The first interstate war cascaded to four more wars in the next half-century. This quickly cascaded to northern Pakistan becoming a training centre for violent jihad in Kashmir, then in Afghanistan and then in Indian Punjab (where Sikhs were dragged into communal conflict, then civil war). This then cascaded to attacks on Indian parliaments and cities and, globally, to diffusion of violent jihad to Indonesia, Chechnya, Britain and beyond.

The most deadly cascade in this case is from interstate war to internal insurgency, particularly to Indian military violence against Kashmiri civilians, which cost several times the number of lives of all the interstate wars across the Kashmir border. The most worrying cascade is to nuclear brinksmanship in the gaming of the conflict by the Pakistani military, in particular, and to a nuclear terrorism risk in Pakistan. Our research in
Kashmir reveals a diversity of less visible cascades down to the creation of organised criminal gangs, assassination of alleged informers, a personal revenge culture, a gun culture, a rape culture, a culture of torture\(^1\) and an anomic culture in which domestic violence, crime and suicide have escalated.

India’s story is a long one that can be traced back to the earliest histories of civilisation. Our version of this Indian story is also long, though we begin it only at Partition. India’s colonial legacy sets the scene for cascades of violence in Kashmir. We discuss the attempts of Jawaharlal Nehru to nurture a low-violence India with strong democratic institutions; the militarisation of Pakistan, and how that cascaded to a greater militarisation of India; followed by India and then Pakistan becoming nuclear powers. We then consider Kashmir as the most extreme example of the hollowing out of democratic institutions, as India rejected socialism and faced the choice between liberal capitalism, authoritarian capitalism and crony capitalism. This is followed by an analysis—through a cascade lens—of Kashmir’s five wars since 1947. This structure allows us to uncover the many different kinds of cascading violence in the micro dynamics and global dynamics of those conflicts. We hope to show the value of a methodology that recognises the multiplicity of cascades in play. We list 26 cascades in the chapter’s conclusion.

A key understanding from this chapter is that, if we develop the tools for diagnosing the multiplicity of such cascades, we will better calculate the true costs of playing the violence card. A diagnostics of cascade recognition can motivate peace processes that otherwise seem impossible. In the concluding sections of this chapter, Kashmir is advanced as such a case, where recognising the cascades in play could be the basis for a peace process that leads to a wider India–Pakistan accord and regional religious and political reconciliation. While Kashmir is our primary focus in this chapter, we recognise that it is certainly not the only important armed conflict in India, and we do explore the patterns of these other conflicts. However, we conceive of Kashmir as the most strategic one for our focus because conflict in Kashmir helped catalyse many of the other

\(^1\) This included torture by militants: ‘The house opposite to ours was a JKLF [Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front] torture cell. Does any Kashmiri Muslim talk about torture by militants? They only talk about the Indian state’ (Interview with Kashmiri Pandit leader, 2012, No. 101247). All citations of the above kind are interviews conducted by the authors together.
armed conflicts in India. More importantly, though, Kashmir is in focus because peace with justice in Kashmir could help catalyse a wider South Asian peace.²

The key policy inference is that, by learning to recognise the multiplicity of cascades, we can learn to avert policy miscalculations about benefits of war that are grounded in undercounting cascades. A second policy issue considered in the conclusion of this chapter is whether or not incremental confidence-building peacebuilding may be presumptively the preferred approach. In cases where confidence-building has repeatedly failed over a long period—leaving a legacy of distrust-building instead of trust-building—a grand bargain to reconcile many cascades at once may be a strategy to consider.

Setting the scene: The National Congress legacy

This chapter emphasises Kashmir as a weak spot in India’s democratic record. A weakness as important as it is, Kashmir must be put in perspective within an overall democratic accomplishment. It is an accomplishment that we might connect to the fact that the Indian National Congress was a vibrant, participatory democratic movement from its foundation in 1885—a very different beast from the party machine it became by the later decades of the twentieth century.

It was a common journalistic theme in the middle decades of the twentieth century that violence would disintegrate India as a democracy (see e.g. Harrison 1960: 338). India, in fact, became the only major country to be decolonised since World War II that has remained consistently democratic since independence. Elections regularly change governments and, compared with most states, in India, there is relatively less control over the operation of political parties and the formation of new organisations in civil society. We find that the most important difference between India and Pakistan (Chapter 6) is that the military and intelligence services in India are firmly under the control of an elected civilian administration. This has important implications for cascades of violence. Although

² We carried out 71 interviews, some with more than one person, mostly with people in Indian-administered Kashmir, Ladakh and Jammu in 2012, including many resistance leaders. These included some Indian military and police interviews and UN and diplomatic interviews in New Delhi, New York, Pakistan and elsewhere in 2013 and going back to 2007.
its critics argue about the integrity of India’s record of respect for civil liberties, its freedom of the press\(^3\) and robustly independent courts are rivalled by few postcolonial societies. The security forces of India have created and armed proxy civilian militias to kill insurgents and to do the dirty work of counterinsurgency. India is the only country we know where the Supreme Court has ruled to stop such activities: in 2009, with respect to counterinsurgency against Maoists in Chattisgarh (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 32; Supreme Court of India 2011). India also has a more independent and professional civil service than most postcolonial states.

There have been five outbreaks of war in Kashmir: a major war with Pakistan at the time of Bangladesh’s independence; some minor border wars with China in the 1960s; diverse civil wars in Assam, Punjab and West Bengal (demanding the creation of Gorkhaland); a long-running armed secession that started in 1955 in Nagaland on the Assam–Burma border; and Naxalite/Maoist\(^4\) conflicts in at least 13 states where mostly indigenous people have struggled for autonomy from oppression. Yet per capita war deaths in India since independence have been much lower than for portions of the British Empire in the region that broke away from India before independence, or, indeed, which never became part of it: Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

\(^{3}\) The Indian Supreme Court scrapped the controversial Section 66A of the Information Technology Act in March 2015, which suggested more stringent policing of social media. However, it stressed the need for a new law to regulate social media in August (Shreya Singhal vs Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012, Supreme Court of India, available from: www.lawkam.org/caselaw/section-66aitact-shreya-singhal-india/8559/, last accessed 20 January 2018; Sriram 2015).

\(^{4}\) In this chapter, we use Naxalite and Maoist interchangeably. The Naxalite movement started in Naxalbari, West Bengal, in 1967, after police shot dead nine women and children during protests in which peasants demanded implementation of a court order against a landlord. In 1968, a year of New Left take-off globally, the Naxalite movement spread to many parts of West Bengal and other states where most people went hungry for half the year. It struggled to build support in most parts of Kerala and other areas where empowered local Panchayats had addressed problems of food security (Chakrabarty 2012: 38–9; Rammohan 2012: 349) and in districts where there was not the kind of police overreaction to protest that occurred in Naxalbari. The uprisings seemed to have been crushed inside five years, but Naxalism has surged back to be stronger today, after several cascades of renewal since a period of quiescence from 1972 (Nayak 2012). As with the Taliban in Kandahar in the mid-1990s and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in rural Bangladesh from 2001, the Naxalites offered rule of law and development services in districts where a vacuum had been left by the state. As one eyewitness account put it: ‘In areas where the government has hardly any presence, the Maoists help the villages in constructing irrigation canals. They also educate the villagers against the problem faced by them. This makes an impact. And, through this process, they become a part of the village. Once inside a village, the extremists offer instant justice for internal problems like theft, cheating, vandalism and land disputes in the area, drawing villages closer to them. It is at this stage that the villagers develop a trust in them and are ready to protect the Maoists from the police’ (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 193). The power of the Naxalites has spread because they had a reputation of protecting the poorest people from common and corporate crime, although there are also many areas where they have lost support because their own armed tyranny made things worse for the poor.
These countries have separately and collectively experienced far higher rates of war deaths than the world average. The violence that cascaded in these cases included an allegiance between Britain and a dominant group. The dominant group and the British together violently subjugated other groups (with the dominant group being Bamar in Myanmar, Singhalese in Sri Lanka, the Punjab-dominated Muslim League in Pakistan, Bengali landlords in Bangladesh, the Nepalese monarchy in Nepal and Pashtun royal lines in Afghanistan).

Breakouts of communal violence in post-independence India—between Hindus and Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, ethnic majorities and indigenous minorities and more—have been widespread, with many thousands of serious incidents of injuries to people and widespread destruction of property (Kohli 1990: 7). Paul Brass emphasised that riots are preplanned productions in ‘institutionalised riot systems’. They have a functional utility for many individuals and groups that prevents them from effectively dealing with violence (Brass 2003: 32–4). Brass identifies two critical characters—the ‘fire tender’ and the ‘conversion specialist’—in the functioning of the riot system.

[The] fire tender … moves about the city uncovering incidents ostensibly to prevent such incidents from turning into communal riots. However, the actual effects of his actions and those of others who play this role is to keep the embers from dying out.

[The] conversion specialist is usually a politician who plays the key role in ‘converting’ potential triggers—instantly transmitted by the news network—into riots … The news is transmitted instantly from the scene to persons in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who then decide whether or not it is worthy of their attention and action. If deemed so—that is, if the political context is such that ‘political capital’ can be gained from it—then a group will be rushed to the scene. They will not necessarily rush with the intent to begin a fracas, but they will go to observe, to confront, and, if necessary, to decide whether or not further forces should be mobilized. (Brass 2003: 33)

In terms of our Proposition 2, Brass’s conversion specialists of institutionalised riot systems are interpreted as politicians who craft a violent political imaginary that ‘converts’ triggers into a riot that spreads the violent imaginary and escalates it through the news network.

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5 Sangh Parivar, a movement of Hindu nationalist organisations in India, has been implicated in the riots, particularly the RSS, Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).
Wilkinson (2004) provides an important insight into what sets the riot system in motion. According to his realist understanding of electoral politics, there is impetus to control the violence if minorities are critical to state political leaders for votes. In multipolar Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP), where Muslim votes mattered, the riots were ruthlessly controlled. But Maharashtra, where Muslim votes mattered less, saw the deadliest anti-Muslim pogroms. Wilkinson’s study demonstrates that political parties have the power to both inflame and control violent riots. Wilkinson’s (2004) study of 167 Muslim–Hindu communal riots found that most led to no deaths. In 80 per cent of cases where deaths did occur, fewer than 10 people were killed.

Communal violence in which hundreds of people have been killed has been less frequent in India than in Indonesia (to take a comparably diverse, though smaller, postcolonial society). Although even Indonesia has a low frequency of such slaughter per capita, it had many more deaths from communal violence in four years from 1999 to 2004 than India had in the 54 years from 1950 to 2004 (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 184). Annual statistics do not exist for China, but it is possible that India has less frequent breakouts of community violence than China, given that the Chinese Communist Party itself estimated that there were more than 200 rural protests a day in China, mostly about local corruption and inequality (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 84). China has also been rather successful in quelling these before they cause loss of multiple lives. It is not in these diverse mega-states but in smaller states, such as Yugoslavia and Burundi, that we find higher statistical incidence of war deaths per capita.

Three of the four most prominent Indians since independence—Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi—fell to assassins; the first to a Hindu, the second to a Sikh, the third to a Tamil. Yet, overall, India’s homicide rate is considerably below the world average and particularly far below the average homicide rate of postcolonial states. It has been steady around the most recent (2014) rate of 3.2 per 100,000 population for the past six years (UNODC 2013). On the other hand, we see that many forms of state violence have cascaded, partly from Kashmir. Particularly important among these forms of state violence are torture and disappearances.6

6 This is why India scores highly on Karstedt’s (2012, 2014) Violent Societies Index.
How do we interpret the success of the three Asian mega-states—Indonesia, China and India—in achieving comparatively low death rates from homicide, sectarian riots and war during recent decades compared with smaller Asian states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal, and middle-sized ones as well, such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Myanmar? We interpret it in the same way we interpret the success of large developed mega-states such as the United States, Japan and, indeed, the Soviet Union during its decades of high growth and high industrialisation before the information economy began to threaten Soviet disintegration in the 1970s. All of these mega-states created large pacified spaces of comparatively low violence (Morris 2014). This was possible because the very success of these states meant that ‘one legitimate monopoly of force dominated all other armed groups in their territory’ (Proposition 4) so that, across their vast pacified spaces, ‘deterrence effects against violence exceeded defiance effects’ (Proposition 1). Indeed, we read the structurally comparatively pacified character of mega-states such as India as one of the most persuasive forms of evidence for Proposition 1. Yet we reveal in this chapter many ways this interpretation requires qualification for India.

India is one of the faster growing economies in the world. It had the seventh-highest level of gross domestic product (GDP) at the time of writing, and has been moving up that league table very fast (World Bank 2014). It has been much more successful at growing its middle class than at conquering poverty. India’s Human Development Index ranking in 2013 was 135 (UNDP 2013). Like many developing countries, India started out with an immiserating colonial legacy of extractive exploitation of its agriculture that reduced agricultural productivity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Per capita agricultural production continued to fall, by 14 per cent, in the final four decades before independence, and, in food grains, by 24 per cent (Chandra et al. 2008: 14).

7 This exploitation is also relevant to the intensification of leftist extremism in India. The Naxalite message of struggle and hope was an alternative for many who might have joined the 100,000 Indian farmers who committed suicide in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Some 48 per cent of these mostly middle-aged men had informal loans from moneylenders or relatives that they could not repay (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 198–9). The Naxalites stood up for indigenous people whose forests were being destroyed by corporate interests in mining and forestry and for landless and impoverished farmers. Naxalites delivered immediate results for desperate people by taking over land belonging to non-cultivating owners and killing moneylenders, landlords, foresters or politicians who were causing local oppression, or threatening them with death unless they softened oppression. They forced landlords to reduce rents, exploitative traders to cut prices and corrupt politicians to reverse exploitative policies secured by bribes. They enforced increased minimum wages. They destroyed legal documents that exploited the poor, declared mortgages and loan agreements void, confiscated hoarded rice and tried and executed corrupt business leaders. They frequently then became local oppressors themselves.
The most influential founders of India—Gandhi and the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru—had a strong commitment to conquering poverty. In retrospect, we can see that Nehru’s development model was excessively statist. He had access to limited bureaucratic competence and deployed much of that scarce resource to managing state-run businesses. He failed to harness entrepreneurship in the private sector to develop private managerial competence. Nevertheless, Nehru did make some impressive progress in freeing up the oppressive legacy of rural landlord exploitation through land reforms that returned fields to peasants. In Kashmir, under Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s governments in the 1950s, land reform was more radical and transformative than elsewhere in
India: large landed estates were abolished, land was seized from absentee landlords and distributed to tenants, no one was permitted more than 6 acres (2.4 hectares) of cultivable soil and holdings beyond 22.5 acres (9 ha) were seized without compensation. One of the reasons some other states, such as Kerala, have been able to resist the widening of Maoist rural insurgency is because of a reasonably effective, egalitarian land reform that has delivered land and agricultural development to the landless (Heller 2000, but see Oommen’s 2014 critique of widening inequality in Kerala). Nehru believed in decentralisation of power. He devolved power to state leaders who had even more radically anti-feudal land policies than his own, such as Sheikh Abdullah. But, more commonly, Nehru devolved it to pro-feudal state leaders, half of whom bequeathed low-intensity rural Maoist insurgencies to their successors of the twenty-first century.

The federalism bequeathed by Nehru initially devolved a lot of power to state governments. Later, it began to do so to local elected Panchayats (village councils) that mandated one-third of elected seats for women and other seats for lower castes and tribal people in proportion to their representation in the local population. This happened when Panchayats were constitutionally entrenched in 1993. The Panchayats were preceded in 1952 by the Community Development Program, with Block Development Officers whose job was to improve rural life through innovations in agriculture, water tanks and wells, communications, health, education and other dimensions of village life. Nehru wished for participation and self-reliance to ‘unleash forces from below among our people’ (Chandra et al. 2008: 186). Better plant seeds and better roads, among other changes, resulted, and agricultural productivity improved. Over time, however, the system became more bureaucratised and less about self-reliance. Thus, the move was made to elected Panchayats in 1957.

Unfortunately, all these forms of decentralisation often became devolution of the power to corrupt and to embezzle from public offices. Land reforms were among egalitarian reforms that were corrupted by state and local elites for the benefit of ruling families. Local Indian elites had learned how to capture local rents from the indirect rule of the British Raj and the Mughals before that. To this day, the absence of robust anticorruption institutions is a principal obstacle to poverty reduction. Still, there is an impressive list of egalitarian legacies of the Nehru governments. In the five-year plan period for 1961–66, for example, male university student numbers increased 14 per cent and females 78 per cent (Bazaz 2005: 47).
Institutional hollowing and security strengthening

Kashmir is a crucial example of a massive security sector keeping the lid on violence in a crudely coercive way. The coerciveness of it also causes cyclical blowing of that lid. Kohli (1990: 15) argued that while Nehru’s statist development did see the federal government initiate transformative change, the weak developmental capabilities of the state actually became weaker after Nehru’s death. The state had limited capacity to persuade people to follow state initiatives or to build consensus. Increasingly authoritarian and oligarchic central control in Indira Gandhi’s time caused the paradox that the very strategy that allowed her to cling to power undermined her capacity to use that power for constructive ends (Kohli 1990: 16). When institutions that had failed loyalty tests to the centre had been weakened, institutional support to implement reforms hollowed out. Institutional capacity to respond constructively to conflict, such as that between haves and have-nots, has been one casualty of that institutional corrosion. Peacebuilding responses became crudely coercive. Coercive policing can, in the long run, increase the appeal of undisciplined political mobilisation of religious, ethnic, caste and other groups. Such vicious circles have, according to Kohli (1990), eroded the Indian state’s capacity to be a problem-solving state—including in matters of violence reduction.8

Nehru’s Indian National Congress was a party of the poor, but, in Indian politics today, a ‘political party that represents the poor will be a poor party. A party with very meager funds’ (Roy 2004: 114). Money politics is, indeed, a structural way for contemporary democracy to drive domination. Arundhati Roy goes too far when she describes Indian democracy as ‘the biggest publicity scam of this century’ (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 148). Yet, with Kashmir and with the Naxalite grievances, there can be little doubt she is right. In Chapter 7, we see a similar pattern in Bangladesh of dynastic populism at the centre combined with mobilisation of communalism from below (which is then controlled

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8 This has been a theme in the writing of Arundhati Roy (2004: 110): ‘In recent years, the police have repeatedly opened fire on unarmed people, mostly Adivasis [indigenous people], at peaceful demonstrations. In Nagarnar, Jharkland; in Mehndi Kheda, Madhya Pradesh; in Umergaon, Gujarat; in Rayagaya and Chilika, Orissa; in Muthanga, Kerala. People are killed for encroaching on forest land, as well as when they’re trying to protect forest land from dams, mining operations, steel plants.’
violently). This pattern corrodes institutional capacity to manage conflict constructively. The state is delivered a bureaucracy that is loyal to dynastic power rather than responsive to the people and to drivers of conflicts that oppress citizens.

Kohli (1998: 12–13, 31) argues that when state authority is well institutionalised in developing country democracies, and when national leaders act in an accommodating manner, violent internal conflicts usually follow an inverted U-shaped curve: violence from time to time escalates, but a combination of firm institutional capability and responsiveness to accommodate demands can bring it under control. Another theoretical language for this is responsiveness—institutional capability that is firm, fair and listens in its responsiveness. The responsiveness idea is the same as in Kohli’s (1998: 13) model in Table 5.1: institutional strength combined with accommodation or responsiveness to grievances permits reconciliation of violence before it escalates beyond control (see Chapter 12).

Table 5.1 Trajectory of self-determination movements.

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<tr>
<th>Leadership strategy</th>
<th>Central authority</th>
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<td>Well institutionalised</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>1. The inverse ‘U’ curve of ethnic politics (e.g. Tamils in India, 1950s and 1960s)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Unaccommodating</td>
<td>3. Demands and repression cycle (e.g. Sikhs in India’s Punjab, 1980)</td>
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Ali Ahmed (2010) explores three case studies—Kashmir, Punjab and Indian intervention in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka—to sustain a conclusion similar to Kohli’s. Violence begins to cascade in Ahmed’s account. He diagnoses all three cases as involving insufficient security sector moderation at the moment of outbreak of a crisis. On Kashmir, he cites the analysis of Ved Marwah, advisor to then governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan Malhotra, in January 1990. Marwah was present at the key meetings that crafted the initial response to the take-off of the insurgency in that month. The key overreaction was killing 30 demonstrators at Republic Day celebrations in Srinagar on 26 January 1990. This ‘had grave consequences for the situation in Kashmir. It gave a tremendous boost to militancy in the Valley’ (Marwah 1995: 79). Governor Jagmohan then:
made matters worse for himself by taking no disciplinary action against the police officers guilty of grave professional lapses. The Governor succumbed to the usual plea that taking action against the police would demoralize the force. (Marwah 1995: 79)

While a degree of escalation of security sector response was inevitable to face the impending will to insurgency at that time:

It would take over a decade before the political need to win hearts and minds asserted itself as the premier policy yardstick in the policy of ‘healing touch’ after the 2002 elections. (Ahmed 2010: 301; see also Anant 2011)

Indian military leaders insist that their philosophy is now ‘soft on the people and tough on the militants’ (Interview with Indian lieutenant-general, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101216). They said in our interviews that there has been a shift of philosophy both in Kashmir and with the Naxalite conflicts. Yet, the fact remains with the latter that four civilians are being killed for every militant who is killed. Ahmed (2010) concludes that suppression must be leavened by responsive political measures. He reads this as fidelity to the Clausewitzian principle of the primacy of the political over the military. In each case, the initial overreaction fed the insurgency, making the situation worse before it got better. Indian internal security policy is characterised as a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ that can work on the de-escalating side of Kohli’s inverted-U, as illustrated by peacebuilding in Punjab, Mizoram and Nagaland. Yet pursuit of a ‘position of strength’ proved elusive for more than a decade of great human and economic costs when the initial response was violent overreaction.

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9 However, there is a sign in some military posts in Kashmir that soldiers are proud to be photographed in front of: ‘If you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow.’

10 The escalating beginning of Kohli’s (1998: 13) inverted-U.

11 Ahmed (2010: 310) observes that the first lesson is the trite but timeless adage that ‘prevention is better than cure’. Second, the political prong needs to be as much in evidence as the military prong of strategy, to capitalise on gains made by the military prong. Third, the military instrument is essentially blunt. ‘Careful civilian control is necessary to ensure that the crisis is not set off into a downward spiral, increasing the salience of the military template … an attention span going beyond the initial crisis point [is needed]’ (ibid.).
Violence cascades from Partition

This section articulates how a cascade of violence can transform the drivers of violence, as in Kashmir, where religious identity was not initially a salient driver of violence.\textsuperscript{12} We also sketch out briefly the dynamic of cascades of indigenous violence and state violence.

The Quit India movement from 1942 was intended to be nonviolent. In the event, it became much more random and violent than earlier campaigns led by India’s anticolonial movements. Academics noted various reasons for this, such as the arrest of Gandhi and other strategists of nonviolent discipline at the outset (e.g. Keay 2010: 498). Also, the element of British resistance to independence of dividing Muslims against Hindus and martial races (whom it militarised in the service of the Raj) against others had succeeded to a degree.\textsuperscript{13} By May 1947, it had become clear to the people of India that partition of greater India into what were to become Pakistan and India was likely. Bengal, Bihar and Punjab were soon in flames and major conflagrations also occurred in Lahore, in New Delhi itself and in many lesser cities. The people of Bengal and Punjab also realised that their provinces would be divided. Anxiety escalated over where India would end and Pakistan would begin. Security dilemmas were on the rise (Proposition 5).

Some violence entrepreneurs saw opportunities to grab land and businesses, to loot and stake a claim to a region for Hindu or Muslim dominance by driving out the religious other. The first acts of such communal violence, which may have been in Lahore and Amritsar (Desai 2009: 265), became a contagion (Proposition 2). Women were not only victims of rape by the other community, but were also pre-emptively killed by their own community to preserve the honour of their family rather than allow them to be raped (D’Costa 2011). This relates to Proposition 9: impending civil war cascading to sexual violence and rape. Estimates of the number who died range from 500,000 to 2 million. There are no reliable figures. While the contagion spread quickly, in most places where it broke out, it

\textsuperscript{12} We describe these more fully for the case of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh in Chapter 7. In the conclusion of the book, we conceive this as a broader South Asian cascade of violence.

\textsuperscript{13} Lange and Dawson (2009) find that, among 160 countries, those with a history of British colonialism experience significantly more inter-communal violence than former Spanish or French colonies. Lange and Dawson interpret this in terms of British strategies of divide and rule and institutionalisation of an ethnically based division of labour and ethnically based hierarchy.
was extinguished within days by the security sector’s response to protect minorities being targeted. In no city did it continue cascading from suburb to suburb for more than a few months.14

This contagion left an indelible script in the Indian imaginary: rising communally against the religious other in looting, burning and raping at times of hatred or perceived oppression. Sadly, Indian secularism became an embattled ideal as a ‘million mutinies’ (Desai 2009: 452) could be put down only by force. They resulted in militarisation of the police, torture and tyranny that became a threat to Indian democracy. As Kak (2011a: xiii) deftly conceptualised it: ‘the very long embrace with militarization had seriously dulled the government’s reflexes’—a dulling we find to be even deeper in our Bangladesh and Pakistan cases in Chapters 6 and 7 (Proposition 8). The worst instances were the slaughter of 3,000 Sikhs by New Delhi Hindu mobs in the days after Indira Gandhi was killed by her Sikh bodyguards and the killing of 2,000 Muslims and a smaller number of Hindus in Gujarat in 2002 after conflict escalated over the burning of a train in Godra. The violence in Gujarat bore an ‘uncanny’ resemblance to riots in New Delhi in 1984 and Bombay (now Mumbai) in 1993 in which a legislative majority ‘let loose the fury of a mob’ following a sudden traumatic event ‘while keeping the police passive’ (Desai 2009: 412).

Wilkinson (2004) has shown that there is a history of cascades of violence of this type across hundreds of such communal riots. When the police show resolve to prevent violence from spreading, however, they have overwhelmingly succeeded in doing so throughout Indian history. A firm police presence protecting civilians can shut down security dilemmas whereby ‘we must attack the communal other before they attack us’ (Proposition 5). Wilkinson found that the cases involving a lot of killing are ones in which the police fail to show resolve. Failure of resolve, in turn, occurs because their state government is politically reluctant to allow the police to control a group that delivers electoral support to the party in power. We can see this pattern instantiated from the bloody beginning of postcolonial Kashmir. The army and the extremist Hindu organisation RSS were involved in loading hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Jammu Muslims into army trucks to be slaughtered. When he learnt the extent of the slaughter, chief emergency administrator of the state Sheikh Abdullah

14 Fiction and films after Partition, and scholarship in the 1990s, explore the pain, trauma and loss of Partition. In this sense, Saadat Hasan Manto’s stories, films such as Tamas and the work of Veena Das, Urvashi Butalia and Ritu Menon on human suffering are particularly noteworthy.
was shocked. Yet, when first advised that the Muslims were being driven out, Abdullah took no steps to stop it, saying: ‘Why should I care for Jammu Muslims? They have never accepted me as their leader’ (veteran freedom fighter Krishan Dev Sethi, quoted in Rasool 2009: 28).

The Jammu ethnic cleansing of Muslims was indeed cleansing of political opponents of the Sheikh. Poonch and Jammu Muslims supported the rival party, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, and possibly the rival political objective at that time of integration with Pakistan.15 So, there are both frequent cascades of communal rioting in India and many more infrequent cascades of political exploitation of that violence by state governments.

A result, in turn, has been politicisation and militarisation of the police as an institution—cascades of tyranny of the police baton in response to cascades of communal rioting. Naxalite/Maoist resistance cascaded not only to police tyranny, but also to other grievances, of economic, indigenous and geographic marginalisation. This, in turn, triggered cascades of escalated police armed violence against rebels. It also saw the state sponsor anti-insurgent militias. Cascades of state-sponsored private militias are also part of the Kashmir tragedy. Their work has had the effect of extinguishing a fire with gasoline, as in Iraq, Syria and so many other contexts.16 Naxalite rebellion has also become more widespread and more violent in the upshot, with Naxalites thrusting many states into conditions approaching civil war and controlling 20 per cent of India’s forests.17

In the aftermath of the communal violence of Partition, Nehru assured the 45 million Muslims who remained that they could live safely in India. He led the nation in mourning the loss of its dearest son, Gandhi, to the violence. Nehru also worked hard to head off future conflict with marginalised tribal peoples through a policy of integrating them into the

15 Likewise, one of the reasons low-intensity Maoist insurgencies afflict some rural areas of half of India’s states is that state political leaders have tolerated or encouraged them because the insurgents mostly killed party-political opponents of those state leaders in the regions that Maoists control (Chadha 2005: 375–6; Routray 2012: 319). In Chapter 9, we see that Nepal’s king also tolerated Maoists when they killed members of the political parties who opposed the monarchy.
16 For details, see Chapter 2, this volume.
17 More so in Chhattisgarh, where 16 of the state’s 20 police districts have been deemed Naxalite areas, with 531 armed incidents and 413 deaths in 2007 (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 153–4). More than 1,000 people were killed in Chhattisgarh alone between 2009 and 2013, in over 2,000 separate incidents. Jharkhand had a similarly high toll for the same period, with 862 deaths (Ministry of Home Affairs 2014). Bahree (2010) estimates the number displaced as 100,000, with almost 5,000 civilians and insurgents dead across India in the conflict between the Maoists and the security forces.
opportunity structure of Indian society while preserving and valuing their distinct identity and languages (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1954: 582).

One of the reasons caste has been so important to India is because of its usefulness in highlighting the social and economic ‘backwardness’ of groups and individuals. Caste groups have used census reports to construct solidarities at regional levels and to demand caste mobility and solutions to their disadvantage (Shaikh 2011). Nehru’s government legislated for reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes, just as it did for Scheduled Castes, in parliaments and the public service. Ninety-eight of 489 seats in the national parliament and 669 of 3,283 seats in state assemblies were reserved. The first postcolonial government in India established Tribal Advisory Councils in all states with indigenous communities and a Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes within the Indian separation of powers to audit whether safeguards provided in law were honoured in practice. In Assam, which had the highest density, with some 100 indigenous groups, autonomous districts were established to provide a degree of self-governance. District and regional councils took on certain legislative and judicial functions under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Assam.

Sadly, landlessness, unemployment and educational disadvantage continued to impoverish these peoples. Anupama Rao (2009: 26) observes that the paradox of Indian democracy—where commitment to substantive equality of groups coexists with the recognition of the politics of caste difference—has created conditions in which Dalits have been subjected to new forms of political violence. State and local governments often did not share the central leaders’ commitment to affirmative action and some state bureaucracies, notably the police, were racist or discriminatory. This meant that, on a wide front, as in wealthier countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States, institutions designed for the benefit of indigenous people did not deliver. Worse, elites often misappropriated funds intended to benefit indigenous people. Forest contractors and other land-grabbers who schemed to steal the heritage of tribal peoples also successfully lobbied for the transfer of effective advocates for tribal people within the civil service. Oppressors harnessed laws for forest rights, which were intended to secure the heritage of indigenous peoples, to exclude them from their own land. Some indigenous peoples who had formerly been majorities now became minorities in their own lands.
This oppression cascaded to a proliferation of protest movements to assert welfare, development and land rights for tribal peoples. Dalits and tribal populations also turned away from what they perceived as the Hinduism of their oppression. Both Buddha and B. R. Ambedkar became important icons for Dalit emancipation (Rao 2009: 180–6). Gender, caste and sexuality became symbolic markers for the Dalits, manifested on Dalit and poor bodies as sites of state violence. When protests and nonviolent movements so often failed to achieve results, some tribal protest movements turned to armed struggle. The state’s counterinsurgency response was another cascade of violence. It was often brutal and directed not just at armed rebels, but also at unarmed civilians from surrounding villages. This brutality tended to escalate the cycle of violence, motivating more bodies to join the armed rebels in the bush. In Assam, another profound cause of armed conflict was a decision by the Assam Government in 1960 to make Assamese the sole official language of the state. This was part of the context that made it imperative to respond to the Nagaland and Mizo insurgencies by constituting Nagaland as a separate state from Assam and Mizoram as a Union Territory separated from Assam. In general, however, as we see in the next two chapters, Pakistan handled less responsively than did India its less complex language challenges. Starting with Nehru, and continuing through to Indira Gandhi’s willingness to concede substantial language autonomy to Tamil Nadu to end secessionist sentiment there, Indian leaders mostly navigated a sensitive and prudent journey to a highly workable degree of language unity within diversity.

Similarly, in the aftermath of Partition, India was more successful than Pakistan at systematically redistributing wealth from richer to poorer states (Chandra et al. 2008: 155). In contrast, West Pakistan discriminated against its peripheries (such as Balochistan) and against East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). Pakistan sought to subdue disenchanted regions militarily whereas India, partly because it was spending a much smaller proportion of its budget on the military, could afford to buy their integration with development assistance. The Indian choice was an integrative and peacebuilding investment, though we see that it has not worked in Kashmir. One senior police interviewee from Assam (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101221) noted that part of the success of peacebuilding in Assam was active civil society engagement with the police, while in Kashmir, civil society avoids open engagement with the police.
CASCADES OF VIOLENCE

In many other parts of India such peacebuilding has continued to work throughout the seven decades since Partition. Peace accords have tended to have a standard set of elements, as Bajpai (2010: 60) has explained. First, they underwrite combatants’ assurances that they will lay down arms and renounce secession from India in return for payment for their guns and other payments. Second, all accords provide for the rehabilitation and reintegration of militants and agitators. Third, all accords provide for the protection of ethnic identities. ‘[V]irtually every accord allows local religious and customary laws to govern economic activity, ownership of land and forests, civil and criminal law, and language and migration’ (Bajpai 2010: 60). Accords in the north-eastern states mostly include provisions to protect minorities, usually by instituting autonomous councils inside states, with special powers over crucial issues such as land disputes, but with the central government having ultimate authority to dissolve them. These councils have not always functioned well and have often been starved of resources by state governments that resent the limited challenge to their authority that they represent. Some accords have created new autonomous states, such as the breaking up of Assam into the ‘seven sisters’. Many of these states, including Nagaland and Tripura, have been successful. For example, Mizoram today has a literacy rate of 89 per cent—second only to Kerala—and 81 per cent of the population lives above the poverty line. Some commentators look back on a past folly of insisting on retaining large states when in India the largest states are the ones that have fared worst at development and smaller states have mostly enjoyed better governance (Chadha 2005: 409).

In sum, we might say of insurgency in India the same thing that we concluded about communal rioting. Insurgency breaks out with great frequency in India and, when it does, it cascades. However, as with communal rioting, when insurgency does break out, it is mostly extinguished before large numbers of lives are lost, in comparison with death tolls from insurgencies across the rest of the world. Ultimately, the security services do their job in asserting their overwhelming power advantage over the insurgents (Propositions 1 and 4) and, ultimately, Indian democratic institutions choose to be responsive in crafting

18 Although, with Maoist conflicts, as in Kashmir, there have been many ceasefires and peace talks that have been a ploy by the state to trap and kill those who participate in the talks (Bhaduri 2012: 19). There have been many other peace accords where there was either an inept failure to bring all the potential spoilers to the table or a continuation of the British tradition of divide-and-rule accords that had the intent of setting one group against another to pursue political objectives by violent means while wearing the mantle of the peacemaker (Chadha 2005: 426–7).
a democratic and reintegrative peace agreement, as opposed to the kind of peace imposed after the Sri Lankan civil war from 2009 (Chapter 8). Kashmir is the most important exception to this pattern. While across India high-frequency communal rioting has mostly been suppressed quickly with low loss of life, high-frequency insurgency has mostly been suppressed very slowly with low loss of life. With insurgency, the Indian state has been willing to wait out resistance and has been patient with the irritation of insurges that cause fewer than a few hundred lives to be lost each year. No state has had as many long-duration insurgencies as India. Kashmir is the longest. Naga resistance and separtatism started in 1947, turned to armed struggle in 1955, mostly ended by all spoilers with the peace agreement of 2012, but continued to flare low levels of mostly inter-communal violence since. A consequence of the protracted nature of these struggles is that, while the lives lost to the war are very low in most years, over the whole period of the conflict, the aggregated number of lives lost is large—perhaps as high as 70,000 in the case of Kashmir since 1990, with tens of thousands more in the previous 43 years (Chatterji et al. 2009; Reuters 2008; Sidhu 2006), and claims of as many as 200,000 dead over 50 years in Nagaland (Iralu 2003).

Another consequence of longevity is a lot of cascading. We describe how Kashmir cascaded across India, the region and the globe. The Naga insurgency cascaded into Myanmar and became a model (Proposition 2) for other separtist insurgencies in north-eastern India, from Manipur to Mizoram, Tripura and other parts of the original state of Assam, and also in Punjab and West Bengal. According to Chadha’s (2005: 28, 230) historical analysis, Nagaland started an insurgency ‘domino effect’, which itself was one of many centrifugal tendencies initially encouraged by the All-India Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. Depending on the ethnic group involved, support for the north-eastern insurgencies cascaded:

• across from Pakistan—for example, into Mizoram, where General Ayub Khan had hopes of ‘repeating another Kashmir’ (Chadha 2005: 343), and, more recently, where the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) expanded its client base to Naxalite groups (Ramana 2005, 2010)
• across from Bangladesh, which continued support for many north-eastern insurgencies after it separated from Pakistan (Chadha 2005: 420)
• across from Myanmar (where the Naga insurgents had many bases), from Nepal—with the Gorkhaland insurgency’s claims for Nepalese language rights (Chadha 2005: 283)—and through infiltration of
Pakistan’s ISI in Nepal to support any and all Indian insurgencies across the Nepalese border, in addition to Nepalese Maoist support for Indian Maoists (Ramana 2010: 158)

- across from China—for example, to Manipur (Chadha 2005: 315) and the Maoist insurgencies
- across from China via Bhutan (Konwer 2012: 120; Rammohan 2011: 83). Six different Indian armed separatist movements have had bases in Bhutan. India retaliated against Chinese support for insurgency by itself cascading support in the past for the (mostly nonviolent) Tibetan resistance movement against China.

This horizontal cascading was complemented by vertical cascades, as in the Bodo resistance to the 1985 Assam accord that Rajiv Gandhi had signed with the All Assam Students Union and the All Assam Gana Sangam Parishad. Groups such as the National Democratic Front for Bodoland took up arms for a separate country for the Bodos when they felt they were sold out by more powerful groups who had negotiated the Assam accord. It took until 1993 to see a Bodo peace negotiated with the Bodo People’s Action Committee to establish the Bodo Autonomous Council. This did not hold until another peace was negotiated, with the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force, in 2003. In recent times, the Bodoland Territorial Council government, led by former Bodo Liberation Tiger Force leaders, has experienced renewed fratricidal clashes from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Konwer 2012: 118). As we see for Bangladesh in Chapter 7, here, insurgency cascaded down from one excluded ethnic group to another group even more excluded by that group. In Manipur, there were around two dozen armed groups (Singh 2012: 74).

There was also some cross-border cascading with the Maoist insurgencies across central India, with some support coming from and to Nepal. More interestingly, in 2001, Maoist groups collaborated to plan a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ that would traverse connected forests across Andra Pradesh to Nepal, crossing Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar in between, to allow easy movement of fighters and arms from one part of the zone to another (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 164). Figure 5.1 shows formidable progress towards this cascade objective by the present decade. The peak years for security force members being killed by Maoists

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19 For details, see Chadha (2005: 256–7).
were 2007 to 2010, when well over 1,000 were killed; the number of insurgents killed has a more erratic and uncertain pattern across space and time, with 2016 being perhaps the worst year in a decade.20

Figure 5.1 Chronic conflict in India, 2015.
Source: Adapted from South Asia Terrorism Portal (2008). See also a similar map in Chakrabarty and Kujur (2009: 164).

20 All the numbers for which sources are cited above and in the following paragraphs are rubbery, but are broadly consistent with numbers used by major international media organisations, including the BBC and Al Jazeera.
This Compact Revolutionary Zone strategy was facilitated in September 2004 by the merger of the two largest Maoist networks, the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), which now has the organisational capacity to create foundations for insurgency in 15 states—foundations that have realised a credible insurgency in a majority of them. It has an estimated 15,000 armed underground rebels, with estimates of 25–40 per cent women, mostly under 25 years of age and many of them students (Ramana 2010: 151–3). The CPI-M now has trained organisational competence in the cascading of armed struggle. The theme explored in this section—how violence cascaded from Partition down to many local armed conflicts—is resumed as a major theme of the next two chapters and of Part III of the book. In the next section, we turn to the specific case study of this long and wide cascade, which is the key focus of this chapter: Kashmir.

While this book concludes that Pakistan is a more militarised state than India, we should never underestimate the historical significance of how formidable the Indian military has long been. At independence, India received 66 per cent of the British Indian Army—nearly 310,000 troops. Over the next five years, the army managed to recover from losing Muslim units to Pakistan and British technical staff and its strength increased to 400,000 soldiers. After the Sino–Indian War in 1962, the number increased further, to 825,000; after the Kargil War, it increased again to an estimated 1.3 million. This made the Indian army the second largest in the world (Wolpert 2006). Since 1991, female officers have also joined the army. During World War II, the Indian army became the largest volunteer army in history, with 2.2 million men fighting in Abyssinia, Eritrea, Italy, the Middle East, North Africa and Sudan (Wolpert 2006: 51).

The struggle against domination in Kashmiri history

Kashmir is nestled in the north-west Himalayas, enclosed by mountains except for a few passes into its rich valleys. For all but a few months of the year, the most elevated regions—such as the predominantly Buddhist region of Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of Control—are cut off from the predominantly Muslim Kashmir Valley and Jammu, which is today predominantly Hindu. In this circumstance of being rather cut off, Kashmir developed a sense of separateness of identity. It invented its own
script and a literature that was rather independent of the larger literary traditions that surrounded it. When it came into contact with them, it enriched them. In the opinion of Jawaharlal Nehru, Kashmir ‘dominated the intellectual scene of the country for 2000 years’ (B. Puri 2011: 119).

Remoteness, however, did not prevent invaders from penetrating its passes and subordinating its people. Indeed, invaders viewed Kashmir as a great prize because of its natural splendour and the agricultural productivity of the Kashmir Valley, with its bounty of temperate fruits that are hard to grow at lower altitudes to the south. For half a millennium, Kashmir has not been ruled by Kashmiris, though Kashmiri tradition clings to fond memories of the periods of rule by Kashmiri kings such as Lalitadiya-Muktapida (725–53 AD) and Zain-ul-Abidin (1420–70 AD). Kashmiri identity is a memory file of domination by India or Pakistan, the British Raj, the Dogra Hindu Maharajas, who were sold Kashmir by the British in 1846, Sikh rulers before the Dogras, Pathans (Pashtuns) before them and Mughals from 1586.

Kashmiris view themselves as suffering centuries of slavery to these rulers. *Gulami* (slavery) is a big word in the Kashmir imaginary (Proposition 2):

In the village they understand the narrative of *gulami*. Not always the narrative of ‘occupation’. Old and contemporary poets use *gulami*. *Gulami* of the Maharaja. Of the Mughals, of India now. (Interview with Srinagar non-governmental organisation (NGO), 2012, No. 101234)

For Kashmiris, *azadi*—endlessly chanted at their demonstrations—means ‘freedom’ in the ancient republican sense of freedom from slavery or freedom from domination by the other. *Azadi* is not about the neoliberal individualist freedom of choice that has growing currency in India today; it is a community vision of freedom as release from slavery and domination. It is a way of seeing liberty that is refracted through those successions of dominations by foreign invaders. None of those successions—passing domination from one overlord to another—better epitomises Kashmir’s ethos of enslavement than the fact that the British sold them to the warlord Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846 after the first Anglo–Sikh war for 7.5 million rupees and an annual tribute of six shawls spun from pashmina wool. The system of *beggar*, or forced rural labour, of mostly landless peasants without compensation that was imposed by the Dogra Hindu Maharajas was oppressive. It was overlaid with deep indebtedness to absentee Hindu landlords and moneylenders. A human rights group told us they received complaints from rural areas today of a continuation
of forced labour ‘as porters, as human shields, as carpenters’, required by the military—sometimes with rape and sexual harassment being part of the complaint. Another rights NGO had surveyed 50 villages in which they found 6,888 cases of forced labour (Citizens’ Council for Justice 2012). Thus, in local eyes, gulami persists.

Plate 5.2 Women clearing weeds, Kashmir, 1890. Gulami (slavery) in the fields of Jammu and Kashmir, probably near the capital of Srinagar.
Source: British Library.

There was also industrial slavery and early industrial resistance. Shawl weavers went on strike the year after Maharaja Gulab Singh took power in 1847, and again in 1865, demanding decent wages and relief from heavy taxation. The silk factory workers’ strike of 1925 laid a foundation for the general uprising against Dogra domination in 1931 in which young Sheikh Abdullah rose to prominence. The silk industry provided the bulk of employment in the Kashmir capital, Srinagar, and its surrounding region.

As the Quit India campaign gained traction and the British prepared to leave, the 1940s became a time of hope for liberation in Kashmir. Its population at that time was 77 per cent Muslim—with a Buddhist region in the north and a significant Sikh population—but was ruled
by the Hindu Marharaja Hari Singh. While Muslim expulsions have left Jammu with a Hindu majority population today, in 1947, even in Jammu, 61 per cent of the population was Muslim; it was 95 per cent in the Kashmir Valley and 88 per cent in the rest of Kashmir (Koithara 2004: 32). Singh feared both Indian democracy and the prospect of Pakistan’s Muslim domination. He hoped to opt out of both and persist in his independent rule.

Sheikh Abdullah had emerged by the time of Partition as the most popular leader of Kashmir’s Muslim Conference. He was respected by Nehru and, by 1947, was minded to take Kashmir into India when he became convinced that Kashmiri independence, while he desired it, was not feasible. He secured from the Indian National Congress a special article (Article 370) in the constitution that restricted the Indian parliament’s authority over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to external affairs, defence and communications. There was a consensus view among the Congress leadership in 1947, advocated by Gandhi, that Kashmir must be given the choice of joining either Pakistan or India, according to the freely expressed will of the people. He also commended the people of Kashmir for averting communal violence in the lead-up to independence. Indeed, while Hindu–Muslim animosity has salience in Kashmir today, it had little among ordinary Kashmiris in the run-up to Partition.

Tolerance in the Kashmir Valley was promoted with the slogan ‘Beware of communal demon; protect motherland and liberty’ (Bazaz 2005: 44). The Kashmir Valley had a syncretic ethos of ‘pride in inhabiting a cultural space between Vedic Hinduism and Sufi Islam’ (Khan 2010: 40). This was not a case of ancient hatreds that were bottled up until the historical moment when they would burst open. Nor was this so across India at Partition:

There is wide scholarly agreement that partition came about not because Hindu and Muslim masses had difficulty living together but because the elites of the two communities could not agree on political power sharing. At that time the religious and cultural anxieties felt by Muslims at large were wholly secondary to the political fears of their leaders. (Koithara 2004: 28)

This is not to deny that there were inter-religious historical dominations in Kashmir that had left scars, which could be exploited through religious mobilisation. The scars were also used for political mobilisation, but they were causally secondary rather than causally prior. Those scars in Kashmir,
as in other parts of greater India, were about centuries of foreign Muslim domination (Proposition 8) followed by two centuries of deterioration of the Muslim position under the Raj. This was festered by British exploitation of Hindu–Muslim differences to secure British dominion. Sustainable peace has so far proved difficult, with a multiplex array of dozens of foreign, Indian and Kashmiri spoilers.

Pre-empting the plebiscite

In 1947, the Pakistani leadership did not accept the idea of a Kashmiri plebiscite to allow its people to decide which way they should go, even though a significant current of Muslim opinion in the Kashmir Valley craved union with Pakistan. While this remains a minority first preference compared with that for independence for Kashmir, to this day in the Kashmir Valley, there is much more shared identity with Pakistan than with India, as is clear when residents of the valley near universally celebrate Pakistan’s cricket victories and India’s defeats. In our discussions with young university and college students in Kashmir, many repeated this allegiance to Pakistan, yet this enthusiasm is relatively tempered by Kashmiri concerns about military domination in Pakistan, fear of exchanging one *gulami* for another and the fact that economic development in Pakistani Kashmir is stunted in comparison with Indian Kashmir. From 1947 to the present, a significant strand of Kashmiri Muslim political analysis has been that, even if independence for Kashmir is the best option, it is not sustainable in the face of a tug of war between India and Pakistan, both of whom believe Kashmir is legitimately theirs. According to their analysis, joining Pakistan is the best of the feasible choices. While Sheikh Abdullah alternated throughout his life between support for independence and support for India as the exigencies of history unfolded, the 1944 constitution for an independent Kashmir approved by the Muslim Conference undoubtedly reflected the majority long-term aspiration (for details, see Ali 2011: 34).

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21 A 1995 poll found 72 per cent support for independence in the Kashmir Valley, with 77 per cent opposed to a future with India (Jha 1995). A 2010 British poll found support for independence varied from district to district in the Kashmir Valley, from 74 per cent to 95 per cent, while in four predominantly Hindu districts of Jammu support for independence was practically zero.
On 22 October 1947, Pakistan decided to pre-empt the options by sending in Pashtun tribesmen led unofficially by Pakistani officers to join up with pro-Pakistan Kashmiri fighters to take Kashmir for Pakistan. The Maharaja’s army was no match for them. As they pushed towards the capital of Kashmir, Srinagar, on 24 October, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed for Indian military aid. On 26 October, the Maharaja acceded to India—abandoning his hopes of an independent kingdom—to secure his state against Pakistan with Indian military power. He also agreed to Sheikh Abdullah ascending to the leadership of the new Indian state’s administration. Gandhi was less than total in his commitment to nonviolence at this moment; he supported the deployment of Indian troops to drive out the Pakistani and Kashmiri Muslim troops marching on Srinagar.

Following the advice of the last viceroy and first governor-general of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and mindful of the looming prospect that Kashmir would become an ongoing provocation for war between India and Pakistan, the Indian Cabinet referred the Kashmir crisis to the UN Security Council on 30 December 1947. Because Pakistan was the aggressor, Nehru hoped the United Nations would order the complete withdrawal of Pakistani armed elements from all of Kashmir so the people of Kashmir could determine their own future under UN supervision. It is a great tragedy that this UN peace and transitional governance diplomacy failed. Nehru had miscalculated. The beginnings of Cold War politics that left the United States and the United Kingdom closer to Pakistan than to India were already present. Thus, on the UN Security Council, the United States and the United Kingdom were more sympathetic to Pakistan than Nehru had hoped.

Pursuant to one of a succession of UN resolutions, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire to the first Kashmir war, on 1 January 1949. By then, each side was exhausted and convinced it could not make significant gains across the ceasefire line, which left India with 63 per cent of the landmass of Kashmir and 72 per cent of the population. The proportion in Indian Kashmir increased in the 1950s; in 1963, Pakistan ceded the least populous 19 per cent of its part of Kashmir to please its ally China; and in the 1971 war India further pushed back the Line of Control. Indian-administered Kashmir became the only Muslim-majority Indian state.
The Partition war of 1947 had been a substantial conflict in which thousands of troops and unknown thousands of civilians were killed in the Kashmir Valley. Jammu also suffered an orgy of Hindu and Sikh killings and expulsions from Muslim-majority districts and Muslim killings and expulsions from Hindu-majority areas. Pakistani infiltrators, driving Hindus and Sikhs from their homes in an attempt to communalise conflict, became a recurrent tactic and cascaded violence in Kashmir for the next half-century—as did threatening or killing former insurgents who participated in peace talks or elections. In 1949, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed to monitor the truce along the ceasefire line—a function it continues to fulfil at the time of writing.

Both sides failed to comply with a 1951 UN resolution that called for withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region of Kashmir under its control. Compliance would have allowed the Srinagar administration to rule the whole state until a referendum was held. Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops and to allow the side of Kashmir under its control to be ruled from Srinagar. In response, India has since steadfastly refused to conduct a referendum. At a series of meetings of seven Commonwealth prime ministers in January 1951, Pakistan accepted—but India rejected—an Australian proposal that Commonwealth troops be stationed in Kashmir to enable a plebiscite (Rahman 1996: 92–3). One exceptional moment was an agreement and joint communiqué on 20 August 1953 between Nehru and Pakistani prime minister Muhammed Ali Bogra for a plebiscite in Kashmir. India told the UN Security Council that it wanted someone from a small neighbouring country as the plebiscite’s administrator. Muscular US diplomacy on the Security Council derailed the plebiscite in the post–Korean War/Cold War climate, when the anti-imperialist Indian National Congress was seen as unfriendly to America. The United Nations proposed US Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administrator, but India walked away (Chandra et al. 2008: 206).

In his book, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir*, Snedden (2012) provides an alternative history of the Kashmir dispute, locating its origins not in the invasion by Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan, as India has consistently claimed, but in protests in Poonch and Mirpur by people long disenchanted with Hari Singh’s rule. He argues that the people of Poonch and Mirpur eventually ‘liberated’ themselves from the Maharaja’s rule and formed the government of Azad Kashmir in October, before the
king acceded to India. Snedden proposes that the people should decide the fate of Kashmir. In our explorations of various stages of the Kashmir dispute below, we recognise how difficult that task might be. Snedden (2012) argues that the uprising in Poonch, in the west of Jammu province, in the summer of 1947 was the beginning of the revolt against Kashmir’s maharaja—predating and encouraging the tribal invasion. According to him, this indicates that the armed campaign against the maharaja, and indirectly against Kashmir’s prospective accession to India, was instigated by citizens of the princely state and not by outsiders. This challenges the Indian account that the invading force of Pashtun ‘raiders’ from Pakistan started the fighting. Snedden writes:

> The Poonch uprising and the violence against Muslims in Jammu province commenced, and were well under way, before Pakistani Pukhtoons invaded J&K on 22 October 1947 … these actions may have inspired the Pukhtoon’s invasion. (Snedden 2012: 63)

Snedden’s revisionist localising narrative of a conflict widely characterised as international bears a striking resemblance to Autesserre’s (2010) revisionist localising narrative of the origins of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (in Part I, this volume).

Various conflicts between India and Pakistan embroiling Kashmir, political and social changes made on the ground in J&K and the global war on terror have also transformed Kashmir. On 24 May 2004, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh noted in his interview with Jonathan Power:

> Short of secession, short of re-drawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything … we need soft borders—then borders are not so important. People on both sides of the border should be able to move freely. (Sardar 2011: 22)

Pakistan’s former president Pervez Musharraf also raised the idea of a soft border during his visit to India in 2005. Both sides, however, have different perceptions of a ‘soft border’. While Pakistan would not accept making the Line of Control into a permanent border, with bus services already introduced between Srinagar and Muzaffarbad and various other people-to-people contacts between J&K and Azad Kashmir, Pakistan is prepared to go as far as making the Line of Control a soft border.
War again: 1965, 1971

Another lost opportunity to secure enduring peace in Kashmir came in 1964 when a dying Nehru sought to redeem his greatest policy failure. He released Sheikh Abdullah from prison and put a new set of options on the table in a letter to Pakistan. These included a UN plebiscite and an autonomous Kashmir federated between India and Pakistan. Pakistan saw the approaching death of Nehru as a time of opportunity, of Indian weakness. The Indian economy was struggling in 1965. It was a period when Pakistan was growing strongly. Pakistan had also prepared for the uncertainty of Nehru’s death in 1964 with a substantial military modernisation with American help. Pakistan made the calculation at that time that it might have an advantage over India in military preparedness and resolve, one that might prove only temporary, with plans for Indian military renewal in train. It foolishly decided to put this theory to the test. Pakistani forces had been infiltrating J&K since 1964, in Operation Gibraltar. Tension escalated between India and Pakistan in January 1965. Border clashes broke out. These became serious in the Rann of Kutch, although British mediation led to a ceasefire. Further tensions, following Pakistan’s infiltration of 3,000 insurgents to start an uprising in Kashmir, escalated to high-intensity interstate war along the Punjab border later in 1965. The United Nations brokered another ceasefire, in January 1966, and ‘the war of 1965’ was at an end. Pakistan went into the war with hopes that the Chinese were poised to ‘resupply the Pakistan army and create a diversion on India’s eastern frontier, with the Indonesian navy steaming to the rescue and other Islamic states promising support’ (Keay 2010: 548). Pakistan yielded to pressure from the great powers for a ceasefire before any such hoped-for escalations came into play. Had Pakistan toughed it out militarily on this occasion, it is hard to assess whether it would have created a bloody stalemate that led to the permanent settlement it wanted. Thankfully, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw that this could only have been accomplished by escalating to one of the most terrible wars of the twentieth century.

India entered the 1971 war in East Pakistan in support of those fighting for an independent Bangladesh (see Chapter 7), which it justified by the flood of millions of refugees from East Pakistan into West Bengal, India (Proposition 6). Indian intervention to protect the people of East Pakistan from the slaughter was decisive in turning the war into a major defeat for West Pakistan. During the war, hostilities also broke out across
the Kashmir ceasefire line. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, met at Simla to negotiate a peace when the Pakistani forces surrendered. It was agreed that the two countries in future should resolve their differences bilaterally and through peaceful means. India returned 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in return for an additional, strategically important 733 square kilometres of Kashmir becoming part of India. The 1971 ceasefire line became the Line of Control that both sides agreed not to transgress.

Politics of hope and despair: The 1987 election

Most elections held in Indian J&K, beginning with the first in 1951, were marred by electoral fraud orchestrated by the party ruling in New Delhi (mostly the Congress Party). This continued, with seven of the first eight elections held between 1951 and 1987 (Snedden 2012: 240) also being discredited by electoral fraud orchestrated by the New Delhi government. After Bakshi Gulam Mohammad’s party won the 1957 and 1962 elections with 95 and 97 per cent of the seats, respectively, Nehru wrote to advise him to lose a few seats in future to improve the image of Indian democracy (Wani 2011: 171). As the 1987 election approached, there had been a total collapse of popular confidence in the J&K National Conference leadership of Farooq Abdullah, son of Sheik Abdullah. The National Conference continued to tout Kashmir autonomy rhetoric, but it had been captured as a pro-India party. Both it and the Congress Party had no substantial support in the Kashmir Valley. Violence such as bombings had escalated in the 1980s.

In this environment, the major resistance groups unified under the banner of the Muslim United Front (MUF), the formation of which was a watershed because it was a unification of disparate groups, some favouring independence, others favouring rule by Pakistan. They shared the ambition of ridding Kashmir of corrupt pro-India parties and winning power for azadi groups using constitutional means at the ballot box. This momentum seemed unstoppable, particularly among the young. Turnout at the 1987 election was high. Instead of being declared as victors, however, successful MUF candidates were imprisoned without charge or were charged with disloyalty to India. In some electorates, gangs of thugs took over polling booths and issued results; in others, ballot papers were
changed en masse or official tally announcements were simply revised. By a variety of rigging tactics, the election result announced in 1987 was that a National Conference–Congress alliance would form a government with an overwhelming majority.

The people engaged with the 1987 election in a politics of hope, yet it produced a politics of despair when the upshot was another pretence of democracy. The reality of a state that was dictatorial and centralist for Kashmiris pushed aside the pretence that it was democratic and federal. This was compounded by 40 years of corrupt misrule by defectors to India—40 years of drastic erosion, piece by piece, of the autonomy that Sheikh Abdullah had negotiated after Partition, 40 years of brutality by the security forces (Proposition 8) and a sharpening of the Islamic imaginary pushed by the globalisation of Islamic resistance to imperialism, particularly in Palestine and Afghanistan (Proposition 2). Victory of the mujahidin in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1988–89 cascaded to confidence that India could be forced to quit Kashmir. While the Pakistani militants who had infiltrated J&K in 1947 and 1965 had failed to fire up mass Kashmiri mobilisation, the people of Kashmir did not need to be pushed by Pakistan in 1987; armed struggle was the way forward. After modest beginnings in 1989, countless young men and women prepared for full-blooded breakout of armed struggle in January 1990:

Our one objective, our one desire, guerilla war, guerilla war;
There is only one way to freedom, guerilla war, guerilla war.
— Anthem of the J&K National Liberation Front

As we see in the next section, the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF) imaginary and surge to readiness in the 1980s came at a time when Pakistan was also more ready and able to support insurgency than during other periods of the long struggle. This was an example of a cleavage putting alliance cascades on the march and unifying formerly divided opposition groups into an insurgency (Proposition 3). Thousands of young men travelled across the border to Pakistan in search of insurgency training and arms; they cascaded back ready to die. ‘Children no longer dream of becoming doctors or engineers; their ambition is to become mujahids’ (Indian journalist, 1992, quoted in Bose 2005: 116).

22 The reaction was a sudden change of sentiment among young Kashmiris; the ballot box had been tried and tried again and, in 1987, they felt it could never be trusted again.
Unlike previous phases of the long conflict, when most fighters were from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, from 1990, the trained fighters were overwhelmingly Indian citizens. Of 844 guerillas killed in fighting during 1991, only two were not Indian residents of J&K.

Updating Swami’s (2006: 175) study with data from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs shows the government’s estimate of the number of conflict killings from 1988 to 2011 at 45,348. This does not include Pakistani soldiers killed in the Kargil War and in other border skirmishes or Pakistani civilians killed during this fighting. All the senior Kashmir Valley journalists we interviewed put the total at closer to 70,000 since 1990, as do the human rights groups and the J&K Civil Society Coalition whose members conducted the door-to-door surveys on which the 70,000 estimate is to some degree based (e.g. Citizens’ Council for Justice, 2012). The figure of 70,000 since 1990 is also common among Muslim and critical writers (e.g. Kak 2011a: x), though some reputable senior journalists put it at 100,000, as do many politicians (fieldnotes 2012). Over 100,000 could be a conservative number for the total number of conflict killings in Kashmir since 1947 when we add probably more than 20,000 soldiers killed in interstate wars across the ceasefire line and many thousands of insurgents, military, police and civilians killed during the first 40 years of conflict. Amnesty International and Asia Watch sources suggest 17,000 were killed in the period 1 January 1990 to 30 June 1992 alone, including 200 schoolchildren and 358 other people who were burned alive. In this two-and-a-half-year period, Amnesty and Asia Watch recorded 2,839 women raped, 4,258 women sexually incapacitated through torture and 25,185 people ‘disabled for life’ (Rahman 1996: 157). Security forces across Kashmir have committed sexual assaults with impunity, in what has been described as a systematic and widespread tactic against the civilian population (Asia Watch 1993; Chatterji et al. 2009). Photographs are often taken of these rapes to provide the option of destroying the reputation of targeted women. Female political activists and other targeted women have also been photographed walking down the street, with their heads subsequently doctored on to obscene photographs, in campaigns to destroy their reputations (Interview with a senior lawyer, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101220).
Swami’s (2006: 175) official Indian data show a pattern where civilian deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim. Yet, when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process, and with a large number of rapes of Pandit women. Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), a civil society group in Kashmir that looks after the affairs of the remaining Pandits, notes that there are currently 3,400 Pandits in Kashmir. Others have placed the number at around 2,700. Rejecting estimates of the death of between 3,000 and 4,000 Pandits as propaganda, the KPSS believes that 650 Pandits were killed in the Kashmir Valley over the past 20 years. Many of these were on a JKNLF hit list for assassination of pro-India leaders and Pandits believed to be intelligence agents. Pandits fled because they were terrorised into fleeing. Other Pandits fled because Indian officials advised them to leave, according to Muslim leaders, to discredit the Muslim community. A standard script of the Muslim politics of denial of atrocity is to suggest that this was the only reason, or the real reason, Pandits fled. A few thousand Pandits stayed or returned later, some of whom were protected by their Muslim neighbours. The 1990 displacement of Pandits has become central to the narrative of the conflict highlighted by the Indian Government. Pandits themselves see their cleansing as part of an ‘Islamisation/Talibanisation’ of Kashmir (Interview with Pandit leader, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101238). The state narrative gives this special focus because, as Bose (2005: 124) points out, the ‘independent Kashmir’ narrative fails to accommodate adequately the ‘multiple political allegiances regarding sovereignty and citizenship that exist even in the Kashmir Valley’ (let alone in Buddhist Ladakh). The Pandits shared a history, a culture, an ethnicity and a language with the valley’s Muslims, but were loyal to India as a community, and therefore were estranged from the ‘patriotic’ upsurge of the anti-India cleavage. While Kashmiri Muslims feel mutilated and defiled by the security forces, Hindu refugees feel uprooted and betrayed by the government and by Muslim militants (Varshney 2010: 153).

Swami’s (2006: 175) data show that attacks on Indian forces declined sharply in 1996 from a peak in 1992, with a further sharp drop in 2004. These years were turning points after which many local insurgency groups based in the Kashmir Valley had their backs broken. Popular leader Yaseen Malik led the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which had descended from the JKNLF, to a ceasefire in 1994 and renounced
violence. Violence continued to cascade after 1996 without a reduced overall death rate, largely at the hands of the Indian state itself: the *ikhwanis* (‘renegades’) militias it had created, many of which had morphed into violent criminal gangs, and foreign militants who kept coming in from Afghanistan and Pakistan, many of whom also morphed into criminal gangs, terrorised people in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan was encouraging battle-hardened mujahidin exhilarated by their defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to do the same to India. The foreigners sought to impose an anti-Hindu and anti-Sufi Islam that was at odds with Kashmiri beliefs. The switch of Pakistan’s support from Kashmiris who fought an Islamic war of national liberation to Deobandi Sunni extremists was a switch to fighters who were more extreme in their hatred of India, more dedicated to an intolerant form of Islamisation of Kashmir and more under the control of the ISI (Pakistani intelligence). By 1999, the uprising:

partly was being sustained by people’s often corrupt ability to make money from it: militants, from fighting for the Pakistan military and/or from extorting Kashmiris; Indian forces, possibly from payments to allow insurgents to cross the Line of Control or to release captured militants and Kashmiri traders, from the large Indian forces’ presence. (Snedden 2012: 242)

Looting of banks has been another profitable activity when armed groups seize control of an area. As this book progresses, we see these grievances cascading to greed (Collier 2007, 2009) to the point where a grievance–greed distinction has little purchase.

In 2000, the most dominant armed group, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, declared a unilateral ceasefire that India reciprocated for a period. Four of the five Hizb-ul commanders who signed the ceasefire were assassinated, with the fifth surviving two attempts on his life (Kaur 2006: 24). The ceasefire thus collapsed quickly and Hizb-ul Mujahideen remains responsible for the majority of attacks today. Fighting continued at a high level well into the 2000s and has not ceased at the time of writing. September 2016 saw

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23 The JKLF was founded in 1966 and became internationally known after its cadres hijacked an Indian Airlines domestic flight and took it to Lahore in 1971. Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhatt are two of its veteran leaders who operated from the United Kingdom, where the JKLF has a large support base. Maqbool Bhatt was executed in 1984 in India and Amanullah Khan returned to Azad Kashmir. The JKLF split into two organisations after Yaseen Malik in J&K pledged nonviolence.

24 Financial support from the Kashmiri diaspora, particularly in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, has been more important than the one-quarter of the militancy’s financing that has come from Pakistan (Chandran 2006: 55) (Proposition 6).
17 Indian soldiers killed by insurgents in Indian Kashmir near the Line of Control, followed by Indian army retaliation and new civilian protests, then state killings of 90 protestors and the blinding of many more with pellet guns in the next eight months (Safi 2017), curfews, disconnection of the internet and mobile phone networks and disappearances. The Indian Government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee attempted new peace initiatives in 2000–01, including a unilateral ceasefire for Ramadan that was extended twice, Track II talks inside Kashmir and five long Track I meetings between Vajpayee and Pakistani president Musharraf. The talks collapsed, the politics changed after 11 September 2001 and Vajpayee urged president Bush to extend his war on terror to Kashmir.

In the early 1990s, whole suburbs of Srinagar were no-go zones for the security forces—part of ‘liberated Kashmir’. By 1996, all but a few rural areas were under Indian control by day. The partial military victory was, however, a political defeat as the resistance energised by repression shifted to nonviolent forms of resistance that will have greater resilience:

David Barsamian: You’ve written: ‘The new generation of separatist leaders seem to have made a conscious decision not to take up arms, a move to retain moral supremacy over Indian occupation. This represents a major shift in tactics.’

Parvaiz Bukhari: I believe so. I think it’s been a long process of internalizing what armed rebellion achieved and what it did for Kashmir. If there was a belief in 1990 that it was possible to overthrow Indian control of Kashmir through an armed rebellion, people have now realized that it was not militarily possible and it was not an achievable military objective. People have also realized over the period of time that what was sought to be crushed militarily has in fact become more entrenched and more widespread, and more pronounced and more clear in people’s minds. Since Kashmiris also have lived the experience of military response to their armed uprising, in the process they’ve also discovered the power of peaceful protests. So if there was a silent debate within Kashmiri society, particularly young people, after the events of 1990 about what an armed insurgency or armed militancy or armed rebellion could achieve, over a period of time—and post-9/11 also helped clarify a lot of thinking about it—it was that it can only serve a purpose of making a point, of creating a political space that has to be used in different ways. (Barsamian 2012: 5)

Snedden (2012) conceives the post-1987 Kashmir conflict as passing through five phases: a euphoric first phase that ended in 1993, during which Kashmiri-led militants were gaining the upper hand against
a rattled Indian military and when militants believed azadi was just over the horizon; a second phase (1993–99) of lost hope, when Kashmiris recognised India’s military resolve to crush the militancy, when ‘perhaps as many as 10 per cent of Kashmiris experienced torture’ (Snedden 2012: 242) and when Kashmiris began to see Pakistan’s help as not altogether altruistic; a third phase (1999–2003) of momentum for more ceasefires and dialogues due to war-weariness; a fourth phase (2004 to mid-2007) during which it seemed that dialogue might be consolidating peace and renewing Kashmiri democracy; and a fifth phase, from mid-2007 to the present, during which it has seemed unlikely that the insurgency will end or weaken further, elements in Pakistan have worked hard to reignite communal tensions inside Kashmir, nonviolent resistance has surged and stone-pelting increased against security forces, who responded by killing many of the stone-throwers.

This has possibly been modelled from the Palestinian intifada (Proposition 2). We could call Snedden’s current stage a loss of confidence in confidence-building, a phase in which hope has been lost that confidence might cascade. Perhaps this is a stage when peace can be consolidated only with a bold grand bargain that embraces Kashmiri empowerment in a peace process that delivers a form of azadi-autonomy meaningful to Kashmiri Muslims and that both India and Pakistan might accept. As Behera (2016: 41) conceives the problem of more than 150 rounds of peace negotiations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir to date, they have been ‘state-centric peace processes’ at odds with the plural social realities and multiple fault lines involved.

The Kargil War of 1999

Pakistani generals have been convinced that predominantly Hindu India has been dominating primarily Muslim Kashmir for decades. The moral high ground of saving Kashmiris was matched by the logic of compensating for profound structural asymmetries with its powerful neighbour. Pakistani defence planners attempted to gain the upper hand in South Asia’s enduring rivalry in the winter of 1998–99, when Indian troops vacated their high-altitude posts believing that extreme weather and difficult terrain would deter the infiltrators. By the end of April 1999, Pakistani soldiers occupied about 130 posts covering approximately 100 kilometres (Wolpert 2006: 7–8) and Kashmiri militants infiltrated Indian
territory across the Line of Control. It may be that the incursion was designed initially as a ‘limited probe’—a modestly calibrated incursion to test Indian will to defend its territory and risk Pakistan’s new nuclear capability (Ganguly 2002: 121). This military strategy is characterised by a willingness to reverse course if firm opposition that clarifies the enemy’s resolve is encountered. Pakistan’s mistake may have been to dramatically expand the probe when no resistance was encountered initially. On the Indian side, after its troops bumped into the incursion and took some heavy losses in early May 1999, it then felt there was no choice but to drive out the large-scale incursion despite escalation risks. The Indian armed forces launched their major counteroffensive, codenamed Operation Vijay (Victory), in the third week of May 1999.

India bombarded the incursion with heavy artillery and air attacks on their bunkers. US Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, General Anthony Zinni, visited Pakistan to tell prime minister Nawaz Sharif to withdraw, dismissing suggestions that withdrawal be linked to talks with India about the future of Kashmir. Pakistan’s leaders miscalculated the West’s concerns about escalation to a nuclear exchange and about Kashmir as a ‘tinderbox’ and a ‘flashpoint’ (Ganguly 2002: 123).

Prior to the Kargil conflict, both the Indian and the Pakistani elites believed that nuclear capabilities were largely for political leverage and deterrence. The Kargil War was accompanied with direct and indirect threats about nuclear capabilities from both sides. The chilling possibility of escalation to a nuclear war made the world take action. Sharif agreed to US demands to withdraw after another stern encounter, this time with president Clinton in Washington on 4 July 1999. Clinton threatened to issue a statement exposing Sharif’s support for international terrorism and Osama bin Laden, in particular (who had allegedly funded Sharif’s election campaign) (History Commons 1999). All the United States asked India to do was refrain from a wider invasion of Pakistan in response to the Pakistani incursion, which was its intention in any case. In addition to putting Kashmir back on the international agenda, which was oblivious to it, one aim of the infiltration was to jump-start the flagging insurgency inside Kashmir. It did achieve this, though only in a modest way (Ganguly 2002: 118–27). Its larger effect has likely been to prompt new Indian doctrines of willingness to engage in ‘limited war’ with Pakistan, to pursue Pakistani forces across the Line of Control and to develop strategies to prevent such limited war from escalating towards the nuclear threshold (Ganguly 2002: 126).
General Pervez Musharraf (2006: 98), who was then the Pakistani military commander in Kargil, argued that the Indian losses were at least twice the 600 killed and 1,500 wounded that India had publicly admitted. This was fewer than the 4,000 Indian losses in 1971, 3,000 in 1965 and 1,900 in 1947–48 (Widmalm 2006: 145). Most commentators believe the Pakistani losses were higher in Kargil and certainly much higher across these four interstate wars, although there are no reliable numbers. The next round of tensions, in 2002, saw 1 million troops massed for another possible confrontation at the Line of Control after the terrorist attacks launched from Pakistan on the parliaments of both India in New Delhi and J&K in Srinagar. On this occasion, war was averted after a tense year-long military build-up and stand-off. The typical number of monthly artillery exchanges before the 2003 ceasefire was over 400,000 rounds (Samii 2006: 243).

Part of Pakistan’s miscalculation in Kargil was that it was seen as such a formidable violation of Indian territory that Pakistan confronted near universal international opposition. Ataov (2001: 160) found that a critical difference between 1999 and all previous India–Pakistan hostilities was that this time China struck a posture of neutrality. China offered no encouragement or assistance to Pakistan and, indeed, joined hands with the United States in counselling withdrawal and honouring the Line of Control. In managing to accomplish this Chinese policy shift, Pakistan had inflicted an acute diplomatic reversal on itself.


Although the political narrative of the Kashmir dispute has been told countless times, this scholarship has largely overlooked the influence of nonviolence in the political mobilisation of Kashmiris. In our field research, we found that nonviolence featured importantly in Kashmiri imaginaries of peace. However, many of our younger respondents also expressed increasing disillusionment with nonviolent means to bring about political and social transformation.

In other words, youthful strategists of nonviolence honour the sacrifices of the martyrs of the armed struggle because their own nonviolent resistance is motivated by standing on the graves of these martyrs. A new hedging
of a nonviolent imaginary alongside one of armed struggle blossomed this century (Proposition 2) among activists who were not missionaries of any one model of resistance, but were model mongers. Many of the young people we spoke to in the Kashmir Valley also saw armed struggle as not only a past that motivates, but also a possible future they can return to:

People are not against violence as such. Violence and nonviolence are just different strategies. The society thinks militancy should not be part of the strategy at the moment. (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101234)

Peace is institutionalised occupation. (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101210)

No one here subscribes to nonviolence as a doctrine. (Interview with human rights advocate in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101237)

Nobody knows what the next form of resistance will be. (Interview with a leader of the 2008 uprising, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101220)

Part of their politics of hope is seeing a history of alternating from one tactic to another as each fails in different periods of resistance. None of the people to whom we spoke argued for a total renunciation of violence. None paid homage to Gandhi or Gandhian strategy. Armed struggle lays a foundation for the possible future success of nonviolent struggle; nonviolent struggle lays a foundation for the possible future success of armed struggle. Or at least their willingness to return to armed struggle is part of what one day will motivate India to come to the negotiating table with the people of Kashmir—to deliver a political solution that will give India some kind of peace and Kashmir some kind of azadi.

Continued political stalemate and everyday violence have created an atmosphere of fear in the Kashmir Valley. The near renewal of a full-scale interstate war across the Line of Control in 2002 frightened all parties and motivated the November 2003 formal ceasefire previously mentioned along the India–Pakistan border, the Line of Control and on the Siachen Glacier (where there was no Line of Control). The ceasefire was renewed in August 2005. The India–Pakistan Composite Dialogue seemed to be making progress in the years immediately after its initiation. In April 2005, a bus service linking Pakistan to Indian-administered Kashmir commenced and continues today.

25 We have articulated these concepts in Chapter 3 under Proposition 2.
Between 1990 and 1994—the optimistic years of armed struggle for Kashmiris—5,119 people were killed and thousands more captured. Total deaths per annum as a result of the Kashmir insurgency decreased from a peak in 2001 of 4,500 to 777 in 2007; known infiltrations across the Line of Control fell from a peak of 2,400 in 2001 to 499 in 2007; and violent militant incidents (including explosions, arson and abductions) fell from 2,900 in 2000 to 1,050 in 2007 (Snedden 2012: 244).

This seeming progress began to fall apart in many ways from mid-2007. The India–Pakistan ceasefire across the Line of Control faltered. The Composite Dialogue collapsed as president Musharraf’s authority eroded. Pakistan perceived India to be fomenting violent resistance inside Pakistan in Balochistan and in the North-West Frontier Province (which had become Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). After the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, many former Indian participants in Track II Kashmir diplomacy pulled out in disgust. Inside Kashmir, most of the resistance became as convinced as ever that the 700–800 militants who remained active in Kashmir (Snedden 2012: 245) constituted a card they wanted to be able to hold and play. Yet intent crystallised to escalate nonviolent resistance.

Plate 5.3 The Taj Hotel, Mumbai, after the 2008 terrorist attack.
Source: Arko Datta/Reuters/Picture Media.
On three occasions—in 1990, 2008 and 2010—Srinagar, a city with a population of 1.2 million, has been able to attract a million demonstrators on to its streets from the Kashmir Valley and, in late 2016, perhaps hundreds of thousands were on the streets again, though this is even less well documented with the internet disconnected.

Plate 5.4 Kashmiri villagers, Tral, 38 km south of Srinagar, during the funeral of Burhan Wani, Hizbul Mujahidin chief of operations, 9 July 2016. Source: Dar Yasin/Associated Press.

In 2008 and 2010, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were important in mobilising the populace by bypassing the media that were in the pay of the state. After 2010, the state more ruthlessly regulated the mass media in Kashmir. Young people reported through social media in ways that reached beyond Kashmir. MC Kash’s rap videos took off from a base in live audiences inside Kashmir. YouTube took his voice to outside listeners who would never see Kashmiri newspapers or television. It did so with more evocative flair than newsprint. His ‘I Protest’26 is poetically compelling. ‘Take It in Blood’27 was written in honour of Parveena Ahangar of the Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons to grip the imagination of Kashmiris with her struggle to trace her disappeared 16-year-old son.

26 www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFDrRaLcUvQ (site discontinued).
27 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=MAOgT49w2Co.
The triggers of the mass demonstrations in 2010 were different from those of 2008 and the somewhat smaller ones in 2009. In 2008, the issue was controversy over a land deal favouring a Hindu shrine board; in 2009, it was the rape and murder of two women by the police in Shopian; while in 2010, the death of a 16-year-old boy after being hit by a tear-gas shell was the trigger. Less interesting than what triggered them is how ready people were to be triggered and how, once demonstrations were under way, they were most fundamentally about *azadi*. *Azadi* is what everyone was chanting in the Kashmir Valley then and again late in 2016. It is hard to confirm activists’ claims that there were 1 million people in the streets in both 2008 and 2010, as they say there were in the May 1990 demonstration at which the killing of demonstrators ushered the take-off of the insurgency (Proposition 9: crime to war). There were also large numbers in 2009. Activists claim that there were more demonstrators on Srinagar’s streets in 2008 and 2010 than in Tahrir Square in Cairo in 2011. Egypt captured the imagination of the West in a way that Kashmir—part of liberal, shining, democratic India—did not. The difference between the Arab Spring and Kashmir was that, in the West, the response to the uprisings that started in Tunis and Cairo was: ‘What should we in the West do to respond to this?’ With Kashmir, there was no energising of a policy conversation in the West about the mass uprisings. It was not a failure of the international media or of social media pick-up; it was a failure of international civil society to demand policy responses from their governments that might have built momentum for transformation. This, in turn, was a case of the international community taking the lead from a sophisticated Indian media narrative: ‘That it’s all so complex. It’s simple. They made it complex’ (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209).

One of the most visible changes in the Kashmiri resistance since 2008 has been the choice of weapon of the youth who feel politically and economically disempowered. Street protests are now accompanied by the hurling of stones at state security forces. Popularly known as the stone-pelters of Kashmir, the young men represent Kashmiri youths’ anger

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28 One significant effect of the Shopian rapes trigger of 2009 was that it sparked, for the first time, large protests in New Delhi in sympathy with Kashmir and against the activities of state security forces.

29 One highly respected human rights leader claimed in an interview with us that, on 25 August 2008, 1.5 million people were on the streets of Kashmir, 1.2 million of them in one place. Perhaps all we can be certain of is that there were hundreds of thousands of people on the streets in 1990, 2008 and 2010 and a large number in 2009 and 2016.
towards India. Omar Abdullah, the J&K chief minister in 2010, called for the Indian army to be deployed after more than a decade’s absence to assist the state police and paramilitary forces. He said:

> For over 20 years, the security forces were conditioned to believe the biggest challenge was militancy. Now it’s youngsters hurling stones that whiz at them at 40 miles an hour. Obviously, the response has to be different. (Wax 2010: 1)

A study conducted by a New Delhi–based NGO found that 39 of the 97 cases of killings in 2010 by the police and the paramilitary—for which the demographic information was documented—were of students (Ahmad Dar 2010).30

In June 2010, the Indian army also killed three Kashmiris on a ‘fake encounter’ mission and later claimed they were Pakistani infiltrators. Eventually, in March 2011, the state government admitted that 5,228 young protesters were arrested in 2010 in Kashmir, of which 4,900 were later released. In a May 2010 press release, the J&K state government revealed that 1,811 youth, against whom 230 cases were registered for ‘involvement’ in stone-pelting during the 2010 and 2011 unrest in Kashmir, had been granted amnesty under the scheme announced by chief minister Omar Abdullah. He made it clear that the amnesty would not be extended to those who were involved in arson and damage to public and private property:

> We have decided to give the youths a second chance. Cases against all the youths arrested on charges of stone-pelting, but not involved in arson, registered during last year’s disturbance will be withdrawn. Their involvement in these [stone-pelting] cases may not affect adversely in the verification of these youths for obtaining [a] passport, service verification and for obtaining loans for education/jobs. (DNA India 2014, cited in D’Costa 2015b)

A child’s and/or a young adult’s social and political identity is shaped by the world to which she or he is exposed. For Kashmir’s younger generation, stone-pelting or writing graffiti are rituals of resistance through which they take some control back from the authorities and make choices in their everyday lives. In Kashmir, childhood/youth is militarised and resistance movement events are heavily politicised.

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30 Similarly, in the 2008 protest, in which over 70 people were killed, most were young people. There were also incidents where youth, including juveniles, were arrested under the Public Safety Act 1978.
The interview below between Arif Ayan Parrey and a stone-pelter articulates how the young generation identified with stone-pelting as the only politics of resistance available to them:

Parrey: But is it not wrong to subscribe to violence as a practice?

Anonymous stone-pelter [mostly students and boys who pelt stones at the police in azadi demonstrations]: Don’t give me this nonviolence falasferry [Kashmirified English word ‘philosophy’ whose meaning is closer to ‘sophistry’]. It makes me sick. My heart is turned to stone, I strike it and it hurts my hand.

Parrey: What is that?

Stone-pelter: Shakespeare. Anyway, tell me, what do you subscribe to personally, violence or nonviolence?

Parrey: Nonviolence.

Stone-pelter: Bah, I tell you nonviolence is not going to work in Kashmir. It worked in India because the British were outnumbered 100:1, according to the most conservative estimates. If a hundred people refuse to cooperate with one person, he cannot possibly continue to live, let alone rule. The situation in Kashmir is different; we are so small in numbers … We will come out in a different way, we will invent new methods of protest and one day Kashmir will have justice and freedom. That is the only parameter of success for stone-pelters; so, yes, we will succeed.

Parrey: Mr Stone-pelter, thank you for taking time out from your busy schedule for this interview. As I have already told you, I don’t believe in violence, so I cannot wish you best of luck for your future endeavors. But I must say it was an enlightening experience to have this conversation with you.

Stone-pelter: The pleasure is all mine, brother. Before I leave, I want to gift you something. Please accept this stone from me as a token gesture. Just in case. (Parrey 2011: 37)

In 2010, thousands of people were on the street every day for three months. Overwhelmingly, both the demonstrators and the police wished to avoid violence, but there were some spoilers on both sides of the barricades. The mainstream Indian media frequently conspires with the spoilers of both sides to focus their cameras on the spoilers to project a narrative of protester violence that is at odds with the majoritarian nonviolence of a demonstration. During the 2008 uprising, 65 demonstrators were killed by the police and 116 demonstrators were killed in 2010—a remarkably
large number of them teenage boys. Young women made up a large proportion of the demonstrators in 2008, 2010 and 2016 and were often at the front, although women almost never engaged in stone-pelting (until 2016) or insurgency training in Pakistan.

Plate 5.5 Young Kashmiri stone-pelters attack Indian security forces during a protest in Srinagar, 16 July 2016.
Source: Dar Yasin/Associated Press.

These numbers, according to the empirical work of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), are normally predictive of success in achieving the objectives of a resistance movement. However, in their analysis of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (1900–2006), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found another variable to be a predictor of long-run success in achieving their objectives that is not at all present in Kashmir. This variable is persuading the state’s military to defect to the resistance. One reason for the power of this variable is that, when mass demonstrations get beyond manageable proportions for the security services, it is hard to disperse them without causing a crush that will kill neighbours, friends or relatives of some of the soldiers or police who fire the tear gas or the live rounds. In Kashmir, however, most of the security personnel were not Kashmiris; they identified with India and not with the people who chanted rejection of India. This was not what the Egyptian soldiers in Cairo faced, nor the Tunisian soldiers in Tunis, during the Arab Spring. In spite of this, the 2008–10 street uprisings in J&K formed
a political foundation because ‘Kashmiris took back their dignity’ and could no longer be ruled by fear of violence (Interview with civil society leader, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209). This, in turn, caused the Indian state to reduce the violence of its response to protest. As a result, ‘if they beat someone in public now, they might be confronted by citizens who take offence. Or [make] a complaint’ (Interview, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209).

Panic set in for the Indian security sector in 2008 about how to manage this different and new scale of challenge. Coverage of such a large event by the national and international media demolished New Delhi narratives that the problems of Kashmir were caused by Pakistan and a tiny minority of Islamic fundamentalists. Even local shop proprietors, who might be expected to be harbingers of the Indian middle class, were joining in the chant of ‘azadi, azadi’ and often joining the march as the demonstrators passed their stores. After the 2010 agitation, which had a level of mass participation at least equivalent to that in 2008, the Indian Government appointed three ‘interlocutors’ to mediate the Kashmir dispute. Our interviews revealed widespread cynicism that the work of the interlocutors was a sincere engagement with the political demands of the people of Kashmir that would lead to a genuinely participatory peace process. Indeed, it is hard to see evidence of their work moving to a deep process.

In March 2015, following the election in India of BJP Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a Hindu–Muslim coalition government—the BJP and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)—was established in J&K for the first time. While both Modi and the new Kashmiri leadership have promised a renewed peace process, Modi quickly walked away from peace talks with Pakistan after Pakistan embraced peace talks with insurgents inside Indian Kashmir. A new attempt in January 2016 came under pressure from militant attacks in India, particularly Punjab, which Indian commentators blame on infiltrators from Pakistan attempting to spoil any peace dialogue. International military incursions then reignited from September 2016.

Important democratic developments in civil society include new forms of mobilisation narratives of state victimisation, pre-eminent among which is the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons and its leader, Parveena Ahangar. Her struggle was the subject of MC Kash’s rap video ‘I Protest’ discussed earlier. Parveena Ahangar’s son, Javed Ahmed, was picked up by National Security Guards in Srinagar on 18 August 1990. After Ahangar spent years searching for her son, a man who had shared a prison cell with the boy came forward to tell her that her child had lost hope, withered
away and died. As he was dying, he was saying ‘I want my mother’—a narrative that inspired Ahangar’s activism and the movement she built (Interview with Parveena Ahangar, Srinagar, 2012, No. 0012199). The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons has contributed organisation of constant (monthly) small protests outside government offices at which relatives, including those known as half widows, whose husbands disappeared and are still missing, hold posters with images of their loved ones, demanding to know what has become of them. These have been important in establishing a continuity of public resistance that is hard for authorities to control with violence. This kind of protest is still laying a foundation today for future mass uprisings in Kashmir.

Cascades of insurgency

The feature of Kashmir’s cascades of violence that startles is that they have been driven along a perverse path of democracy deployed as an instrument of domination. The Kashmir election of 1987 ushered in the largest surge of armed violence because it was rigged and because it followed a history of resentment at recurrent electoral fraud. India has reason to be proud of its struggle to be democratic. So it is an alarming tragedy of Kashmir’s cascades of violence that we show India to have been propelled by a variety of democratic pretences: pretences of rule of law, of village democracy, of state democracy, of freedom of speech and of freedom of assembly that in reality has been regulated by live rounds aimed at the heads of young protestors and pellets aimed at their eyes—in other words, rights ritualism (Charlesworth 2012).

Swami (2006: 138) concludes about armed resistance in Kashmir that ‘[t]he proliferation of jihadist groups from 1991 onwards can be seen as the dense branches at the top of a tree, whose roots lie in the Partition of India’. Pakistan may have lost wars in Kashmir in 1947 and 1965, and another against India in Bangladesh (and Kashmir) in 1971, but it did not give up on Kashmir and on destabilising India by destabilising Kashmir. It trained thousands of young men—almost certainly tens of thousands—with assistance from Chinese trainers and military supplies, to be ready and armed for insurgency inside J&K.
This capacity for insurgency was also aided by a gift that fell into Pakistan’s lap with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Western, Arab and Asian Muslim aid flooded to Pakistan to equip and train mujahidin to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. This mandate to cascade violence into Afghanistan was a cover for cascading violence in new ways, and on new fronts, into India. The Afghan jihad minded the United States to overlook Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons and motivated China to support Pakistan’s nuclear program as a way of simultaneously checking Indian and Soviet power. The Afghan jihad gave Pakistan cover in the 1980s to back an insurgency aimed at carving out a Sikh state of Khalistan from Indian Punjab. The civil war in Indian Punjab was waged not just with AK-47s and AK-56s, but also with RPG-7 rockets, Chinese-made machine guns and night-vision equipment that had been supplied to the ISI for deployment to Afghanistan. Pakistan also moved to support insurgencies in north-eastern India31 and terrorist cells inside the metropolitan Indian heartland. Raising the temperature of the Kashmir insurgency—through high-profile bombings during the 1980s, for example—was therefore just one front of a cascade of covert confrontations with India, whose military superiority, demonstrated in 1965 and 1971, precluded open confrontation. The United States and China were well aware this was happening with their money and equipment, but viewed India as a Soviet ally at the time, so they looked the other way as most of their weapons and funding were used to foment the regionalisation and then globalisation of escalating Islamist terrorism. In sum, jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan cascaded each into the other. Kashmir cascaded into Afghanistan and Afghanistan cascaded back into Kashmir—thus enabling cascading into Indian Punjab and the north-eastern Maoist insurgencies—and into terrorism in India’s metropoles. All this, in turn, cascaded to interstate Pakistan–India attacks at the Line of Control, which persist at the time of writing.

Pakistan’s strategic establishment also came to believe—as a result of the experience of Soviet defeat in Afghanistan—that it could do to India in Kashmir what it had done to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Moreover, freedom fighters inside Kashmir came to believe that if the mujahidin

31 It was more possible for the ISI to arm and train Naga, Mizo and other insurgents in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and to hook them up to Chinese support before 1971 when the Hill Tracts ceased being part of Pakistan (Raman 2008: 7–8, 85). However, there were periods after 1971 when there was Bangladeshi support for insurgencies inside India—something the ISI encouraged Bangladesh to do.
could defeat a power as mighty as the Soviet Union, they could defeat an adversary as weak as India. This analysis in Srinagar and Islamabad helped set the scene for the tragic escalation of armed struggle in J&K in the years after the rigged 1987 state election. There were two main strands to the lessons the Pakistani strategic elite drew from Afghanistan. The first imaginary was that, with the right kinds of support, irregulars could bleed a superpower ‘at relatively little cost to its patron-state’ (Swami 2006: 145). Second:

'The proxy war could be calibrated to a point where it was not worth the while of an adversary to punish the sponsor-state by going to war. ‘The water in Afghanistan,’ [Pakistani president] Zia-ul-haq had told his spymaster in December 1979, ‘must boil at the right temperature’. Could the water be heated up to a similar point elsewhere as well?' (Swami 2006: 145)

The cascade mechanism here is emulation or modelling (Proposition 2). Saudi, CIA and ISI funders were ‘model mercenaries’. Osama bin Laden was an example of a ‘model missionary’, with madrassas as the mission schools where the model was taught. Jihadi groups that experimented with one insurgency and terror tactic after another were ‘model mongers’. This is an example of diffusion and modelling in global politics (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Rogers 1983; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Simmons et al. 2007)—that is, an example of the power of humanly articulated futures formulated from reflection on the past enactments of others.

For Praveen Swami (2006: 172), Pakistan’s covert wars against India in the late 1980s and 1990s were a ‘nuclear jihad’, in the sense that they would not have been possible without Pakistan’s rudimentary nuclear weapon capability being an open secret. Swami believes India would have gone to war against Pakistan to end the bloody escalation of its Punjab war of 1988–89, especially when it was combined with the evolution of a similar escalation in Srinagar. What pulled India back from the brink

32 This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that inside Punjab the Indian security state was willing to mobilise massively to ensure that ‘deterrence effects exceeded defiance effects’ (Proposition 1). Proposition 10 of our theory was not in play in Punjab. That is, the strategic interests of India in suppressing the separatist uprising in Punjab were so profound that there was never any prospect of the Punjab insurgency escalating to the point where the Indian state would conclude that the costs of continuing to suppress the cascading violence could exceed the benefits of winning the civil war (see Brass 1988; Jeffrey 2013). Ganguly and Bajpai (1994: 411) refer to this approach as ‘doing a Punjab’. Mathur (2011: 3) sees Punjab as a case of counterinsurgency success by a government staying the course by projecting ‘an aura of invincibility while retaining a sense of solidarity with the local population’. It was also assisted by sufficiently sealing the Pakistan–India border against external support flowing into Punjab so that infiltration into Kashmir became a more effective priority for the ISI.
of a war to end this escalation was fear that a conventional incursion into Pakistan might attract a nuclear response. This period of South Asian history seems consistent with Glenn Snyder’s (1965) stability–instability paradox: fear of escalation against a nuclear adversary secures stability from major attacks while leaving incentives for low-intensity conflicts that respect dangerous thresholds. Pakistan’s aim was a jihad in Kashmir that imposed costs that might bring India to the negotiating table to make concessions without causing all-out war between the two states. The escalation of pressure by Pakistan may have gone closer than was prudent to causing India to declare war in 1990. This ‘nuclear jihad’ was brinksmanship of a deeply dangerous kind. And the ‘bleed India’ strategy failed to lever any concessions on Kashmir.

The nuclear front of the escalation of confrontation was the most worrying for the rest of the world and also for India. Unfortunately, Pakistan became the site of the world’s most rapidly expanding nuclear program at the time of writing and its biggest nuclear terrorism risk—partly because concentrations of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists grew inside its borders and partly because of its tactic of protecting its weapons from pre-emptive strikes by regularly moving them in risky journeys on its roads. Nuclear risks also cascaded because Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan funded his nuclear program in Pakistan by trading knowhow for Libyan cash, by selling weapon-related technologies and likely by trading weapons knowhow for missile knowhow from North Korea and probably Iran as well.

Pakistan’s attacks in 1947, 1965 and 1971 were an excuse for India to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a neighbour with demonstrated hostile intent. In reality, future regional and great power parity with China was India’s reason for becoming a nuclear power. India followed the policy of ‘responsible nuclear powers’ of renouncing first use. When Pakistan justified its acquisition of nuclear weapons with the provocation of Indian nuclear capability, Pakistan, of course, did not renounce first use. Indian nuclear weapons were not intended to deter use of superior Pakistani capabilities. Pakistan’s nukes were intended to deter Indian conventional and nuclear superiority. To do that, Pakistan needed a first-strike deterrent threat. So, India lost out militarily in competition with Pakistan as a result of them both becoming nuclear weapons states. India lost the unchallengeable military superiority over Pakistan that had been apparent in the wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971. The best counter it
can offer to a first-strike threat to many of its cities is the threat that India’s ‘response strike would be a large-scale society-destroying one’ (Koithara 2004: 114)—a terrifying brink both states must act to move back from.

It was the nuclear backstop against a massive conventional invasion of Pakistan that moved Pakistan to chance the folly of the 1999 Kargil War. This was a bellicose cascade from the 1971 war when Kargil was territory lost from Pakistan to India. While Pakistan overplayed its hand in that war, the evidence is clear that India was cautious to ensure that its military and diplomatic riposte to the Kargil incursion was measured rather than overwhelming because of concern over Pakistan’s new nuclear capability and its willingness to indulge first use. Nuclear weapons have therefore played a role in the cascading of violence in South Asia that is utterly different from their role in the Cold War stalemate:

Nuclear weapons were used to compensate for the perceived conventional inferiority of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], but the US was not interested in using military force to upset the status quo in Europe. In South Asia, however, nuclear weapons have helped Pakistan compensate for the conventional superiority of India, and Pakistan has been interested in using military force to upset the status quo. (Ganguly and Wagner 2004: 481)

Pakistan’s ongoing sponsorship of young men from J&K to enter Pakistan for insurgency training and then return as members of Pakistan-controlled cells has caused a different kind of cascade of violence. Kashmiri nationalists with distaste for Pakistan pulling the strings set up jihadi groups that were independent of Pakistan. They organised their own training on the Indian side of the Line of Control. This complemented the normal dynamics of factionalisation in anti-establishment movements. It produced a reality in which there were two dozen significant armed jihadi groups (Sreedhar and Manish 2003) and perhaps a hundred tiny ones. In the early 1990s, the groups that were more independent of Pakistan became militarily more significant than jihad sponsored from Pakistan (a situation that was reversed in the periods before and after the peak 1989–93 phase of the conflict).

From 1991, Pakistani intelligence ceased funding the JKLF because it was more pro-independence than pro-Pakistan. This cleavage induced another counter-cascade that energised competing jihad groups. Pakistan built up a formidable new pro-Pakistan force in the Kashmir Valley, Hizb-ul Mujahideen (discussed earlier), which was linked to the
conservative Islamic party in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Jama’at-i-Islami. The ISI also encouraged zealous Islamic organisations inside Pakistan, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, to join the Kashmir war (Bose 2005: 127). In recent decades, Pakistani state encouragement and funding are no longer essential; jihad has cascaded to the point where it is effectively privatised and globalised in its funding sources.

A response to these cascades of violence was, of course, a cascade of much more deadly state violence—as Swami’s (2006: 175) statistics confirm. This included new tactics of violence such as the ‘crackdown’. A crackdown cordons off a village or neighbourhood thought to include hostile actors. Adult and adolescent males are extracted, leaving women and children in their homes either wondering what is happening to their young men or themselves becoming victims of sexual assault or other forms of violence. In a common form of the crackdown, all the men are walked past several informers sitting in cars. If one of the informers beeps their horn, that is sufficient evidence for targeting a person as a likely jihadist or jihad sympathiser and he is taken away—often never to be seen again.

This awesome, unaccountable power of informers over life and death arose from the fact that Indian security forces did not care if they made a lot of mistakes. They preferred to terrorise the families of jihadists, but if they terrorised the entire civil society of the Kashmir Valley along the way that was fine, too. There was, at least until quite recently, a Kashmiri police policy of giving ‘blood promotions’ to police who kill militants. A senior police officer interviewed in 2012, who was otherwise a progressive ‘hearts and minds’ officer, defended this policy by saying how hard it is to motivate police officers, especially local Kashmiri ones, to be brave in confronting militants. He regarded it as necessary to reward bravery in this way. But he regretted the problem of police manufacturing fake encounters to kill someone and claim a ‘blood promotion’. Fake encounter police murders to secure blood promotions is another to add to our list of types of Kashmiri cascades of violence (Proposition 9: insurgency cascades to state crime).

The military rightly perceived a unity of community support for *azadi* in the Kashmir Valley, though it was a unity partly forged by their state terror. The exceptions to that unity were those Kashmiri Muslims put on the state security payroll. Just as some jihadists defected to careers as organised criminals in the private sector, others defected to organised crime in the public sector by joining the police, sometimes in secret roles, sometimes in senior and strategic roles (Baramian 2012: 3). Kashmiris who feigned support for *azadi* while lining their pockets were everywhere:
Several times I’ve met top, powerful officials who mention there are anywhere between 150,000 and 170,000 people who work as informers at various levels. Some of them do it voluntarily and some are trapped in a situation where they’re compelled to do that. Imagine in a society that is just 7 million, if you have 150,000 informers. (Interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, cited in Baramian 2012: 2)

Other senior journalists we interviewed quoted similar numbers (up to 200,000 and down to 90,000), sourced from their conversations with intelligence officials. Exaggerating these numbers could be a tactic by those intelligence officials to promote distrust and fragmentation in the resistance. However real or exaggerated they are, they have been real in their consequences in causing fragmentation of valley society:

I suspect him. He suspects me … The military pay people for information. So students who are short of money are tempted to text someone they know in the military with a certain piece of information about someone and ask for money. (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233)

Widespread killing and shunning of suspected informers have been part of the response that has cascaded from Muslim society (Proposition 9: war cascades to crime). State creation of hundreds of NGOs, particularly human rights NGOs, has been another strategy for expanding intelligence networks. This simultaneously secures the objectives of managing the impression of a vibrant democracy, with a vibrant civil society of active human rights NGOs, and the objective of intensifying surveillance.

Ceasefires in the Kashmir Valley, of which there have been many, have generally failed to dampen these cascades of violence. In 1994, after his release from prison, Yaseen Malik declared an indefinite JKLF ceasefire, ‘partly to preserve what remained of the JKLF’s cadre’; yet the security forces seem to have killed hundreds of JKLF members after the unilateral ceasefire (Bose 2005: 130). In some cases, groups of leaders who negotiated ceasefires perished soon after the agreement—some killed by the security forces after they laid down their guns, others killed by competing jihadi groups (or their own) as traitors for laying down their arms. Sadly, the peace processes in Kashmir have mediated the cascading of war to crime (Proposition 9).

As is so common in other conflicts, yet another cascade then arose from the climate of chaos and violence that provided cover for criminal entrepreneurs. Many ‘politically shallow people’ and ‘opportunists’ who joined the freedom fighters formed criminal gangs (Bose 2005: 127).
Others, who were professional criminals to start with—including foreign professional criminals—joined and exploited the anomie to expand their criminal repertoire from nonviolent crime to violent organised criminality. Kashmiris referred to this as the new ‘gun culture’.

In turn, the whole pattern of destabilisation across Kashmir and Punjab caused yet another cascade of violence. In the mid-1980s, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to play the same as Pakistan, inside Pakistan. ‘Gandhi set up two offensive desks in the Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], CIT-“X” and CIT-“J”, both tasked to retaliate against Pakistan’s support of terrorism’ (Swami 2006: 153). Beyond a series of bombings in Lahore and Karachi, little is known about what they actually did. The violence they cascaded back to Pakistan was presumably significant, however, as it resulted in a meeting brokered by Jordan between ISI chief Hamid Gul and his Indian counterpart in India’s RAW, A. K. Verma. At this meeting, India agreed to end reprisal bombings in major Pakistani cities in return for Khalistan groups being restrained from executing attacks in India’s urban centres (Swami 2006: 154). The agreement seems to have been less than perfectly implemented on both sides.

In an earlier round of Indian retaliation for Kashmiri terror, Rajiv’s mother, Indira Gandhi, had been able to inflict a more devastating cascade. Her decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India to East Pakistan in January 1971 was made in response to the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft by JKLF militants.33 It played an important role in enfeebling the capacity of Pakistan to hang on to East Pakistan in the independence war of 1971. Prime minister Indira Gandhi then pressured Sri Lanka to deny Pakistan refuelling facilities, thus restricting Pakistan’s capacity to reinforce and supply its military in the east (Raman 2008: 10). Indian intelligence was also preparing East Pakistani insurgents for the future civil war. Finally, when mass slaughter and mass rape set in as the Pakistani military pre-emptively struck against its enemies in the east (D’Costa 2011), the Indian army went to the aid of the east and crushed the West Pakistani forces, enabling the splitting asunder of Pakistan. Ultimately, therefore, while the moves of Indian intelligence to internally destabilise Pakistan were less persistent in the use of terror than the ISI’s efforts to bleed and destabilise India, it was India’s internal destabilisation work that had more devastating impacts.

33 Swami disagrees with this view and suggests that the flights had been restricted since 1965.
Kashmir and global cascades of peace and terror

During the 2008 US presidential campaign, Barack Obama gave speeches that identified resolution of the Kashmir crisis as a key to peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By the time Obama appointed diplomat Richard Holbrooke to broker peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in January 2009, frenetic lobbying by India had excised the words India and Kashmir from his portfolio. Regional experts such as veteran CIA officer Bruce Reidel (2008) had for some time been arguing that peace could not be secured in Afghanistan without a resolution in Kashmir. One reason is that Pakistan’s regional strategic thinking is utterly infused with fear of encirclement by India, particularly in Kashmir, on one side, and an Afghanistan under Indian influence on the other, after the United States withdraws. Pakistan wants Afghanistan to deliver ‘strategic depth’—a buffer zone, a place to retreat to in the case of an Indian invasion of Pakistan.

Peer and Polakow-Suransky (2010) argued that back-channel talks, rather than overtly pushing India on Kashmir, can move India towards incremental steps for a Kashmir resolution. They contend that back-channel talks came close in 2007 to securing a mostly autonomous Kashmir with demilitarisation and a softening of the existing borders between India and Pakistan. These talks were derailed when president Musharraf was ousted in August 2008—and more so after the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008. Cynics see this as a story about cascades of militarisation in Pakistan, as the Pakistani military refusing to give up one of its cards (Pashtun proxies), which gives political relevance to the military as the only guarantor against the risk of terror-led disintegration.

Jonathan Tepperman (2010) also believes ‘the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir’ and that there are levers available to engage India with a Kashmir peace process. He quotes Sumit Ganguly as suggesting that if a permanent seat on the UN Security Council could be dangled in front on India, it ‘would roll over on any issue’. Robert Fisk (then Middle East Bureau Chief for the Independent) argued that ‘[m]any of the Taliban come from Kashmir, and the Pakistan military and the ISI have boosted their support for the Taliban because they believe the Indians are backing Karzai. By allowing India to control the fate of Kashmir, we have not only helped Pakistan to disintegrate, but ensured that Pakistan forces will help the Taliban, and the war will continue in Afghanistan’ (Fisk, quoted in Haqqi 2012: 1). Ahmed Rashid (2010a) argues that the ISI’s decision to allow Afghan and Central Asian terrorist groups to operate from Pakistani soil for decades has radicalised Pakistani Pashtun tribes, who are linking up with militant jihadists in Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces with the aim of overthrowing the Pakistani state. Surprisingly, the ISI for decades remained optimistic that it could control them while retaining them as a proxy force for a final settlement in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban are still sufficiently out of control at the time of writing (see Chapter 6) that many ISI analysts today have doubts about this.
We discuss this further in the next two chapters. This widely held thesis is that the whole region, including Afghanistan, will continue to be wracked with war until India and Pakistan negotiate a Kashmir peace rather than negotiate by proxy war. Unfortunately, there are still elements of the ISI who lean towards proxy war at the time of writing.

Teresita and Howard Schaffer (2011: 2) take the thesis a step further by proposing a grand bargain, initially between Pakistan and the United States, but eventually involving India:

> [G]ive Pakistan what it wants in Afghanistan—but on two conditions: Pakistan assumes responsibility for preventing terrorism out of Afghanistan, and Pakistan agrees to settle Kashmir along present geographic lines.

Given the imperative for Afghanistan to lead its own peace, ‘giving Pakistan what it wants in Afghanistan’ hardly seems a promising formula. Moreover, we argue later that any kind of Kashmir settlement that involves only negotiations among states without engaging Kashmiri civil society is also certain to fail. This is not the only reason that a grand bargain of the sort the Schaffers propose is not appealing. We must be cautious about the tendency, ‘almost a reflex—among foreign-policy thinkers to advocate for grand bargains’ (Greenberg and Radin 2012). Greenberg and Radin argue that American strategists are particularly susceptible to US leadership reaching for:

the seductive, completionist idea of the grand bargain—gathering all concerned players around a table, putting every contested issue in the pot and coming up with a comprehensive agreement that pretty much settles everything. The implication is that the parties in the conflict could not or would not have come up with such a fine solution on their own and that an overarching solution is preferable to incremental negotiation. (Greenberg and Radin 2012: 1)

Grand bargains can short-circuit processes that might build confidence with an end run by diplomats of major powers. Nevertheless, grand bargains that are cooked slowly from below by local parties—a ‘slow-food’ approach to peacebuilding (Boege 2006)—with support from major powers, are possible. Indeed, where all confidence in confidence-building has collapsed—as seems the case with the collapse of the politics of hope in 2003–07—a grand bargain cooked from below may be a viable remaining strategy. Our hypothesis here is not that grand bargains are a better strategy than confidence-building. Quite the reverse.
When confidence-building has been tried again and again and failed to the point of hopelessness, then, if a grand bargain is possible, top down and bottom up, it becomes an alternative strategy.

In the case of Kashmir, there have been approximately 150 failed dialogues between India and Pakistan. Consider the sequence of peacebuilding failure and success that we saw in Aceh in Indonesia: repeated failure of confidence-building because of a history of bad faith, followed by a successful grand bargain negotiated as ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: Ch. 6). The more decades a militarised conflict has been cascading multiple forms of violence, the harder it is for incremental confidence-building to earn trust and the more appealing becomes the search for a breakthrough grand bargain. On the other hand, there is still a long list of confidence-building measures that have been advocated by local civil society, human rights groups and international think tanks such as the International Crisis Group (ICG 2004) that have never been attempted.

The complex challenges of a slow-food approach to a grand bargain would probably need deep and long Track II diplomacy before the principals began to contemplate grand bargaining. Yet, where that could be accomplished, the idea of a grand bargain is attuned to the challenges of how to respond to regional cascades of violence. Where one conflict has cascaded into causation of another and another, a grand bargain that encompasses all of them has a comprehensiveness advantage compared with any one solution on its own—a singular solution that could be unravelled by the very causes of the other two that brought the conflict into existence in the first place. One party to a grand bargain can promise to eliminate the root causes of someone else’s conflict in return for another party removing the proximate causes of its conflict. A grand bargain is also a way of responding to diplomatic apathy that says the world has learnt to live with Kashmir and does not care enough to take diplomatic risks for it. The answer of the grand bargain theorists is that the conflict is not just about Kashmir, it is also about Afghanistan, Pakistan, 9/11, Bali, Mumbai and Paris. While we see no specific grand bargain proposals of promise on the horizon for Kashmir, we are attracted to the form of a grand bargain constructed from below as a path well suited to the challenge of cascades of violence, and particularly well suited to cascades that incremental confidence-building has failed repeatedly to stem.
Occupation by democracy

Outside of Srinagar, for those living in the *qasha* [old part of the city] and the small town, the real face of power was clearer, and usually sign-posted in the middle of the main street. ‘Town Commander’, the modest tin boards said. Lettered in just below, the name and phone number of a major of the Indian Army. (Kak 2011b: 34)

As armed insurgency began to decline, Kashmiri civil society returned to nonviolent struggle for a plebiscite. Indian militarism and Pakistan’s infiltration have, to a considerable degree, been managed by both states because of the serious repercussions of a full-scale war: India had been deterred from attacking training camps and insurgent strongholds in Pakistan by fear of escalation to a nuclear war and Pakistan lobbied with US policymakers to intervene by arguing that resolving the Kashmir dispute is the key to South Asia’s nuclear disarmament (Chadha 2005; Khan 2010).

One of the important factors is long-term reduction in the risk of conventional and nuclear war in a region of the world increasingly important for global trade and development and for the confidence of stock markets. Few other parts of the world have suffered four interstate conflicts—with numbers of battle deaths that define them as wars—in the back half of the twentieth century, combined with countless minor incidents of cross-border incursions of troops, cross-border artillery exchanges, many of them massive barrages, and aircraft shot down. A fifth, more complex war raged from 1990 as a civil war inside Kashmir, with state proxies on both sides, for more than a decade into the twenty-first century. It cost several times more lives than the four combined interstate conflicts between the Indian and Pakistani militaries across the Line of Control. In the twenty-first century, it is probably correct to say that no other flashpoint has seen crises in which more than a million troops have massed to square off at an international border, even if full-scale war has been averted so far in this century.

The Pakistani Government continues to support a plebiscite with two options—India or Pakistan—though there have been times when its leaders have suggested openness to an independence option. Pakistan’s support for a plebiscite has at times been more tactical than genuine. Most *azadi* activists in J&K want a plebiscite with three options on the ballot—India, Pakistan or an independent, reunified J&K—with the outcome
to be settled by a simple majority of the joint electorate of Pakistani and Indian citizens of J&K. The Indian Government, however, dismisses any plebiscite as ‘irrelevant, obsolete, and unnecessary’. The standard line of the Indian Foreign Ministry is:

> the question of a plebiscite in any part of India, including Jammu & Kashmir, simply does not arise. The people of Jammu & Kashmir have exercised their democratic rights repeatedly, as have people in other parts of India. (Bose 2005: 166)

Reasonable arguments can be put for the alternative—dialogue among all parties within J&K—in search of a powersharing transitional compromise. All parties might concede that a winner-take-all referendum could be destabilising in that it would leave supporters of minority positions aggrieved. The standard line of the Indian foreign ministry above is not one of those reasonable arguments. This is because there has only been an appearance of the people of J&K ‘exercising their democratic rights repeatedly’. We have seen that elections have mostly been rigged in Indian J&K, with electoral fraud the norm rather than the exception. The state has been ‘ruled by compliant cliques, usually of limited representative character or none, installed at New Delhi’s behest’, with the autonomy once guaranteed by the constitution ‘eroded and virtually destroyed by authoritarian central intervention, operating in collusion with those compliant local elites’ (Bose 2005: 237). State governments understand that their survival depends on the goodwill of New Delhi rather than the goodwill of the people of J&K. The people have been unable to exert legitimate democratic power. The victors in democratic struggles have instead been able to indulge the power of predation, to line their pockets.

The level of contrivance in creating an appearance of democracy is in a sense an impressive feat of central state capacity. New Delhi has ways of reminding J&K politicians, whenever they ponder democratic responsiveness, of the demise of state leaders who defied New Delhi on rare occasions in the past. Democracy’s charade is constructed by carrots more than by sticks. In the 2000s, New Delhi sought to coopt members of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (a coalition of 30 azadi parties formed in 1993) who could be bought. Doubtless it is a little crude to describe their renunciation of independence as being bought, just as it would be crude to so describe the ultimate submission of Sheik Abdullah, his son and grandson as chief ministers. Carrots were mixed in with release from prison and overtures about how much can be achieved for their people from inside the palace. Yet the carrots can be crude if the Indian media is
correct when it reports that Hurriyat defectors were ‘guaranteed electoral victories. At least 17 of the 87 seats in the assembly would be kept aside as “safe seats” for such elements’ (Bose 2005: 239). A democracy elegantly contrived.

Early on, democracy was contrived even more crudely. The first election of 1951 was of Sheikh Abdullah during one of the periods when he was out of prison because he was pliable to New Delhi. His National Conference won every seat in the assembly of 72 seats. Only two seats were contested. The nominations of competing candidates, apart from these two, were simply rejected. By the end of 2002, after widespread and serious allegations of human rights abuses by Indian military and paramilitary forces, the Indian Government was persuaded to organise elections in J&K to form a new government. Nyla Ali Khan (2010: 110) writes about her experience at that time and mentions that the paramilitary forces intimidated and coerced voters in many areas. Nearly 1.5 million citizens who were entitled to vote were not registered, and women mostly did not participate in the electoral process.

Some of the more recent contrivances at the local level have been equally inelegant. As Arundhati Roy (2009: 3) puts it evocatively:

[E]lections have become a finely honed instrument of the military occupation, a sinister playground for India’s deep state. Intelligence agencies have created political parties and decoy politicians, they have constructed and destroyed political careers at will.

Our interviews revealed how the military at times seeks to rig Panchayat elections. They call a targeted leader to visit the military camp regularly. Locals then perceive that village leader as being a useful bridge to the real government power in their area: military power. The military then forces that leader to run for the local election and gives him or her support. Ambitious politicians harness military collaboration for their projects as well. They get the military to arrest a political troublemaker. The troublemaker is tortured. Then the very politician who targeted them makes noisy mock complaints to the military, banging on the door of the military commander, pleading for the release of the troublemaker, who is then in their political debt when released. Released militants cannot get a job. So, pro-India politicians bring them under their wing after they appear to get them released and promise to protect them from more torture and from being disappeared. They then use them as listening posts and to coerce people.
A variant of this method mentioned in another interview was the village party leader paying informers to find out about people’s politics. This information can be used for the local military commander and the party leader to arrest a young person who, on the one hand, is attracted to militancy and, on the other, is attracted to the party leader’s ‘reform’ party. The commander arrests them. The party leader bangs on the commander’s door demanding release and the young person, on release, is turned away from the insurgency and towards electoral politics. In the process, the party leader gains credibility in the village for standing up to the military:

After decades of this step-by-step, one-by-one building of a politics of collusion, collaboration and consent, resistance, they believe, can be undermined … There is an expanding web, [a] matrix of collusion created by these means. (Interview in Srinagar, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

Some join this web of collusion, some go to prison to be tortured, while other young people disengage to a privatised apolitical world of Facebook superficiality. Yet, contemporary Kashmiri resistance politics is about revealing that kind of collusion for the collaboration it is.

An important part of the appearance of democracy in Kashmir is reporting by the Indian public relations machine of high voter turnouts in elections:

State-backed militias take people at gunpoint to the polling booth to get up the turnout percentage and to increase the odds of favoured candidates. Then the state is able to announce her democracy is working. So democracy increases domination. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

Another informant described an incident in 2008 in which the local military commander abducted the wife of the village headman and took her to the military post. She was kept there all night. People assumed she was being raped. The village head banged on the door of the post through the night. In the morning, his wife was released to him. The military commander asked her to say if anyone had harmed her during the night. She said she had not been touched. Then the commander told the village head to put aside his resistance to getting the village vote out for a favoured candidate on election day. If he did not, his wife would be picked up again and, this time, his men would rape her all night— democracy increasing domination again.
New Delhi preaches democracy, but on the ground practices occupation … Control is routed through democratic practices … Disempowerment through democracy. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101209)

A senior bureaucrat said that, in some situations:

[the] village votes partly to protect the headman … The military is generally not bothered by who wins. They are only interested in the show of it. The army is in power regardless of which party governs. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101229)

Our Kashmiri informants reported annoyance at the way Western diplomats praise India for the high voter turnout in recent J&K elections. Indian power has always prevented international election monitors or the UN mission from monitoring elections in J&K. That said, a former senior Indian defence official argued that rewards by the military are more important than force in getting villagers out to vote: ‘I don’t have a responsibility to give you medical care or repair your roads and don’t come asking me to do that if you don’t get out and vote’ (Interview in New Delhi, 2012, No. 101208). There is a systematic policy of rewarding villages that are subservient to the appearance of Indian democracy with the bribe of development assistance. One informant spoke of the state intelligence strategy at the time of the 2008 protests as using families, in part, as a barometer of public sentiment. They estimated that, as of 2008, there were only 160 families in the Kashmir Valley who benefited from India, and, while they were powerful families, this was not enough to control the valley. The objective was to double this number of families in 10 years and rely on them to spread the Indian state’s narrative.

The people of J&K have been denied a politics of hope that they might be heard. Being denied elections that fit the definition of that term is just one dimension of denial of voice. Denial of listening by the international community is another. Denial of justice is another. Independence of the judiciary is one of India’s democratic strengths, yet the executive often simply ignores court orders in J&K. Moreover, in the Kashmir Valley, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA) and the Public Safety Act 1978 (PSA) cut the rule of law from normal democratic operation. The AFSPA grants the security sector sweeping powers to arrest, kill on suspicion and search and destroy property suspected of belonging to insurgents. The PSA allowed detention for up to two years without trial and without charges being laid. Reduction of this period from two years to one in response to international human rights critics in 2011 has not
made much difference, as those released after one year are immediately charged with something else as soon as they leave the police station—sometimes with this recurring three or more times.

For me, both as a journalist and a Kashmiri, Kashmir is nothing more than a huge, huge jail today, where no rules apply, where every rule applies, where the only objectives of the state are to control the people. (Interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, cited in Baramian 2012: 5)

Law is a façade that helps create the illusion of democracy. Democracy is a tool to crush us and so is law. (Interview with Kashmiri law professor, 2012, No. 101241)

The awful irony here is that the sheer frequency of atrocity shortens the media’s attention cycle for each atrocity, leading to ‘atrocity fatigue’. A fresh, vivid crime against humanity will be more newsworthy than a stale one, though it too will occupy only a short new window of media attention. The consequence is that announcing a ‘full and painstaking’ inquiry that runs for a long time (and never produces a public report) works in cooling community outrage. Arundhati Roy (2009: 2) finds this to be a more general phenomenon of checks and balances in Indian democracy being corrupted into covering for one another, instead of checking on each other:

‘The hoary institutions of Indian democracy—the judiciary, the police, the ‘free’ press, and, of course, elections—far from working as a system of checks and balances, quite often do the opposite. They provide each other cover to promote the larger interests of Union and Progress. In the process, they generate such confusion, such a cacophony, that voices raised in warning just become part of the noise. And that only helps to enhance the image of the tolerant, lumbering, colorful, somewhat chaotic democracy.

Democracy has not only been marginalised in Kashmir, but also criminalised:

So many things become sedition. Telling the truth is sedition. Genuine democratic politics is a crime … The policy is to criminalise all forms of dissent. And to reward coopted participation and to encourage the private sphere. To divide and conquer and fragment. (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101210)
This journalist went on to argue that speaking truth is a criminal act, is criminalised, even when speaking the truth of the obligations that UN resolutions impose on India.

Freedom of movement is also a facade in Kashmir. Even Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus) complain of this tyranny:

> We have seen the worst face of Indian democracy for the last 60 years because of certain politicians here. I have never seen the soft face of Indian democracy. Why am I asked to show my ID when I am a staunch Indian, when I am wearing my red thread? (Interview with Kashmiri Pandit leader, 2012, No. 101247)

Voice through freedom of the press is another strength of Indian democracy. It has not been shut down in J&K. It has been watered down, wilfully diluted, awash with fake news filtered through the deep state. In fact, there were six or seven dozen daily newspapers in Kashmir during our 2012 fieldwork! Only occasionally are they shut by the state. The government is their largest advertiser. This encourages great confusion and a cacophony of media voices that engender a politics of complexity. It is a puzzlement politics of citizens not knowing what to believe from this chaos of voices. On the account of several journalists we interviewed, it is a kind of intentional construction of anomie (Proposition 7) (and hopefully normless paralysis of analysis) by overloading democracy with plurality of political and religious thought:

> Human rights groups and academics [which are often funded generously by the state] are part of the security grid. Their job is to produce understated reports that render abuse and tyranny uncertain and debatable. They also play into the strategy of complicating things by saying Ladakh is Buddhist and Jammu is Hindu [when the Muslim populations of these areas are large]. (Interview, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101209)

Yet, Kashmiri journalists who step too far over certain lines are warned, threatened, fired, beaten, shot at and occasionally killed. ‘If you want to work objectively, there is no safety for your life. Do you want to live with your family or be objective’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101213). Mostly, journalists receive a warning shot first—simply a call from the military to say they did not like a story. The response escalates if robust reporting continues. In one case, the boss of a journalist said: ‘We got a call from the military to say you are becoming a nuisance.
People are talking about bumping you off’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101209). Those who write desired stories reap financial rewards from the state:

The press as a whole has developed a kind of organic relationship with the state … They don’t always take money … The police and intelligence push for certain journalists to be placed in media organisations. (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233)

The government has a rating system for journalists: ‘If you are category one, every phone call is tapped’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101213).

When journalists submit stories of torture and state brutality in Kashmir to the national media, editors ‘tend to say this is boring’. The military wants torture and killing to be vivid, as when they attached a bomb to the body of a person who lodged a criminal complaint against the military and blew him to pieces in a place where many locals witnessed the horror (see Hernawan 2013), thus receiving a lesson about the folly of lodging complaints against the military. But they want the terror to be narrowcast to a local audience, not broadcast. Narrowcasting of this kind is not easy to manage. One reason is that the military sometimes feeds stories to the media about abuses by adversaries in the police, and vice versa. Both use militias to do much of the killing that they wish to see done in a public way. The risks of narrowcasting being broadcast were realised in one case in 2009 where 11 boys, detained for participating in demonstrations, were humiliated through the filming of their forced sodomy of each other. This story was broadcast and a responsible officer was prosecuted and executed as a result. Another instance—of a detained man having his feet cut off and being forced to eat flesh from his feet, thighs and other parts of his body—found its way into a human rights documentary.

A symbiotic relationship between the media and the state is secured by issuing local television licences to business supporters of pro-India parties. Government officials are also located in media offices to check the front page and ensure that a terrorism narrative, or a ‘Pakistani stooge’ imaginary, is used to describe any armed action. As with managing the appearance of electoral democracy, so the appearance of a free press is managed. Journalism that is extravagant in its radicalism is okay because ‘rhetoric is allowed, substance is not allowed’ (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233). An example of forbidden substance is outlining how the security establishment controls Kashmir. The journalist explained that one of his senior colleagues had obtained a copy of the standard operating
procedures for the security forces in managing protests: one was to ‘keep the press away from protestors’. Part of this media strategy is to drown out the minority who persist with moderately robust journalism in the face of these sticks and carrots. Srinagar has had more newspaper and television outlets than any city these authors have experienced.

Facebook is managed but only infrequently shut down when the security forces are losing control of the streets. Part of managing the impression of freedom and democracy is to cultivate Facebook and Twitter to overwhelm the internet with ‘frivolous stuff’, which allows politically extravagant and inflammatory content, but suppresses politically serious and politically dangerous communication. Those responsible for the latter can be visited and threatened, arrested or can disappear. At times of crisis for the state, all texting, the internet, Facebook and other social media are shut down. But the normal micro-regulation is to allow use of Facebook—even to allow someone to say something politically disapproved by the state—but to then organise ‘40 or 50 people to attack him in the alternative space’ (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233) to discredit and ridicule the politically disapproved idea and the politically disapproved person. ‘Nothing happens by default here’, this journalist continued. Likewise, if a journalist writes a truth about the security services, 10 other journalists can be enrolled by the military to question the veracity of the story and discredit the journalist. In 2016, Kashmiri human rights activists were complaining about Facebook taking down their content documenting security sector abuses. Facebook issued a statement explaining its actions in these terms: ‘There is no place on Facebook for content that praises or supports terrorists, terrorist organisations or terrorism’ (Geelani 2016). There is an important warning from Kashmir here. Facebook self-regulation that crushes nonviolent Muslim cries for freedom from oppression, that silences pleas for respect of their human rights, can be coopted to a fabric of ‘unfreedom’ that causes young Muslims to see violent jihad as the only path left open to them.

**Domination by democracy**

Domination by rule of law complements domination by democracy. Institutions inspired by the aspiration to control domination have been coopted to an insidious craft of domination. We challenged one Kashmiri leader with the fact that J&K chief minister Omar Abdullah repeatedly and publicly expressed his commitment to abolishing the AFSPA:
It’s a game. He presents himself to the people as a moderate wing of the resistance. But he is in the game with the state that the state controls and he well understands the rules and limits of the game and the appearances he must create to survive politically. He must be seen to be resisting martial law while actually being part of the state apparatus that preserves it. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

The security forces are effectively empowered by the state to remove or kill off the voices they do not wish to be heard. A prime way that the appearance of rule of law is kept up is by the ritualism of calling inquiries into atrocities:

The ‘democratically elected’ governments since 1996 have ordered scores of probes into human rights violations. During Farooq Abdullah’s rule (from 1996 to 2002) at least 40 inquiries were instituted into custodial killings, disappearances, rapes, and other rights abuses by the armed forces. The People’s Democratic Party-led coalition government ordered 28 from 2005; in the governor’s rule (from June 2008 to December 2008), six probes were ordered; the ruling National Conference–Congress coalition has announced 14 probes since January this year. Ordering a probe into rights abuses has become the customary ritual of the authoritarian democracy in the state. The emphasis is on the announcement of the probe. Time takes care of public resentment, which fizzles out with each passing day, and a fresh killing or rape necessitates another probe. (Yasir 2015)

It is clear, then, from our narrative that state violence cascaded into escalated insurgent violence and to other forms of violence as well. It is equally clear that the escalation of state tyranny in the 1990s ultimately succeeded in suppressing a mass insurgency. Tyranny worked up to a point. But not totally, as there are still jihadists who occasionally prick India and make it bleed. More fundamentally, enhanced rather than diminished nonviolent resistance capability was the legacy of the tyranny. India’s folly has been to think that time is on its side in Kashmir, that with time and unwavering military resolve it could mostly crush the armed struggle. This is true. With time, it could consolidate the Line of Control as an international border and cause Pakistan to give up the project of taking back Kashmir by military means. India’s error was in failing to see that, in the decades up to the 1980s, they might have negotiated a peace with Pakistan that included a political settlement on Kashmir that might have been accepted by the great powers, the international community and the people of Kashmir.
Today, there is no prospect that the people of Kashmir would submit to a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan brokered with the great powers. They would effectively resist any agreement in which the people of Kashmir—its entire political spectrum—are not full negotiating partners. Large sections of the international community and many major states would back them in that resistance. By bludgeoning the people of Kashmir, India has terminated the political possibility of a purely bilateral international settlement. At the same time, they have created in Kashmir a people who have more enmity towards India than they ever had in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s or 1970s.

A better long game would have been more like the one India played with the multiple insurgencies in its north-east, with Pakistan's and China's support for those insurgencies. A still better game would have been the way Nehru and Indira Gandhi worked persistently at a preventive political solution to separatism in Tamil Nadu from the 1940s to the 1960s, which prevented insurgency before it took off. The Tamil Nadu population is almost as large as that of Germany and larger than France. Tamil Nadu was too big to ignore and too big to risk subjugating. So New Delhi embraced responsiveness to Tamil Nadu's wishes about having laws written and adjudicated in Tamil and many other matters. Widmalm (2006: 97–108) points out that the situation with the demand for independence for Dravida Nadu was similar to the course of Kashmir in many ways. But the Indian National Congress did not try to corrupt the state electoral process in Tamil Nadu. Because the Congress was able to persuade the leaders and people of Tamil Nadu that their voice could be heard through state politics, they were also persuaded that democratic politics in pursuit of Tamil autonomy inside India could achieve more than appeals to separatism or violence. In contrast, Kashmir was considered a zero-sum contest with Pakistan. Both sides irrationally viewed it as an existential struggle quite unlike other conflicts such as Tamil Nadu. Indira Gandhi had a revealing exchange with Tariq Ali that reflects how this was true on both sides:

Meanwhile her ‘sources’ had informed her that Pakistan was preparing a military invasion of Kashmir. Could this be so? I doubted it. General Zia-ul-Haq was brutal and vicious, but he wasn’t an idiot. He knew that to provoke India would be fatal. In addition, the Pakistan army was busy fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. To open a second front in Kashmir would be the height of irrationality.
‘I’m surprised at you,’ Mrs Gandhi said. ‘You of all people believe that generals are rational human beings?’

‘There is a difference between irrationality and suicide,’ I said (a judgment I have since had cause to revise).

She smiled, but didn’t reply. Then, to demonstrate the inadequacy of the military mind, she described how after Pakistan’s surrender in Bangladesh her generals wanted to continue the war against West Pakistan, to ‘finish off the enemy’. She had over-ruled them and ordered a cease-fire. (Ali 2011: 45–6)

Democracy is part of the answer to generals who see nails when they have a hammer. As Indira Gandhi implied, Pakistan has been more adventurist in warmongering than India because India has been more under civilian democratic control. India may have failed to prevent a preventable Punjab insurgency and then prolonged it—as Ahmed (2010) concluded—because its initial military reaction was excessively brutal and insufficiently alert to political solutions. Likewise, there were missed opportunities for political solutions and excessive police brutality that escalated the Assam and Naxalite insurgencies. Yet, overall, moderate civilian voices in Indian democracy have been loud and often effective enough to prevail over crude militarists, as have moderate voices within the military and the police. So India overall has done fairly well with holding its massive complexity together by dialogue in search of political solutions to conflict. Pakistan, in contrast, allowed itself to split in half and has ceded parts of what is left to the tyranny of terror organisations. Kashmir is the greatest exception, where Indian democracy has fared as badly as Pakistan, or worse, at responsive politics.

An important feature of democracy’s domination has been the widespread practice of sexual and reproductive crimes by the security forces in Kashmir (Proposition 9). During our interviews with women activists, we were told about an incident in Kunan Poshpora, which still haunts Kashmiris and fuels the politics of retribution by the resistance movement. On the night of 23 February 1991, 125 soldiers of 4th Rajputana Rifles, of the Army’s 68th Brigade, entered villages in the Kupwara district of Kashmir, separated men from women and raped, sexually tortured and humiliated girls and women aged between 13 and 60.
In 1991, the Indian state—on the basis of an investigation driven with inherent biases, as reported by Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (n.d.)—called the allegations a ‘massive hoax orchestrated by militants and their international allies’. Again, in 2014, during a hearing about the Kunan Poshpora case, the army’s counsel reiterated similar sentiments by describing the statements of victims as stereotyped and ‘like recorded rotten stereo sounds that play rape all over again’ (Pervez 2014).

The case was reopened in 2013—a year in which 70 more cases of sexual violence by the security forces alone were registered. It was a move that was jarring to the military establishment of Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Coalition for Civil Society, a human rights organisation representing the victims, and the ‘We Demand Justice for Kunan Poshpora Survivors’ campaign, which filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in 2012 to reopen and reinvestigate the case, have consistently highlighted how the army has deliberately delayed the process (Pervez 2014).

Kunan Poshpora and numerous other cases of sexual violence and rape by the security forces have made Kashmir’s women wary of men in uniforms. Despite the army’s civilising rhetoric of peacebuilding in J&K in recent years, the ongoing targeting of women makes Kashmiris deeply resentful not only towards the army, but also towards the state it represents.

**Democracy as the problem**

In the 1950s, B. R. Ambedkar—one of India’s most respected reformers, its first law minister and the primary drafter of India’s constitution—warned that democracy in India is ‘only a top dressing on Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic’ (cited by Roy 2015: 1). Indeed, Kashmir is that great failure of Indian democracy and Indian wisdom in finding some sustainable form of azadi that can triumph over militarism (Proposition 8). Arundhati Roy sees Kashmir as the prism through which we can see the epic scale of what is at stake in the modern world. Roy (2009: 2) worries:

> As a writer, a fiction writer, I have often wondered whether the attempt to always be precise, to try and get it all factually right somehow reduces the epic scale of what is really going on.
Perhaps, she wonders, the transformative power and more evocative precision of poetry are better tools:

Something about the cunning, Brahmanical, intricate, bureaucratic, file-bound, ‘apply-through-proper-channels’ nature of governance and subjugation in India seems to have made a clerk out of me. My only excuse is to say that it takes odd tools to uncover the maze of subterfuge and hypocrisy that cloaks the callousness and the cold, calculated violence of the world’s favorite new superpower. Repression ‘through proper channels’ sometimes engenders resistance ‘through proper channels.’ As resistance goes this isn’t enough, I know. But for now, it’s all I have. Perhaps someday it will become the underpinning for poetry and for the feral howl. (Roy 2009: 2)

India is the swing state in the future of capitalist democracy. Gorbachev steered the Soviet Union to devolve briefly into liberal democratic capitalism. Putin now reassembles the old regime as an authoritarian capitalist empire (Thornton and Thornton 2012). China has already pioneered its own form of authoritarian capitalism, which, under the current leadership, is becoming more authoritarian rather than transitioning towards a liberal path. India is the big swing state that will decide whether the more dominant variety of capitalism will be authoritarian capitalism ruled by cabals of cronies, Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism or German/Nordic collaborative social democratic capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Narendra Modi’s ascent to the prime ministership in 2014 would seem to suggest a shift towards Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism. Yet, as a state leader, Modi revealed significant and assertive authoritarianism in responding to the religious other. Economic reform is now used in conflict-prone J&K, north-eastern India and Naxalite regions to depoliticise development and to crack down on the people, especially the poor and minorities. Gujarat, where earlier there was a robust trade union movement, has seen a substantial decline in mobilisation of the working class, job cuts, exploitation of Muslim workers and an increase of Hindu nationalism among Hindu workers.

Authoritarian capitalism is reflexive and ‘develops out of systems of labour control existing prior to the transition to capitalism at the centre and its expansion from the centre’ (Foweraker 1981: 192). The landowning class is often the most powerful stakeholder in authoritarian capitalist systems.

35 Somewhat sidelining India’s icon of nonviolence, Gandhi, Modi championed the nineteenth-century Hindu revivalist Swami Vivekanda, who was known for his assertive cultural nationalism.
Examples are Russia in the nineteenth century and Brazil and much of Latin America after their independence. Labour is very strictly controlled and managed in such a system. William and Songok Han Thornton (2012) argue that authoritarian capitalism has been shaping up as the winner in India since 2008. One reason, they argue, that India misses a lot of investment that goes to China is that Western corporations are attracted not only to the dynamism of Chinese growth and productive capability (India has that, too), but also to the fact that they will not have to worry about strikes in China or Chinese media exposés of their labour or environmental practices. Once the deal is done with the right Chinese Communist Party officials, they will manage the red tape. Courts do not overrule party officials in ways that can happen in democratic India.

In the pushback from liberal capitalism in its heartland, we see the opposite side of this coin with US President Donald Trump and far-right European politicians. They have a will to crush trade unions, minimum wages and regulation of labour rights as part of their authoritarian policy package for forcing jobs back to the United States and Europe, respectively.

There are arguments that run the other way. Democratic capitalism may be more sustainable, more responsive and more innovative as societies move from industrial to post-industrial wealth creation. Manuel Castells (1996) points out that the Soviet Union had much stronger growth than the United States and the rest of the capitalist world during the era of industrial capitalism. Moscow and St Petersburg could build better subways than New York and London; Russia could crank out tanks, MIGs and AK-47s with exceptional efficiency. It was when information capitalism first arrived during the 1970s that Moscow could not cut it at the networked governance of innovation. India was initially better positioned than China to become an innovative information economy, though Chinese opening up and investment in the best Chinese universities, which were once far behind Indian universities, and Chinese excellence in industrial espionage have put that in the balance.

There is every hope that India will continue to choose to be an open, democratic, responsive economy in preference to the admitted charms for ruthless corporations of authoritarian capitalism. On the other hand, the hollowing out of Indian democratic institutions discussed in the work of Kohli (1990, 1998) has been happening at the behest of central party
machines. Wilkinson’s (2004: 44–5) Uttar Pradesh data show that the predicted number of deaths in Hindu–Muslim political violence increases by 75 per cent if there was a close race in the previous election in that town.

Many countries that have experienced war and international peacekeeping sign up in a peace agreement to internationally supervised elections. As in Cambodia, these elections are often window dressing for authoritarian control. The DRC is a distressing case of a nation that has conducted post-conflict elections under UN supervision. As we saw in Chapter 2, the way DRC democracy works is that the ruling party of Laurent Kabila sells off the country’s national resources in gold, diamonds, coltan and other minerals to foreign corporations at bargain prices for his party’s and his own enrichment. Some of those riches are paid to local party bosses to coerce and reward people for voting them back at the next election. Authoritarian capitalism with regular elections keeps key players in the West happy enough—the mining companies, the democrats, the peacemakers—and keeps exploitative local party elites even happier. But it crushes their people with a negative peace without justice—the faux democracy of authoritarian capitalism. The peace, the democracy and the crony capitalism are not sustainable for the long term.

Here we have the terrible predicament of the world in which Indian citizens are the swinging voters. China makes no pretence at being democratic. It markets a Beijing consensus as more business friendly and more respectful of the tyranny of other sovereigns than neoliberal capitalism. Singapore represents the more realistic choice for India. Singapore works hard at a charade of liberal democratic politics, while the reality is that only its economy is liberal. Its polity is bubbling with contestation of

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36 Authoritarian capitalism, as Russian elites have discovered, and as Indonesian president Suharto and his Filipino counterpart Ferdinand Marcos discovered, is better for lining the pockets of ruling elites than capitalism with a robust separation of powers. This is why there is a genuine contest between some form of democratic capitalism and authoritarian capitalism for the soul of India. Socialism is now scratched from the race. Sadly, the people-power revolution in the Philippines has reverted to authoritarian capitalism, as have various of the flower revolutions of Eastern Europe. Indonesia could go that way as well, though so far its democracy continues to consolidate, if not without setbacks. Vietnam has consolidated towards authoritarian capitalism, and the semi-democracies surrounding India—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—as we discuss in Chapters 6–9, teeter towards the allure of militarised forms of authoritarian capitalism.

37 One of the attractions that Congolese capitalism shares with Suharto’s crony capitalism in Indonesia, or Putin’s Russian capitalism, is that the group of party officials who need to be bribed is quite narrow compared with the chaotic capitalism before Putin, when so many had to be bribed. So Putin became more electorally popular than his predecessors, just as Suharto was more popular with the people of Indonesia than Sukarno and his more chaotic coalition.
ideas on matters of economic policy, over which different factions of the bureaucracy fight for innovation and ideas. But it is quiescent on the political front. Many Western optimists believe that there is an inevitable transition where the final stop sees authoritarian capitalist states transform into liberal capitalist orders. Now that we have seen the transition go the other way in cases from Russia, China, the United States under Trump and Eastern Europe, even in Poland (which sparked the great rebellion against authoritarian communism) and in the inspiring people-power case of the Philippines, we are no longer so naive about this.

The West is much more unrealistically optimistic about Indian politics than Chinese politics, yet for reasons of the same naive neoliberal evolutionary faith. The fantasy of this faith is that India is just further along the road to liberal democratic capitalism and is progressing at a faster pace. In fact, like Kohli (1990, 1998), we have argued that there are important ways that Indian democratic institutions have headed in the reverse direction since Nehru. Because the West believes whatever fits its master narrative of historical triumph for liberalism, it wants to believe that ‘India Shining’ has restored democracy to Kashmir, has kept its media free, has rebuilt rule of law and has cracked down on the human rights abuses that its security forces foolishly inflicted on the citizens of Kashmir in the past. As one Srinagar journalist lamented to us, ‘even Al Jazeera’ is infatuated with liberal India Shining and is not interested in covering human rights abuses in Kashmir. Kashmir is a worrying case study of democracy’s swing state because it shows how, Singapore style, a charade of democracy can leave India beloved by the West.

The reality of authoritarian Delhi control of a recalcitrant people is barely a blip on the West’s radar. That accomplishment has been more impressive than anything the Chinese Communist Party has managed. Kashmir is more militarised and more brutalised by torture and disappearances than China, with Xinjiang as a clear exception to that. Under India’s supposedly federal democracy, Kashmir’s chief ministers have been more effectively subject to recall by party bosses in New Delhi than Chinese provincial leaders are subject to recall by party leaders in Beijing. The party in control in Delhi has dictated who will win most elections, unless this is too slow for them; on several occasions, they have fired chief ministers and replaced them with governor’s rule, which is direct rule from Delhi.

38 India Shining was a marketing campaign about optimism in the Indian economy promoted by the BJP.
Though there is no pretence of democracy by China, a People’s Liberation Army major could not put up a sign that describes herself as ‘Town Commander’. Of course, such signs do not exist on the roads that tourists travel in Kashmir. Here is the even more remarkable and worrying Indian accomplishment—that the West can still be infatuated with India Shining even after its tourists travel to Kashmir in large numbers. They travel freely about the tourist areas without realising that even local Kashmiris need a permit to visit one-third of J&K. The worry is that elites from many countries are honing their skill sets at coaxing and caressing Western investment with a cloak of democratic contrivance. In Kashmir, this cloak conceals a bloodbath of tyranny with more sophistication than in other Peacebuilding Compared cases.

Until India looks the tyranny that is Kashmir in the eye and fixes it, its democracy will be at risk of cascading authoritarianism. Likewise, it must look honestly at the way many marginalised peoples who turned to the Naxalites have had their forests stolen by corporate mining and forestry interests and local party cronies. These threats to democracy are not contracting. They are happening because of the way Nehru’s successors hollowed out the democratic institutions he and the Indian National Congress struggled to erect. Kashmir is the most hollow democracy of any Indian state. We have argued that it is a place where democracy has been coopted to a project of subjugation. When this happens in India, it matters so much more than when it happens in the DRC, not because the people of Congo matter less, but because no one speaks a democratic imaginary of Shining Congo.

The DRC has been greatly influenced, and greatly bought, by authoritarian Chinese capitalism. Is Kashmir the precursor of a more sophisticated, nuanced and beloved Indian authoritarian capitalism that will come to influence and buy other African states? Or will India forge from the ideals of the Indian National Congress a different path from First-World capitalisms, from communism and from the new authoritarian capitalism of the old Second World? Can Kashmir play a part in that better future? Can Kashmir become that ‘dazzling gem on the snowy bosom of Asia’ of the azadi imaginary in the 1944 J&K National Conference Constitution? We think so, as we argue in our concluding sections. The Asian century can be a century of greater peace and richer democracy than the American Century or the European centuries that preceded it. No country is in a better position than India to lead the world to a better future path of peace, prosperity and democracy. To realise its promise as the great swing
state that can lead the world away from the dangers of authoritarian
capitalism that consumed the world in the 1930s (and could do so again),
India must desist from gaming democracy and return to the authenticity
of commitment to democracy of Gandhi and Nehru.

Democracy as a cause of war

A popular Western narrative is the democratic peace theory: democracies
never go to war against one another (see e.g. Babst 1964, 1972; Doyle
1983; Rummel 1983, summarised in Gleditsch 1992). Part II of this
book is about democratic India and an intermittently democratic Pakistan
and Bangladesh going to war with one another quite a lot. This chapter
has explored the fictions and contrivances of Indian democracy that
count among the deepest sources of grievance in Kashmir. Proposition 8
of our theory (domination recursively cascades to further violence) takes
a particular form in Kashmir, where democratic contrivance has been
a form of domination that has cascaded insurgency.

Paul Collier (2009) is one scholar who has systematically advanced
the empirically grounded thesis that the form democracy has taken in
many impoverished societies has undermined peace. His interpretation
of why this is so is that, in societies such as the DRC, as we illustrated
in Chapter 2, politicians win elections by methods that require them to
misgovern. In particular, to survive, they are required to dismantle the
separation of powers. For Collier, this means that a democracy without
checks and balances conduces to corruption and state criminality of
multifarious forms. This prevents societies from lifting themselves out of
‘the bottom billion’. Societies stuck in the bottom billion of the planet’s
poor suffer recurrent violence. Misgovernance driven by criminalisation
of the state is also a problem for more economically successful societies,
including India, where 34 per cent of the winners of the 2014 elections
had criminal indictments pending against them (Fukuyama 2014: 547).

Following Collier (2009), and following our Kashmir case, we might
consider an alternative cascade hypothesis:

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39 The idea could be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s (1963) essay ‘Perpetual peace’, in which he
elaborated that a republican form of government was essential for perpetual peace. Kant also believed
that, in a system of government in which citizens could vote and determine the political outcomes,
obody would vote to go to war unless their country was under attack.
Electoral democracy cascades peace and crime control when complemented by robust separations of powers; electoral democracy without separations of powers cascades civil wars, coups and criminality.

Part III of this book resumes the debate about this competing hypothesis.

A peace process for Kashmir

India has always been the stronger adversary in the long conflict with Pakistan and Kashmir. Its margin of superiority, especially economically, but also militarily, has grown continuously since 1947. It is well satisfied with having managed at Partition to hang on to a Muslim-majority area that it wanted, and well satisfied with a 1948 ceasefire line that left it with most of the territory, most of the population, the capital city, nearly all of the most productive and resource-rich regions of Kashmir and areas that were strategically important to forward Himalayan defence against China. Ongoing tension is likely when ‘power advantage and satisfaction with the status quo rest with the same party’ (Koithara 2004: 24). The weaker parties—Pakistan and the people of Kashmir—were the ones who wanted a referendum that might unsettle this status quo and who started five wars, countless minor cross-border incursions and recurrently massive nonviolent mobilisations to unsettle it.

Pakistan’s wars have given India an excuse to move towards nuclear parity with China. India has had the view that time is on its side in Kashmir. In time, the United Nations gave up on the idea that Kashmir is a Security Council issue on which anything could be achieved. The Security Council gave up in the 1960s and in 1971. After Pakistan’s worst military defeat by India, in exchange for the return of 93,000 prisoners of war in the Simla agreement of 1974, even Pakistan signed up to resignation that Kashmir would thenceforth be a bilateral issue. Since Simla, UN secretaries-general have privately and even publicly conceded that the UN resolutions of the 1940s and 1950s calling for a plebiscite are now ‘obsolete’. Time consolidates territory captured long ago with the weight of history. Time also consolidates the inertia of the international community that, with good reason, believes in recognising long-established international borders as inviolate, however unjustly drawn, for the sake of stability and war prevention.
India can also look back with satisfaction to the passing with time of a situation in which the United States was its adversary and an ally of its enemy, Pakistan. Today, the United States is more strongly allied to India than to Pakistan, largely because of the way Pakistan has played its security politics. The year 1999 also saw the watershed of the first Pakistan–India war in which China did not back Pakistan and supported US diplomacy for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. Beyond these great powers, India has more diplomatic friends than ever; Pakistan fewer than ever.

A former leading Indian defence official argued that India is more stoic than Western countries. In Kashmir, it has lost five times the number of troops lost by the United States in Afghanistan, but the official said these losses do not attract headlines in Indian papers: ‘Ability to absorb pain delivers power to India’ (Defence interview, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101208). All these arguments seem to converge on the analysis that all India need do is stay the course and pretend to engage in peace chatter now and then, always contriving disengagement before any unsettling of the status quo occurs. Kashmir may have come at a large price for India, but it has blooded India into a much more feared regional military power than the pacific state with a low defence budget in which Nehru believed. With India’s burgeoning GDP, the economic burden of Kashmir is less painful every year.

So, it seems peace hits a realist impasse. Not so in our analysis, in spite of all we have just said. India might cling to all these benefits that time has already delivered as it engages with a future peace process. But India can now move on to securing new benefits. Among these are taking the diplomatic respect it currently enjoys to an even higher plane as a peacemaker. Thereby, it could become a deserving Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. Another is slashing the fiscal burden of a million security sector employees in Kashmir. Another is creating its own region as peaceful; this is a contemporary requirement for a nation to become a great power. Disintegration or humiliation in Pakistan strengthens the hand of militant jihadists in ways that threaten regional peace and India’s security. China matured into this realisation after it settled its savage 29-day border war with Vietnam in 1979, which took tens of thousands of lives. If India wants to be a great power, it must show the regional maturity towards Pakistan that Deng Xiaoping and his successors showed with Vietnam after 1979.

40 The 1979 war between these former allies against the United States was another cascade from the Great Indochina War. China saw the war as necessary because it perceived Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia as part of a Soviet scheme to encircle China with Moscow’s allies (Zhang 2015: Ch. 8).
There is another central strand to the Indian ‘time is on our side’ analysis. With time, the resistance and will to independence inside Kashmir will be worn down and surrender to reality. Yet, this has not happened. Kashmiri opposition to integration within India has been much more widespread and heartfelt since 1987 than it was in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and the first seven years of the 1980s. Young Muslims in the Kashmir Valley today are more ready than ever to sacrifice their lives through nonviolent or violent resistance—through whatever means it takes.

Subjectively, Kashmiris believe they have been discriminated against by the Indian state. Objectively, the people of Kashmir have been denied their rights under international law, denied rights to self-determination through a referendum that was repeatedly reaffirmed by overwhelming UN votes, repeatedly promised by prime minister Nehru in the years before and after Partition and affirmed by India’s signature on the 1948 peace agreement to end the first Kashmir war. Objectively, Kashmiris have suffered six decades of crimes against humanity, including mass murder and mass rape (Khan 2010: 108), detention without trial, disappearances, torture and electoral fraud. The quantitative cross-national evidence is strong on the effects of this kind of domination: state-led discrimination against a people (as opposed to ethnic conflict that is not congealed as state discrimination) is a profound predictor of political instability (Goldstone 2008: 5; Gurr 2000).

The evidence is even stronger that war recurs when there is a combination of: a) state discrimination against a people; with b) long periods of military brutality against them; and with c) the blockage of genuine opportunities for a voice that might resolve grievances (Braithwaite et al. 2010a; Walter 2004). We have shown that Kashmiris have had their voice blocked through the ballot box, through the courts and through peace dialogues in which they were parties whose voices were not heard. Pakistan has not been voiceless in international forums and peace negotiations, but the majority of the people of Kashmir—who want neither Pakistan nor India—have been voiceless. The people of Kashmir have suffered these three conditions in an unusually long-term way. So the structural preconditions for Kashmiris giving up on their resistance are not propitious. Our interview evidence from the ground is that they will not give up. If India wants to avoid the fiscal drain of a million security
personnel in Kashmir\textsuperscript{41} for the next six decades, it had better rethink its ‘time is on our side’ analysis. If it does not like the indignity of cricket matches at which Indian citizens boo the Indian team and cheer India’s adversary,\textsuperscript{42} it had better not schedule any in Kashmir.

We suggest India might take a page from its own history and engage in a genuine political dialogue with the \textit{azadi} parties of Kashmir (along with the pro-India parties) in the way it did with the Dravidian separatists of Tamil Nadu.\textsuperscript{43} That means deep dialogue not just with handpicked elites. The international experience is that ‘autonomy arrangements that are negotiated in a democratic and participatory fashion have a higher rate of success than those which merely end up being inter-elite bargains’ (Ghai 2000: 160)—that is, the slow-food approach to peace, with justice and democracy checked by genuine separation of powers (Boege 2006; Braithwaite et al. 2012). Dravidian identity, like Bengali identity, was no less separate from the Hindi/Hindustan Indian identity than Kashmiri identity. The Indian National Congress did not afflict the Dravidian separatists with decades of torture and disappearances. It did not wipe out families because their son supported Dravidian armed resistance. Far from discriminating against them, India discriminated in favour of Dravidians by, for example, allowing them the privilege of writing their laws and conducting their justice and their education in a Tamil voice. By allowing the Tamil separatist parties to contest elections that were not rigged, India converted them into self-determination and autonomy parties for the relatively autonomous Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Difficult as it would be, if India now wants to build on the gains it has won in Kashmir, the Tamil Nadu path is one it might ponder.

There are some positives in the current peacebuilding context. The people of Kashmir want a peaceful solution and are weary of killing. The diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan was set back in

\textsuperscript{41} One million if we include military, police of various kinds, special police officials and village defence committees.

\textsuperscript{42} It was alleged in our interviews that former West Indies cricket captain Viv Richards said that his team never enjoyed as much support from the crowd in the West Indies as it did in a game at Srinagar. The Srinagar authorities were forced to respond to the problem of the crowd throwing their sandals at Indian cricketers by requiring that spectators leave their sandals at the entrance and watch the game barefooted! In 2014, the Meerut police brought sedition charges against a group of Kashmiri students for supporting Pakistan against India during an Asia Cup match.

\textsuperscript{43} The movement for Dravida Nadu (a wider southern Indian state) was at its height from the 1940s to the 1960s, but, due to fears of Tamil hegemony, it failed to find any support outside Tamil Nadu.
2008 and considerable shooting and displacement of people are occurring at the time of writing, but the diplomatic relationship is better than it was in the twentieth century. The youth of both countries are in favour of India–Pakistan dialogue and reconciliation. Political leaders who grasp that future will have a special place in South Asian history. Across all of Pakistan there is cross-cutting acceptance, including in the military, that Indian military superiority and an utter absence of international support mean Pakistan can never wrest Kashmir from India. The Pakistani political class generally accepts that adventurism in its relationship with India strengthens both the Pakistani military and jihadist groups that are also a threat to Pakistan itself.

While many Pakistani military leaders continue to support retention of its jihad terror card, they have now come to terms with the limits of the ‘bleed India’ strategy and the folly of thinking that India might quit Kashmir in the way the Soviet Union quit Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan can now see the fact that securing regional peace is a step India must take towards becoming a great power, that only Pakistan can deliver India this regional peace and that this is a splendid bargaining chip for Pakistan. There would be great economic benefits for Pakistan in a sustainable regional peace.

The international community, in turn, must reframe its thinking about interests to see that a genuine peace process that is clearly in the interests of Pakistan and the people of Kashmir now might also be reframed to fit the interests of India in the terms just argued. The international community might consider letting go of the glib realism that sees a referendum as being off the table because India is the more powerful party, because India does not want it or because history has proven it a nonviable option. India is not more powerful than concerted US–EU–Chinese–Pakistani–Kashmiri pressure for sustainable peace between Pakistan and India, combined with pressure from a peace movement within Indian civil society. Referendum options that are put back on the table are not necessarily options that will prevail. But unless a referendum is allowed back on the table in some form, as an option legitimated by the integrity of international law, not one of the many spoiling azadi parties on both sides of the Line of Control will come to the table.

Once all the players are at that table, India’s position will be strong. It knows Pakistan will not support independence for Kashmir, that the United States will not want a new Islamic state in Central Asia and
that China is adamantly opposed, believing independence for Kashmir could encourage a Muslim uprising in Xinjiang and independence demands in Tibet (Ganguly 1997: 144). India has many alternatives to independence for Kashmir that it can also table for discussion. It can promise to withdraw half a million troops from Kashmir and reform its police force. It can promise to release all political prisoners. It can establish a Kashmiri-controlled anticorruption commission and a truth and reconciliation commission. A Kashmiri-controlled electoral commission is something Professor Abdul Gani Bhat of the Hurriyat Conference has suggested is critical to the Hurriyat interpretation of ‘self-rule’ (Wani 2011: 142)—‘self-rule’ being the heart of General Musharraf’s earlier ‘enlightened moderation’ formula (Musharraf 2006). India might promise to reinstate all of the autonomy provisions Nehru negotiated with Sheikh Abdullah 60 years ago that it has since wound back. Or it could offer Kashmiris the opportunity to write their own constitution a second time (Ganguly 1997: 149). It might explore the ‘protectorate option’ of Amitabh Mattoo in which the Kashmir Valley would be turned into a protectorate in which India controlled only defense (Ganguly 1997: 144). It could explore what Sumantra Bose (2005: 248–61; 2010: 220) has called a ‘cascading autonomy’ response to cascades of violence, an autonomy within autonomy or a federation within a federation, where Jammu would enjoy much more autonomy within J&K than it does today, and also perhaps Leh and Kargil could enjoy more autonomy.

India can promise international supervision of elections, even UN supervision (as opposed to supervision by Indian electoral institutions), until such time as the legitimately elected J&K parliament votes by a two-thirds majority to reinstate its faith in the rule of Indian electoral law. Instead of agreeing to change the border, after an agreed period of sustained peace, it could agree to make the border irrelevant, porous—dismantling the Gaza-style fence Israel assisted it to build along the length of the Line of Control, allowing visa-free travel across that border, customs-free trade across it and a resumption of traditional Kashmiri trading relationships with Lahore, exploiting the cheaper transport costs of export through Karachi (rather than through Indian ports). India can propose special development assistance to Kashmir that is much cheaper than half a million troops. It could be funded by the tourism and trade benefits a peaceful Kashmir would deliver to India. Through suggesting some package of such things as an alternative to independence, India
could stand tall with an enhanced international reputation if the effect of this was to force Pakistan to promise similar things to Kashmiris on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.

There would be dignity for azadi parties in the Kashmir Valley if their struggle with India allowed them to believe that their sacrifices had led them to secure a greater degree of self-determination for Kashmiris inside Pakistan as well as for themselves.44 Pakistan might back down with dignity from its claim to all of Kashmir if it can say to its people that it has extracted promises of deep autonomy and freedom from oppression for Muslims in Indian Kashmir. Both Pakistan and India could take pride in creating greater freedom for Kashmiris on the opposite sides of the Line of Control, and their electorates might embrace that narrative of peace and freedom. In short, there are rich pluralities of options for Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to craft a peace agreement into a win–win–win contracting space.

The challenge is persuading India to reframe its ‘time is on our side’ analysis to ‘time has been on our side and now we can imagine an even better future, a just and peaceful one’. Indian political will to do that reframing against the resistance of its military hawks, its Hindu radicals and the extremist nationalist elements of its media must come from its own civil society and from the international community. So why should the international community care enough to pressure Shining India, geopolitically potent India, in that way?

Kashmir approaches Palestine as an enduring source of grievance in the Muslim world. Grievances that motivate international terrorism need to be resolved one by one, starting at the top of the list with the oldest, seemingly most intractable conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir. For most of the past quarter-century, Pakistani-administered Kashmir and its region have been a more important and longstanding base for the international export of terrorism than Palestine or any other node of terrorist training. Perhaps no other tinderbox has caused senior officials of the CIA to write analyses that a greater risk of nuclear conflict resides here than existed at the

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44 Azad Kashmir has its own president and prime minister, but, in practice, it has been under the control of Pakistan’s Ministry for Kashmir Affairs, with northern areas under the control of the Force Commander Northern Areas—notwithstanding the 1979 establishment of the elected Northern Areas Council.
time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.\footnote{The very short missile flight time from each country to major cities in the other conduces to greater risk of miscalculation than was seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vice-Admiral Verghese Koithara (2004: 111) finds that ‘as far as continuous real-time monitoring of the opponent’s nuclear delivery systems is concerned, both sides are effectively blind. This places a heavy premium on strategic warning. Relying on strategic warning without corroboration from nuclear specific technical intelligence can lead to miscalculations’. Other Western states have been as concerned as the Americans about regional nuclear and domestic terrorism risks alike. According to Wikileaks, on 18 July 2008, a senior British official told the Americans that ‘stabilising Kashmir is important for the UK’s domestic security reasons’ (L. Puri 2011: 64).} No other nuclear power confrontation has been so characterised by brinksmanship and miscalculation (especially on the Pakistani side) and by regulation of nuclear weapons ill disciplined enough to pose a risk of nuclear terrorism.\footnote{One senior Indian military officer argued that, in the event of diversion of nuclear assets to non-state actors in Pakistan, it would be unwise for India to intervene because of nuclear provocation risks, and therefore: ‘The US must have some plan to take control of advanced nuclear assets [in Pakistan] if they fall into the hands of terrorists’ (Interview in New Delhi, 2012, No. 101205).} Moreover, Pakistan’s nuclear competition has increased the nuclear risks in a diversity of non-proliferation states as worrying as North Korea, Libya and Iran. The only historical precedent of two nuclear powers directly fighting each other was the minor Sino–Soviet border clashes of 1969 that cost fewer than 100 lives and have not recurred. ‘They [Pakistan] say if the Karachi Stock Exchange crashes, we reserve the right to conclude that it is an Indian conspiracy to cause the crash. That’s scary’ (Interview with Indian participant in Track II diplomacy, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101231).

It follows that the international community has betrayed future generations by failing to persistently confront India with these global security facts to coax and caress a Kashmir peace. As Snedden (2012: 247) points out, a creative approach to Kashmiri ownership of a local peace process could transform Kashmir from diabolical obstacle to a bridge for a wider India–Pakistan peace and reconciliation. The international community’s failure has been driven by inertia that India has brilliantly orchestrated. Dazzling as the Indian diplomacy has been in persuading the world that domination is democracy, that the status quo is immovable, this status quo can be moved if the international community persuades India that it will be better off when it moves onwards and upwards from it. Its children will be safer from terror and from fear of nuclear catastrophe. When it calls out the charade of democracy in Kashmir, India’s democracy will be safer from corrosion within, from falling prey to its own spin. Checks and balances that protect democracy are strengthened when they crunch a country’s hardest cases. So, the right thing for the international
community is to lobby for Indian succession to permanent membership of the UN Security Council, conditional on India doing what is in its national interests to do and what international law obliges it to do in Kashmir.

It is not for us or for the international community to say for which of a wide plurality of possible options the political leaders of Kashmir, Pakistan and India should opt. We do not express any view for or against independence. We simply urge a genuine peace process that leads to a deep Kashmir–Pakistan–India peace agreement. The United Nations should move Kashmir back to a central place on its agenda because such an agreement is feasible with international diplomatic imagination. This would prove to Muslim youth globally that the world is serious about grappling with the longstanding humiliations used to justify violent jihad imaginaries. And it would be redemptive of a terrible history of UN failure of the people of Kashmir. The United Nations, the West, India and Pakistan can all humbly seek reconciliation with the suffering of the people of J&K.

Recognising cascades to end them

Let us, then, list 26 different kinds of cascades considered in this chapter.

1. The Partition of India and Pakistan resulted from a variety of deliberate political and violent tactics by the British Raj to divide the minority Muslim community from the Hindu majority in the self-rule movement (Dutta 2012). Religious animosities that were prized open failed to preserve colonial rule, and instead cascaded to violence. This started with the British defeat of the 1857 rebellion, which ‘damaged the syncretic, tolerant, and sophisticated culture and composite Hindu–Muslim Indo–Islamic civilisation that the Mughal court under the last emperor had fostered’ (Dalrymple 2007; see also Lange and Dawson 2009). At Partition, violence was greatest in Punjab, where the Raj, during and after the mutiny, concentrated its recruitment of ‘martial races’ as mercenaries to be set against the ethnic other (Proposition 3).

2. As Partition approached in 1947, communities became fearful about where India would end and Pakistan would begin. That fear became a resource for violence entrepreneurs who mobilised around it to attack, rape, murder and drive out the religious other (Proposition 3).
3. A contagion of communal violence occurred as violence entrepreneurs in one part of the country emulated the scripts learnt in other parts of greater India (Proposition 2).

4. This contagion made many communities feel they were in a security dilemma: if we do not drive them out to create the fact on the ground that our district is dominated by our religious group, the religious other will soon drive us out (Proposition 5).

5. Muslim refugees cascading from India to Pakistan, and Hindus from Pakistan to India, travelled long distances to areas where they became the ethnic other. Refugee camps created hardships, and food and land shortages for locals in many districts where refugees settled. This resulted in cascades of ethnic violence, sometimes years or decades later, between refugee communities and the local ethnic group (Proposition 6). The worst example was the case of the Biharis who migrated to East Pakistan in 1947, where they suffered marginalisation. During the civil war of 1971, Biharis worked with the Pakistani army to slaughter thousands of Bengalis against whom they had local grievances. In turn, Bengalis slaughtered thousands of Biharis inside Bangladesh when they won the upper hand.

6. Leaders in the Kashmir Valley campaigned successfully to resist this cascade in 1947. But in Jammu, where Muslim and Hindu numbers were more equal, mass slaughter of Hindus by Muslims and of Muslims by Hindus cascaded, leaving most districts of Jammu overwhelmingly Hindu, with some surviving Muslim enclaves.

7. Pakistan sent irregulars (Pashtun tribesmen) led by military officers initially to areas where fellow Muslims were being driven out of Jammu, particularly Poonch and Rajouri. They recruited local mujahidin for an uprising to take all of J&K for Pakistan. They marched on Srinagar, defeating the maharaja’s army in battle after battle (Proposition 3).

8. This externally accelerated internal insurgency quickly cascaded to a full-scale war between the Pakistani and Indian armies and air forces for more than a year of fighting in 1947–48.

9. This war cascaded to three further Pakistan–India interstate wars across the 1948 Kashmir ceasefire line—in 1965, 1971 and 1999—and countless minor incursions that led to loss of life, artillery exchanges and downing of aircraft, plus crises that nearly led to full-scale wars between India and Pakistan in 1983–84, 1986–87, 1990 (Sidhu 2000) and 2002. The fifth and bloodiest cascade has been the
insurgency within Indian-administered Kashmir from 1990 to the present. While it was a civil war, when the local insurgency faltered, Pakistan sent in new waves of foreign mujahidin from Afghanistan and other parts of Pakistan.

10. Violence in Kashmir cascaded from the Cold War. ‘India and Pakistan could not be in the same Cold War camp’ (Interview with retired Indian general, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101204). Arms, training and diplomatic support were received from the United States, the Soviet Union and China (including nuclear arms in the last case) when belligerents adopted aggressive positions. Great powers repeatedly refused to seize opportunities for peace during the first 40 years of the Kashmir conflict for fear that doing so could offend a vital South Asian Cold War ally.

11. The rapid militarisation of Pakistan (the topic of the next chapter) therefore cascaded to the greatly increased militarisation of India, especially in Kashmir. Obversely, India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons cascaded to Pakistan doing likewise and, in turn, that cascaded nuclear secrets between Pakistan, North Korea, Myanmar, Libya and Iran (Proposition 8).

12. When interstate war was on the boil, internal insurgency in Indian Kashmir was energised (notably in 1965 and 1971, although not very successfully, and in 1988–89 and 1999, more successfully). When internal insurgency was unusually active, interstate military tensions escalated.

13. Pakistan-trained armed insurgency cascaded to the formation of competing local militias that were pro-independence rather than pro-Pakistan. When these local jihadist groups became dominant between 1989 and 1994, Pakistan responded by cascading the creation of new jihadist groups that followed its orders. Fighting flared between these competing groups. More recently, leaders of major insurgency groups have declared themselves for neither Pakistan nor independence but for Al-Qaeda or the caliphate of Islamic State (Safi 2017). The increasingly fragmented insurgency was rife with spoilers who would kill jihadist leaders who participated in ceasefires, negotiations or even talks about talks (Proposition 2).

14. Sponsorship of jihad by the Pakistani state, to energise and communalise jihad inside Kashmir through attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, as well as on Indian security forces, cascaded to privatised
jihad with insurgency increasingly funded by private religious groups in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and diverse Gulf state business benefactors (Siskand 2001).

15. Pakistan decided to destabilise India indirectly when it could not succeed directly in Kashmir by supporting various insurgencies in Punjab and in north-eastern India through the provision of arms, training and safe havens for infiltration from Pakistan. These, in turn, cascaded horizontally from insurgency to insurgency and vertically (as in the Assam insurgency cascading down to the Bodo insurgency, cascading to one Bodo faction fighting another) (Proposition 2). Pakistan also supported some Maoist insurgencies, which were also designed to cascade from state to state (facilitated by the movement of weapons and insurgents across the linked up ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’). The Punjab civil war cost 25,000 lives (Singh 1996), although none of these separatist wars delivered on the intent of contributing to the breakup of India.

16. A cascading of support for separatist insurgency inside Pakistan by India (particularly in East Pakistan and Balochistan) and terrorist bombings in major Pakistani cities organised by Indian intelligence operatives—in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for insurgency inside India—contributed to the splitting asunder of Pakistan with the independence of Bangladesh (Proposition 2). This war cost more than 1 million lives and the mass rape of hundreds of thousands. It also contributed to Pakistan’s current instability.

17. Chapter 6 argues that the humiliation of Pakistan’s military defeat in Bangladesh motivated a restoration of Pakistan’s martial dignity by all-out war in Balochistan during the 1970s (this lays one foundation for revision of Proposition 8 to 8(a) in Part III).

18. Some of the more than 100 Kashmiri jihad groups mutated into organised criminal gangs (Proposition 9). Others defected to become ‘renegade’ militias in the pay of the Indian deep state, who killed people India did not like and civilians the ‘renegades’ did not like, and who raped ruthlessly (Proposition 9).

19. By far the most deadly escalation was of internal Indian state violence, though there was also some Pakistani military violence against Kashmiri elements inside Pakistan who did not submit to the ISI’s orders. Indian military violence converted waves of Kashmiri families to support for the azadi jihad. In turn, as the jihad grew from 1987, Indian military violence ratcheted up further in response, with
security force deployment doubling from the level of the 1980s, then doubling again by the mid-1990s and doubling again in response to subsequent surges (Proposition 8).

20. Another cascade of this sort was in the recruitment of informers in the pay of the Indian security services. This, in turn, cascaded to assassinations of those alleged informers (Proposition 9).

21. Another insidious cascade was formed by the fake encounters contrived by police who wanted to collect a ‘blood promotion’ by killing an alleged militant who was supposedly resisting arrest (Proposition 9).

22. The atmosphere of anomic violence provided cover for other kinds of revenge killings or for the settling of longstanding property disputes by driving individuals off their land (Proposition 7). Crime rates increased; domestic violence surged. A revenge culture and what Kashmiris called a ‘gun culture’ took hold (Proposition 9). Both civil society and the security forces imbibed this revenge culture. Durkheimian anomie was also associated with a massive spike in self-violence and depression, the levels of which had previously been very low: suicide rates may have soared as much as twenty-six-fold in the Kashmir Valley after the 1989 insurgency (Pandit 2011: 210–13). Suicide and trauma impacts seem to be the worst in rural areas of Kashmir. Adverse mental health impacts that cascade from witnessing atrocity in Kashmir seem to be at least as great—and probably worse—as those from surviving it (DasGupta 2012) (Proposition 7). Ghobarah et al. (2003) show, in cross-national data, that suicides (and homicides) increase after nations experience civil wars and that increased rates of homicide cascade after the war to countries contiguous to the one that has experienced a civil war (Proposition 9).

23. Another statistically minor but politically notable form of crime that has cascaded from these roots of communal violence in South Asia is political assassination. Mohandas Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi—half the leading political figures of India’s first half-century—were killed by assassins. Former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto was shot, probably by the Pakistani Taliban, following the fate of her brothers Murtza (shot by an assassin) and Shahnawaz (poisoned, presumed assassination). Former Pakistani president Musharraf survived several serious assassination attempts by Islamist extremists. His predecessor and successor, Nawaz Sharif, has also survived several assassination attempts. Pakistan’s first prime
minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, *Quaid-i-Millat* (Father of the Nation), in the aftermath of recriminations over the foreign policy mistakes that led to the loss of Kashmir and the conduct of the 1947–48 war with India, was killed by an Afghan assassin’s bullet in 1951. Afghan intelligence, which has not been contradicted by the US Government, concluded that Pakistan’s ISI organised the Haqqani network’s attempt to assassinate Afghan president Hamid Karzai in 2008 (Rubin 2008). In the next two chapters, we argue that the cascades of violence that start in the narrative of this chapter cascaded to the assassination of the first two Bangladeshi leaders. Many state, province and district political leaders, and many judges and prosecutors, have also been assassinated in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan (Proposition 9).

24. The wars in which Pakistan attacked Indian-administered Kashmir gave India an excuse to acquire nuclear weapons. This cascaded to Pakistan doing the same, which cascaded to an internal nuclear terrorism risk inside Pakistan as the country became increasingly unstable.

25. Insurgency in Kashmir predated the creation of the State of Israel and the communist regime in Afghanistan. Scripts such as jihad, martyrdom, stone-pelting and intifada have been transplanted from one insurgency to another in mutually reinforcing narratives of Muslim oppression by imperial powers and religious domination by Hindus, Christians and Jews (Proposition 2). Northern Pakistan became a node of mujahidin training for Kashmir from 1947, later for Afghanistan and finally for a global jihad in which training was acquired for jihad from Indonesia to the United Kingdom and in countless other corners of the world. When the Kashmiri jihad became less energised, struggles in Palestine and Afghanistan re-energised it, as the ham-fisted war on terror created a community of shared fate among all jihadist groups. It was this community of shared fate that enabled the bold imaginary of a global Islamic State.

26. When global jihad spiked, communal violence in India—the starting point of our cascade—also spiked. The killing of dozens of Hindus in Gujarat and the killing of thousands of Muslims in retaliation in Gujarat in 2002 came soon after the 11 September attack on New York. This was the most bloody case of Muslim–Hindu
violence since Partition. This cascade was not limited to India; 2002 was also the peak year for terrorist bombing incidents in the history of Indonesia (at least as far back as the statistical record goes) (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 14).

It is important to stand back to see how long and variegated is this list of ways that violence begets violence. The longevity of the list helps us recognise that the cascading has continued for 70 years. By listing them this way, we also begin to see that one cascade interlocks with a predecessor. It is clear from our narrative that we do not see cascade dynamics as the only dynamics that drive each of these cascades forward. Each cascade is embedded in a web of factors that includes many non-cascade drivers. In addition, we get glimpses in this chapter of how cascades of violence are connected to a related kind of cascade: cascades of militarisation. In the next two chapters, on Pakistan and Bangladesh, we explore in more detail how cascades of militarisation lead to cascades of violence, which lead to further militarisation and to hawkish politics. We come to interpret this as a more general dynamic of cascades of domination and cascades of violence intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement.

Recognising the diversity and persistence of cascade dynamics is a corrective to single-level objectives such as regime change in Iraq, which are then evaluated as successes or failures according to whether that single-level change occurs. We would prefer an evaluation methodology more like this one, which seeks inductively to reveal and follow all that cascades from an initial military response. Another possibility that has been explored is opening out to a methodology that charts where confidence-building peacemaking has failed. This invites exploration of contexts in which grand bargains might be considered.

India Shining or shaking?

On balance, India has a good record of democracy-building and peacebuilding. A persistent disaster such as Kashmir must be balanced against larger triumphs such as the peaceful and democratic integration of Tamil Nadu into India. It should be balanced against many insurgencies in the north-east of the country that were managed with excessive force at

47 Some have emphasised that this incident was a pogrom and not a communal riot, as Muslims were particularly targeted.
first, but in the end allowed reintegrative, responsive political solutions to trump brutal ones. Yet we also find that India today is a more militarised state than it was during Nehru’s long rule. Kashmir is an important reason for this (Proposition 8). We also find merit in Kohli’s (1990, 1998) analysis that institutional checks and capacities of Indian democracy have been hollowed out to a degree. Militarised competition with Pakistan has been a contributor to this.

The great contest of global politics today is no longer between socialism and neoliberal capitalism, but between liberal capitalism and the authoritarian models of capitalism in Russia, China and much of Asia that have outperformed liberal capitalism since the financial crash of 2008. This and the fact that India is the large swing state in that contest mean that South Asian wars and terrorism—that push India to more authoritarian, more militarised models of capitalism—are a concern. Step by step, India can continue to struggle against its colonial legacies to become a democratic, peace-loving Permanent Member of the UN Security Council that leads the world towards some kind of contemporarily relevant amalgam of the visions of Gandhi and Nehru for peace with justice, for the suppression of gulami. Liberation from gulami in Kashmir is important enough to be one entry ticket to that future Indian global leadership.

A peaceful institutionalisation of genuine democracy and meaningful self-rule in Kashmir is therefore important not only for more global concerns about nuclear security, for harmony and free trade among Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan and beyond, but also for the future of capitalism and democracy globally. Kashmir is a fissure that continues to transform India Shining to India–Pakistan–Bangladesh shaking towards more authoritarian, militarised futures. Kashmir shows that democracy is no peace potion. Indeed, it shows that elections can be a profound threat to peace. Democratic forms and appearances can be captured by the darkest tyrannies and the most brutal violence. Yet, those J&K National Conference delegates who gathered in 1944 to draft a constitution for an independent Kashmir seemed to have the political instincts required for peace with justice when they aspired to democracy with azadi that conquers a history of gulami and of domination. Without restoring integrity to democracy in Kashmir, South Asian peace and free trade are a hollow hope. Kashmir is key to Indian leadership that shines freedom globally.
A defining moment in Pakistan occurred with former president Pervez Musharraf’s decisions reversing the country’s pro-Taliban Afghan policies in favour of supporting the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the global war on terror against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Pursuing a pro-Western agenda caused a realignment of Pakistan’s enemies within the country, especially the ultra-conservative factions (Schofield 2011: 623). Scores of analysts have written about Pakistan’s problems of identity, national security and ethnicity, and how these have contributed to its instability (Lodhi 2011; Nawaz 2008; Rashid 2010b, 2012). Due to various conflicts in the region—in particular, in Afghanistan and the internal conflicts in Pakistan—the state has been in turmoil since its creation in 1947. The crises of Pakistani statehood lie in the inherent tension between Pakistan’s deep religiosity and its quest for a secular disposition. In the previous chapter, we saw that the departure of the British was accompanied by riots and violence. This has been analysed by political scientists and historians from the perspective of both religious nationalism and communalism.

In this chapter, we begin with a brief introduction to Partition and then move on to the current conflict narratives of Pakistan. National policies—whether or not seemingly neutral in relation to various ethnic groups—are ‘superimposed’ on local settings that may be marked by class, caste, gender and community inequalities (which are mutually constituted rather than additive). Thus, the embedding of discrimination
in local institutions also affects the state apparatus. While the importance of local-level or lower-level state functionaries contributes to the rise of religious politics and various kinds of discrimination, our initial focus is on the impact of religious politics at the national and international levels. In the conclusion to the chapter, we summarise how interstate wars such as those in Kashmir, civil wars in Balochistan and against the Pakistani Taliban are national cleavages that link to local ones. This lays a foundation for the discussion of international–national–local peacebuilding in Part III of the book.

Plate 6.1 Members of the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan protest in Peshawar, Pakistan, against the takeover of Afghanistan by the Taliban, 28 April 1998.

Cascades of violence and identity politics that involve gender, race and minorities are also raised in this chapter. The proliferation of non-state armed groups in Pakistan is a factor in the notable rise in violence over the past four decades. In their analysis of armed militias of South Asia, Laurent Gayer and Christophe Jaffrelot (2009: 3) argue that the privatisation of violence generalises so that militias can operate without any connection with the official public sphere, although ‘they do maintain relations with institutional political forces and even the state—by default or intentionally, depending on the case at hand’. They also suggest that these militias often take part in their own way in state formation. This practice is common in both authoritarian and democratic political systems. Each successive government in Pakistan has used armed militias to achieve short-term objectives. As we discuss later in the chapter, Talibanisation in
Pakistan is just one kind of appropriation of young men by armed militia groups. Cascades of violent radicalisation are manifest in a number of forms, through the Pakistani Taliban, Shia and Sunni extremism and also through the rise of violent urban outfits.

We conducted 92 interviews in Pakistan and held a focus group with 27 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) politicians, civil society actors and senior journalists, including women and minorities, who are often at the bottom of the conflicts in the region.

**Context: Communalism, Islamism and fundamentalism**

Pakistan is like Israel, an ideological state. Take out Judaism from Israel and it will collapse like a house of cards. Take Islam out of Pakistan and make it a secular state; it would collapse.


A dispute between the modernists and the radicals predates the creation of Pakistan (Bennett Jones 2002: 11). Pakistan owes its existence largely to British colonial rule of India, without which it would not have become a sovereign entity in 1947. The growth of Islam was a direct consequence of the Mughal invasion in the third decade of the sixteenth century. The bulk of Indian Muslims were—mostly voluntary—converts from Hinduism (Ali 1983: 16). Akbar (1556–1605), one of the most successful Mughal rulers—and a secularist—established an administrative network for the collection of revenue and a military apparatus for the maintenance of order that were not based on the principle of religious loyalty. However, Aurungzeb (1658–1707), the last of the Mughal monarchs—with an allegiance to orthodox Islam—reintroduced separate taxes for Muslims and Hindus, including the *jizya* tax on non-Muslims. Mughal economic policies were unproductive and based on the extraction of revenues and taxes from a peasantry that obtained nothing in return (Ali 1983: 17). As we saw in the previous chapter, the British encouraged communal politics, both ideologically and through constitutional measures, in India, as part of its politics of divide and rule.

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With the end of World War II, anticolonial nationalism reached its highest peak of intensity in the Indian subcontinent. With the election of the Labour Government of Clement Attlee in the United Kingdom, it was only a matter of time before the British would quit India as a result of demands made by both the Indian National Congress and the All-India Muslim League. But there was a clear rift between the Congress and the Muslim League about the process of independence. The Muslim League strongly maintained that a separate state comprising Muslim-majority areas would serve the interests of Muslims. In March 1947, Lord Louis Mountbatten was sent to India as a new viceroy to arrange the British withdrawal from the country. Meanwhile, the Congress leadership accepted the Muslim League’s demand for the division of India and the creation of two countries on the basis of religion (Jalal 1995; Khilnani 1999).

On 3 June 1947, the UK Government announced the ‘Mountbatten Plan’—a policy statement that recognised the inevitability of the Partition of India. The plan was implemented with the birth of Pakistan on 14 August 1947 under the provisions of the British Indian Independence Act 1947. Pakistan was to comprise five provinces—Punjab, Sindh, North-West Frontier Province, Balochistan and East Pakistan—each with a provincial assembly. But, from its inception, Pakistan was confronted with insurmountable problems that arose from its federalist nature and the relationship of its constituent provinces with the central government (D’Costa 2011).

The Bengal and Punjab Partition riots had distinct characteristics. While both were extremely brutal, the Punjab riots were also quite militarised. The pivotal role of Punjab as the cornerstone of the Raj’s military establishment is well established; in fact, the proportion of Punjabi men in the army far exceeded that of men from any other province (D’Costa 2014). The disruption and upheaval of Partition not only divided communities but also splintered the existing state machinery. During Partition, there were in fact three authorities: the outgoing British regime was handing power over to the two successor states, India and Pakistan. In considering the breakdown of social order during this period (Proposition 7), it is therefore necessary to keep in mind its context. The transfer of power, the division of resources and the general disarray that followed the dismantling of the colonial state were followed in turn by the attempts of the two new states to build up viable alternatives. The responses of the successor states to Partition—especially
with regard to administrative reforms—reveal not only the resilience of the structures inherited by them from the departing colonial state, but also their attempts to consolidate a unified national identity. On the one hand, colonial structures were inherited and modified. On the other hand, political leaders used the rhetoric of nationalism and a common national identity to restore the morale of a people traumatised by the widespread violence that accompanied Partition.

Bolstering the inherited state structures of authority and making them more responsive were difficult tasks. Rival communities that included a large number of demobilised soldiers conducted military-style violence and abduction. This presented an extremely unusual and serious challenge to the authority and legitimacy of the two nascent successor states at the very moment of their birth. Further complications arose because, at the very time these former soldiers were needed by the new states to help control the situation caused by Partition, they were in fact among the aggressors. As former soldiers of the outgoing colonial state, these men participated in the violence and abduction, but, soon after, many of them were reinstated to military life and formed the security apparatuses of India and Pakistan. This is important to understand because revenge and retaliation were key sentiments expressed by Punjabi soldiers during the 1971 Bangladesh war when they vowed to make proper Muslims out of Hindu Bengalis. The 1971 war was an opportunity for them to make things right again.\(^2\) This chapter argues that, when that war failed to make things right, the Balochistan civil war became another push to make things right by restoring the dignity of the Pakistani military and political leadership that were humiliated in the 1971 war.

There is a large body of literature on violence in South Asian societies. Veena Das and Ashis Nandy (1985), for example, attempted to assemble the structure of ideas within which we could understand the movement for violence as generative of society and culture. Loss of signification occurred in periods of anomie when violence could not be contained within any structures of ideas (Proposition 7). The language by which order was created and communicated is easier to comprehend. Loss of signification cannot find a language within which it can be represented. South Asian literature has addressed the deafening silence that accompanied the trauma

\(^2\) Chapter 7 discusses this in detail. Also see D’Costa (2011, 2013).
of being simultaneously the subject, object and instrument of violence.\textsuperscript{3} The stories of Partition—their symbolic significance—provide us with a picture of transition, a progression from normality to nightmare (Das and Nandy 1985). Das and Nandy analyse the opening statement of Saadat Hasan Manto’s 1940 novel \textit{Khol Do (Open It)}, which describes a train journey carrying refugees across the border:

The special train left Amritsar at two in the afternoon, arriving at Mughalpura, Lahore, eight hours later. Many had been killed on the way, a lot more injured and countless lost.

It was at 10 o’clock the next morning Sirajuddin regained consciousness. He was lying on bare ground, surrounded by screaming men, women and children. It did not make sense.

They argue that this is the context in which we must understand that the only people who retain the memory of good and evil are the impersonal witnesses because, for Das and Nandy, the entire society was entangled in a pact of violence. They suggest ‘the victims are not even killed for themselves, for they are merely the medium through which this pact is concretised’ (Das and Nandy 1985: 193). Indeed, during Partition, the normal condemnation of wanton killing, destruction and mass rape was replaced with an unashamed approval of such acts (Proposition 9).

Agarwal (1995) argues that very little attention has been paid to the making of the ‘communal mind-set’ in both its active and its supportive variants. He observes that, more often than not, scholars try to explain communalism only in the context of religion and the socioeconomic causes of anger and frustration. With this kind of simplistic justification, the remedy becomes either broad democratic mobilisation or socioeconomic remedies, with confrontation within the political context of communalism given very low priority. There have, however, been attempts to convince people of the need to be either religiously tolerant or rationally intolerant of a religion. Agarwal (1995: 32) notes that what is usually ignored is the point that ‘[c]ommunalism is essentially a political project, which uses religion not only in an ephemeral or spiritual sense, but as a racial denominator of the political community’. By its own

\textsuperscript{3} Das and Nandy (1985) draw from Rabindranath Tagore’s 1935 novel, \textit{Cār Adhyāya (Four Chapters)}, which narrates the lives of two lovers trapped in a world of revolutionary violence, imperial terror and the politics of resistance. Partition’s unspeakable violence has been depicted in various novels and short stories, such as Khushwant Singh’s \textit{Train to Pakistan} (1956); Saadat Hasan Manto’s \textit{Khol Do (Open It)} (1940), \textit{Thanda Ghosht (Cold Flesh)} (1950) and \textit{Toba Tek Singh} (1955); Bapsi Sidhwa’s \textit{Ice-Candy Man} (1988); and Salman Rushdie’s \textit{Midnight’s Children} (1980).
admission, the primary agenda of communalism is to transform the traditional and religious identity into a modern political one. In this sense, the communal project is as non-religious as any other nation-building project. Therefore, the fundamental conflict is not between religious fanaticism and secularism, but rather between two notions of nationalism itself: authoritarian and democratic. The previous chapter conceived India as the swing state in shifts to authoritarian capitalism. In this chapter, we conceive Pakistan as subsumed with authoritarianism from those first moments of the communal crises of Partition. Pakistan, we will see, was also more successfully capitalist and less socialist than India in the decades immediately after Partition. Islamabad was more drawn to Washington, and New Delhi more to Moscow, from the beginning to the end of the Cold War.

Some noted scholars have explained communalism in terms of a disease in the body politic, although they differ on where it may be located (e.g. Mohanty 1988). But this positioning does not explain the process through which communal ideology is transformed into violent conflict. The misplaced contextualisation of communalism within the confines of religious intolerance and socioeconomic collision leads analysts to observe communal conflicts simply as ‘us verses them’. However, to abettors or collaborators, every communal conflict is actually a battle in an unfinished war, not only between two religious communities but also between two racially defined nations (Agarwal 1995). In this context, whether in wars or identity conflicts, communalism appropriates the collective memory and constructs—if not false, then only partly true—historical narratives to justify its current political performance. This self-image of the community at war becomes crucial in the complex process of the construction of the communal mind-set, with its horrible tales of decimation and marginalisation of rival religious communities and with the performance of rape as a spectacle (Proposition 9).

This discussion of communalism helps us to explain the rise of religious fundamentalism in Pakistan today. Religious movements in Pakistan have undergone two different forms of radicalisation—namely, Islamist and neofundamentalist (Zahab and Roy 2004). Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), the largest Islamist party in Pakistan, was founded by Maulana Maududi in the 1940s and dominated the discourse of political Islam until the 1980s. JI’s active collaboration with the Pakistani army in carrying out genocide in the East Pakistan/Bangladesh war is widely documented (see the proceedings of the International Crimes Tribunal). During that war,
JI employed the discourse of communalism in portraying Hindus as the enemy of a unified Pakistani identity, and provided the justification for the targeted killings of Hindus and the rape of Hindu women and girls in 1971 in the ‘Liberation War’ of Bangladesh. In addition to working closely with the Pakistani army, JI also helped maintain a relationship between the army and Hizb-i-Islami4 in Afghanistan. After the 1980s, JI gradually became an Islamist nationalist party, and has never been included on the terrorism watch list of the US Government. Interestingly, calling the sentencing of alleged war criminals by the Awami League Government of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina ‘state terrorism’, the chairman of the Hurriyat Conference in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Syed Ali Geelani (2015), noted that this process was lacking the element of justice and the decisions were based on political vengeance only. He added:

In this process of injustice, the Bangladesh government has got the full backing of India and they want to silence all those people who can raise their voices against the rising interference of India into the affairs of Bangladesh. The silence of the Pakistan government over the movement against the leaders of the Jama’at-i-Islami Bangladesh is meaningful and the Jama’at people are being punished for the crime that they have committed in 1971 when they opposed the split of Pakistan and when they protested against the interference of India. (Geelani 2015)

The Islamic parties in Pakistan, especially JI, have always managed to organise street demonstrations by successfully mobilising youth. They also strategically groom people to take up future powerful positions. In our conversations with JI senior party cadres, we were told:

In Pakistani student politics, we have strong alliances, and there is personal grooming for the welfare and betterment of the society. We are not involved in mainstream politics but we often take our demands to the streets. Our main focus is to build skills and give students a vision regarding Islam and Pakistan.

Another activist noted: ‘We have given many scholars, politicians, parliamentarians, vice-chancellors and other visionaries to Pakistani society. Ours is basically a platform to groom the future leaders.’ Mainstream, ‘secular’ or Western actors largely misunderstand the intellectual thinking within the Islamic parties. Islamic parties target young minds to influence

4 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s mujahidin pro-Pakistan party.
the politics of Pakistan and shape the society. They aim for a resilient imaginary of power in the society more than for power itself, more than for direct control over pulling levers of power (Proposition 2).

One JI party member, a lecturer in law at a university in Islamabad, explained in 2013:

[T]he true Islamic concept is about human life. Islam is the complete code of life and it should be prevalent in the world. That is why we are working in particular with the students.

They also differentiate between the petro dollars poured into the country by Saudi Arabia and the military aid from the United States. Another senior JI party cadre said in 2013:

Saudis are not controlling the policies of Pakistan. Saudi interest does not clash with Pakistan's interest but that is not the same for the US. We do not want the Americans. US policies are directly affecting our society. US and European intervention is influencing our social norms and community. Saudi Arabia is not exploiting our society in the shape of aid. The US is the biggest threat for Pakistan.

In the 2013 elections, Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI), the party founded by former Pakistani cricket captain Imran Khan, campaigned hard along religious lines to win conservative votes. Many political observers were surprised when Khan's party received approximately 20 per cent of the popular vote, key seats in the National Assembly and provincial coalition control in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province (KPK). A senior leader from the Insaf Students' Federation, the youth wing of the PTI, reflected: ‘Youths are mostly crazy about Imran Khan. Election was about junoon vs noon.’ He was citing Imran Khan, who had earlier predicted a battle between noon (the status quo), meaning the Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N), and junoon (passion). This leader also applauded Khan's anti-American campaign and religious views. He noted:

Imran Khan is against the war on terror, and he is against the US influence. Some Talibans are created by the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and the Indian intelligence. This war on terror is not our war.

Imran Khan's views on the drone war, the Pakistan–United States relationship and an interest in negotiating with the Taliban instead of fighting made the PTI an ally of JI (Ullah 2013). Similar to JI, the PTI was successful in mobilising Pakistani youth, many of whom were disillusioned by the state's authoritarian policies and the corruption of politicians. They
turned to leaders who were able to portray a clean image of themselves. Leaders from Islamic parties were thus able to garner support from young Pakistanis in their struggles against rampant corruption among political and military elites.

Haroon K. Ullah, in his important book *Vying for Allah’s Vote* (2013), argues that the Islamist parties are not driven solely by ideological principles. With appropriate incentives, he argues, they can moderate their policies. Reflecting on Stathis Kalyvas’s typology of confessional political parties that are organised by leveraging ‘aspects of religious ideology and culture to mobilise, recruit, and campaign in electoral contests’, Ullah (2013: 7) lays out a new typology: the Sharia–secularism spectrum within which Islamic parties exist. This spectrum includes those ‘who believe that Pakistan should be governed by Islamic law with little or no lay person’s input, to those who believe that religious authority has no place in governance’ (Ullah 2013: 9).

Based on ideological underpinnings, organisational structures and political strategies, Islamic parties could be organised in three distinct types: Muslim democrats, hierarchical Islamists and network Islamists.

The Muslim democratic parties such as the PML-N are thin, hierarchical organisations with high walls to entry. These involve highly educated technocrats from among the economic elites and the middle class (Ullah 2013: 48). For votes, these elites primarily turn to local political entrepreneurs (Ullah 2013: 49). Islamist groups are defined by their commitment to impose Sharia law. Hierarchical Islamists such as JI—and not unlike Muslim democrats—also have among them prominent religious intellectuals from prestigious institutions. A high and rigidly controlled hierarchy ensures compliance (Ullah 2013: 48), including well-trained leaders who organise local groups and serve as gatekeepers of the parties (p. 50). Many of their supporters have an urban base. Finally, the network Islamists involve individual political entrepreneurs who were trained in local madrasas. Organisationally, these parties are broader and more accessible than other Islamist groups and are deeply embedded in the rural underclass (Ullah 2013: 48, 50). In Ullah’s typology, Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) is a network Islamist party that is a breakaway faction of the original Jamiat Ulema-i-Hind (JUH, Organisation of Islamic Scholars). It is a Sunni Deobandi party that experienced another factional split in 1998. The JUI-S faction is led by Samiul Haq and has a support base in KPK. JUI-F, led by Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, is based in southern KPK and northern Balochistan. In the 2013 election, JUI-F won 3.2 per cent of the popular vote, giving it 15 seats in the 272-seat National Assembly.
Ullah (2013) believes there are five myths of political Islam in Pakistan. The first is that extremist violence is ad hoc. Ullah argues that there are links between key voting districts, campaign rhetoric and extremist violence. Parties that leverage violence to push political agendas through connections with extremists use fear as a form of securitised patronage. The second myth proposes that democratisation moderates Islamic parties and, if the parties compete for longer periods, they are more likely to adopt moderate practices. He notes that if party instrumentalism prevails then there is a danger of being more extremist than moderate. This reinforces the Kashmir analysis in Chapter 5 that finds democracy can be a driver of domination and extreme violence. The third myth presupposes the homogeneity of Islamic parties. Ullah counters that, in fact, they compete intensely with each other because of out-group bias. The fourth myth, about Islamic parties not winning big, is countered by Ullah’s argument that Islamic parties prefer and do better in lower-level elections. They are stronger by being smaller and they enjoy controlling the 5–7 per cent of votes that can swing elections. Extreme positions sometimes provide them with the opportunities to swing votes. The fifth myth—that Islamic parties focus only on national elections—is, in Ullah’s view, incorrect, as these parties perform better at local levels because of their strong connections through mosques and their volunteers. Islamic parties prefer to steer the moral debate, and this is easier to do in local communities.

Pakistan held seven elections between 1988 and 2013.\footnote{There was a six-month opposition blockade in Islamabad in 2017 and court proceedings over corruption allegations, which led to disqualification of prime minister Nawaz Sharif by the Supreme Court in July 2017. Sharif resigned after a short delay. At the time of the publication of our book, Shahid Khaqan Abbasi is serving as prime minister of Pakistan.} Except for the 2002 elections, the Islamist parties have not managed to win more than about 6 per cent of the vote. In the 2002 elections—widely understood as a flawed electoral process—Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), a coalition of some 58 Islamist parties, won about 12 per cent of the vote. Some commentators believe that even the limited success of the Islamist parties in the national elections, such as those held in 1970, 1988, 1993 and 2002, has largely been the result of assistance from the military and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) (e.g. Schofield 2011). We explain this strategic alliance below in our analysis of the military–mullah (Islamic cleric) nexus.
The conflicting beliefs between the modernists and the radicals\(^6\) in predominantly Muslim Pakistan have been carefully manipulated to generate profound ideological divisions that have contributed to conflicts in KPK, Karachi, Balochistan and elsewhere. Factions in the military have also taken advantage of these opposing perspectives. For the international community, the military is at the heart of three interlinked concerns about Pakistan: the war-prone conflict with India, the jihadi threat and the security of its nuclear weapons (Shah 2014).\(^7\) Ahmed Rashid (2010b: 367–9), one of Pakistan’s most senior journalists and public commentators, observes that three similar factors have prevented Pakistan’s stability. First, there is the question about Pakistan’s Islamic identity—whether or not its people are Muslim first and Pakistanis second or whether regional identities should be prioritised. Second, the national security paradigm perceives India as the main external aggressor, with Afghanistan, Iran and the United States as other threats. This view ensures the dominance of the military over Pakistan’s politics and prevents the consolidation of civilian power. Finally, Rashid (2010b: 367–9) argues that differences according to ethnic identities and the dominance of Punjab have contributed to internal conflicts, especially in Balochistan and Sindh. We argue that economic inequality has exacerbated Pakistan’s instability; a new lens on inequality becomes one of the general themes of this book in Part III.

In the first decade of Pakistan’s statehood, agriculture accounted for 60 per cent of the country’s output and 70 per cent of total employment. Industry provided 6 per cent of output and 10 per cent of employment (Ali 1983: 43). While large-scale production was virtually non-existent, British control of trade and credit enabled it to determine Pakistan’s economic growth. While 3.5 million peasant households existed in the countryside, just 6,000 landlords owned the bulk of the land. These landlords also dominated the Muslim League National Council (the supreme authority of the Muslim League) and barred crucial reforms in Pakistan’s socioeconomic structure. Often these reforms were stopped on the basis of being ‘un-Islamic’. This book argues that the economic disparity with East Pakistan was a major contributor to war in 1971, following which Pakistan lost Bangladesh and had to concede defeat to India.

\(^6\) For example, in the Sunni community, there are those who follow a more orthodox Deobandi view and those who subscribe to moderate Barelvi traditions. The Deobandi madrasas became the major recruiting ground for the Taliban movement in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.

\(^7\) Former Pakistani president Asif Ali Zardari in 2008 publicly overturned Pakistan’s ‘first-use’ nuclear deterrence policy as a counter to India’s military superiority, only to watch the demise of the policy shift when his commander-in-chief announced this was not strategically wise (Shah 2014).
Civil war in Balochistan

Balochistan is the largest of Pakistan’s provinces. From 1947, Afghanistan claimed that Pakistan’s North-West Frontier Province and Balochistan were both part of Afghan Pashtunistan (Nadiri 2014: 134). Pashtuns make up 35 per cent of Balochistan’s 9 million residents. For their part, some Baloch feudal leaders (sardars) aspired to a Balochistan that was combined with the Baloch regions of southern Afghanistan and southern Iran. A major Baloch civil war from 1973 to 1977 cascaded from three more localised Baloch uprisings in 1948 (over resistance to joining Pakistan), 1958 (over centralisation that eroded provincial autonomy) and 1963. It was, at times, an independence war and, at other times, a struggle for autonomy—in response to a variety of grievances that included dramatic erosion over time of the limited autonomy promised to Balochistan in the independence settlement. As in Bangladesh (Chapter 7), in Balochistan, important grievances were about the failure to nourish and respect Baloch language and culture, structural inequality and systematic discrimination against the periphery by the centre.

Plate 6.2 Balochistan liberation soldiers.
Source: NewsGram.
The 1973–77 war saw 70,000 to 80,000 Pakistani troops (some say supported by as many as 100,000 armed police), with helicopter support from Iran and some Iranian pilots, dispatched to fight 55,000 Baloch fighters. Approximately 3,300 state forces and 5,300 militants were killed (Gazdar et al. 2010: 4; Harrison 1981: 3). Unknown numbers of civilians perished in horrific atrocities, such as the napalming of villages by aircraft (Harrison 1981). The tactic that succeeded in decimating the Baloch army was the herding of large numbers of refugees, who were mostly women and children, on to the plains and attacking them, thereby drawing the Baloch fighters down from the hills to defend their families (Proposition 6). The ruthlessness of the militarisation, shunning a peace settlement in pursuit of total victory, may have been driven by the shame the Pakistani army and government were managing over the loss of Bangladesh. Bansal (2004: 45) describes the Balochistan war of 1973 as ‘a Godsent opportunity to redeem their honour and reputation, which had been tarnished by their meek surrender at Dhaka’. It was, in fact, an opportunity provoked by Pakistan’s prime minister Bhutto rather than by God! Mansfield and Snyder (2007: 244–7) argue that this is one of a number of examples from the democratic periods of Pakistan’s history that support their conclusion that emerging democracies with weak institutions are particularly likely to go to war (Proposition 5(a): weakly institutionalised democracy as a driver of domination and violence).

The conflict reignited in 2003. While the war was significant in 2004, with 626 rocket attacks and 122 bomb explosions (Bansal 2008: 192), it took off in a major way in 2006 after Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti, a symbolic but non-combatant leader of the Baloch resistance, was assassinated along with 35 of his colleagues (Proposition 9).8 That phase of the conflict continues today, though with perhaps as few as 3,000 to 5,000 armed militants continuing to hold out in the mountains (Brown et al. 2012: 6–7). More disruptive than the limited contemporary fighting itself has been what it cascaded to:

[A] new cycle of bombings, abductions and murders … a major security operation pitting the security forces against the Baloch people, attacks against Punjabi settlers and sectarian violence against Hazara Shias. (Samad 2014: 293)

8 An earlier crime that caused an earlier escalation of the conflict was the rape of Dr Shazia Khalid at the Sui Gas Plant on 2 January 2005. Anger boiled over when the army refused to give local police permission to interview suspects, who included an army officer (Amnesty International files).
Our interviews suggest that probably more than 1,000 people have disappeared during this phase of the conflict (Baloch activists claim the number is 8,000–12,000). Narcotics trafficking funds insurgent purchases of weapons ‘from the same black market pool accessed by the Taliban, Al Qaeda and common criminals’ (Samad 2014: 315). The Afghan war caused a flood of Pashtun and Hazara refugees to Balochistan. This has dramatically upset traditional balances and historically harmonious relationships between the two dominant groups in the province—Baloch and Pashtuns—and of both with Hazaras (Proposition 6).

While security analysts see the trouble in Balochistan through the prism of political divisions, during our interviews, the separatist groups—Balochistan-based political parties and civil society in Quetta—noted that there was a humanitarian crisis in the region. Baloch experience is of discrimination against them by the Pakistani state, with Baloch underrepresentation in the military and other key institutions. Until 2008, only four of the 179 individuals who had reached cabinet rank in Pakistan were ethnically Baloch (Bansal 2008: 185–6). At the time of the outbreak of the current phase of the conflict in 2003, fewer than 500 of the 3,200 students at Balochistan University were ethnically Baloch. For politicians and the military, the Balochistan crisis is interlinked with Pakistan’s territorial integrity and national defence. In addition, Balochistan’s energy-rich strategic location makes it an important region through which the United States, China, Europe and Indo-Pacific littoral states can access Central Asian and Caspian resources (Malik 2013). For landlocked Afghanistan, Gwadar port provides access to the Indian Ocean. When completed, the Gwadar deep-sea port, being constructed with massive Chinese support as part of its ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative,9 will grow as a gateway to the 34 km wide Strait of Hormuz, through which 40 per cent of the world’s oil is transported (Malik 2013). One of the world’s largest copper deposits has also been found in Balochistan as well as rich reserves of gas, coal, oil, chromite, zinc and gemstones. One major grievance relates to the fair sharing of those resources, with Baloch people believing that benefits primarily accrue to Punjabi elites and military cronies. During our interviews with senior Indian and Pakistani political and military elites, they stressed Balochistan’s enormous potential to emerge as a regional hub and a transhipment port.

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9 Gwadar deep-sea port became partially operational, with some Chinese ships departing for the first time, in November 2016. The Chinese ‘One Belt, One Road’ vision is for a new Silk Road that integrates the region with China and that reconfigures the Chinese economy from one driven by the building of infrastructure in China to an infrastructure exporting economy.
Balochistan’s strategic location makes it a significant factor in Pakistan’s security policies. It shares its western border with Iran and northern border with Afghanistan. China, the United States and Central Asian states have strategic interests in Balochistan due to the Gwadar deep-sea port. In our interviews with Pakistani military officials, they indicated that India’s interest has also shifted in Balochistan following its own energy crisis. In the 1970s, a politically unstable Pakistan would have been desirable, but for energy-starved India today, supporting a stable Pakistan is a more pragmatic choice (Khan 2015). India is keen on a proposed 2,600 km Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline. Even India’s criticism of Pakistani army operations in Balochistan is more about ensuring support from Baloch nationalists for future economic objectives than about India’s relationship with Pakistan (Khan 2015).

The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan notes that Pakistan has used a ‘blinkered vision’ in dealing with the Balochistan crisis. In Balochistan, military cantonments, four of the 28 districts and 250 of the 28,000 villages are the primary sites of the province’s natural gas that supplies 70 per cent of the needs of the whole country. Quetta continues to experience a high level of violence, both by Islamist extremists and by Baloch nationalists. Additionally, since it shares a border with Afghanistan, Balochistan has been used as a base from which to carry out military operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. The United States has military forces based in Dalbandin and Pasni on the Baloch coast. Unlike the Tamils and the Kashmiris, the Baloch diaspora does not have mass engagement in vigorous advocacy work with the international community.

At the heart of the Balochistan crisis is the short-sightedness of successive regimes in responding to people’s grievances. Kachkol Ali Khan, a Baloch nationalist, observes: ‘The people of Pakistan did not get a nation—the Pakistani army got a state’ (ICG 2006: ii).

Baloch demands have included an end to state surveillance, particularly by the ISI, and cancellation of all allotments of civil-military lands made between 1998 and 2008 in Gwadar and Lasbela districts. Other demands include a redirection of funds towards the socioeconomic development of the province, immediate assessment and repatriation of the internally displaced populations of Dera Bugti and Kohlu districts and a policy of paying equal wellhead prices for gas and a 30 per cent royalty to Balochistan.
In a bid to address the widespread grievances within Balochistan, Pakistan’s then interior minister Rehman Malik in 2012 offered to drop all cases against Baloch leaders who had left the country and were spearheading the movement for independence from overseas. In response, Nawabzada Jamil Bugti, a key nationalist leader in the province, demanded a UN-supervised referendum to see whether or not the Baloch people wanted to remain in Pakistan. From our interviews, we conclude that the violence carried out by the insurgents against unarmed people and minorities has created resentment towards those groups. Ordinary people do not necessarily support the nationalist movement the way they did even until the 1990s. With the younger generation finding education and employment outside the province, they no longer have the kind of tribal loyalties that allowed rigid control of communities. This has made possible recent progress with reconciliation of fighters, surrender of their weapons and development assistance to help them with jobs and reintegration into Pakistani society. In April 2017, 487 militants, including at least eight senior commanders, joined this reconciliation to become part of the development opportunities associated with the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (the Belt and Road initiative) (Hindustan Times 2017).

Violence and underdevelopment

Decades of internal political disputes and low levels of foreign investment have now led to slow growth and underdevelopment in Pakistan. This is most emphatically the case in Balochistan, which is the poorest province. But today this economic toll is being felt right across Pakistan. After the country’s most significant metropole, Karachi, experienced record levels of killings in 2013, ‘possibly 40 per cent of business [fled] the city to avoid growing extortion rackets’ (ICG 2014b: i). Karachi accounts for 70 per cent of Pakistan’s gross domestic product (GDP). It is hard to judge how much of this exit of legitimate business is caused by criminal gangs or jihadist networks. Both have cascaded to the point where they are killing the economy. When jihadist groups fund their operations by kidnapping for ransom and bank robberies, criminal gangs seize the opportunity to

10 On 29 May 2015, 20–25 Baloch separatist militants stopped the buses ferrying over 30 passengers, mostly Pashtuns, in south-western Mastung District. The United Baloch Army (UBA) claimed responsibility for the attack, which was widely resented across civil society. The UBA is a splinter group of the Baloch Liberation Army. Pakistan’s paramilitary Frontier Corps later sent 200 troops in an operation that killed the perpetrators.
exploit a pretence that they are militarily invincible jihadists. Criminals then engage in the same crimes, confident they can terrorise the police against enforcement action. Carjacking in Karachi has flourished thanks to the ease with which stolen cars can be disposed across the porous Balochistan–Afghanistan border (Rashid 2010b: 192). Intermittently throughout Pakistan’s history, Islamabad has responded to the chronic failure of local policing with panic bursts of nationally sponsored extrajudicial paramilitary assassinations of criminals. Just as insurgency conditions have motivated many major and minor political parties to forge alliances with insurgent groups and with the mullah–military complex, these same anomic conditions motivate major parties in locales such as Karachi to forge alliances with criminal gangs who help them strongarm their way to electoral domination (ICG 2014b) (Propositions 7 and 9).

Agriculture accounts for more than one-fifth of national output and two-fifths of employment. Textiles account for most of Pakistan’s export earnings, and Pakistan’s failure to expand a viable export base for other manufactures has left the country vulnerable to shifts in world demand. Several of our respondents raised the issue of Pakistan’s underground economy and the criminalisation of the state and society (see also Rashid 2010b: 192). Since 2004, Pakistan has experienced much lower growth than it enjoyed in the 1960s and 1970s, and 2008 saw a severe spike in inflation led by a spurt in food prices that acutely increased poverty. The government agreed to an International Monetary Fund (IMF) Standby Arrangement in November 2008 in response to a balance-of-payments crisis. Although the economy has stabilised since the crisis, it has failed to recover. Foreign investment has not returned, due to investor concerns related to governance, energy and security. Remittances from overseas workers, averaging about US$1 billion a month since March 2011, remain the bright spot for Pakistan. Pakistan is stuck in a low-income, low-growth trap, with growth averaging about 3.5 per cent per year from 2008 to 2013, though edging slightly above 4 per cent from 2014 to the time of writing. Pakistan has been unable to respond to some longstanding issues related to government revenues and energy production to spur the economic growth urgently required to employ its growing and rapidly urbanising population, more than half of whom are under 22 years of age. Other long-term challenges include expanding investment in education and health care, adapting to the effects of climate change and natural disasters and reducing dependence on foreign donors.
Cascades of militarisation

US military investment in Pakistan since 2001 has been one of the unsustainable props to Pakistan’s economy that support elites with limited trickle down to the poor. The majority of research on militarism critically analyses three dimensions of military impacts on societies—on the economic and social structure, the legal and political system of the state and the attitude of citizens towards the ideology and values of the military (Hook 1996). These are primarily interrogated in this literature through two perspectives. First, the Marxist approach argues that militarism is a problem specific to the social and economic structure of a capitalist society that requires external expansion and internal repression as integral to the development of the capitalist mode of production and class system (Hook 1996). As such, militarism is viewed as a tool of the ruling class, serving its interests and accomplishing accumulation of capital, according to writers such as Rosa Luxemburg (1913: Ch. 32), as discussed by Kowalik (2009: 105).

The second liberal approach, through an interrogation of legal and political systems, focuses on the functional relationship between the military and the civilian sectors of the state (Hook 1996). The popularity of military services, uniforms, insignia and songs—‘martial spirit’—is a representative indicator of the extent to which militarism has taken root in the society. For liberals, militarism is also a product of military supremacy over civilian control of state affairs.

Until 2013, Pakistan did not have a single democratic and peaceful transfer of power from one democratically elected government completing its tenure to another. The longstanding pattern in Pakistan had been to use military force to address interstate and intrastate disputes. Pakistan has used its military forces to influence relations with neighbouring states—in particular, India, Iran and Afghanistan. Max Weber’s notion of the state’s monopoly on the legitimate use of violence provides a crucial grounding for Pakistani military culture. The security forces perceive that they use violence in the interests and with the sanction of the population.

Senior Pakistan policy analyst Maleeha Lodhi (2011) argues that Pakistan is at the crossroads of its political destiny. She opines that the growing and politically assertive urban middle class is utilising various opportunities that are available to them in the globalised world. In her opinion, they now have a greater voice in Pakistan’s politics and demand better
governance. From our field research in Pakistan, we have identified this as one of the polarising factors in Pakistan today. The gap between an urban, technologically savvy, English-speaking middle class and those in rural or semi-urban areas is gradually increasing. Those who speak in regional languages also believe that their opinions are often sidelined in matters of national security and development.

People from FATA and the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) have less faith in the central government and the army. While there is much support for the army’s presence in FATA, for example, civil society leaders also believe that army operations are responsible for massive displacement of the civilian population.

One of our respondents from South Waziristan noted: ‘Government has done nothing for South Waziristan’s internally displaced population. Following the military operation, more than five million people were displaced. Our Government did nothing for them’ (Interview, Peshawar, 2013, No. 061301).

As early as June 2007, the National Security Council of Pakistan decided to take a number of measures to stop the ‘Talibanisation’ of South Waziristan. About 79,000 Mehsud families had to leave their homes when security forces launched the Rah-i-Nijat operation against the banned Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, or Pakistani Taliban) in the region in June 2009. By mid-2015, 5,122 internally displaced person (IDP) families were repatriated by the government. About 1 million registered IDPs were living in camps and rented houses in Bannu district.\(^\text{11}\) During our 2013 interviews with displaced families, we heard that many were reluctant to return as they were worried that they would be targeted by the militants for the support provided by the government and the military. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) co-chairs a voluntary returns task force with the FATA Disaster Management Authority, which also includes other humanitarian agencies. A lack of trust in the UNHCR and other international agencies was also evident in our interviews. Several respondents implied that many UN staff were present on the ground ‘just for money and status’ and were also ‘part of the corrupt system’. IDPs face some immediate threats such as insecurity and restricted access to education, employment and health services. With regard to insecurity, militarisation of South Waziristan is one of the major concerns for the

IDPs. Despite repeated assurances from the government—and from the UNHCR—many people for many years have perceived the situation on the ground to be too hostile for them to return home.

As Rashid argues, the role of the military in Pakistan’s politics sees most of the regions in Pakistan heavily militarised. Civil society leaders believe that militarisation directly contributes to the plight of displaced populations:

The army gives an impression that there is peace in South Waziristan. The army forced people to go to the areas. When people returned the army confined them to certain areas. People need fuel, they cannot go out. Taliban tell us you should not return, but the army is forcing them to come to the area. People feel like they are in a sandwich. (Interview with civil society leader, Peshawar, 2013, No. 061301)

We do not conclude that Pakistan is a failing state—as development agencies following some US leads tend to suggest. Protracted conflicts and emerging tensions have created deep divisions. Pakistan has quite a resilient civil society, legal and constitutional framework and state agencies of variable capacity. The strength of Pakistani civil society was evident, for example, in the lawyers’ movement in 2007.12 Pakistan’s role in the global war on terror meant that conflicts within the state—especially the political crises in Balochistan and Sind—have fallen off the radar. The pervasive insecurities that women and minorities face in these provinces are now in the oppressive hands of the Pakistani security sector and local leaders, which include even more oppressive insurgency groups.

12 In March 2007, president Musharraf asked chief justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry to resign. Following his refusal, Chaudhry was suspended, sparking a lawyers’ movement that resulted in his reinstatement in July of that year. In November, Musharraf declared a state of emergency and arrested Chaudhry. At that time, 60 other judges were also suspended. The emergency was lifted in December 2007 and a general election was held in 2008. Although Musharraf resigned after the election, the new president, Asif Ali Zardari, did not reinstate the chief justice. In March 2009, lawyers and opposition political parties under the leadership of Nawaz Sharif, who was re-elected as prime minister of Pakistan later in 2013, undertook a long march from Karachi to Islamabad to demand the reinstatement of Chaudhry and other judges ousted from office by Musharraf. The long march was successful and the reinstatement of the judges was announced by then prime minister Yousaf Raza Gilani. During Chaudhry’s term as Pakistan’s chief justice, the country experienced unprecedented judicial activism including cases of missing persons in Balochistan, environmental concerns and privatisations of Pakistani steel mills. These issues and their connection to judicial activism were much discussed in our interviews.
The *mullah*–military nexus and covert operations

Pakistan’s security policies from the very beginning of its statehood have been marked by four challenges:

1. a quest for security and survival as a sovereign state
2. the legacy of a troubled relationship with India
3. reliance on Western allies for economic, military and political survival
4. divisions over support for Muslim causes.

Commentators on Pakistan’s security refer to a *mullah*–military nexus that implies a symbiotic relationship between these two groups. Asaf Hussain reflected on this as early as 1979 and stated:

> The military–state relation conceptualizes a dialectical relationship between Islam, Pakistan and the military. Without Islam, Pakistan would not have been able to come into existence; without Pakistan the military would not be able to exist; and without the military, Islam and Pakistan would be threatened. In perpetuating such a state, the military was perpetuating Islam. (Hussain 1979: 133)

In a recent analysis of a political alliance forged between the *mullahs* and the military, Akhtar et al. (2006) argue that the dialectical nature of the relationship between the *ulema* (the body of Muslim scholars) and the state was apparent in the first decade of Pakistan’s independence—in the riots of 1953, when the *ulema* were crucial in instigating anti-Ahmadi sentiments, provoking the Pakistani army’s first intervention in civil life in the name of re-establishing order. Akhtar et al. (2006) further note that the 1950s and 1960s set the stage for a mythical construction of the army as the defender of the Pakistani nation:

As the protector, the army established a mandate to intervene when civilian authority had failed. In practice, the episode reinforced both the image of the Ulema and the military as defenders of Islam and Pakistan, even if they were apparently pitted against each other on this occasion. (Akhtar et al. 2006: 389)

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13 Also see D’Costa (2014).
In Pakistan’s north-western regions, KPK and FATA, the mullah–military nexus has seen compromises made to bring ‘stability’ to the region. It is estimated that over 50,000 members of Pakistan’s security forces fought Taliban militants in the Swat Valley and more than twice that number has fought in FATA since then, in a surge involving more troops and causing greater losses than president Obama’s surge against the Taliban in Afghanistan over the same period. In our interviews, activists from the region stressed that this massive militarisation only added to the fear and insecurity in rural communities generated by Taliban violence. Essentially, the Taliban leadership and most of its fighters fled Swat without resistance as soon as the military arrived in force, leaving the civilian population to suffer the brunt of a heavy-handed militarisation that included heavy artillery and air bombardment. Lashkars (civilian militias armed by the military) sometimes used their armed might to ‘settle personal vendettas’ (Swat Valley non-governmental organisation (NGO), quoted in ICG 2013b).

Senior military officials maintain that Pakistan’s army has always been at the forefront of peace politics. Brigadier Mohammad Khan told us in one of our interviews:

The Pakistani military has been defamed because it has been ruling the country. The military rulers have been more peaceful in the region. If Pakistani military had been discriminatory then they would not have been forthcoming in forming peace between India and Pakistan.

The presence of Indian intelligence throughout the region and its support of insurgents in Karachi, Balochistan and elsewhere are significant sources of insecurity for Pakistan. In fact, as noted in Chapters 5, 7 and 9, covert operations carried out by both Indian and Pakistani intelligence in the region and the funding of insurgents have essentially shaped the conflict dynamics in South Asia. One senior army official in Islamabad stated in his 2013 interview:

Let me to tell you frankly. Where is TTP getting the funding? Who is working in Balochistan? One of the journalists working in Iran said that she found huge Indian intelligence. India should not promote insecurity in FATA, Balochistan and PATA. I want to ask the Indian leadership that they should stop external intervention and really promote cooperation.

In 2016, Pakistan arrested an Indian intelligence operative in Balochistan who was alleged to have been working with Baloch nationalist armed groups and who was a recently retired commander of the Indian navy.
(Shahid 2016). In February 2014, three months before he became India’s national security advisor, Ajit Doval said: ‘You do one more Mumbai [a reference to the 2008 terror attack in which gunmen killed 172 people], you lose Balochistan’ (Balachandran 2016). India, the United States and other parties in the global war on terror have likewise accused Pakistani intelligence of covert operations and fuelling conflict. The ISI was established in 1948—as Pakistan engaged India in the first war over Kashmir—to be the top body coordinating the intelligence functions of its army, air force and navy. In the 1950s, when Pakistan joined anticommunist alliances, its military services and the ISI received considerable Western support in training and equipment. The ISI’s attention was focused on India. But when Ayub Khan, the army’s commander-in-chief, mounted the first successful coup in 1958, the ISI’s domestic political activities expanded. As a new state bringing together diverse ethnic groups within what some described as contrived borders, Pakistan faced separatist challenges—among Pashtuns, Balochis, Sindhis and Bengalis.

Much of the country’s early history was shaped by politicians seeking regional autonomy while the central civilian and military bureaucracies sought to consolidate national unity. The ISI not only mounted surveillance on parties and politicians, it also often infiltrated, coopted, cajoled or coerced them into supporting the army’s centralising agenda. The army ran the country from 1958 to 1971, when East Pakistan broke away with Indian and Soviet help to become Bangladesh. The ISI and the Pakistani military were thoroughly discredited and marginalised after the war, but they gained fresh purpose in 1972 when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the new civilian leader, launched a clandestine project to build nuclear weapons.14 A year later, military operations were launched against nationalist militants in Balochistan. These two events helped rehabilitate the ISI and the military.

14 Paradoxically, the resumption of civilian government in the context of the militarised Pakistani state brought to power a man who was a greater extremist on military strategy than his predecessors. Bhutto (1969: 152–3) had written: ‘Pakistan’s security and territorial integrity are more important than economic development ... All wars of our age have become total wars; all European strategy is based on the concept of total war; and it will have to be assumed that a war waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming a total war ... our plans should, therefore, include the nuclear deterrent.’ Two years earlier, his predecessor, Ayub Khan, expressed greater hesitation in his diary: ‘If India was to acquire atomic military capability, we shall have to follow suit and it will just ruin us both’ (Hoodbhoy and Mian 2014: 1127).
After Bhutto was ousted by General Zia ul-Haq in 1977, Balochistan military operations were ended (until they reignited in 2003). The nuclear program, however, was expanded. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 transformed the regional setting. All foreign assistance to mujahidin rebels at that time arrived via Pakistan, to be handled by the ISI, whose Afghan bureau coordinated operational activities with the militias. This was done in such secrecy that the Pakistani military itself was kept in the dark. Foreign money helped to establish hundreds of madrassas in Pakistan’s cities and frontier areas. These turned out thousands of talibs (students) who joined the mujahidin in the anti-Soviet campaign. The ISI managed this operation, handling tens of thousands of tonnes of ordnance every year and coordinating the action of several hundred thousand fighters in great secrecy. In 1989, the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan. A decade earlier, this had seemed an implausible outcome. Consequently, the ISI analysis (which was shared by the CIA, according to our interviews—for example, Interview No. 051305) was that only a highly radicalised imaginary would motivate the martyrdom of the young talibs to throw themselves at the Soviet war machine.

This 10-year Afghan war against the Soviets not only bestowed on the ISI huge experience of covert warfare in the 1980s, it also created for it a vast reserve of motivated humanpower that could be used as its proxy in the geopolitical games of regional powers. Despite denials from Islamabad, many analysts say that there is evidence aplenty that, in 1988, without directly involving Pakistan in a conflict, the ISI moved Islamist militants from Afghanistan to Indian-administered Kashmir to start an insurgency there. India has repeatedly accused Pakistan, and especially the ISI, of involvement in Kashmir and in attacks elsewhere in India—including the 2008 Mumbai attacks. Ever since Pakistan’s third, disastrous stint of military rule ended in 2008, under the coup-maker Pervez Musharraf, the generals have tried hard to be seen to be getting out of politics. Behind the scenes, the army still wields immense influence. But being seen bossing around civilian governments is to be avoided. So it is a sign of the army’s current unease that its newish chief felt he had to publicly defend the army’s ‘dignity and institutional pride’ on 7 April 2014. General Raheel Sharif was responding to rank-and-file concerns of ‘undue criticism of the institution in recent days’ (The Economist 2014). Tensions have been rising over the treatment of former president Musharraf, a former general, who unwisely returned from self-imposed exile in 2013 to relaunch his political career, only to fail and face charges of high treason. Because
even retired generals are thought to be untouchable, many Pakistanis did not believe the trial would ever get off the ground. Indeed, the army seemed to come to Musharraf’s rescue when he claimed a heart scare, was moved into an army hospital and dodged court appearances by claiming ill health. Yet, after weeks of legal wrangling, the former president was indeed indicted, on 31 March 2014. He was indicted for treason in relation to the coup that brought him to power and for the assassination of Benazir Bhutto and named as the prime suspect in a separate case for the assassination of Akbar Bugti in 2006 (Times of India 2016), which, as we have seen, reignited the civil war in Balochistan. Nothing has come of any of these cases. Musharraf was allowed to travel abroad for medical treatment in 2016 and lives in Dubai at the time of writing.

As all of these cases were launched, people assumed that the government would allow Musharraf to slip off back into exile rather than risk the repercussions of his conviction and possible death sentence. Not so, said a government minister, Khawaja Saad Rafique, who branded Musharraf a ‘traitor’ who must face justice. Such language infuriated the army establishment who were also involved in the coup and the assassinations to varying degrees. And it heightened their worry that prime minister Nawaz Sharif, whom Musharraf ousted in his coup in 1999, really did want these legal processes to run their course. The will of the military prevailed.

Adding to the army’s annoyance was the government’s effort to negotiate a peace deal with violent Islamist revolutionaries. In March 2014, negotiators met militants from the banned TTP (Pakistani Taliban). A ceasefire was agreed, but extreme violence continued. Internal TTP divisions about participating in these peace talks with the Pakistani state caused one of the many splits in the organisation that have occurred in the past decade. Many of the militant organisations under the fragmented TTP umbrella have retained strong alliances with Al-Qaeda. Hundreds of TTP fighters travelled to Syria to fight alongside Arab Al-Qaeda–affiliated militants. Later in 2014, the Pakistani army prevailed with its preference in the face of these realities for launching an operation against militant sanctuaries in North Waziristan. With the NATO drawdown in Afghanistan, the Pakistani army feared militants would much more easily melt into Afghanistan when the army attacked them. The military surges of 2014 and 2015 seemed to suppress the Pakistani Taliban for a time, resulting in the surrender of hundreds of TTP fighters, but,
by 2016 and 2017, it was launching more deadly and disruptive bombing operations than ever and was strengthening its ties to Islamic State\textsuperscript{15} as well as Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban.

In the past, a strong public rebuke from an army chief over something as important as peace negotiations with the enemy would have sparked panic among politicians. Military defiance of peace negotiations by the civilian authority was still possible, even when their military surge to displace it did not succeed. Yet a strong judiciary and media appear to have made the threat of a coup unthinkable in recent years—hence our analysis that not everything is awry in Pakistan’s current democracy.

The mullah–military nexus has done much more than leave a space for military–political selection of extremist militant jihadists for survival in safe havens. It is not just in the madrassas from which Taliban are recruited that violent jihad imaginaries are taught. Pakistan’s political leaders repeatedly promise reform of the national curriculum to remove violent jihad and religious martyrdom from the textbooks from which most children are infused with this imaginary. Under pressure organised by mullahs and religious parties, these promises to reverse the Islamisation of the national curriculum are never realised (ICG 2014a: 10–12). Even private schools feel the pressure. In November 2013, the All Pakistan Private Schools Association banned the book written by Malala Yousafzai, a campaigner for girls’ education and a Nobel Prize recipient, from its 40,000 schools for fear of retaliation from the TTP commander-in-chief who had ordered Yousafzai’s assassination (ICG 2014a: 13).

While the mullah–military nexus is critical to understanding the dynamics of the conflict within Pakistan, the role of the international players in the country—particularly the American involvement in the war on terror—is also important in understanding the complexities of peacebuilding in Pakistan.

\textsuperscript{15} More than one report has claimed that Sheikh Abu Haseb, who took over the leadership of Islamic State in Afghanistan in 2017, but was killed 27 April 2017, was broaching collaboration rather than competition between Islamic State and the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans. While Abu Haseb was an Afghan, he used to be a commander in the Pakistani Kashmiri organisation Lashkar-e-Taib (see e.g. Dickey and Yousafzai 2017). This is one kind of evidence for our interpretation of a cascade of violence that runs from the Kashmir conflict to the rise of the Pakistani Taliban, back into Afghanistan and to jihad in Iraq, Syria, the United Kingdom and beyond.
Cascading violence through drone strikes and dislocation

Since 2004, the United States has launched more than 420 drone strikes in FATA alone.\textsuperscript{16} International criticism of drone strikes argues that they are an ineffective counterterrorism measure and a ‘failed cost-free’ form of warfare. President Obama, who had personally approved the scaling up of drone assassinations, eventually seemed to reach the same conclusion, with all drone strikes in Pakistan ceasing for the final year of his administration. President Trump rejects this retreat from targeted drone killings and has resumed it with an intensity that is too early to assess. After more than a decade of drone warfare in Pakistan, the long-term repercussions are evident. Growing anti-American and anti-Western resentment among ordinary Pakistanis in areas targeted through drone strikes has long since been viewed as a strategic failure of the US military. Some argue these strikes have provided an effective recruitment tool for extremists—fuelling rather than minimising radicalisation. In our interviews, we found there were mixed views on drone strikes. Whereas in the cities and among more educated Pakistanis, drone strikes were perceived as attacks on Pakistani sovereignty and as violating basic human rights, in areas where drones are frequent features there are mixed reactions.

Activists from the Islamist parties and those who remain in Islamabad, including Pakistan’s left/progressives, have been against drone strikes. A senior JI student activist in Islamabad stated:

\begin{quote}
We think that America is making our policies, then how can we be free? And it fits Pakistani politician made the Parliament to introduce resolutions regarding drone attacks but those resolutions have never been implemented. Pakistan is an independent state. Why are the Americans here? (Interview in Islamabad, 2013, No. 061318)
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{16} A 2015 study on drone strikes in Pakistan between 2004 and 2013 records that, over this 10-year period, 374 drone strikes killed 2,296 people, while 7,361 terrorist attacks killed 13,829 people. While terrorist attacks are responsible for 85 per cent of the deaths within this conflict, the average drone strike kills more than six individuals, while the average terrorist attack kills just less than two (Gill 2015: 7).
On the other hand, a number of our respondents expressed their strong support for drone strikes in Taliban-dominated areas. One university professor sought to convince us that drone strikes were actually pragmatic as these were the most effective way of stopping the Taliban. His students—some of the other participants present during this focus group meeting—held unsympathetic views towards civilians whose houses were targets of drone strikes. In response to our questions about innocent civilians including children killed by drone strikes, one of them explained: ‘These people are not innocent. They harbour terrorists and they are supporters of terrorism. We have no sympathies for them.’

The peacebuilding literature provides some insights about compassion fatigue among humanitarian actors and weariness among soldiers in protracted conflicts. The above discussion shows that ordinary people also grow weary, impatient and unsympathetic at times of protracted conflict. The Pakistani military is also perceived to be part of the wider militarisation problem of which drone strikes are a part. One former Pakistani ambassador to Kabul, who was also closely associated with the UNHCR’s work in the region, provides a useful context to understanding radicalisation and its connection to Partition and imperial politics:
It is not the military’s business to formulate policy. We have third-rate political leadership in Pakistan largely because the military has a very strong role … We were administering tribal areas but we were not conscious of the problems across the border because at least we had control over other areas. Between 2007 and 2009, three things happened:

1. Gen. Musharraf deployed the army, the first monumental blunder.
2. Then the army began to spread and began to administer the area.
3. Local institutions were completely destroyed.

By aligning Pakistan with the war on terror, which was not accepted by people, an environment was created in which insurgency was bound to take root. Government policies helped the insurgency to take root eventually. The tribal area is devastated because of military operations not because of drones. The people who were displaced did not flee because of drones but because of the military. (Interview in Peshawar, 2013, No. 061306)

The fear of drone strikes has pushed some of the militant leaders to move to other parts of Pakistan. The Pashtun militant networks in Karachi facilitated these relocations. It is highly doubtful that these relocations have made Pakistan safer. The new arrivals have engaged in crime, kidnapping and land-grabbing in Karachi and some of the funds from this have then been channelled to militant groups in FATA and elsewhere. The Kurram Tribal Agency also attracted several militants to move from North Waziristan. Kurram is home to the largest Shia population in FATA and that created intercommunal tensions in this area. Anti-Shia violence in Parachinar, the capital of the Kurram Agency, reportedly left hundreds of casualties (Aslam 2014).

Begum Jan, one of the most respected educationalists from South Waziristan, provides a more nuanced understanding of targeted killings such as drone strikes as ineffective counterterrorism measures. She notes: ‘Taliban is mushrooming. Drone cannot control Taliban’ (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061301). She asserts that these attacks undermined Pakistan’s prospects of negotiating successful peace talks with tribal leaders, including Taliban leaders. Not only are these attacks used to mobilise and recruit new talibs. There are now increasing numbers of terrorist attacks against the Pakistani Government by Taliban militants who believe that the government has failed to maintain Pakistan’s sovereignty.
Drone strikes in Pakistan also complicated the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan. Infiltrators from TTP in the CIA resulted in the deaths of US personnel at an operating base in Khost province in 2009. Wrong information in other instances also resulted in high numbers of civilian casualties. In sum, US counterterrorism measures have not been perceived as a success by wide sections of Pakistan’s civil society, although others support them. Further, senior journalists believed that the 2014 US troop pull-out from Afghanistan (which turned out to be only a partial withdrawal) would not bring any significant changes in Pakistan’s security situation, particularly in relation to the Afghan conflict. Ismail Khan, editor of the Dawn news site, reflected:

I don’t think that the US pull-out will dampen the spirit of the Pakistani Taliban … There are now so many groups involved. There are foreigners fighting as well. Where will they go? (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061304)

Indeed, they do not seem to have gone since 2014, though nor have the Americans gone from Afghanistan, with President Trump demanding increased Western troops on the ground again. About Pakistan’s instability, especially in KPK, Ismail Khan observed:

The Swati Taliban are sitting across the border and launching attacks and trying to infiltrate in Malakand Division. As they are able to regroup and reorganise there will be problems. There will be no immediate stability. We are in for a very long haul. There is no national consensus. What should be the return of engagements and preconditions? We are on the eleventh year but there is no national consensus. (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061304)

The ISI has also played a double game in the region. It took money from the CIA for the war against the Soviets and diverted some of its mujahidin to attacks on India. Ahmed Rashid (2010b: 416) concluded that president Musharraf ‘deliberately raised the profile of jihadi groups to make himself more useful to the United States [after 2001] and to enhance his country’s strategic importance in Western eyes’. Rashid’s observation goes to the relevance of our Proposition 2 in terms of the nefarious, complex way violence promotes the enrolment of different cleavages to the ambitions of ruthless politicians such as Musharraf and ruthless intelligence organisations such as the ISI.
Pakistan was quite attentive in handing over foreign jihadists who had masterminded or executed specific high-profile operations against the United States, such as Mohammed Saddiq Odeh (who was behind the attack on US embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam in 1998), Ramzi Yousef (nephew of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center attack), Khalid Sheikh Mohammed himself and Aimal Kasi (Mir Qazi) (who attacked CIA operatives in Langley, Virginia, in 1993) (Zahab and Roy 2004: 56). For a long time after 2001, Pakistan managed to maintain the impression that it was doing a good job of handing over foreign (‘Al-Qaeda’) fighters who had fled Afghanistan, even if it continued to protect certain favoured Afghan Taliban. This interpretation faded after the killing of Osama bin Laden by US Navy SEALs. The ISI was continuously giving up some Afghan and Pakistani Taliban targets to the CIA, but, in retrospect, knowledgeable analysts conclude that these tended to be those whom the ISI perceived to be no longer fully under ISI control and/or a threat to Pakistan’s security interests (as opposed to US interests). Those given up to the United States included Taliban leaders who sought to negotiate in peace processes that were
sponsored by Kabul or Washington without Pakistan at the table.\textsuperscript{17} This tactic has now succeeded in persuading many in Kabul and Washington that no peace can be negotiated with the Taliban that Pakistan does not help to shape. The most crucial Afghan Taliban leaders continue to be dependent on protection from elements of the ISI.

**Propaganda war: The arts, Talibanisation and media politics**

From our interviews in Pakistan, it is evident that Pakistani civil society emerged as a watchdog of the country’s politics. In this section, we discuss two specific roles of Pakistan’s media in conflict. The first is the representation of various cascades of violence in the media and the second is the cultural politics of peacebuilding.

On a cold night in January, 2008, a group of militants hammered at the door of a popular Pashto dancer, Shabana, in Mingora, a city in the Swat district of Northwestern Pakistan. (Yemen Times 2009)

It was reported that the militants dragged Shabana through the narrow alleys towards Green Square, where they planned to publicly punish her and teach local artists a lesson. Shabana’s mother pleaded with her killers, repeating that she would never sing or dance again. However, her killing was a calculated decision by the Taliban to instil fear in the region where the tradition of music had been kept alive for generations by the artists in Banr Bazar, the traditional dwelling of the Swat Valley’s female dancers and singers.

Shabana’s body was found the next morning with her throat slit, riddled with bullets and with bank notes and her music CDs thrown on top. Ghazala Javed, another popular 24-year-old Pashto singer, was killed along with her father in Peshawar, the capital of KPK on 18 June 2012. Afsana, another female dancer, was killed on 14 March 2010. Afsana’s family was displaced by the conflict and she began to earn a living by performing at various ceremonies such as weddings. While the numbers

\textsuperscript{17} Swami (2006: 195) contends that Pakistan’s strategy in Kashmir was also to ‘sabotage Indian efforts at securing a unilateral dialogue with terrorist groups’. Pakistan sponsored new groups in Kashmir who would assassinate jihadists who negotiated towards peace agreements with the Indian Government.
are not as high, male artists have also suffered at the hands of the Pakistani Taliban. Sardar Yousafzai and Anwar Gul were attacked on 15 December 2008, causing Gul’s death.

The Swat Valley has been a centre for Pakistani arts and literature for centuries. Since Buddhist times, local artisans, poets and singers have contributed to the emotional, spiritual and intellectual development of society in the Swat Valley. ‘Music is an integral part of our society. Pashtuns have a rich musical and literary heritage,’ Usman Ulasyar, President of the Swat Arts and Cultural Society, noted. ‘Even our religious tales are preserved in the form of poetry and our evenings are incomplete without musical gatherings’ (Yemen Times 2009). Miangul Abdul Wadud, a former ruler of Swat, followed by his son Miangul Abdul Haq Jahanzeb (1915–69), not only encouraged local arts and literature but also allocated a piece of land in the heart of the city to traditional singers and dancers. Such areas became emblematic sites for Taliban militants seeking to attack artists and send waves of fear throughout the valley.

Shaukat Sharar, a Swat Valley social scientist, says that local society began rapidly changing in September 2007, when Maulana Fazlullah, a cleric turned militant commander, vehemently discouraged music, dancing and all forms of entertainment in his broadcasts on a pirate FM radio station. Through the radio station, he had discouraged education for girls, anti-polio drops and all forms of artistic expression. ‘The Yousafzai tribes inhabiting Swat harmoniously inter-mixed Buddhist and Islamic values with their own Pashtun traditions and customs, and formed a society based on peace, love and tolerance,’ Sharar maintained:

They excelled in handicrafts, wood carving, poetry, music and performing arts, and every year attracted thousands of tourists to their lush green valley to enjoy the serenity of its environment and the diversity of their socio-cultural lives. (Yemen Times 2009)

Thirty years of political instability in Afghanistan encouraged extremist Wahhabi Islam to flourish in neighbouring Pakistani tribal areas, and different Taliban groups gradually engulfed the whole of north-western Pakistan. Neither the international community nor Pakistani authorities placed much importance on local arts and literature as a means of promoting peace and discouraging religious extremism. However, Pashtun jirgas played a historical role in peacebuilding and conflict resolution; Pashtun hujra (a traditional Pashtun sociocultural club) provided the much-needed catharsis to Pashtun tribes after a day labouring in their
fields and mountains. Pashtun romanticism was expressed in Pashto folk tales and songs, and the strength and pride of Pashtun youth were demonstrated in traditional dances called *atan*.

The Taliban attacked these liberal traditions, as our respondents noted. One senior cultural activist said: ‘With the windows for natural human expression closed, extremist religious thoughts took over the society.’ Shazma, a well-known actress in Peshawar, further explained to us:

> At that time there was a lot of peace and love. Culture, *mohabbat* [love], *Pakhtun bhai* and *babin’s stories* (all Pashtuns are like brothers and sisters). And now it is only about *amaan*—peace—the scripts have changed. Repression in the stories. The cultural scripts have changed. Over the last decades, covering the head, no close association of men and women. The dramas before were not only for the *moulvi* and for the religious scholars, but for the society. But now drama is only for the *moulvi*, and conservative people. If someone sees me they could kill me. Every drama is in *dupatta*. No heavy make up. ‘Vulgar’ dialogues such as—I like you, I love you—are not allowed. (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061302)

Strict censorship also affects women’s participation in cultural activities. Sensitive or contentious issues relating to women are usually not discussed on local TV and radio channels. Shazma mentions:

> There are censorship committees. Producer or director on TV and radio. Stage managers are involved in censorship. You have live programs, there is censorship through ear piece. Cover your head, fix your *dupatta*, etc. Don’t say this, backtrack from this statement and all these. Creativity gets stifled. (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061302)

Over the past few years, the call by Islamist academics and Muslim moderates in Pakistan to replace universal human rights with local laws and punishment has opened the door to ‘culturally relevant’ justice. Some of the most important arguments about women’s rights, citizenship and public and private roles are fixed within what is religiously appropriate. One space for manoeuvring is that women can fight to interpret texts in their favour. Within this limited scope and with the Pakistani state complicit in violence against women, today the very survival of Pakistani women depends on such interpretations rather than any universal guarantee of the protection and security of life, regardless of belief or creed. The Taliban is giving other elements of political Islam a humane cover. However, the primary argument has stayed technical and within the Islamic framework—for example, whether or not the punishment...
of women is according to Sharia law. What women’s struggles actually demonstrate is that it is far easier to dismiss the barbaric Taliban as the inconvenient Muslim. It has given an opportunity for some liberal politicians to actually pronounce themselves ‘secular’ by virtue of merely denouncing the Taliban.

Cleavages and alliances

Chapter 5 provided many examples, including from Pakistan, of how attempted and successful assassinations of senior political figures escalated long-term patterns of violence and cascades of militarisation across South Asia (Proposition 9). There are many more examples in subsequent chapters. The assassination of former and likely future Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 was something of an exception to this pattern—but an important one. It happened at a time when public dissatisfaction with coup leader Pervez Musharraf was high and there was US pressure to allow Bhutto to return from exile to compete in elections. In the absence of the indictment of Musharraf for the assassination of Bhutto proceeding to trial, one cannot be certain whether the Pakistani Taliban was to blame for the assassination, as claimed by the military, or whether the military allowed or encouraged it. It would be an exaggeration to say that this assassination caused a mass people-power movement, though it certainly brought large numbers of ordinary Pakistanis on to the streets. Most importantly, however, it set off a realignment of cleavages.

The major political parties—Bhutto’s Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and its old enemy, former prime minister Nawaz Sharif’s PML-N—foresaw the likelihood of a people-power movement that could throw up alternative leaders. So the major parties, supported by the West, linked arms across their cleavages to campaign together for a return to democracy. The military could likewise see a risk that its power would sink unless it threw president Musharraf overboard. Younger officers pushed their generals to cut Musharraf adrift from military support. The generals advised Musharraf to resign and facilitate a democratic transition, which he did (Shah 2014: 1009).

Our take on these events is therefore that the military and party elites were sophisticated in their analysis of the risk of a people-power movement that might allow new sources of political power to emerge, so they collaborated across their deep divisions to remove the dictator
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and return to a democracy beholden to the deep state. Read another way, the assassination of Benazir Bhutto did not produce a cascade of violence and militarisation. Nor did it lead to a cascade of nonviolent people power that fundamentally transformed Pakistan from the streets to end militarisation. Precisely because the military leadership saw a risk of that coming, it acted with party elites to reaffirm a familiar balance of elite forces. This was a balance of power the military could ‘manage’, continuing as the most enduring font of power.

Aqil Shah (2008: 18) has depicted civil–military relations in Pakistan on questions such as accommodation with the Taliban as ‘path-dependent with a vengeance’. The military was the most enduring source of power because, as the conjuncture of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto demonstrated, it was the institution that could steer through the ‘state of exception’ (Agamben 2005; Schmitt 2006, 2013). 

All the old cleavages of Pakistani society and politics remained once the state of exception was navigated through the removal of the president, including the cleavages between the two major political parties, between both parties and the military and between all of them and the cascade of insurgencies we have described within and across Pakistan’s borders. Violence from the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans, in particular, continued to increase, as did anti-Shia and anti-Christian violence.

This conjuncture forged an alliance that reset the democracy button in a constructive way, allowing two elections since that time. In these elections, the most popular leader was allowed to win. The high command closed the ISI’s ‘political’ wing, which many say had been involved in rigging elections and blackmailing and bribing politicians in the past (Shah 2014: 1016). Return to (militarised) democracy changed little, however, in terms of the same old cleavages that continued to cascade violence. One of the reasons for this is that alliances across one cleavage are recurrently forged to facilitate violence across another cleavage. At various points, the Pakistani military accepted resources from the United States to fight jihadist groups in the region. At other points, it accepted resources

18 Carl Schmitt (2006, 2013) and Giorgio Agamben (2005) are the influential theorists of the state of exception. Schmitt conceives the power of state leadership in a state of emergency to be a particularly decisive form of power. He defines sovereignty as the power to decide when a state of emergency, a state of exception, will justify dictatorial armed force freed from legal constraint. Guantanamo Bay illustrates how the state of exception can be sold as a defence of the constitution, while the reality can be that it changes the constitution, legalising detention without trial and torture under that constitution.
from Gulf states to pass on to these groups and to protect them in safe havens. At many other points, the ISI formed alliances with these same groups across these cleavages to destabilise some third party. The Pakistani military and the ISI have supported a succession of different groups fighting to destabilise both Soviet-supported and US-supported Afghanistan, Indian Punjab, Kashmir and some north-eastern Indian states. At times, Afghanistan has provided a safe haven to Pakistani armed groups being pursued by the Pakistani military. In this and the previous chapter, we have seen that India’s intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), has supported armed groups that destabilised West Pakistan and the old East Pakistan (Bangladesh). At times, the ISI forged a de facto alliance with Iran to destabilise Afghanistan; at other times, it fought aggressively to exclude Iran’s proxies from any influence in Afghanistan; and at other times, it coordinated military efforts with Iran to degrade Baloch insurgencies that were a threat inside both southern Iran and Pakistan. Afghanistan provided safe havens for Pakistan’s Baloch separatist fighters and allowed them to fund their insurgency by smuggling drugs and other goods across their border with Pakistan (Nadiri 2014: 135). In other words, the cleavage effects we discuss in our Proposition 3 have a shifting character that cascaded violence as alliance structures shifted.

A central conclusion of this chapter is that repeated promotion of military coups, assassinations (Proposition 9) and proxy wars by insurgents and terrorists in Pakistan drives a resilient militarisation of society, regardless of whether or not it has democratic elections (Proposition 8). Wild swings from state support for insurgents to killing and torturing them and civilians in heavy-handed military operations, then swinging back to support for insurgents, does not create conditions for deterrence effects to exceed defiance effects in violence prevention (Proposition 1). This is especially so when insurgent leaders were killed and tortured, and their families threatened, when they attempted to participate in peace talks with a third party, as we have seen with ISI punishment of Afghan Taliban attempting to make peace with the Karzai Government (Nadiri 2014: 145, 150; ICG 2014c: 4) and punishment of Kashmiri insurgents who became peacemakers with India (Chapter 5). Defiance is particularly more likely than deterrence when a state promotes violent imaginaries through its education policies (Proposition 2), as with education through extremist madrassas and the Pakistani state’s wider jihadisation of politics that started from the early decades of Indian confrontation over Kashmir. ‘Repertories of contention’ (Tarrow 2011: 106–41) fuelled defiance
through state socialisation, Saudi socialisation and religious socialisation initially supported by CIA cash, which was used to destabilise India and the Soviet-backed regime in Afghanistan. A military and state-sanctioned jihad imaginary combined with inconsistent and hypocritical deterrence to fuel jihadist defiance (Propositions 1 and 2).

US drone attacks have been a form of deterrence that fostered defiance because they have so frequently involved innocent women and children being killed by the perceived imperial infidel.\(^{19}\) Evidence also mounts of cases where locals have provided false targeting information to the CIA for drone strikes to eliminate political rivals or for vendettas (Proposition 9: war cascades to crime) (ICG 2013a: 11). O’Loughlin et al.’s (2010) data showed that, in 2008 and 2009, all drone killings occurred on the Pakistani side of, and within 100 km of, the Afghan border.\(^{20}\) They also showed that for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, conflict killing of all kinds is concentrated in rural rather than urban areas, with the highest concentrations for both countries within 100 km of their shared border, although the killing pattern in Afghanistan was more dispersed across the whole country than in Pakistan (O’Loughlin et al. 2010: 448). This was mapped from over 5,000 conflict violence events for these two years. In Pakistan, more recent years have witnessed a balancing upsurge of violence in urban centres such as Karachi,\(^{21}\) while earlier decades saw huge numbers of killings across Pakistan’s borders with India in Kashmir, Punjab and East Pakistan.

Beyond being a frontier of interstate fighting, border areas also experience a concentration of killings because of the millions of Afghan refugees destabilising these areas, with the madrassas near the border accounting for most of the recruits for the Afghan jihad (Proposition 6). It is a remarkable fact about the Afghan war from 2002 that most of the Taliban fighters were recruited and trained not in Afghanistan, but in

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19 The US Government regularly releases statements on the ‘extremely rare’ civilian casualties, perhaps even in the ‘single digits’ (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic 2012: 32). But The New York Times showed that the Obama administration regarded ‘all military-age males [killed] in a strike zone’ to be combatants ‘unless there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent’ (Becker and Shane 2012).

20 There were occasions before and after 2008 and 2009 when significant numbers of drone strikes also occurred on the Afghan side of the border.

21 Suicide attacks took off in Pakistan in 2007 and spread from the North-West Frontier to also afflict the country’s major cities. Suicide attacks averaged four a year in Pakistan from 2002 to 2006 and 60 a year from 2007 onwards (Chandran 2012: 57), with other forms of terrorist operations also taking off from 2007.
a narrow border region of north-western Pakistan. Since 2001, all three major armed groups fighting in Afghanistan have continuously based their command and control across the Pakistan border and launched their recruits and operations from there: the Quetta Shura (consultative council) led by Taliban prime minister in exile Mullah Mohammed Omar (to whom the TTP swore allegiance when formed in 2007) (ICG 2014c: 5), until his death in 2013; Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-e-Islami; and the Al-Qaeda–linked Haqqani network.22 Conversely, TTP leader Maulana Fazlullah operated out of Taliban sanctuaries in Afghanistan (ICG 2014c: 6).

In this Pashtun borderland, ‘disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence’ (Proposition 4). According to one interview informant: ‘A global jihadi complex exists [in Pakistan and beyond]. All of these sometimes collaborate, sometimes compete’ (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 061309). The same might be said of the way this jihadi complex has cascaded to Iraq, Syria and beyond since this 2013 interview. The Pakistani military has been no more able to dominate this complex in the North-West Frontier tribal areas than could the British military in centuries past. Denys Bray (1923), foreign and political secretary to the Government of India, discussed and dismissed in the 1923 Legislative Assembly a ‘Chinese wall’ that was ‘high enough to keep the trans-border tribesmen beyond the pale’ and dismissed a policy of ‘forward defence’. Bray’s analysis affirms our Proposition 10 on how contemporary war economics counsels against ‘staying the course’ in such hotspots:

The task is infinitely more difficult today, chiefly because the tribesmen are infinitely better armed … True, if we had to fight them in the plains, this would matter little. But it is the mountains, those inaccessible mountains of theirs, that give them their strength. It is one of the striking things in modern warfare that these modern inventions of ours do not give us the advantage in savage warfare in the hills … with the improvement in

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22 Much to the chagrin of the United States, because of its Al-Qaeda linkage, Haqqani seems in recent times to have been the ISI’s favourite: ‘Of course there are favorites. Every intelligence agency in the world has favourites’ (a senior Pakistani military leader referring to the Haqqani network, quoted in ICG 2014c: 7). Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami was the ISI’s original favourite before and immediately after the fall of the communist regime in 1992. But after Hizb failed to dominate Afghanistan militarily, Pakistan’s favour shifted to Mullah Omar’s Taliban. Without the ISI’s support, which included the ISI playing matchmaker between the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it is unlikely the Taliban could have taken over the country in 1996.
armament the advantage lies with the tribesmen rather than us. In short, in these days of acutest financial stringency, the conclusion stares one in the face that a thoroughgoing forward policy along the line is a mere counsel of perfection. (Bray 1923, quoted in Naseemullah 2014: 510) (Proposition 10)

These tribal areas have been an internal Vietnam for the Pakistani military and, indeed, an external one for the United States when it pursued bin Laden in Tora Bora in 2001. That is, the North-West Frontier tribal areas have been to Pakistan what Vietnam was to the US military and Afghanistan to the Soviet military. By this we mean that, on many occasions in history, until recent surges such as that in 2015, the Pakistani military has attempted military surges to dominate its North-West Frontier. On none of these occasions has it succeeded in establishing a state monopoly of armed force. Every time, the costs of shutting down the violence came to exceed the benefits of winning, so the economics of war dictated an accommodation with tribal militias that left the tribal frontier lands a launching pad for future cascades of violence (Proposition 10). Even the Pakistani military attacks in FATA, which were motivated by repeated attempts to assassinate president Musharraf by Taliban and Al-Qaeda–affiliated armed groups based there in the early years after 2001, were so unsuccessful that Musharraf himself ‘concluded that he had no option but to negotiate with his would-be killers’ (Gartenstein-Ross 2010: 29). Moreover, not only did the limited resolve to assert a state monopoly of force in that part of the country fuel more defiance than deterrence (Proposition 1), but also the intermittent state military surges fuelled anomie (Proposition 7). These military surges tended to be taps turned on when new fires started, but turned off when the fire got hot.

Naseemullah (2014) argues that FATA was always ruled by a form of ‘hybrid governance’ that divided coercive power between state and society. State military power was part of the mix, especially because of the way it would arrive in moments of crisis, even if it would step back before the crisis was resolved to allow a return to indirect rule. Naseemullah (2014) contends that this hybrid governance maintained political order in a restive region. It allowed, for example, a space for those who supported blossoming of the wonderful artistic traditions of the region discussed earlier. After the war on terror cascaded jihadist imaginaries more strongly than in the past, these hybrid governance arrangements were weakened and then disrupted at the hands of actors from all sides of the cleavages (Proposition 3).
During the FATA insurgency, the Taliban marginalised the state political agents of indirect rule and tribal elites who had been most pivotal in coordinating the hybrid political order. All sides in the conflict mobilised violent proxies who pushed aside structures of tribal authority. Foreign interests also mobilised violent proxies, as with evidence of an Afghan intelligence operation to recruit Latifullah Mehsud, TTP second-in-command, in October 2013 (Nadiri 2014: 167). Agents of the ISI’s clandestine state frequently quashed decisions of civilian authorities in the tribal areas to move against some of the most violent actors who were proxies for the ISI’s forward defence imaginary.

In a sequence of episodes of intervention in the decade after 2001, the military usurped the second critical authority: civilian political agents and agencies. As this chapter has argued, the militarisation of FATA in itself also fuelled chaos and terror. When half-baked attempts to transplant state courts in FATA (and PATA) destroyed the formerly speedy justice of the region’s hybrid judicial governance, the Taliban seized the opportunity to impose Taliban courts to restore an oppressive form of rule of law. One experienced military commander in FATA argued that it was folly to hope that in this remote context the political administration can ever achieve the ‘reach to get routine issues resolved speedily. We have to think seriously about provision of speedy justice; maybe through a refined form of the already existing jirga system’ (Bajwa 2013: 152). Khadim Hussain (2013: 9) argues the Pashtunwali (traditional Pashtun ethical code) that is enforced by jirgas in hujras is a:

dynamic code [that] has incorporated almost every step of the civilisational march of humanity in the past several decades. Poetry, art, literature, architecture, music and dance have been inseparable parts of the code that could be retraced over the last several centuries.

Hussain (2013: 13) contrasts Pashtunwali with the ‘militant discourse’ that is ‘intricately woven around the central premise of a homogenized world view’:

23 This actually started before the war on terror in the early 1990s when the ISI director-general Javed Nasir advocated reconstitution of mujahidin militias under state sponsorship to promote instability in Indian Jammu and Kashmir (Naseemullah 2014: 515). Enrolment of the Haqqani network to the clandestine state in North Waziristan and Pakita Province was later part of the same forward defence project, as it attacked NATO forces in Afghanistan.

24 For the same political reason, in 2007, the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a TTP-affiliated group led by Sufi Muhammad, imposed Sharia law in the Swat Valley and Malakand Division, areas that were enduring non-existent to painfully slow state justice.
The discourse presents a world where every object is identical with every other object. It is a world where all living species have the same brain structure, speaking the same language, thinking the same way, having similar social organization and having similar cultural fabric. Hence, it is important for them to eliminate indigenous socio-cultural fabric everywhere in the world on the one hand while on the other hand the militant discourse tries to push back history through the judicious use of the concept of Khilafat [caliphate: the rule of Mohammed’s deputies across earth]. Both indigenous wisdom and modern human civilization must be the first victim … The concept of Khilafat is nested in the concept of Jihad [struggle] and the concept of Jihad is nested in the concept of Shahadat [martyrdom]. This triangular construct coupled with ‘otherization’ to make it more lethal in waging a war against the whole world. (Hussain 2013: 13)

Hussain’s (2013) research is interesting because of the way he sees the work of organisations such as Tanzeem-e-Asatiza Pakistan (a JI-affiliated association of teachers) as important in promoting this triangular imaginary (Proposition 2). It is also instructive in the way he interprets anomie as an intentionally created normlessness that is a cornerstone of militant strategy (cf. Proposition 7). ‘Banning music, destroying social institutions and banning all types of communication both internally and externally’ are all strategies ‘to take the relevant communities towards internal and external isolation’, as is ‘eliminating the socially and politically influential to create a social vacuum’ and ‘co-opting criminal gangs of the area’ to create chaos that the Taliban can fix with Sharia law and also so the criminals can ‘give them an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of law enforcement agencies in a particular community’ that they set out to destroy (Hussain 2013: 17). After our meeting with Khadim Hussain, a senior Pashtun journalist agreed with his analysis: ‘The Taliban is under the control of the ISI and the army, but their ideology is not under their control’ (Interview in Peshawar, 2013, No. 051354).

In Part I of this book and in the work of Braithwaite and Gohar (2014), we outlined how the assassination by the Taliban of revered traditional elders (maliks) and the sidelining of traditional jirga presided over by maliks dismantled ‘state–society entente and management of conflict’ (Naseemullah 2014: 503). CIA drone ‘signature strikes’ exacerbated this disruption. ‘Signature strikes’ target groups of men based on behaviour patterns that could be associated with terrorism, rather than targeting known identities. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2013a: 11) reports that tribal elders fear convening conflict-resolution jirgas in tribal
areas lest such gatherings attract a signature strike. In this sense, there is a gap between the acclaimed precision of drone targeting and the reality of the crudeness of the technology. It has turned out to be another blunt instrument of violence that is destructive of social capital and constitutive of anomie. In one shocking targeting of a large *jirga* on 17 March 2011, only four of the 40 men believed to have been killed were militants, with a large proportion of those killed being *maliks* (ICG 2013a: 12). While the *maliks* struggle to hold together traditional normative order and to plead with militants to abandon violent resistance, if they are not murdered by the Taliban, they are murdered by the Americans. All these factors have radically shifted the *malik–mullah* balance in favour of the *mullahs* (Harrison 2009). It also shifted the balance between *jirga* and *fatwa* (a ruling on Islamic law) in favour of the *fatwa* (Chandran 2012: 70). The indigenous and deliberative *jirga* decided in *hujras* lost ground to the theocratic edicts of the *fatwa* issued from mosques.

Militant Islam mobilised historically excluded local groups through its millennial imaginary. These constituencies excluded from the old hybrid governance had long traditions of anticolonial, anti-*malik*, anti-state and anti-tribal authority defiance. They included impoverished Wazir subclans and unemployed youth who were unimpressed with tribal elders and their traditions. Mariam Abou Zahab (2013: 52) characterises this as a ‘movement of the *kashars* (the young, the poor and those who belong to minor lineages or powerless tribes) against the *mashars* (the tribal elders) and the Political Agent’.

One police leader from KPK added a greed-based interpretation to this reading of grievance: ‘Landless people joined the Taliban to grab land’ (Interview in Abbottabad, 2013, No. 051350). Through Taliban courts, ‘the Taliban also got the ascendancy by getting victims of rip-offs by business elites their money back’ (Interview in Quetta, 2013, No. 051358). This proved easy with an insurgency that has caused most surviving *maliks* and middle-class people to flee FATA for cities such as Peshawar. Not only did militant *mullahs* who harnessed the defiance of *kashars* displace *malik* power and state power with *mullah* power, but also the traditional tribal authority of elders was pushed aside by the power of the gun in the hands of marginalised young men. Some of these young men were veterans of

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25 A reverse traffic to this fleeing of the middle class from FATA involves criminals on the run from the police in cities such as Peshawar escaping to FATA beyond the jurisdiction of state police (Proposition 9).
the Kashmir jihad who, after insurgency into Indian Kashmir declined after 2003, found they ‘had no vocation other than “the Jihad” [and] drifted to FATA to join the Pakistan Taliban’ (Khan 2011: 215).

Abbas (2010: 8) therefore construes the TTP conflict at the local level as a class conflict against the historical elitism and local tyranny of maliks and agents who were collaborators with indirect rule by Islamabad. The Talibanisation imaginary right across the Pashtun belt of Afghanistan and Pakistan is for a war of liberation that is at once ‘an anti-feudal and anti-capitalist revolution’ (Hussain 2013: 65). Western-educated capitalists from the city and rural landlords, according to this imaginary, are gentry cut from the same cloth. In a place like the Swat Valley, both showed contempt for local forests and disinterest in the education of the poor and propped up a corrupt justice system that defended their own interests against those of the poor (Hussain 2013: 76, 92–3). At the same time, there were middle-class progressives among them. The majority of the TTP followers of Maulana Fazlullah in the Swat Valley were from the lower rungs of the social ladder. Fazlullah gave them recognition and respect, promised power for the powerless and communicated to them widely and regularly in their own language through his FM radio station. Many women became avid listeners of the radio station and active volunteers who worked for it.

Apart from the fact that the United States frequently sought to sabotage the dozens of attempts to forge peace agreements between the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani Taliban,26 many tribal people we interviewed argued that these attempts at peace always failed because they were processes that were not responsive to the hybrid governance of tribal areas. Across 30 peace agreements, one Pashtun newspaperman could not think of any exception to a pattern where:

tribesmen were left out of the peace agreements. They were between militants and the military. Local administrators were not even involved. So there was no backing of the people of the area. (Interview in Peshawar, 2013, No. 051316)

26 Our notes from two interviews with a Pakistani general who led one of the major peace deals in FATA before the drone era records the following: ‘But the big obstacle came from the Americans firing mortars, shooting rockets, dropping bombs. So the Pakistan Taliban came to him and said you were not living up to your side of the bargain, which he thought was a fair comment. This American spoiling was what caused his cascades of nonviolence to unravel’ (Author notes from interview in Islamabad, 2013, No. 051301). Other interviews record US drone attacks likewise spoiling subsequent peace diplomacy and peace deals in FATA.
The lack of involvement of women was not even mentioned. ISI Brigadier Mahmood Shah, who has spent much of his life in FATA, said:

In tribal areas you must do the agreement with the tribe, and not with the militants. It’s the tribe that provides protection for the militants … You need to ask the tribal leaders to give a guarantee that the militants in their areas will not do B, C or D and in return we will guarantee X, Y and Z … Military force needs to be used and then negotiation can occur when the maliks have been restored to their proper positions of authority. The traditions in each tribal area are different so one needs to be able to understand the complexity. (Interview, 2013, No. 051308)

Responsiveness goes beyond the ‘who’ to the ‘how’ of a peace jirga. One man from Bajaur Agency in FATA said that, when you sit down with tribal Pashtuns to build a peace, you start by telling them a story:

I tell them stories, they tell me stories. In their language. Then we share food from the same plate together. They tell poems, I tell poems. Then trust is beginning to build and a peace begins as a process. (Interview, 2013, No. 051358)

Informants argued that Pakistan’s initial mistake that set it on the cascade to becoming an ‘extremely violent society’ (Karstedt 2014) was president Musharraf overly seeking to please the United States through massive military operations during the first two years when the Afghan Taliban and Al-Qaeda fled to FATA. ‘In 2002, diplomacy was needed in Afghanistan. In 2003, Pakistan made the mistake of going in militarily to FATA. As a result, the TTP grew’ and then the dozens of militant FATA groups rebranded as the TTP in 2007 (Interview with Pakistani military brigadier, Peshawar, 2013, No. 051320). However, the same informants argued that a return of middle-class IDPs to FATA required both an umbrella of military security and a peace process. A Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Sami (JUI-S) party leader argued that a peace process must be inclusive and thoughtful about the different stages needed to gradually move the different participants to a viable new hybrid governance for FATA. A first prong, he argued, is to peel off low-level fighters by taking away the grievances that cause them to join the jihad. Access to education for their children is critical, as is seeing US and other foreign fighters withdraw from their tribal lands that cross the Afghanistan–Pakistan border and an end to drone attacks: ‘We must disarm the arguments of
the foot soldier. The most important thing to say to him is that we are no longer fighting America’s war on terror’ (Interview with JUI-S leader, Peshawar, 2013, No. 051319).

His second prong is to bribe middle-level commanders (perhaps with cash for surrender of their weapons). His third prong is negotiation of a realist political solution with the top commanders. This means a process that is culturally appropriate for tribal Pashtuns and that asks the top leaders what they want politically. ‘Okay, if you want Sharia law, what are we going to do with this group who are against Sharia law?’ This JUI-S party leader’s philosophy includes a grievance-driven approach with low-level fighters who are mostly fighting a class war, a greed-driven approach for middle-level commanders who could otherwise become spoilers and morph into criminal gang leaders and a political negotiation approach for top TTP leaders. All this must be backed, he argued, by a credible and resolute military presence.

This political leader was influenced by the Northern Ireland peace process, where the ultimate principals to the political negotiations were the most extreme elements: Reverend Ian Paisley on the Loyalist side, Gerry Adams of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA), who had displaced the less violent and extreme ‘old IRA’, on the Republican side and Protestant and Catholic politicians of middle-ground compromise and reform such as John Hume. Through a process of responsiveness to the needs of impoverished lower-level and middle-level combatants’ claims that are grounded in grievance or greed, the most extreme leaders can be made to fear isolation unless they negotiate a political compromise. This fear of isolation is especially likely as elements of FATA civil society and local governance return to the area. These returning elites can re-establish their traditional tribal bonds with reintegrated TTP fighters who benefit from the new peaceful social compact for a future with more social justice. That means a pact for inclusion of the formerly excluded landless and for the landlords who have been excluded from their land as IDPs.

In a preliminary negotiation, both the Taliban and the Pakistan state need to establish red lines that neither of them will cross and then find a middle way. That is, the first *jirga* between the two sides would draw these red lines. (Interview, Pakistan, 2013, No. 051319)

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27 The Pashtun tradition is to have a ceasefire as a context for talks. If the talks collapse then you start shooting again (Interview with retired Pashtun lieutenant general from FATA, Peshawar, 2013, No. 051301).
This JUI-S version of a sequenced peace strategy that is responsive to local hybrid governance realities is one example of many in our interviews.

**Top-down negotiation, bottom-up mosaics**

One peacebuilding NGO that had resolved a peace in 37 very local conflict *jirgas* in south-western Waziristan envisioned a strategy in which many such peace processes in separate rural locales might connect up through wider *jirgas* into pieces of peace that might ultimately constitute a fabric of peace *jirgas* across all of North and South Waziristan; then across all FATA for a whole-of-FATA peace and then across the border into Afghanistan. In time, a whole-of-Pakistan peace could one day connect up to a whole-of-Afghanistan cascade of peace. As a Pakistani army brigadier who was born in FATA put it:

> Peace comes in a mosaic way in Afghanistan. There are 34 provinces. Afghanistan is always decentralised. Self-government is needed with an in-group morality and a loose connection to the centre. The solution lies in this mosaic, a more close-to-the-ground reality and a higher acceptability factor. (Interview with FATA brigadier, 2013, No. 051320)

There are many different visions of how to build peace in FATA. Few topics for discussion can be more important. Yet it is impossible for outsiders such as the authors of this book to know which, if any of them, might work. We can agree that military–militant deals reached by both sides wading through blood have not worked. We can also agree with the JUI-S leader quoted above, who has an analysis similar to the former British colonial diagnosis. He argued that the United States may be able to arrest the Afghan Taliban leader tomorrow on the basis of their own intelligence, just as they did with Osama bin Laden, and certainly the Pakistani state could. But both want him alive—and they wanted Mullah Omar alive before he died—because he could legitimise a peace process:

> He’s not replaceable because of his symbolic value … If they killed Mullah Omar no one on the Taliban side would believe in an apparent peace process and hundreds of thousands of willing fighters would join the fray. We need to isolate the FATA insurgency in this way because military power cannot finish them off. There are almost a million kids illiterate in FATA. There are Swat Valley people in Afghanistan today. There are 10,000-foot [3,000 m] mountains in FATA where insurgents can take shelter and never be defeated. (Interview with JUI-S leader, 2013, No. 051319)
The fact that Pakistan wanted Mullah Omar alive is supported by its keeping the lid on the fact of his death for two years after it happened. Beyond the folly of killing Mullah Omar, both US diplomatic and Pakistani commentators we interviewed agreed that the position the Pakistani military puts to the United States is a fear of all the militant groups being allied against the state of Pakistan if they tackle them all at once. ‘So a selective approach is needed’, the Pakistani military argues. We have seen in this chapter that the practice of past ISI selectivity has been to tolerate militants who threaten the United States, India and Afghanistan and to crack down on those who challenge the domination of the Pakistani military. In addition to the leadership of the Afghan Taliban’s Quetta Shura, ‘GHQ [headquarters of the Pakistani military] don’t want to give up Haqqani’ (Interview with Western diplomat, Islamabad, 2013, No. 051359).

The hypocrisy in the military’s analysis does not mean it is necessarily completely wrong. They believe that by prioritising military targeting of some insurgents who compete with others, those competitors might become more realistic peace partners. Our interviews suggested that the Pakistani military had been pressing the Quetta Shura of the Taliban and the Haqqani network to ultimately make peace talks work with the Afghan Government for powersharing in Afghanistan as part of Pakistan’s strategy for peace with the Pakistani Taliban. For their part, Obama-era Western diplomats in Islamabad hoped that democratic peacemaking reform elements in the Pakistani military and in the ISI could be cultivated and encouraged to take a path like the one taken in recent years by reform elements in the Myanmar military and in the Indonesian military in the 1990s. In few countries is it more difficult to see the paths for cascades of peace. This will make Pakistan a strategic case for helping us to think more creatively, in Part III of this book, about how to end seemingly interminable cascades of violence and militarisation.

A final, particularly important contribution of this chapter—important for the remainder of this book—is that it helps clarify what we mean by militarisation as a phenomenon that cascades. As with Kashmir in the previous chapter, so with the Swat Valley, FATA and Balochistan in this chapter: when tens of thousands of soldiers move into an area, most aspects of the local governance of that space become imbued with a military character, particularly local security (e.g. policing) and political institutions, but other kinds of institutions as well. At a national level, we see a much more pervasive militarisation of national institutions in
Pakistan than we saw for India in Chapter 5. At both the local and the national levels, we can conceive of militarisation as a continuous variable. Pakistan is a country that clearly was much further along the militarisation continuum than India during long periods when executive government was taken over in military coups. Yet, at every period of Pakistan’s history, we have attempted to show that its military, more than the Indian military leadership, shapes national institutions, controlling them on issues where it is important enough to do so and limiting the degrees of freedom of elected leaders and all other branches of governance.

This is how we define militarisation in this book: control or shaping of other institutions by the military and imbuing other institutions with a military character. Extreme militarisation conduces to ‘intelisation’—as we have illustrated with the exceptional influence of Pakistan’s ISI in shaping politics across South Asia. Extreme militarisation means that a master political cleavage is always between the military and its enemies. Military hegemony over the society then arises from the fact that one path to political power becomes to pick a fight with the enemies of the military to make the military your political ally/sponsor. This was how the Pakistan prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, who stood down after corruption findings against him by the courts in August 2017, initially became an influential politician, even though his politics were a constant contest between military power and his civilian power. The next chapter considers a society deeply influenced by Pakistani militarisation, yet with a character of militarisation that is qualitatively different.
Macro to micro cascades: Bangladesh

Macro violence

Chapters 5 and 6 began to reveal how imperial domination cascaded down to a politics of separation of India from the Mughal and British empires, which cascaded further down to a violent politics of separation of Pakistan from India, cascading to a war of separation of Bangladesh from Pakistan. This chapter follows how this cascaded further through layers of internal conflict within Bangladesh. The focus of this chapter is to place the final cascades that occurred within the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh into the context of the entirety of the South Asian cascades. We consider how the macro cascades from the Mughal and British empires play out in one particular part of greater India: Bengal. While Chapter 5 shows the horizontal breadth of 26 different cascade dynamics, this chapter documents the vertical depth of cascade dynamics from greater India down to the most peripheral little villages of the CHT.

The South Asian cascades of partitions delivered homogeneity without peace to the geopolitically critical part of imperial India that was Bengal. We argue that this was because the comparative homogeneity that emerged in Bangladesh was achieved by a cascade of violence. This chapter resumes the theme that modern wars can cascade to the creation of Hobbesian rural spaces in which sexual violence becomes a strategy, revenge is indulged, rule of law is in abeyance and insurgents morph into gangs of organised criminals. These anomic spaces are in the market for a supplier
of order (Proposition 7). That supply might come from one organised crime group dominating or from an armed rule-of-law movement such as the Taliban, UN peacekeepers, a state that supplies community policing and the rule of law or a state military that allows enough pacification to justify its presence and enough anarchy to itself profit from organised crime. The CHT are seen as fitting the last description. The descent into this condition is viewed through a lens that points from the CHT back through the layers of the above cascades.

Plate 7.1 Peacebuilding Compared filmmaker Sari Braithwaite and Bina D’Costa, while smiling for John’s camera, have actually been detained by the military while attempting to visit a recently burnt-out indigenous village, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 2011.
Source: John Braithwaite, fieldwork photograph.

Chittagong Hill Tracts’ layers of violence

The CHT conflict had been raging for 25 years when a peace agreement was signed in 1997. This was a conflict that pitted the indigenous peoples of the CHT against ethnically Bengali settlers and Bangladeshi security forces defending the settlers’ right to land in the CHT. The indigenous peoples of the CHT were concerned about a sequence of policies,
including the flooding of 40 per cent of the arable land in the CHT and, in 1961, the displacement of 100,000 mostly indigenous people for the Kapitai Dam, unsustainable exploitation of forests and state incentives for Bengalis to settle in the CHT that made indigenous hill peoples a minority in their own lands.

In 1947, indigenous people were 98 per cent of the CHT population; one estimate was 51 per cent in 1991 and falling since (Mohsin 2002: 119); another re-computed 2011 Census figures to suggest 53 per cent. The last figure is only a guess informed by interviews with donors as the state stopped collecting these statistics when the figure hit 51 per cent. In this sense, the conflict has been like the struggle of the people of West Papua to resist transmigration—a struggle that in the past decade passed the tipping point of non-Papuan Indonesians becoming a majority (Braithwaite et al. 2010a)—or the Christian Philippines pursuing a long-run policy of transmigration of Christians to render Muslim Moro a minority on the island of Mindanao. The conscious use of migration to marginalise indigenous people was also the policy of the British Empire in its Europeanisation of the continent of Australia two centuries ago. We therefore see the core dynamic of CHT violence as a historically recurrent modality of cascading violence, yet with each exemplar having its own very local dynamic character. This armed conflict was not a struggle for the independence of the CHT from Bangladesh. Rather, the insurgents’ objective was a level of autonomy comparable to that which the CHT enjoyed in British colonial times and the return of Bengali settlers who had arrived in recent decades. The European Union has more than once offered to fund resettlement incentives for limited returns to the plains by recent settlers. Our donor interviews confirm the Government of Bangladesh has spurned this offer.

The CHT conflict is still very much alive today because the government has been either unable or unwilling to implement key clauses of the 1997 CHT Accord. To the indigenous political leaders and the insurgency factions of the CHT, the Government of Bangladesh and the international community—especially India—tricked them into handing in their weapons and then walked away from the CHT Accord, which had motivated their leaders to opt for peace. Many insightful analyses have been written on this conflict (e.g. CHT Commission 2000; Fortna 2008; Mohsin 2002, 2003). In this chapter, we interpret the conflict as being the end point of a cascade of violence, while incorporating local drivers of conflict into the analysis. Fieldwork for this research comprised
114 interviews, some with more than one stakeholder in the CHT conflict, mainly conducted in trips to the CHT in 2010 and 2011, although Bina D’Costa had other research trips to her homeland during this period and John Braithwaite had another research trip in 2015.

Bengal was one of the regions deeply traumatised by the violence of the Partition of India. We saw in Chapter 6 that the violence of Partition was crucial to understanding why Pakistan became a militarised state (Jalal 1995). Military domination of East Pakistan by West Pakistan ensued. This long cascade of violence was constituted by the separation of India from the United Kingdom, of Pakistan from India, Bangladesh from Pakistan, the civil war of indigenous peoples of the CHT against Bengali settlers and violence between more and less dominant indigenous groups and spoiler factions within the CHT who were encouraged by Bangladeshi military and intelligence operatives (Fortna 2008; Mohsin 2002, 2003). At each level of the cascade, violence from the higher (more macro) level created a political niche for escalated violence at the next level down.

At the lowest level of multiple cascades of violence that we identified in Chapter 5 in the history of greater India (Majumdar et al. 1950) are the many localised Maoist/Naxalite insurgencies. Some Naxalites continue to have a foothold in Bangladesh; in fact, the Naxalite movement started in Naxalbari in Indian West Bengal. To some extent, similar to the indigenous struggles in the CHT, the Naxalite movement was also generated as a conflict over land rights and very poor people in the rural periphery of rapidly developing countries resenting oppression from metropolitan elites. For an overview of land rights as motivators of bottom-up conflicts in the CHT that have much in common with the Naxalite/Maoist conflicts documented in Chapter 5, the work of Shapan Adnan (2004) and Shapan Adnan and Ranajit Dastidar (2011) is illuminating.

This chapter brings into focus the idea of seeing South Asian history as cascades of violence by looking at them from the end point of the cascade within the CHT. We begin the analysis at the macro end, however, with the breakup of India. Greater India before Partition was a hugely diverse nation. It remained almost as diverse after Partition, with India including a larger Muslim population than Pakistan, and also with large Buddhist, Sikh, Christian and other minorities. Pakistan was rendered more homogeneously Islamic, with over 90 per cent of the population Muslim, yet remained ethnically diverse, with more than 60 language groups.
Ethnic and language conflicts contributed to the separation of East from West Pakistan in 1971. After this sequence of two bloody partitions, Bangladesh was left as one of the most homogeneous nations in the world: 90 per cent Muslim, 98 per cent ethnically Bengali, with almost all its citizens able to speak the Bengali language. In spite of this, it still suffered a civil war in which ethnic minorities constituting barely half of 1 per cent of the population took up arms against the majority. The South Asian cascade of partitions delivered homogeneity without peace to Bangladesh. We argue that this was because the comparative homogeneity was achieved by a cascade of violence that cascaded militarisation and domination (Proposition 8) and because it is not homogeneity that predicts absence of civil war; rather, it is non-discrimination and inclusion that create positive peace (as the total assembly of evidence concludes in Part III).

Let us now seek to understand something of the dynamics of each layer of a cascade that we will characterise first as a cascade of militarisation. First, we consider militarisation in imperial pacification, then in the Partition of India and Pakistan, then in the partition of Pakistan and Bangladesh, then in autonomy struggles within Bangladesh and, finally, militarisation in the resistance to the resistance within the CHT.

**Militarisation in imperial pacification**

The Mughal Empire and the British East India Company can be conceived as imperial protection rackets oriented to squeezing maximum tax in return for protection from other armies (van Schendel 2009). This was the first of a number of cascades of domination that our narrative conceives as washing across South Asia. It is hard to underestimate the importance of the Mughal Empire (1526–1710 CE) to the history of greater India. There was no continuity in state formation in India as there was in China after 200 BCE. While the Portuguese settlement in Goa in 1510 was strategic to control the sea trade across Asia and between Asia and Europe, it was nearly a century later that the Dutch, French, Danish and British began to establish their trading ports by setting up alliances with local powerbrokers (Sheppard et al. 2009: 355). However, following the 1526 invasion of the Persian Babar, the Mughals financed the establishment of the entire empire through a system of taxation on land and internal trade. Soldiers were needed to build, control and maintain hold of the empire. Desai (2009: 7) concludes that the Mughal Empire was the first time one
dynasty had controlled up to 80 per cent of India since the Maurya period of 400–300 BCE. By the 1590s, the Mughal emperor ‘commanded more than four million warriors—a force bigger than any army in Europe until the twentieth century’ (Boot 2006: 82–3). It was not a power the British Empire could defeat head-on.

Neither the Mughal nor the British empires ruled India in the direct sense of a contemporary state. While the rule of both empires was in most regions limited to collecting tax to enrich the rulers and fund their indirect administration and their military domination, the British East India Company differed from the Mughal Empire in that its modus operandi was ‘not just collecting but maximizing the revenue’ (Desai 2009: 54). East India Company profit maximisation was to satisfy the extravagant expectations created to raise capital from shareholders (Mill 1826). In comparison, Mughal revenue raising was haphazard, often flexible and tradition-bound—for example, during wars and good years of harvesting, the tax was higher than during times of poor harvest. The East India Company’s revenue raising was oppressive, savagely exacerbating the poverty of the ordinary people of the colony during their hardest times. Its rigid insistence on tax collection in response to a succession of droughts then floods in 1769–70, combined with unbridled profiteering in grain markets, led to a famine in which one-third of Bengal’s population—10 million people—perished (van Schendel 2009: 57).¹ Tax collection in Bengal had been outsourced to zamindars (landlords), who were primarily Muslims during Mughal hegemony, but were later replaced mostly with Hindus under the British imperium. The East India Company² was corrupt and failed to create institutions that would allow economic development and good governance. It exemplified Acemoglu et al.’s (2004) and Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) conclusion that, in the wealthiest parts of the early modern world, such as India, colonialism imposed exploitative, extractive military control that farmed and manipulated the formidable regimes that had created their wealth, while in the poor lands of early modernity, such as North America, Australia and New Zealand, colonialism created white settler economies designed to benefit the settlers through good

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¹ The first governor-general of India, Warren Hastings, and some of his colleagues in 1772 reflected on the British East India Company’s key role in meeting revenue demands for repatriation to Britain (Sheppard et al. 2009: 366).
² The decisive Battle of Plassey in 1757 was the first major clash of arms between the Moghuls and the East India Company, following which the British became masters of Bengal, Bihar and Orissa and eventually of most of India (Butalia 1998: 144–54).
institutions. Keay (2010: 414–15) argues that *Pax Britannica* devastated the Indian rural economy not only because it was *Tax Britannica*, but also because it was *Axe Britannica*—deforesting the continent from 1780 and disrupting ecological balances on which rural livelihoods depended. This critique became less true as British influence in India passed from the East India Company to the British state (the company was wound up in 1857). The British colonial state built many enduringly valuable institutions such as law courts, a legal profession and a fine university system by nineteenth-century standards.

On the other hand, the militarisation of greater India by the British Raj was more oppressive as time went on. It was beyond the power of the British to subdue and fragment a military power as formidable as the Mughal Empire without turning other local rulers against the Mughals and assisting their armies to resist. British sovereignty, like British taxation, could only be achieved indirectly by opening up divisions in the country, enrolling weaker rulers to be British puppets and to usurp, through violence, stronger rulers who might challenge British control. Enmities the British Raj intentionally stoked continued to create flashpoints of conflict for centuries afterwards. In sowing fragmentation to underwrite indirect rule, the British were taking a page from the Mughal Empire’s playbook. Divide and conquer were not the only tyranny that cascaded from the Mughals to the British to the present. When General Reginald Dyer fired on peaceful demonstrators in Amritsar on 13 April 1919, a week after Gandhi’s first *hartal* (withdrawal of the cooperation of people with their governors through strikes and shop closings), it provided a model (Proposition 2) for how South Asian states later in the century would respond to Gandhian tactics of resistance.

So we conclude that the first cascades of violence that rolled across greater India and across the centuries, and the first cascades of corruption, cronyism and money politics that crippled the whole of greater India, were at the hands of the haphazard yet responsively traditionalist tax exploitation of the Mughals and the systematic, destructive tax exploitation of the British that was locally unresponsive and responsive instead to the logic of the capitalism of the metropole. While the cost of these cascades in institutionalising violence and in crippling institutions of economic development were inestimable, progressively, through the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, British state power that displaced the capitalist power of the East India Company began to build noble institutions such as courts, an education system and a national bureaucracy that were
constructive contributions to the development of modern India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Gandhi, after all, was as much a product of these institutions—of a British education and British legal professionalism—as he was a product of Indian spiritual traditions of nonviolent ethos and citizenship. In Gandhi’s satyagraha (truthful resistance)—denoting a legitimate, authentic and moral form of political action against state oppression (Chakrabarty and Pandey 2009: 40)—one crucial variable was ahimsa (nonviolence), which drew on the strength of persuasion (p. 51). Even with his nonviolence, Gandhi learnt—via his vegetarian socialist circle in London—from the radical, patient, solidaristic, tactical nonviolence of the Chartists (Desai 2009: 135).

Gandhi was a great sometime resident of Bangladesh (where he organised the weavers, whose struggle is symbolised at the centre of the Indian flag), a leader who saw the possibility of cascades of reconciliation. We return to a discussion of cascades of reconciliation in Part III of this book.

Militarisation in the partition of Pakistan

At first, Mohandas Gandhi, who assumed the presidency of the Indian National Congress in 1921, attempted to cultivate Muslim solidarity with Congress as a party. He did this by exposing the Sykes–Picot Agreement for putting Palestine under British colonial rule that would remove some of Islam’s holiest sites from Muslim control (Desai 2009: 142). However, instead of increasing Hindu–Muslim solidarity, Gandhi’s strategies deepened the hold of the ulamas (Muslim scholars), thereby alienating secular Muslim leaders, including Muhammad Ali Jinnah (Parekh 1997: 18–19), the founding prime minister of Pakistan. There was a perception that Muslims suffered the greatest sacrifices from Gandhi’s nonviolent tactics. Nonviolence required boycotting education institutions and career restrictions that particularly disadvantaged Muslim activists. Because Gandhi also denounced and spurned Muslims when they sometimes resisted with violence the terrible oppression the British inflicted on them, Muslim engagement with the Indian National Congress eroded rapidly between the two World Wars. Some scholars also argue that the idea of Pakistan as a separate state of the Paks (‘the pure’) came very late in the Muslim resistance to British colonialism (Keay 2010: 496). During most of the anticolonial struggle, the majority of Muslim leaders,
including Jinnah, favoured a greater Indian federation with a number of autonomous Muslim democracies scattered across India, shaped by Sharia principles more than by British law.

Many in the evolving Indian National Congress resisted this devolution of power. Most of the Congress leaders believed in an uncompromisingly secular state that had one rule of law for all. Some others were Hindu fundamentalists who resisted Muslim autonomy because of a will to religious hegemony. Most of all, the Congress had become a hierarchy under the control of a few Hindu leaders who did not want to share power with Jinnah and Muslim leaders, preferring ‘to rule India on its own terms’ (Desai 2009: 450), even if constituting only 75 per cent of the population of greater India. So the Congress elite could, in the end, be persuaded by Lord Louis Mountbatten to surrender to the ‘inevitability’ of Partition. It was Congress resistance to powersharing with Muslim leaders that had given birth late in the struggle to thoughts of the two-state solution. Once that imaginary was conceived, ambitious Muslim politicians could see that the Pakistan idea could give them power over what could become one of the most powerful states in the world. Indeed, Pakistan did become a geopolitically important state and a nuclear power. Had Pakistan and Bangladesh continued to be unified today, it would be the third most populous state in the world after China and India. The temptation of this kind of geopolitical Muslim leadership was great for ambitious Muslim politicians and military officers.

In the lead-up to independence for India, contestation of top-down religious separatist ideas gave platforms to all manner of bottom-up religious mobilisation of protest. Sikhs and Christians began to fear some of the fundamentalist utterances they heard about building Hindu or Muslim states in their homelands. The tensions were particularly great in regions where both Muslim and Hindu populations were large and where they aggressively contested political and economic opportunities. Some political leaders sought to make their mark during this period of anomie (when the rules of the political game were unsettled and about to be resettled in an independence settlement) by preaching religious violence (Proposition 7). They led mobs in attacks on the religious other. Stories of riots and religious oppression from Noakhali (in south-eastern East Pakistan), Bihar and Rawalpindi spread like wildfire throughout India (D’Costa 2011: 51).
However, it did not always take word spreading of these religious riots before all religious communities felt they might be in a security dilemma (Proposition 5). People worried how their community could inherit political control of their district after independence. They calculated that perhaps it would be better to drive out the religious other before they were driven out themselves. Innocent gestures by the other, even by Gandhi himself, were read as a threat. The decaying postwar British colonial security sector did not have the capacity to manage these security dilemmas. It did not have the personnel to guarantee the security of religious communities living in fear of attack. Hobbesian anarchy and violent self-help were the result—to Gandhi’s despair—although they did abate as a result of the shock of Gandhi himself being murdered by this religious violence in 1948. Instead of solving this predictable security dilemma through good community policing once the spectre of Partition began to hang over greater India, the British state took the seemingly cheaper, more convenient path of giving in to separatism and announcing that Pakistan would be created as a separate Muslim state of two halves on opposite sides of the subcontinent.

This weak decision executed by Lord Mountbatten was the decisive one in giving ambitious leaders total sway over large areas where they enjoyed religious majority support. Dividing and spoiling (Stedman 2000) caused another series of cascades of violence as debates raged about where the precise boundaries between Muslim and Hindu sovereignty should be drawn and about which way Sikhs should move. The announcement of Partition only worsened the security dilemmas of local communities; millions of Muslim refugees headed for Pakistan and millions of Hindus headed from Pakistan to India (Propositions 5 and 6). The large Muslim enclave left behind in Hyderabad in the heart of India created a civil war there that took years to resolve. The population pressures from the stream of refugees in search of somewhere safe to settle, especially the 7 million Muslims pouring into Pakistan, created new cascades of Muslim–Muslim and Hindu–Hindu violence of a more ethnic character.

In sum, these various cascades of violence triggered by a combination of bottom-up mob violence and top-down political ambition and miscalculation cost perhaps as many as 2 million lives. It was the responsibility of the British state to make the security sector investment (Proposition 4) to quell these security dilemmas at the final curtain of the Raj. It failed in that responsibility, struggling as it was to recover from even worse cascades of violence that had washed over Europe during
World War II. If this level of religious slaughter had occurred in the twenty-first century, one would hope that the United Nations would demand of the British state that it honour its ‘responsibility to protect’ (Evans 2008) its citizens. If it were unable to meet that responsibility, the contemporary international community, when at its best, can mobilise its responsibility to protect innocents from religious slaughter by deploying peacekeepers. Today, we know that international peacekeepers are frequently ineffective, but, on average, in the best multivariate studies, peace operations prove effective in substantially increasing the prospects of ending civil violence and preventing future civil wars (Call 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2006; Fortna 2008; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Quinn et al. 2007; Riordan 2013; Sambanis 2008; Walter 2002). With the wisdom of hindsight, we can see that, had it been politically possible, it certainly would have been a profoundly sound investment for other major powers to support the United Kingdom in mobilising to resolve these security dilemmas, not only to prevent the loss of so many lives, but also to prevent cascades from them to future calamities.

In what ways was the cost of failing to make international humanitarian intervention in India in the 1940s much greater than 2 million lives? It was the cost of lives we saw in Sikh separatism, particularly in Punjab in the 1990s, which took the life of prime minister Indira Gandhi, the cost we see today in Kashmir and which we find in the conflict in Afghanistan fuelled by Pakistani intelligence agents that now blows back into Pakistan through the agency of the Pakistani Taliban and Islamic State. And there is the potential future cost to the world of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan or of nuclear terrorism—a risk that is greater in South Asia than in any part of the world. In addition, there was the cascade of the Bangladesh war of liberation, to which we turn in the next section, which cost 200,000 to 1.5 million lives (LaPorte 1972: 105), doubtless fewer than the official Bangladeshi estimate of 3 million, but possibly as high as 1.7 million (Rummel 1998: 153–63). It was the cost of a huge foreign aid burden to fight the massive famine of 1974 (for details, see Sen 1981) that Bangladeshi state institutions could not counter because the war had razed state institutions. In addition, the food politics of the Cold War era made Bangladesh vulnerable to political pressure from states such as the United States, which used food aid to manipulate economic policies (Sobhan 1979), which also contributed to subsequent catastrophic agricultural consequences. That 1974 famine cost another 1.5 million lives.
The unusually massive famines that have plagued the history of Bangladesh are part of an appalling pattern across human history. Complexities of climate change interact with cascades of domination and cascades of violence that disable adaptation to climate change. Cascades of domination and violence, as in Bangladesh, can destroy the state institutions that can manage adaptation. More simply, insecurity can prevent farmers from taking the risk of planting their crops exposed in open fields at the optimum time for planting. Insecurity also recurrently throughout human history disrupts distribution systems for food that is grown. At the time of writing, we see many societies in North Africa and the Middle East that are mobilising their institutions to adapt adequately to the worst drought conditions in decades. The societies with the most massive famine mortality as we write are societies across North Africa and the Middle East that have suffered particularly shocking decimation by recurrent cascades of violence: Yemen, Somalia, Nigeria (where farmers fear Boko Haram), Syria and South Sudan. Some other societies that have suffered institutional decimation by war in recent decades also have unusually large numbers of famine deaths, including Sudan, Ethiopia, Niger, Chad, Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq (Robertscribbler 2017).

For South Asia, the largest problem was that the cascade of violence produced a cascade of militarisation in Pakistan (Aziz 2008; Siddiqa 2007; Chapters 5 and 6, this volume). Border disputes, particularly in Kashmir, created a perceived imperative for the weaker of the two states to build a large military to match its giant adversary. The new India and Pakistan both had larger problems than most new states—because of their size and diversity of language groups—in holding together a fragmented society. In terms of holding fragmentation together, India inherited the advantage of the administrative centre and the institutional infrastructure of greater India in New Delhi, the older imperial centre in Kolkata, as well as nearly all of its industrial capacity (Desai 2009: 295). It also inherited greater revenue and administrative capacity to collect it. Hence, the Indian state could buy loyalty from dissenting regions by supporting them economically. Pakistan could not afford to do that in its early years, so it chose the path of holding the country together by buying the loyalty of a strong military to keep the lid on dissident regions and groups. Between 1947 and 1970, over 50 per cent of Pakistan’s central state expenditure was on defence (van Schendel 2009: 135) and, in some periods, it was over 60 per cent (Mohsin 2002: 152).
As conflict in Kashmir imposed ever-greater military burdens, the military became even more politically indispensable and an ever-greater fiscal burden. This made it more difficult to buy peace from dissident regions. Truncation of options for peace through development was reinforced by the fact that, in Pakistan, unlike in India, the brightest and best sought military careers rather than careers in business or the professions. Both the state and the elite became militarised. By militarisation, we refer to the increasing power and influence of the military in society, the spread of militaristic behaviour/ideologies/values in society and its institutions (Batchelor 2004: 77; Ross 1987: 564) and military build-up with a rapid increase in military spending, armed forces, arms imports and arms production (Batchelor 2004: 78). These processes positioned the Pakistani military to make itself even more indispensable to its political masters, by fomenting security threats in Kashmir, in Afghanistan and through terrorism. Later, the military made itself valuable to foreign clients in China in achieving a regional power balance after India and Afghanistan became aligned with the Soviet Union, and, later still, with the United States when the United States became interested in destabilising the Soviet Union by causing it to bleed into the sand of Afghanistan. Pakistan's military leaders benefited from the equipment and training, including nuclear knowhow, that these great powers could provide, and became wealthy men by corruptly creaming foreign military aid.

We saw in Chapter 6 that their budgets also gave the military the wealth to buy politicians, as did massive funding that the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) collected from benefactors in Arab states for the mujahidin fighting in Afghanistan. As Pakistan became progressively militarised, military control of politicians was exercised through sticks as well as carrots. Leaders whom the military and intelligence commanders did not ‘like’ were assassinated by their agents posing as terrorists. Entire regimes were overthrown by military coups followed by execution or imprisonment of selected leaders of the old regime (usually for corruption). Military patronage passed control of industry and finance to crony families. We will see that the foregoing militarisation imaginary and narrative came to apply to Bangladesh as well as Pakistan. Just 22 families monopolised two-thirds of Pakistan’s industrial assets and controlled 87 per cent of the assets of the banking and insurance industries (D’Costa 2011: 84). It is worth noting for the next step in our analysis that none of these families were Bengali.
Thus, the creation of Pakistan by partitioning India left the smaller state more impoverished, even though its fertile land saw it start out with a higher per capita income than the rest of greater India. It also became more militarised, while India enjoyed a relatively stable democracy with a military continuously under democratic civilian control. Worse was to come when all this cascaded into a civil war that tore Pakistan in two.

**Militarisation beyond the partition of Bangladesh**

Most international scholars opine that it was the folly of Pakistan’s militarised competition with India that caused it to lose Bangladesh (for a critique of this view, see D’Costa 2011: Ch. 3). There were other aspects of Pakistan’s militarisation that contributed to the Bangladesh ‘Liberation War’. For various reasons, British colonialism had cultivated Punjab as ‘our Prussia’ and Punjabis as a loyal ‘military race’ useful for the control of more pacific peoples of greater India (particularly Bengalis during and after the 1857 rebellion against British rule). Approximately 75 per cent of the Pakistani army is drawn from three districts in Punjab (Siddiq 2007: 59). The resultant inheritance of military traditions and familial reproduction of military opportunity structures in Punjab province meant that when the military progressively came to control the Pakistani state, Punjabis increasingly controlled the state, with Punjabi politicians and senior civil servants often chosen by the military to be its clients. Punjab being a centre of power in West Pakistan left Bengalis in East Pakistan feeling excluded from militarised state power. East Pakistan had a majority of the population but only 3 per cent of the higher ranks of the armed forces (van Schendel 2009: 119). In Chapter 6, we saw that this systematic discrimination in military powersharing was also a factor in the 1970s Balochistan civil war. Western control of the state for the greater benefit of the west also captured most foreign aid, with five times as much American aid going to West Pakistan as to East Pakistan before the ‘War of Liberation’ (Brecher and Abas 1972: 62). Bengalis most deeply resented the displacement of Bengali by Urdu as the official language of state. The ‘War of Liberation’ actually started from a grassroots (Bengali) language movement in 1952.
In March 1971, after its near unanimous victory in East Pakistan, the reformist Awami League (AL) had the numbers in the national parliament to dictate sweeping constitutional reform to empower the east. As West Pakistan leaders feigned talks over this political crisis, they secretly mounted a military solution. Pakistani troops streamed into Dhaka and commenced targeted killings of Bengali leaders and political activists that then spread all over East Pakistan. Some Bengali units managed to either kill or overthrow their Pakistani officers and, with Bengali police, began to organise military resistance. They formed the Mukti Bahini, to which young combatants flocked as arms and training flowed to them from India. The Soviet Union also supplied and supported the resistance.

India decided to teach Pakistan a lesson in the east that was more militarily difficult to do in the west. Indian troops marched in to support the Mukti Bahini and delivered a humiliating defeat to Pakistan. One of the Indian terms for the return of Pakistani prisoners of war (POWs) was a grab for land beyond the Line of Control in Kashmir that had been recently occupied by Pakistan. India took this West Pakistan territory as damages after holding 93,000 POWs until 1973. So Pakistan’s defeat in the Bangladesh War of Liberation was a continuation of the cascade of violence that had started with Partition and the subsequent military contests over Kashmir.

The 1971 war was also a continuation of Cold War competition that had cascaded violence across Asia and Africa, with the Soviet Union backing Bangladesh and the United States and China supporting Pakistan. US president Richard Nixon saw cooperation with China and Pakistan as a step towards the United States–China thaw that he and Henry Kissinger were executing. Nixon’s handling of the Bangladesh crisis had a detrimental effect on the United States–India bilateral relationship, which was compounded by the mutual animosity between Indira Gandhi and Nixon. The 1971 war and the emergence of a third sovereign state in the subcontinent shifted the South Asian regional balance of power decisively in India’s favour.

In the aftermath of Pakistan’s military retreat, there was a cascade of retribution for those accused—sometimes wrongly—of collaborating with the occupation, including in the CHT. Many of those targeted fled to West Pakistan, where they became unwelcomed refugees, cascading to further internal conflict there (Proposition 6). Thousands of non-Bengalis, mainly Biharis, were killed in this counter-slaughter and more
than a million who had fled their homes ended up huddled in refugee slum settlements inside Bangladesh where they received some help and protection from the international community. Many of these people described themselves as ‘stranded Pakistanis’ and demanded repatriation to Pakistan. This never happened. Pakistan did not want the disruption and welfare burden they would bring to the country. They remained in their slums/camps, ostracised, stateless, impoverished, living to old age in never-ending limbo. The High Court of Bangladesh in November 2007 issued a rule on a writ petition filed by seven Biharis living in Bangladesh that stated that around 300,000 ‘Urdu-speaking people’ have been living in Bangladesh, and finally approved citizenship and voting rights for about 150,000 refugees who were minors at the time of Bangladesh’s war of independence in 1971. Those who were born after would also gain the right to vote in May 2008 (D’Costa 2009: 13).

Source: Associated Press.

By 1975, there was a rapid decline in the popularity of the new Government of Bangladesh, due to corruption and nepotism in the Awami League, which formed the government, combined with widespread concern over undue Indian influence over the new nation and economic decline in the aftermath of war and famine. The cronyism that characterised Pakistan
had become part of the legacy of Bangladesh. Modelling was the cascade mechanism in play here (Proposition 2). Import licences, smuggling, extortion and industrial opportunities went to Awami League cronies. Steps towards renewed militarisation were taken with Awami League leaders. They formed a paramilitary force, the Jatiya Rakkhi Bahini (JRB, National Defence Force of Bangladesh). Its 30,000 troops terrorised and tortured Awami League opponents. The military resented the level of funding the JRB received while the military budget for 1975–76 was set at 13 per cent of the national budget—a shock compared with the 50–60 per cent the military enjoyed under Pakistani rule. Most of the officers of the Bangladeshi military had been trained in Pakistan and retained its praetorian culture concerning the need for the military to dominate the nation and cleanse corruption among greedy civilian leaders. In fact, the bitter rift between the military and civil servants repatriated from West Pakistan (on one side) and those who fought on the frontline (on the other) opened security sector cleavages in postwar Bangladesh. A group of middle-ranking army officers—most of whom were repatriates—assassinated Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, popularly known as Bangabandhu (‘Friend of Bengal’), the country’s first prime minister (and later president) and the leader of the Awami League, along with more than 40 members of his family on 15 August 1975. Saudi Arabia and China recognised Bangladesh only after Mujib’s death.

While Mujib’s assassination sent shockwaves throughout the region, the coup was also perceived to be politically popular, at least among some segments of urban Bangladeshi society. Between 1977 and 1981, the alleged coup leader, Major General Ziaur Rahman (Zia), delivered economic development and pushed administrative reforms. Jagodal (Jatiyatabadi Gonotantrik Dal), Zia’s national front, was consolidated later in 1978 to form a new political alliance, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). It emerged as the key political player opposed to the Awami League. Zia, however, began to lose popularity and there was another military coup, which put Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad in power from 1982 to 1990. This followed an earlier failed coup attempt in November 1975 by a pro–Awami League chief of general staff, which had triggered the murder of four of the most respected and senior leaders of the Awami League inside a Dhaka prison. While during the Mujib era the Rakkhi Bahini killed an estimated 40,000 people, the numbers of extrajudicial killings and disappearances within the armed forces during Zia’s rule remain an all-time high. Colonel Abu Taher, a liberation wartime
sector commander who subsequently appeared as a left-leaning leader on retirement from the army, was the first Bangladeshi to walk to the gallows in independent Bangladesh. He was hanged immediately after a controversial military court trial along with 16 others, mostly belonging to the left-leaning Jatiya Samajtantrik Dal (Jasod or JSD, National Socialist Party), on treason charges in July 1976. In a bizarre twist, during a plane hijacking drama by the Japanese Red Army in Bangladesh that kept Zia and his senior commanders busy in Dhaka, an army battalion mutiny in Bogura in south-western Bangladesh cost the lives of 200 more soldiers. This uprising was ruthlessly crushed, with 1,100 soldiers either hanged or shot in the next two months. Militarisation cascaded on.

There was also a cascade of liberation politics—anti-militarisation politics—from below throughout the entirety of Bangladeshi history. The University of Dhaka was one hotbed of it, as were elements of the media that were, for the most part, clients of the military and the regime. The way surges of republican politics in defence of a democratic constitution worked in Bangladesh was similar to that in Pakistan. They were rather Gandhian at first: hartals that mobilised large proportions of the population on to the streets, pledging their refusal to cooperate with military regimes, especially in 1990 when people power ended the long military rule that had begun in 1975. Hartals in recent decades came to be enforced (by the political party that calls the hartal) and with much more violent forms of protest. Even so, the movement in December 1990 was very much about people power. People massed, demanding the resignation of president Ershad and calling for free elections in rallies and strikes organised by the All-Parties Student Union and supported by the major political parties. Ershad’s generals deserted him when he asked for their support to restore order (Multiple military interviews, 2010). While West (as well as East) Pakistan had experienced other formidable moments of people power in 1969 and 1981 (Milam 2009: 89), in Bangladesh people power has been historically somewhat stronger in surging back to check military power than in Pakistan. As in Pakistan, in Bangladesh, many ordinary people were rather supportive of military leaders who took over if they seemed to bring competence and integrity to the management of the country, if money power and dirty deals in politics seemed to reduce and if the economy seemed to provide increased opportunity for them and their children. But when coup leaders slipped into corruption and cronyism themselves, and when things started going badly for the country, people power had its opportunities to mobilise for constitutional values.
Generals and party leaders alike live in heightened fear that they will suffer the assassin’s bullet or the noose when people power is on the march. People power creates great opportunities for competitors to rally military elites to replace incumbents and to rally replacement political elites who make more credible commitments than political incumbents to restore the constitution. Consequently, often generals judge that the best bet is to relent to surges of liberation that call for a return to electoral politics. One reason they relent in this call is that, in both Bangladesh and Pakistan, the culture of politics has become so militarised that generals can sustain great influence over elected leaders. Just as military coup leaders fear the assassin’s bullet in a militarised polity, so do elected leaders. They fear the military, especially its intelligence elite, as those who might hire the assassin, and they crave the loyalty of the military to protect them from other potential assassins. Elected leaders fear coups, just as coup leaders fear counter-coups.

Until the end of 1990, the political power of the military had been sustained in Bangladesh in a way similar to the Pakistani formula. General Zia-ul-Haq came to power in Pakistan in a military coup in which he raised the banner of Islam against corrupt secular government. He built an Islamist civil society base for his regime: ‘Militarism and Islam were to be the twin pillars of the Zia regime’ (Jalal 1995: 101). In the same period, in Bangladesh, the regimes of both Ziaur Rahman and Ershad militarised a state created with democratic, rule-of-law aspirations (Riaz 2016). These military regimes also Islamised a state (Riaz 2007) that was founded with secular aspirations in revulsion at the widespread slaughter of Hindus by the Pakistani army during the ‘War of Liberation’. Zia militarised the national police system by firing thousands of police on charges of corruption and appointing army officers to oversee the system (Heitzman et al. 1989: Ch 3)—a legacy that continued during and after the Ershad period.

Quite unlike the era of military takeovers in the 1970s and 1980s, even when opportunities for the military to take control arose, the military elite did not take over again, until 2007. Electoral deadlock between the Awami League and the BNP in 2007, violent clashes and subsequent mass protests led to military intervention, but of a much more subtle kind. The military took over behind the scenes and led a caretaker civilian government that was in power from January 2007 until December 2008. The military strategy was to reconfigure political power bases by forcing Sheikh Hasina (daughter of Mujibur Rahman) and Khaleda Zia (wife of
General Zia) into exile. They intended to then allow others to emerge as alternative viable options in that leadership vacuum. The election on 29 December 2008 made it clear that it was not so easy for the military to accomplish this against party machines that could outspend and outmuscle new competitors; the Awami League won 229 of the 300 seats. By punishing, marginalising or removing dissenting political and economic actors, Sheikh Hasina silenced (and continues to silence) dissenting voices. The military then had to be content with hegemonic influence. The framework of the democracy of two competing family dynasties was ossified.

The Bangladeshi military continues to exercise considerable power through civilian facades—for example, journalists, newspaper editors, intellectuals, politicians and business leaders who are in their pay, in fear of them or who respect them as a source of stability or Islamic ideals. This is very much as in Pakistan and Indian Kashmir. Another path has been colonisation of other institutions by retired military officers. As in Pakistan, in Bangladesh, the dual strategy of militarisation and Islamisation has provided a broader base for the power of generals than a pure militarisation strategy could have provided without the support of religious networks in civil society. When General Ershad was president (1982–90), he broadened his political support through a local mosque-building program. The legacy of all this was revealed in our interviews, as captured in the following extract:

J. B. interview: Who is the more influential, the two major political parties or the military?

Senior political leader in the CHT: This country is ruled by the military and the DGFI [Directorate General of Forces Intelligence]. (Interview, CHT, 2011, No. 101129)

Bangladesh has a two-party political system today that is more vibrant and somewhat less controlled by the military than the system in Pakistan. The Awami League is less Islamised than its competitor, the BNP, which was founded by a military man and is led today by Khaleda Zia. Yet how the state-founding Awami League has changed is a tribute to the dual appeal of militarisation and Islamisation for securing hegemony. This was the party whose grassroots leadership pulled on the crisis that led Bangladesh to independence. It was a determinedly secular party in the 1970s that assumed power with the military firmly under its control.
Nevertheless, today it is a considerably Islamised party that works with the military as partners in a pact of mutual intimidation: a dynasty in fear of military power and a military in fear of dynasty power.

Khaleda Zia first took the BNP to an election victory in 1991. The Awami League is led by Sheikh Hasina. Both parties are dynastic. Both Hasina and Khaleda have alternated as prime minister and opposition leader, both serving in each role twice, monopolising these leadership positions since 1991. Both have sons who they have groomed to succeed them. The dynastic quality of the leadership plays into the dynamics of militarisation and democracy that have driven domination through dynastic populist Islamisation of politics.

Insiders from both dynasties reported to us that their leaders feel the chill of their family biographies. They both have a highly developed fear of the assassin’s bullet and the coup that caused so much pain to their father, their husband and extended families. They also remember other unsuccessful assassination attempts by elements of the military against the male family members who founded their parties.

Both incumbent party leaders have a robust contest with the military. In power, they promote the generals most likely to be loyal to them:

Sure, you promote your own men from a party point of view, but you know those passed over are a danger to you. So you seek to maintain good relations with everyone in the military, including those you pass over and you keep them in good positions. (Interview with former BNP minister, 2011, No. 101151)

Junior and middle-ranking officers wish to stay on good terms with both dynasties, but, at the end game of their careers, the most senior among them only make it right to the top by backing the incumbent dynasty or the dynasty they believe will soon succeed it. Once they take sides in dynastic politics to boost a surge to the top, they might last at the top only as long as that side remains in power, unless they are clever in the way they change sides at the right moment to assist the successor dynasty back to power. This interplay between democracy and militarisation contributes to a type of democracy that is a driver of domination (Proposition 5(a), Chapter 10).

This game, of course, makes it difficult for third parties to draw on the formidable power of the military. Conversely, the praetorian culture of the military is reinforced by what insiders from both major parties
reported as a preference of both party leaders for being displaced by a nonviolent military coup over being replaced with the other party leader. The militarised two-party system is also reinforced by money politics. Our interviews with business leaders and lobby groups indicate that they best serve the interests of their business by not supporting third parties and by making large payments when asked by both dynastic parties. Many of them make larger payments to one over another to reinforce the better crony networks they have with that party for securing government contracts, favourable tax treatment and rapid project approvals when their favoured party is in power. Business leaders also cultivate military leaders who might help them persuade the civilian government to do deals with them and who can help guarantee their own security as members of the elite.

This symbiosis between military politics and money politics engenders a two-class system or a ‘two-networks’ system, as one senior supporter of the current government put it. Yes, there is a professional class, an intellectual class, the glamour classes of stage, screen and fashion, traditional castes and religious and NGO elites. Notwithstanding these and other nuances of elite composition, the deep structure of the Bangladeshi class system is bifurcated into a military class who do military politics and a business-political class who do money politics. ‘In the 1973 parliament, 10 per cent of the members were businessmen; today the figure is 70 per cent and increasing’ (Interview with a newspaper editor, Dhaka, 2011, No. 101154). However accurate these numbers are, there were no informants who disagreed that the moneyed business class has progressively taken over parliamentary politics since the ‘War of Liberation’. ‘In Bangladesh, politics is a continuation of business by other means’ (Interview with political insider, 2011, No. 101156). ‘Politics is the best business in Bangladesh’ (Interview with indigenous leader, CHT, 2011, No. 111018). Few military leaders go into politics. They can be more influential as a general who guides the dynasties than as a Member of Parliament who seeks to influence them through enacting laws. ‘They [the military] don’t tell us what to do. Their attitude is to guide you’ (Interview with former minister, 2011, No. 101151).

The military class is reproduced through an elite system of cadet schools that was initially inherited from Pakistan, with new cadet schools emulating Pakistan’s after separation (Proposition 2). The Pakistani military had modelled these schools on Eton College in England. Today, there are two elite cadet schools for girls as well as the 10 for boys.
While maintaining a low-profile facade, these are some of the wealthiest schools in Bangladesh and are highly competitive to enter, though easier for military families with the right connections. Graduation from these schools is the best route into graduation from the best universities. Bangladeshi military officers are extremely well educated compared with the officers of Western militaries. In our interviews with dozens of them, we learnt that many have multiple masters’ degrees from good universities.

For most of Bangladeshi history, the military has been the safest path to wealth, status and power. This has begun to change in recent years as the economy has boomed, creating more lucrative business opportunities today than in the past. Yet it continues to be the case that many of the brightest young people are inducted into the military rather than business through the portals of the cadet schools. This underwrites the hegemonic class power of the military. Politicians often respect senior military officers as more educated, more sophisticated, more urbane and broader in their understanding of the rest of the world, compared with themselves. This respect for the good preparation the military class has had for rule, in comparison with those who have come up through money politics, also infects the perceptions of ordinary people. When money politics becomes so incompetent, so corrupt and so debilitating that the people want change, a cleaner, more highly educated, religiously pious general has been a politically credible option.

Understanding this symbiosis and dialectic between a distinct military class and a business-political class is necessary for understanding the dynamics of the next cascade of violence down into the CHT. Because military politics and money politics cascaded across time and across space (from Pakistan) in Bangladeshi history, violence cascaded down to a civil war in the CHT and from the instability there across to insurgencies back in India, where all these cascades began, and into Myanmar.

**Militarisation in the Chittagong Hill Tracts**

We have seen that the sequenced breakaway of Pakistan from India and Bangladesh from Pakistan left Bangladesh an unusually homogeneous state: 90 per cent Muslim and 98 per cent Bengali. Even with that degree of homogeneity, an internal armed conflict with its indigenous minorities in the CHT risked further fragmentation of the state. We have interpreted the CHT civil war as an outcome of the earlier cascades of violence.
The first South Asian fieldwork for the Peacebuilding Compared project was in the CHT. Indeed, the central inference of this book about cascades of violence first came to the project in Bangladesh, before we began to apply the cascade lens to India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Myanmar and beyond.

Within the CHT, we found a further cascade of domination. This is partly military domination, but also domination of other indigenous minorities by the largest minority, the Chakma. When the CHT Accord was finally signed in 1997, spoiler factions broke away—the lowest level of our cascade of violence.

The domination dynamics that cascade down to the CHT take many forms, including—among other dynamics—cascades of exclusion, militarism, cronyism, corruption and money politics, of mob violence, of land grabs in an overpopulated, flooded country and of class politics. These cascades of domination are met from below by brave surges of liberation, of resistance to domination, of self-help and self-education, of nonviolence, of human rights activism, of women’s rights activism and of empowerment and participatory village and NGO politics. So we can conceive the nest of conflicts in the CHT and across South Asia in terms of contests between cascades of violence and surges of liberation from the bottom up.

Our conclusion also embraces alternative, top-down cascades of rights discourse, of separations of powers, of constitutional inclusion (as opposed to the exclusion of indigenous rights in the current constitution), of respect for and responsiveness to the ethnic other and the rule of law. These are top-down cascades of peacebuilding that check cascades of violence. We conclude that South Asian insurgency groups, such as those we find in the CHT—the Purba Banglar Sarbahara Party (PBSP, Proletarian Party of East Bengal) in the 1960s and 1970s in the south-west, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen (JMB), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB, Awakened Muslim Masses of Bangladesh) in the north-west of Bangladesh from the late 1990s until 2006—have taken root where top-down law and order have broken down. This allowed militants to move in, promising a parallel state structure that worked in providing personal security or addressing personal grievances such as those related to land disputes.

This book does not seek to replicate the excellent analyses of the grievances concerning land rights, gendered inequality, migration and more that led the indigenous peoples of the CHT to take up arms against the Government of Bangladesh. This can be found in the
work of scholars such as Amena Mohsin (2002, 2003), Devasish Roy (2007, 2011), Meghna Guhathakurta (2004), Shapan Adnan (2004) and Bhumitra Chakma (2010). The non-Bengali indigenous peoples of the CHT—of which the three largest groups are the Chakma, Marma and Tripura, with others being Bawm, Khumi, Khyang, Lushai, Mru, Pangkhua, Chak and Tanchangya—hoped the secular Awami League government of 1972–75 might be more open to their rights as non-Islamic minorities than Pakistan’s militarised Islamic regime had been. Their hopes were dashed when prime minister Mujibur implored them to ‘join the mainstream of Bengali culture’ in 1973.

The military was deeply distrustful of the indigenous peoples of the CHT. At the time of Partition from India, some CHT leaders had raised the Indian flag to signal their preference for staying loyal to India, because the CHT was a 95 per cent non-Muslim region (predominantly Buddhist, but there were also some Hindus, Christians and animists). They backed the wrong side, as the boundary commission forced the CHT to go with Pakistan under the guns of the Pakistani military. Then in the war of partition of Bangladesh from Pakistan, the most important CHT leader, the Chakma king, Raja Tridiv Roy, who was also the local member of parliament, sided with Pakistan for strategic reasons to protect non-Bengali ethnic minority interests. He conceived the war as being fought primarily on the ground of Bengali nationalism. He became a minister in the Pakistani Government and left the CHT before Pakistan declared war on India (9 November from CHT and 12 November 1971 from Dhaka). In our military interviews, there was bristling intolerance of this history of perceived disloyalty. *Adivasis* (indigenous peoples) had failed in their eyes to come to terms with the fact that they live in a Bengali society: ‘It’s called the Bay of Bengal, not the Bay of Chakma’ (Interview with a brigadier, Dhaka, 2011, No. 101145).

The military coup of 1975 led the (largely Chakma) political leadership of the CHT to believe that under military control there would be even less chance of regaining the level of autonomy the CHT had secured during indirect British colonial rule of the remote area. The founding leader of the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSS or JSS, United People’s Party of the Chittagong Hill Tracts), Manabendra Narayan Larma, was forced to flee to India in 1975. The Indian Government, which had backed the Awami League and feared the coup leaders, whom it saw as anti-Indian, welcomed JSS to the Indian state of Tripura, just across the border from the CHT. Indeed, it was the Indian intelligence agency, Research and
CASCADES OF VIOLENCE

Analysis Wing (RAW), that approached Larma on 16 August 1975, the day after the coup (Interviews with many JSS leaders, 2010, 2011). India supplied arms and training and allowed bases for the JSS’s military wing, Shanti Bahini (Peace Force), to conduct cross-border raids. The first major attack by Shanti Bahini on a Bangladeshi military convoy did not occur until 1976, although there had been minor engagements from 1972 when Shanti Bahini was originally formed to protect CHT villages from atrocities committed by a liberation army rampaging against whomever it saw as an enemy of the ‘Liberation War’ or of Bengali nationalism. Supporting Shanti Bahini was a way for India to remind Bangladesh, especially its military, that Bangladesh remained in the Indian sphere of influence. India was not interested in supporting the JSS if it became an independence movement, because an independent CHT would have weakened Indian leverage over the Government of Bangladesh.

The insurgency continued, with many failed peace negotiations until the 1997 CHT Accord. It was not a high-intensity conflict, with the number of lives lost uncertain, but not more than thousands. Nonetheless, the continual violence in the CHT deeply affected indigenous peoples’ security at every level. Between 1979 and 1997, there were 11 major massacres in which several thousand indigenous CHT people were killed (CHT Commission 2000). One of the terrible features of the 1971 ‘War of Liberation’ was the militarisation of rape (Proposition 9), with the Pakistani military using rape as a strategic tool of warfare. There were more than 25,000 officially recorded cases of forced impregnation (D’Costa 2011). The militarisation of rape also cascaded, with 94 per cent of reported rapes of CHT women between 1991 and 1993 committed by security personnel (Mohsin 2003: 54). A senior official from an indigenous women’s organisation observed:

[B]efore 1980 we never heard of rape incidents. With the increase in the number of army posts and Bengali settlements, rape of women and children have increased, with some alarming events of pahari [CHT/indigenous] girls between five and eight years of age being raped. (Interview, CHT, 2010)

In 2012, newspapers also reported rapes of indigenous women committed by indigenous men. Indigenous men—in particular, indigenous youth—are extremely intolerant of indigenous women who choose to marry outside indigenous communities (most often to Bengali Muslims). The deep hatred towards the Bengali other and gender insensitivity have created various cascades of dominating prejudice.
Rape of indigenous women and girls and forced marriages in the CHT persist as an endemic residue of these cascades today. Women were heavily involved in the politics of the PCJSS/JSS and the United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) and in fighting (Interviews with many female combatants 2010, and with women activists from various factions, 2011). Sexual and gender-based violence by security personnel was the single biggest motivating factor for the formation of the Hill Women’s Federation (Guhathakurta 2004: 11). Some revisions to the Hill District Act 1989 were made after the signing of the CHT ‘Peace’ Accord to include three female representatives (two indigenous and one non-indigenous) in the 34-member Hill District Councils (HDCs). The CHT Regional Council also reserves three (two indigenous and one non-indigenous) of 25 seats for women. The HDCs are not able to function adequately as they are run by ruling party members and loyalists. Appropriation of the HDCs for party politics and the meagre representation of indigenous women in the upper echelon of formal politics have added to the deeply embedded traditional and patriarchal structure of the CHT. Our research in the CHT suggests that women’s peace initiatives and peace leadership from women’s NGOs and networks, on the other hand, were less a feature for this conflict than in many others we have studied to date for Peacebuilding Compared. When a retired general who led one of the most prominent peace processes of the 1980s referred to ‘tribals who went to the insurgents and said please come in and talk’, we asked if there were many women involved in this kind of shuttle diplomacy: ‘No. Hardly one woman among 99 gentlemen’ (Interview with military general, Dhaka, 2010, No. 111024).

What was decisive in making the 1997 peace process ‘succeed’ where earlier efforts had failed? One reason is that it was negotiated by the first elected Awami League Government to enjoy power since 1975. To India’s relief, Sheikh Hasina was elected as prime minister in 1996. India hoped the Awami League would provide a secular government that would be less militarised, less Islamised and less hostile to India. India showed its support to the new prime minister by telling the JSS leadership that its military aid had come to an end and that the JSS would have to reach a peace agreement with its government that would include handing in Shanti Bahini’s weapons (Interviews with negotiators and political leaders, 2010, 2011). The JSS bases in India would be closed. JSS cadres and refugees were forcibly returned to Bangladesh as part of the peace accord. India immediately stopped food supplies to hungry refugees to
put pressure on the deal. A shift in Indian policy to curb insurgencies through peace deals with groups in its north-east was also a motivating factor for it to push for stability in the CHT.

This put Prime Minister Hasina in a strong negotiating position. She also enjoyed and used a good relationship with Jyoti Basu, then chief minister of West Bengal (Interviews with indigenous leaders, CHT, 2010). That strength was especially profound because Shanti Bahini and the Bangladeshi military were both war weary after 25 years of fighting since the ‘Liberation War’. The military in 1996–97 was a strong supporter of reaching a peace agreement. ‘The Accord would have been impossible without that support from the military’ (Interview with JSS peace accord negotiator, CHT, 2011, No. 101156). But the military proved a duplicitous supporter of the peace. Once its objectives of the surrender of most weapons, the closure of the Tripura insurgent bases and return of the JSS leadership to their martial control and surveillance were accomplished, successive military leaderships from 1998 to the present mobilised their political power to defer, delay and ultimately deny implementation of key elements of the 1997 agreement. Initially, dozens of temporary military camps were closed in the CHT to implement the demilitarisation part of the agreement, but effective remilitarisation of the CHT was ultimately asserted with slightly fewer military and more police, intelligence and auxiliaries under military control.

A majority of the Bangladeshi army inside the country continues to be based in the CHT. The clause in the peace agreement to establish an autonomous indigenous police force in the CHT has never been realised. Most critically, CHT Accord provisions on the return of land confiscated from indigenous peoples during the war have been ignored (Adnan and Dastidar 2011: 23–6), as have unwritten agreements between the prime minister and JSS leader, Shantu Larma, concerning repatriation of Bengali settlers (Interviews with JSS leaders and Members of Parliament, 2010, 2011, 2015). It is important to note that the Bengali settlers in the CHT also distinguish between old Bengali settlements (permanent Bengalis) predating Bangladesh and natural migrations before the early 1980s of people who are ‘not tribal and possess land legally in the Hill district’ and the government-sponsored illegal Bengali settlements (Interviews with many Bengali settlers, CHT, 2010). In our interviews, the leaders of the old Bengali settler communities indicated that the new (post-1980) settlers should leave the CHT. However, in our conversations with the imams of several mosques, we found that Muslim religious leaders
support a strong Bengali Muslim presence and expansion in the CHT (e.g. Interview, CHT, 2011, No. 111016). Both the religious leaders and the Bengali settlers of all categories share (both formal and informal) information with the security sector in the CHT.

Successive governments all tacitly supported the military’s policy of Bengalisation of the CHT through state-assisted transmigration of Bengali settlers, although through consolidation rather than escalation in recent years. One reason the major parties supported Bengalisation was that the CHT is a strategically important region with resource riches that they believed should not be held hostage to indigenous insurgents who might one day decide to work again with India. ‘If we misbehave with India, the Chittagong Hill Tracts will be burning again’ (Interview with retired general, Dhaka, 2011, No. 111024). Basically, none of the parties wishes to implement the CHT Accord because that would inflame the army as well as Bengali settlers, who now have strong majorities in CHT electorates. Stories of continuing ‘terrorism’ in the CHT—either by the spoiler factions or by the ‘others’, such as Bengali settlers, various extremist groups and Rohingyas from neighbouring Myanmar—have eroded support for implementation of the 1997 accord in the wider Bangladeshi electorate. District and regional councils were never given
the autonomy from the central government or control over many of the specific domains of governance nominated in the accord. Amnesties for insurgents provided for in the peace deal were generally honoured and refugees were provided with modest resettlement funding.

The founding leader of the JSS, Manabendra Narayan Larma, was killed in 1983 and succeeded by his brother, Shantu Larma, who had been imprisoned for five years. Shantu Larma’s strong hold as an underground leader and later as the sole legitimate political leader of the CHT delivered peace but in a rather fragile form due to factional politics and the government’s careful manufacture of peace offerings. What were delivered in the peace package were ‘personal sweeteners’ aplenty (Interview with breakaway faction leader from the PCJSS, CHT, 2011) for Shantu Larma, including a government salary as chairman of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council, a government car and driver, personal security provided by the government and patrimonial control of a limited set of autonomous government functions in the CHT, albeit with a promise of more to come (they never did) as the peace process progressed. These rather limited concessions generated strong resentment that was expressed during our interviews with indigenous leaders. Some of them associated this cascade of unequal distribution of power with Chakma domination. Some held a strong view that the set of functions over which Shantu Larma was given personal control, while limited, were enough for him to dole out many government jobs and education scholarships, mainly to the elite of his Chakma ethnic group. These went overwhelmingly to the children of his Chakma elite, leaving the Chakma and, to a lesser extent, the other two dominant CHT groups—the Marma and the Tripura—with higher levels of education and literacy than many ethnic Bengalis today. Meanwhile, the other CHT indigenous groups continued to languish with shockingly low levels of access to education, with literacy in some cases only one-tenth that of the Chakma (Interviews with indigenous people, 2010, 2011, 2015). In aggregate, however, affirmative action (or, as it was sarcastically described, the ‘Larma quota’) with educational scholarships for CHT students is one way the accord has delivered.

Tables 7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 are useful to understand the power discrepancies and resulting resentment brewing in the CHT, particularly concerns about Chakma and regional Marma domination and marginalisation of women as they existed at the time of our fieldwork in the first half of the current decade.
Table 7.1 Membership composition of the Hill District Councils.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Class/type</th>
<th>Ethnicity</th>
<th>Bandarban</th>
<th>Khagrchari</th>
<th>Rangamati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chairperson</td>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chakma</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marma*</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>10</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khyang</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mro</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tripura</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tongchangya</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bawm**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lusai</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pangkho</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khumi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chaak</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-indigenous members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women members</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-indigenous</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* For Bandarban HDC, 10 seats are for Marna and Khyang together
** For Bandarban HDC, one seat is for Bawm, Lusai and Pangkho together

Table 7.2 Membership composition of Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Chairperson (indigenous)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Indigenous member</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Non-indigenous member</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Indigenous women</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Non-indigenous women</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>f. Chairperson of three HDCs</td>
<td>3 (ex officio)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council was established to supervise the implementation of development work and preservation of tribal traditions by Hill District Councils, including municipalities, in accordance with the 1997 Peace Accord.
The power politics aspects of the peace deal cascaded to a politics of resistance to the PCJSS’s local power by non-Chakma indigenous groups, and also by excluded Chakma factions. CHT civil society saw it as a peace that benefited a few—‘peace without justice’ (Mohsin 2003)—and a militarised peace at that, regularly punctuated with violence. One might go further and say the CHT has only a partial negative peace, without truth, justice or reconciliation. The 1997 peace agreement was not a best-practice inclusive process. It was an elite deal that totally excluded the participation of wider civil society and women. There was no international engagement or monitoring to ensure that marginalised voices were not suppressed in the process. The exception to this absence of international engagement was Indian manipulation behind the scenes. The accord was not discussed in the parliament prior to its signing, contributing to opposition to the accord from all three opposition parties in the 1997 parliament. A naïve international community applauded the peace agreement, showering plaudits on Prime Minister Hasina, who was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for the accomplishment.

Three civil society groupings had been pre-eminent in the PCJSS struggles: the Pahari Chhatra Parishad (PCP, Hill Students’ Forum), the Pahari Gono Parishad (PGP, Hill People’s Council) and the Hill Women’s Federation. Some of the prominent leaders from these groups who had done much of the work of sensitising wider civil society networks across Bangladesh to the grievances of CHT people, walked out of the PCJSS, protesting the way the deal was negotiated and repudiating the peace agreement. Large factions of the memberships of these three groups split from the PCJSS to form a new resistance party, the UPDF, demanding ‘full autonomy’. Later, other factions broke away from Shantu Larma’s PCJSS. To them, Larma seemed to be allowed—‘unlike anyone else’—to speak out against the military and the government without being arrested, because he could be tolerated by the government to use tight personal control of the PCJSS to prevent any more effective leadership against the government from

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Table 7.3 Indigenous group representation on the Chittagong Hill Tracts Regional Council.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indigenous Group</th>
<th>Representation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>a. Chakma</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Marma</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Tripura</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Mro (Murang)</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>e. Lusai, Baum,</td>
<td>Pangkhua, Khumi, Khyang and Chak</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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taking root. He had a cosy mandate to bluster, seemingly bravely, but was not to threaten the regime (Interviews with senior indigenous leaders, 2010, 2011).

**Militarisation of the resistance to the CHT resistance**

Our interviews suggest that, at various times, the DGFI (Bangladeshi intelligence) has found it helpful to provide funding or weapons to the UPDF. The military decided to use the UPDF to divide the CHT resistance. At times, the UPDF and the PCJSS have used force of arms to murder or kidnap members of the other group. As the local commands of these parties became more criminalised, police and military informants allege that each party used firefights with the other as an excuse to eliminate their own in ‘crossfire’ (Proposition 9). At the height of the CHT conflict, another neglected element of the cascading of violence was the use of civil war to exact revenge for conflicts that had nothing to do with the autonomy struggles of indigenous peoples (see Kalyvas 2003). Likewise, critics of the military allege that the military finds the PCJSS–UPDF conflict a useful pretext for military murder of troublesome members of both groups. The military then blames the killing on the other group (CHT Commission 2000: 27) (Proposition 9). Shantu Larma and some of the senior leaders of the PCJSS regularly refer to the UPDF as ‘terrorists’. In this, they do useful work for the military in justifying its continued militarisation of the CHT. On the other hand, a senior UPDF leader thinly disguised his threat in a 2010 interview and noted:

> Mr Larma says that UPDF must be banned. Well, we could do more damage if we want to. And we could just take him off the equation. But he is getting old, and we have time, plenty of time to wait.

UPDF members also have their linkages with the military that use these personal and ideological differences to maintain control over the CHT.³ Killing between the PCJSS and the UPDF is easier for the military to manage using force than killing between indigenous people and Bengali settlers.

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³ Mithun Chakma, one of the central UPDF leaders, who we interviewed, was shot dead in January 2018.
During the 1980s, one of the smaller CHT ethnic groups, the Mru, deserted Shanti Bahini, forming the Mru Bahini, which engaged in some fighting with Shanti Bahini forces. This occurred because of excessive taxation of Mru villages by Shanti Bahini, disrespectful treatment of the Mru by Chakma officers, including an incident of rape of a Mru woman after the officers had demanded that she husk paddy for them, and other allegations of sexual assault. The military exploited this cascade to interethnic conflict, providing weapons training and funding for the Mru Bahini, and using Mru who defected from the PCJSS to lead them to PCJSS hideouts (CHT Commission 2000: 28; Shelley 1992: 117).

During the civil war, there were also armed clashes between different Shanti Bahini factions that divided over ideological and tactical questions. As noted above, in one of these clashes, the founding leader of the insurgency, Manabendra Narayan Larma, was killed (by the breakaway JSS-Preeti faction).

We have begun to explain why the Bangladeshi military sees the CHT as a strategically important zone. It has repeatedly been the scene of heavy fighting in the history of wars in the region, including in the most recent major war, in 1971. With the CHT an insecure zone, the military
can justify heavy state expenditure in keeping a large military presence there. It can thereby keep on the table the options of allowing insurgents from India and Myanmar to locate bases there if that suits its strategic interests, or the strategic interests of a potential ally such as the United States, China or Pakistan. During the Pakistan era, the CHT was used this way, with the Mizo National Front, the Meitei rebels of Manipur and the Tripuri rebels of Tripura all well entrenched in the CHT for the conduct of hostile operations into India (Mohsin 2003: 89). Myanmar insurgents still inhabit the CHT to a degree today.

In 1997, Assam was broken up into seven states, the ‘seven sisters’. These seven new states were suffering under more than 30 insurgent organisations. That has reduced somewhat today. At the junction of the borders of Bangladesh, Myanmar and India, there were 24 known insurgent groups in 1990 (Interview with retired Bangladeshi general, Dhaka, 2010, No. 111024). So the CHT conflict was connected to the most variegated cluster of violent cascades in greater India.

As the CHT is not totally insecure, development of its believed resource riches is possible. And, better still for the military, its leaders are empowered by moderate insecurity to personally cash in on such resource opportunities. This is so, for example, if a locale is insecure enough for them to be able to demand protection money from investors. The CHT is a land of opportunity and of importunity. Extortion is already a reality, with the military extracting healthy rents from illegal logging, tobacco, tourism and other businesses that operate in the CHT. The wives of military officers have often ended up as beneficiaries of CHT land stolen after its owners were driven off or by illegally buying national forest reserves (Interviews with indigenous leaders during which we have been shown documents of illegal land acquisition, 2011) (Proposition 9). In the past, a source of revenue for the military was the collection of protection money from Indian Naxalite and other insurgent groups permitted to use the CHT, especially those groups trading drugs or arms under Bangladeshi military protection. The special conflict zone allowances that soldiers receive for serving in the CHT, combined with these protection rackets and business opportunities, make CHT postings the most lucrative in Bangladesh. Awami League governments negotiated agreements to send Indian insurgents back to India. In some cases, informants we interviewed said the top leaders were pushed back, with others being allowed to stay if they paid local Bangladeshi military commanders enough. The military also sees the CHT as valuable training for peacekeepers. Bangladesh is
Currently the world’s largest supplier of UN peacekeepers (military and police); UN peacekeeping is seen as a good income opportunity for the security sector.

A lot of the insecurity in the CHT is a result of groups of Bengali settlers driving indigenous people off their land. Cascades of mob violence thus enable cascades of land grabs as Bengali settlers are also driven off land by indigenous people or by the military using proxies. Sometimes the military tolerates or foments Bengali land grabs out of sympathy for the settlers or because it creates opportunities for the military to grab land. And the whole insecure scene of bottom-up cascading of violence in pursuit, and defence, of land grabs justifies a continuation of the militarised cascading of violence across the whole region.

Many of the post-1980 Bengali settlers in the CHT are extremely poor. Some are refugees from the changing and increasingly surging flows of the plains rivers as Himalayan snow-melt responds to global warming. Like the indigenous people, they work hard for meagre returns and then find they have to pay taxes on what they grow to armed UPDF men when they transport their produce through UPDF-controlled areas and to PCJSS men when they move produce through their areas. After decades of fighting, these two groups and the military have generally worked out stable accommodations about where and within what limits each of them can and cannot shake down citizens. As in so many conflicts around the world, such accommodations have transformed former combatant groups who have a presence in the CHT from armies into organised crime gangs extorting taxes, kidnapping people who can pay ransoms, engaging in contract killings and contract violence for the military and for political parties, illegal logging, drug dealing and arms trading. In the CHT, however, one should say the violent elements among the PCJSS, the UPDF and foreign insurgent groups are the ones who have morphed to organised crime (Proposition 9), not the nonviolent majorities of the memberships of these political movements against indigenous oppression.

Cascades within cascades

In our rush to move the story of the cascade of violence forward from one cascade to the next within the space of this chapter, we have skated quickly over various other cascades that recur at multiple levels. Some we were not expecting to encounter, such as cascades of taxation as a cascade...
of domination. Impoverished Indians disliked the taxation of the Mughal Empire. This resentment was a resource the British East India Company could use to persuade Indians to fight alongside the British to sideline the Mughals. Another resource was promising new Indian elites that they could replace Mughal clients as tax collectors (which in Bengal were mainly Hindu landlords who replaced Muslim zamindars). At a later cascade, many impoverished Muslim Bengalis were attracted to joining Pakistan in the 1940s in the hope of throwing off the yoke of these Hindu landlords.

Tax is an issue that cascades; it runs right through to the lowest level of the cascades of violence we document. During our CHT interviews, dozens of poor rural people complained to us of the injustice of having to pay off both the PCJSS and the UPDF in ‘taxes’ per unit of production.

More broadly, we have seen how money politics has cascaded to the point where politics in Bangladesh has become ‘business continued by other means’, where all businesses must do their bit to entrench the two dynasties by monetary tribute to both at election time. We have seen also how the Bangladeshi military elite is intertwined with the business elite, drawing corrupt payments from Dhaka at the top, down to insurgents trading illegal logs at the bottom, to the point where occupation of the CHT is a profitable business for the military. Hence, politicians specialise in a business politics in which their political support for the family dynasties is bought through trading the right to approved forms of plunder. Soldiers specialise in military politics whereby the family dynasties and politicians allow military elites that support the dynasty to partake in certain other forms of plunder.

Moving from the cascading of tax defiance to noting the cascade of money politics is not the most abstract move we should remark on here. The more important abstraction is to see cascades of taxation as an instance of cascades of domination. Just as the Mughals, Clive of India and India’s first governor-general, Warren Hastings, wanted to dominate Bengal, so, at the bottom of our cascades, the UPDF, the PCJSS and Arakan insurgency extortionists from Myanmar such as the Rohingyas wish to dominate their local piece of the CHT. Violence such as cutting off the ear of a farmer who does not pay—as interviewees complained Rohingya insurgents sometimes did in the CHT—is just a tool of domination here. These incidents exemplify the way domination has been inductively conceived in this book through reflecting on the narratives and the examples of those who struggle violently and nonviolently to resist ‘domination’ as they see it. In these narratives, domination is conceived as an arbitrary
form of power, as opposed to a form of power that issues from a legitimate rule of law. Hence, tax policies that are debated and decided through democratic politics and that respect rights constraints—for example, against discrimination—result in taxes that are not domination. ‘Taxation without representation’, as under the Raj, was domination—as is taxation of farmers enforced by cutting off their ears, collected by competing groups of militants as farmers move their produce to market.

Cascades of domination also connect to cascades of exclusion. As Partition unfolded in the 1940s, Hindus excluded Muslims, Muslims excluded Hindus and both excluded Sikhs. After Partition, the Pakistani army dominated East Pakistan and embraced an ideology of exclusion as they slaughtered and raped in 1971, leaving behind many texts about how they saw Easterners as not true Muslims—fake Muslims with ‘Hindu hearts’. In turn, even as the Indian army helped Bangladesh win its ‘Liberation War’, exclusionary attitudes—indeed, contempt—motivated many Indian soldiers to loot, brutalise and rape many of the Bangladeshis they had saved, particularly the refugees (Proposition 6), leaving a legacy of resentment of India that cascaded to the coup against the Awami League partly for being too close to India. And this, in turn, led to India’s support for the CHT insurgency. At the bottom of the cascade of exclusion, the indigenous peoples of the CHT were treated as primitive second-class citizens by both Bangladesh and India, particularly when India used violence and starvation to drive refugees back to Bangladesh in 1997 (Proposition 6). Finally, smaller indigenous groups who have been deprived of literacy often feel the Chakma treat them contemptuously as primitives. The Mru resistance to the Chakma through the Mru Bahini militia illustrates one upshot of this humiliating domination (Proposition 8(a)).

In countries that seem to have experienced less civil war than Asia and Africa, such as Australia and the United States, we find the same dynamics in close calls that did not become bigger wars. In Australia, the same policies of transmigration to make Indigenous people a minority in their own land did not have to be enforced by a large war machine because European diseases did most of the decimation, as also happened in North America and in the South American decimation of the Inca Empire. And, of course, tax (at the Boston tea party) was more than just a spark that lit the American War of Independence from its colonisation (and in the South American wars of independence as well). The American Civil War was fought over both slavery as an institution of domination and domination of the rural south by the industrial north. So, in ‘peaceful’
societies such as the United States and Australia, we see cascades of colonial exploitation, domination, humiliation and exclusion. Yet, it is violence that is contained by circumstances that lead to quick capitulation rather than long war and by a politics of national reconciliation. We see this especially strongly between the United States and its British colonial master and between Abraham Lincoln’s attempts at reconciliation of north and south. Lincoln began this with the new national narrative at Gettysburg that north and south, black and white—all Americans—had been victims of a terrible institution called slavery.

In less lucky societies where violence has been cascading in many directions for decades, people become war weary. One of the questions they then ask themselves is: Who is going to be in charge in five years; perhaps I should be supporting them for the safety of my family? We found people asking this a lot in our 2011 interviews in Afghanistan and indeed throughout Afghan history, as we did in Bangladesh. We found in Bangladesh that, when violence cascades, ordinary folk can suffer double waves of violence for supporting the wrong side, for being suspected of having done so or for being in the company of someone who has done so.

An additional abstraction in all this is that when violence cascades, revenge cascades. In making choices to try to minimise their exposure to violence, people can make decisions that expose them to revenge attacks for harbouring sentiments they do not have. Revenge is regulated when spaces are pacified by the rule of law. In more anarchic spaces such as the CHT, armed men can get away with revenge. Anomie creates spaces where resentments that have nothing to do with the war—about a property dispute, a sexual relationship or a gesture of disrespect—can trigger a revenge attack (Proposition 7). Finally, as so many have observed in Africa (Reno 1995, 1999), in the CHT, we also found that war can cascade into the violence of organised crime (Proposition 9).

The CHT case study shows cascading down, up and horizontally. The dominant dynamic in this chapter is one of cascading downwards. But there are also upwards cascades of the mobilisation of mob violence directed against the ethnic or religious other, sometimes revenge attacks, sometimes calculated attempts by small fry to grab land. There are other bottom-up cascades that we might have included in our narrative, such as the Salafist terrorist group with links to Pakistan’s Lashkar-e-Taiba and the JMB. The JMB detonated 500 bombs in all but one of the 64 districts of Bangladesh within half an hour on 17 August 2005 (ICG 2010).
Violence also cascades horizontally across borders, from Myanmar to Bangladesh, and from Bangladesh to India back to Bangladesh. Cascades of refugees across the borders of the CHT, as in Pakistan and Afghanistan and so many modern wars, have facilitated the recruitment of resentful, footloose young fighters motivated by hunger and by the suffering of their refugee families to fuel the next cascade of violence (Proposition 6).

Reversing cascades in Bangladesh?

In the less anomic international system that has prevailed in recent decades, compared with the 1940s (before the rules of the UN game had been settled), one might have hoped that the terrible cascades we have described might have been interrupted at their source. One might have hoped that states that were a ‘group of friends of India’ might have worked to prevent a slapdash British exit and the imposition on Pakistan by Mountbatten and the Indian National Congress of a ‘moth-eaten Pakistan’ that was unsustainable. There might have been more plural, hardworking preventive diplomacy to craft a win–win solution for the people of both India and Pakistan. Then, for the unfortunate refugees who were still its losers, international peacekeepers might have filled the policing gap that the British felt they could not afford to fill to meet the international community’s responsibility to protect victims of predictable, preventable security dilemmas.

Imagining such counterfactuals is useful for understanding how the international community might prevent future cascades of violence on other continents. The Bangladeshi state at a more micro level has begun to understand that one reason the JMB gained a foothold in the Rajshahi Division is the same reason the Afghan Taliban won a foothold in rural Kandahar province in 1994 (Chapter 2). There was a rule-of-law vacuum, an absence of any effective governance in these spaces that attracted the most brutal of forces (Proposition 4). It was the JMB in Rajshahi Division and the Taliban in Kandahar province who were advocating the use of Sharia law to assure people that they did not need to yield to gangs of armed criminals. The Government of Bangladesh began to realise after 2005 that religious extremism is a risk when the state fails to provide the protection of people from revenge with good community policing. In other words, when states and the international community both decide that it is too hard and too expensive to make the rule of law work
across a Hobbesian space, they should not fail to see that such spaces are vacuums that ultimately will attract a provider of order. If the state or the international community declines to fill those vacuums of social order, there are ‘armed rule-of-law movements’ (Kilcullen 2011) such as the Taliban and the JMB that will cascade into them.

More fundamentally, cascades of domination, exclusion, corruption, money politics and violence cannot be ended by a ceasefire and surrender of weapons cashed out with an amnesty and reintegration payouts. Preventive diplomacy is not enough at the end of a cascade, even if it can sometimes work to prevent a cascade at the source. Not everyone can get what they want in a peace process. Yet war weary people repeatedly grant legitimacy to a peace if it is settled in a process they accept as genuinely giving voice to all sources of grievance and injustice, strenuously seeking peace with justice, even though that ideal is never fully or even fulsomely attained. The CHT peace—precisely because it was at the end of such a long cascade of so many peoples feeling they were victims of dire injustice—had to be a more participatory peace than it was. That participation needed to include not only indigenous civil society and women, but also Islamist members of parliament in Dhaka who felt deprived of an opportunity to discuss the peace deal in their parliament.

What was needed were not only peace with participation and peace with a search for justice, but also peace with a search for truth and reconciliation. Bangladesh, through all its cascades of suffering, has practised a politics of forgetting. Peace with truth and reconciliation requires a different ethos from the money politics that sees nonviolent (Gandhian) tactics of liberation, such as the hartal, harnessed by corrupt, dynastic political parties to destabilise democracy and institutionalise violence. A politics of truth, justice and reconciliation is likely to come not from practitioners of money politics, but from civil society practitioners of a spiritual politics of grace, humility and forgiveness. These abound in South Asian people power, which can join on the streets to support the students of universities such as the University of Dhaka when opportunities arise in the future, as they have in the past, in 1952, 1969, 1971 and 1990. Bangladesh can be seen as a society with a history dotted with inspiring struggles of people power against domination.

Discounting people-power cascades of bottom-up liberation is one of many kinds of errors of misplaced realism (Braithwaite et al. 2012). Bottom-up cascades of liberation, at the right moment, can overwhelm
Cascades of domination. Another error of misplaced realism is seeing a clear, achievable objective—such as a more powerful nation changing the regime of a less powerful one—as a single-layered objective, rather than as violence that may cascade. The prescription from our analysis of South Asian cascades is that military powers should stop and ask: What is the worst-case cascade this could trigger and the most likely cascade? Insisting on more thoughtful answers to these questions might prevent violence.

Fine-grained study of cascades of violence, such as the one we have begun to attempt from the CHT, at least uncovers some of the vertical diversity in the way violence can cascade. This complements the analysis of horizontal diversity of cascades in Chapters 5 and 6. That is another step towards understanding how to prevent cascades. The particular addition to our understanding from this chapter comes from methodological openness to causal process tracing of domination from the geopolitically macro, through many layers of history down to the extremely micro. This book advocates methodological openness to tracing how a micro politics that coordinates resistance to domination recurrently bubbles up both violent and nonviolent resistance. Cascades of domination induce both cascades of violence and cascades of nonviolent liberation politics. The challenge is to understand the contingencies these top-down and bottom-up, macro and micro, violent and nonviolent cascades turn on. Part III begins to tackle the challenge of that contingent complexity.
Crime–war in Sri Lanka

A least likely case with dozens of degrees of freedom

In this chapter, three armed conflicts in Sri Lanka since independence are used to provide a particularly strong focus on Proposition 9: crime as a cause of war and war as a cause of crime. The Marxist revolutionary party Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP, People’s Liberation Front) first led an insurgency in the 1970s and 1980s, which overlapped with the more deadly ethnic Tamil insurgency (which also encompassed class and caste resentments) starting in the 1980s. In the context of an analysis of our other propositions, the recent history of Sri Lanka is used to illustrate three cascade dynamics: crime cascades to war, war cascades to more war and to crime and crime and war both cascade to state violence such as torture, enforced disappearances and extrajudicial execution. Sri Lanka is also a case that cascaded new technologies of crime–war globally, such as suicide-bomb vests. The criminological lens for looking at cascades of warfare is not the most important one, but it is a profoundly neglected one.

To put it dynamically, Chapter 4 argued that war has a propensity to morph into extreme crime problems that can be a cause of violence greater than the war. But crime can also morph into war. Hence, war prevention is crime prevention. And crime prevention—community policing that works—can interrupt cascades of warfare. For the past half-century,

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1 This chapter is an expanded version of considerable portions of Braithwaite and D’Costa (2015).
countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia have been losing many more lives to their warmongering through domestic crime and suicide than from battle deaths (see e.g. Archer and Gartner 1984; Ghobarah et al. 2003). This is one reason for a move to diagnose the Sri Lankan case with a special focus on Proposition 9. It has implications for understanding variation in how much violence every society suffers as a result of war—from peaceful societies such as Costa Rica, Japan and Switzerland to combative societies such as the United States, the United Kingdom and Russia. We will see, however, that Sri Lanka is also inductively useful for enriching our insights about deterrence and defiance (Propositions 1 and 10). Indeed, as in the previous three chapters, in this chapter all 10 of our propositions come into the analysis.

The cascades framework conceives cascades of violence as recursively related to cascades of militarisation and cascades of domination (Proposition 8). With Sri Lanka’s three recent armed conflicts, we illustrate how a single society, a single war, is not an $n$ of 1, but includes many degrees of freedom that support qualified inference about explanatory dynamics. For example, there are many ethnic riots and many assassinations at different points in the history of a society, each of which can assist in testing our propositions.

Sri Lanka is a strategic single-society case to assist in the diagnosis of cascade dynamics—first, because it is an outlier as an extremely violent society. Sri Lanka was the most consistently violent Asian society across recent decades on Karstedt’s (2012) Violent Societies Index, though no longer in her more recent data (Karstedt 2014), where Pakistan was scored as the most violent society in Asia and globally (before Syria had reached its deadly heights). When Sri Lanka was confronted with an existential threat, it responded with security sector crimes that included summary executions, disappearances, torture, intentional bombing of Tamil hospitals and rape of Tamil refugees (HRW 2011; ICG 2011b, 2013c; UN 2011).

Sri Lanka is also analytically attractive because it is a ‘least likely case’ (Eckstein 1975) to validate propositions about violence begetting violence. This is because violence works decisively in ending Sri Lanka’s wars. A least likely case is a tough test of a theory because it explores a context in which the theory is least likely to be true. Obviously, a case where violence ends violence is one least likely to be supportive of a theory that violence begets violence.
Sri Lanka is also a least likely case of cross-border violence because it is an island. Yet Sri Lanka’s wars cascaded across to the assassination in India of prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991. In the early phases of this conflict, Indira Gandhi’s annoyance at Sri Lanka moving from under India’s wing to be more aligned with China (and to receive military assistance from Pakistan), combined with her party’s need to curry favour with India’s powerful state government of Tamil Nadu, minded her intelligence service to train and arm Sri Lankan Tamil parties in Tamil Nadu. In these and other ways that we will discuss, the cross-border cascade dynamics may not, therefore, be as vigorous as those across the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, the India–Pakistan border or the borders of the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Moreover, in the end game, it was possible to cut the Tamil Tigers off from arms supplies by sea. Yet, there are still substantial cross-border cascades of violence to code in the Sri Lankan case. This is also true for the other ‘least likely’ island war cases that we have coded for Peacebuilding Compared so far—Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b) and Solomon Islands (Braithwaite et al. 2010c)—which were both cases that cascaded to a degree from grievances spawned in World War II and
were fought with weapons buried by American and Japanese troops during that war. This is also true of a number of other island war cases coded in Peacebuilding Compared such as Ambon in Indonesia (Braithwaite et al. 2010a).

The three subpropositions of Proposition 9 that will organise our analysis of Sri Lanka are:

a. Crime often sparks cascades to war.

b. War cascades transnationally to more war and more crime.

c. Both crime and war cascade to state violence such as torture.

These three cascades occur in almost all 39 armed conflicts for which the preliminary core fieldwork has been completed for Peacebuilding Compared (and 700 variables about the conflict that have been preliminarily coded). This is an utterly non-random sample of armed conflicts in which follow-up is required for another decade (all are post-1990 conflicts). The Peacebuilding Compared team conducting the broader, longer-term research will not take this pattern as credible unless it continues to hold up in the years ahead for these 39 cases and until fieldwork-grounded coding has been completed on a more geographically representative sample of at least 60 armed conflicts. This statistical approach to inference in the Peacebuilding Compared project is relentlessly complemented by a more historical and ideographic attitude to inference contained within single cases and across whole regions that multiplies the degrees of freedom from this small n, as we attempt for South Asia in this book.3

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2 Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) soldiers also did some fighting in the Western Province of Solomon Islands. Weapons cascaded between both nations and from and to tribal conflicts in the Highlands of Papua New Guinea. Finally, a global private military organisation, the British–South African corporation Sandline, escalated violence in a way that played the most decisive role in ending the civil war on geopolitically remote Bougainville island.

3 When John Braithwaite spoke at the Institute for Ethnic Studies in Colombo in 2013, a retired general chastised him for referring to the fight with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a civil war. ‘It wasn’t a civil war,’ he said, ‘we were fighting terrorists.’ Rohan Gunaratna (2001: 314), in his book on the JVP conflicts, said: ‘The JVP is not a terrorist group but it has often resorted to terrorism.’ Instead of arguing with such contentious claims, we are attracted to the virtue of understanding the cascading of crime–war in a way that admits crime–terrorism–war distinctions, but basically seeks to embrace them through a unified explanation. One of the strengths of the Peacebuilding Compared coding methodology is that it allows us to code violence as many things at once. It allows coding of crime variables concerning extrajudicial assassinations, torture, rape and drug trafficking to support insurgency, terrorism and more. It allows Sri Lanka’s wars, to varying degrees, to be coded as ethnic conflicts, religious conflicts, class/caste conflicts, ideological conflicts, identity conflicts and separatist wars. And it allows the war against the LTTE to be coded simultaneously as counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and conventional war. ‘In the Jaffna peninsula
The data for this case were collected from interviews in India with Indian military officers and diplomats who served in Sri Lanka, in various fieldwork trips to Sri Lanka this century by Bina D’Costa on other projects and in 68 interviews John Braithwaite conducted mostly in Sri Lanka in 2013, some of them with more than one person.

Following a brief overview of the Tamil radicalisation and class radicalisation that are relevant to our arguments, we provide an analysis of early phases of Sri Lanka’s conflicts to illustrate hypothesis 9(a): crime cascades to war. Then we move to hypothesis 9(b): war cascades transnationally to more war and more crime. Finally, we return to hypothesis 9(c), on cascades of state crime, after considering the paradoxical quality of cascades of crime–war in Sri Lanka. In the context of prioritising these lenses, we manage to bring into the analysis a consideration of all our propositions.

Context: Tamil and class radicalisation

Sri Lanka’s nation-building process and the ethnic identity politics of difference (De Silva 2005; Wickramasinghe 2006) are deeply intertwined through a discursive process initiated by predominantly Sinhalese–Buddhist state elites who took control of the postcolonial state (D’Costa 2013). Class politics was also intertwined with a pushback of radical Sinhalese youth against state elites that cascaded to terrible violence in 1971 and 1987. In our narrative, we attempt to unpack intersections between the kind of oppression in focus with the Marxist imaginaries of these Sinhalese youth and the ethnic identity politics of Tamil resistance to their oppression by state elites (Proposition 8).
Plate 8.2 The Sea Tigers of LTTE were innovative in building their destructive little navy.

Picture (a) shows a submarine on display at Puthukudiyiruppu War Museum. Picture (b) shows LTTE cadres embarking on a LTTE Sea Tiger vessel in Mullaitivu, 2003.

Sources: Wikipedia. (a) Photograph by Adam Jones. (b) Photograph by Isak Bernsten.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE or Tamil Tigers) was formed on 5 May 1976 under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. The LTTE was a political party with various military wings—notably, the Tigers (armed infantry), Sea Tigers (navy), Air Tigers (air force) and Black Tigers (a wing with expertise in terrorism, including suicide bombing and assassinations). While in 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979 and 1981 there were serious outbreaks of ethnic riots allegedly orchestrated by state actors, a turning point in Sri Lanka’s history was the anti-Tamil pogrom, commonly known as ‘Black July’, which started on 23 July 1983. An estimated 3,000 Tamils were killed and more than 150,000 became homeless in mob violence that continued for three days. The riots were understood by many to be triggered by an LTTE attack in Jaffna, in the Northern Province, which killed 13 soldiers. A large number of Tamils were displaced and many who were able to leave the country moved to other parts of the globe. The LTTE declared its first ‘Eelam war’, marking the beginning of Sri Lanka’s long civil war.

After the Indo–Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987, Indian Peacekeeping Forces (IPKF) moved in to enforce peace. The last IPKF contingents withdrew in March 1990, after which the second ‘Eelam war’ was declared. During this phase, the LTTE displaced nearly 75,000 Muslims from the north of the country. Part of the complexity of this conflict is that Muslims came under attack from both of the largest ethnic groups: Tamil militants and violent Sinhalese. After an unsuccessful peace agreement with president Chandrika Kumaratunga’s government in 1994, the LTTE declared the third ‘Eelam war’, causing mass displacement and a humanitarian crisis, especially in the Jaffna Peninsula and the Vanni region in the north. After a four-year ceasefire, the fourth ‘Eelam war’

4 The Air Tigers were led by LTTE leader Prabhakaran’s son, Charles Anthony, and the Sea Tigers, an amphibious warfare unit, which consisted mainly of lightweight boats, was headed by Colonel Soosai, a.k.a. Thillaiyampalam Sivanesan. In addition to these there was a suicide commando unit called the Black Tigers (Karunku Puligal), which launched one of its first attacks against the Sri Lankan army in 1987, causing 40 deaths, and the LTTE Intelligence Unit, which operated internationally. Both of these were headed by Shanmugalingam Sivashankar, better known as Pottu Amman.

5 Although Muslims from the Tamil-dominated north of Sri Lanka speak the Tamil language, they are not generally considered ethnic Tamils. Before the 1990s, nearly 5 per cent of Sri Lankan Muslims lived in the Northern Province. However, after the emergence of the Sri Lankan Muslim Congress in 1981, LTTE leaders perceived Muslims as a threat to the mono-ethnic Tamil nation and forced them to leave their homes. Researchers estimate that close to 75,000 Muslims were forcibly displaced during the late 1980s and early 1990s (IRIN News 2013).
CASCADeS of VioLEnCe

was declared following the collapse of the peace process in July 2006. The narrative of some informants was that this led to a fifth war on Tamil civilians:

There was a war against the LTTE. Now there is a war against people … There is a gradual genocide and a structural genocide going on … State colonisation is being used to change the electoral balance and to change the demography … Refugees are not going to strive for economic reasons. They are going in search of their rights. There is no future with their family here. They do not have a dignified life. They have to sell their property to pay the people smugglers. When Australia sends them back, they are treated as betrayers of the country. The intelligence tells them: ‘You are in trouble’. It offers them the way out, of working as intelligence agents and villagers. Sometimes they are given the option of showing their loyalty by doing work for government political parties, commonly getting 30 Tamils to vote for the government. CID [the Criminal Investigation Department] and the army are doing this … The people-smuggling business is win-win-win for the regime. They build their structural genocide, gradual genocide agenda when more Tamils leave. They win by collecting money from them right up to family members of the president for the navy to allow them to leave. They win when they come back by extracting betrayal of their community. When they threaten returnees, sometimes they fabricate fresh accusations against them of crimes they allegedly committed before they left. (Interview with religious leader, 2013, No. 091354)

Muslim leaders we interviewed in 2013 believed they likewise were at risk of a ‘war against the Muslim people’ enabled by the untrammelled power of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s then executive presidency and attacks on Muslim communities by Buddhist extremists who supported the executive presidency that dismantled the separation of powers, institution by institution. An interview with one leader of a militant Buddhist organisation seemed to affirm this analysis:

We support the executive presidency. The priority is to strengthen accountability of the executive presidency to all the people of Sri Lanka. Not to divide power or devolve power … The government should have moved against LTTE extremism early and it now must do this with Muslim extremism to nip it in the bud early … We must stop campaigns that support social division. We must ban parties based on race or religion. Schools based on religion should be banned … Clear standards and guidelines should be established for establishing places of worship. This includes basic things like providing parking. The government should take responsibility and demolish new places of worship that are not approved. (Interview with Buddhist organisation leader, Colombo, 2013, No. 091353)
The standard narrative of Sri Lankan scholars and protagonists of the four Eelam wars, followed by a cascade of violence against Tamil and Muslim civilians, is a cascade narrative of four wars within a war followed by seemingly never-ending structural violence (even as one hopes for reform from the new regime elected in 2015). In this chapter, we complement this narrative with a cascade of class war that preceded these five cascades, and which enabled them. We return to the class war cascade that was historically prior to the LTTE wars later in the chapter.

The LTTE’s deliberate recruitment strategies—which in the earlier decades might have been supported by some of the population but were gradually dreaded by them—also increased the vulnerabilities of the Tamil population in the Northern and Eastern provinces. While it started to recruit women from the beginning of the conflict, it also began to recruit children in the late 1980s after the India–Sri Lanka Accord. Fighting an insurgency of this composition soon became an enormous challenge for the IPKF. Thirty per cent of the LTTE’s fighting cadre were women. It is estimated that, between 1987 and 2002, 4,000 women had been killed in combat. This number included more than 100 suicide bombers who belonged to the Black Tigers. The women in the LTTE were responsible for the deaths of prominent people, including India’s prime minister Rajiv Gandhi, who was assassinated on 21 May 1991 during his re-election campaign.

The majority of the LTTE’s child recruitment occurred in the Vanni region. The United Nations estimates 64 per cent of the child recruits were boys and 36 per cent girls. There is no new evidence of children being recruited since the LTTE’s collapse in 2009. Both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International have suggested that the breakaway Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), formerly led by Sri Lankan politician and former militant Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan (also known as Karuna), has been reconstituted and is now under the control of former LTTE cadre Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan (also known as Pillayan). At least 60 people who were recruited as children and are now over 18 years of age are still associated with the group.

Between September 2007 and 19 May 2009, the Sri Lankan army carried out a resurgent military offensive in the Vanni using widespread shelling that caused a large number of civilian deaths. Despite grave danger, the LTTE refused civilians permission to leave and used them as hostages. Throughout the final stages of the war, the LTTE also continued carrying
out suicide attacks against civilians outside the Vanni. A panel of experts appointed by then UN secretary-general Ban Ki-moon to advise him on accountability during the final stages of the conflict found ‘credible allegations’ that, if proven, indicate that war crimes and crimes against humanity were committed by both the Sri Lankan army and the LTTE (UN 2011). The Sri Lankan Government has continually frustrated implementation of UN resolutions for an international investigation into alleged abuses by both sides in the bloody finale to the civil war. In the final six months of the conflict, up to 40,000 civilians were killed and another 6,000 forcibly disappeared (UN 2011).

The state’s imposition of an economic embargo on the conflict zone between 1990 and early 2002 was the single most important cause of the severe economic and social decline of the Northern and Eastern provinces (Sarvananthan 2007). The embargo was in force when the LTTE gained control of the Jaffna Peninsula and almost the entire Northern Province. The declaration of the area as a high-security zone (HSZ) and heavily militarised area destroyed people’s livelihoods. Restrictions on fishing and subsistence farming, the planting of landmines in agricultural areas and the collapse of infrastructure, especially major roads, were all results of the area being declared a HSZ. This intensified ethnic grievances and generated deep divisions between the north-east and other parts of Sri Lanka. During this period, the number of serious crimes also escalated in these areas.

Extreme poverty in the Northern and Eastern provinces contributed to huge economic disparities with other regions of Sri Lanka. These two provinces comprise 28 per cent of Sri Lanka’s area and 14 per cent of the population. The LTTE controlled 44 per cent of these two provinces and 20 per cent of the population. While no household survey data are available to include the refugee camps and internally displaced persons (IDPs), the Vanni was perhaps the worst affected by the protracted conflict. The inequality and the economic vulnerability of the population were exacerbated by the fact that two parallel economic authorities existed in the provinces: the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE. Illegal taxation by the LTTE to finance its activities and the formation by it of some

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6 It was in force between 1990 and 1996 on the Jaffna Peninsula, and until January 2002 in the Vanni. Also, there was no electricity in the Vanni between 1990 and 2002.

7 These data are valid until July 2006 before the final round of full-scale hostilities between the rebels and government security forces. For details, see Sarvananthan (2007).
administrative units, such as the Tamil Eelam Police and the Tamil Eelam Judicial Service, squeezed out resources from the already vulnerable and impoverished communities. The LTTE was also involved in transnational crime, took relief goods from local and international donors and sold them to the black market and forcibly took land from minority communities (D’Costa 2013).

Crime cascades to war in Sri Lanka

We argued in Chapter 4 that historians do not always take seriously the proposition that crime often cascades to war (MacMillan 2013). In a sense, they are right that this should not be the most central element of a theory of cascades of violence. Yet, in the Peacebuilding Compared dataset, some kinds of crimes are repeatedly coded as sparking armed conflicts. Political assassinations, major terrorist acts, murder and rape in the context of ethnic/religious riots appear in our data so far to be particularly important crimes societies must minimise in seeking peace. Sri Lanka reveals this wider pattern in an illuminating way. Few wars in recent history were escalated to a greater degree by a violent leader than the LTTE’s war for an independent Tamil state in Sri Lanka under the leadership of Velupillai Prabhakaran. At the start of that war, the LTTE was just one of five major armed groups and another 30 minor ones pushing for Tamil independence. During the 1980s, Prabhakaran assassinated leaders of competing groups who hesitated in complete submission to him, liquidating all competing Tamil insurgency groups. He also terminated LTTE members who questioned his judgment. Understanding the biography of a man who turned his society upside down is no easy matter. Frances Harrison (2012: 234) sees Prabhakaran as an example of trauma being ‘transmitted from one generation to another, storing up trouble for the future’. One story told by Prabhakaran’s father that greatly affected him was of a Hindu Brahmin (most Tamils are Hindu) in the 1958 riots who had been tied to a bed by the Buddhist Sinhalese mob, doused with petrol and burnt alive (Clarance 2007: 41). Prabhakaran also repeatedly used narratives of other violent crimes committed against Tamils to call for an armed struggle against the state. In a 1984 interview with an Indian magazine, Prabhakaran dubbed the anti-Tamil pogrom of 1983 the ‘July Holocaust’ and claimed that this experience united all sections of the Tamil masses. He stated: ‘Armed struggle is the only way out for the emancipation of our
oppressed people’ (Thottam 2009). Prabhakaran, however, is not the only LTTE leader for whom such crimes figured in the biography of their turn to violence.

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 was both a crime caused by war and a crime that escalated war. It was an event that decisively changed the dynamics of Indian engagement with Sri Lanka’s war. After this, the Indian state and intelligence service were no longer playing a balancing game between sometimes currying favour from Tamil politicians in the state of Tamil Nadu by supporting the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka and sometimes supporting the Sri Lankan state to enhance regional stability. After the young female suicide attacker snuffed out Rajiv Gandhi, India’s regional military and intelligence might was committed to the ultimate defeat of the Tigers. It played a major role, mostly covert, in delivering that military result. It was a result that did not come, however, until domestic Sri Lankan military leaders became convinced that they could and should win militarily. Assassination attempts were also relevant to that change of heart.

Some of our military informants in Sri Lanka argued that LTTE mistakes even bigger than the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi were their failed assassination attempts on the lives of Sri Lankan secretary of defence and brother of the war-winning president Mahinda Rajapaksa, Gotabhaya Rajapaksa, and war-winning army commander General Sarath Fonseka. These were the two men who persuaded the army that they could defeat the LTTE. Prior to their leadership of the late 2000s, the Sri Lankan military was seduced by the militarily unsophisticated analysis of the international diplomatic community and Sri Lanka’s own strategic elite that the LTTE was the most militarily powerful terrorist organisation in the world. In retrospect, its accomplishments seem less formidable than the mujahedin of Afghanistan in driving out the Soviet army and then the North Atlantic Treaty Orgnaization (NATO). One Sri Lankan commander jumped from recognition of the undoubtedly formidable military capability of the LTTE to the inference that defeating the LTTE would prove as impossible as it was for France to defeat Ho Chi Minh’s army in Vietnam (Proposition 4). According to our interviews, this was the answer one of Sri Lankan president Chandrika Kumaratunga’s five most senior military commanders gave on an occasion when she asked each for their assessment of the feasibility of abandoning peace talks in favour of a full military solution. It was an answer that reflected the
thinking of the Norwegian leadership of the post-2002 peace process, of EU diplomats generally and of the US State Department. Fonseka served as the commander of the Sri Lankan army from December 2005 until mid-July 2009 and led the military to victory against the LTTE. However, he fell out with the government and challenged president Rajapaksa unsuccessfully during the next election. Two weeks after his defeat, he was arrested and convicted by a military court on four counts of corruption and nepotism related to defence deals that bypassed military procedures in purchasing equipment.

Most good Sri Lankan analysts we interviewed were unsure of what Prabhakaran’s strategic calculations were. But a number felt that Prabhakaran shared the delusion that it would be incredibly difficult to defeat him. Hence, he could go to the absolute brink of a genocidal conflagration; he thought that would call in the kind of international intervention that would give him the best shot at an independent Tamil homeland. In retrospect, we can see that the international community should have been saying to the Tamil diaspora and the LTTE leadership in Sri Lanka that if Prabhakaran

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8  Lead Norwegian diplomat and current Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme Eric Solheim 'had a meeting with president Rajapaksa in late March 2006 where he told the president, Eric Solheim, that Prabhakaran was a military genius and that it would be suicidal to take him on' (Chandraprema 2012: 312).

9  In our interview with the Sri Lankan military commander General Sarath Fonseka (Interview, 2013, No. 091340), he said that, during the 2000s, Pentagon analysts would engage very sympathetically with his analysis that he could militarily defeat the LTTE quite quickly. While US military leaders found that credible, State Department officials saw military defeat of the LTTE as unrealistic. Fonseka described the reaction of the UK high commissioner in Sri Lanka to the 21 July 2006 LTTE provocation of closing the sluice gates that cut Eastern Province farmers off from irrigation for their crops. After the LTTE was routed in the region around the gates by 14 August, Fonseka said the high commissioner warned him that he should not assume that the military victory in this region could be replicated across the north. Fonseka’s critique of Western diplomats was that they were always talking up the impossibility of military defeat of the LTTE. Among the people who believed the Western diplomats’ analysis were the LTTE itself and the Tamil diaspora who funded the LTTE’s military folly and kept pushing for a maximalist military solution. At the moment of that military defeat around the sluice gates, Western diplomats should have been warning Tamil leaders that they must dissuade Prabhakaran from that folly because military defeat was certain if they did not genuinely embrace a political settlement. General Fonseka’s comment in our 2013 interview was: ‘It probably would not have worked. Prabhakaran probably would not have been convinced. But that would have been the right way to go for the international community and the political leadership of Sri Lanka to work together to end terrorism.’

10  For example, a retired Sri Lankan general said: ‘Prabhakaran never believed that he was defeated or that he would be defeated right up to the end. Even when he was totally trapped, he was hoping for a change of government in India’ (Interview, Colombo, 2013, No. 091352).

11  Put another way, Prabhakaran, the Tamil diaspora and Western diplomats may all have believed that Rajapaksa had no effective peak to his enforcement pyramid; he would not and could not go all the way to the military annihilation of the LTTE. He did. They were wrong.
goes to the brink, what will happen is what did happen: he would push his people over it. Pushing to the brink would not bring international intervention; pulling back from the brink would save the Tamil people and give the international community a shot at a political settlement that gives him at least some of what he wants. By not saying this, the international community created a monstrous moral hazard. Hopes for international peacekeeping intervention can be a cause of war. The moral hazard was the false belief that, in pushing to the brink of genocide, the LTTE could count on an international intervention that would catch the Tamil people in its net before they went over the precipice. International intervention should be clearly articulated as a reward to the likes of Prabhakaran for pulling back from brinksmanship, not a reward for going to the brink. As one Sri Lankan human rights leader put it, peace negotiators could have said there would be ‘severe consequences’ if the LTTE did not accept an autonomy deal (Interview, 2013, No. 091316). Consequently, the LTTE was seduced to the view that there could be benefits from playing by the rules of the peace game for a while, but no costs from withdrawing from peace talks after gaming them (see Toft 2010).

The military defeat of the Tigers in 2009 might be read as a refutation of the cascade hypothesis. While thousands were killed in the final year of the long conflict, since 2009, the war victory has resulted in a cessation of war deaths and almost complete cessation of Tamil terror. In other words, instead of cascading to more violence, the extreme violence of 2009 seemed to end further violence rather decisively.12 The evidence is strong that while LTTE leader Prabhakaran was alive, he would have used peace talks to regroup, recruit and eliminate Tamil leaders who supported peace.13 So it may always have been the case that a military solution was feasible and the most likely path to ending the killing. We do not argue that violence always cascades to further violence. As with all social science propositions, often it proves downright wrong that violence cascades. Nevertheless, even at this point of maximum invalidity in South Asia, we diagnose the cascade framework as providing fertile insights and

12 For more examples, see Toft (2010) and the discussion of Proposition 4 in Chapter 3, this volume.
13 See comments like the following from a leading contemporary analyst and former JVP fighter (Interview, Colombo, 2013, No. 091355): ‘LTTE was a maximalist political organisation. They could not settle for anything little. They gave primacy to the military over the political. The job of the political strategy was to support the military strategy.’
correctives to offer the discerning analyst. Let us then turn to how one should salvage explanatory relevance of cascade hypotheses even in this least likely case (Eckstein 1975) of violence ending violence.

The violence cascades thesis causes us to critique the maximalist way the Sri Lankan army conducted the final slaughter of the war. The insistence of the Sri Lankan Government that the United Nations quit the north of Sri Lanka eight months before the final onslaught, and the lack of backbone from the United Nations in asserting its responsibility to protect civilians, permitted a much more vast slaughter than would otherwise have occurred. More slaughter, on the cascades account, builds the potential for larger future cascades of violence. A minimally sufficient military victory induces lesser cascade dynamics.

Cascade to authoritarian capitalism

The ruthlessness and authoritarianism of the unaccountable power afflicted on the Tamil civilians in 2009 became part of a vicious cycle of unaccountable and violent authoritarianism imposed by the victorious regime over all Sri Lankans who were not its cronies. Ending the war was politically popular, especially among the Sinhalese majority. It was sold as a necessary kind of unaccountable power for the military and the leadership of the president. Once a long period of wartime unaccountability of power is entrenched, those who hold it are reluctant to surrender it, especially when they can sell a narrative about the risk of the enemy rising again. Torture and disappearances for the opposition, and impunity of the regime for war crimes, are not the best policies for averting long-term cycles of violence. As Goodhand and Korf put it:

The Rajapaksa government may have thrown off the shackles of the ‘peace trap’, and successfully, in its own terms, pursued a war for peace, but escaping the ‘war trap’ may be more difficult, as the coalitions and alliances constructed to pursue the war may impede its ability to forge a new broad-based political settlement for lasting peace. (Goodhand and Korf 2011: 2)\(^\text{14}\)

\(^\text{14}\) Goodhand and Korf’s (2011: 14–15) analysis also shows the limits of liberal peacebuilding for turning back the tide of cascades of violence. Sri Lanka was a peacebuilding case where the international players were enrolled by weighty domestic political players: first, the LTTE, and then the regime of the Rajapaksa brothers. The liberal international peacebuilders may have been able to enrol much of domestic civil society with their bags of money, but, in the end game, the civil society players who were not swept from the game table were those with deep indigenous identities or domestic roots that resonated with local support that permitted state tolerance. In that end game,
The Sri Lankan state became the family firm of president Rajapaksa until his defeat in 2015—a state sheared of many of the checks and balances of its independence constitution. As one party leader put it: ‘The country today is run by criminals. Big business belongs to the criminals’ (Interview, Colombo, 2013, No. 091302). Sri Lanka acquired a form of crony capitalism under president Rajapaksa under which the ruling Rajapaksa brothers got a slice of the action from much of the legitimate economy and the criminal economy. Two of president Rajapaksa’s brothers were the two most influential members of his government’s inner circle. The military was the part of the family firm controlled by defence secretary Gotabhaya Rajapaksa. Before the Rajapaksa Government, Sri Lanka was significantly under the control of the shadow government of a handful of criminal business entrepreneurs who used their income from control of gambling, drugs, prostitution, smuggling and human trafficking to buy individual journalists, television stations and newspapers to shape the political environment. From that base, these business criminals moved up to control blue-chip companies. After the 2009 military victory, the shadow government of organised business criminals who were once the puppeteers of political leaders became the puppets of the Rajapaksa brothers.

Sri Lanka waits in hope to see whether the defeat of president Rajapaksa in the 2015 election by a senior defector from his own regime, Maithripala Sirisena, will temper crony capitalism. One of Rajapaksa’s ministers who was rather critical of his president in 2013 provided this pessimistic analysis of Sri Lanka’s governance problems not being about personal dictatorship: ‘No, he [Rajapaksa] is not authoritarian. But the structure of the government is authoritarian and so he becomes authoritarian’ (Interview, Colombo, 2013, No. 091328). He then went on to argue that one of the ways in which president Rajapaksa was not authoritarian was that he had not rigged elections: ‘His joy is to be genuinely elected’ (Interview, No. 091328). Rajapaksa’s surprise election defeat in 2015 in some ways vindicated this assessment—as it did the assessments of other ministers we interviewed—that the president believed his people loved him and would keep electing him.

peacebuilding weakened rather than strengthened civil society, with human rights becoming a dirty term in mainstream populist Sinhala politics. By 2011, employment in the non-governmental organisation (NGO) sector in Sri Lanka had fallen to around one-quarter of the level reached during the 2000s.

15 This was the leader of the Marxist Party, the JVP, which led the uprisings discussed in the next two sections of this chapter.
Peter Bloom (2016) has argued convincingly, however, that a long-run shift towards authoritarian capitalism is utterly compatible with both the kind of free markets and free elections we see in Sri Lanka and other regimes that have shifted to authoritarian capitalism such as Mexico, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s newly constitutionalised authoritarian capitalist regime in Turkey, Viktor Mihály Orbán’s Hungary or Rodrigo Duterte’s Philippines. A strong majority of Russian citizens freely choose to vote for Vladimir Putin and half the people of the United States freely chose to vote for Donald Trump’s authoritarian capitalism. For Sri Lanka, the war on terror provided the ideological justification for the shift to authoritarianism, as was true with Putin, and with the shift to authoritarian capitalism that started with George W. Bush in the United States after 11 September 2001 (state torture, extraordinary rendition to Libya, Guantanamo Bay’s endless detention without trial, widespread drone assassinations in countries against which the United States had not declared war and the spurning of liberal multilateralism in trade policy after the 2001 Doha Declaration by the World Trade Organization). The ‘war on drugs’ also motivated authoritarian shifts in many countries, such as Mexico—in fact, across the Americas, starting with Richard Nixon’s war on drugs. The war on drugs, war on terror, war on fascism, the Cold War on communism—all have been the stuff of the imaginaries of authoritarian shifts since the 1930s. Whether by Rajapaksa in Sri Lanka, Putin in Russia or Xi Jinping in China, an imperial executive—in particular, an imperial presidency that sheds checks and balances from other institutions such as courts and parliaments—is the execution strategy for swings to authoritarian capitalism. We do not see this as an iron law of oligarchy (Michels 1962); shifts to authoritarianism are regularly reversed. We see such reversals to some degree in Sri Lanka since the defeat of Rajapaksa in 2015, to a large degree in Germany, Italy and Japan after 1945, in the Soviet Union with Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika in the 1980s, in many people-power revolutions since then (as discussed in Part III) and we will quite likely see it in the United States after the demise of Trump. On our analysis, there is no iron law of oligarchy, but there is systematic modelling of tactics of concentration of political and financial power in imperial executive presidencies (including by

16 In Part I, we discussed how Hitler used Stalin’s authoritarianism, and vice versa, to justify their populist imaginaries of why their own domestic authoritarianism was needed. Likewise, many allied countries in World War II used fear of fascism to justify terrible authoritarianism, such as interring innocent German and Japanese citizens.

17 This is the law that however democratic is the ethos of political parties, over time, they become increasingly oligarchic.
prime ministers who remake their office presidentially) (Proposition 2). In addition, from Sir Lanka to Bangladesh (Chapter 7) to Putin's Russia there is modelling of the idea of cultivating money politics through crony capitalists who get to monopolise national champion firms. This drives widespread shifts to authoritarian capitalism—as does fear among ordinary people of globalisation, fear of domination by great powers or fear of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) acting at their behest (Bloom 2016). Especially among those who feel the chill of job insecurity, nationalist capitalism ('America first', 'Sinhalese first') has populist appeal. Sri Lanka has not competed as well as India in global markets. Sri Lanka has managed regional hegemonies through King Solomon’s compromise of giving India first refusal on development projects in the northern half of the country and China first refusal for the southern half. Resentment over this can motivate the kind of warlike nationalism that we will see the JVP popularised in demanding the exit of Indian peacekeepers from Sri Lanka. Paradoxically, as with the Chinese Communist Party, the JVP’s Sinhalese nationalist socialism in the end became a prop of bourgeoning authoritarian capitalism in Sri Lanka.

Cascade prevention options in the hands of insurgents and diasporas

Blame for the maximalist slaughter and war crimes that occurred in the 2009 end game rests most profoundly with Prabhakaran. His engagement with a succession of peace processes was always tactical, less genuine than everyone on the other side of the table. Even at the end, LTTE orders to shoot civilians who tried to surrender contributed to the slaughter (one war crime cascading to another)—as did Prabhakaran’s decision to have his commanders attempt to sneak through enemy lines wearing suicide vests to use should they fail (Harrison 2012: 67). They all did fail. When the commanders were shot in suicide vests, the army could use this to justify murdering surrendering civilians. The army likewise used an incident in February 2009 when the Tigers sent a female suicide bomber to mingle with a group of escaping civilians (Proposition 6)—an operation that killed 20 soldiers plus eight civilians (Harrison 2012: 102). That is not to excuse the mass murder of civilians, the 32 artillery or air attacks on hospitals recorded by Human Rights Watch or the Red Cross and indiscriminate bombing of the final UN food convoy of the war (Harrison 2012: 90–91, 240). But it does help explain mass murder through a cascade of violence that involved suicide vests that were
invented by the LTTE to be cascaded globally. From Iraq to Afghanistan to Yemen to Pakistan, innocent civilians are now killed daily somewhere in the world on suspicion of being a suicide bomber.

Somasundaram (2010: 423) argues that the development of the Tamil militancy and the LTTE suicide bombers can best be understood in terms of the particularity of Sri Lanka’s sociocultural and political circumstances. He observes that while Tamils in Sri Lanka had often been stereotyped as somewhat submissive, the suicide cadres very quickly developed following the 1983 riots. Somasundaram (2010: 422) argues that ‘social sanction for a group to behave violently can bring out aggressive acts they had learnt or seen’ (Proposition 2) and this increased the participation of Tamil youth in suicide attacks. Prabhakaran also advocated a cult of the use of cyanide capsules: Tamil rebels were instructed to commit suicide rather than be captured by the state. Suicidal violence was the worst way that violence cascaded globally from Sri Lanka. It was the cascade that gave the Sri Lankan state the green light from the United States, India and China to ‘do what it takes to fight terrorism’. The prominence of that terror cascade in the calculations of the great powers was heightened by the Sea Tigers’ innovation of a suicide boat that speeds towards a navy ship, which was replicated by jihadists on the USS Cole in 2000.

Plate 8.3 The USS Cole is towed away from the port city of Aden, Yemen, into open sea, 29 October 2000, after a terrorist attack killed 17 crew members and injured 39 others.

A cascades analysis does not say military solutions never work. Our least likely case analysis suggests that military solutions, even when they work, cascade violence. Hence, it warns that maximalist military solutions risk more virulent cascades of violence than minimalist ones. It counsels mobilising the spectre of military defeat to motivate peace negotiations—when military defeat is in reality a credible possibility (as in Iraq–Kuwait in 1990 and Sri Lanka in 2009)—as a better option with the Saddam Husseins and Prabhakarans of this world than purely facilitative diplomacy that fails to be assertive with military reality checks. This is a philosophy of preventive diplomacy as something that must be asserted, which then must fail and fail again, in multiple creative modalities before taking the risk with cascades of violence. One of those last-chance modalities involves laying out the full brutality of the worst possible military consequences of shunning a political settlement. This is best done not by making threats, but by third party diplomats laying out the military reality check to insurgent leaders and the diasporas that fund them. Western diplomats share some blame for the cascades of violence from Sri Lanka. They failed to open their minds to the military reality and then to use it to try to motivate a diplomatic solution.

Crime–war and security dilemmas of the JVP: From class struggle to ethnic separatism

This section continues the analysis of Proposition 9(a) (crime cascades to war). It does so, however, by considering two other wars that immediately preceded the take-off of the Tamil insurgency. It explores how these wars cascaded into one another. We cannot understand the Tamil wars without embedding them within the cascades of class wars that were their immediate historical antecedents. The first civil war driven by class politics was in 1971. It recurred in 1987–89 when the Sinhalese nationalist and Marxist political party, the JVP, took up arms against the state. Many JVP activists had disappeared before the conflict and thousands by the

18 Following the split within the Ceylon Communist Party in 1963 roused by the Sino–Soviet conflict, Sri Lanka’s largest leftist party, the JVP, was founded, in 1965. The JVP has been described as ‘hydra-headed’ and ‘phoenix-like’ for its ability to regenerate despite being violently annihilated by the state.
end of it. Many were tortured. The security forces raped female activists (as also happened with LTTE women). This state crime was important to the onset of the cascade of violence that occurred.

The various phases of conflicts demonstrate that economic interests have played a major role in Sri Lankan ethnic rivalry. Class theories of ethnic conflict (Horowitz 2000: Ch. 3) reveal and explore the diversity of conflict motives among different classes of society. Economic rivalries—traders versus traders, clients versus traders/merchants, landowners versus labourers, labourers versus labourers—may have further accentuated differences marked by ethnic lines. Caste was another layer of vertical complexity in the cleavages that coalesced to escalate these conflicts (Proposition 3). Interestingly, however, caste was also complex as a horizontal cleavage: ‘a horizontal competition of “my caste is best”’ (Interview with a Marxist student leader who had been on the JVP hit list during the JVP’s conflict with the state, Colombo, 2013, No. 091307). This informant continued:

Rural caste oppression was a factor in the rise of JVP, but only one factor, and [the rise of the] LTTE. JVP was fundamentally a crisis of the system of agrarian production. Smallholders and peasants experienced population increases with disease eradication and better health. There was an excessive labour supply and the land shortage.

In the mid-1980s, the JVP’s financial support base comprised small entrepreneurs based in Colombo who either had rival Tamil businesses or had difficulty in obtaining credit from banks that, according to them, were under disproportionate influence from Tamils (Ponnambalam 1981). The JVP led an unsuccessful youth rebellion, first in 1971, which was crushed with a loss of 4,000 to 10,000 lives, and then another armed uprising, in 1987–89, which again was put down at a cost of perhaps 40,000 or more lives (Gunaratna 2001: 105, 269).

Just as the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi and the attempts on Gotabhaya Rajapaksa and General Fonseka were crimes that escalated plans for a Tamil war, we can see that kind of cascade at the foundations of the JVP uprisings in Sri Lanka. In our interviews, JVP leaders stressed that they turned to armed struggle because their party was being tyrannised by state violence in the form of arbitrary arrest, torture and disappearances. In the literature (Gunaratna 2001: 269) and in our interviews, it was often said that the fatal mistake the JVP made was to announce that if members of the military and the police did not defect to them, the JVP would kill
their families. Some JVP members, without actually being ordered to do so by the JVP leadership, then indeed proceeded to kill family members of the security forces. One reason they did this was that they had already persuaded 2,000 soldiers to desert, many to join the JVP (Gunaratna 2001: 328).19 Erroneously, they calculated that by threatening military families in the conditions of extreme uncertainty they had created by December 1988, when around 100 people were being assassinated every day (Gunaratna 2001: 267), larger sections of the military might defect to them. Instead, the JVP triggered a cascade of slaughter of their own cadres. The security forces recruited hit squads of soldiers and police whose family members had been killed by the JVP (Gunaratna 2001: 333, 338–9). They had no compunction in the systematic killing of the entire leadership of the JVP. Once almost all politburo and central committee members were killed, the insurrection collapsed. On the other side, it was likewise a case of crime enabling civil war: ‘The JVP concentrated on recruiting members from houses set on fire and families in which brothers or fathers were killed or a female harassed or raped’ (Gunaratna 2001: 295).

With the JVP uprisings, a Marxist imaginary cascaded violence:

Where there was a lot of influence on both JVP and LTTE from Marxism was when it comes to armed struggle. People thought, especially oppressed people thought, the best way was armed struggle because of the Marxist influence. They thought that killing was a good way to liberation … JVP and LTTE had the same heroes. It was not Gandhi. It was [advocates of violence such as Subhas Chandra] Bose, Mao, Che [Guevara], [Fidel] Castro. (Interview with JVP leader, Colombo, 2013, No. 091313)

Assassinations on both sides in the failed JVP uprising of 1971 motivated both sides to settle scores in 1987. The security forces argued that the government had erred in not wiping out the JVP in 1971. This perception also encouraged the security forces in 1987 to believe that ‘unless we wipe them out first, they will wipe out not only us, but also our families this time’. This perceived security dilemma (Proposition 5) magnified and cascaded common criminal threats into an imperative for war. Deputy inspector general of police Premadasa Udugampola, the most efficient, ruthless death squad leader, who had lost his wife, children, mother

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19 Others of these deserters and the estimated 20,000 deserters from the long war against the Tamil insurgency (Gunaratna 2001: 368) became members of armed criminal gangs who mounted armed robberies, kidnapped for ransom and undertook contract killing, among other activities (i.e. a war-leads-to-crime dynamic internal to the victorious army).
and brother to the JVP, said: ‘I did not want a Pol Pot regime to come’ (Gunaratna 2001: 340). Even more interesting are the considerable data supporting the conclusion that the JVP prematurely resorted to armed struggle against the government by attempting to capture the armouries of 74 police stations on 5 April 1971 and then abduct the prime minister and senior ministers, because of their analysis that, if they did not strike first, the state would wipe them out in the way that the Indonesian Government had wiped out that country’s communist party in 1965 (Cooke 2011: 122, 135; Authors’ interviews). That security dilemma analysis of the JVP in 1971 was exaggerated because the Sri Lankan security forces did not see the JVP as the threat that the Indonesian security forces had seen in their communist party in 1965. The Indonesian Communist Party was the largest in the world outside China and the USSR; it already wielded great power inside Sukarno’s government. Thus, cascades of imaginaries can be as important as cascades of action. Imaginaries of pre-emptive violence are spread by networks—in this case, Marxist networks that modelled a security dilemma, even if it was not fully grounded in reality. What the security dilemma realities are matters little if key actors imagine that, when they fail to act decisively to kill the enemy, the enemy will kill them.

Preventive diplomacy was needed in 1971 to persuade the JVP that they were not in that security dilemma and that parliamentary politics was a more plausible path to power (which became a reality in 2004 when the JVP became the third force in the Sri Lankan parliament, with 41 seats and various ministerial portfolios). It was true that state crime against JVP cadres was also a cause of the 1971 uprising. So what we have here is serious state crime that needed to cease, combined with an imagined security dilemma imported from state violence in Indonesia that triggered a cascade of JVP violence that, in turn, triggered a cascade of state violence. All this was allowed to cascade for want of preventive diplomacy to provide a reality check to the immature political minds of the JVP cadres of 1971, whose average age was 20 (Gunaratna 2001: 119). The more mature minds of regional foreign ministers or wise and respected communist revolutionary leaders might have persuaded them that they were not in as dire a security dilemma as they believed (or propagandised).

Our hypothesis is that the two JVP uprisings helped create a culture of violence and a legacy of untreated trauma in Sri Lanka. Beyond these profound ways in which JVP violence contributed to crime (Proposition 9(b)), and was caused by it (Proposition 9(a)), in both uprisings common crimes to steal guns were the principal way the JVP armed itself,
combined with hundreds of major robberies planned by the JVP from September 1986 of money, gold and other valuables that allowed them to buy guns (Gunaratna 2001: 267). Gunaratna describes this crime wave as contributing to anomie—a state of disorder in which citizens no longer knew who was in charge or what were the rules of social order (Proposition 7):

The gradual build up of crime and the accompanying brutalization of the society was followed by the emergence of a lawless, a policyless and a leaderless nation. Two governments had emerged [the JVP was called the 'night government'] and the people did not know whom to support and follow. (Gunaratna 2001: 270)

Paradoxes of the cascades between LTTE and JVP violence

This section seeks to inject more complexity and nuance into Proposition 9(b)—that war cascades to more war and more crime. It does so through a paradoxical exploration of the application to the Sri Lankan case of Proposition 3: * Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power imbalances.* The JVP always tended to be a Sinhalese nationalist party and it still is. It chose in 1987 to reignite its uprising because it believed that Sinhalese dignity was challenged by the presence on Sri Lankan soil of an Indian peacekeeping force. The JVP argued that the Sri Lankan Government was allowing their country to be hostage to Tamil division and Indian imperial designs. There was a paradox, therefore, that the LTTE had provided weapons, landmines, explosives and training to the JVP to weaken the Sri Lankan military that would have to fight on two fronts (Gunaratna 2001: 133) (Proposition 3). The LTTE threat cascaded through the intentional agency of LTTE strategists of violence to the JVP becoming a more credible threat.

In the late 1980s, the Sri Lankan state was suffering military defeats at the hands of the LTTE. It seemed to lead to a society that was disintegrating. For that reason, the state at first welcomed Indian peacekeepers so the Indians could bring the LTTE under control while the state concentrated on subjugating the JVP in the south. The next paradox was that JVP nationalist propaganda pilloried the state for its weakness in surrendering Sinhalese sovereignty to the Indians. Indian intervention redefined JVP
politics in Sri Lanka (Uyangoda 2008). The JVP nationalist propaganda resonated in the south and built support for the JVP while helping to destabilise president J. R. Jayewardene, who lost power in 1989. His successor, Ranasinghe Premadasa, was therefore minded to convince the unpopular Indian peacekeepers to leave. Then came the next paradoxical cascade of the Government of Sri Lanka replenishing the firepower of its principal enemy, the LTTE, so it could inflict more losses on the Indians. This it did, killing 1,200 Indian peacekeepers. The peacekeepers had initially been fairly popular among Tamils, many of whom were protected from the LTTE by the peacekeepers, and protected as a result of the pause from the more general ravages of war. The LTTE manoeuvred to undermine this Tamil civilian goodwill by firing on Indian troops from inside places of worship and other locales where Indian return fire would kill many Tamil civilians. Incidents of rape of Tamil women and other misconduct by demoralised Indian peacekeepers, who, in our interviews, found it hard to understand why they were there being killed, also made the cascade worse (Proposition 9(a)).

Sri Lanka had become a country with wars among four major combatants: the Sri Lankan military, the Indian military, the JVP and the LTTE. Some of these combatants chose to escalate violence not only against enemies, but also against ‘friends’. They did this to goad their friends to resist their enemies. As a result, cascades of violence became convoluted and virulent. Organised crime then saw opportunities to enrol political parties to their projects, even to seek to take them over, as some interview informants alleged organised crime interests did with the JVP. More mundanely, a climate of extreme violence created opportunities for Sri Lankan organised crime to promote protection rackets, in turn nurturing a political culture of corruption. Suicide (self-violence) also trebled between the 1960s and 1990s in Sri Lanka (Gombrich 2006: 25). Sri Lankans became inured to a culture of disappearances.

While we do not document cascades of state crime and combatant crime in detail here, abductions, disappearances, arbitrary detention, torture, rape and sexual violence were rampant in Sri Lanka during its 26 years of protracted warfare. These crimes have been documented by human rights organisations and the United Nations (see Amnesty International 2013; HRW 2011; UN 2011). Various regimes were quite open about making the fact of torture common knowledge:
Disfigured heads and bodies were displayed openly to serve as a warning to the public. Such atrocities became commonplace. The existence of at least eight such torture chambers was discovered by a Commission investigating disappearances in four provinces. (Commission of Inquiry into Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of Persons in the Western, Southern and Sabaragamuwa Provinces 1997: 34)

In our interviews, Tamil activists also reported that there had been an increase in disappearances following the 2005 failed peace process. Human rights activists and Sri Lankan Tamils living in Jaffna and Colombo were usually ‘white vanned’. White vans without number plates picked up people who were usually never seen again. Incidents of enforced disappearances continued after 2009, though at a lower level. A report that includes interviews with 40 witnesses of sexual violence and torture notes that the witnesses had been released only after their family paid a large bribe to the security forces, most often brokered by a member of the Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) or well-connected individuals in Sri Lanka (Sooka 2014: 43). The domination dynamics evident here that cascade from cascades among the four major combatant forces down to individuals take many forms: cascades of exclusion, militarism, cronyism, corruption and money politics, cascades of state terror and cascades of class politics, among other domination dynamics.

Conclusion: Multiplicity in crime–war dynamics

Archer and Gartner (1984) showed that homicide rates rise after nations participate in wars at home or abroad (supporting Proposition 9(b)). There are other war–crime dynamics beyond those considered here that feed this result. We have illustrated but a few. These include war in Sri Lanka cascading to rape, during the war and in refugee camps afterwards, followed by murder to eliminate witnesses; war cascading to militarisation of a society in which the military steals land and businesses from people; and war cascading to crony capitalism in which a ruling family loots the nation, corrupts accountability institutions and causes political opponents to disappear. The collapse of an autonomous rule of law also induced anomie and revenge criminality (Proposition 7):

20 The EPDP is a political party and a pro-government paramilitary organisation in Sri Lanka.
When accountability is not there in the legal system of society you get a lot of revenge happening. People take things into their own hands. Crime rates increase as you get a revenge culture. (Interview with rights activist, Sri Lanka, 2013, No. 091342)

‘People start to think if we can’t change militarisation, then we had to learn how to live with it and cope with it’, and, as a result, there is ‘normalisation of abnormality’, such as Tamil widows being told that if they want a normal life they should marry a soldier (Interview, northern Sri Lanka, 2013, No. 091318).

Many of the data points that drive Archer and Gartner’s (1984) result are countries that experience elevated homicide rates after participation in wars that end with a peace forged by military victory: World War I, World War II, the Vietnam War. Major cases such as these and Sri Lanka, where peace is achieved through military victory, at one level do refute the simple hypothesis that war cascades to more war. A cascade approach helps us unpack simple causation models that read Sri Lanka as a case of nonviolence secured through violence. We might likewise unpack World War I, World War II and the Indochina Wars as cases that each included a cascade to genocide: to a Turkish genocide against Armenians in World War I; Nazi genocide in World War II; and Khmer Rouge genocide against class enemies of the new Maoist Cambodia, which included supporters of the defeated pro-US government of Lon Nol, non-Maoist intellectuals, professionals, monks and people of Vietnamese and Chinese ancestry in the Indochina Wars. Each of these genocides cascaded refugees who triggered other conflicts in places such as Palestine—for example, refugees from the Khmer Rouge (most of whom fled to Vietnam) encouraged the cascade to the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, which then cascaded to an invasion of Vietnam by China in 1979. Within each of these wars where military victory caused a peace, a war between A and B drags in C, which in turn drags in D and E. The fact that the cascade dynamics internal to these wars are so profound is what leads us to call two of them World Wars and to call what started as ‘the Vietnam War’ the ‘Indochina War’. Hence, it is simultaneously true that violence ended these wars and that violence cascaded from them.

21 Consider also the work of Toft (2010), discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume.
Sri Lanka is not a case like these mega wars that have dragged in large numbers of national armies. Yet we can see the victory of the state military in the first JVP uprising as creating conditions not only for peace, but also for the second JVP uprising and the four ‘Eelam wars’—just as we saw in Chapter 2 World War I creating conditions for World War II. So we have illustrated how we must unpack cascades internal to a country case, and internal to a single war, to understand the ways in which the peace-through-war script in Sri Lanka is not quite right. Just as Sri Lanka is not a case that cascades to world war, it is also not a case like Iraq (in 2003), El Salvador (Richani 2007) and various African countries where more people are killed by homicides, state violence and armed gang violence after a peace agreement is signed than were being killed during the war. Even so, Sri Lanka powerfully demonstrates the cascade dynamics of homicide leading to war and war leading to homicide. We have also identified in our narrative many data points in Sri Lanka where riots and rapes contributed to escalation to war and war motivated and enabled rape and riots.

This returns us to the dangers of static analysis discussed in Chapter 2. We saw in Chapter 2 that, in deciding to invade Iraq in 2003, president George W. Bush’s inner circle undertook a static analysis of the cost and desirability of regime change in Iraq (see Luban 2013; Woodward 2002, 2004) rather than any recursive analysis of possible cascades. Our policy inference, of course, is that such decisions will be better if they are open to recursive diagnosis of cascade risks. President Bush did not weigh the costs of a crime wave in Iraq that would take more lives than the invasion (Iraq Body Count 2012). For example, more academics had been killed in Iraq (448) through kidnapping, suicide bombs and other violence than by coalition forces up to the time of president Bush’s ‘mission accomplished’ declaration (Griffis 2014). President Bush did not weigh up waves of traumatised young American soldiers returning home to inflict violence on their families and on themselves in an awful carnage of suicide in their families. Nor was there any factoring in of the threat to American constitutional values that state crime at institutions such as Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay and extraordinary rendition to totalitarian regimes like that in Libya would have on the fabric of American society or on the lives of young Americans such as Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning who exposed these state crimes. He did not weigh up the risk of cascades to civil war that could empower something like Islamic State, led by a former inmate of the Abu Ghraib and Camp Bucca prisons in Iraq.
Obversely, our analysis causes us to reconsider the importance to war prevention of sharpened security sector and crime prevention competence. Improved democratic policing that might have prevented the anti-Tamil riots of 1956, 1958, 1977, 1979, 1981 and 1983 that so shaped the imagination of young LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran\(^\text{22}\) and that might have prevented the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi—as with the case of Archduke Ferdinand (Chapter 2)—are counterfactuals we cannot empirically test. Yet we can hesitate to dismiss them as sparks that, if extinguished, would inevitably lead to other sparks that light identical conflagrations. Extinguishing sparks that ignite wars is not as important as tackling the root causes of those wars, such as the domination of Tamils—discrimination and violence against Tamils by the Sinhalese nationalist state. Yet it is important.

We can be attentive to redressing root causes of regional cascades of violence at the same time as we also work at dampening all types of cascade dynamics. States and the United Nations can be moderate in deploying military power to guarantee a responsibility to protect civilians. It is possible to demand a political process and political transition backed by military might that threatens regime change, without moving with maximal force to war as the instrument of regime change. When diplomacy and military deployment become more like that, extremely violent legacy societies such as Sri Lanka and Palestine can become less common. That, at least, is one policy hypothesis that motivates the ongoing inductive work of Peacebuilding Compared.

\(^\text{22}\) In this context, we mean democratic policing that is not captured by a ruling party or a dominant ethnic group, but that acts decisively to protect the rights of citizens of all ethnicities and parties. Across South Asia—in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Nepal, as well as Sri Lanka—this book has revealed a deep pathology of police being politicised rather than playing an independent role in a separation of powers that sees them douse sparks of communal violence, whichever group is injured first. Chapter 7 conceived this as a cascade of violence from the colonial policing of the Raj being politicised to defend British interests. We see the importance of this policing pathology in Wilkinson’s (2004) research that shows a history of cascades of violence of this type across hundreds of communal riots in India (see Chapter 5). Where the police do show resolve to prevent violence from spreading, to smother the sparks, they have overwhelmingly succeeded in doing so throughout Indian history. Wilkinson found that the cases where there is a lot of killing are ones where the police fail to show resolve. Failure of resolve in turn occurs because their state government is politically reluctant to allow the police to control a group that delivers electoral support to the party in power. One of the reasons low-intensity Maoist insurgencies afflict some rural areas of half of India’s states is that state political leaders have tolerated them or encouraged them because the insurgents killed mostly party-political opponents of those state leaders in the regions Maoists control (Chadha 2005: 375–6; Routray 2012: 319). Likewise, in Nepal, the king tolerated Maoist killings for a number of years because they were killing his republican enemies in the democratic parties (Chapter 9).
Another is the power of cascades of reconciliation. A retired Sri Lankan general told the story of how he reconciled with one of the few surviving top LTTE commanders, quoting the Buddha: ‘Hatred does not cease with hatred, but with love.’ His message was that the same religious belief systems that provided the resources for cascades of hatred also had the resources for cascades of reconciliation.23

Many such small gestures, we argue, are important to cascades of reconciliation: a little cascade from one Buddhist country to another or from a Buddhist to a Hindu invoking a shared religious belief. Much more than this is needed to reverse a legacy of extreme violence, as discussed in Part III. We also conclude there that everyday rituals of reconciliation are important. A macro-structural peace is most fertile when recursively related to an everyday micro politics of nonviolence.

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23 The context was a reconciliation meeting just a few months before the war ended. Former LTTE commander Vinayagamoorthy Muralitharan, better known by his nom de guerre, Colonel Karuna, who had recently been appointed as a minister, arrived at the reconciliation meeting in Colombo. There was silence and no one knew what to say. ‘Karuna had been made a minister but no one had ever forgiven him,’ as the Sri Lankan general expressed it. So the general walked up to Karuna and shook his hand, which broke the ice. Then the general said, ‘I want you to know that I forgive you because I was one of the first people you attacked with a Claymore mine that killed two men on my patrol in 1986.’ Then the general made that quote from the Buddha. Karuna smiled and shook hands with the general a second time. This quote had been used by the Sri Lankan prime minister at the San Francisco meeting to form the United Nations and greatly moved the Japanese Government and people at the time. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe recalled it in a speech on 7 September 2014: ”Hatred ceases not by hatred, but by love”. On September 6 [1951], 63 years ago, at the San Francisco Peace Conference, it was Sri Lanka who encouraged Japan’s return to the international community by saying this phrase, while Japan at that time was trying to take a step forward to its reconstruction from its post-war devastation. Over 60 years since then, Japan as a peace-loving nation has contributed to world peace. This time, I would like to visit Sri Lanka with feelings of gratitude towards them’ (translation of this part of the speech in Sri Lanka acquired during fieldwork).
Cascades to peripheries of South Asia

This chapter considers countries at the periphery of South Asia—first Bhutan, then Afghanistan, Nepal and Myanmar. Events in these countries have cascaded violence from South Asia into Central Asia and the Middle East on one side, and South-East Asia on the other. Afghanistan, according to the analysis in this chapter, is a strong fit to the 10 propositions of our starting theory. Myanmar is a weaker fit, Nepal is a much weaker fit still and Bhutan barely fits the theory at all. Myanmar is more clearly part of South-East Asia than South Asia, though Myanmar has applied to be a full member of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). Afghanistan has significant historical, cultural and social ties with both Central and South Asia. Both regions’ political and strategic interests overlap in Afghanistan, contributing to its security dilemmas. We will see that cascades of violence that have shifted boundaries across the centuries are among the reasons for a degree of fluidity about what South Asia means.

Bhutan

Bhutan is the least geopolitically significant country of South Asia apart from the much smaller string of atolls of the mid-Indian Ocean that make up the Maldives. Bhutan has a tiny population of 744,000 and a weak economy. Its people are extremely poor. Bhutan has little in the way of natural resources. Timber is its most valuable resource, but
impenetrable mountains make such limited resources difficult to access profitably. So, potential invaders from the powerful states around it never saw Bhutan as a plum waiting to be plucked.

Moreover, Bhutan always recognised its weakness by aligning with the biggest kid on the block. It did not resist the British Empire and was an early mover in cultivating close ties with it. In 1910, the Treaty of Punakha guaranteed that British India would not interfere in Bhutan’s internal affairs if it accepted British advice on its external relations. After India became regionally dominant, Bhutan cut a similar deal with India. The Treaty of Friendship between India and Pakistan, 1949, stipulated that India would not interfere in Bhutan’s internal affairs, but would guide its foreign policy. India also dominates its economy and trade, with China having limited interest as a result of the impenetrability of this part of the Himalayas. This was a different situation from Tibet, which suffered brutal Chinese occupation, cascades of protest suicide immolations that continue to this day and integration into China because it was accessible from there. Tension was compounded by Indian destabilisation of Tibet’s integration. The upshot is that Bhutan is most unusual as a country in that it has been independent throughout its history as a state without ever having been conquered. In foreign policy and trade, it has, however, always been subjugated to the regional hegemon.

Bhutan therefore offers up considerable refutation of our cascade propositions. A methodological weakness of this book is that, at the outset, we decided not to undertake fieldwork in Bhutan because it has not hosted any of the subcontinent’s major wars—an error of selecting on the dependent variable. Perhaps the lessons from the history of Bhutan are so clear that fieldwork is not needed to affirm it; perhaps not. We leave that assessment to critics who are deeply knowledgeable on Bhutan. Our reading is that Bhutan in recent centuries is a clear case of a phenomenon that is hugely recurrent throughout recorded history. This is of a weak state that is geographically difficult to totally dominate accepting the proposition that it be absorbed geopolitically into a large empire in return for autonomous governance of local affairs. A generalisation that has already come up in this book is that empires can pacify large spaces for long periods—as the Ottoman Empire did across North Africa, the Middle East, Turkey and the Balkans, and as the Habsburg Empire did across Central and southern Europe, Spain and Latin America—but, when empires break up, violence cascades. That was our account of the onset of the World Wars cascades in Chapter 2. The collapse of the Spanish part
of the Habsburg Empire a century earlier likewise cascaded a great many decades of revolutionary violence in Latin America. So we might conceive Bhutan as likely to remain securely nestled under the huge shadow of the Indian ‘empire’ until something unusually catastrophic, such as a nuclear war, triggers the breakup of India.

Propositions 3–5 are the relevant parts of our starting theory here:

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

We construe Bhutan as a case where submission to the British Empire and then India averted any ‘unsettling of power imbalances’, where the capacity of those empires of armed force to prevail as the ‘single legitimate armed force’ that dominates Bhutan has never been challenged. It was challenged neither domestically nor by other empires such as China. Therefore, there have never been armed factions in Bhutan who believed that credible enemies were preparing to defeat them. Hence, they never saw themselves as being in a security dilemma where they should attack first. Even though the states of India and China today rule more people than the Roman or British empires ever did, it is controversial to describe them as empires. The ambiguity of language here is educative. Whether we think of large swathes of pacified space as states or empires, the important thing is that they are pacified spaces where one armed force dominates all others across that space. Whatever you call it, Bhutan is part of a continuity of pacified space with India. These are conditions where alliances that unsettle power imbalances and create security dilemmas are unlikely and where cascades of violence are unlikely to spin out of control.

Bhutan is not only a society without armed conflict, but also a low-crime society with a homicide rate and an imprisonment rate far below the global average, even though cannabis abuse has long been a major social problem (UNODC 2009). Over 60 per cent of the population of Bhutan is below 25 years of age (Bhutan National Statistics Bureau 2012: 8). Such a large youth population theoretically should cause the crime rate to be higher than average.
While Bhutan has nowhere near the violence problems of Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Myanmar or Sri Lanka, some violence has cascaded from these more troubled neighbours. For example, it is common for terrorism by outsiders to be commented on as the only major crime problem in Bhutan. The United Liberation Front of Asom, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland, the Bodo Liberation Tigers Force and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation have had significant bases in Bhutan (as discussed in Chapter 5). The Bhutanese military has complied with pressure from India to attack their bases at times (particularly in 2003). This, in turn, has triggered some retaliatory terrorist attacks against the state and people of Bhutan by these groups. No nation can totally cut itself off from cascades of regional violence to be an island of peace and happiness.

Bhutan domestically has also triggered violence by driving approximately 100,000 Nepalese refugees out of the country into UN refugee camps in Nepal and India. These refugee camps have been tragic breeding grounds of poverty, suicide, crime and violence. While it was domestic communal conflict rather than war that created these camps, the dynamics of violence in the camps mirror our Proposition 6 analysis. Upreti (2010: 248) reports the proliferation of small arms among militant groups in camps for refugees chased from Bhutan as a major concern of post-conflict arms proliferation inside Nepal. Recruitment for the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist) was strong in these refugee camps. This was a party that demanded return of refugees and a constitutional republic in Bhutan that did not discriminate on the basis of ethnicity or in language policy. In 2008, during the transition to a constitutional monarchy, the Bhutan Communist Party declared a people’s war that had little impact. Its party membership was fewer than 1,000 cadres. Five bombs were exploded across Bhutan, the Maoists killed four forest rangers and the police killed a handful of Maoists (South Asia Terrorism Portal 2008).

These qualifications aside, we interpret Bhutan as illustrating quite a common limit on our cascades propositions. Our explanatory framework has much more limited purchase in circumstances where settled subordination of a pacified space occurs under the umbrella of a dominant state or empire. Such pacification of cascades occurred when Britain was nested within Rome’s European empire and today with secure micro-states such as Monaco and Luxembourg, nested under the hegemony of EU foreign policy.
Afghanistan

As a battleground for several intrastate and international conflicts, including the Cold War and the ‘global war on terror’, Afghanistan’s sociopolitical infrastructure has been deeply affected. While the US-led international military intervention that ousted the Taliban regime in 2001 was welcomed at the time by many Afghans, statebuilding and peacebuilding efforts in Afghanistan have had very limited success. Following the Bonn process in December 2001 that drew a road map for Afghanistan’s statebuilding, several benchmarks were set to establish key institutions of a sovereign and democratic Afghanistan, including a transitional government, a new constitution, presidential elections by September 2004 and parliamentary and provincial council elections by October 2005. The Bonn Agreement addressed security sector reform only indirectly and not as part of a broader set of law reforms. It emphasised the need for an international security force until such time as an Afghan security force could be developed. The initial priority was not on building credible institutions, but on ensuring a minimal security presence in provinces and districts, with the focus of Western forces on targeting Al-Qaeda. As a result, building and reforming the Afghan National Police, the border police, the Afghan National Army and the National Security Directorate were compromised during and after the Bonn process (Ayub et al. 2009: 11).

On 22 March 2011, then Afghan president Hamid Karzai announced that the first phases of the transition to national control of national security would be completed by the end of 2014. By the end of 2012, the Afghan National Security Forces were meant to have taken over protection of 87 per cent of Afghanistan’s population, with 23 of 34 provinces completing the transition process. However, by the end of 2013, evidence on the ground suggested that overall security conditions had deteriorated as a result of increased attacks on civilians and greater restrictions on civil society and, in particular, on women’s rights groups. By 2018, this security situation had become even worse.

The sharp rise in the number of children and young people killed and maimed in the Afghan wars has also generated lifelong grievances among young Afghans living in camps in Pakistan or in a range of settlements.

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1 A total of 159 interviews were conducted in Afghanistan, mostly in five Afghan provinces in 2011 and 2014 and mostly by John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak (2013), with some interviews with Afghans also conducted in New York and other sites.
in Afghanistan. According to the United Nations, in 2016, there were 11,418 causalities—a 3 per cent increase since 2015 and the highest civilian casualty toll in Afghanistan since 2001. In addition, small militant groups loyal to Islamic State also pose new threats to Afghanistan (Rasmussen 2017).

While this book does not dedicate a chapter to Afghanistan, Chapters 1–6 were each about Afghanistan in major ways. Because the conflict in Afghanistan has been so repeatedly canvassed in these six chapters, we do not retrace the history of this conflict. We have already seen that one cannot understand cascades of violence in India and Pakistan without understanding Afghanistan. Chapter 6 showed that the Balochistan conflict also cascaded across to the Middle East, with violence cascading between Iranian and Pakistani Balochistan, as well as across Pakistan’s border into Afghanistan. In a similar fashion, Afghan Shia refugee camps that accommodated several million Afghans in Iran cascaded weapons and young refugee fighters into Afghan Shia armed groups that staked Shia and ethnic Hazara claims in Afghanistan’s various wars.

The Afghan civil war in 1992 cascaded in a terrible way into a civil war in Tajikistan that cost 50,000 to 100,000 lives. This was a war that started as an opposition movement of both Islamist and liberal democratic reformers opposed to the way the ethnic community of the Leninabadi region continued to dominate the ruling elite in the post-Soviet era, in continuity with their domination during the Soviet period. The Tajik civil war in turn cascaded back into Afghanistan as 80,000 of the million-plus refugees fled to Afghanistan, where Afghan Tajik leader Ahmad Shah Massoud, the pre-eminent leader of the Northern Alliance, became a benefactor of the Tajik opposition (Djalili et al. 1997; Rashid 2002; Roy 2001).

Jihad in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan also cascaded back into conflict in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan and beyond, even to China. An instructive micro–macro process tracing of these cascades is through the biographies of Jumaboi Khojayev (nom de guerre Juma Namangani) and Tohir Yuldashev. Khojayev was a Soviet conscript from Uzbekistan sent to fight in Afghanistan. He returned home impressed by the Afghan jihadists. Newly radicalised, he established, with Islamist ideologue Tohir Yuldashev, a Salafi2 opposition group called Adolat (Justice) in his home,

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2 Salafism is a sect of Sunni Islam that demands a reading of Islam stripped of local customs and cultures, following the original ways of strict Sharia law under the social structures prescribed in the earliest days of Islam in Arabia.
the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan. In 1992, Adolat established order in this anomic, unstable post-Soviet valley by imposing Sharia law. The Uzbek military attacked the valley, driving Khojayev and Yuldashev to Tajikistan, where Khojayev became an important commander on the Islamist side in Tajikistan's civil war. From there, Yuldashev networked ideologically with jihadists, travelling to Afghanistan and the Middle East. Between 1995 and 1998, he moved his base to Peshawar, Pakistan, where he befriended Osama bin Laden and other Afghans. Khojayev and Yuldashev became disillusioned with their Tajik hosts when they agreed to a UN-brokered powersharing peace deal in Tajikistan and when their Tajik hosts also backed Massoud’s Northern Alliance against the Taliban. In 1998, Khojayev and Yuldashev formed the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) with the objective of establishing Sharia law across all Uzbekistan and beyond. They received funding from Pakistan’s intelligence services, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI).

Episodic IMU attacks on the Uzbek state continue to this day, at times with terrible repression and militarisation coming back as a state response. On 13 May 2005, Uzbek troops fired on a demonstration in the Fergana Valley, killing approximately 850 people (Rashid 2010a: 268). IMU violence cascaded into the Batken region of southern Kyrgyzstan, which is inhabited mainly by ethnic Uzbeks. This generated pressure on the Tajik Government to drive the IMU out of its bases in Tajikistan. In a less than constructive Russian contribution to regional stabilisation, Russian military helicopters flew the IMU fighters to refuge in northern Afghanistan, where they fought against Massoud’s Northern Alliance alongside Osama bin Laden’s brigade and later against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces. One of the ways the IMU was useful to the Taliban was when the Taliban Government came under pressure from China to drive out Uighur militants (from China’s Xinjiang province). Mullah Omar’s government simply pushed the Uighurs out of Afghanistan to IMU camps across the border in Uzbekistan where they were able to remain part of the regional jihad network.

The IMU fled to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in Pakistan after the fall of the Taliban in 2001. There the IMU allied with the Haqqani network and Al-Qaeda fighters who fled to the same districts. From 2007, IMU fighters were an integral and exceptionally violent part of the Pakistani Taliban network (Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, TTP) and conducted many operations with it against the Pakistani military. By this time, the IMU had morphed from an ethnically Uzbek
group to a multiethnic group in which Uzbeks were a minority: the IMU included many Uighurs, Afghans, Chechens, Turkmen, Arabs, Westerners and others (with a Kyrgyz military commander and a mufti who was a Pakistani national of Myanmar Rohingya descent). One IMU niche in its contribution to global jihad was the proliferation of internet, video and print propaganda in many languages, including Uzbek, Russian, German, Persian, Arabic, Burmese, Urdu and Pashto. By September 2009, US airstrikes had killed both Jumaboi Khojayev and Tohir Yuldashev. But in the micro politics of Pakistan, Afghanistan and beyond, the IMU lived on to destabilise local regimes in many hotspots (see, for example, Box 9.1). The cascading of IMU Uighurs from China, according to some informants, cascaded Chinese special forces into working with the Afghan army to kill the Uighurs inside Afghanistan.

**Box 9.1 The IMU pounces on the killing of innocents in a night raid**

In the province of Takhar in May 2011, we saw another way that killing operatives can be counterproductive. An Uzbek *mullah* and two women were killed in a NATO night raid. Leaders of the Uzbek community alleged they were targeted by the Tajik governor and police commander of Takhar on the basis of false rumours of involvement in terrorism. These false rumours were allegedly passed to NATO intelligence because the *mullah* was a critic of Tajik domination of Takhar province. It has become a tactic of criminals across Afghanistan to tighten their grip on local power by planting clever intelligence that their political adversaries support terrorism. In this case, they also spread the rumour that NATO troops raped the two innocent women before they killed them. This was almost certainly false. But whoever thought up the rape rumour was effective in building anti-NATO sentiment among the Uzbek majority of Takhar province.

Local NATO commanders sought to explain it was false that the women were raped, that they had intended only to arrest them because of evidence they were sewing belts for suicide bombers. A crowd of Uzbek demonstrators persisted in the belief that the women were innocent and that they were raped and in the belief that, even if they were guilty, the crime of sewing a suicide belt did not justify execution without trial. Over two days the demonstration swelled, culminating in a massed attack on a German military base where Molotov cocktails were thrown. Neither the Afghan police nor the young German soldiers defending the base had training in riot control; they panicked and fired on the crowd with live rounds, killing at least 12 and wounding possibly 75 on 28 May 2011.

The security situation in the province plummeted after this incident. This insecurity was driven not by the Taliban, but by Uzbek anger at the minority Tajik leaders of the province for excluding Uzbeks from political power, and particularly at the allegation that the governor and the police leadership spread false rumours against the victims of the NATO night raid. Then, when the governor called a summit on the demonstration, a bomb was detonated during the summit, killing General Daud (the police commander for the northern region of Afghanistan), the hated local police chief, another policeman and two German soldiers, and seriously wounding the governor and German General Markus Kneip, who was the NATO northern commander. Then, on 10 June, a suicide bomber attended the funeral of General Daud, killing mourning police.
We must ask one question about these waves of collateral damage and unravelled local security as a result of counterproductive night raids. How many successful night raids must NATO conduct to create sufficient productive ‘military pressure’ to counterbalance one such counterproductive raid? We presume a very large number. Of course, this is an extreme example of a counterproductive night raid. Condra et al. (2010: 3) report a more moderate average revenge impact of civilian casualties in a systematic statistical study:

If the average ISAF [International Security Assistance Force]-caused incident, which resulted in 2 civilian casualties, was eliminated, then in an average-sized district there would be 6 fewer violent incidents between ISAF and insurgents … over the next 6 weeks.

Braithwaite and Wardak (2011) discuss in detail how the benefits of military pressure on foot soldiers seem as doubtful as those on mid- and high-level insurgents.

Afterword: The two deadly bombings that killed General Daud and other leaders were almost certainly the work of the IMU, exploiting the instability and anger into which Takhar had cascaded. A minister in Afghan President Ashraf Ghani’s cabinet said four years later:

The High Peace Council is an industry. It’s not a peace process; it’s a death process. We have lost too many of our best leaders to it. We lost Professor [Burhanuddin] Rabbani to it because he let the Taliban into his home as part of the peace process. We lost many police chiefs to the peace process like General Daud. (Interview with minister in Kabul, 2015, No. 121411)

But was it the peace process to which General Daud was lost? Or was it the war process of night raids in this local cascade to which the General was lost?

Source: Adapted from Braithwaite and Wardak (2011).

We decided it would be tedious in Chapters 5–8 for readers to construct the narrative of each country case under the list of 10 propositions. For Afghanistan, and then the other shorter cases in this chapter, however, this is what we do as a prelude to systematic re-evaluation of those propositions in Chapter 10.

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

Our interpretation of the Afghan war in Part I of this book is that deterrence effects of the Taliban exceeded defiance effects between 11 September 2001 and 2003, perhaps even until 2005. This period, 2001 to 2005, was therefore the best window for crafting a sustainable peace. From then on, as the Taliban regrouped and retrained with support from elements of the ISI, they ceased viewing themselves as outmatched by the combined might of NATO powers and the Northern Alliance. For more than a decade since, defiance effects have exceeded deterrence effects.
Afghan tribal society has a long history of warfare. As with many rural warlike peoples who routinely carry weapons, Afghans are skilled at making war, but also adept at making peace. While the former is well understood by Westerners who see Afghan success in subduing the British, Russian and American/NATO empires, their aptitude for peacemaking is not so well understood. The Afghan tribal tradition is one of rising up against centralised power when it encroaches excessively on tribal prerogatives. The second part of that tradition, however, is that, as soon as a central power in the capital agrees to back off from excess in encroachments on rural tribal society, tribal militias reach an accommodation with the centre. The hope in Afghanistan today is that president Ghani might be able to negotiate a peace with the Taliban that president Karzai and the United States were unable to accomplish. One of the many limits on that hope is the fear that Islamic State may cascade in, positioning themselves as spoilers of a peace that many elements of the Taliban hope for. Another is Pakistan resuming the spoiling role it played during earlier Karzai-led and US-led peacemaking efforts; or Iran as a future spoiler if US and Sunni reconciliation with Iran continues to unravel under the Trump administration and the new Saudi adventurism Trump encourages.

In 2002, president Karzai was appealing constructively to the Pashtun tradition of the Taliban to acknowledge the defeats it had suffered on the battlefield in 2001 and reach an accommodation with his government. Vindictive elements among his Northern Alliance coalition partners and in the Bush administration that had swept Karzai to power frustrated this sensible work. Many Taliban figures with whom Karzai reconciled and who were welcomed back in peace to Afghanistan from Pakistan in 2002 were murdered when they returned. They also had their land and property stolen. This included people as senior as the Taliban military commander and the Taliban minister of defence (Afghan 2011: 308–9; ICG 2011a: 6; Ruttig 2011: 6). Michael Semple (2011: 2) argued that, in 2002, many ‘senior Taliban figures attempted to pledge loyalty to the new order, but were hunted down. The US sent to Guantanamo Bay many people who could have been far more useful if they had been given a chance to participate’.

Likewise in 2005, in advance of the insurgency spinning out of control, Karzai sought to initiate talks and amnesties with the Taliban through a peace and reconciliation commission. Again, this was opposed by Northern Alliance loyalists and was viewed as appeasement by the Bush
administration (Rashid 2010b: 228). This persuaded the Taliban that accommodation with the new regime was a door their Northern Alliance and NATO enemies had slammed in their face.

Their only option was to train a new generation of fighters for a long haul of insurgency. As that defiance of the US-backed regime became more successful, the Taliban capitulation that was a possibility in 2002 and even in 2005 became an unlikely prospect. Reconciliation was never impossible during the next decade. There was not the diplomatic resolve, however, to bring all the players (including Pakistan and Iran) to the peace table. That resolve was always missing from protagonists on both sides, who naively believed either that they could prevail with military ‘surges’ (and in a short space of years) or that a bit more surging would deliver them the upper hand in negotiations.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

With defiance exceeding deterrence after that 2001–05 window, Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders found they could imbue a new generation with a jihad imaginary in Pakistani madrassas funded by petro dollars from the Gulf states. In Chapter 6, we saw that Pakistani civil, political and military society were surprisingly widely infused with a jihad imaginary that conceived jihad against US forces in Afghanistan as noble work. As president Karzai’s military resistance to them began to creak and crack under escalating desertion rates, widespread drug addiction in the Afghan army, ‘green on blue’ killings inside their barracks, the retreat of one NATO contributing country after another and then the recapture by the Taliban of districts NATO had pacified, the jihad imaginary diffused more aggressively. The Taliban began to believe—rightly or wrongly—that, in time, large swathes of the Afghan army would defect to its side.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

The vindictive elements in the Northern Alliance and NATO who were spoilers of reconciliation with the Taliban in 2001–05—who derided ‘negotiation with terrorists’—failed to conceive of the possibility that even bin Laden himself could renew his old alliance with elements of the ISI to establish the world headquarters for Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. Zahab and
Roy (2004: 62) called this ‘the Pakistanisation of Al Qaeda’. It was from Pakistan that the terror attacks on Madrid, London and Bali were planned (Rashid 2010b: 237). The spoilers of reconciliation with the Taliban did not conceive the possibility that, from Pakistan, Al-Qaeda could cascade alliances with the Afghan and Pakistani Talibans, with jihadi groups from Yemen to Iraq, to Syria, to Libya and down into the depths of Africa. Neither the spoilers of a Taliban reconciliation nor the leaders of Pakistan conceived of the possibility of a Taliban leadership protected by the Pakistani state cascading as violent a jihad inside Pakistan as it had cascaded across to Afghanistan. They did not conceive that this would become a global jihad that would find alliance partners in jihadist cells inside every NATO state and inside the other two great powers of our era, China and Russia. They did not conceive that unknown thousands of foreign fighters from these countries could play a major role in military conquest of the very cities in Iraq that NATO forces had conquered a decade earlier. They did not conceive of the rise of Islamic State as a radical flank and spoiler of any softening or weakening by elements of Al-Qaeda. They did not understand the formidable dynamics of cascade–cleavage–alliance and the unsettling power balances that jihadists put in play.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

The mujahidin’s disintegration of the communist monopoly of armed force almost four decades ago was the last time Afghanistan experienced a monopoly of armed force. Consequently, violence was incessant across these four decades. It is questionable whether post-2001 Afghanistan ever experienced any semblance of a state monopoly of armed force. The Northern Alliance’s armed capability was factionalised, at cross-purposes, under the control of disparate warlords and never really under the control of president Karzai. President Bush and president Karzai were also fighting different enemies. Bush was in the business of crushing Al-Qaeda and their Taliban supporters; Karzai would embrace Afghans who were former Al-Qaeda supporters so long as they joined him in fighting his hard-core Taliban adversaries. Karzai resented Bush turning a blind eye to Pakistan providing a safe haven for Taliban leaders as long as it handed over foreign fighters the United States wanted in Guantanamo Bay. In rural Afghanistan, tribal militias and police armed by the US military had their own local power agendas, the politics of which were recurrently at odds with both Karzai and NATO. For example, tribal groups armed by the United States would cooperate with (and fund) the Taliban to protect their
trading routes for opium exports. At cross-purposes with US objectives, even members of Karzai’s family were profiting hugely from those opium exports. For all the military might unified under the same command structure in US–NATO–Karzai–Northern Alliance Afghanistan, there was no reality of a single monopoly of armed force. For this reason, our analysis is that violence cascaded.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

The tragedy of security dilemmas is that combatants strike out to defeat their enemy in the sometimes false belief that, if they do not kill them, they will be killed by them. The murder of reconciled Taliban with a genuine desire to return in peace to their beloved valleys in 2002 and 2003 was a case in point. We have seen that this was critical to surging the cascade of insurgency from north-west Pakistan throughout the past decade and a half by a younger generation of Taliban commanders who had lived their lives in Pakistan and who were more radicalised and more brutal than those older Taliban leaders who longed to return to their home valleys. As late as 2011 during our fieldwork, we were able to attend peace negotiations with middle-level Taliban whose desperation was deeply moving when they explained at Provincial Peace Council meetings that they had surrendered their weapons as part of their reconciliation, but that now they were in poverty because they had to buy new guns to protect themselves from murder by both their former enemies and their former comrades. They confronted an unusually acute security dilemma at the micro level that cascaded into renewed macro-level violence.

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

The Balochistan camps at Girdi Jungle and Bramchah housed 150,000 refugees in squalor. They were awash with weapons and literally off limits to the Pakistani police and security personnel. Bramchah straddled both sides of the border and was a well-known conduit for drug smugglers. The camps had become breeding grounds for crime and religious militancy. (Khan 2011: 130)
There are millions of Afghans living in Pakistan and Iran. With rising terrorist attacks and decreasing foreign aid, the Pakistani Government pushed to repatriate nearly 3 million Afghan refugees, including an estimated 1 million undocumented Afghans. There is some evidence that most young Afghans who were imbued with the jihadi imaginary in Taliban training camps were recruited from the Afghan refugee community in Pakistan. However, radicalisation is a complex phenomenon that thrives on grievances, both real and imagined. Kind words (as the example in Box 9.2 illustrates), sympathy and financial support generate loyalty in extremely vulnerable populations. Young refugees and IDPs are at increased risk of being recruited by extremist groups and targeted by enemies of those same groups.

Box 9.2 Al-Qaeda seduction of refugees in Peshawar

From about 1979, Arab leaders, prominently Dr Abdullah Azzam [a Palestinian who taught Osama bin Laden in Jeddah and invited him to Peshawar] and Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri [bin Laden’s successor], set themselves up opposite the entrance to the main UNHCR reception point for refugees in Peshawar. The refugees arrive beginning to fill out some forms. UNHCR tells them to wait with a large number of waiting people sitting along the side of the road and on a railway line. Dr Abdullah would then send out someone who was very kind and empathic, unlike the overwhelmed UN bureaucrats, and someone who spoke the same language and was from the same ethnic group, the same tribe. They said: ‘Look come to our place and have a cup of tea while you’re waiting and we have a man at the front who will listen for your number being called to make sure that you don’t miss being called.’ Unlike at the UN, they would come into this warm and inviting room with a large traditional carpet and no security checks to go through. Families could sit down together and food would be brought out quickly. Then someone would say what do you need? They would often say tents, food, implements and clothing. The staff would then make a call and by the time they finished the meal someone would have arrived from the store with all of these things. Then he would say you can take these and also take anything the UN gives you. And here is our number. Come to us with any needs that you have, for example with the education of your children. And this was the start of the enrolment of them into madrassas. Dr Zawahiri had a very kindly manner. He tended to their bullet wounds and other wounds and health problems in a hospital he built for them. There were two hospitals funded by the Arabs. The doctor spoke the language humbly and with love and empathy. One of the hospitals was called the Mercy Hospital, which made it seem like a Christian hospital to some. They also established orphanages for all orphans from the Afghan war and Kashmir. Intermarriage was also important for the Arabs in building acceptance. The Arabs also provided money for constructing or reconstructing any mosque that was falling down.

Source: John Braithwaite’s notes from interview with Peshawar Pashtun leader, 2013, No. 051343.

One of the paradoxes of US military strategy in Afghanistan was that, as it succeeded in killing middle-level Afghan-born commanders, they were replaced with more fundamentalist, younger talib commanders who had
been born, educated and radicalised in Pakistani madrassas (Braithwaite and Wardak 2011, 2013; Rashid 2010b). Box 9.2 is from our fieldwork notes of an interview in Peshawar with a senior Pashtun UN leader. It illustrates how sophisticated the enrolment of disenfranchised Afghan refugees was from the beginning of the jihad against the communist regime.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

During our fieldwork in Afghanistan, we had several experiences of travelling on helicopters that the United Nations contracted with Russian pilots. The Western troops who accompanied us on these trips complained of how the Taliban would be firing on them, but, as soon as they headed towards the Russian helicopter to provide protection to a UN group, the Taliban would cease firing on them. They alleged this was because the Russians bribed the Taliban. It is also widely reported in the literature that US taxpayer funds find their way into Taliban pockets in a massive way because the contractors who drive trucks with supplies and weapons for the US military inside Afghanistan pay the Taliban to guarantee them safe passage (e.g. Braithwaite and Wardak 2011, 2013). Some of the same Pakistani contractors were also involved in paying for Taliban protection to truck opium harvests out of Afghanistan from which leading members of the Afghan Government profited. These are just some examples of how complicated the rules of the game can become in conditions of protracted warfare.

This complexity allows sophisticated players of the game who turned war into a business to reap fortunes that sometimes motivated them to frustrate effective peacebuilding that might end the war economy. Anomie in this book means living in a society where one is continually unsure of what the rules of the game are. In such a world, one is never sure that one is not doing something that has the effect of funding the very people who are seeking to kill you. When anything goes, everyone has to survive through

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3 ‘We’ in this case was John Braithwaite and Ali Wardak, from whom we learnt so much about Afghanistan. See Braithwaite and Wardak (2011, 2013) and Wardak and Braithwaite (2013) for a much more detailed treatment of many of the issues in this chapter.
whatever it takes. Secure pacification of a violent society requires clear rules of the game. When British prime minister Tony Blair in 2001 made so much of justifying the invasion by the desire to shut down the Afghan opium trade that supplied much of the world’s heroin market, he could not have imagined that, a decade on, this would have increased to supply 92 per cent of that market (Paoli et al. 2009; UNODC 2010: 7) and that British forces would be tolerating mass opium production that would fund both the untold wealth of the ruling families they were propping up and the weapons of the Taliban.

Plate 9.1 Afghan National Army sergeant patrolling in a poppy field, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan, 2013.

In previous chapters, we have seen that anomie was the very condition in Kandahar province that brought the Taliban to local power from 1994. The Taliban became popular at first by allowing farmers and truckers to get crops to market without paying off many different mujahidin groups who set up roadblocks along the route and by preventing undisciplined fighters and criminal gangs from harassing women. In pacifying the chaos of Kandahar and replacing anomie with its oppressive rule of Sharia law, the Taliban attracted trucking interests and ordinary people alike to fund and support it at first (Rashid 2010b).
Proposition 8: Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

Of course, when the Taliban pacified Kandahar from 1994, it pacified the province with guns. Ultimately, we saw in Part I that this caused the ISI to switch its military support to the Taliban as a group that it perceived might credibly take over all of Afghanistan as a pro-Pakistan regime. In the same process, donors from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, including Osama bin Laden, also provided weapons and fighters to support the Taliban.

Hence, the dynamic at play here was that criminal gangs harassing farmers and women in Kandahar cascaded Taliban militarisation in the 1990s. This cascaded to a great variety of dominations that the Taliban perpetrated against its enemies, including crimes of mass atrocity against other armed groups and civilians who refused to submit to Taliban military domination (e.g. Afghanistan Justice Project 2005; Grossman 2006).

Proposition 9: Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

Under the previous two propositions, we have already described how the crimes of gangs in Kandahar cascaded to a civil war that later cascaded to an interstate war with the NATO invasion. One of the ironies of this was that the first funder of the Taliban was the Quetta-based transport and smuggling mafia who had the same concerns as ordinary farmers about their trucks being taxed dozens of times along roads to Kandahar (Rashid 2010b: 191).

The war-to-crime cascade with the Taliban is a much less convincing proposition. The Taliban really did seem to clean up a great deal of petty street crime and serious crimes against women such as rape, though not of course rape within marriage:

So long as you did not break their religious rules, you could walk safely anywhere. You could not do that before they took over and you cannot do that today. (Interview with Kabul civil servant, 2011, No. 071101)
The Taliban courts were brutal in killing rapists even when Taliban fighters perpetrated the rape. This is not to say that Afghanistan’s civil wars were free of rape. It is to say that there is no comparison between the Taliban wars and the widespread mass rape that occurred in Pakistan’s war in East Pakistan/Bangladesh (Chapter 7), in Sri Lanka’s civil wars (Chapter 8), in Nepal and Myanmar (below in this chapter) or indeed in most civil wars. Although Western forces perpetrated atrocities in Afghanistan, there is no evidence that mass rape counted among them.

There are certainly many threats and vulnerabilities that women and girls experience in Afghanistan as a result of the war. There were, before and after the war against the Taliban, many women imprisoned for ‘moral crimes’—women who were ‘guilty’ of running away from home as a result of domestic violence (sometimes undoubtedly fostered by war), having had extramarital relationships or having been sexually abused. As oppressive as they are, it is likely that these forms of domination are slightly improved compared with the time before the war against the Taliban, but worse than they were in communist times before the war against the Soviet occupation.

The crime that cascaded most was terrorist targeting of civilians through suicide and roadside bombs. The Taliban had never engaged in suicide bombing anywhere until after the US occupation of their country in

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4 The complicity of local communities and state authorities, morally legitimised by patriarchal prescriptions invoked in the name of either tradition or religion, increases women’s insecurity (D’Costa 2015). The Afghan Government enacted the Law on Elimination of Violence against Women (EVAW Law) in August 2009. The EVAW Law bans 22 different harmful practices against women and girls, including rape, physical violence, child marriage, forced marriage and the denial of rights to education or work. The Afghan Parliament held a debate in which some members criticised portions of the EVAW Law as ‘un-Islamic’—specifically, the law’s prohibition of child marriage and forced marriage and restrictions on women’s access to health care and education. The EVAW Law, signed by president Karzai, was never ratified by parliament and some activists fear the legislative body could amend or overturn it in the future. A recent UN study noted, ‘negative attitudes towards the EVAW Law as well as a reluctance to apply it’ among many judicial and law enforcement officers, which ‘discouraged women from reporting violence perpetrated against them’ (UNAMA 2013: 26). The report revealed that 650 incidents of violence against women and girls were reported to authorities across 18 Afghan provinces between October 2012 and September 2013, representing a 28 per cent increase from the previous year. The Afghan Department of Women’s Affairs tracked far more cases than those reported by the police and prosecutors, recording an additional 1,019 incidents of violence against women and girls. ‘This gap’, according to the report, ‘suggests that many Afghan women (and their families) still remained reluctant to approach police and prosecutors with their complaints’ (UNAMA 2013: 4). Most incidents of violence against women remain largely under-reported, especially in rural areas, due to social norms and cultural constraints (UNAMA 2013).

5 But not much improved, with Afghanistan ranking 101 out of 102 countries on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Development Centre’s Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI 2016).
2002, although Osama bin Laden and his network, who were enjoying the hospitality of the Taliban, had of course done so. Such acts of terror ceased being shameful to Taliban members. Indeed, they became matters of pride rather than shame and a just path to paradise in the redefined imaginary of jihad against the infidel and his accomplices. The other kind of crime that cascaded from 2002 was criminalisation of the state. The United States put criminals in charge; many were criminals in the sense of being not only war criminals, but also expert practitioners of corruption, extortion, embezzlement, tax evasion, bank fraud and living off the profits of the opium trade (Afghanistan Justice Project 2005; Braithwaite and Wardak 2013; Grossman 2006; Nordland 2012). A UN survey concluded that Afghans paid an equivalent to 23 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP) in bribes during 2009 (UNODC 2010: 25).

The war in Afghanistan from the 1990s also promoted a degree of criminalisation of the Iranian state, with the Revolutionary Guards and the state-run industrial foundations counting among the beneficiaries of the stupendous profits from smuggling (especially of petrol into Afghanistan and Pakistan). From the 1990s until the early 2000s, 3,700 Iranian police lost their lives in firefights with opium smugglers exporting through Iran to Europe, but also to Iran’s 3 million heroin addicts (Ashouri and Rahmdel 2003; Paoli et al. 2009: 238). The resultant Iranian ‘war on drugs’ further cascaded the authoritarianism of its state, with Iran becoming second only to China in the absolute number of state executions (mostly for drug offences), probably a higher per capita execution rate than China and an unknowable degree of extrajudicial assassination of drug traffickers.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

Chapter 4 has already advanced the analysis that the war in Afghanistan became exceptionally costly for US, UK, German and other taxpayers and costly in the blood of their soldiers. As the emotional suffering of the families of those troops endured for more than a decade, as their treasuries craved the fortunes poured into Afghanistan after the Global Financial
Crisis,⁶ one coalition partner after another exited, at first over the strenuous objections of the United States, until the Obama administration itself decided to cut its losses from a conflict that had cascaded beyond its capacity to manage at affordable cost.

Nepal⁷

If the bloody rise of the Taliban in Afghanistan was an exception—in making contributions to rape prevention (Proposition 9)—the Nepalese civil war not only was one that cascaded a shocking epidemic of rape, but also was a case where this rape shaped a distinctive gender politics in the character of the war. The history of Nepal is like many countries in the sense that from 1769 a monarchy (the house of Gorkha) unified disparate feudal fiefdoms into a nation-state through superior military capability. What is distinctive about Nepal is that the royal palace continued to dominate national politics and enjoyed control of the Royal Nepalese Army until April 2006, when the king stood down to end the monarchy after 19 days of massive mobilisation of people power on the streets.

This was preceded by six decades of struggle between the king and left-of-centre political parties that had been campaigning for parliamentary democracy since the end of the British Raj. The most prominent of these was the Nepali Congress, a party of democratic socialist provenance, which, like all significant leftist parties in Nepal, and like the Indian Congress Party, became less socialist and more corrupt as it tasted power. To the left of the Nepali Congress was a multitude of communist parties. One of these, the Communist Party of Nepal–Unified, coalesced a number of Marxist–Leninist parties to accept multiparty democracy and compete electorally. It became the major competitor to the Nepali Congress. Its successor as the dominant Marxist party was the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist) (CPN-UML), which has shared power with the Nepali Congress for much of the time across recent decades. These political parties enjoyed many victories over the king in advocating that he step back to become a constitutional monarch. They demanded

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⁶ This reached US$10 billion a month for the United States alone in the late years of the previous decade and the early years of the current decade.

⁷ John Braithwaite interviewed 68 individuals for the Nepalese case study of Peacebuilding Compared, mostly in Kathmandu and Rolpa, but also in New Delhi, Beijing, at the United Nations in New York and elsewhere, and mostly in 2014. For a longer paper on this fieldwork in Nepal that provides much more information about source materials, see Braithwaite (2015).
parliamentary elections and successive constitutional reforms to edge Nepal towards democracy. At each turn until 2006, the palace, backed by the army, succeeded in winning power back from the parliamentary parties—indeed, in dismissing prime ministers—after recurrent periods of unstable, corrupt and unpopular elected governments.

Enter the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist (CPN-M) in 1996, leading the People’s Liberation Army after a period when it fared poorly in winning parliamentary seats. It drew part of its imaginary from the Naxalite/Maoist uprisings across the border in north-eastern India. Indian government security analysts argued that Maoists began a process of laying a revolutionary corridor, otherwise known as the Compact Revolutionary Zone, extending from Nepal across many Indian states, including Bihar, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Odisha and Madhya Pradesh (see Chapter 5: Figure 5.1). Nepalese and Indian Maoists met at Siliguri, West Bengal, in August 2001 to organise the Compact Revolutionary Zone. The CPN-M was also an inspiration in the formation of the Communist Party of Bhutan (Marxist–Leninist–Maoist). The Nepalese revolutionary imaginary was Maoist rather than Leninist in that it sought to cascade its military control of the countryside from remote rural areas until it encircled the capital. This it accomplished, coming to control 80 per cent of the territory. It established the People’s Government in those domains of its rural control. Its revolution started in the remote mid-western districts of Rolpa and Rukum where initial raids on police posts captured its first weapons. Some 13,000 people died in its ‘people’s war’.

A unilateral ceasefire by the CPN-M was embraced by a war-weary people who surged on to the streets in a movement beginning in 2005, and culminating in the people’s victory of April 2006. The Maoists agreed to participate in a multiparty democracy and successfully demanded a UN peacekeeping operation to monitor the cantonment of its troops and those of the Royal Nepalese Army. The newly nonviolent Maoists became sufficiently popular to become the dominant elected party. Their commander-in-chief, Prachanda (Pushpa Kamal Dahal), became the first post-conflict prime minister until he unconstitutionally sought to oust

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8 An earlier attempt by the alliance of seven parliamentary parties to mobilise a mass people’s movement against the monarchy failed because the parties did not have the trust to lead it, but also because the people overwhelmingly wanted democracy and peace, not just the reinstatement of democracy without peace (Dixit 2011: 124).
the defence chief, causing his own demise in 2009, but then returning to power until the time of writing and serving again as prime minister in 2016 and 2017. The Maoists continued to wield influence as the largest parliamentary party until they lost most of their seats at the second post-conflict election, in November 2013. At the time of writing, they are back in power in coalition with the Nepali Congress.

King Gyanendra, Nepal’s last king, was unpopular. People were suspicious about how he came to power after his brother, the popular former King Birendra, and 10 other members of the royal line were murdered in the royal massacre of 2001. In 2005, Gyanendra dismissed the elected prime minister and re-established royal autocracy. At first, the Royal Nepalese Army fell in behind their new king, as did the entire international diplomatic community. The major regional powers—India and China—supported Gyanendra and his war. The United States post 9/11 classified the CPN-M as a terrorist group and particularly strongly supported the new king and the Royal Nepalese Army. India, in contrast, was playing a more complex game than the other international players. It hedged its bets for the future by helping the Royal Nepalese Army with hardware and training to fight the Maoists, while also protecting Prachanda and the other Maoist leaders who were running their war from New Delhi.

In the early years of the war, until Maoist domination of much of the Nepalese countryside, the Maoists also maintained training camps in India and supplied their operations across an open border (Dixit 2011: 270). Dozens of arms manufacturing units are reported to have been operating in the India–Nepal border districts during the war (Upreti 2010: 242). Civil society leaders of the people-power movement that resulted in the return of parliamentary democracy and a new constitution in 1990 went to New Delhi to succeed ultimately in persuading Indian intelligence and the Maoist leaders, in 2005, to join forces with what became the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP) and with the old democratic parties in deposing the king with a genuine multiparty democracy.

The CMDP was an umbrella for other umbrella organisations such as the All Nepal Peasant Federation, the All Nepal Women’s Association and the Professional Alliance for Peace and Democracy that mobilised lawyers, teachers, engineers, professors, doctors, journalists and, importantly, stars

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9 Also known as Jana Andolan II, with the 1990 citizens democracy movement being Jana Andolan I.
of the stage and screen. In 2003, seeing how unpopular the king had become, India hijacked the peace talks, moving them from the Maoist capital in Rolpa to New Delhi, excluding the Nepalese civil society leaders who had convened the talks to that point. As so often occurs in peacemaking, international players who speak a vernacular of inclusion impose a practice of exclusion when they have an opportunity to shape the peace with a narrow group of party and military leaders. One of the remarkable terms of the peace that India secretly secured from the Maoist leadership was a signed undertaking that any future Maoist government of Nepal would not act against Indian interests (Braithwaite 2015)!

By April 2006, India’s peace talk leadership had brought the international community to consensus behind a peace package in which parliamentary democracy would return and the king would step back to being a constitutional monarch. This was a miscalculation by the diplomatic community in Kathmandu, which was out of touch with the level of feeling on the street. The CMDP would not compromise with the king; the Maoists were prepared to exploit chaos by returning to the people’s war; the army and the international community blinked—deserting the king, who eventually resigned in favour of a transitional government of the Maoists and the democratic parties.

A remarkable feature of this war and this transition to peace is that it embraced women as fighters to a degree that no other war in the Peacebuilding Compared database has seen to date. Estimates of the proportion of the Maoist fighters who were women vary from 20 per cent, recorded by the United Nations, from a count of the numbers who entered cantonment (an undercount because of the way Maoist commanders told women to return to care for their children and families at war’s end), to more than 40 per cent. The policy of the People’s Liberation Army was to achieve a fighting force that was 33 per cent female. It probably achieved this, as it claims to have done. Yami (2006: 5) may have the numbers too high when she asserts women were 30–50 per cent of the People’s Liberation Army, and even higher in Maoist militias. The fighting started out as a predominantly male affair between 1996 and 1998. The Maoists did not make great progress until they broadened their Maoist class appeal to advocacy of women’s rights, indigenous rights and liberation of landless castes, particularly Dalits (Untouchables), from oppression by landlords. Almost all of the Maoist fighters came from these three groups, though the party elite was predominantly upper-caste males.
Among the 40 demands the Maoists put to the government as conditions for not embarking on the people’s war was an explicitly feminist demand: ‘Patriarchal exploitation and discrimination against women should be stopped. The daughter should be allowed access to property.’ Women and excluded indigenous and caste groups achieved some quite decisive gains at the historical moment of peace—such as reservation of 33 per cent of parliamentary seats for women; a progressive new law on domestic violence and a national campaign against domestic violence after a ‘black petticoat’ movement on the streets; a law criminalising rape within marriage; and reform of laws that granted rights to inheritance and citizenship only through the male line (Nepal Citizenship Act, 2006).

Women’s organisations submitted 116 gender discriminatory laws to the Supreme Court after the abolition of the monarchy, arguing that these were laws inconsistent with republican democracy, with equal rule of law and with Nepal’s obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The court
found for the women’s groups. This was reform newly translated into the vernacular of republican rule of law. The most disadvantaged caste group, Dalits, also won symbolic gains, such as the declaration of the abolition of the caste system in the interim constitution and a law criminalising untouchability and class-based discrimination (*Caste Based Discrimination and Untouchability (Offence and Punishment) Act*, 2011) combined with the more concrete gain of significantly increased Dalit representation in the Constituent Assembly of 2008. As with women, Dalit parliamentary representation fell back slightly in 2013, although the fall was still to a level substantially higher than that before 2008.

The proportional elements of the post-conflict voting system guaranteed 59 indigenous groups at least one elected representative in the parliamentary and constitution-writing Constituent Assembly—no mean accomplishment of electoral engineering. The politically decisive mass citizen uprising that delivered this outcome was preceded by a decade-long Maoist armed struggle in which women, disadvantaged indigenous peoples and Dalits had unusually high representation in the People’s Liberation Army. The prominence of women and Dalits in the Maoist army helps explain their gains through the ultimate decisiveness of the nonviolent citizen uprising of 2006.

The policy of the parallel People’s Government until 2006 across its local administration—that the People’s Courts and its army were to have 33 per cent women—was carried forward into the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, in which it was stipulated that 33 per cent of the legislature and constitutional assembly (the Constituent Assembly) would be female. This was institutionalised and achieved in the 2008 election, though it slipped back to 30 per cent in 2013 as a result of technical failures in the electoral machinery. A positive step forward for women was the election in 2015 of Bidhya Devi Bhandari, chair of the All Nepal Women’s Association, as Nepal’s first female president.

The Peace Agreement also stipulated that 33 per cent of the civil service and of the security forces would be women. These two objectives remain a long way short of implementation, although there has been some progress. For women, the new constitution (2016) guarantees 33 per cent of political representation at the federal level and 40 per cent at the local level (DIPD 2015). Furthermore, to ensure that women are in decision-making roles, the constitution demands that either the speaker or the deputy speaker of both the federal and state parliaments and the
upper house has to be female at any given time (Malla 2015). Likewise, reservations for Dalits across these spheres have achieved significant progress (there were 50 Dalits in the 2008 Constituent Assembly), despite falling far short of proportional representation. Both educational opportunities and informal discrimination against Dalits have improved according to interviews with Dalit activists. However, finalisation of the constitution deepened divisions across ethnic cleavages (IFES 2016).

Plate 9.3 President Bidhya Devi Bhandari, 2015, the first female president of Nepal, former leftist student leader, Chair of the All Nepal Women’s Association and Vice-President of the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–Leninist).
Rolpa, the district that became headquarters for the Maoists, achieved what our interview informants asserted was the highest percentage of female fighters. Estimates of the peak percentage of female fighters in Rolpa ranged from ‘exceeding our policy of 33 per cent, but I don’t know by how much’ to ‘50 per cent (or more)’ (the most common kind of answer) to ‘60 per cent’. There are no surviving authoritative records from war-ravaged Rolpa. The upper-range estimate came from the most authoritative sources of the top male Maoist military commanders in Rolpa, so it seems possible that the majority of fighters in Rolpa District after the early years of the conflict were women.

Our Rolpa interviews suggest that targeted rape may have been the most important reason for the percentage of female fighters being highest there. Because Rolpa District was a first mover into sustained armed conflict and became host to the headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army, the security forces targeted the daughters, wives and sisters of Maoist fighters particularly savagely with rape. Rolpa was also targeted earlier, by Operation Romeo, in November 1995, which drove Maoist men into the jungle to escape police atrocities (Gautam et al. 2011: 343). After many men were killed, women stepped in to take their places, partly to avenge family killings and rapes and partly because they concluded it was better to get up into the hills and fight than wait in the valleys to be raped.

Menon and van der Meulen Rodgers (2015), using three waves of data, showed that there was a pay-off from the conflict in increased paid female employment—as opposed to dependence on remittances and subsistence work—during the war. Valente (2013) showed that districts that experienced more conflict violence during the Maoist war also had the highest increases in educational attainment of girls during the war. Contrary to the negative effects of war on schooling recorded in countless other countries, war intensity in Nepal also increased male educational attainment, though not as strongly or robustly as for females. This was true even though Maoist abductions of children were found to have a negative effect on educational attainment during the war (Valente 2013: 2). In 2011, only 5 per cent of women aged over 40 had some secondary education, while 50 per cent of women between 15 and 20 years of age (who mostly entered high school during the war) had some secondary education (Engel et al. 2013: 27). Maoists policed the problem of teacher absenteeism in remote rural schools and used the People’s Courts to confront parents who allowed truancy by their children. During the war, between 1996 and 2006—when the majority of the population
came under Maoist rural governance—Nepal’s maternal mortality ratio fell by 47 per cent (Engel et al. 2013: 4), an indicator that normally rises sharply during civil wars. Neonatal mortality, mortality of children under five years of age and many other health outcomes also improved markedly during the war. Remarkably, too, for a major war, overall life expectancy improved at about twice the rate during the war as during the previous two decades of peace (Engel et al. 2013: 9). Part of this was the change from a shorter life expectancy for women than men before the war to women living longer than men by war’s end—a change assisted by a successful female community health volunteers program.

Plate 9.4 Empowerment through post-conflict livelihood.
John Braithwaite interviewed these Rolpa women who had built and owned a successful textile weaving factory by pooling the reintegration funds most of them received as Maoist fighters for handing in their weapons to UN peacekeepers.
Source: John Braithwaite, fieldwork photograph, 2014.

Nepal is a rural economy where landlessness is a dominant driver of poverty. The two demographic groups with the highest rates of landlessness are women and Dalits (Nepali 2008). Murshed and Gates (2005) found that variation in the intensity of armed conflict across Nepal’s 75 districts between 1996 and 2001 was a function of the incidence of landlessness and the Human Development Index. Macours (2011) shows that Maoist
recruitment through abductions of young people to fight was most intense in districts where the growing inequality between the landless and the landed had widened most.

Nepal et al. (2011) argue that, in a village society, the village is the best specified level of analysis for exploring inequality effects, rather than the district or national level. This is because groups must overcome the costly collective action problems to organise for revolt against the state machinery, and, in village society, it is at the village level that organisation for collective action is most possible. Indeed, it is true that the initial attacks on police posts to acquire the insurgency’s first weapons did not arise nationally, but were a result of local uprisings in certain villages in the remote districts of Rolpa and Rukum. Nepal et al. (2011) found large, robust effects after measuring for endogeneity of inter-group inequality explaining resistance, especially inequality between upper and lower castes (and disadvantaged indigenous groups). That is, across 3,857 villages, when inter-group inequality was high, Maoist killings were high.10

The foregoing narrative account of the structural drivers and impacts of Nepal’s war and the peace will play an important part in our conclusion in Part III. Now we turn to a proposition-by-proposition assessment of the starting theory against the Nepalese civil war.

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

In all accounts of the movement to civil war led from Rolpa and nearby districts, the targeting of those districts by the police atrocities of Operation Romeo in November 1995 is important (Gautam et al. 2011: 343). Likewise, the killing of its men and the campaign of police rape in Rolpa engendered more defiance than deterrence, decisively shaping the gendered character of this conflict. One reason the war reeled out of control is that it began in a small way at a time when the political contest that mattered was between the king and the parliamentary parties. The king tacitly supported the revolutionary tactics of the Maoists in

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10 The work of Nepal et al. (2011) is also an important methodological advance in the study of intragroup inequality effects on the intensity of war because a cross-national study of inequality effects across 100 societies suffers massive institutional heterogeneity problems with wars of local origin and local resilience.
killing their (and his) political competitors in the parliamentary parties. This was why the police (who were under the control of the executive government of the parliamentary parties) fought the war in the early years. The army was loyal to the king and, under the constitution, the king was their commander-in-chief. The king held the army back from fighting until the civil war had cascaded to the point where it was difficult for the army to dominate the 80 per cent of the territory by then controlled by the Maoists. Military deterrence therefore never reached the point where it overwhelmed defiance.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

As discussed above, the violent imaginary that cascaded from nearby Naxalite struggles in India and from Chairman Mao’s *Little Red Book* was Maoist. Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) Maoists were also an influence on the ‘Prachanda Path’ doctrine for combining Marxism, Leninism and Maoism. In the aftermath of systematic policies of rape, feminism also became central to the ‘Prachanda Path’ imaginary. At the decisive moment of transformation, however, the imaginary that surged millions on to the streets of Nepal’s cities in 2006 to demand that the king step down was of nonviolent people power in which a nonviolent women’s movement was momentous. As discussed in more detail in Part III, like Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo in South Africa and Xanana Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta in East Timor (Braithwaite et al. 2012), the Maoist leadership in Nepal opted to shift strategy from armed struggle to nonviolent resistance in a way that swept them to a post-conflict electoral victory.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

The cleavages that opened up to enable the rise of Maoist civil war and the rise of the victorious CMDP were between the king and the political parties and, ultimately, between the king and the Government of India (which protected the Maoist leadership in New Delhi and supported the Nepalese democracy movement). The empirical research of Nepal et al. (2011) is important in suggesting that, in the initial rise of the insurgency, the depth of local village-level cleavages between upper-caste landlords
and the lower-caste landless was decisive. The Nepalese case therefore supports Autesserre’s (2010, 2014) and Kalyvas’s (2003) analyses on the importance of how local cleavages enrol national ones (and international ones, such as between India and the Nepalese king) and vice versa.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

We have already argued that this war was unusual in that, for most of its duration, it was fought by a militarised police force with the army on the sidelines. A militarised police controlled by the executive government and an army controlled by the king did not make a great formula for winning the war. When the Maoist army grew to a force of perhaps 10,000, the fragmentation of the state monopoly of force was profound. This fragmentation was compounded by major political parties controlling violent youth wings that terrorised their political opponents and mobilised violence against village leaders who refused to organise their village to vote for their party sponsors. This problem has continued since the peace of 2006. Luitel et al. (2010) found it worsened post conflict in some ways, reporting 15 different militant youth groups formed by political organisations, some with countrywide influence and at least nominal memberships of hundreds of thousands of youths. They report that some ethnic, caste and religious groups have also established militarised youth wings to advance their political objectives. Luitel et al. (2010: 196) dub this ‘societal militarisation’, as opposed to state militarisation: a ‘militarisation of [Nepalese] youth’. They report that problems such as rape associated with state militarisation are also associated with societal militarisation through youth wings, noting at the same time that politically active young women have not been militarised since the cantonment and reintegration of the Maoist army. A demographic youth bulge with high youth unemployment enabled this societal militarisation.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

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11 This is the number currently coded in Peacebuilding Compared from various sources. It may be revised in future years, however, as better sources are documented.
The Nepalese civil war is coded in Peacebuilding Compared as one in which the contribution of security dilemmas as a factor in the onset of conflict was ‘low’. The war did not start because the downtrodden were in a security dilemma. So this proposition of the theory is not supported for this case. One could say that women fearing rape joined the war at a later stage because they were in a security dilemma whereby they chose to fight before they were raped. Upreti (2010: 248) identifies the militarisation of youth wings of political organisations as a potential post-conflict driver of future security dilemmas.

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

Refugee camps were not critical sites of Maoist recruitment. IDPs, however, certainly became more available for Maoist recruitment than villagers whose homes were not being burnt to the ground. From 1967 onwards, many minority Nepalese were driven by communal violence from various troubled north-eastern Indian states to become refugees in Nepal, but we have not seen evidence that this was important to Maoist recruitment or insurgency creation. In the Peacebuilding Compared database, the numbers of refugees and IDPs were not high in Nepal compared with other armed conflicts to date, and certainly not compared with the other South Asian conflicts included in this book. This proposition of our theory is therefore also not supported for this case.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

Nepal was a classic case of Durkheimian anomie. Not knowing what the rules of the game were and not knowing who was in charge afflicted everyone, particularly in areas in transition from government control to control by the United People’s Revolutionary Committees.
A telling example is how anomie afflicted the Royal Nepalese Army. With its proud Gurkha tradition, this army sat on its hands for years while unusual rules of the game were played out in which its civil war was fought by the police. Both the Indian intelligence agency (Research and Analysis Wing, RAW), which had great influence over the Royal Nepalese Army, and the king wanted the army to stay out of a civil war that had effectively been between the democratic parties and the Maoists. With the murder of the king by one of his sons in 2001, there were different views within the officer corps about the royal massacre and about loyalty to the new king. When the crunch came in 2006, the army supported the overthrow of the monarchy by the CMDP. The important qualification to our hypothesis in the final act of this saga is that, ultimately, anomie cascaded on the streets to a nonviolent democratic people-power transformation. This was a unifying moment and movement towards a new normative settlement. This qualification to Proposition 7 will be a focus of analysis in Chapter 11.

**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

Even though the military stayed out of the civil war until 2002, ultimately, the war did cascade to militarisation in this way. Moreover, by then, the police had been radically militarised to the point where it was functionally a second military within Nepal’s borders (though a less able one than the Gurkhas in the Royal Nepalese Army). The militarised police cascaded torture, rape, disappearances and other forms of domination that brutalised the oppressed people of rural Nepal, driving forward recruitment into the People’s Liberation Army. After the 2006 peace agreement, armed groups morphed into 119 armed criminal gangs involved in kidnapping, extortion and robberies in the Tarai region, some supported by Indian interests. A great success of Nepal’s peacebuilding has been that most of the leaders of these armed gangs have now been persuaded by enforcement, peace negotiations or both to surrender their weapons (Interviews with police chief and home secretary, Kathmandu, 2013, No. 031426). Nepal’s homicide rate was less than half the world average by 2013, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC 2013), falling further,

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12 This is the number according to interviews with police. It was 107 and 109 armed criminal gangs, according to our interviews with academic experts.
to almost one-third of the world average by 2014. On our analysis in Part III, the war-to-crime cascades have been moderated by the nonviolent people power of Nepal’s transformative peace.

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

Our introduction to this section emphasised rape and other crimes of violent domination at the village and district levels as explaining why some villages became local hotspots of a civil war that cascaded between hotspots and joined up hotspots of violence. Ghimire and Upreti (2010: 211) argue that war cascaded to crime via the proceeds from annual sales of illegal drugs growing post conflict to a value twice the level of the government funding allocated to its security agencies. As we have just discussed, there was a very large post-conflict criminal gang problem associated with former combatants for a few years after the end of the war. For the security sector, the war strategy defined rape of Maoists as patriotic rather than shameful.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

Proposition 10 does not fit the Nepalese war and peace in the way it does Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya. There were no imperial French, British, American or Russian invaders to cut and run after they concluded that their losses no longer justified continuing the war. There is also a much more profound sense in which Proposition 10 does not fit Nepal. It is not that the Royal Nepalese Army had been bled to the point that it was in a hurting stalemate with the Maoist army. Rather, after it took over the conduct of the war from the police in 2002, it began to make progress that had eluded the police during its conduct of the long campaign since 1994. After 11 September 2001 and the US listing of the People’s Liberation Army as a terrorist organisation, the Royal Nepalese Army was enjoying a new flush of US military aid to renew its firepower.
The denouement of the conflict had nothing to do with cascading to the point where superior firepower succeeded or failed in delivering deterrence effects that exceeded defiance effects. Rather, the denouement was about conflict transformation led from Nepalese civil society. Nepalese civil society, as opposed to Nepalese political parties, transformed the conflict from a violent struggle for a Maoist revolution to a nonviolent democratic struggle for a republican revolution.

The next critical thing was how India responded to this transformative initiative from the streets of Nepal. India had been playing a double game of supporting both the king and the Maoists—actually, a triple game of also cultivating the non-Maoist parliamentary parties. Ultimately, India responded to the CMDP by cutting off its support for the king and urging the Maoists to declare a unilateral ceasefire. India also urged the Maoists and the parliamentary parties to work together for the first time to support the CMDP, and to craft a new republican constitution that would see the Maoists as credible electoral competitors in the aftermath of their unilateral termination of the war. When this was accomplished, India persuaded the Royal Nepalese Army to side with the people and the political parties rather than the king. The icing on the people-power cake came when the United States and the entire Kathmandu diplomatic community, which had been pushing the impossible compromise of a constitutional monarchy, defected from the king to the people and urged a reluctant and resistant king to relent by abdication.

Hence, Nepal is a nonviolent people-power story of conflict transformation rather than a Proposition 10 story. In Chapter 11, we argue that there is much to learn from this. We argue that, at many points since 2001, the Taliban and the governments of the United States, Afghanistan and Pakistan might have realised that interminable continuation of the Afghan war would ultimately prove too costly for all of them. A peace process early on that perceived a long-run likelihood of hurting stalemate would have been a profoundly rational perspective for all these key parties. The policy conclusion of Chapter 11 is that nonviolent conflict transformation—people power combined with unilateral ceasefires—is a policy package that makes sense for making Proposition 10 untrue in a wide range of cases beyond Afghanistan and Nepal.
Myanmar

When China sneezes, the Irrawaddy floods.
— Bamar proverb, cascade metaphor

Modern Myanmar differs from other smaller countries of the region—Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and the Maldives—in being much less under the influence of India (Butler 1932: 647; Wilson 2007: 89) and shaped more by China. Even with Bangladesh and Afghanistan, India has had a more profound influence than China in shaping their histories. While Myanmar and India share a long border, Indian influence is buffered by Bangladesh between them. Fear of Chinese invasion has been a constant of Myanmar’s history, though full-scale Chinese conquest of the capital happened only once, when the Mongol rulers of China invaded the old capital, Bagan, in 1287. Failed Chinese invasions occurred in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and there have also been surgical Chinese incursions. Chairman Mao Zedong allowed an important Chinese intervention in 1968 to back the Communist Party of Burma. In our 2015 interview (No. 071519) with the then speaker of Myanmar’s upper house, Khin Aung Myint, he recounted an experience as a young officer fighting the Communist Party of Burma. He captured three Chinese soldiers and found in their possession maps indicating that Burma was a rebel province of China. On interrogation, the Chinese troops actually believed this to be true. Myanmar in the current decade seeks to balance its continued and considerable domination by China through becoming an active member of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and through partial democratisation and then more complete democratisation when Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) came to power in the 2015 election. This democratisation engaged American power as another counterbalance against China.

Myanmar has long been a society with a master cleavage and many more local cleavages that feed and transform the master cleavage (Aung-Thwin 1989; Autesserre 2010; Kalyvas 2003). Until the November 2015 election, the master cleavage was between the democracy movement and continuing domination of the society by the inner circle of the old military junta (Wintle 2007). Military domination continues to be important today and this cleavage continues to be significant. The most influential institutional

13 John Braithwaite, Naing Ko Ko and Bina D’Costa conducted 136 interviews, some with more than one person present, for the Myanmar case, most of them in Myanmar in 2015 and 2017.
foundation of the democracy movement is the NLD. Secondary cleavages include ongoing autonomy struggles between regional ethnic armies and military control from the centre. Interethnic clashes also continue in less deadly ways at many hotspots. Before the rise of the NLD in 1989, the primary cleavage was between the junta and the Communist Party of Burma. Two dozen secondary ethnic insurgencies sometimes supported the communists against the military, were sometimes coopted to support the military against the communists, sometimes coopted by China and sometimes coopted China (Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin 2012; Lintner 1990a, 1990b; O’Hara and Selling 2012; Oo 2006; Seekins 2002; Shee 2002; Smith 1994; Steinberg 2013). Before that, the primary cleavage was between British colonial power and pro-independence armed groups led by General Aung San.

Before British colonialism (from 1885), the master cleavages were what are today’s secondary ethnic cleavages. Domination of the state by Bamar kingdoms displaced domination by kings of other major ethnic groups, who continued to push back against Bamar sovereignty. Right up until 1949, there was an attempt by the Karen National Union to conquer the country and supplant Bamar with Karen hegemony. The army of the second largest ethnic group went close to taking the capital, Yangon. The Bamar-dominated state might not have survived without other ethnic armies, such as that of the Kachin, joining the defence of the state against the Karen National Union.

In 1961 (and earlier), prime minister U Nu’s government alienated the Kachin by allowing itself to be captured by a tertiary (religious) cleavage. Myanmar has recurrently seen powerful factions of unarmed Buddhist monks set against other elements of the society. We saw this with the Saffron Revolution of 2007, when monks led mass protests on the streets of Yangon and when large sections of Buddhist society joined hands with the democracy movement. By 1961, more conservative factions of Buddhist monks who supported the government persuaded it to declare Burma a Buddhist state. The Christian Kachin in the north took up arms in response. This was the start of dozens of ethnic autonomy wars against the centre. A number of these continue at the time of writing. The Kachin conflict between perhaps one-third of the Myanmar military (one of the largest in the world, which boasted 400,000 personnel at its peak) and 20,000 Kachin Independence Army fighters in 2015–16 was the bloodiest conflict. The Buddhism cleavage that initially cascaded to this has a contemporary echo in the capture of elements of the Myanmar
military and state by the ‘969 movement’ of Islamophobic Buddhist monks. The movement has agitated for driving Muslim Rohingyas from Rakhine State across the border to Bangladesh and into the sea in boats (Burma News International 2013: 11; Farrelly and Hossain 2015). This has led to the recruitment of some angry young Rohingya Muslims to the Pakistani Taliban and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (Burma News International 2014: 19).

The morphology of modern Myanmar conflict has always had a primary cleavage (over colonialism, Marxism, democracy/militarism), many ethnic secondary armed cleavages and unarmed tertiary cleavages with a religious character. What has been in constant flux is the content of these cleavages.

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

Christian Kachin defiance of Buddhist Bamar domination, when it moved up a notch to the attempted declaration of Burma as a Buddhist state, is one of dozens of examples of ethnic armies manifesting the defiance part
of Proposition 1 (Della-Giacoma and Horsey 2013; Farrelly 2014b; ICG 2013c; Smith 1994). Various empires—from ancient to early modern Myanmar history (Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin 2012), as well as the late-modern Bamar, British, Japanese and junta dominations of Myanmar territory—were all accomplished by levels of deterrence that suppressed defiance. The defiance of the Communist Party of Burma collapsed after it no longer had the support (Ball 1994) of a power greater than the junta (China’s People’s Liberation Army). The party completely disappeared in 1989 when its ethnic minority fighters mutinied and reorganised as breakaway ethnic armies with Chinese support (Smith 1994: 60). The Communist Party of Burma went into liquidation as a criminal enterprise in 1989; it was taken over by Chinese gangster syndicates, who turned it into ‘the most heavily armed drug trafficking organisation in Southeast Asia, outnumbering and outgunning even the hitherto most powerful opium warlord in Burma, Zhang Qifu, alias Khun Sa’ (Lintner 1999: 472). In sum, we conceive the support for Proposition 1 as strong in the Myanmar case.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

The transition in the model of resistance from Aung San to his daughter Aung San Suu Kyi is one from an imaginary of armed resistance to an imaginary of unarmed resistance. The nonviolent imaginary of the democracy movement has been effective—albeit slowly—in accomplishing a partial, then a more substantial, transition towards democracy (Pedersen 2008; UN Special Rapporteur 2012). The new step forward was Aung San Suu Kyi becoming the most powerful figure in the NLD Government that assumed power in 2016. Yet the violent imaginary of the Bamar general, the ethnic army and the communist insurgent is the dominant one in Myanmar’s history. We interpret this as a reason for the high level of violence in Myanmar’s history, and today. Each time the architectures of coercion—by colonial power or by junta power—have begun to crack, violence has cascaded. The current conjuncture is a good example. As Min Zin (2015: 2) wrote in late 2015, ceasefire agreements between the government and the major ethnic armies are being signed ‘when more people are fighting and dying in Burma’s internal wars than at any other time in recent memory’ (although hardly as many as were dying before the mid-1990s) (see also Ball and Farrelly 2013).
Plate 9.6 Dau Aung San Suu Kyi gives a speech to supporters at Hlaing Thar Yar Township in Yangon, Myanmar, 2011.
Source: Wikimedia. Photograph by Htoo Tay Zar.


**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

The introduction to this Myanmar analysis attempted to encapsulate how different kinds of cleavages have unsettled power balances. Ethnic armies in particular have aligned at different times with and against each other and with and against master cleavages over colonial control, junta control, communist and anti-communist (Kuomintang) control of spaces. At other times, secondary ethnic cleavages have driven alliances concerning Buddhist tertiary cleavages (as we see with the Rohingya conflict today, for example). The Myanmar experience is therefore quite a good fit with this proposition.

**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

The Myanmar military, with far more active personnel than France and the United Kingdom combined, 14 has the capability to dominate any single armed group in the country. But because it has confronted dozens of credible armed groups, some with as many as 20,000 hardened fighters (the Kachin Independence Army) or even 30,000 (the United Wa State Army) (Maung 2014: 246; Selth 2013: 14), it has ceded control over a significant part of the country to economic and military domination by the United Wa State Army and some other ethnic armies. This is because state forces only have the capacity to take on a small number of these ethnic armies at one time (Selth 2013). That is also the context in which the consensus position of all the major ethnic armies in ceasefire negotiations with the government in late 2015 was to refuse disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration. Rather, their position was to demand a ‘federal army’ of which the dominant militaries of major ethnic groups—such as the Kachin, Shan, Karen and Mon—become state armies that are component parts of the federal whole. A narrative of broken promises drives this negotiating position: in the past, ceasefires were signed with promises to move on to a political settlement that never happened, and then government forces launched attacks in breach of the ceasefire. Hence, the Myanmar reality remains that disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify the country through its domination over all competing armed groups drives continued cascading of violence.

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**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Propositions 1–4 provide a better account of the root causes of conflict in Myanmar than the security dilemmas invoked in Proposition 5. Nevertheless, a history of ceasefires that have often been broken by both sides frequently causes armies to perceive imminent attack, so they calculate that the next time it should be they who breach the ceasefire first. In this way, there are certain secondary security dilemma dynamics in Myanmar’s violence. Compared with some other cases, however, here we see the centrality of the security dilemma explanation of conflict as limited. One way to eliminate the considerable future risk of security dilemmas reigniting old conflicts may be international peace monitoring with a trust-building mandate.

**Proposition 6:** Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

There is explanatory power in refugee and IDP camps as places of despair that fuel recruitment to insurgencies (Oo 2006; South 2007: 61). For the most part, this has been, however, a second-order factor that accelerated conflicts that have deeper causes. A genuine peace process in Myanmar that crafted compromises on these primary causes, which we conceive as about cascades of domination, could aim to close all the refugee and IDP camps and the secondary impetus to violence that they drive. A major difference between Myanmar refugee camps in Thailand and Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan is that the latter have not been the incubus of a nonviolent democracy movement as an alternative to transformation through insurgency. Refugee camps in Thailand, in contrast, trained many to lead nonviolent democracy campaigns that have been constitutive of the master cleavage of Myanmar politics (Banki 2014; Naing 2017).

The contemporary Rohingya crisis, however, raises a growing challenge of displacement and disenfranchisement. It is such a currently dangerous example of a Proposition 6 cascade that we now give it detailed consideration. As explained in Chapter 4, trapped populations in times of
conflict can become recruiting grounds for armed groups. Now, in the age of the ‘global war on terror’, refugees are no longer welcome and are seen as security threats. Illegal immigrants, refugees, stateless people and IDPs create moral dilemmas for states. Identity differences can be accentuated and refugees left with nowhere to turn. This has been the case in recent times in Rakhine state. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2016) worries that the ongoing crisis involving the Rohingya population could give rise to a new insurgency movement in South Asia.

The multilayered political, social and psychological trauma of violence and displacement has also generated multifaceted anxiety in Myanmar, which could unravel stability. The immediate priorities to create stable democratic and economic institutions, to address the culture of impunity and to restore peaceful coexistence of a multiethnic society have also meant some of the deeper challenges of identity politics have been overlooked. In this environment, initiating an inclusive conversation with the Rohingya ethnic group and revisiting their citizenship status have simply not been priorities.

On 9 October 2016, nine border guards were killed in three attacks along Myanmar’s north-western border with Bangladesh. The president’s office held a previously unknown Rohingya group liable. Soon after troops started to arrive in Maungdaw, a regional curfew was declared and 400 area schools were closed. Villages have been torched, many people have been killed, including babies, elderly and children burnt alive, and soldiers have carried out gang rape (OHCHR 2017). Pierre Peron, a spokesman for the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in Myanmar, estimated that over 30,000 people were displaced by the attacks (Slodkowski 2016), increasing over the next year to 90,000 (OHCHR 2017: 7). During the months when this book was in the copy-editing process in late 2017, this number may have cascaded to perhaps 700,000 driven across the border by further violence and rape. Rohingya activists and international media are referring to this current crisis as a genocidal conflict, despite the Myanmar Government’s repeated denial of genocide.

The Muslims of Myanmar’s west coast identify themselves as Rohingya, a name derived from Rohang, the ancient name of Arakan (now Rakhine State). Realising the deeply embedded prejudice the term carries with it, many Rohingyas in recent decades preferred to be labelled simply as Arakan Muslims. In all formal and most of our informal discussions
in Myanmar, the widely used term for Rohingyas is ‘Bengali Muslims’ or ‘illegal Bangladeshis’. During our interviews in Myanmar, we heard that the key problems of legitimacy and citizenship are linked to this debate about what exactly to call these persecuted people. Many of our respondents from Myanmar did not even recognise the right of Rohingyas to be called by their preferred name.

All identity groups should have the right to name their own group. Yet census programs, textbook revisions and the systematic silencing of Rohingyas in broader public discourse have wiped them from the living memory of modern Myanmar. This erasure occurred against the backdrop of Myanmar’s protracted conflict that touched all ethnic groups in the country. Myanmar, through its 1982 Citizenship Law, recognises the Kaman and Bamar Muslims in its Muslim populations. Its population also includes Chinese Muslims and Indian Muslims. However, the largest Muslim population living in Rakhine State, the Rohingyas, is not recognised in the list, which has effectively rendered them stateless.

Exclusion policies worsened sharply with the 1962 military coup, after which freedom of movement was restricted. The restrictions on movement continue to be oppressive, with massive numbers of Rohingyas even denied the right to enter Rakhine towns, greatly truncating their access to education and healthcare institutions. Then there was promulgation in 1974 of the *Emergency Immigration Act*, which was designed to prevent people entering from India, China and Bangladesh; the census program Operation Nagamin, to check identification cards and take action against illegal aliens, in 1977; and, finally, the 1982 Citizenship Law, following the 1978 exodus, when many Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh were starved through deprivation of food rations by the Government of Bangladesh to force Rohingya to return or attempt to return to Myanmar.

Electoral politics prior to the 2015 general election contributed to further disenfranchisement of the Rohingyas. The right to vote of an estimated 700,000 Rohingyas and other minority groups holding temporary identity cards was revoked in May 2015 (UNHRC 2016: 3). The new parliament has no Muslim members. Systematic persecution, extreme poverty and alienation have led Rohingyas to seek asylum in other countries.
An OCHA report estimates that 2,000 Rohingyas and Bangladeshis died at sea between 2012 and 2015. While there are no reliable figures, there are reports that many of these deaths were of children.

By March 2015, there were already 146,500 internally displaced people in Rakhine State and 662,400 in all Myanmar (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2015). The Rakhine IDPs are mostly Muslims, some Buddhists, and almost all live in camps. Following the renewed crackdown, these camps have been severely affected. In northern Rakhine, one-fifth of children under the age of five suffer acute malnutrition. Food and medical supplies in the camps provided by international organisations have had many restrictions placed on them or have been completely stopped, contributing to the further vulnerability of refugees. Sexual abuse and lack of proper sanitation and medical supplies have affected the sexual and reproductive health of girls and young women.

Widespread accusations of rape of Rohingya girls and women were either denied or shrugged off by the authorities. Some 24 per cent of the Rohingya refugee women interviewed by the United Nations in 2017 reported having been raped and 52 per cent subjected to some form of sexual violence (OHCHR 2017: 9–10). Some of the responses to rape accusations indicate how deeply the Rohingyas are despised. For example, Aung Win, the chairman of a Rakhine investigation committee, in his interview with the BBC, laughed and stated that the soldiers would never rape Rohingya women because ‘they are very dirty’. These responses clearly show how Rohingyas, especially women and girls, can be quickly dismissed from any recourse to justice. During informal conversations, even with activists from other ethnic groups, we were told (at least twice) that Rohingya women and girls were not sufficiently ‘beautiful and attractive’ to be raped by security forces.

Children are also vulnerable when they are crossing treacherous borders to seek refuge. The vulnerabilities of children, and the sexual and gender-based violence against women and girls, have angered young Rohingya men. The crisis has broader regional implications. The Leda camp in Bangladesh, which shelters 30,000 Rohingyas, is close to a Rakhine village where only 120 Rakhine families live. People in this village are

worried that the intercommunal tension will spill across the border and there is grave concern that extremists will target the minority Buddhist community in Bangladesh, where minorities and indigenous populations have been attacked and displaced numerous times under a range of pretexts. It is reassuring to see that the Bangladesh Buddhist Federation condemned the ongoing repression of Muslim Rohingyas (Star Online Report 2016).

Faith-based restorative justice mechanisms could serve as important healing platforms in rebuilding trust between Rakhine Buddhist and Rohingyas in Myanmar and also in Bangladesh. There is certainly a need for civil society voices, particularly those from faith-based institutions who have symbolic authority, to speak up, unite diverse opinions and denounce hate speech. Myanmar also needs to prioritise intercommunal dialogue in Rakhine State. Part III of this book considers these options for making the Proposition 10 dynamic no longer true for desperate current cases such as the Rohingya.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

Since the time of Myanmar’s first military coup in 1962, it has been clear who is in charge. Even the pecking order within the junta was always rather clearer than in most regimes. It was still clear in 2015 that a small group of former and current generals was in charge, and that had not changed hugely at the end of 2017. Today, it is clear that Aung San Suu Kyi is also in charge in a very top-down way, albeit in a distinctive kind of powersharing with the military. Leaders set the rules of the game and it has mostly been rather obvious to everyone what those rules were. Even though those rules and rulers had circumscribed legitimacy, Myanmar could not be conceived as fundamentally a case of anomie driving violence. Even the 20 years before the first coup (1942–62) have been described by Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin (2012: 33–4) as a period of ‘disorder with meaning’, which replaced the British colonial ‘order without meaning’ and was followed after the coup by a period of ‘order with meaning’. We might object that the meaning had shallow roots because of the politics of domination. The order was also fragile, and limited to the core
of the country, while its peripheries recurrently fractured into violence. It remains to be seen whether NLD rule might produce another era of ‘disorder with meaning’ or settle to ‘order with meaning’.

Proposition 8: Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

A vast literature documents how violence, militarisation and domination have been mutually reinforcing in Myanmar (Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin 2012; Burma News International 2013, 2014; Callahan 2005; Cheesman 2014; Farrelly 2013, 2014a; Fink 2001; Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014; Lintner 1990a; Maung 2014; Myanmar Peace Monitor 2013; Selth 2015; Smith 1994; Steinberg 1981; Seekins 2002). The surprise has been how the military leadership of the country voluntarily loosened the screws of its domination by releasing most political prisoners (Selth 2013: 16) and by a variety of partial steps towards democratisation this decade (Cheesman 2014; UN Special Rapporteur 2012). Myanmar is a useful puzzle for our consideration of cascades of nonviolence, liberation and demilitarisation in Chapter 11. It is also a case of cascades of humiliation, as we sought to illustrate with the plight of the Rohingya.

Proposition 9: Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

Specific crimes were not so important in the onset of Myanmar’s ethnic wars. Specific policies of domination, Bamarisation, denial of autonomy and broken promises were recurrent provocations. Likewise, the rise of the armed resistance to British colonialism and the creation of the Communist Party of Burma (whose first elected general-secretary in 1939 was General Aung San) do not seem to have been sparked by any specific crime. When it comes to the rise of the democracy movement as a mass nonviolent movement, however, specific crimes that were ignition points were quite important. There is a difference between Aung San and his politically sophisticated friends calling a meeting to form the Communist Party of Burma and a cascade of growing numbers of angry ordinary people who had had enough with the regime and who surged on to the streets in a massive way for the first time in 1988. This started with a fight/assault
in a teashop on 12 March 1988 over the issue of whether rock or Burmese music should be played (Aung-Thwin and Aung-Thwin 2012: 256; Fink 2001; Lintner 1990a; Maung 2000). It was near the Yangon Institute of Technology and a university student was injured. His alleged assailant was arrested but released because of his alleged contacts with the regime. This brought students on to the streets in protest over the police handling of the matter. The police fired on the demonstrators and killed two of them. This escalated the youth mobilisation. Riot police surrounded the Yangon Institute of Technology. Monks joined the protests. By August, there was a general strike and president Ne Win had announced his resignation as Burma Socialist Programme Party Chairman. Myanmar’s long march of people power had begun, even though the military retook control of the streets that September. The NLD was formed after August 1988. The firing of live ammunition during the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in September 2007 was a state crime that cascaded a mass democratic uprising that the state could hardly contain. This helped persuade the junta to move gradually towards democratic reforms and limited powersharing (Interviews with two senior junta generals, Yangon and Naypyidaw, 2015, Nos 081522 and 071519).

The war-to-crime part of the crime–war–crime nexus is more pervasively supported by the Myanmar case than crime-to-war. Interview informants claimed there were many hundreds of armed groups in Myanmar. How could there be so many? Most of them are incapable of fighting even a very local civil war. What they are capable of is a little localised violence in pursuit of criminal objectives.

Major insurgent groups such as the Communist Party of Burma had many splits over ideology and strategy, as well as some breakaway regional parties (Lintner 1990b). The intelligence services often aided and abetted such splits as a strategy to weaken the insurgency. Frequently, they encouraged splits by promising the breakaway faction control of a particular territory or control of a legal or illegal part of the economy, without interference from the state, so long as they refrained from attacking state forces. Even insurgent cartels controlling markets in legal commodities were often criminally enforced at the point of a gun. The most common lucrative deals, however, granted impunity in illegal drug markets (Ball 1999; Meehan 2011). This criminal business model took off in northern Myanmar, led by Chinese Kuomintang troops who fled there after their defeat by Chairman Mao’s communist forces.
In this case, the heroin trading business model was aided and abetted by the governments of Taiwan and the United States (through the Central Intelligence Agency, CIA) (McCoy 1972: Chs 3–4).

Alfred W. McCoy’s (1972) work laid the foundation for an understanding of how war in places such as Indochina, the Middle East, Colombia, Burma and Afghanistan cascaded drug production from control by one warlord after another in different regions of the world, each protected and supported by one major power after another. With each war-induced move of the dominant site of drug production, another region of the world became afflicted with an out-of-control scourge of drug addiction. Had policymakers recognised this cascade dynamic and the impossibility of suppressing drug production in a war zone, the more sensible option of legalising regulated production in one stable part of the world might have been considered. The world today might, as a result, have only a fraction of the addiction it has and a major source of funding for civil wars might have been eliminated.

More than half a century later, endless emulation by others of the Kuomintang drug lord business model has left Myanmar with one of the most drug-addicted populations in the world (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014) and as one of the top-three drug-exporting nations in the world (Burma News International 2013: 11). Indeed, during some periods of the past half-century, it was the top exporter (Ball 2003: 12). This pattern continues today. While Kachin State has experienced one of the worst civil war in recent years, the consensus there among many informed actors we interviewed was that ‘[m]ore Kachin youth have died from drugs than from the war’ (Kachin Independence Army Brigade commander, quoted in Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014: 38).

In Kachin State, one of the things promised by governments to factions that break away from the Kachin Independence Army is impunity for trading in methamphetamine and opiates (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014). In historical periods when fighting spiked, drug production and drug abuse spiked in Shan as well as Kachin states (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014: 16). The combination of war, poverty and drug addiction traps women in violent family relationships:

> When my husband wants more drugs, he threatens me with a knife …
> I have run away many times. But as I had nothing to eat, I was very hungry. (Kachin Women’s Association Thailand 2014: 28)
Even this is not the principal way so many hundreds of armed groups came into existence. One common path is that a businessman will see an opportunity to make money in a conflict-ravaged area where opportunities for moneymaking are few. The businessman discusses that opportunity with the local military commander (Interviews in Mon State, 2015, Nos 081501 and 081502). They agree together to persuade a local indigenous leader to use weapons provided by the military to grab the land on which the business opportunity is located—be it a tourist resort, factory or mine—and drive off the existing operator. The indigenous leader, with support from the local military commander, then applies to be listed as an armed group with a grievance that this land was his people’s traditional land. The armed group then seeks to participate in the ceasefire negotiations with the government. Until it is decided whether the group will be given any participation rights in ceasefire negotiations, the military commander is able to say to displaced businesspeople who complain of being driven off their property that his hands are tied until a decision is made on the status of the claim lodged to the ceasefire negotiations in Yangon.

Civil war cascades to crimes of this kind with countless variations. Often the military will work with a business partner and an insurgent partner not on the basis of an indigenous land claim, but based on ideological dissent from a mainstream insurgent group (Interviews, 2015, Nos 081501 and 081502). Ironically, the Bamar-dominated military may aid and abet dissent based on anti-military, anti-Bamar racism and ethnic chauvinism, on the claim that the mainstream armed group has become too close to the military and its cronies. Commonly, the new group that conspires to grab the business opportunity while registering to become a participant in ceasefire negotiations will promote itself as the true defender of the full autonomy or independence of their people. They brand themselves as an alternative to the corrupt compromisers of the mainstream group. This marketing resonates and therefore lays a good foundation for the criminal enterprise. Hence, we might say that the primary military/democracy-movement cleavage, the secondary ethnic army cleavages and the tertiary unarmed religious cleavages are complemented by even more numerous (though less politically significant) quaternary criminal enterprise cleavages.

Obviously, this kind of war-to-crime dynamic under Proposition 9 also reinforces the militarisation dynamic in Proposition 8, as it depends on the military domination of a local military commander. This dynamic enriches the most dominating and criminal military leaders.
Military power has consistently protected rapists when the rape was perpetrated by soldiers or political supporters of the junta. The militarised Myanmar state has therefore bequeathed a society in which the shamefulness of rape, like that of the other military-sponsored crimes we have discussed, has been undermined.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

In Myanmar, there is little semblance of the great power cut-and-run tactics that so devastated the people of Afghanistan, Vietnam, Iraq and Libya (or Kashmir). There is not even a semblance of the major deployment of a regional power like India that left a mess with its cut and run from Sri Lanka’s civil war. There is no support for the Proposition 10 dynamic here. China’s approach has been to govern Myanmar ‘at a distance’. Even when Chairman Mao chose to give the junta a deterrent lesson by allowing tangible military support to the Communist Party of Burma in 1968, the Chinese troops who went into Burma to fight with local communists were said to be locals and were limited in numbers. In another alternative narrative, they were said to be the troops of rogue People’s Liberation Army generals. The most consequential Chinese support involved the training and equipping of Myanmar nationals and the provision of cross-border safe havens inside China. This is government at a distance in the sense of seeking to manage an impression in the art of (transnational) government that locals are self-governing (Foucault 1991). The reality is self-government designed to please the Chinese state, or at least designed not to offend it. Moreover, when the Chinese Government decided to cut off all support for the Communist Party of Burma, this did not cause a cascade of violence. Quite the reverse: it put the communist insurgency on the track to total collapse. Its demise in 1989 was a spectacle of the power of Chinese government at a distance, a lesson in why all Myanmar factions must take the Chinese art of government seriously. One might say that under the Obama administration, ‘principled engagement’ (Pedersen 2008) or ‘constructive engagement’ (Bunyanunda 2002) with Myanmar moved the United States towards a more Chinese style of governing Myanmar at a distance. ‘Principled engagement’ is government
more through hegemony than through threat, through carrots more than sticks, but with the stick of sanction reinstatement hovering in the background as a Sword of Damocles,\textsuperscript{17} likely to fall only in extreme circumstances. Myanmar largely made its own mess of crisscrossing civil wars; it is not a case where great power oscillation between domination and disengagement bears the major responsibility for disintegrating the society.

Conclusion: Wars of the periphery

South Asian warfare since the 1940s has been a pattern of peripheries against the centre. When General Aung San was organising insurgency against centralised colonial power in the 1940s, it is alleged by many in Myanmar that Britain encouraged the Karen National Union to rise up against Bamar domination of the state and against the Bamar-dominated independence movement.\textsuperscript{18} Faced with an uprising at the periphery of its Raj, Britain may have helped cascade a further uprising of a periphery of that periphery. The Sikh Punjab periphery waged a conflict for an independent Khalistan from 1986 to the mid-1990s. Muslim Kashmiris waged more bloody wars for the separation of Kashmir from India. Early on, potentially larger conflicts in Andra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu were moved from a war trajectory to a peace-with-autonomy path by recognising an autonomous role for Sharia courts and other concessions in Andra Pradesh and Tamil language and other claims in Tamil Nadu. Concessions to the Tamil minority at the Sri Lankan periphery of the Raj were less generous; civil war there was more bloody and protracted. Pashtun peripheries waged wars against the ethnic peripheries in Afghanistan; indeed, Pashtuns in control at the centre waged many wars against their own Pashtun periphery.

\textsuperscript{17} In an interview we had with one retired lieutenant general, junta member and senior minister, he said: ‘Western sanctions were definitely useful in creating pressure of change. The international pressure increased rather than decreased with the release of Dau Suu [Aung San Suu Kyi]. The second big cause of pressure was the people movement. So it was joint pressure from the people, from the US and from the UN. These were the three key pressures’ (Interview, Yangon, 2015, No. 081522).

\textsuperscript{18} Steinberg (2010: 59), in suggesting British support for the Karen, also finds Indian support for the Karen and for the Kachin, Chinese support for Kachin and Naga insurgents as well as the Burma Communist Party, Bangladeshi support for Rohingyas, US support for the Kuomintang and Thai support for various ethnic armies.
The Marxist Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) uprisings in Sri Lanka were wars of class peripheries, alliances of youthful intellectuals from universities and impoverished caste and class groups and peasants who were marginalised from state power. This kind of alliance was evident in the Naxalite (Maoist) conflicts that have afflicted half the states of India in recent decades, the Maoist conflict in Nepal and the long civil war of the Communist Party of Burma. These Nepalese, Indian and Myanmar conflicts were much more determinedly Maoist than the Sri Lankan JVP conflict in the way Maoists in Nepal, India and Myanmar built support in rural areas where landlords were most exploitative of peasants on the theory that Maoism would eventually take over the entire countryside to surround the capital. The communist takeover of Afghanistan in 1978 was, like the JVP uprisings in Sri Lanka, more classically Leninist, though the Soviet-backed Leninists had competition from Chinese-backed Maoists in Kabul. Afghanistan’s Leninist overthrow of feudalism was led from Kabul. It quickly came to antagonise tribal peripheries in the rural areas more totally than the king had ever done. It was defeated because it was so arrogantly unresponsive to decentralised power, it was seen as atheistic by devout Muslims, as pushing too far in bringing women into the centre of power in Kabul and as guilty of many other sins of the centre against the periphery. Then, when the Taliban became the next ideology to consolidate power in that long-suffering country, it pushed women back further to the periphery of society than they had ever been, and it perpetrated atrocities against non-Pashtun ethnic peripheries, Shia and other infidels of its periphery.

Hence, the focus of this chapter on countries that are on the geographical fringe of the massive core societies of South Asia adds to that broader picture of South Asian war being about struggles pursued from peripheries and peripheries of peripheries. When Rohingyas from Myanmar move to fight from and in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) and oppress indigenous peasants there with violence, tax collection and protection rackets, the Myanmar periphery joins up with the cascade of peripheries discussed in Chapter 7: Pakistan pulling away from the centre in New Delhi, Bangladesh pulling away from Islamabad, the CHT tearing away from Dhaka and subordinated indigenous groups in the CHT resisting the dominant indigenous periphery, the Chakma. The Rohingyas became just another armed group struggling against exclusion and another criminal group operating as a remote rural borderland periphery to Chakma as well as state power.
One important difference between the geographical core of South Asian megastates—India, Pakistan and Bangladesh—and the geographical peripheries beyond them is that these peripheries suffered less of the bloodshed of Partition than Kashmir, Bengal or Punjab. In effect, the British Raj had forged effective alliances with the dominant ethnic groups of peripheral states in a deal of transition from indirect to direct governance by the dominant group: Sinhalese in Sri Lanka, Pashtuns in Afghanistan, Nepalese in Nepal, Bhutanese in Bhutan and Bamar in Myanmar (though it toyed with a switch to Karen allegiance there). In each case, we have seen that terrible conflict broke out in South Asia’s periphery between subordinated ethnic minorities and the group whose domination Britain enabled. Only in Bhutan did the Nepalese–Bhutanese conflict fail to cascade eventually to a bloody civil war, although it did cascade to violence, suicide and terrible exclusion.

Fundamentally, however, the post–World War II history of South Asia—with its geographical peripheries that cascade across to South-East, Central and West Asia and the Middle East—is the history of the entire planet. After World War II, warfare shifted decisively towards being predominantly civil wars (Kaldor 1999). Until 1945, ‘World Wars’, a Russian Revolution that was in important ways a war to constitute a wider Soviet empire, Napoleonic wars, wars to crush the Ottoman Empire and other wars of various kinds of empires dominated the shaping of history. After 1945, the mapping of conflict was shaped by postcolonial warfare, peasant uprisings, civil wars at the fringes of both Russian and NATO power (such as Ukraine today) and wars of ethnic and religious independence, from Northern Ireland to Mindanao. While the shift to these kinds of warfare becoming predominant is more decisive in South Asia than for the rest of the globe, the neglect of South Asia in the Western imaginary of warfare cascades has come at a cost to Western strategic analysis.

For example, regulating drugs in the Golden Triangle would not have been such a difficult challenge in the 1950s and 1960s had major powers such as France and the United States decided not to protect and feed the drug trade as part of their anticommunist strategy (McCoy 1972). The war in Kashmir should not have been so difficult to resolve in the 1940s and 1950s, before it cascaded in the crippling ways described in Chapter 5. But the West had no staying power; Western mobilisation of its enormous diplomatic and economic power was limited in pressuring the then weak states of India and Pakistan to negotiate a permanent peace across their borders. It seemed in the West a minor conflict at the margins of the
margins. In retrospect, we can see it as a conflict that incubated a jihad that spread to Afghanistan and, ultimately, to the geopolitical centre: Manhattan and the oilfields under Western hegemony in the Middle East (Rashid 2010b). It has been a conflict that caused the worst and most dangerous breakout from the strictures of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, threatening China more than South Asia with the deaths that would occur in the fallout from a nuclear catastrophe in Kashmir, and perhaps even effectively putting mobile nuclear weapons at the disposal of Saudi Arabia. A. Q. Khan's Pakistani network has assisted nuclear weapon development in Iran, North Korea, Libya, Iraq and Myanmar (Ball 2009). Kashmir seemed unimportant to the West in the decades after World War II because the Western imaginary of war prevention was about preventing World War III. The West lacked the cascade imaginary needed to suppress new wars (Kaldor 1999).

Today, the time is ripe to grasp that imaginary. It is harder to bring a permanent positive peace to Kashmir today than it was in the 1950s. Untangling South Asia’s nuclear knots is difficult. The neoliberal ideologies of donors and state econocrats make it harder than ever to mobilise land reforms that give justice to peasants who are still attracted to Maoism because they are still oppressed by landlords. Even so, ‘principled engagement’ of the West, China and ASEAN with Myanmar has meant that its nuclear weapons program never took off (Naing 2010) and probably never will. This, at least, is one story of better preventive diplomacy than occurred in Iraq. The cascade imaginary conceives of peacebuilding to mop up messy wars of the periphery as being more expensive for the West than preventive diplomacy and economic diplomacy to stop them before they start. That challenge is a theme of Part III. Chapter 10 moves into that challenge by integrating the findings of this chapter about the many turning points towards violence and nonviolence on the periphery of South Asia with the findings of earlier chapters about turning points in the core of South Asia.
Part III: Refining understanding of cascades
This chapter affirms the broad conclusion that the cascade lens is strategic for averting large geopolitical errors and little local ones that can ignite fires that spread afar. Proposition by proposition, its assessment of our 10 starting propositions is more qualified. Cascades theory remains no more than a program of work for inductive theory development.

Our hope is that, for research questions such as how cascades work, inductive evolution not only of processual understanding but also of the definition of the analytic concepts themselves is advanced by the attempt to describe a holistic narrative of how violence cascades within and between societies. Can researchers manage a convincing narrative of the cascading of violence across a whole region? And can they manage to reject some unconvincing alternative narratives in so doing? Inability to give affirmative answers to both questions is one way of invalidating the cascade account.

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1 Readers will have noticed that, rather than define all theoretical concepts at the beginning of this book, we defined only a few key ones up front, allowing the conceptualisation of other concepts to emerge inductively from a discussion of the cases. The reality with this kind of causal process-tracing research is that concepts begin the project meaning something less attuned with praxis using those concepts than is the case at project’s end. Social scientists straitjacket qualitative research too much when they shun conceptual ambiguity; it is better to explore and experiment with textures of ambiguity (Levine 1988). Likewise, we have communicated the methodological precepts of our research in small doses as they arise at conjunctures in the narrative that bring those precepts to life. In an era when keyword searches for ‘define’ or ‘method’ coupled with a specific concept are so easy, this seems a more illuminating and less tedious way to make methods important to the research.
Methods for evaluating cascades

One way of evaluating the 10 starting propositions would be to count how many of the eight country cases support each proposition. While an \( n \) of 8 is tiny, one could argue the sample is more or less the population of South Asian states. According to the Peacebuilding Compared methodology, however, all this is barking up the wrong tree, or not the best one, because a better quantitative approach analyses armed conflicts rather than country cases. This is because we have seen that many contemporary wars are both subnational and transnational, driven by complex interactions between macro cleavages (including global ones) and very local cleavages.\(^2\)

In a case like Kashmir, Peacebuilding Compared quantitative variables are mostly coded for Kashmir rather than for India or Pakistan, and coded for specific Kashmir conflicts involving specific combatants at particular moments in space and time. The conflict in Balochistan—mainly within Pakistan, though with overspills to Iran and Afghanistan, where we have done substantial fieldwork on those overspills—is coded as an armed conflict quite separate from the conflict between the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Taliban.

Ultimately, when we have coded all the Peacebuilding Compared variables for a larger, more representative sample of armed conflicts than the 39 we have preliminarily coded, quantitative analyses will be possible. In important ways, however, the qualitative process tracing (Bennett 2010; Bennett and Checkel 2012; Kay and Baker 2015)\(^3\) in this book is

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\(^2\) This connects to a wider epistemological resistance of the authors to organising social science knowledge around knowledge about states, as in political science, or societies, as in sociology. Eric Wolf (2010: 17) argues that no context should be thought of as internally homogeneous and externally segregated. For Wolf (2010: 3), ‘the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality. Concepts like “nation”, “society”, and “culture” name bits and threaten to turn names into things. Only by understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding’.

\(^3\) Bennett and Checkel (2012) conceive process tracing as a mechanism-based approach to understanding the world that is methodologically plural. They define causal process tracing as ‘the use of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process that a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case’ (Bennett and Checkel 2012: 8). Moreover, ‘process tracing [is] the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case … it inductively uses evidence from within a case to develop hypotheses that might explain the case’ (p. 10) and help interpret other cases. Explanations are more convincing to the extent that the evidence is inconsistent with alternative explanations (p. 26). Bayesian logic further
superior to simply counting cases to understand cascades. The number of cases is not the crucial thing for theory development and evaluation because data are not created equal (in probative value). India is not only a bigger society than Nepal, it also has had a significantly larger number of armed conflicts. Bhutan is tiny and has had none, yet it has profound probative value as a case that did not cascade to war. As Chapter 9 argued, it was a methodological error to fail to give it more priority in our original project design, allowing us to be discouraged by its not having had a war and by the notorious difficulty of getting access to do social science research in Bhutan compared with other South Asian societies (Penjore 2013). Evidence blows many straws in the winds of war.\(^4\) While most cases might not discriminate between explanations at all, others might be ‘doubly decisive’ in confirming one proposition and simultaneously eliminating many others (Bennett 2010: 5).\(^5\)

It follows that the quality of inference is based less on the quantity of facts at hand than on the contextual quality of how researchers drill down into processes that unfold into facts. More important still are processes that unfold into other processes that consolidate new configurations of social and political relationships. It also follows that the variable contestability of ‘facts’ can be productively viewed through different lenses. Moreover,

\(^{4}\) Chapter 2 illustrates that it is no easy matter to discern which are the straws in the wind that provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the onset of war. It is easy to infer that World War I did not cause the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand because his assassination preceded the onset of war. It is quite hard, though possible, to assess the counterfactual of whether World War I would have occurred had the Archduke not been assassinated.

\(^{5}\) ‘Process tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. A central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesised causal processes. The researcher looks for the observable implications of hypothesised explanations, often examining at a finer level of detail or a lower level of analysis than that initially posited in the relevant theory. The goal is to establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative explanations. This mode of analysis is closely analogous to a detective attempting to solve a crime by looking at clues and suspects and piecing together a convincing explanation, based on fine-grained evidence that bears on potential suspects’ means, motives, and opportunity to have committed the crime in question … Careful process tracing focused on the sequencing of who knew what, when, and what they did in response … might, for example, establish whether an arms race caused a war, or whether the anticipation of war caused an arms race’ (Bennett 2010: 3–4).
as argued in Chapter 1, inference based on such analysis of contested facts can be combined with counterfactual analysis (Climo and Howells 1976; Fearon 1991; Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968; Weber 1949).

Inference based on analysis of contested facts also means subjective logic (Jøsang 2016) software might be used on a full sample to identify on a dynamic map of the world the most likely cascades of violence and whether any pose a plausible risk of cascading to World War III if they are not prevented. It remains to be seen, however, whether our final analysis will be systematic enough by 2030 to allow this. A matrix of the probability of the best-established cascade risks and the confidence in those probabilities—both in fuzzy verbal categories—might be possible. The challenge will be to do this with enough granularity. Subjective logic software that does not assume linearity of effects is developing fast. It allows some variables to be coded quantitatively and in an uncontested way, other variables to be coded qualitatively and in a contested way and other data to be coded ‘don’t know’. With more than 700 variables coded already, data reduction will be needed for input into such an analysis.6

So our final list of cascade propositions in 2030 may be a shortened list compared with the 10 here, or maybe not. Maybe it will be longer, depending on how much complexity the subjective logic analyses of that new era, and we as analysts, will be able to handle. A subjective logic framework (Jøsang 2016) involves a major advance on the present analytic frameworks used by intelligence agencies to warn what our preventive diplomacy priorities should be. Extant models require each piece of circumstantial evidence to be paired with a measure of how reliable it is: its probability.7 Jøsang sees this as flawed because it wrongly assumes a sense of certainty about the reliability of a piece of information. Jøsang (2016) in effect says: ‘What they really ought to say is “we don’t know

6 Recent developments in principal coordinates analysis (multidimensional scaling) for mixed qualitative–quantitative data with holes can be used to reduce the 700-plus variables before hypothesis testing. The nature of the dataset to be input into that analysis will be that some codes will be ‘facts’ (e.g. that a peace agreement was signed), others will be solid consensus interpretations of the facts, others will be coded as speculative and many will be coded ‘don’t know’. A variety of multivariate clustering analyses will answer questions such as: Which combination of five policies when all completed provides the best assurance of preventing the recurrence of war and preventing a high-crime postwar society? If there are only three that can be guaranteed, what is the cluster of three that is most important to fund in different war contexts? Which are the peacebuilding failures that are the strongest predictors of the recurrence of war and high postwar crime rates?

7 I am grateful to discussions with one former Peacebuilding Compared postdoctoral fellow and co-author, Mike Cookson, and to Roger Bradbury for alerting me to the potential of a subjective logic approach to cascades analysis.
EVALUATING THE PROPOSITIONS

this”. However, such input arguments are not permitted in traditional analytical tools.’ His solution is to provide an estimate of how certain each probability is, injecting an extra layer of subjectivity into intelligence analysis and bringing quantification to uncertainty itself.

Subjective logic encourages the analysis of arguments that may be completely uncertain and allows estimates based on such arguments, even though fraught with uncertainty. Jøsang (2016) contends that unless this is done, the uncertainty is swept under the carpet and frail humans become stuck in the preconceived notions that are the cause of so many intelligence failures. These failures can be seen more clearly in retrospect from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Jervis 2011) and the intelligence rationale for the appeasement of Hitler.

Tracing cascade processes from Balochistan across to Iran and Afghanistan, when this is a cascade that matters—as we do in Chapter 6—is superior to a nationalism of separate cases for Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, qualitative analysis of many cascades contained within a single massive country (such as India) contains infinitely more degrees of freedom for inference than might be suggested by an $n$ of 1. In Chapter 7, we discuss the cascades of armed conflicts nested within other armed conflicts right down to subconflicts among different armed factions within the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Contemporary civil wars—most dramatically in cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo—are Russian dolls of wars within wars within wars (Chapter 4).

Chapters 9 and 11 discuss the failure of international comparative analysis to show large quantitative effects of income inequality (measured in certain ways) on the incidence of war. This is put alongside the substantial impact of inequality in intervillage comparative data from 3,857 villages (Nepal et al. 2011). We argued that this was because a cross-national study of inequality effects across, say, 100 societies suffers massive institutional heterogeneity problems with wars of local origin and local resilience. A study of inequality effects for 3,857 villages does not have these institutional heterogeneity problems. This, we argued, was why it contributes results more in accord with our qualitative tracing of causal processes. Communal rioting was what cascaded to interethnic or interfaith armed conflict in many Peacebuilding Compared cases. There are massive degrees of freedom in the qualitative discussion in Chapter 5 of hundreds of communal riots, for example, in the research of Wilkinson (2004), in the discussion in Part II of millions of communal riots across
South Asia or in the comparison of them with communal riots across other large pacified spaces such as China and Indonesia (see, particularly, Chapter 5). We hope such limited uses of quantitative data in this book go to the process-tracing contribution of reflection on what kinds of hybridity between quantitative and qualitative analysis permit doubly decisive inference.

All this means we cannot be myopic about where degrees of freedom to evaluate our propositions have come from in the course of our chapters. In that discursive spirit, let us now summarise what we think we have learned about the propositions across those chapters. The main point of this discursive spirit is not to confirm or refute the propositions—though that is always a possibility—but to refine inductively our sophistication about their complexity. ‘Confirming’ them is especially limited in its meaning when the propositions have partly been developed inductively by reflection on the very data from these case studies. It will become a more meaningful complementary exercise to the research in this book to confirm and refute the propositions when quantitative analysis becomes possible on a much larger number of conflict cases, beyond those within which the propositions were developed.

Notwithstanding all of the above reservations, the Appendix at the end of the book provides a summary country-by-country assessment of all of our cascade propositions for each country case. We do this to make our data more legible to scholars who wish to use them to complement their own country-by-country analyses of armed conflict. The Appendix also provides at least a crude summary of a general pattern of support for the propositions, with 74 of 88 evaluations of the propositions supporting them and not all the other 14 cases that fail to provide support to the propositions refuting them. The most consistent support is across India and Sri Lanka, and the least support is in Bhutan.

One thing that becomes clear from the following empirical summary of what we have found, of what is revealed in tracing the causal processes among these 10 propositions, is that we can see they are interwoven with an intricacy and recursiveness that are not easily captured by focusing on particular arrows that connect one proposition to another. War creates refugees; yet we have concluded qualitatively that refugees recursively make contributions to the ignition of wars. At some future date, perhaps, it will become clear that some particular causal arrows that link one
prevention of war, we have an obligation to help readers today make sense of such a large complex of data as they jump back and forth between our interim assessment in this chapter and the Appendix, to the motivating assessment of preliminary evidence of major cascades in Part I, to the more detailed narratives of South Asian cascades in each of the chapters in Part II and to our concluding analysis in Chapters 11 and 12. The even bigger obligation will be in 2030 to conclude where the sense-making that follows is wrong.

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

For India (Chapter 5), we relied in part on Wilkinson’s (2004) quantitative analyses of communal riots that did and did not cascade. This analysis concluded that where policing agencies mobilised prevention and deterrence consistently, they steered away from violence with zero or near-zero loss of life. Going further, in his more fine-grained data for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, Klusemann (2012: 475) found that violence only escalated to major massacres when attackers were allowed to achieve ‘emotional dominance’, and this only passed the tipping point to massacre where:
soldiers accompanied attacks and where assaults started with and relied heavily on gun-fire and grenades in a dramatic show of force. Groups without soldiers and rifles did not achieve much in terms of violence. (Klusemann 2012: 475)

Klusemann concluded that killing is emotionally difficult for most people. An implication of this was that, in Rwanda, brave civilian leaders were sometimes able to pacify killing in their village. Therefore, relatively modest numbers of UN peacekeepers may have been able to deter the seemingly unstoppable slaughter of Rwanda at many of its killing sites.

Wilkinson’s (2004) data on communal riots can be read as data on civil wars that never started in the overwhelming majority of cases where security forces did not support the violence of rioters. The research on the civil war that did start in Indian Punjab, at a cost of 25,000 lives—and its cascade to and from the murder of prime minister Indira Gandhi by a Sikh extremist—is interpreted in Chapter 5 as a deterrence effect that ultimately came to overwhelm a considerable defiance effect. It was quelled by a state that offered both sticks of deterrence and carrots of inclusion to separatists and by a civil society that educated the community about the economic and social benefits of peace. Not a complete or perfect inclusion, perhaps, but enough inclusionary carrots to end the conflict. We see the combination of civil society’s silencing of a violent imaginary and an unwavering deterrence over many years by the security sector that was led by police officer Kanwar Pal Gill (K. P. Gill) in Indian Punjab (Jeffrey 2013).

On the other hand, the jihadist conflicts in Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been given an opposite interpretation in our analysis. With the suppression of many South Asian violent jihads, we see considerable state promotion of a jihad imaginary and selective, vacillating deterrence. For example, Chapter 6 identifies wild swings from state support for insurgents in Pakistan to killing and torturing them (and civilians) in heavy-handed military operations; then a swing back to supporting, cajoling and caressing insurgents. This failed to create conditions for deterrence effects that exceed defiance effects.

US drone attacks in Pakistan illustrate the Proposition 1 dilemma of a deterrence that is so episodic and haphazard as to offer little prospect of an outcome other than the promotion of more defiance than deterrence. President Obama surged drone attacks in Pakistan after his first more
cautious year in office, but had completely eliminated them in his final year as counterproductive. Now his successor, Donald Trump, has started them again. Jennifer Carson (2017) has produced the best evaluation to date of high-profile targeted killings in the war on terror. Some targeted killings produce short-term deterrence effects in reducing lethal suicide attacks by the international jihadist movement, some produce a short-term increase in attacks, but most, including the assassination of Osama bin Laden, had no effect. Overall, there is no short-term deterrent effect. Given that lags in some of the defiance effects discussed in this book are much longer than those measured by Carson (2017)—for example, jihadist imaginary effects of US state criminality and increased recruitment to jihadist madrassas turning out active jihadists years later—we should emphasise that part of Carson’s conclusions that suggest this is an unwise policy because most of the targeted killings ‘either had no influence or were associated with a backlash effect’ (p. 191). Carson’s results are consistent with those of Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) on targeted extrajudicial assassinations of Palestinians. Chapter 9 concluded that, up to 2003, or perhaps 2005, deterrence effects on the Taliban exceeded defiance effects, but, after 2005, Taliban defiance clearly exceeded deterrence. This is a nice illustration of the methodological point made in the introduction to this chapter about having many extra degrees of freedom in the qualitative data by being able to see one kind of deterrence effect for one historical period, then a rather opposite deterrence impact for another period.

In Myanmar, the defiance of the Communist Party of Burma decisively collapsed when China withdrew its support for their defiance of the junta. Likewise, in the CHT conflict (Chapter 7), defiance was dampened by the withdrawal of Indian state support for the insurgency and the closing of the refugee camps in India that had sustained the insurgency. With this suppression of defiance, the spectre of Bangladeshi military deterrence became more potent. Bhutan (Chapter 9) also fits an interpretation of Indian hegemony as capable of this kind of pacification dynamic, as does Nepal to a degree. In Nepal and the CHT, we see defiance ascendant followed later by a period in which deterrence is ascendant—the opposite pattern to Afghanistan, where it was deterrence (by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Northern Alliance) that was initially ascendant between 2001 and 2003, while defiance has been ascendant for more than the past decade. Defiance was always going to be ascendant in
Nepal while the parliamentary parties attempted to fight a civil war with the police because they were reluctant to trust the Royal Nepal Army, which was loyal to the king.

In a way, Proposition 1 reveals what we see as the advantages of a discursive process-tracing approach to inference. More so than for most of our propositions, we see a set of times and places where deterrence works and another where it fails. Rather than interpreting a quantitative pattern to conclude that deterrence is therefore a variable of weak explanatory power, we work inductively with the patterns of data to develop a theory of the contexts in which deterrence is powerful and a much wider set of contexts in which it is weak or induces blowback. They are inferences that might be refuted by, for example, more richly detailed empirical analyses of the impact of drone assassinations on specific villages or of exactly how the civil war in Indian Punjab was suppressed.

In sum, Proposition 1 proves to be a proposition grounded in quantitative micro data (Brehm and Brehm 1981; Braithwaite 2018) that is a good fit to qualitative macro patterns of the cascades of violence across South Asia. That said, our grasp of the precise nature of the nonlinear tipping points to mass atrocity in the work of Klusemann (2012: 475), for example, remains limited. Braithwaite (2018) has made a more detailed case for a policy of ‘minimally sufficient deterrence’ and ‘dynamically responsive deterrence’ in response to Proposition 1.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

The jihadist imaginary proved recurrent in its power to cascade violence, as documented in Chapters 5, 6 and 8, as did a Marxist/Maoist/Naxalite imaginary in Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9. Kashmiri identity was understood as a memory file of imaginaries of domination by India or Pakistan, the British Raj, the Dogra Hindu Maharajas who were sold Kashmir by the British in 1846, the Sikh rulers before the Dogras, the Pashtuns (Pathans) before them, the Mughals from 1586 and imaginaries of azadi (freedom) as resistance to domination (Chapter 5). Azadi is also an imaginary chanted beyond Kashmir by Palestinians during the intifada, on the streets of many countries during the Arab Spring, among Persians...
during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in the Green Movement against
the Iranian regime in 2009 and in Kurdish uprisings against regimes of
Persian oppression in Iran and Arab oppression in Iraq and beyond.

The power of the jihadist imaginary is evident in Pakistan's inability to shut
it down. Pakistani intelligence operatives had been effective in turning on
and off the tap of terrorist actions by specific armed groups that gave
meaning to the jihadist imaginary. Yet, they were utterly incapable of
shutting down the violent jihadist imaginary itself. This goes to a general
hypothesis about the challenge of regulating cascades of violence that is
relevant beyond Pakistan: it is easier to shut down the control of territory
by an armed group than it is to shut down the violence that arises from
a violent imaginary it effectively promotes. As difficult as it is to win the
awful battle against Islamic State being fought in Mosul as we write, it will
be much more difficult to shut down Islamic State's virtual entrepreneurs
in Raqqa and the West who connect minds to an imaginary that persuades
lone fighters to stay ‘behind the lines’ and launch creative lone-wolf
attacks against the West (and China, India and Bangladesh, among other
‘enemy states’).

More optimistically, it is easier for hawks to prevail over advocates of
nonviolence and repeatedly take their country into wars. It is harder for
them to shut down a Gandhian nonviolent imaginary. How recurrent
nonviolence imaginaries are is difficult to assess. Chapter 11 concludes it
is a road mostly not taken, but more frequently taken in recent decades
than earlier in the twentieth century. Bacha Khan and Gandhi, we
conclude, have been critical model missionaries of tactics of nonviolent
resistance to oppression. The globalisation of the peace movement owes
a debt to them.

This book documents a great diversity of ways cleavages have opened:
partition, terrorism, invasions (such as of Afghanistan), communal rioting
escalating to civil war (Sri Lanka being a leading instance), violation of
indigenous rights (the CHT), broken promises about regional autonomy
(Balochistan), language rights and more. Rich creativity in the way
violent model mongers have spread their Maoist or jihadist imaginaries
to network across cleavages has been chronicled. Growing creativity is
also evident among model mongers of nonviolence who agitate, scan and
wait for the ripe moment for the surge of the crowd in history. There are
tipping points in such surges, such as that seen in the surge of the crowd
in Egyptian history on the Qasr al-Nil bridge to push aside police on
6 April 2011. That surge turned the tide against president Hosni Mubarak (Kilcullen 2013: 194–6). Our analytic grasp of how such tipping points are passed is still immature.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

Chapter 5 argues that a colonial strategy of aligning ‘martial races’ with British military power recurrently unsettled power balances in many parts of greater India. Chapter 6 finds that the flight of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to the Pashtun belt of Pakistan unsettled longstanding hybrid governance arrangements, allowing mullahs and marginalised young men with guns, in alliance with foreign fighters, to seize power from tribal maliks and from the state. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) is a good case study (Chapter 9) of how a cleavage in Uzbekistan can motivate alliances in these other countries and, more recently, in the alliance of the IMU with Islamic State. In turn, we have seen how Islamic State has forged—or claims to have forged—local alliances across the Muslim world and inside all NATO powers, inside China (Xinjiang) and inside Russia (Chechnya). Nepal (Chapter 9) is a case study in the Kalyvas (2003) tradition. We see in Nepal village-level cleavages—between upper-caste landlords and landless lower castes and indigenous women and men—connecting up to state and interstate cleavages that divided the king, the political parties and India. In Chapter 8, Sri Lanka showed how alliances with one’s enemy against a third enemy can cascade violence in ways that intractably and unexpectedly unsettle power balances. Chapter 7 shows how indigenous peoples in the CHT were able to enrol a cleavage between India and Bangladesh to their autonomy project. It also showed how India was able both to enrol indigenous insurgency and to shut it down, depending on what progressed India’s project of domination of Bangladesh. This pattern of switching on and off alliances across micro and macro cleavages was also evident in the relationship between Indian intelligence and the Nepalese Maoists (Chapter 9), as it was in the enrolment of India across Sri Lanka’s cleavages (summarised under Proposition 3 in the Appendix).

As the Appendix summarises, only seven of our eight country case studies support Proposition 3. There are many cleavages in Bhutan, but none of them so substantially unsettles power imbalances as to cascade widespread armed violence.
Proposition 4: Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

On the one hand, the collapse of Afghanistan into catastrophic cross-cutting violence, which totally destroyed Kabul after the retreat of the Soviets, supports Proposition 4. At the other extreme, so does Bhutan, which was seen in Chapter 9 as largely free of armed conflict because no credible challenge exists to the authority of the national army enforcing a policy that is tightly aligned with that of a regional hegemon, India. Pakistan’s military has more power within the Pakistan polity than Nepal’s army has in Nepal, or the army of any other South Asian state, and few states on the planet have more formidable military power than Pakistan. Yet, that military power has been contested and defeated by a combination of Bangladeshi separatist forces and the Indian military and by jihadists at various places and times, and has been severely contested by Baloch insurgents who have retained control over certain spaces for much of the past 70 years. Our interpretation has been that Proposition 4 gives a good account of why Pakistan has stood out as an ‘extremely violent society’ (Karstedt 2014) during the past decade. It also gives an account of why Sri Lanka preceded Pakistan as the region’s most ‘extremely violent society’ in Karstedt’s data until its frayed monopoly of armed force was re-established during the past 10 years. Sri Lanka no longer has a security sector challenged by the mass desertions it suffered in previous decades. Pakistan disintegrated more than India because it chose too many fights and vacillated with them. Thus, it has become a relatively uncontroversial interpretation to identify the absence of a single legitimate armed force in parts of rural Pakistan as a phenomenon that brought jihadist groups such as the Taliban to power.

In a more complex way, Proposition 4 is also seen in Chapter 9 as explaining how the Maoists in Nepal got into a sufficiently strong position to assume state power for a period. Although India has a profound monopoly of a single legitimate armed force across its vast terrain (Chapter 5), where an enemy such as Pakistan can ally with local cleavages—as it did so potently for a time in Punjab and as it continues to do in Kashmir—terrible brutality can cascade in these locales. Likewise in Myanmar, the formidable military machine of the junta sustained a massively dominant monopoly of armed force across the core of the country, yet suffered many cracks in that monopoly across many
peripheries of the country (Chapter 9), with the widest crack opening where China sustained contestation of the junta’s monopoly of force in Wa State.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Chapter 5 is also particularly revealing on this proposition. It shows that while the security services in India normally mobilise rather effectively to subdue threats from the religious or ethnic other, when that capacity was not yet developed (at Partition), security dilemmas fuelled widespread violence. Moreover, when the political masters of the security services in a particular state have a political interest in inflaming violence, the security services fail to shut down security dilemmas. Security dilemmas did not loom as major explanatory factors in our Pakistani case. Baloch insurgents and Bangladesh Liberation War fighters alike saw themselves as taking to arms to push back domination, not because they saw themselves in a security dilemma. This was also true of most of the Maoist groups across South Asia and of the indigenous insurgents in the CHT. The young Marxist revolutionaries of the Janathā Vimukthi Peramunça (JVP) in Sri Lanka during the 1970s and 1980s, however, did view themselves as being in a security dilemma. Nevertheless, across our conflict contexts, the explanatory power of security dilemmas is not strongly recurrent, at least for South Asia, during the past six decades. We cannot think of any other large region of the planet where there have not been clear cases of international peacekeepers securing a security dilemma (Fortna and Howard 2008), but we find none in South Asia. Macedonia is a prominent example, discussed in Part I, where UN peacekeepers prevented the realisation of well-founded fears that the war in Kosovo would cascade into Macedonia, as it had cascaded from Serbia to Croatia to Bosnia to Kosovo.

We drop Proposition 5 for South Asia in a spirit of caution for the whole Peacebuilding Compared project. In the preliminary coding of 39 armed conflicts up to March 2017, there are only 12 conflicts for which security dilemmas are coded as an important factor in the onset of armed conflict. As in South Asia, so around the globe, security dilemmas are, often enough,

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8 Most of the examples detected in the Peacebuilding Compared data are not so macro and prominent as Macedonia. Because they are much more micro, they are of underestimated importance in the international relations literature (Autesserre 2010).
powerful in explaining patterns of violence. They were tremendously important in massive slaughters such as the onset of World War I and in the Partition of greater India. But, for most contemporary conflicts, they do not seem to count among the most important explanations (so far).

In the next chapter, we argue for a forward-looking ‘cascade mentality’ that asks hard questions about how future escalations of deterrent threats might cascade. An example of an exceptionally hard question for which we should be seeking answers is what will be the cascade effects of drone and robot proliferation in warfare? In particular, what will be the effect on less technologically competitive economies of an era in which millions of dollars, as opposed to billions, may allow sophisticated states such as China, the United States, Japan, Iran and Israel in future to fly, ship and deliver by submarine pods millions of killer robots to invade a country? ‘No blood, little treasure sacrificed’ could be a formula for new cascades of predatory warfare (see Haldi 2003). Would technologically backward countries in the Middle East then see themselves in a security dilemma where they are at risk of Iran’s or Israel’s relentless waves of robots inflicting a low-cost decimation of their conventional defences? Will they then turn to embrace the interpretation of North Korean military strategists who say, as discussed in Chapter 2, that no country with nuclear weapons has ever been invaded? Will they decide that the mistake that landed Libya in its current chaos was to abandon a secret nuclear deterrent trajectory that previously had adversaries in fear of Libya? Will they turn to the interpretation of chaos in post-Saddam Iraq that the 2003 invasion was not caused by his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program but by the fact that Saddam had dismantled it? Astutely or stupidly, could weak states jumping to such a security dilemma imaginary of the risk of new cascades of drone predation withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? How can the nuclear non-proliferation regime be strengthened in response to this risk? How can we prevent its collapse if some states respond to waves of new technologies of domination by renouncing the norm against first use of a nuclear option, as Pakistan has already done?

Dropping Proposition 5 from our list and replacing it with a new Proposition 5(a) in the next chapter does not mean the security dilemma is unimportant to cascades of violence. It is simply to say that, after analysing our data, we can definitely no longer see it as among the top 10 patterns of cascading violence in South Asia.
Proposition 6: Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

Refugee recruitment to, and targeting for, violence is found to be unquestionably significant in the chapters on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Myanmar and even for incipient violence in Bhutan. Wars are found to make great contributions to refugee populations and refugee populations to wars. While there may be other variables that are more structurally foundational to the roots of specific conflicts than this one, none of our propositions is more consistently supported as genuinely important in our data. Nepal is the only South Asian exception to Proposition 6, helping explain both war and criminal violence. When one adds the recent European experience of waves of refugees destabilising regimes even as secure as that of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the stupidity seems clear of wealthy economies declining to support decent housing, education, food, water and health care in many of the first arrival situations from which refugees fled. The insight of Osama bin Laden in providing that support in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s seems equally obvious.

Proposition 7: Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

Proposition 7 has recently been taken to heart globally in a most disturbing way by Islamic State. We saw in Parts I and II how the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda in Iraq and various other jihadist, Maoist and other groups in South Asia came to power locally by targeting anomic spaces where rule of law had totally collapsed and chronic violence dominated daily life. The Taliban and other jihadist groups filled that rule-of-law vacuum with the rule of their Sharia law and dominated the space with a local monopoly of violence. The Taliban did not create the anarchic chaos in Kandahar; Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant did not create the anomie and violence in Iraq and Syria. They sought it out and used it to advantage.
Islamic State has moved that strategy beyond one of selecting sites of anomie and exploiting them. That shift is to actively create anomie through disruptive barbarism. Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006) *The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass* is a key online text on this paradigm shift. The book finds virtue in the Al-Qaeda strategy of provoking cascades of military responses from superpowers to motivate recruitment and indoctrination of martyrs. This is linked to an attrition theory similar to Proposition 10. However, a kindred theorist for Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Suri, was critical of Osama bin Laden for attacks on superpowers that were so high profile as to cause the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, thus depriving the ‘holy war’ of a precious heartland (Rousseau 2015). *The Management of Savagery* argues that within Muslim states the imperative is campaigns of constant violent attacks that disrupt the rule of law, exhaust and disintegrate the local governance of violence and provoke state torture and other state abuses that motivate defiance (Proposition 1). As the writ of the state withers under the chaos, ‘savagery’ ensues: ‘management of savagery is defined very succinctly as the management of savage chaos!!’ (Naji 2006: 11).

Savagery is promoted by the various extremes of violence we see in the implementation of this theory by Islamic State. These excesses of bloodlust and beheadings were opposed by the Al-Qaeda leadership, as was the idea of ‘regions of savagery’ (Wright 2014). Jihadists, according to Islamic State proponents of the theory, have a tried and true blueprint to end the savagery: Sharia law, which moves society from the phase in which savagery is intentionally promoted to the calm waters of the new order of Islamic State.

Senior Iranian analysts we interviewed accused Israel and the United States of responding to the chaos of barbarism generated by Salafists with a strategy of ‘managed chaos’ that further exacerbated the chaos—for example, by leading from behind towards regime change in Libya and Syria. Their account starts with the ‘view from Tel Aviv’ that what is happening in Syria is fine because it has crippled one of Israel’s most hated enemies, Assad. Syria provided Israel opportunities to target Hezbollah, weakened Turkey (particularly in relation to Israel’s only regional ally, the Kurds) and contributed to a chaotic Middle East in Yemen and beyond, where most of Israel’s enemies have been fighting each other. The chaos of recent Middle East history has seen so much proxy warfare between Israel’s adversaries—between Iran and Iraq and between Iran and Saudi Arabia—and the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in
Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Gaddafi in Libya. Other Iranian analysts, including at the High Security Council, contended that there was a long history of US support for managed chaos in the Middle East to weaken its enemies. During the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war, they allege, the United States was joined by some European powers who allowed the export of chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein so they could contribute to managed chaos. Western analysts have also articulated the view that US and Israeli strategy was to prolong the Iran–Iraq war, which was weakening the two regimes that they saw as most threatening to their interests in the Middle East (e.g. Alpher 1989; Pelletiere 1992: 111). A policy of managed chaos was why the United States barely criticised Iraq when it desperately resorted to chemical weapons attacks against Iranian troops heavily embedded in civilian populations during periods when Iraq was losing the war. At the same time, the Iranians allege that the United States leaked strategic intelligence and provided other covert support to Iran at times when it was losing the war. The Iran-Contra scandal was articulated as just the part of this that became public when the United States was revealed to be secretly providing weapons to Iran in breach of the arms embargo it had earlier demanded.

One interview with a senior Iranian government advisor went on to contend that the White House tends to think that when chaos is in the interests of Israel, it is in the interests of the United States. The exchange continued:

Iranian strategist: Some accuse Obama of not acting decisively on Syria because many in his administration were attracted to a managed chaos strategy; because they have a similar interest to their ally Israel in managed chaos.

John Braithwaite interjects: Hmm. I find it hard to believe that Obama would have wanted war to continue in Syria, or indeed chaos to continue and the bloodletting to continue across the Middle East, even if some in his Administration might think that way and have a similar view of it to what you call ‘the view from Tel Aviv’.

Iranian strategist: Perhaps, or perhaps the presence of this view among his advisors made him more indecisive on Syria. It is wrong to speak of just the power of the Israel lobby [over the White House]. Some of them are the decision-makers and not just a lobby [from outside the walls of the White House]. (Interview in Tehran, 2017, No. 041717)
What is beyond argument is that conditions of extreme anomie are created by contests among some players who have a strategy of barbarism to intentionally produce chaos and others who have a strategy of managed chaos to harness that chaos. Israel and the United States are not the only players who can be accused of toying with a strategy of managed chaos. Russia has done so recently in Ukraine (Husaraov 2016). Our interviews make it clear that Iran has done so itself in Yemen, Lebanon and beyond to give the rest of the world the message that this is how Iran can orchestrate chaos if they do not stop treating it as a pariah regime that must be removed. And Pakistan recklessly promoted managed chaos in Afghanistan—for example, through its sponsorship of the Taliban in the 1990s and, earlier, during the Soviet occupation, through other mujahedin groups in collaboration with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Labrov (Whitney 2017) has been the most prominent proponent of the view that the US strategy in the Middle East and Libya has been to organise and manage chaos.9

Returning to barbarism as a strategy of chaos, Hussain’s (2013: 17) work shows that Pakistani Taliban strategy bans music and the arts, murders traditional elders and destroys communication networks and social institutions with the intent ‘to create a social vacuum’ in Pakistan. Likewise, the ‘co-opting of criminal gangs’ is used to drive out social order (Hussain 2013: 17). Normlessness is a cornerstone of a savage contemporary militant strategy that succeeds in cascading violence. Across many of our chapters, we have seen that these anomic conditions enable many forms of violence to flourish that have nothing to do with the war or the jihad—for example, revenge over a property dispute or an insult. This cascades to more anomie and more violence. Normatively, our conclusion is to see extreme disintegration of the normative order as dangerous. This is

9 ‘The concept of managed chaos appeared long ago as a method of strengthening US influence. Its basic premise is that managed chaos projects should be launched away from the United States in regions that are crucial for global economic and financial development. The Middle East has always been in the focus of politicians and foreign policy engineers in Washington. Practice has shown that this concept is dangerous and destructive, in particular for the countries where the experiment was launched, namely Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan … In Iraq, Syria and Libya, this chaos was created intentionally … Responsible politicians have come to see that the managed chaos theory is destroying life in many regions. Some parties can benefit in the short term from fluctuations on the raw materials markets provoked by the revolutions orchestrated by external forces, but this theory ultimately backfires at its engineers and executors in the form of massive migration inflows, which terrorists use to enter these countries. We can see this in Europe. Terrorist attacks have been staged even in the United States. The Atlantic Ocean has not protected it from the terrorist threat. This is the boomerang effect’ (Sergei Labrov, quoted in Whitney 2017).
not the same as saying that there is virtue in maximising social order or societal consensus over norms. This book finds virtue is in nonviolent strategies for challenging the dominating elements of social order, vice in barbarism as a strategy of disorder and vice in managed chaos as a response to barbarism. Our cascades analysis contends that managed chaos is a dangerous policy because the chaos that great powers believe they are clever in managing repeatedly cascades beyond their control to come back to bite them. Even if that were not true, almost 2 million dead in the combination of the Iran–Iraq and Syrian wars is too high a cost, as was the breakdown of the norm against the use of chemical and biological weapons in war for the first time since the early twentieth century.

We conclude that Al-Qaeda was right to see anomie as something that can be exploited to cascade the power of their violence. Islamic State is astute to see anomie as something that can be created to enable a period when their writ spreads. That is a very different claim, however, from suggesting that they will be able to hold those gains in any historical long run. Geopolitically, the globalisation of jihad enabled the re-election of a weak US president who had come to power in 2001 with the feeblest electoral mandate of any president. That president became a militaristic and authoritarian US leader (Proposition 8) who executed a profoundly unsustainable militarism (Proposition 10). Likewise, the jihad in Chechnya put the blossoming of Russian freedom into reverse with the repeated election of Vladimir Putin to realise his promise to be the strongman who restored Russian greatness by military power, starting in Chechnya (Cronin 2009: 131–7) (Proposition 8). The Putin strongman model is spreading authoritarianism regionally to previous leaders of democratisation and rule of law such as Poland and Hungary. The Bush (and now Trump) and Putin eras of militarism weakened both the United States and Russia, strengthening the rising geopolitical ascendency of China—propelling the world more rapidly towards an era in which the Chinese economy could well become more dominant.

Jihadist terror has therefore worked in turning the strength of great powers against themselves and also against each other. On this account, US diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski’s bragging that the United States cleverly managed chaos by leading the Russians into the ‘Afghan trap’ through the 1979 Soviet invasion (Chomsky 2002: 40) can be reread as jihadists leading both Russia and the United States to actions that weakened each other through the blood and treasure they successively poured into Afghanistan. An argument of this book is that the geopolitics of the twentieth century
also opened with this dynamic: 19-year-old Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip of the Black Hand brought the Habsburg Empire down as a consequence of its militarist response to Princip’s assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. Terror has proved powerful in both centuries because of the cascade of unpredictable actions and reactions to the flailing of a wounded giant (Cronin 2009: 200).

One of the messages of this book is that great powers can be smarter than the Habsburgs, the Bushes and the Putins—overreacting less is more in the long game of responding to terror. It also concludes that anomie can be transcended by good community policing in local spaces. That is what we found the police station reconciliation committees are contributing in small but significant ways to peace in parts of Pakistan (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014).

In Myanmar, it has always been clear who is in charge of the core of the state and what are the rules of the game. The master cleavages opened up by the Communist Party of Burma and the National League of Democracy were rebellions against that clearly articulated order that proposed clearly articulated alternative orders. So Myanmar is the only country case that does not provide support to Proposition 7.

**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

A wise observation of Audrey Cronin’s (2009: 204) analysis is that ‘the militarization of counterterrorism strategy can be counterproductive, even if every strategy for countering terrorism requires a military and coercive component’. Cascades of militarisation increase violence in all our country cases, and not only in terms of the direct violence executed by the military. This has never cascaded to war or to a large crime problem in Bhutan, but nor has Bhutan suffered the kind of cascading of militarisation that all our other country cases have experienced, so the Bhutan case actually supports Proposition 8 as well. All the militaries of the region have trained and supported proxy non-state militias to promote violence when the military wishes to turn on that tap. Pakistan is the state that has been most destructive of regional peace through a military intelligence wing that has sponsored terrorism in other countries and even on its own soil. Other South Asian states have followed suit—sometimes in retaliation for Pakistan’s sponsorship of terror in their territory. It is fair
to say that terrorism has globalised as a threat more from South Asia than from the Middle East. The Black Tigers of Sri Lanka have a special place in this global modelling as leading innovators with technologies such as the suicide bombing of ships, security forces and civilians and sophisticated planning of elite assassinations.

With the possible exception of Bhutan, all South Asian militaries have ‘disappeared’ and tortured large numbers of civilians. In every country in South Asia, one of the responses to conflict in society has been militarisation of the police. This has been extreme in Afghanistan and has enabled the police to count among the most efficient, well-armed thieves of the property of civilians in that country. The most extreme case of the militarisation of the police was Nepal, where the police had full responsibility for the conduct of the civil war against the Maoists during most years of that war. The kind of domination that most distinguished police militarisation in Nepal was not theft, as in Afghanistan, but rape, which in turn drove the feminisation of Maoism. ‘Blood promotions’ for police in Kashmir who killed jihadists created an incentive for ‘fake encounters’ in which police claimed to have killed a terrorist when in fact they had opted for the safer path to promotion: killing an innocent. This ‘body count as key performance indicator’ mentality was one reason the US war in Vietnam cascaded to such a bloody defeat. Land grabbing by militaries and police has been an important element of the militarisation of South Asian economies and societies. So has the phenomenon of militaries using their domination of a space to establish commercial monopolies run by them or by businesses owned by individual officers or their families. The militarisation of South Asian economies has contributed to growing police militarisation and competition between the military and police for control. In Kashmir, in Naxal areas in India and in the CHT, we see the police behaving more like the army and the paramilitia and village defence forces behaving more like police. In this way, militarisation cascades down within the security sector.

A particularly disturbing form of domination driven by militarisation in Kashmir was to transform democracy from an accountability mechanism in the hands of the people to a militarised tool of tyranny—domination by democracy. We demonstrated in Chapter 5 that domination by the rule of law was part of that. Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006) *The Management of Savagery* is one influential jihad strategy document that, as discussed under Proposition 7, picked up on the opportunity created for jihadist domination by a cruel and corrupted rule of law. Democratic contrivance
has been a form of domination that has cascaded Kashmir’s insurgency. The Kashmir election of 1987 ushered in the largest surge of armed violence among the many dozens of such surges in the history of the conflict because the election was rigged and because it followed a history of resentment of recurrent electoral fraud.

At the more micro level of inference, no fieldwork story could be a more salutary symbol of domination by democracy than that of the abduction and threatened military gang rape of the wife of the village headman, a sentence suspended for her on condition of her husband persuading the village to abandon their boycott of an election and turning out to vote to advance an optics of citizen participation in democracy for their district. The tragedy of Kashmir’s cascades of violence has been propelled by a variety of democratic pretences, by rights ritualism (Charlesworth 2012) and by pretences of rule of law, village democracy, state democracy, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly that in reality have been regulated by live rounds aimed at the heads of young protestors. India started its career as a young democracy under Jawaharlal Nehru with a radically less militarised state than Pakistan (and Bangladesh). The militarisation of democracy in Kashmir has done much to narrow that gap. This is why a sustainable peace in Kashmir is the most profound step that could be taken to reverse the militarisation of politics in both India and Pakistan. That peace demands not only a softening of the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, but also a softening demilitarisation on both sides. It is also Kashmir that cascaded nuclearisation of South Asia from India to Pakistan and the ‘intelisation’ of South Asia that cascaded from Pakistan to India and beyond. Nuclear disarmament is the most difficult part of the demilitarisation challenge in South Asia.

Nepal is a worrying case in the way it has seen the militarisation of party politics in the form of militant youth wings that threaten electors, candidates and political activists with violence. Across South Asia as a whole, we see the militarisation of youth (Luitel et al. 2010: 196) as leading a militarisation of not just politics, but also society. Chapter 6 identifies this dynamic in a different form in Pakistan, where major political parties enrol criminal gangs or the Taliban to help them win elections by threatening or killing credible political adversaries. Chapter 7 tells similar narratives for Bangladesh. In summary, this book has traced, right across South Asia, local causal processes whereby cascades of militarisation have led to cascades of violence, which have led to further militarisation and to hawkish politics.
This is the heart of the empirical conclusion of this book: that cascades of domination and cascades of violence are intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement, leaving democracy more an appearance than a meaningful guarantee. The appearance of democracy can be fine for people in the peacebuilding business who are model misers or model modernisers in the terms of Chapter 3. Chapter 12 argues, however, that model misers with templates can be useful, but more often are dangerous, and that model misers who are content with the appearance of democracy are particularly dangerous when they legitimate democracy as domination. We will return repeatedly to the importance of the empirical conclusion that cascades of domination and cascades of violence are intertwined in mutually reinforcing cycles. It goes to the limitations of static analyses of national income inequality, for example, as a correlate of civil war. Our dynamic case study analyses of local–national–international cleavages show that income inequality, especially between the landless and the land-rich, is important alongside other forms of domination—such as racial, caste or religious discrimination and discrimination against indigenous minorities—that are intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement between cascades of domination and cascades of violence. It is important to be able to see the imbrication of one in the other—for example, by seeing cascades of rape in Nepal, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka as both cascades of domination and cascades of violence.

On the basis of our fieldwork notes, we also see cascades of rape as cascades of humiliation that are perceived as dominating the dignity of a people. Because this is a local–national–international recursivity of domination and violence, it is not too surprising that, at the local level in Nepal, static analyses of the association between inequality and killing show a much more powerful impact of inequality than we see in most cross-national studies. Cross-national studies are simply too aggregated to catch the right kind of glimpse of the recursive power of domination and humiliation as a cause of war. At another level, methodological nationalism is not aggregated enough because our analysis identifies the key driver of Taliban or Islamic State fighters in Pakistan or Afghanistan to be a local sense of injustice for a child born in a refugee camp that local mullahs imaginatively connect to a global sense of injustice and a transcendent quest for God’s justice. In Chapter 11, we argue that a traditional jirga or a local reconciliation committee with a restorative character may be needed to remedy such a child’s sense of injustice, to restore their humiliated dignity—not to mention a path that gives them an alternative to seeking
the protection of the Taliban or Islamic State when petty local tyrants dominate them. And, in a way, that is exactly how jihadists have recruited refugees—with generous offerings of dignity to the bereft (see Box 9.2, Chapter 9). Local jirgas are best able to contribute to peace when they can call on the resources of a social developmental state that can supply high-quality educational opportunities to that child, welfare support for orphans and vocational training and job placement services that will keep the child out of poverty and within the embrace of remunerative work and dignified employment. The blunt force of a halving of poverty or income inequality on its own, in contrast, might do little to reduce Taliban and Islamic State recruitment.

Bangladesh is a salutary case for scholars of war and peace. One might expect it to be a peaceful place because its democracy is vigorously contested by parties that have been led by women for several decades. For some decades, it has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. It is a large society of 160 million people that has more ethnic and religious homogeneity than any society can claim, and a vibrant sense of national identity. Yet the remarkable thing is that it is a militarised society where politics is transacted through violence, where rape is widespread and in which a major civil war can be fought in a 98 per cent Bengali society between some of the non-Bengali indigenous minorities and the dominant group. Few societies better illustrate the folly of seeing elections and nation-building for national homogeneity as the foundations of peace.

Chapter 7 is a particularly variegated instantiation of how domination dynamics that cascade down to the CHT take many forms: cascades of exclusion, militarism, cronyism, corruption and money politics, cascades of mob violence, of land grabs in an overpopulated, flooded country, cascades of class politics and cascades of oppressive taxation—among other domination dynamics that flow down to the CHT. Domination through taxation is a good example of the fine-grained work of this chapter. Domination through taxation that promotes violence follows in a line from the oppressive taxation of the Mughals, the even more oppressive taxation policies of the British Raj and its successor states of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the multiple oppressions of multiple taxations by not only competing Chakma-dominated insurgent groups, but also foreign insurgents such as Rohingyas from Myanmar. We must remember that the imposition of roadside taxes by a multitude of armed groups in Kandahar was the principal proximate cause of the rise of the
CASCADeS OF VIOLeNCe

Taliban to power. A missing abstraction in many analyses of the onset of civil war is to fail to see cascades of taxation as cascades of domination that motivate both violent and nonviolent resistance.

These various cascades of domination are met from below in the CHT by brave surges of liberation from many sites such as universities, surges of resistance to domination, self-help and self-education, nonviolence, human rights activism and surges of empowerment and participatory village and non-governmental organisation (NGO) politics. So, we can conceive the nest of conflicts in the CHT in terms of contests between cascades of violence and surges of liberation from the bottom up. This is a good way of summarising our findings for Myanmar as well, and, indeed, in summarising our story across South Asia (Appendix).

Proposition 9: Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

It is not only violent crime that cascades to war. Under Proposition 8, we saw that no crime was more decisive in causing the 1990 take-off of the Kashmir conflict than electoral fraud: the stealing of elections. But disappearances, torture and the conclusion that democratic protest would be crushed violently were also vital to that escalation. Indeed, the 1990 take-off of the strongest escalation of insurgency was triggered by the killing of demonstrators in a May 1990 protest (Chapter 5). This is a recurrent pattern in our data: while deeper structural variables such as domination through democracy are root causes, the triggering incidents were often initially isolated acts of violence in a single place on a single day. It is also important to note that acts of violence on a single day were also important in triggering massive people-power uprisings, with Kashmir examples being the Shopian rape and murder of two women by the police that triggered the 2009 surge of nonviolent protests on the streets of Srinagar (and, indeed, New Delhi) and the 2010 surge of nonviolence after a 16-year-old boy was killed by a teargas shell.

In all of our South Asian country cases, except Bhutan, crime-to-war sparking of cascades is present and important. Chapter 5 argues that in many states where Naxalites rose to power in rural areas, they did so by protecting people from criminal predation by police, landlords and businesses, and from corporate crimes such as illegal logging. This was
also true of Nepal’s Maoists and of the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan (Chapters 6 and 9). Chapter 8 argued that improved democratic policing on the streets of Colombo might have prevented the slaughter of Tamils in racist riots that so shaped the imagination of young Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his lieutenants. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been one of the greatest accomplices of cascades of crime to war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have documented in Chapters 4, 6 and 9 how false targeting information has been provided to the United States (for example, by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) to secure drone attacks and night raids to eliminate political opponents or square vendettas and to eliminate or imprison in Guantanamo Bay Taliban leaders who were peacemakers.

In every one of our South Asian country cases, except Bhutan, war has also cascaded to a great deal of violent crime, including insurgents morphing into criminal gangs, transnational crime and domestic violence. In almost every conflict, war cascaded to large numbers of rapes, an exception being the military conquests of the Taliban in the 1990s, which may have reduced rape. In the process, domestic assault, rape and violence became much less shameful in societies recovering from war. This accounts for the longer-run empirical consequence of wars promoting high violent crime rates among combatant countries (Archer and Gartner 1984) and indeed for their near neighbours in subsequent decades (Ghobarah et al. 2003). No case is more dramatic than the militarisation of rape in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation cascading to the militarisation of rape in the CHT, where over 90 per cent of rapes have been committed by the military (Mohsin 2003: 54). This dimension of militarisation has constituted rape against the ethnic other as something that is less than shameful. Protracted cascades of warfare leave the legacy of a revenge culture in which crime rates increase because a right to revenge abrogates the moral bind of the criminal law.

In Pakistan, the ability of criminals to escape to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) beyond the reach of the law has helped preserve and nurture countless criminal careers and criminal organisations in a trajectory that has left Pakistan such a high crime society. Firefights with the enemy are used by insurgents in the CHT and beyond as an opportunity to assassinate factional opponents in ‘crossfire’. An assassination like that of India’s prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by a Black Tiger was both a crime caused by war and a crime that escalated war.
Part II demonstrates, across the region, many ways in which the criminalisation of society, enabled by a war, in turn enables the criminalisation of the postwar state. Sri Lanka under Mahinda Rajapaksa was a leading example for most of this century (Chapter 8), as was the Karzai era in Afghanistan (Chapter 9), the junta era in Myanmar (Chapter 9)\(^\text{10}\) and many other examples in our text. As in so many African cases, war cascades to crony capitalism in which a ruling family or families loot the society, often in collaboration with Western or Chinese mining corporations. In Myanmar, Woods (2011) has dubbed this ‘ceasefire capitalism’. War contributes to the macro political economy of a very real contest of world order between authoritarian and liberal capitalism.

In that contest India is the great swing state, which, if it joins China, Russia and a legion of post-conflict societies such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Philippines and beyond in the authoritarian capitalist camp, risks a global transformation in which authoritarian capitalism becomes the more dominant model globally. One reason we are in an era when authoritarian capitalist societies are growing faster than liberal capitalist economies is that leading firms in liberal capitalist states create a niche for authoritarian capitalism because they like to do business with a regime that will guarantee them no trouble from unions, environmental regulators, investigative journalists and other democratic nuisances. Already the era is past when a state (such as Thailand) that shifts to the authoritarian capitalist camp in a military coup has a great deal to worry about in aid and trade retaliation from the West. This is because authoritarian capitalist societies such as China and Russia now relish the geopolitical opportunity to fill such vacuums. One might go so far as to say that Russian and Chinese state power rewards the criminalisation of states as surely as does Western corporate power.

Hence we conclude that one of the dangers from not resolving peace with justice in Kashmir and beyond is that the long, gradual trajectory of the Indian state towards criminalisation since the nobler time of Nehru might ultimately see India abandon liberal capitalism in favour of the kind of authoritarian capitalist medicine Vladimir Putin promised Russia to cure ‘weakness’ in Chechnya. Liberal capitalism has afflicted

\(^\text{10}\) The successors to Rajapaksa, Karzai and the Myanmar junta, moreover, so far have made little progress in reversing this entrenched criminalisation of the state. There is a path dependency about criminalised states.
widening inequality and great domination around the world in the past three decades (Piketty 2014); domination by progressive globalisation of authoritarian capitalism would be decidedly worse.

Chapter 8 included a helpful interim summary of the multifarious ways in which Proposition 9 has proved correct across South Asia. Chapter 5 is also important in the way it concluded with 26 diverse types of Indian cascades, mostly of the war-to-war variety, but including crime-to-war examples. For most of South Asia’s armed conflicts, war kills fewer people than crime. In considering the sequence of violent crimes that help motivate wars, crimes against civilians during the war and postwar violent crime caused by the war, battle deaths are quite a small problem compared with crimes against civilians that are causally connected to the war. Chapter 8 argues that, given the profoundly recurrent nature of crime as a cause of war and war as a cause of crime, our cascades analysis is not an explanation of war but the beginnings of a theory of crime–war as inextricably imbricated forms of violence. Crime prevention is war prevention and war prevention is crime prevention. All our cases show how both crime and war create flows of small arms that feed back into the facilitation of more of both forms of violence (Duffield 2001: 132). Moreover, war cannot be understood only through an international lens because it mainly happens within nations rather than between them and, during the period since World War II, rarely afflicts whole nations. Rather, war behaves like crime in a variety of important ways we have specified, spreading from hotspot to hotspot, and leaving most of a societal space pacified and relatively free of violence.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

We have seen that while the West interpreted the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 as a triumph of Western geopolitics, jihadists saw it as a jihadist victory that they could replicate against other great powers such as India (in Kashmir), China (in Xinjiang), the United States (ultimately, in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan again) and Russia (again, in Chechnya) and its satellites (particularly in the ‘stans’). They focused
on the term the CIA itself often used post-Vietnam to describe cascades: ‘blowback’. We have seen how Abu Bakr Naji valorised the Al-Qaeda strategy of provoking a cascade of military responses from superpowers to motivate martyrs. Naji (2006: 7) quotes American author Paul Kennedy: ‘If America expands the use of its military power and strategically extends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.’

We have argued that because US strategic thinking overweights deterrence and underestimates defiance, it has been all too willing to walk into this trap set by jihadist strategists. American unwillingness to consider reconciliation with the Taliban in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (and with Ba’athists in Iraq) was a classic example of this error. We have also seen that the Indian military in Kashmir, and its 1980s adventure into Sri Lanka, likewise overvalued deterrence and underestimated defiance. The Pakistan military has even more perversely overweighted its deterrent capabilities in Kashmir and Bangladesh and its capacity to switch off militant jihad as readily as it switched it on. Obversely, the LTTE in Sri Lanka so overestimated its military prowess that it deluded itself into believing it could repeatedly prevail in conventional battles. Until General Sarath Fonseka took over, the Sri Lankan military underestimated the deterrent capabilities the Pentagon long believed Sri Lanka had.

Overall, the results summarised in the Appendix for Proposition 10 are more mixed than for our other propositions. There is strong support for Proposition 10 in India, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, and also significant support in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar are coded in Table A as failing to support it. The generalisation from this seems to be that where great powers do not commit their boots on the ground, Proposition 10 does not apply or applies only weakly.

It is obviously difficult to accurately judge how steep the deterrence and defiance curves are in Figure 3.1. Indian Punjab (Chapter 5) and Sri Lanka (both the Tamil Tigers and the JVP) (Chapter 8) were cases where state deterrence stayed the course until deterrence effects exceeded defiance effects, decisively ending insurgencies. We simply note the patience of hawks who spent most of their lives at the margin of public life. History’s patient hawks often seize centre stage by promoting an exaggerated potency of military deterrence as a simple solution to a nation’s problems in the ripe moment. Proposition 10 is about the way states gradually come to realise the complex morass their hawks can draw them into. As the costs of blowback pile up, states pull out, usually leaving a bigger mess than existed when they arrived—and a tangle of cascading violence.
In the aftermath of an event like the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks on America or the assassination of the successor to the throne of the Habsburg Empire, hawks do not have as much analytic work to do. They are model mongers who have their hammer ready to hit its nail. Doves, in contrast, need more time for analysis to grapple with the complexity of what a military response might cascade to and what might be the other tools that could provide a more suitable response to the crisis. One of the great things about the architecture of the UN Security Council is that it slows the pace of escalation to war that so overtook diplomacy in World War I (see Chapter 2). Security Council deliberation can prevent a conflict from spinning out of control during that window when the hawks seem to have a monopoly on the only response possible, giving doves time for research and development of alternative strategies to war. Rapid assembly of local regional experts is needed initially to create lists of problems war might cascade to—lists of preventive diplomacy options to put on the table—and then to start research on the highest priority items on these lists.

Nepal is a most instructive case where Proposition 10 seemed to have no explanatory relevance. This was because people-power diplomacy and Indian diplomacy, among other diplomacies, did creative work in crafting alternative peaceful constitutional paths that led all stakeholders (except the king) to believe they would be better off. While it is true that neither the Maoists nor the Royal Nepalese Army joined a ceasefire as a result of their balancing of deterrent and defiance considerations, the king abdicated because all powerbrokers turned on him: his military and police, India, the United States, the entire diplomatic community, the Maoists, the democratic parties and the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace. In that sense, many of the power dynamics of Proposition 10 are confirmed because the king’s power could never have held out in defiance of the military and the nonviolent power of all these social forces. Still it must be understood that it was diplomatic power backed by the enormous clout this alliance could muster that caused the king to abdicate. It did not happen at the point of a gun. Hegemonic nonviolence that unfolded on the streets did the most decisive work, according to Chapter 9. Chapter 11 argues that strategic nonviolence can usually find a path out of the deterrence trap.11

11 The deterrence trap was a term used by John C. Coffee (1981) to describe the dilemma with corporate crime enforcement of being unable to impose a fine sufficiently large to deter, yet which would not be so high as to cause the bankruptcy of the corporation, costing innocent employees their jobs.
Revising the propositions

The starting propositions were neither plucked from thin air nor derived from a particular theoretical tract in the literature. Rather they were shaped by:

1. preliminary reading of our data during the latter stages of data collection and analysis for South Asia during 2014
2. reflection on interpretations that enjoy empirical support in the prior theoretical and inductive literatures on conflict in South Asia
3. reflection on the early stages of our data collection beyond South Asia, glimpses of which are provided in Part I from our fieldwork notes from the Great Lakes region of Africa, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Washington, New York, Beijing and beyond.

This means it makes no sense to conceive the research process as reaching interim closure of our South Asian data collection during 2017. There is no completion of the process of sifting through these data that leads to confirmation or refutation of any of these hypotheses. What our provisional results lead to is some revision of them as starting propositions. They still remain provisional and revisable, with more interviews and future developments in the history of these cases remaining a part of the Peacebuilding Compared project. At this stage, two revisions seem responsive to the more comprehensive analysis of the South Asian data possible in the course of 2014–17. First, with some hesitation, Proposition 5 is dropped:

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Security dilemmas were important as an explanation of violence during Partition and have been far from absent since. But they are nowhere near as recurrently present as domination by democracy as a cause of violence, which is the theme of our replacement Proposition 5(a). We saw in Chapter 5 that this was a major theme in our Kashmir data. The conclusion of Chapter 5 was that electoral democracy cascades peace and crime control when complemented by robust separations of powers. Electoral democracy without separations of powers cascades civil wars, coups and criminality. In Pakistan, we discussed the importance of political parties hiring gangs of criminal thugs to terrorise their opponents (Chapter 6). Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all manifest a combination of these two ways that democracy cascades violence, although in these countries this may not loom as such a large driver of violence as in India and Pakistan. Post-
conflict Nepal is characterised in Chapter 9 by a ‘militarisation of youth’ through militant youth wings of political parties that intimidate electoral opponents. So Nepal also strongly supports our replacement proposition. the Appendix finds Bhutan to be the only country case that does not support our replacement proposition and Myanmar a case that is too early to call:

Proposition 5(a): Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

For the 39 armed conflicts preliminarily coded for Peacebuilding Compared, 23 find a ‘Proposition 5(a) domination by democracy’ dynamic to be an important factor in the onset of armed conflict, while only 12 so far have coded a ‘Proposition 5 security dilemma dynamic’ as important. We must, however, remember that these are all post–Cold War conflicts. In earlier periods of history, when pretences of democracy were less widespread, the reverse may well have been true. This is made possible by the data reported in the World Development Report (World Bank 2017: 24) showing that, since 1985, the world has seen both a doubling of the number of countries that are electoral democracies and a decline of more than one-third in its measure of the integrity of elections worldwide. Average voter turnout worldwide has also declined by more than 15 per cent in the past 70 years (World Bank 2017: 228).

The second revision goes to the importance of the humiliation of a people and how this can motivate recourse either to armed struggle or to nonviolent struggle to redeem the dignity of that people. In Chapter 5, we saw that Kashmiris saw themselves as afflicted with gulami (slavery) and this required struggle for the dignity of azadi (freedom)—not just in the shallow liberal sense of having more choice, but in the deeper republican sense of seizing the dignity of shaking off chains of slavery, as in the republican political theory of Pettit (1997). We found azadi to motivate both violent resistance and nonviolent people-power surges on the streets of Srinagar.12 In fact, both the domination through democracy revision of Proposition 5(a) and this revision to Proposition 8 have implications for cascades of nonviolence (see Chapter 11) as well as for cascades of violence:

12 Activists saw the 2008–10 street uprisings of hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris as a political foundation because ‘Kashmiris took back their dignity’ and could no longer be ruled by fear of violence (Kashmir civil society interview, 2012, No. 101209).
**Proposition 8(a):** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation, domination and humiliation. Militarisation, domination and humiliation recursively risk further cascades of violence.

In Chapter 6, we interpreted the humiliation of the Pakistan army under its defeat in the Bangladesh War of Liberation as motivating ruthless militarisation of the conflict in Balochistan through a strategy of total civil war in the 1970s that included napalming Baloch civilians. Wars in Kashmir subsequent to that 1971 defeat can also be interpreted as attempts to reassert the dignity of the Pakistani military. A. Q. Khan’s imaginary and program to arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons was likewise a prideful antidote to the humiliation of Indian military domination. We can interpret the ruthlessly criminal annihilation of fleeing Tamil civilians and Tamil fighters alike in 2009 as a response to the repeated humbling of the Sri Lankan military in previous decades by LTTE fighters. The rape of Nepalese Maoist women in Rolpa by the security forces was a domination and a humiliation that motivated women to seize their dignity by feminising the Maoist struggle in a contribution that was critical to giving Maoist forces the upper hand. Indigenous children in the CHT have grown up seeing their mothers and/or fathers being humiliated at military check posts. The pattern of humiliation has been callous and an expression of prejudice and racism towards the ‘backward tribes’ or a deliberate method of domination. Decades of such humiliation from the state and its security forces have backfired and contributed to growing resentment among indigenous youth. The way the Bush administration and the Northern Alliance sought to humiliate Taliban leaders who wished to reconcile with the Karzai regime in 2001, 2002 and 2003 contributed to the passion of the resurgence of Taliban military power thereafter. Moreover, the administrations of both Bush presidents in 1991 and 2003 sought to break the power of Saddam Hussein in Iraq by so humiliating him that his own people would rise up to crush him and spurn his legacy. The defiance of Saddam in response to this, according to his own speeches, was about redeeming Arab dignity from the humiliations of Western domination and exploitation since the crushing of the Ottoman Empire. While they were political opponents of Saddam, the Salafist jihadists and

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13 The level of vaunting pride was evident when, in 2013, John Braithwaite visited the home of a sardar in Quetta at a time when a political gathering of A. Q. Khan’s political party, preparing for the forthcoming election, was being held there. As he sat in the meeting, he looked through the interesting array of election materials and posters—all of which had the logo of a nuclear warhead prominently displayed to connote Pakistani national pride!
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards alike are motivated by Islamist oratory and propaganda tracts that bristle with humiliation over domination by the triumphant Western powers of World War I, who parcelled out their old caliphate to colonial humiliation.
Cascades of resistance to violence and domination

Chapter 10 summarised ways that peacemakers can avert cascades of violence. This chapter moves beyond that to consider how peacemakers can promote cascades of nonviolence. Such promotion of nonviolence can go with the grain of what happens naturally because, like violence, nonviolence is contagious transnationally. Braithwaite et al. (2015) found that, for nonviolent civil resistance campaigns against autocratic regimes, the mounting of campaigns in foreign countries increased the likelihood of campaigns at home, especially for countries without a tradition of civil resistance.

In the next two sections of this chapter, we consider, in turn, the two revisions made to the propositions in Chapter 10: humiliation as a factor in cascades of domination and violence and democracy as a cause of domination. What are their implications for how leaders from below and institutions from above should build peace? The chapter concludes with a consideration of the implications of the revised 10 propositions for the contest between cascades of nonviolence and cascades of violence and domination. This analysis starts with a consideration of the more bottom-up dynamics of the idea of cascades of nonviolence or peaceful ‘regime-change cascades’ (Hale 2013). Here, key actors are civil society model mongers for peace with justice, although top-down institutions such as those of the United Nations are also important.
Our conclusion is that leaders might be more conservative in launching unintended cascades of violence and more assertive in promoting cascades of nonviolence. We argue that peace deals and peacekeeping work best when transitions are long and are crafted to prevent dominations of democracy. Normally, peacebuilders do best to defer elections and prioritise building a separation of powers. Peacebuilding must be an accomplishment of networked governance if it is to institutionalise the prevention of domination (Braithwaite et al. 2012).

We observe that there is a need for a UN transition strategy from a credible over-the-horizon guarantee to domestic security sector reform that enables a state to shut down even the most powerful mafias and any future warlords with the ambition of igniting a civil war. As discussed in Chapter 3, Toft’s (2010) data suggest that such security sector reform is imperative for sustainable peace. Carrots for warlords to join a peace tend to be gamed if they are not balanced with sticks when they break out from the peace deal militarily.1 In Barbara Walter’s (1999, 2002) empirical analyses, peace endures when third parties provide credible commitments to enforce settlement terms. Without credible commitments, combatants game the peace to gain through deception what they could not command through battle. Toft’s (2010) conclusion about the combined importance of credibly delivering both carrots and sticks is supported by Regan’s (1996: Table 6) finding that third-party interventions are five times more likely to succeed when they involve a mix of military and economic strategies than when they rely on economic or military strategies alone. This was true in Regan’s data for both ideological and ethnic/religious conflicts. These empirical conclusions about regulating war are consistent with the criminological evidence on regulating organisational crime. Single deterrents tend to be ineffective on their own; what is effective for controlling organisational crime is a plural regulatory mix of sticks and carrots, of sanctions and supports that rehabilitate and transform organisations multi-systemically (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 312; J. Braithwaite 2016a; Schell-Busey et al. 2016).

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1 This can be conceived as a theoretical development in Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) theory of ‘motivational postures’ in response to authorities. The postures are commitment, capitulation, disengagement, resistance and game-playing. According to the theoretical development advanced inductively here from the behaviour of warlords, game-playing is the motivational posture that cannot be regulated by carrots alone (without sticks).
UN peacemaking that precedes peacebuilding must offer carrots for rejecting military/political domination; however, the United Nations must also offer international commitment to enforcing the peace agreement by putting UN troops in harm’s way when necessary. Even before that architecture of commitment is put in place, conflict prevention must be more sensitive to averting humiliation. The first section of our conclusion advocates restoration through a human dignity framework as critical to peacebuilding.

Implications of proposition revision: 
Humiliation

There is a considerable literature on the importance of humiliation in fuelling conflict. The work of Evelin Lindner (2006) and her Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network is one example. The imperative to avert humiliation in diplomacy has long been well understood by experienced diplomats. The first law of the Concert of Europe, which secured a century of major-power peace, was, after all: ‘Thou shalt not challenge or seek to humiliate another great power’ (Richardson 1994: 104). Diplomatic custom and convention are memory files of what diplomats have learned across the centuries about how to avert needless humiliation of an adversary, down even to the point of knowing who should sit where. Common courtesy is important but easy to neglect at times of war when events stir the contempt of adversaries. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev (and indeed Margaret Thatcher) were models of that courtesy and mutual respect when they negotiated the end of the Cold War.

One of the most cited events of successful diplomacy that every international relations (IR) student has to learn about is the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which John and Robert Kennedy (Kennedy 1969: 62) and Nikita Khrushchev (1970: 493) saved the world from catastrophe by being attentive to a settlement that would allow the other to save face (Allison 1971; Braithwaite 2002: 188–9; Ting-Toomey and Cole 1990). In the midst of that crisis, however, the leadership of the US navy was less than attentive to the need to avert humiliation. Its submarines played aggressive cat and mouse with the Soviet navy, forcing its submarines to surface. It did this because it wanted to prove its superiority to promote lagging support for a campaign on Capitol Hill to fund its ‘Hunter-Killer’ anti-submarine program (Allison 1971).
Beyond the diplomats, there remain three levels to the humiliation-aversion challenge. First, the political leaders who sit above diplomats often survive by populist politics in which humiliation plays well. Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election campaign is just a more colourful version of an old kind of populism. George W. Bush could behave quite differently from the way presidents Reagan and Kennedy did by describing several states and their leaders as an ‘evil empire’. George W. also managed to compete with his father, George H. Bush, in coming up with new insults of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, though in that he hardly surpassed the Kuwaiti leadership who, in the period before Saddam invaded their country, were clever enough to suggest publicly that Saddam had been born out of wedlock. In response, Saddam’s appeals to other Arab states to resist the US invoked humiliation: ‘Rebel against all attempts to humiliate Mecca’ (Braithwaite 1991b: 54). Second—as with the US navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis—admirals, generals and even police constables in UN peace operations often spark conflict by lesser sensitivity than diplomats to humiliation aversion. Third, diplomats unintentionally insult potential enemies because of imperfect local knowledge. Diplomats had no idea that establishing US military bases near the Muslim holy lands of Saudi Arabia in 1991 would be interpreted as such a humiliation that it would...
motivate Osama bin Laden to declare a holy war against the United States: ‘Our Islamic nation has been tasting … more than 80 years of humiliation and disgrace’ (Osama bin Laden, quoted in Keen 2012: 210). A general failing of diplomacy in the era of local wars at hotspots remote from capitals is that diplomats ply their craft in the politics of the capital (Autesserre 2010, 2014). They still practise a war-prevention diplomacy of the grand era of gunboat diplomacy, failing to work hard enough at understanding ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007) and village wars, or at understanding what would humiliate local chiefs, local religious leaders, local warlords and local women’s peacemaking groups.

There are two general lessons from all of this. One is a paradigm shift in diplomacy from a craft of the capitals to a craft of engagement with local hotspots of conflagration as well. The second lesson is that diplomacy is a craft that should be taught not just to professional diplomats, but also to neophyte politicians as part of their induction to parliaments, by the United Nations in its democracy promotion work (such as the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Development Programme), to military in the military academy, police in the police academy and to ground-level peacebuilding staff in mission training. In Western societies, all these categories of people need to receive certain simple messages of cultural sensitivity and recognise how national contexts of social hierarchies are critical to successful diplomacy—for example, the recognition that public image and deferring to a leader are more delicate issues in Asian societies than their own or that younger Western leaders need to behave especially courteously to older Asian officials. Australian prime minister Paul Keating would address Indonesian president Suharto as ‘bapa’ (‘father’), as Suharto himself had done to his predecessor, Sukarno. All categories of peacebuilding actors must learn that traditional chiefs in indigenous communities should be treated with respect and deference; that in some societies religious leaders can be more revered than political leaders; or that in some societies it can be rude to ask direct questions, so more indirect styles of communication must be cultivated. These examples are not overwhelmingly important in themselves, but discussing them cultivates a sensibility to the local and to the contextual character of humiliation and dignity.

Peace journalism training is also important. Even the highest-quality media organisations sell their product at times with reckless humiliation of enemy commanders. A widely syndicated Washington Post story in July 2017 on Islamic State’s failure to realise the extraordinary amount
of cobalt-60 they had available to them in a Mosul university laboratory was an important story to write (Warrick 2017: 11). Yet its tone did not need to be so humiliating towards Islamic State—crowing, gloating in embrace with relieved US and Iraqi officials over the stupidity of Islamic State in failing to achieve their objective of making a dirty bomb with precisely such ingredients. One official is quoted as saying: ‘They are not that smart.’ Thank you, Washington Post. That taunting will help energise Islamic State to prove they are smart enough to make that dirty bomb.

Democracy as a cause of domination

This section considers the implications of the new Proposition 5(a):

**Proposition 5(a):** Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

In many ways, what we have discovered in modern South Asia, and provisionally in the coding of 23 of the 39 Peacebuilding Compared cases globally, is Roland Paris’s (2004) conclusion on the limits of a liberal peace and on the virtues of institutionalisation before liberalism, before democracy and before markets. This is also Mansfield and Snyder’s (2007) empirical conclusion—that when domestic institutions are weak, the process of democratisation promotes war—and Collier’s (2009) conclusion about the impact of democracy on violence in *Wars, Guns, and Votes*. They argue that checks and balances in institutions—such as the rule of law—are what help democracies prevent civil war (see also Hegre and Nygård 2015). However, ‘it has proved much easier to introduce elections than checks and balances’ (Collier 2009: 44). Moreover, ‘taken together, the results on elections and democratisation are consistent: if democracy means little more than elections, it is damaging to the [good government] reform process’ (Collier 2009: 45). The reason is that good government is not the most cost-effective way of benefiting from power. If you can get away with buying elections, corrupting an electoral commission, intimidating or killing opponents, scapegoating a minority to cultivate majoritarian support, jailing strong opponents for corruption and running against weaker ones or simply miscounting the votes, once in government, you can reimburse these costs by pillaging the state. Incumbents do this by embezzling billions from state coffers, favouring cronies and family members with government contracts, welcoming foreign investors when
they make huge political contributions and through other strategies. If politicians try to win elections with good government, their capacity to benefit from power is much reduced. This is because good government means the rule of law and checks and balances on abuse of power that place limits on their pillaging of the state, or even prevent it. The best way to accumulate power and money is to win elections by methods that require the winner to misgovern.

Of course, once in place—with the rule of law and checks and balances such as parliamentary committees, audit offices, electoral commissions, anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, civil service commissions and independent judges and prosecutors—good government does become a good way to win elections. Checks and balances create a wonderful path dependency\(^2\) in this regard. Being cursed with lootable natural resources can increase a country's susceptibility to corruption, civil war and many other problems. Yet, for countries with democratic institutions that include strong checks on the executive, resource rents do not predict corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2009).

This means there is something the international community can do about these problems. After civil wars that tear a country apart, the United Nations can put in place a UN transitional administration that is a hybrid of local, national, UN and broadly participatory deliberative governance (such as restorative justice) wherein both the local and the international install checks and balances and the rule of law. Indeed, many levels of governance do so. Success at this is difficult and a matter of degree, as revealed in the cases we have documented for Peacebuilding Compared, such as UN transitional governance in Timor-Leste (Braithwaite et al. 2012) and transitional governance hybrids with regional organisations of states in Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b) and Solomon Islands (Braithwaite et al. 2010c). Once these institutions take root, pillaging the state through bad governance becomes a way to lose elections. Opposition political parties then acquire enough clout—with support from the separation of powers, from a semi-autonomous legal profession, accounting profession, civil service and a vibrant civil society—to protect

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\(^2\) Path dependency means that decisions and options follow a trajectory dependent on past decisions and options. For example, ‘QWERTY’ keyboards were a mute force of history on the future of typewriter layouts. Computer keyboards then became path dependent on QWERTY.
the established checks and balances against political leaders who seek advantage by eroding them. The hard part is the transition to bedding down path dependency on a polity with checks and balances.

Other elements of Paul Collier’s work suggest that we can get better at that hard part. Indeed, Collier is convincing that it is in the economic interests of rich countries to invest in checks and balances. We refer to Collier’s (2007; 2009: 83–92) empirical work showing that the costs to the world economy of spending on peacekeeping are one-quarter of the benefits and, indeed, that post-conflict aid has a significantly stronger economic benefit than aid at other times. Of course, the main reason we invest in peace is not to increase the efficiency of our public investments in poverty reduction and productivity growth, but to save the next generation of children from cascades of violence. Collier’s (2009: 96) program of empirical research concluded that US$100 million spent on UN peacekeepers reduced the cumulative 10-year risk of reversion to conflict from 38 per cent to 17 per cent. That risk falls further to 13 per cent if the investment in peacekeeping is scaled up to US$200 million and down to 9 per cent with a US$500 million price tag. This is rather cheap in global terms. Collier’s team presented his conclusions on the benefits and costs for the world economy of investment in peacekeeping to a panel of Nobel laureate economists for the Copenhagen Consensus. This involved 10 rival research teams making a case for international public money to be spent on something. The Copenhagen Consensus panel’s verdict selected peacekeeping as one of their endorsed public expenditures.

There are data suggesting that older styles of peacekeeping that passively monitor truces and lines of control that separate armies are much less effective in reducing the recurrence of war than modern multidimensional peacekeeping with a transformative character (that goes to installing checks and balances) (but see Riordan 2013, who found older styles of peacebuilding have been strongly effective). Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 336) found that the greater effectiveness of a combination of treaties and transformational UN peacebuilding is particularly dramatic when local peacebuilding resources and capacities are low. In a follow-up of these data, Sambanis (2008: 23) found that UN peace operations reduce the risk of peace failure in the longer run by about 50 per cent. Quinn et al. (2007: 187) found the combination of a treaty and a peace operation reduced the probability of civil war recurrence by 54 per cent. These peace impacts persist after peacekeepers leave. Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 336) found that, without a treaty and UN mission, the statistical prospects of
successful peacebuilding in states of low capacity are extremely dim. This is a similar result to the meta-analyses of domestic reconciliation of serious crime through restorative justice: where restorative justice is hardest to do, it is most important to do, and restorative justice is maximally effective when we manage to pull it off with those hard cases (J. Braithwaite 2016b).

Other quantitative evaluations of the effectiveness of international peace operations likewise find many failures. Overall, however, they confirm a big statistical contribution of peace operations to building peace (Call 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008: 288–94; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Nilsson 2006; Quinn et al. 2007; Riordan 2013; Sambanis 2008; Walter 2002). Fortna (2003, 2008) also found a large tendency for ceasefires overseen by international peacekeepers to be more effective than those without peacekeepers. War prevention has features in common with crime prevention in this regard. One can be pessimistic about crime prevention because, when we are dealing with serious criminals who are in prison for the first time, a large proportion come back a second time. Yet, we know that the long-run historical project of progressively improving crime prevention interventions produces large effects in reducing the crime rate.

There is every reason to believe that peacekeeping can become even more effective by continuously improving the capacities of peace operations to become learning organisations of reflective professionals who benefit from past mistakes (Howard 2008). This can be achieved by investing more resources in learning to do forward-looking preventive peacebuilding well, and by running longer transitions that step-by-step bed down hybrid international–local checks and balances that morph gradually into national–local–participatory checks and balances. Usually that will need to occur under a new constitution. Indeed, peacekeeping has become more effective in keeping the peace in recent decades compared with its quantitative success rate during the Cold War (Fortna 2004). Even so, the failure rate remains high.

3 Lise Howard’s (2008: 2) comparative study of completed UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations found an organisational learning culture in the peace operation to be the best predictor of its success: ‘UN peacekeeping tends to be more successful when the peacekeepers are actively learning from the environment in which they are deployed. In other words, rather than seeking to impose preconceived notions about how the missions should unfold, peacekeeping is at its best when the peacekeepers—both civilian and military—take their cues from the local population, and not UN headquarters, about how best to implement mandates.’
Critics have attacked these consistent findings of large effects of peacebuilding by arguing that the wars that receive UN peacekeeping are a decidedly non-random sample compared with the wars that do not. The qualitative analyses of Peacebuilding Compared, however, suggest that the wars that are more intractable and serious are in fact the ones that attract the investment in a UN peace operation. Fortna’s (2008) systematic quantitative data confirm this. When Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) corrected for the effects of non-random assignment with matching techniques, they found that the causal effect of UN peace operations in preventing war was even larger than would have been estimated had there been no correction for non-random assignment of UN missions.

This approach means taking time with the process of constitution-building: creating wide circles of participation. It means heeding New Zealand Māori wisdom: ‘Westerners say, don’t just sit there, do something! We Māori say, don’t just do something, sit there. Listen.’ The first post-conflict election of a legislature is normally best delayed until after the new constitution is entrenched in a vote by the whole society. Constitution drafting is best done without an incumbent government calling the shots, under a constitutional commission of respected local leaders from all walks of life who consult widely. If all credible political players are in a more ‘original position’ (Rawls 1971), unsure whether they are writing a constitution for a government that they or their political adversaries will lead, stronger checks and balances are likely to emerge.

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4 We are grateful to Mary Ivec for reminding us that this saying is often heard in restorative justice workshops.

5 Crises of the state are most productive when they usher in constitutional moments that put political leaders in a Rawlsian original position, where none can be sure who might seize power in the successor regime after the constitutional moment has passed (Rawls 1971). The most inspiring and transformational constitutional moments in the history of democracy illustrate this phenomenon. The American Revolution created a context in which no one knew who, among the founding fathers of the federalist debates, would come out of the ruck to become the first president of the United States. Many of those founders became presidents—Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton, Madison—but they had to live under Washington's presidency first. They all argued for changes that would restrain an executive government that they feared they would have to live under themselves, as opposed to a disposition they would rule over as incumbents. The 1945 German and Japanese constitutional moments were both unusually inspiring ones that took constitutionalism to new global heights for similar reasons; all incumbents of executive power were out of their seats during the process. The 1996 South African Constitution is the most potent example of this Rawlsian insight about constitutions. When its parameters were first laid down in the peace negotiations from 1990, no one knew who would ultimately seize executive power. All the good money was on Mandela rather than F. W. de Klerk or Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Yet our South African interviews suggest that everyone knew that Mandela would only rule the transition, soon to hand over to a successor. No one knew if that would be Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma, Allan Boesak or someone else. Indeed, no one knew whether the African National Congress would end up ruling in its own right, on the basis of
Prolonging windows of people power and UN transitional power is smart global governance for peace, freedom and development. It is smart because a peace process with a wider window at war’s end creates a special opportunity for a ‘critical juncture’ for setting up inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 413).

One possible new normal of transition for war-ravaged societies would see the writing of new constitutions that institutionalise a decade of transition. The citizenry votes for a constitution that during its first decade accepts the United Nations as a transitional co-guarantor of the independence of their new accountability institutions. They do not vote for the United Nations as a long-term co-guarantor of the constitution, only as a medium-term co-guarantor, for perhaps 10 years. That is, the constitution would entrench an extra transitional layer of local–international hybridity of accountability for its first decade. This kind of new normal would delay elections until peace was well institutionalised and armed groups utterly demobilised. During this long period of preparation for democracy, donors would also have the opportunity to support other basics of good governance that Paris (2004) concludes, on the basis of his analysis of 14 transitions, allow elections that avert renewed conflict. These include maturing of political parties, maturing of cross-factional civil society groups that break down barriers between former enemies (thereby enabling grassroots reconciliation and self-regulation of hate speech) and the spread of political stability and effective administration across the territory. During the transition, the society would also have the opportunity to build its capacities for deliberative democracy. It would have the opportunity to strengthen the inclusion and powersharing that Call (2012) finds empirically to be the strongest predictors of non-recurrence of war (see also Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). By first guaranteeing the growth of inclusive political institutions, inclusive economic institutions are likely to follow (Acemoglu and

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powersharing or in coalition. The greatness of the South African Constitution was born of a group of political leaders who were in a more original position than is normally the case in politics. Juxtaposed with these more successful post-conflict constitutional transformations, we can see that one learning from Nepal—and more so from Egypt—is that the first post-conflict election might best be deferred, with an extended transitional national unity government with a dual peacebuilding and constitution-building mandate.

6 This can include village-level deliberative assemblies, with budgets too small to be a honeypot for organised crime and which all villagers can attend to discuss on what to spend their village development budget. These are good venues for young future leaders to learn to be democratic (see Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2012).
This approach is sharply at odds with ‘shock therapy’ liberalisation or the IMF conditionality. It is consistent with Hartzell et al.’s (2010) finding that adopters of IMF structural adjustment programs between 1970 and 1999 were more likely to experience the onset of civil war. Donors are not usually apolitical and neutral actors. They come in with their own agendas and their own assumptions of and interests in how to ‘fix’ a crisis.

As such, a new normal would use renewed military clout the United Nations can call in (with UN legitimacy) to track warlords away from the hope of taking over the state in the short term. The alternative carrots for them would be guaranteed incumbency in a well-heeled UN job and, as one of the constitutional commission members, a conditional amnesty for them and their troops during that decade, payments for each weapon surrendered, high-quality reintegration into business, job and educational opportunities, plus the more uncertain prospect of winning a much delayed election. It would involve a graduated strategy for embedding path dependency along the path to continuous improvement of the independence of accountability institutions.

Kosovo proved a disappointing initial attempt at some, but far from all, of the long transition elements described above. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) privileged ‘stability’ over accountability institutions by granting impunity for the most powerful faction of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) when it assassinated many of its political opponents in advance of elections. UNMIK allowed the KLA to place a representative of its wartime Shërbimi Informativ Kombëtar (SHIK, Kosovo National Intelligence Service) in every key government agency. The SHIK man would threaten anyone who did not support the domination of the

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7 On Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) analysis, the Roman Republic’s comparatively inclusive political institutions allowed Rome to flourish economically and pacify a wide space of empire. From the time of Julius and Augustus Caesar, ‘Rome’s increasingly extractive political and economic institutions generated its demise because they caused infighting and civil war’ (p. 168). Extractive feudal institutions and war then took over the formerly pacified space of the empire. Likewise, war and poverty in modern Sierra Leone can be understood thus: ‘British colonial authorities built extractive institutions in the first place, and the post-independence African politicians were only too happy to take up the baton for themselves … Extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, which enrich a few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to rig their elections in order to remain in power. They also have every interest in defending the system. Therefore, extractive economic institutions create the platform for extractive political institutions to persist. Power is valuable in regimes with extractive political institutions, because power is unchecked and brings economic riches’ (p. 343).
ruling faction in decisions of their ministry or agency. When this was overlaid with liberalising IMF-enforced conditionality, privatisation was undertaken at bargain prices to asset strippers, cronies and organised criminals affiliated with the ruling faction (Marsavelski et al. 2017).

Distinguished Australian civil servant and peacebuilder John Wood (Interview, Canberra, 2015, No. 051501) gave another reason this vision could fail. It will fail if donors do not make it a peacebuilding priority from day one to support the local post-secondary education system to train future cadres of line auditing staff, particularly for societies where career opportunities for independent, technically competent auditing professionals have been absent. Not all education system deficits can be solved at once, but Wood is perceptive in seeing the education of auditors as one that frequently should be the first bottleneck to be fixed.

More generally, education is one of the best investments that can be made for long-run development (and therefore long-run peace). Collier and Hoeffler (2000: 23) found that increasing secondary school enrolment for males by 10 per cent above the global median reduces the risk of the onset of war to 30 per cent below the median. But this is expensive. New schools cannot be built everywhere at once. So, post-conflict education investment should start where it will best feed the peace. Schools can be built first in hotspots where poor fighters joined the conflict because they

Plate 11.2 A Libyan schoolgirl stands in what remains of her classroom, 2012.
Source: Susan Schulman.
suffered local oppression and inequality and felt that future opportunities were closed to their children. While incentives paid to male killers to hand in their guns can fuel resentment among their female victims, education carrots that go to the children of fighters are less controversial because the children of combatants so systematically suffer interruption to their education during a war.

Unfortunately, little of this strategy is the international community’s current preference. Western militaries prefer to do less of the cost-effective activity of peacekeeping so they can invest more in warmaking capabilities. Warmaking is much more costly than war prevention and crime prevention. To battle goes the glamour and glory for generals; this is their ‘core function’, their imaginary of the professionally excellent soldier. Western incumbent governments prefer to cut peacebuilding costs in post-conflict societies in the (usually correct) belief that if the country goes to hell as a consequence, that problem will haunt one of their political successors, not them. Chapter 2 argued that, both in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, as their communist regimes collapsed, it was in the interests of the United States, Russia and European states to persevere with assertive joint diplomacy to tame armed groups and communal violence and invest in peacemaking that secured the rule of law and checks and balances. Yet, Soviet leader Gorbachev and US president George H. Bush decided it was in their interests not to spend resources on these objectives in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, preferring to concentrate their resources and energies on pressing domestic concerns. The administrations of Boris Yeltsin and Putin in Russia and Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama in the United States continued for decades to bear massive costs in attempting to clean up the shambles left by the cheap diplomacy of their predecessors. The hope, of course, is that scholars can persuade voters in democracies that peace diplomacy on the cheap is bad governance—a short-termism in economics they should oppose. The evidence is strong that UN peace operations are more likely to be effective in preventing a return to war when they are of longer duration (Sambanis 2008: 29). Lengthening UN peace operations is a wise investment because of the evidence that the longer a peace can be held, the less likely is civil war to recur (Quinn et al. 2007), especially if the UN keeps working with locals at fixing governance problems and developing local capabilities.

Readers are perhaps thinking that our prescriptions are utopian. Undoubtedly, they are, although their realisation is a matter of degree. And, to a degree, the international community has begun to head in the
direction we suggest. In UN corridors there is an understanding today that a rush to holding an election and then pulling out of the peace operation is unwise. There is a recognition that moving to the first free multiparty election for 46 years in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006, with the intention of withdrawing UN peacekeepers immediately after the election,8 served only to institutionalise the criminalisation of the state into the hands of the winning family. In civil society, the peace and democracy movement in Egypt and internationally now shares in a growing consensus that one tragic error of Egyptian civil society was to support a rush to a parliamentary election in 2011 and a presidential election in 2012, before a constitutional architecture—with agreed and entrenched checks and balances—was settled. Documentation, including lessons learned, is now available for longish and more successful transitions such as those in Liberia and Solomon Islands, where UN and regional peacebuilding became more active in embedding checks and balances.

Timor-Leste is the most refined and researched experience of the struggles and difficulties of a long transition. Timor-Leste was a difficult, imperfect journey of two steps forward, one step backward. Peace has been consolidated and the deeply impoverished economy has been growing briskly for many years now. Time heals, but economic recovery with political checks and balances heals even more. Collier (2007, 2009) argues that poverty is dangerous and that unchecked power also increases the risk of violence. Timor-Leste’s imperfect history of implementing checks and balances has been a great learning experience for the international community on hard questions such as how to ensure a diverse plurality of checks that enrich rather than destroy the capacity for decisive action by the executive government. These detailed challenges in the design of accountability institutions are not the topic of this particular book. In an earlier Peacebuilding Compared volume, however, we used the Timor-Leste experience to grapple in detail with how these dilemmas can be tackled (Braithwaite et al. 2012: 128–9).

What is extremely important to register as a conclusion of this book is that if the major powers had worked together and committed to invest both in financial terms and with technical assistance on a Timor-Leste–style transitional administration backed by UN peacekeepers in Afghanistan

8 In the event, the United Nations had to fly more troops in after the election rather than flying troops out, because fighting broke out immediately after the election between supporters of the losing candidate and government forces.
in 1989, this might have prevented the rivers of blood that have flowed for two generations and greatly reduced the national debts under which NATO nations creak today. Similar points to those made about the failures of the major powers in Yugoslavia at the same time (Chapter 2) can be made about the failures of those major powers to pressure Pakistan and India in the 1940s and 1950s into a permanent Kashmir settlement to be overseen by a Timor-Leste–style UN transitional administration. Instead, what Kashmir got was ineffective cooperation between major powers whose diplomacy was enfeebled by what they saw as Cold War imperatives. From our interviews, it was evident that what Kashmir got was a largely symbolic UN peacekeeping operation that did little more than write reports when fighters crossed the Line of Control. We were told how big boxes of letters were sent to the UN mission and no one ever received a response. We have shown that what has cascaded from that diplomatic failure and underinvestment in peacebuilding has been a catastrophic cascade of violence that continues to jeopardise the nuclear non-proliferation regime, threatens nuclear terrorism and risks cascading mobile nuclear weapons into a nuclear contest with Israel (Chapter 5).

Timor-Leste is also instructive on the need for the United Nations to be ready to whisk military and police peacekeepers back into a country if the risk of civil war reignites. This happened in Timor-Leste in 2006 when the return of peacekeepers, enabled by the willingness of the Australian military to mobilise quickly, ultimately succeeded in helping the nation back on to a trajectory of peaceful development. Collier (2009: 85–9) has discussed the variety of options that are available for over-the-horizon guarantees for peace enforcement should new warlords decide to ignite violence during periods of post-conflict disorder. Collier (2009: 85) argues that the British military effectively made an over-the-horizon guarantee work to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. In the late 2000s, there were only 80 British troops stationed in Sierra Leone, but the United Kingdom gave the government a 10-year guarantee that if violence were to ignite, troops would fly in overnight. Howard (2008: 338) sees UN learning in this:

[W]hen UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were attacked, rather than withdrawing the forces as was done in Rwanda, or not really doing anything, as in Bosnia, UN troops under siege in Sierra Leone were augmented by additional UN, ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], and British troops.
Collier (2009: 86–7) further found that the French Government provided a similar informal guarantee to its former African colonies and that this informal over-the-horizon peacekeeping guarantee left Francophone Africa with a statistical conflict risk three-quarters lower than comparators.

This book shows that cascades of violence have overwhelmed much of South Asia because, while the British Empire left behind an incipient rule of law and democratic institutions, it did not leave a security sector capable of guaranteeing an orderly transition from colonialism. Britain also failed to do this in Africa, as did other European colonial powers, with disastrous cascades of civil war the result. Collier makes the point that the same thing happened in the centuries after the Roman Empire pulled out of Britain, leaving the region to civil war without any semblance of a state monopoly of force:

The history of Britain post-403 makes the post-colonial history of Africa look like a staggering success. Within a few years, the British had petitioned Rome to be recolonised: even heavy taxation was preferable to the absence of security and government. (Collier 2009: 173)

It is virtually impossible for a police force to survive a civil war without ceasing to be a servant of the rule of law. This is because, during war, a paramilitary organisation with armouries is like a 20-dollar bill sitting on the sidewalk, waiting for a warlord to pick it up and take it over. As Bayley and Perito (2010: 48) put it:

In post intervention environments, local police are normally unprepared, unwilling, or unfit to provide police services. As a result, looting, civil disorder, and crime increase until and unless the intervention forces in question take action.

As long as all armed groups are held in cantonment, transitional administrations have some time to assist with making the military part of security sector reform work. In contrast, for the police, the maximum challenges arise on day one after a ceasefire and cantonment. That is when there is maximum anomie on the streets. UN learning on how to repair the ship at sea, how to patch the holes in the ship of an emerging democratic police service, has been particularly slow. Yet international learning and patience with that crucial challenge are maturing (Howard 2008).
Cascades of nonviolence?

In many ways, it is a stretch to identify cascades of nonviolence in the history of South Asia since World War II. Yes, there have been dozens of armed conflicts and most of them ended at some point during these seven decades with a ceasefire and peace agreement of some kind. The pattern seems rather similar to the global pattern that is emerging in Peacebuilding Compared: peace mostly does not come quickly and easily and the successful peace agreement comes on the back of many, often dozens of, failed agreements and countless broken ceasefires. Chapter 5 found this to be the Indian pattern: policy learning accumulates from many failed peace agreements, while the final Indian peace tends to nurture reconciliation and reintegration and grant autonomy or powersharing concessions.

A pattern of intractability of conflict also seems an apt way to characterise war and peace in South Asia. Just as checks and balances in a polity have a profound but imperfect path dependence once in place, armed conflict is worse than path dependence once entrenched: it cascades to deeper problems. Peace seems settled for good, then war breaks out again between the same parties or it is started by a breakaway armed spoiler (Stedman 1997) from one of those parties. Even a peace agreement like the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord that is celebrated internationally, with the prime minister receiving an international peace prize—and which does end a civil war—can usher in two more decades of intractable lower-level conflict that inflicts continuous militarisation, continuous violence, rape and land-grabbing, failure to implement most of the agreement and a persistent re-emergence of new generations of potential spoilers who are suppressed by violence from the state and from competing militarised factions. This is worse than a failure to move from negative peace to positive peace (conceived in this book as peace with justice); it is a partial and desperately flawed negative peace.

Two major wars that would have remained intractable were ended by decisive military defeats: the decimation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 by the Sri Lankan state after 26 years and the defeat of the Pakistan state in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation. The militarised termination of the Khalistan uprising in Punjab by Indian security forces was also rather decisive, although it was a militarised counterinsurgency accomplishment mostly of the police mobilising carrots as well as sticks, rather than a defeat through conventional
warfare. Other decisive military defeats, such as the fall of Dr Najibullah’s formerly communist regime in 1992 and of the Taliban regime in 2001 in Afghanistan, and the JVP’s first defeat in Sri Lanka, cascaded more civil wars.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir have been both intractable and the most geopolitically significant in the region. These two conflicts have cascaded not only across South Asia, with terrorism in India’s metropoles and the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and Islamic State, but also across to Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Chechnya (Russia), Xianjiang (China), the Middle East and even New York and Washington, and have destabilised the nuclear non-proliferation regime in places as far away as North Korea, Iran, Libya, Myanmar and Iraq. Kashmir and Afghanistan have seen many phases of their wars, dozens of failed peace processes in Afghanistan, more than 150 rounds of failed negotiations in Kashmir, hundreds of collapsed ceasefires, continuously failing UN peace operations and a ‘peace operation’ following the seemingly decisive military defeat of the Taliban in 2001 that has received more international funding than any in history—most of it wasted on dysfunctional ‘security sector reform’, quite a bit of it ending up in the Taliban’s pockets and in the pockets of Afghan commanders who sold weapons to their Taliban enemies. Iraq was a comparable failure of a ‘peace operation’ that prioritised ‘security sector reform’ funding that trained bad guys to shoot straight with American weapons.

This book is, nevertheless, about lifting our vision above the failures of Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq to see the peacebuilding glass half-full. We have seen that the quantitative work of Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) and others shows systematically that, when peacekeeping is led by the United Nations rather than the United States, and is multidimensional, the effect size of the peacekeeping variable is substantial in reducing the incidence of war globally. As with international peace operations, so with domestic peacemaking, successes are less visible than failures to those not well read in the history of a particular country. Chapter 5 celebrated the peacemaking of Nehru, Indira Gandhi and legions of local peacemakers from civil society in preventing a regional autonomy struggle in Tamil Nadu from cascading into a major war. It was prevented from cascading into a much more terrible conflict than Kashmir’s wars by decisive concessions, with Tamil language rights and other autonomies transacted in a spirit of reconciliation. This was successful peacemaking of a kind that Pakistan failed to grasp in circumstances of some considerable similarity.
in Bangladesh. Chapter 4 shows that a formula similar to the Nehru/Gandhi model in Tamil Nadu was attempted with more mixed success in many north-east Indian conflicts. Uneven though the north-east Indian successes have been, many have ended protracted armed struggles for autonomy.

Chapters 5 and 9 in particular documented many qualified successes in reconciling ethnic conflicts. An example is the qualified success of finally securing a peace among the Naga—first, among Myanmar’s Naga minority, then, in Indian Nagaland in 2012, after so many prior failed peace agreements and the loss of perhaps 200,000 lives (Iralu 2003). Yet this must be balanced with failure to settle most of the Maoist/Naxalite conflicts in rural areas of half of India’s states (Chapter 5). Here, the dramatic contrast is with the Maoist civil war in Nepal. It was both more bloody and more successfully negotiated to a peace than any of India’s Maoist conflicts (Chapter 9).

Nepal’s game changer was the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP). It persuaded the Maoist leadership that, if they renounced armed struggle and joined the nonviolent people-power struggle for constitutional reform that would overthrow the king, the Maoists would enjoy prospects of winning an election. This was persuasive because it was right: the Maoists did win the first post-conflict election, although they lost the second post-conflict election. The CMDP leaders also helped persuade Indian intelligence that this path to peace was in India’s interest. These overtures were so persuasive that India hijacked the peace negotiations! In the end game, however, it was the people power of millions on the streets of Nepal’s cities in 2006 that was decisive. Leader of the CMDP, Devendra Raj Panday, said: ‘It was the sheer numbers that lent us legitimacy’ (Interview in Kathmandu, 2014, No. 031415). The CMDP in its culmination was so massive that people power occupied the entire circumference of the 27 km ring road around Kathmandu and Lalitipur (Dixit 2011: 124).

Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) data on 323 resistance movements for maximalist societal change confirm this interpretation more systematically: nonviolent resistance movements had twice the success rate (53 per cent) of those that resisted regimes through armed struggle (26 per cent) in the long run. When nonviolent movements were strong enough to mobilise 3.5 per cent of the population on the street or through other forms of active political engagement in a sustained way, their success rate moved
to 100 per cent (Chenoweth 2013: 11). This initial percentage does not seem high, but it means massive mobilisation in absolute terms—100,000 people for Nepal. The 3.5 per cent result suggests there is a tipping point in cascades of nonviolence beyond which the security forces surrender the project of taming the crowd. The first 100 protestors on to the streets risk extreme violence, but each extra hundred that successively joins them enjoys lower risks, enabling a cascade to a tipping point where the security forces ultimately defect to the people. Organisational, as opposed to individual, auspices for a reasonably large initial surge on to the streets therefore increase the prospects of a rapid cascade of nonviolent resistance. These organisational auspices are documented for Nepal in Chapter 9; we can also see it with the first-mover role of the Polish trade union movement in commencing the European cascade of nonviolent uprisings that tore down the Iron Curtain. We also see this reality with people-power movements that in the end are captured by tyrants. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was mounted by a broad and plural political coalition, but was quickly captured by a ruthless theocracy, which had a superior organisational base in Islamic organisations. The Egyptian Arab Spring revolution in 2011 was plural on the streets, but then captured in quick succession by the superior organisational power of the Muslim Brotherhood and then the military.

The two main factors that drove the widespread initial success of nonviolence, according to these data, were that nonviolence was most effective when it could attract very large numbers of participants on to the streets and into the ranks of resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 34–41) and when this, in turn, persuaded the security forces to withdraw support for the regime. Proposition 1 of our theory implies that, when regimes lose control of the means to crack down, they break down (Brownlee et al. 2015).

Even more instructive about the Nepalese case is that the unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by Maoists who joined arms with nonviolent people power swung the electorate behind them for a quick, clear path to power. What communists construed at first as the only successful communist revolution of this century seems quite an accomplishment. Yet this is exactly what happened to the African National Congress (of which the Communist Party was a major organisational member). When the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo shifted South Africa’s resistance to Apartheid from armed struggle to a movement of nonviolent people power (the United Democratic Front), they won
(Braithwaite 2014a). Victory is what happened when Xanana Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta shifted the once Marxist Timor-Leste independence struggle from violence to nonviolence (Braithwaite et al. 2012). There are other historically recent cases of this ilk that are less familiar to most readers. An instructive one is the civil war involving the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea (Regan 2010). This case is more persuasive concerning the potential power of a shift from armed to nonviolent struggle for justice because BRA leaders who joined the peace process became the first two elected presidents of the Autonomous Bougainville Government. In contrast, the longstanding leader of the BRA who held out for continuation of the armed struggle to victory, Francis Ona, was quickly marginalised by a war-weary people. He died a decade later without tasting power. When a people are so weary of war that a citizen’s movement can mobilise masses for peace, smart contemporary insurgents see the tipping point for defection to nonviolence.

Kashmir is a case where this did not happen. One reason is that, as with the Afghan Taliban’s early peacemakers, peacemakers among Kashmir’s jihadists were assassinated by Pakistan, by spoiler factions who agreed with the Pakistani prescription of continued insurgency within India and by deterrence-mad or retributive elements of the Indian security sector (Chapter 5). An even more important difference between Kashmir and Nepal, South Africa, Timor-Leste and Bougainville (or Northern Ireland) is that, in the last five cases, the international community gradually unified behind the good faith gestures of former insurgents for peace—even when they had been officially registered by the United States as terrorist organisations and/or communists. Chapter 5 interpreted peacemaking failures in Kashmir as the ‘India Shining’ effect. India was a shining light of democracy in the developing world, one that shifted from socialism to neoliberalism, from sympathy with Moscow to sympathy with Washington. The terrible paradox was that this allowed India to seem to the international community to have clean hands when it dominated Kashmir with democracy. When greater numbers of citizens pleading for azadi surged on to the streets of Kashmir in 2009 and 2010 than surged into the capitals of Arab Spring states, the indifference of Western states and Western civil society was near total. Westerners loved it when people power rose up against Muslim autocrats, but a Muslim uprising against domination by Hindu ‘democrats’—no thanks. In the 1980s and 1990s, Western diplomats and Western publics likewise declined to support massive surges of Muslim nonviolent resistance to Serbian
domination in Kosovo. In fact, the West actively punished nonviolence and then rewarded armed violence by supporting the KLA with NATO bombing when the KLA pushed aside nonviolent resistance (Marsavelski et al. 2017).

It was easier for Egyptian people power to persuade its military to defect from the regime to support the people because relatives of members of the military were assembled in Tahrir Square in 2011. Defection of the Indian military to people power in Kashmir was a taller mountain to climb because loyal Hindu soldiers from other Indian states were confronting Muslim protesters, most of whom had stronger loyalty to Pakistan than to India. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011: 48) data show that an important predictor of the success of nonviolent resistance is whether major factions of the state, particularly the military, defect to support the protesters. Even so, Timor-Leste shows that, with international support, people power can prevail against a foreign military of religious and ethnic others who stand fast against defection to the people. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) data show that the more total a resistance movement’s commitment to eschewing all forms of violent resistance, the more likely it is that the international community will support that nonviolent transition (Braithwaite 2014a; Schock and Chenoweth 2012).

In sum, Chapter 9 shows that the international community, late in the day (and late in the same way it shifted in South Africa, Timor-Leste and Bougainville), cascaded its support behind Nepal’s CMDP with total unanimity. This surge was in fact both very late and extraordinarily rapid and total. It was the end for the king. In Kashmir, the international community looked on as armed struggle shifted to mass nonviolent mobilisation and it felt sorry for India as its troops slaughtered children on the streets. The international community and media believed India when it lamented that Kashmir could elect whomever it liked to rule Jammu and Kashmir state.

While cascades of violence are relentlessly affirmed by our South Asian data, on first inspection, cascades of nonviolence seem a glass more than half empty. There is, however, a way of seeing nonviolent cascades in South Asia as half full, beyond Indian peacemaking cascades from success in Tamil Nadu to mixed success in north-eastern India and to greater success in pressuring peaceful resolution of the civil wars in Nepal and the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. This involves seeing the progress of the nonviolence imaginary of which Gandhi was the most internationally
influential practitioner. That imaginary cascaded way beyond South Asia to Martin Luther King Jr in the United States, Nelson Mandela in South Africa and, to some extent, to Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, who counted among those who acknowledged the influence of Gandhi in becoming advocates of a nonviolence that would settle only for a version of positive peace that meant peace with justice.

Plate 11.3 Gandhi with Bacha Khan, Peshawar, 1938.

Moreover, as Chapter 3 argues, within South Asia, we can trace the influence on Gandhi of the nonviolence of his close friend Bacha Khan’s nonviolent movement against British colonialism and on behalf of Pashtun nationalism. On 23 April 1930, when Bacha Khan was arrested, protesters gathered in Peshawar’s Storytellers Bazaar. The British ordered troops to turn machine guns on the unarmed crowd, killing an estimated 200–250 people (Habib 1997). The ‘peace army’ acted in accordance with their nonviolence training under Bacha Khan, facing the bullets as the troops opened fire and continued to shoot (Johansen 1997). Two platoons of the the Garhwal Rifles refused to fire and were punitively court martialed, undermining the legitimacy of British rule. Bacha Khan’s funeral was a moment of awe and momentary triumph of nonviolence and his love for Afghanistan. Respecting his last wish to be buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, his funeral brought about a ceasefire in the Afghan
civil war, causing tens of thousands of Pakistanis to march peacefully through the Khyber Pass into the war zone. More than 200,000 people massed for a funeral attended by Afghanistan’s president Najibullah in 1988. Erica Chenoweth’s (2016a, 2016b) data show that before the time of the campaigns of Bacha Khan’s Peace Army and Gandhi’s Indian National Congress, nonviolent campaigns for regime change were almost non-existent globally.

Figure 11.1 Nonviolent and violent uprisings.

Source: Authors’ work, with thanks to Erica Chenoweth (2016a, 2016b: 2) for access to her Major Episodes of Contention dataset.

Figure 11.1 can be read as evidence of support for the existence of a growing global movement for nonviolence that was in large part given birth in imaginaries enacted in what are today Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The failure of the international peace movement and peace journalists to mobilise support behind people power on the streets of Kashmir in 2009 and 2010, and the reversals of the Arab Spring after 2011, suggest this movement has a long way to go. Indeed, they suggest that nonviolent uprisings have become less effective in the present decade compared with previous decades (Chenoweth 2016b). A common cause of these failures is the jihad imaginary that cascaded from benign enough beginnings with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East in the late decades of the
twentieth century and as a result of the war on Saddam Hussein in 1990 and the war on terror that included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was a jihad imaginary that cascaded to something progressively more violent in the trajectory from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Taliban, to Al-Qaeda, to Islamic State and to Boko Haram, and along other militant tributaries. It was precisely this ethos of militancy that motivated the spoilers of peace in Kashmir who assassinated jihadists engaged in constructive peace talks with the Indian state. It was Al-Qaeda and Islamic State activists with that ethos in Libya who, seeing the transformation from an authoritarian to a more liberal state that the Arab Spring delivered to neighbouring Tunisia, seized the initiative to steer the Libyan revolution on a barbarous path.

Anomic crises—chaos on the streets that questions who is in charge—create opportunities for advocates of a nonviolent politics that transcends the dominations of a Gaddafi-like regime. Equally, anomie creates opportunities for advocates of a more dominating rule by clerics even more barbaric and dominating than Gaddafi. Put another way, we see Proposition 7 of the theory as a contingent explanation of cascades of violence that can equally be hijacked to cascades of nonviolent resistance led from below. And we read failed peace processes in Kashmir, which led to the assassination of jihadist peacemakers without attracting much interest beyond Kashmir, as a conjuncture where the international community allowed Proposition 7 to be true and allowed anomie to cascade to violence. This when it might have cascaded to nonviolence with the right kind of international support and protection for the peacemakers. Astute and aggressive players can flip cascades of nonviolence to cascades of violence or they can use the opportunity of anomie to flip cascades of violence to nonviolence. The key variable is which side has the organisational base and strategy to do the flipping.

In terms of macro cleavages, we conceive three ‘master cleavages’ in south Asia:

1. A nonviolent South Asian imaginary with Bacha Khan and Gandhi as pre-eminent model missionaries.
2. An imaginary that cascaded from Marx and Mao to University of Kabul leftists, to a Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan, to Marxist/Maoist armed uprisings across South Asia (from the Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) in Sri Lanka, to Nepal and Myanmar, to rural uprisings in half the states of India).
3. A jihadist imaginary that cascaded from the medieval caliphate to the Muslim Brotherhood, to 1970s Islamist students at the University of Kabul, to the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and a complex archipelago of jihadist groups/cells/loners.

South Asia is one of the few regions of the world where the Maoist master cleavage still clings to significant vibrancy. The nonviolent imaginary of resistance to domination and the super-violent imaginary of jihadist resistance have spread activist hotspots to almost every country in the world.

From global to local contingency: Struggles, reconciliation and peace zones

The imperative for diplomacy to avert humiliation, discussed earlier, emphasised the importance of this at the level of village as well as national–international diplomacy. Upper-caste and police domination of indigenous and lower-caste people and women in Rolpa and nearby villages in the hills of Nepal gave rise to a local Maoist politics of resistance. That local imaginary of struggle against very local injustices found a larger meaning in terms of the Marxist/Maoist macro cleavage. This connected supralocal actors from Marxist parties and intellectuals in Kathmandu and ultimately an archipelago of local dominations and local Maoist imaginaries dotted across rural Nepal and down into rural India and Bhutan. Kalyvas (2003: 475) theorises such alliances as resulting in violence that aggregates the local and the supra-local, ‘yet still reflects their diverse goals’ in ‘complex and ambiguous processes that foster the “joint” action of local and supralocal actors’. Nepal and all our country cases are rich examples of concatenations of cleavages ‘loosely arrayed around the master cleavage’ or cleavages (Kalyvas 2003: 486).

According to Kalyvas, violence arises from master cleavages and from local cleavages, but, most importantly, from interaction between the two. For example, when thousands of Kurdish Yazidi women were drafted into sexual slavery from 2014 in Iraq and Syria, this did not motivate feminist fighters from all over the world to travel thousands of kilometres to join the fight against Islamic State. But, at the local level, the unequal treatment of Yazidi women did motivate Kurdish women to travel hundreds of kilometres—from across the border in Iran, for example—to join the fight.
And they motivated one another through a global feminist imaginary. Our key example is a Maoist class cleavage that enrolled a village-level gendered cleavage about rape by police; in reverse, local feminists enrolled the master Maoist cleavage to embrace specific local feminist objectives, such as female judges for the Rolpa People’s Courts. This upward enrolment infiltrated the Maoist political platform. The result was joint action that forged a majority-female Maoist army in Rolpa that advanced a Maoism that had a distinctively local feminist hybridity. As Jonathan Spencer (1990: 12) said about Sri Lanka, villagers did not ‘simply have politics thrust upon them; rather they appropriated politics and used them for their own purposes’. Often these are not political purposes. They may be about revenge, infidelity, piety, criminality, land, sorcery (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 29, 31, 67, 81, 95, 113, 123; Forsyth n.d.) or many other matters. Sometimes they are dominating and violent purposes; sometimes they are anti-domination and nonviolent purposes.

It follows from this approach, and from the data in this book, that Kalyvas’s analysis of the joint local/supralocal production of violence is frequently true of the joint local/supralocal production of nonviolence. Chapter 2 sought to illustrate from our fieldnotes the local *jirgas* and reconciliation committees where locals have parochial nonviolent projects about ending blood feuds, while police attend with the role of defending the integrity of the rule of law as an institution. At least some of them do. Ali Gohar and John Braithwaite were attending those meetings as emissaries of a supralocal imaginary of a social movement for restorative justice that in turn has linkages to the peace movement globally. Some of those sitting in the circle had some understanding of this restorative justice imaginary and approved of it, and even saw it as something inspired by Bacha Khan; others knew nothing of it and cared nothing for it. But, when the Australian Government and the Asia Foundation provided funding for the building where the reconciliation committee could meet, safe from the Taliban’s suicide bombers, those with no engagement with restorative nonviolence were nevertheless most pleased to seize this opportunity to end the cycle of murders in which their families were embroiled. They were, to a degree, model mercenaries with that foreign aid. Ali Gohar

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9 An approach influenced by Kalyvas (2003) to understanding the cascading of both violence and nonviolence might avert the myopia of seeing warmaking as the business of states and peacebuilding as statebuilding. It might avert stigmatising local reconciliation as corrupting the rule of law and, on the other hand, avert romanticising the local as the repository of all things great (Wallis 2014: 347).
was a restorative justice model missionary and John Braithwaite a model monger, who moved Pakistan to his front burner for a period simply because its government and his friends invited him to visit (see Chapter 2).

In more direct ways, across the Peacebuilding Compared dataset, we see local peacemakers of many stripes. They often create islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) in circumstances in which the national politics of peace has totally collapsed. This is more than local peacemakers making a local contribution to a national peace, though they may do that as well. Peacemaking that builds a higher-quality peace locally—a positive peace as opposed to a negative peace—may create at a village level a peace superior to the negative peace forged at the national level, or a superior regional peace, as we have seen in Somaliland, Somalia and in nonviolence in North Nias, Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 36–40; Reddy 2012). This regional peace can then cascade more widely. Even when there is only one village where the killing is stopped, surrounded by hundreds of villages where violence escalates, that village can become the only safe space where peacemakers can meet to advance the project of cascading a wider peace. That is precisely what happened in Ambon, Indonesia, where the one de facto zone of peace, Wayame Village, was where the Muslim Concerned Women’s Movement and the Christian Concerned Women’s Movement were able to meet without being killed (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 160–2). These brave women then guided the early leadership towards a sustained peace across Ambon and Maluku province 15 years on.

A contrast is Mindanao, Philippines, where a sustainable national peace has remained elusive so far in spite of many peace agreements. Here, Islamic State in 2017 took over: at the time of writing a terrible battle rages between Islamic State and the Philippines military for control of one of our Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork sites, the hotspot city of Marawi. Some Mindanao ‘peace zones’ were exploited by the state military. Other, church-initiated peace zones, and some established with UN support as part of the 1996 peace deal with the Moro National Liberation Front that led to more war with spoiler groups, were examples of islands of some success within a sea of failure (Avruch and Jose 2007; Iyer 2004; S-CAR 2015). They were limited successes not only in securing a limited local peace, but also in jump-starting modest local economic development as fighting continued around them. An example of much more contained local peacemaking success in the midst of even more devastating national/international failure were the efforts of organisations such as the Carter Center to assist in the negotiation of local ceasefires and humanitarian
pauses early in the Syrian civil war, at least so thousands of trapped refugees could be excised from the slaughter (Interviews with Carter Center leadership in the United States, 2013, No. 111301).

In Idlib City, Syria, it has been impossible for civilians to escape from the fighting and the domination of Jeish al-Fateh, which includes Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly known as the Al-Qaeda regional affiliate the Al-Nusra Front. But civil society organisations including, prominently, the Idlib Youth Group, Women’s Fingerprints, Glimmer of Hope, the Association of Educated Women and the National Opposition for Idlib Intellectuals used nonviolent tactics to demonstrate to the militants that they could not govern Idlib City without the support of its people, and that support depended on giving the people a democratic voice and reducing oppressive violence against them (Taleb 2017).

In Latin America, there have been citywide peace and reconciliation processes as civil war continued to rage nationally. A move from ‘iron fist’ (mano dura) policies to violence prevention, reconciliation, reintegration and social development in Bogota and Medellin, in Colombia, in the 1990s saw homicide reductions of 65 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively (Mallonee 2015). For Medellin, which had a homicide rate of 400 per 100,000 before the intervention, this meant saving more than a few thousand lives every year (Braithwaite 2002: 212–13). This pacification of some of Colombia’s most violent cities may have shown a path in a way that assisted the wider peace now dawning across that country.

We saw in Chapter 4 that El Salvador was an example of a civil war that had a ‘successful’ peace process in 1992 in terms of terminating the war, but which delivered a peace in which more people were being killed in homicides by criminal gangs and femicides than were being killed at the height of the war. A March 2012 peace process among the major gangs, brokered by the Catholic Church, but driven at the time by the national government, resulted in a 14-month truce during which homicides per day fell by more than 60 per cent until the truce began to unravel in mid-2013 (Seelke 2015). Some of this decline may have been a result of gangs wanting to create an appearance of homicide reduction by ‘disappearing’ people rather than killing them openly in the street. Disappearances overall, however, were on a long-run trajectory of increase before the truce and increased somewhat less steeply during the truce (Carcach and Artola 2016: 16).
The Catholic Church’s intervention strategy was based on the probably correct analysis that a root cause of gang growth was that El Salvador has one of the most extreme levels of economic inequality in the world. That root cause is probably multiplied by an honour culture in which men feel impelled to respond to humiliation, domination and violence with violence (see also Denny and Walter 2012). Therefore, a gang truce was needed that built hope through reintegration and educational and job opportunities for gang members10 and that gave an honourable path to ending cycles of revenge for the sake of the nation, sealed by the prayers of the church. This particular truce was politically corrupted and hardly secured this, with political parties using the church as a front for getting gangs to deliver votes in areas they controlled. Even so, it did work in reducing homicide. The aspiration of church leaders had been rather like the rationale for the Pakistani reconciliation committees, which reformed jirgas as a peacemaking strategy in a cultural context that demanded revenge in a similar way to the Salvadorian gang code requirements for retaliation (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014). The negotiated truce package in El Salvador included establishing high schools as ‘peace zones’, gang undertakings to end the recruitment of children and to eliminate death as a penalty for leaving a gang. It proposed targeting 18 municipalities as initial peace zones with weapons surrender and termination of all gang crime, including extortion and violence against women11 in the peace zones, followed by spreading peace zones from community to community (Wells 2013).12

10 In addition to the government and donors, several multinational companies committed—and began—to put in place job-creation programs for gang members (Wells 2013).
11 In addition to the reduction in gang homicides and police killings during the truce, femicides were also reported to have reduced, by 76 per cent (Garzon 2014).
12 ‘The conservative side of politics that had presided with an ‘iron fist’, then a ‘super iron fist’, strategy over two decades of intractable escalation of murder campaigned to discredit the truce. This was not hard to do as the execution of the truce had been poor and secretive and had failed to engage wide circuits of civil society with relevant experience to offer. Suspicions about this secretiveness turned to widespread contempt across the society when video evidence was published that both leftist and rightist parties were coopting the truce negotiations to negotiate deals with gangs for cash payments to them in return for guarantees for gang support for particular parties in particular neighbourhoods they controlled. Conservatives were able to equate any gang truce to negotiating with terrorists, corroding the rule of law and providing an impunity that gave gangs an opportunity to regroup and reorganise. They highlighted how the gangs’ economic crimes—notably extortion—continued unabated. The gangs’ negotiating position was that the initial undertaking they were honouring was to stop killings; they would stop extortion when the economic reintegration elements of the package were delivered one by one—in the first instance, to peace zone municipalities (Wells 2013). Of course, no one can be sure now if this resolve was just a bluff and a lie because it was never tested by empirical peacebuilding praxis and evaluation. Business supporters of the rightist party
In the first 17 months after the government called off the truce and thrust the military on to the streets to battle the gangs, homicides per day increased by 57 per cent in the first year, then higher still to the highest level per day for a decade in the early months of 2015 (Lakhani 2015). By 2016, El Salvador worsened further to again become the only country in the world with an annual homicide rate above 100 per 100,000 adults. Law-and-order election auctions, as our Peacebuilding Compared interviews revealed in this El Salvador case, are a form of violence cascade. They share features with the cascades of crime–war caused by the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Across Latin America, we see model missionaries and model mercenaries of the ‘iron fist’ type in contest with missionaries of more restorative strategies.

The growing literature on peace zones informs model mongers of diverse options. Exploring them systematically remains an ambition for another book that evaluates the evidence on the effectiveness of peace zones in diverse sites, complementing books already addressing this topic (e.g. Hancock and Mitchell 2007; Odendaal 2013). Examples are not as diverse and rich in South Asia as in some other regions. There have been securitised equivalents to the peace zones idea in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan that were manipulated for military subjugation, just as the Salvadoran truce was manipulated for political party subjugation. These militarised peace zones were not cascades of nonviolence. They were closer to, or part of, the counterinsurgency (COIN) tradition of gradually expanding secure areas under state military control, in a line from Malaya (1954–60), Kenya (1955–60) and Vietnam (1966–75). A possible exception is Ahmadabad and the Sayid Karam District of Afghanistan’s Paktia province, which saw some impressive tribal leadership when tribal elders said to the Taliban and to American and Afghan government forces in effect:

We don’t like your war. Don’t fight it in our lands. If you try to, the noncooperation of the tribes with everything you try to do will make life difficult for you. (Interview with Paktia tribal leaders, 2014, No. 121406)

As of 2015, these districts continued to be free of fighting for many years, although all the claims about this case need more careful up-to-date evaluation by researchers on the ground in Paktia. South African

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Arena hired former New York mayor Rudolf Giuliani and his consulting business (The Economist 2015) to fly in to advocate zero tolerance and prosecution of children as adults (Rodriguez 2015). The leftist government lost its nerve and renounced the truce to woo middle-class median voters in the lead-up to the 2014 election, which the rightist opposition almost won with 49.9 per cent of the vote.
peace committees had important local successes in preventing conflict in the early 1990s—for example, in steering African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party funeral marches along different routes so they would not clash (Peacebuilding Compared South Africa interviews). These peace committees have been modelled with some success in many African countries, with notable success in preventing electoral violence in Ghana, for example (Odendaal 2012). This model was also picked up, with very limited success, in the Nepalese village-level peace committees. Their accomplishments in Nepal were meagre because these local committees were captured top-down by the machines of the major political parties: ‘partyocracy in Nepal’ (Interview with Kathmandu newspaper editor, 2014, No. 031410; see also Odendaal and Olivier 2008)—another resonance with our El Salvador interviews. Odendaal’s (2012, 2013) study of peace committees in 10 countries concluded that they were much more successful at the subnational level and that six out of 10 sailed into political headwinds and failed to achieve legitimacy at the national level. Mixed results are also evident in van Tongeren’s (2013) evaluation across 10 countries. Peace zones, and the conditions for their effectiveness in cascading nonviolence and averting the pitfalls of militarisation, will engage the Peacebuilding Compared project with more systematic research in future. The peace zones literature is an immature one, with limited empirical rigour at this stage of its development.

Rethinking domination: Inequality, exploitation, crime and wars

An inference from our data has been that domination more richly and consistently explains violence than a thin conception of inequality measured by a national Gini coefficient. One way domination is thicker than inequality is that it better enables the integration of explanatory theory and normative theory (Pettit and Braithwaite 2000), specifically through its connection to a civic republican conception of freedom (as nondomination that is secured by separations of powers). Yet thin inequality is an important constituent of thick domination, so we must consider the vast quantitative literatures on the relationships between economic inequality, poverty, crime and war.
These bodies of literature are contradictory, contorted and confusing. At the individual level, people who are poor are much more likely to commit direct crimes of interpersonal violence such as assault, murder and rape, and common property crimes such as robbery, burglary and theft (Braithwaite 1979; but see Tittle et al. 1978). Unemployment may have a stronger impact on increasing the criminality of individuals with prior criminal records or with a propensity to crime than individuals who lack such predispositions (Aaltonen et al. 2013: 587). When it comes to major organisational crimes—corruption, embezzlement, price fixing, securities fraud, criminal profit shifting into tax havens, environmental crime, work safety crimes and genocide—poor people are generally not responsible because they do not have incumbency in the positions of organisational power required to be a lead perpetrator. In other words, opportunity is one variable that complicates the picture as we move from interpersonal murder to mass murder, from holding up banks at the point of a gun to pillaging them at the point of a pen (Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2018). Scions of high society can exploit the realisation that the best way to rob a bank is to own it; the homeless cannot. Systematic quantitative data on the relationship between organisational crime and inequality are scarce, though levels of organised crime (Pinotti 2015) and corruption are positively correlated with income inequality in the work of Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti (2014).

Most studies that compare census tracts of cities or whole cities, counties, states or standard metropolitan statistical areas find that districts and cities with higher levels of poverty or income inequality have higher crime rates (Braithwaite 1979; Chamberlain and Hipp 2015; Cheong and Wu 2015; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Scorzafave and Soares 2009), with poverty effects being somewhat more consistent than inequality effects on homicide in 47 studies analysed by Pridemore (2011: 752–3). With property crime, class-related opportunity structures again complicate the picture as we move from the individual level of analysis to ecological analysis. The richer opportunities in wealthy areas for crimes such as burglary and car theft have some effect in driving up rates in wealthy areas. Poor people who live close to rich areas commit more

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13 Time-series results on the impact on crime of changes in the level of inequality, poverty or unemployment have always been more inconsistent than data on individual poverty or ecological inequality cross-sectionally (see Brush 2007). Reconciling these differences in favour of seeing inequality as something that must be reduced to conquer crime has long been a focus of John Braithwaite’s research (Braithwaite 1979, 1991b; Kapuscinski et al. 1998).
property crime than other poor people. Poor areas adjacent to rich areas have higher property crime rates than poor areas far away from wealthy census tracts (Boggs 1965; Chamberlain and Hipp 2015; more generally on the spatial mobility of offenders, see Eck and Weisburd 2015: 17). When we aggregate to the societal level, statistical comparisons of societal property crime rates have limited meaning because some police forces are more efficient than others at recording petty property crimes (and the more common petty crimes drive the numbers, not serious crime). Also, in different legal systems, ‘burglary’, ‘break and enter’, ‘break without entering’ and ‘entering without breaking in’ can mean different things.14

With homicide rates, reasonably meaningful comparisons are possible, however, because it is hard for police forces to fail to record a body that turns up with a knife in its back. Homicide is also measured imperfectly, but has reasonably similar meanings cross-nationally. On the other hand, officially measured homicide rates tend to undercount homicide in the countries where it is worst and most militarised, as we saw with failures to count disappearances as homicides in El Salvador. With homicide, high income inequality is consistently associated with high homicide rates (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 1980; Fajnzylber et al. 2000; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Nivette 2011; but see Pare and Felson 2014;15 Pridemore 2011).16 Evidence of low-income countries having more crime has historically been inconsistent, although in recent decades it has become quite a consistent pattern that the high-income societies of Western Europe and East Asia have extremely low homicide rates. With falling US crime rates, its exceptionalism from an association between high income and low homicide has reduced (Butchart and Mikton 2014: 12).

14 When survey data are collected consistently across a large number of countries, as in Elgar et al.’s (2009) finding of a correlation of 0.62 between income inequality and rates of bullying in 37 countries, we can take an interest in the possibility that inequality is conducive to societal cultures of bullying. We should also be cautious, however, that the bullying measure might mean rather different things in translation among different tongues and societal contexts. In most, however, bullying has a meaning close to our conception of domination.

15 Pare and Felson (2014) find both strong inequality and strong poverty effects in increasing crime at the cross-national level. However, inequality effects disappeared after controlling for poverty.

16 Pridemore (2011) compares 47 studies to show that income inequality is consistently associated with higher homicide rates cross-nationally. His analyses further show that this relationship always remains if gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included in the model. However, he finds in a number of studies that, when child mortality is included in the model, the income inequality effect disappears.
Countries with a wide gap between the rich and the poor (or countries with a high Gini coefficient for income inequality) very consistently have higher homicide rates.

Braithwaite (1991b) has argued that at the societal level even the complication caused by the organisational crimes of the rich can be elegantly resolved. In radically unequal societies, the rich tend to enjoy unaccountable power, while the poor are desperately powerless. A narrow elite puts in place extractive political institutions that concentrate power in their hands; they disable constraints on the exercise of that power. This in turn allows the elite to put in place extractive economic institutions that exploit the rest of society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The powerful are able to buy their way out of trouble with the law, while the poor are denied access to justice in radically unequal societies. Hegemony and the purchase of impunity create profound opportunities for crimes of the powerful; the degradation, hopelessness, loss of identity and meaning of the poor foster crimes of the powerless. Hence, unequal societies have both more crimes of the powerless because the powerless are exploited and more crimes of the powerful because the powerful exploit (Braithwaite 1991b). Inequality produces crimes of exploitation and quite different crimes of the exploited.

The quantitative literature on civil war, GDP per capita and income inequality seems at first to paint a somewhat opposite picture. It is poverty conceived as national GDP per capita that predicts war, not inequality between rich and poor. ‘The bottom billion’ in GDP per capita is at profoundly greater risk of civil war. Moreover, Collier (2007: 19–20) summarises the literature as clearly showing that poverty contributes to war and war (or the anticipation of war) contributes to disinvestment and poverty. Wars also last longer in low-income countries (Collier 2007: 26) than elsewhere. Fearon and Laitin (2003), furthermore, found that low GDP per capita and weak institutions are associated with the onset of civil war, but they argue that GDP may be a proxy for weak institutions. In most studies, countries with high income inequality do not have higher risks of war, although Collier et al. (2004) found that conflicts in unequal societies lasted longer than elsewhere.

17 The frequency with which infant mortality emerges as a considerably stronger predictor than GDP per capita of the probability of civil war recurrence (e.g. Quinn et al. 2007: 187) might mean that infant mortality is an even better proxy for weak governance institutions.
When we move down to the village level, as in Nepal et al.’s (2011) study of 3,857 Nepalese villages (Chapter 9), villages/districts with a wide gap between landlords and landless have higher rates of war deaths. Systematic qualitative comparisons of dozens of rural Indian districts that have and have not experienced Maoist uprisings likewise conclude that locally unequal development is the key variable (e.g. Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009), as opposed to national inequalities. Local dominations are critical to decisions to join civil wars in village societies. Rome is far away and most poor people do not know or care much about the politics of the capital. Mobilisation is local rather than national in terms of putting together armed units that are motivated to take and hold a district. As illustrated by the rise of the Nepalese Maoists and the Taliban from very local concerns, once a local armed group pacifies a remote niche, this can become a base for building bigger ambitions and wider imaginaries as victories expand opportunities for power and plunder, and as alliances are forged with other armed groups in control of other districts. Grievances over national inequalities are not as critical to this process as the aggregation of grievances over very different kinds of local inequalities.

This perspective helps account for why Philip Verwimp (2005) found that poor and tenant farmers were overrepresented among génocidaires, while landlords were disproportionately victims. Poverty and promises of wealth were associated with recruitment to rebel armies in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Catherine Riordan (2013) points to this research and other data to suggest a conclusion for the inequality–war relationship similar to Braithwaite’s (1979, 1991b) about the inequality–crime relationship:

Recent findings indicate that in societies characterized by greater levels of inequality, members of both wealthy and poor ethnic groups are more likely to be involved than those whose income is near the national average (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). This could be explained by the engagement of the wealthy in conflict to defend their property, and the engagement of the poor in order to increase their wealth; or as a synergistic product of inequality: poor people increasingly participate in conflict as they become poorer, and wealthy people have more to contribute financially to conflict as they become wealthier, meaning that greater inequality drives greater participation into conflict (Esteban and Ray 2011). (Riordan 2013: 35)
Riordan’s interpretation of the data goes to the often heard rebuttal of the claim that terrorists are disproportionately poor people by reference to the wealth of Osama bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. Yes, top leaders may be disproportionately wealthy exploiters; however, the suicide bombers and foot soldiers are disproportionately poor, manipulated and exploited. The inequality–war relationship is complicated by the fact that fighting a war requires organisational capacity to mobilise many fighters and to buy credible weaponry. In this business, the rich have more organisational capacity (to enrol and coopt foot soldiers) than the poor, and greater buying power for weapons. Poverty and injustice do not cause war unless poor people with a grievance can connect with wealthy people who fund the logistics of feeding and arming troops. Barrington Moore (1966) reached the conclusion that landless peasants are unlikely to rise against their oppression unless some external power takes their side against the power that constrains them. Insurgencies of the disenfranchised do not scale up to winning wars without external sponsors. Aboriginal defenders of the Australian continent did not inflict major defeats on white land thieves because no external power, wealthy benefactor or diaspora was supplying arms to them. For the comparatively poor Taliban fighters of Kandahar in 1994, we saw that these financial backers initially were the Quetta trucking mafia who were fed up with being shaken down in this lawless zone, then, later, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Gulf petrodollars. Later, we saw that the destitute fighters of Peshawar’s refugee camps were connected to the wealth of Osama bin Laden.

Riordan (2013) goes on to argue that, as a long-deprived group in a society becomes better off, it has better means to engage in conflict (Besançon 2005). Consistent with Nepal et al. (2011), Riordan (2013: 35) then contrasts local with national inequality effects:

> When examined at the micro-level, however, areas of countries which had more absolute poverty were more prone to outbreaks of conflict, suggesting that inequality increased the risk of conflict (Buhaug et al. 2011; see also Buhaug and Rød 2006). It seems that not only does inequality play a role in the incidence of conflict, conflict itself further exacerbates economic inequality, although this effect diminishes over time and inequality typically returns to pre-war levels within five years after conflict ends (Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2010).

The capacity and opportunity to mobilise against governments and to have complaints listened to reduce armed violence, as does the absence of state-led discrimination against certain groups (Braithwaite et al. 2010a;
Cederman et al. 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2000, 2003; Goldstone 2008: 5; Gurr 1993, 2000; Linder and Bächtiger 2005; Rørbæk and Knudsen 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). The World Development Report (World Bank 2017: 8–9, 119) has taken up this theme, showing that societies with more even internal balances of power have less violent national security outcomes. We can conceive this considerable body of studies in different ways as measuring the positive impact of inequality of political power on armed violence, as opposed to inequality of wealth, although these different forms of inequality are themselves correlated.

Such positive associations of different kinds of inequality are the core of the theory of intersectionality in feminist theory (e.g. Cooper 2015). Societies in which gender-based violence is normal in families are more likely to engage in militarism and war than societies with lower levels of gender-based violence (Cockburn 2001; Erchak 1994; Erchak and Rosenfeld 1994; Levinson 1989; see also Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2009, 2012). One interpretation of this is that boys and young men who learn in families that they can get their way through violence experience reinforcement of violence that generalises to how they conduct themselves as men in the community and in international affairs (Patterson 2008). Societies where gender inequality is higher are more likely to deploy military power in conflicts (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2006; Hudson et al. 2009, 2012; Melander 2005; Sobek et al. 2006). In a variety of ways, Hudson et al. (2009; 2012: Ch. 4) have shown that states are more likely to enjoy security when the women who live in them enjoy security from domination. The evidence is consistent with the interpretation that gender inequality in a society grows sexual and gender-based violence and this increases the prospects of violence in the national and international politics of that society. Moreover, we have seen that, across South Asia, war has increased sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflict. So there is a recursivity that reinforces cycles of gender inequality, violence against women, war and then further increases in violence against women.

Intrasocietal violence against women is driven by an unequal politics of domination and humiliation in a way that helps us understand how violent patriarchy at home might promote armed violence against women abroad:

Humiliation [can] motivate violence among those humiliated and [more fundamentally] enables violence among those who humiliate. Hence, the degradation of women countenanced by men who do not grant women
CASCades of VioLence

dominion enables rape and violence against women on a massive scale in patriarchal societies, not to mention commercial exploitation of the bodies of women by actors who might ambiguously be labelled as white-collar criminals. Empirical work on homicides by men against women confirms that homicide can be viewed as an attempt by the male to assert ‘… their power and control over their wives’ (Wallace 1986: 126; Polk and Ranson 1991). (Braithwaite 1991b: 50)

Heirigs and Moore (2017) confirm that, after controlling for the Gini coefficient (and other controls), higher gender inequality is associated with higher homicide rates cross-nationally.

Plate 11.4 Australian Aboriginal prisoners in chains, c. 1890.
Source: State Library of Western Australia, Image 4497B/1.

One reason exploited poor people find it hard to organise nationally for the violent overthrow of the state is that a society’s poorest people are often a minority. Consider the invasion of the continents of North America and Australia by comparatively rich people from Europe. The invaders quickly became organised in states such as Massachusetts and Virginia and then in federal states—the United States of America, Canada and Australia—militarised with the most modern technologies for killing. Aboriginal Australians and Native Americans could give the first settlers a difficult time in pushing back the invaders of their land, but, as soon as
European numbers grew and mounted troops followed, genocide quickly spread and resistance collapsed. Aboriginal Australians did not have the resources or the national organisational capabilities to unify sufficiently to fight a credible war against the white state. Of course, local grievances often triggered local uprisings, which created opportunities to ‘teach blacks a lesson’. But, once Aboriginal Australians were stripped of the land that was the source of their wealth, once their population fell to less than 3 per cent of the population of their colonised country—an impoverished, dispersed 3 per cent without the resources to buy the guns to take on the superior firepower of the colonisers—civil war was unthinkable for them.

Hence, the deepest structural inequalities in the world, such as those that Aboriginal Australians continue to suffer, rarely lead to civil war. That is one important reason the statistical association between national inequalities and war is inconsistent. Inequality drives high crime rates in a different way, however. Aboriginal Australians committed murder and were victims of murder at seven to eight times the rate of the general population between 1989 and 2000 (Mouzos 2001). Their overrepresentation in the prison system is even worse. In fact, it is twice as bad again. Aboriginal Australians are disproportionately victims of state crime such as police violence compared with richer people with lighter skin, because they are an impoverished people whose identity and sense of meaning have been decimated, who have lost hope for themselves and who struggle to pass on hope to their children.18

Domination and inequality are highly correlated phenomena. The inductive theoretical conclusion of this book is that domination rather than poverty is the best specification to explain civil war. We can focus on domination within a Kalyvas (2003) model of local cleavages that interact with supralocal structural inequalities. As in Nepal et al.’s (2011) data, because mobilisation against grievances is local, village dominations can give rise to mobilisation of local armed groups, especially if supralocal linkages enable local access to organisational and financial capacities for

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18 Restorative forms of indigenous justice offer a limited micro strategy for resisting this form of domination. For example, in a recent Aboriginal sentencing circle in Canberra, Australia, Aboriginal elders asked a young man who committed a serious crime whether he was Ngunnawal, who was his ‘mob’ or tribe? He said he did not know who any of his relatives were. He was sentenced to producing a research report on who his relatives were and what his identity was. The elders offered their support on his journey of finding them. Two months later, he reported back not only on who his newly discovered mob were, but also on offers from his mob to help him with rehabilitation, with finding meaning in his identity and fighting nonviolently for it (Braithwaite research notes).
army formation. Chairman Mao understood this. It is why Maoist strategy was about building rural armed groups around the local grievances of the most immiserated peasants, who were most dominated by their landlords. Then Maoists spread this strategy from hotspot to hotspot until, ultimately, these village struggles connected. An armed countryside ultimately surrounds the capital. Our empirical conclusion is that dozens of Maoist struggles, mostly in quite remote regions of South Asia, continue today to successfully exploit local grievances and cause local killing. They are not so successful at connecting today (except in Nepal until 2006) and not so successful today in spreading a Maoist imaginary.

This book also explored the rise of very different kinds of grievances over local dominations typified by the rise of the Taliban. While local jihadist groups derive their sense of domination from the militarised oppression and exclusionary practices they experience in their corner of the Kashmir Valley, the Swat Valley, Iraq or Libya, as with Maoism, their sense of local grievance is connected to a global imaginary (about jihad against oppression by Western infidels and their Eastern dupes). Peacebuilding Compared finds that refugee camps and madrassas near them funded by jihadists are critical local sites for allying resentment over the local experience of domination to global cleavages, to a global domination imaginary and to global crowd-sourcing from rich sponsors.

This is another sense in which national inequality is not the best specification with which to approach domination. So why is national inequality not the best way to see the effects of domination? Why is domination at the local level (which intersects with more global imaginaries of domination) the more pressing imperative for civil war prevention? The domination of being a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon or Syria with no job, no home, no right to return home, no country, no access to education and subject to targeting and systematic murder by foreign armies illustrates why. In Peshawar, Al-Qaeda proved more adept at fixing those dominations than the UNHCR and Western humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (see Chapter 9, particularly Box 9.2). In addition, global domination of Muslims must be addressed. It is just as hard to reverse the colonial occupation of Arab lands by the West during World War I or the humiliation of the Mughal Empire by the British army in the previous century, as it is to reverse the European decimation of Aboriginal Australia or the indigenous nations of South Africa. Yet Apartheid can be dismantled and discrimination against Aboriginal Australians and Aboriginal land rights can be tackled—for example, through achieving
Australia’s ‘closing the gap’ targets. Likewise, discrimination against Arabs in Israel can be confronted, Palestinian land rights can be addressed with justice, Palestinian refugees can be given their right to return to their homeland and bombing of Gaza’s economic infrastructure and cutting off its economy from global markets (which delivers Gaza a 43 per cent unemployment rate) can end. In South Asia, Muslim Kashmiris can be given an active voice in shaping a permanent peace settlement for Kashmir that they view as fair in all circumstances, against the background of the complex of geopolitical realities that confronts their valley. Hindu and Sikh Kashmiris can likewise be respected with an active voice in those same processes.

An important recursive relationship here is, first, that state-based discrimination, particularly as measured in the Polity dataset, is associated with higher armed conflict (Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Cederman et al. 2011; Gurr 1968, 1970, 1993, 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Wimmer et al. 2009; but see Jakobsen and De Soysa 2009). Vadlamannati (2011) has confirmed Gurr’s (1970) ‘why men rebel’ conclusion on quantitative data across nine north-east Indian states. He found that poverty (compared with the rest of India) and economic and political discrimination explained outbreaks of violent conflict after controlling for income, population pressures, state capacity, ethnic affiliations, forest areas, peace years, neighbouring conflict incidence and distance to New Delhi. Furthermore, Rodrik (2000: 25), using the Polity dataset, showed that the ability of non-elites to access political institutions increases national economic growth. In other words, while national income equality might not consistently predict reduced armed conflict directly, poverty reduction does, and the non-discriminatory access of non-elites to political institutions predicts poverty reduction.

The ruthless exploitation of Muslim societies by Western oil magnates and multinationals, backed by gunboat diplomacy, has already receded; however, Muslims still experience so many other forms of humiliation and stigma in and by the West. Some Westerners consider insulting the prophet Mohammed a show of pride in the exercise of their freedom of speech. A president like Donald Trump can see humiliation of Muslims as paving the path to the White House. Some Westerners view ‘banning the

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19 And widening them to close more of the gaps that are critical drivers of domination, such as the gap in imprisonment rates between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australians. Available from: www.healthinfonet.ecu.edu.au/closing-the-gap/key-facts/what-are-the-targets (accessed 26 March 2017).
burqa’ as a secular security policy that applies equally to all, as a measure to liberate women, and not as a policy of religious discrimination. International human rights law is Western dominated, grounded in international law that comes from Christendom, closed to Sharia concepts of rights such as the right of a victim of serious crimes such as murder to forgive their perpetrator (J. Braithwaite 2016b). Sharia law is treated with utter disrespect in Muslim-minority countries; oaths are sworn in courtrooms on Bibles and when swearing in presidents and judges, while the holy Koran rarely enjoys such respect. All this, combined with popular culture that is disrespectful to Muslim beliefs and customs, leaves young Muslims feeling humiliated and dominated. These global dominations must be connected to the observation that most of the dominations local Muslims feel have a local character. In the 2005 Cronulla riots in Sydney between ‘Aussies’ and ‘Lebs’ (Lebanese), resentment over racism towards ‘Lebs’ had been palpable in restorative justice conferences over incidents of racial and religious abuse in Sydney high schools years in advance of the riots. Local restorative justice over local dominations in high schools, refugee detention centres, prisons, workplaces and rural towns is a way that countries such as Australia can struggle against these dominations that can lead some young Muslims beyond rioting with knives to suicide attacks with bombs and recruitment to Islamic State.

That is also a reason the restorative reconciliation committee work in the areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, described in Chapter 2, is important. As Braithwaite and Gohar (2014) argue, the reconciliation committees matter because they help prevent the cascading of civil war by resolving local dominations and humiliations and restoring order to areas where a collapse of the capacity to regulate violence gives the Taliban a foothold.

We see these reconciliation committees as rituals of anomie reduction, humiliation reduction and revenge reduction. For children who have been dealt a wretched hand in a refugee camp, as a survivor of a family wiped out by a drone, reconciliation rituals must also do better at offering placement into a high-quality education, to receive excellent vocational training and job placement into an economy that pays decent wages to people from impoverished backgrounds. Integration of economic justice and restorative justice is difficult but achievable. For the rape victims of Rolpa, integration of restorative forms of justice and economic justice in the People’s Courts was critical (Braithwaite 2015). Halving national gender inequality or the national Gini coefficient on its own is unlikely
to have much effect on the probability of further civil wars. The powerful linkage is to harness national equality policies to local reconciliation that heals local hurts, restores local dignity, repairs local harms and reverses local discrimination against the poor and excluded. On our analysis, healing of cleavages with an integrated local–national strategy might make a difference. Our micro–macro method leads us to see the interaction between local, national and international imaginaries of domination and injustice as needing a reparative policy yeast for the bread of positive peace to rise. That is why we suspect brute structural remedies to national injustice cannot do the job in isolation.

Let us, then, be more specific about the hypotheses we have induced from these varieties of data. National inequality reduction on its own bears a weak relationship to reduced prospects of war. National inequality reduction coupled with local inequality reduction, however, contributes to effectiveness in peacebuilding that reduces the prospects of war. Combining global reductions in inequality with addressing global imaginaries of domination and with national and local reduction of inequality can, even more strongly, reduce the incidence of war and crime on the planet. Reducing gender inequality at all levels seems particularly strategic. These seem to us the conclusions most consistent with the current state of the diverse kinds of evidence on inequality, crime and war that we have considered.

National income inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims therefore matter, even if local and global dominations and humiliations seem in our data to matter more. Having individual young Muslims being economically marginalised, unemployed or treated unjustly by the police certainly renders them more vulnerable to terrorism, just as it leaves them more vulnerable to all other forms of violent crime. Muslims who experience these things are more susceptible to recruitment to violence in the same way as non-Muslim young people who experience them are susceptible to crime. Reducing poverty helps—that is certainly a challenge of national policies. Of course, very few young Muslims who experience poverty become suicide bombers. Single acts of crime rarely make a difference to the state of anomie in a society. Even so, a society that lifts its young people out of poverty can have less crime and chaos on its streets and fewer people who are susceptible to recruitment to violent jihad in prison or in front of their internet screen. Jihadist strategists learned the lesson that poor children who need an education, or bereft refugees, are
good targets. They learned that rural anomie enables the seizure of local power. So why cannot those who work against their violence give priority to fixing these same dominations?

Changing tack, one critical reason that states with low GDP per capita have recurrent civil wars is that poor states cannot afford good state institutions, especially accountability institutions, and have not even learnt how to build them. As a result, the state often falls prey to criminalisation. Ultimately, ambitious alternative leaders seize opportunities to use armed force to overthrow the criminals who strip state assets. Sadly, the successors are often warlords who have the ruthlessness and resources to organise armies. Usually, their ambition is also to criminalise the state for their advantage. Hence a fundamental way to prevent war is to help states grow out of poverty and grow their institutions. This is also Paul Collier’s (2007) empirically grounded prescription about ‘the bottom billion’.

Equally, it follows that an imperative is a security sector that does not dominate the society through militarisation, and especially does not further dominate refugees through militarisation. Rather, a security sector is needed that protects citizens from domination. That means a community policing service that protects women from rape. It means a state military (with support from UN peacekeepers, if necessary) that can subjugate any and all other armed factions that threaten domination of people who live in the community. A police force that protected women from rape was what was missing in Rolpa, Nepal (Chapter 9). Indeed, the problem was police and their proxies perpetrating the rape. A legitimate state military that could shut down armed gangs dominating the people was what was missing in Kandahar in 1994, in Libya since 2011 and in the DRC for decades. Our propositions are about how the security sector can be either the principal driver of dominations that cause war or the principal guarantor against domination. Many Western states and some developing states have legitimate security sectors under democratic rule-of-law control. They do the job in preventing the worst dominations that can cause armed conflict, so there is no mystery about what is needed. This imperative, however, has sadly eluded the security sectors that impose militarised domination in all the major South Asian states.

This is not to say that these militarisations are cut from the same cloth. No other South Asian society has the degree of militarisation of politics of Pakistan or an intelligence service as powerful as the ISI. Myanmar did until quite recently, however, and perhaps still does. Bangladesh,
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have more militarised security sectors than Nepal, Bhutan or India (except in Kashmir). In each chapter, we have shown that the qualitative texture of how institutions are militarised is quite distinctive in each of these societies. It follows that each society needs nationally attuned accountability institutions crafted to call their distinctive dominations to account. In rural Kashmir, that means something very different than in Mumbai.

In sum, even though low GDP predicts war but less so crime, and national inequality predicts crime but less so war, both crime and war can be reduced by tackling poverty and inequality in an integrated way at all levels. Part of the integrated social justice strategy required also involves making power accountable at all levels, especially the power of the security sector, and tackling domination and humiliation at the local level, the refugee camp level, the bank level, the national level and at the level of global imaginaries and global institutions. Most importantly, these strands of a web of peace must be joined up. That is difficult and patient work for weavers of a fabric of peace and non-domination. Expressed another way, reducing inequality at the national level is part of an integrated peacebuilding design that can help create an enabling environment for crime and war prevention at the local level. Quality schools and jobs near refugee camps might be more important to crime–war–suicide prevention than macro national equality; yet, without national institutions for creating good schools, good jobs and good state services for placing disadvantaged people into them, local jirgas or peace committees cannot pull in the state welfare capabilities to realise their potential for crime–war–suicide prevention. Wherever poverty remains at the local level, wherever desperate refugees congregate, local domination will drive crime and will drive war when it connects to a more global imaginary of armed struggle against injustice.

Restorative justice that is also locally redistributive can therefore help. Peace committees that listen to stories of dominations and humiliations at all these levels and follow up on plans to ensure that domination and humiliation end can help. Reconciliation with social justice is required at higher levels for more aggregated dominations. Reconciliation with social justice at the local level must be put in the context of local dominations and humiliations. That is why the reconciliation committees in rural Pakistan are important as both peacebuilding and crime-prevention initiatives. For groups who have suffered national degradation, this aggregates to the importance of national reconciliation, reintegration and ‘justice as a better
future’ through truth and reconciliation commissions.\(^{20}\) It goes to reform of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice so they can play not only important legal justice roles but also social justice and reconciliatory roles to reintegrate the victims of domination.\(^{21}\) It means strengthening UN peace operations to be always able to stand behind state security sectors when they need help to protect their people from domination. Of course, when state security sector actors are doing the domination, the international role shifts from supporting that security sector to transforming it, and regulating it through international support for domestic accountability institutions. A UN peacebuilding imaginary of strengthening non-domination in a wide variety of ways is needed, from gender rights to children’s and victim’s rights and to the rights of indigenous peoples to their forests—to strengthening the entire spectrum of accountability institutions. This means economically efficient investments in peacebuilding, particularly in funding accountability institutions. Then societies can be enabled to lift their people out of poverty by resisting the criminalisation of the state. This means freeing the shackles of corruption and crony capitalism. All this is hard to do; yet societies are variably successful in doing it. It is hard because it is complex and because it requires more resilience than that enabled by the resources available to the forces for inequality, domination or corruption. Ours has been a long account of the interscalar relationships among domination, inequality and violence that is more complex than most such analyses. Chapter 12 turns to the complex character of helping societies to learn from each other’s failures and successes with these challenges.

\(^{20}\) We are indebted to Clifford Shearing for the expression ‘justice as a better future’ as an articulation of the kind of justice poor South Africans wanted during the 1990s in Zwelethemba Model peace committee meetings.

\(^{21}\) Kathryn Sikkink’s (2011) empirical work on the ‘justice cascade’ across all states that experienced transition between 1974 and 2004 and Olsen et al.’s (2010) dataset on human rights prosecutions, amnesties and truth commissions are more or less consistent in finding weak effects of each of these transitional justice interventions on their own. But, when human rights prosecutions, truth commissions and amnesties are all in harness during transitional justice, or when at least two of the three are in harness, there is a solid impact in reducing subsequent repression and human rights abuses. Moreover, this impact cascades to geographically proximate countries in Sikkink’s results. As in our earlier analysis, these results can be interpreted as further evidence for an integrated approach to supports and sanctions if transformation to non-domination is to be accomplished.
Conclusion: A cascades mentality

Peace movement activists might concede a little admiration for the strategic thought of Chairman Mao, Che Guevara and Islamic State strategists. They had an imaginary of a diaspora of warriors against injustice in remote locations who could ultimately connect to achieve transformative things. They advanced their imaginary in circumstances in which their followers were geopolitically weak. Che Guevara (2003: 350) expressed it as ‘[c]reate two, three, many Vietnams’. Their accomplishments were not small: reversing the military gains of a decade of fighting by Western militaries in Iraq, inspiring platoons of peasants to take over a country as massive as China and even the smaller transformations in Cuba or Nicaragua.

Model mongers of the peace movement likewise have a bold imagination. Weak cells of nonviolence activists can connect through a global imaginary of peace with justice, but only as long as they can be relevant to the hurts that people feel locally. They can work at establishing little zones of peace in the midst of desperate lands such as Somalia, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, or even in implausible toeholds for reconciliation committees safe from the suicide bombers inside the fortified walls of Pakistani police stations. Kathryn Sikkink’s findings about the ‘justice cascade’ of transitional justice human rights prosecutions and truth commissions (see footnote 22) are rather like this:

[T]he justice cascade started in domestic politics in the semi-periphery and diffused outwards and upwards through horizontal diffusion from one country to another, and then via bottom-up vertical diffusion from individual countries to international organisations and international NGOs. (Sikkink 2011: 250)

Many jihadists had a cascade imaginary of jihad in Indian Kashmir, then in Afghanistan, then across Pakistan to beyond the old Mughal Empire, connecting to a modelling of violent jihad across the Middle East and North Africa through Central Asia. So, too, can peacemakers have an imaginary of peace in Kashmir spreading infectiously to help peace in Afghanistan. That, in turn, can help peace in Balochistan, Iranian border regions and Central Asia. If that regional peace could eventually grow so strong as to enable nuclear disarmament of India and Pakistan, that would renew mightily the vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. If at least there could be a nuclear arms reduction and stabilisation treaty
between an India and a Pakistan that both flourished economically in a peaceful trading relationship, the risk of nuclear terrorism could recede worldwide. Then one long-term hope for a cascade of peace might be Israel beginning to feel more secure about nuclear disarmament because it would live in less fear of nuclear attack from Saudi Arabia or Iran supported by a mobile Pakistani nuclear capability.

To achieve that first step of peace in Kashmir, international support must surge behind hundreds of thousands of nonviolent protesters for peace with azadi on the streets of Srinagar the next time a local surge equivalent to the events of 2009 and 2010 occurs. The global peace movement can aim to make it a vote-catching imperative for political leaders in New Delhi, Islamabad, Washington, and Berlin to listen and then support a final overdue diplomatic surge to peace in Kashmir. In that peace process, pressure must come for peace that surges bottom up as well as top down, that softens the Kashmir border in a way that truly means something to ordinary Kashmiris and that takes concrete measures to end the militarisation of Kashmir—to end domination by democracy, the brutalisation of youth and the rape of women and liberates the promise of Kashmiri economic opportunity.

The peace movement can aspire to educate the great powers about the precise reasons that, since 1989, great powers have acted against their own interests in Afghanistan and against the interests of the people of Afghanistan. The peace movement fared better at this project of learning from errors of history in Vietnam because it persuaded the centre and leftist parties of democracies that Vietnam was a reckless and immoral folly. The peace movement has not convinced the Democratic Party in the United States of that, nor many of the world’s social democratic parties.

Today, some leadership towards educating the West of its folly is beginning to come from the most unlikely of places among some of the most experienced military commanders. February 2015 saw Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, leader of the US Army Capabilities Integration Center at its Training and Doctrine Command, point a finger at US doctrinal delusions that took root in the 1990s after the seemingly quick Gulf War ‘victory’. It was known as ‘the revolution in military affairs’. That 1990s lingo included ‘full-spectrum dominance’ and ‘rapid, decisive operations’. ‘War was going to be fast, cheap and efficient’, General McMaster lamented (Brannen 2015: 1). After $1 trillion of US defence
spending in Afghanistan and Iraq and a decade and a half of making things worse, the language with which Donald Rumsfeld dressed up these ‘fast, cheap and efficient’ invasions rings hollow. McMaster said:

I think in many ways what we learn from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could in the future be as important as the outcomes of those wars. If we learn the wrong lessons, we’ll engage in the kind of self-delusion we engaged in in the 1990s. (Brannen 2015: 1)

McMaster had been there before. As a young major, McMaster published a book called *Dereliction of Duty* (1998), which was openly critical of what he saw to be failed leadership during the Vietnam War. Intriguingly, General McMaster was appointed in February 2017 as President Trump’s third choice as National Security Advisor. So, there could be a glimmer of hope there for a voice that might moderate President Trump’s propensities to cascade violence.

This book argues that the critical lessons to learn are about the catastrophic ways violence can cascade. One reckless lesson would be that we should draw back from peacebuilding because it is costly. That is the reasoning that for decades caused underinvestment in constantly working at peace talks on Kashmir, underinvestment in UN peacekeeping, in rebuilding and reconciliation after the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. Western peacekeepers should have had boots on the ground in Libya to disarm militias under a UN flag after the fall of Gaddafi. That work would have been dangerous. Yet, for a Europe reeling from thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea of refugees launched from chaotic Libya and reeling from the Manchester bombing of May 2017 launched from Libya, we can look back on UN peacekeeping as a risk that should have been taken. There has been underinvestment in supporting cascades of nonviolence and in preventive diplomacy to stop cascades of violence in these places. Social movement energy to educate the world community is a starting point for a surge upwards of the graph of nonviolent struggles in Figure 11.1 during the decades ahead—old friends Gandhi and Bacha Khan shining.
Conclusion: Cascades and complexity

Understanding transformative possibilities in complex systems

This chapter concludes by reconsidering each of our 10 propositions in light of the complexity of social forces. How do we nurture peacebuilding that is a complex adaptive system rather than a complex maladaptive system trapped in its own templates? One reason peacebuilding systems are complex is that leadership from below and above can be shown to accomplish forms of learning that make deterministic understandings of the system no longer true. Indeed, we can define a complex adaptive system as one that learns about its own large number of interacting components. Change in any subsystem can change the circumstances confronting every other part of emergent systems that self-organize and evolve. In biology, we know such systems are “pregnant” with the possibility of breakdown and breakup (Thompson 2003: 11). In peacebuilding, complexity is likewise alive with possibilities of self-organising transformation that adept practitioners of the craft learn to do.

The challenge for positive social science is that complex systems interact with so much intricacy and so many nonlinear feedback loops that they cannot be predicted by standard linear equations: so many variables are at work in the system that its overall behaviour can only be understood as an emergent consequence of the holistic sum of all the myriad behaviors embedded within. (Levy 1993: 34)
One contribution of Part II of our book, we hope, is improved holistic understanding—indeed, interscalar understanding—of greater India’s and South Asia’s emergent character as spaces and histories of violence and nonviolence of myriad forms.

This chapter ends with a proposal for an open-source preventive diplomacy wiki as a response to the complexity we reveal in the task of preventing cascades of violence and encouraging cascades of nonviolence.

**Complexity or chaos**

Adapting responses to cascading violence in light of insights of complexity or chaos theory requires peacebuilding policies that frequently fail fast, learn fast and adapt fast. When they fail to do that, they must learn and adapt more slowly. Skills in ambiguation are not so much absent in international relations and criminology, as huddled in opposing epistemological tribes. This tribalism segments the community of scholars who study how violence rises and falls. In conditions of complexity, explanatory concepts must disambiguate sparingly. A sequenced epistemology is proposed: first, examine simple lessons from quantitative evidence-based social science such as the finding that, on average, UN peace operations reduce the recurrence of violence quite a lot. When this proves too simple a conclusion in the face of the unpredictability of emergence, layer probes that enable qualitative research on adaptation. Finally, the focus of evaluation research shifts to meta-analyses of meta-strategies. This asks which are the most effective theories for how to layer iterated responses to policy failure?

This section adapts the Cynefin framework (Kurtz and Snowden 2003; Snowden and Boone 2007; Warne et al. 2004: 47), which is just one approach to complexity and chaos. Cynefin partitions the social world into the known, the knowable (but not known), the complex and the chaotic. We simplify by collapsing contexts for understanding violence into the known, the knowable and the complex. The complex and the chaotic are collapsed *not* because the theoretical differences between the two are minor. Rather, they are combined because our theoretical prescriptions for responding to the unknowability of chaos are the same as those for responding to the unknowability of complexity.

Even if Snowden and Boone’s (2007) Cynefin strategy differences were convincing in application to violence, the ability of peace researchers to distinguish complexity from chaos on the ground can be questioned.
One reason for this is our hypothesis that, as complexity and chaos theories develop, we will find that social systems are rarely deterministic chaotic systems, and are much more often complex systems. For the moment, that itself is unknowable. Because it is unknowable, an intervention theory that covers both possibilities is more serviceable. A difference of note here is that complex systems are not deterministic, while chaos theory is the study of elaborate, difficult to understand systems that are deterministic. The determinism of chaos theory is only seemingly chaotic. In an ordinary language usage of the word complex, chaos theory is complex because very minor changes to initial conditions can radically change the outcome of the system. This is the flap of the butterfly wing in Libya that causes a typhoon in Haiti.

What chaotic and complex systems have in common is that they are fragile and hard to comprehend. Yes, they are fragile for different reasons. For chaos theory, fragility arises from that extreme sensitivity to minor differences in initial conditions. For complexity theory, fragility arises from the indeterminate way cascades work. Sometimes dynamic networks cascade into network-wide domino effects; on other occasions, modest shocks do not cascade—the system wobbles a bit and pulls itself back together. The ambition for peace operations, conceived in this framework, is to help them become complex adaptive systems that pull peace back together in this way. Starting with Kashmir and the early Congolese peace operations, however, we have lamented in this book that they are often complex maladaptive systems for managing violence. Theoretically, the idea of complex adaptive systems for the multilevel governance of peace has much in common with Bob Jessop’s (2017) notion of reflexive self-governance and meta-governance (governance of governance) as fuzzy but strategic. Jessop (2017: 33) conceives this as developing a ‘repertoire of modes of co-ordination so that’ governance and meta-governance ‘can respond to signs of failure’.

Emergence distinguishes complex from chaotic systems. Emergence means the impact of a shock is inherently unpredictable. Macrosociological change shares this emergence feature of complexity theory. Macro changes occur that we cannot causally trace back to any particular event or agent. Whether uncertainty arises from the practical unknowability of unmeasurable tiny variations in initial conditions, or from emergence, our prescription is for peacebuilders (be they the United Nations or rural villagers) to be ready with a theory of how to layer probes into the system one after the other. Probing peace researchers of complexity do not know
which probe might have an impact. They monitor the consequences of the probe and then adapt the probes that have an impact in a way that is responsive to the nature of the feedback. Consider this example of a complex situation. Soldiers are trapped in a World War II foxhole behind enemy lines. Bullets crisscross their refuge seemingly from every direction. Analysis paralysis is fatal in this situation because, if the soldiers wait it out, the enemy will eventually overwhelm and kill them.

They discuss where they would position their firepower were they the enemy, their suppositions about the enemy's movements, to diagnose options for a breakout to friendly lines. They decide first to send a soldier in this direction; if he moves for 10 seconds without drawing fire, they will all follow. If he is killed instantly, they will wait for five minutes then try to break out in a different direction. Or they might have more than two layered probes of how to strike out in multiple diversionary directions. They might at first furtively crawl out. If that gets them close enough to a machine gun, they change strategy to running to hurl a grenade and break through. Once they have broken through to the area that lies between the enemy and their own forces, they have moved themselves into a knowable world, a world where the directions of enemy fire and of friendly fire are both more knowable.

Because analysis paralysis is fatal for soldiers in conditions of unknowability, the Australian Defence Force teaches chaos and complexity theory to soldiers as junior as its 'strategic corporals' via the Cynefin framework. This teaches them that there are 'knowns' in warfare: if a situation is categorised as an attack by a tank, it is known that even high-calibre bullets will bounce off. In less complex, less networked times, more was known about what makes for success in warfare. Two centuries ago, soldiering was more about standard operating procedures such as drilling soldiers to hold a straight line under fire (the 'known' quadrant of the Cynefin framework where soldiers can categorise and act). This is no longer true in a world where adversaries can network in a varied web of options against you and might or might not have drones deployed that allow them to know more about you than you know about them. More warfare is fought in the realms of the unknown or complex. If the facts are unknown but knowable, at least techniques such as scenario planning are possible. In the realms of the complex or chaotic, only probing into the incomprehensible may be possible. Soldiers probe to see what happens until they can make some sense of the situation, gradually drawing the context back into the realm of the knowable or the known.
Normal social science and complexity: Towards a responsive intervention theory

Normal social science assumes that the patterning of violence is knowable. It also tends to privilege the probes of one kind of actor, the state, as the most relevant kind for controlling violence. To transform social science into something more useful, we must radically loosen both the knowability and the public policy presumptions. That said, the responsive intervention theory we advance here has as its first layer an evidence-based strategy that presumes knowability. Yet we do presume that because worlds of cascading violence are mostly not knowable, the evidence-based strategy will mostly fail. Cascades to unlikely catastrophes such as World War I illustrate unknowability in this book. Complexity implies seeing outliers as sometimes more important than averages, tails more important than Gaussian bell-curve dogmas for a world where evolution occurs in jerks. We must then have a policy design (which is more plural than just a state policy design) for how to layer further probes into the unknowable.

‘Best practicitis’ (Ramalingam 2013: 33) and evidence-based policy can be public policy curses. They indoctrinate private and public policymakers to persist with evidence-based policy when it is demonstrably failing in new contexts. They can work when local contexts are well understood (as Duncan Green explains in How Change Happens, 2017: Part IV). Even that is too simple because it is unknown whether an evidence-based practice will work when the context is known to be different from the one in which it was tested. Westendorf’s (2015) qualitative comparison of Why Peace Processes Fail finds that a technocratic approach is the main culprit because, at heart, peace processes are political and they fail without responsiveness to local politics; a politically and socially attuned approach is more likely to succeed than technocratic best practice. Our submission is for responsiveness to context that begins by trying to make standard operating procedures or evidence-based best practice guidelines work only as a first layer of strategy. They can work in areas that are low in complexity, like peace operation logistics, building schools and payroll management. There are tried and true methods for detecting when employees have been overpaid or underpaid for their hours worked. There is also good evidence, for example, that if police are deployed to hotspots in response to computer mapping of crime, crime can be reduced at the hotspot and prevented from cascading from the hotspot (Braga et al. 2014). The criminological evidence provides little guidance on what police should
do, however, when they are deployed to those hotspots. Our colleague Clifford Shearing offers peacekeepers the counsel of master practitioners of policing to ‘act like you are on holidays’ if they wish to calm difficult situations (Shearing and Ericson 1991). That is probably good advice. Yet police and peacekeepers can only acquire wisdom about how to layer that demeanour with switches to firm or severe demeanours through feedback experiences from probes with those demeanours.

Boundaries between the known, the knowable and the complex cannot be taken as hard. The complex spaces of policing will have a minority of spaces that are known (such as logistics). Indeed, it can be best to start by fixing what is known because these minority contexts of the known are usually in play in violence control—where checklists, templates and standard operating procedures allow us to categorise and act successfully. There is no sense in failure to cash in on knowability where the known is robust. Why stumble around with probes in those worlds where a good checklist would get us on track?

There is little doubt that, compared with peace studies, medicine has made larger strides in moving the knowable into the realm of the known. This has helped human beings live much longer. Of course, individual patients may be complex, but less so than social systems of millions of human beings and the institutions emergent from their interaction. Medicine has achieved success by iteration between randomised controlled trials and clinical method. When we experience cancer at close quarters in our families, we learn that doctors may prescribe an intervention backed by randomised controlled trials that works in slowing a malignancy. Then one day the doctor announces that a tumour has doubled. The complex system surrounding the cancer has passed some unknown threshold beyond which the clinician believes this therapy no longer works. She then suggests a new layer of therapy in which she has less confidence than the therapy of first choice. The family then participates in the difficult clinical judgment as to whether a quicker but more peaceful death might be better, or whether to try to probe with more speculative third or fourth therapies that work infrequently or are not yet properly evaluated.

A good clinician improves the quality of these judgments with problems more tractable than cancer, such as infections, by trying one theory after another until the infection goes away. The clinician never has a scientific warrant for knowing that the infection disappeared because of her intervention. The fact that the infection stopped immediately after the intervention is a kind of evidence that her theory was right, but it is poor-
quality evidence. What we do know is that by being well-trained detectives within complex systems, by being a doctor who is a good clinician rather than a clairvoyant, and being detectives who run down checklists based on some degree of evidence, we cure more infections on average. Theory provides reflective practitioners with generative metaphors. Conversations among clinicians through clinical rounds and other means provide new lenses, new ways of seeing or framing the problem (Morgan 1997). The existence of one symptom leads the doctor to do detective work checking other symptoms associated with a certain syndrome. They look for side-effects. In the body/environment system, they watch for and seek to understand feedback loops that can render the cure worse than the disease or that can take the patient up to a new level of wellbeing. We have all experienced how good clinicians do this kind of detective work to diagnose the often complexly interacting root causes of our health.

Plural lenses push us to ask questions about the similarities and differences between the clinical problem and the metaphorical scenario of the theory. The good clinician asks about (family) history: context and background become important for the diagnosis. The good clinician is a detective who asks a lot of journalist’s questions—what, who, how, when, where, why—to get the time line of the story clear. The good clinician ‘thinks in a stream of time’ (Neustadt and May 1986) to develop a contextual, integrated, joined-up, multiple-mechanism strategy to fix the problem. But because this beneficent new equilibrium in the system will eventually break down, regular check-ups watch for this. The excellent clinician is also regenerative, seeking to use each bout of illness not merely to restore the status quo, but also as an opportunity to move the patient to a higher level of wellbeing. Complexity enables excellent clinicians to prioritise the pursuit of opportunities as well as the management of risk. This is also true of good regulators of violence who seize opportunities to create the good society out of conditions of complexity.

Good clinicians of health or violence control are neither determinedly deductive theorists nor determinedly inductive. They are skilled at shuttling backwards and forwards between deduction and induction (Scheff 1990).\footnote{Strictly, as Philip Pettit commented in a personal communication, abduction means ‘inference to the best explanation’. He quoted the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy: ‘the best way to distinguish between induction and abduction is this: both are ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) contained in the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences), but in abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations, whereas in induction there is not.’} Scanning improves when that abduction also occurs
between explanatory theory and normative theory, between values and what will work in realising them (Pettit and Braithwaite 2000). Complexity science has taught us that many systems adapt over time, without a global equilibrium, perhaps with multiple equilibriums. Evolution happens by switching equilibriums, generating perpetual novelty. That is why we should seek a doctor to treat our disease who is both knowledgeable about the known and clinically gifted in how to probe and adapt within the uncertainties of complexity. Randomised controlled trials allow us to be more credibly evidence based. Their problem is that they allow us to look at just one or a few causes at a time and do not help us understand the dynamics of how these causal factors push system effects across thresholds. Their findings offer limited guidance when we are dealing with complexes of many interacting causes (Sachs 2005).

For all these limitations, the responsive theory of peacebuilding proposed here starts first with trying what is known from evidence-based social science.² Responsive peacebuilding探es cautiously at first with strategies that are evidence based. It monitors feedback to glean qualitative information about why a strategy like holding an election fails when it does fail in a particular context. That may even inform the design of a subsequent probe into the unknown with a strategy that evidence-based peacebuilding shows on average to be a failure.

Because many domains of practice are quite well known, evidence-based standard operating procedures are invaluable as first cuts at problem solving. We well know from the history of business empires, however, that standard procedures like Henry Ford’s production line can generate great wealth for long periods of history until what is required for manufacturing excellence becomes too complex for those standard operating procedures. Corporate graveyards are full of firms that stuck too long with old evidence-based templates. As capitalism and its governance have become more radically dynamic and complex, the speed has quickened for the obsolescence of yesterday’s evidence-based practice. Likewise with peacebuilding, we are rather good at fighting the last war.

That said, the danger of assuming complexity and rejecting knowability up front is that we miss opportunities for violence control within the realms of the known and the knowable. When it is known that police

² This approach is also discussed in the working paper by Campbell et al. (2016), from which parts of this chapter are drawn.
departments improve effectiveness by setting up the logistics of a crime-mapping capability and then deploy to hotspots, that can be a useful starting point. A starting point is all it is because the police assigned to a hotspot might be racists who abuse the ethnic other and use excessive force in arrests and thereby cause a civil war to break out at a place such as the Bougainville copper mine hotspot (Braithwaite et al. 2010b), at the very place where policing was most critical, at the place where the rape of a nurse, which was another major spark in this conflict, also occurred.

State strategic planning starts with the correct insight that if the state does not do synoptic strategic planning to solve certain big social problems then maybe no one will. It also starts with the normally correct insight that the state has most legitimacy for convening a wide-ranging and plural policy conversation about what are the highest priorities for their society. Then it proceeds to the apt insight that, if it does not measure progress in achieving those priorities, attention will drift to other less important things that are being measured. Peter Drucker is frequently falsely accused of expressing this as ‘you can’t manage what you can’t measure’. So states feel the imperative to plan, prioritise and concentrate measurement resources on those priorities. Then they must also prepare for all manner of failures of that process as a result of complexity, including complexity induced by agents of the state themselves when they game the measurement process by, for example, ‘creaming’ easy cases.

Tony Blair was a political leader who saw all those imperatives of political leadership clearly and embraced them more passionately than other leaders who mostly ‘muddle through’ (Lindblom 1959). Yet, he was also an example of a failed political leader because he did not see those steps as just starting points in a process of good government. He did not layer plural probes and monitor and adjust in a way that was responsive to complexity, especially in Iraq. A more established documentation of this problem was Robert McNamara, whiz-kid of US Air Force Statistical Control in World War II, who was hired by Henry Ford for his strategic planning and later became Ford’s chief executive officer. McNamara as US Secretary of Defense applied his Fordist defence strategy to the Vietnam War: ‘We first determine what our foreign policy is to be, formulate a military strategy to carry out that policy, then build the military forces to conduct that strategy’ (Ramalingam 2013: 45). Former US defence chief and secretary of state Colin Powell recounts how McNamara would arrive in Vietnam declaring that ‘[e]very quantitative measurement … shows that we are winning the war’ (Ramalingam 2013: 46). McNamara’s
measures were famously imperfect in grasping what was most important about the complex evolution of the war. As an old man, McNamara recanted his rationalist strategic planning, acquiring an exaggerated view of the impossibility of coming to grips with ‘the fog of war’. His failure, like Blair’s, was not in being passionate about priority setting, measurement and strategic planning; it was in being myopic about them, failing to probe the complexity that strategic planning simplified into a ‘conspiracy of illusion’.

**Layering strategies in the face of complexity**

Evidence-based social science shows how much can be achieved by further strengthening what is already strong, such as strengthening a functioning education system. The language of Harvard’s Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation model—step, learn, adapt, take another step—has virtues (Andrews et al. 2015). When the fruits of intervention are disappointing, the responsive peacebuilder does two things. The first is qualitative process evaluation research on why the intervention failed. The second is to probe with new layers of strategies that are as evidence based as they can be. The second and third layers of strategy are almost certain to be less evidence based than our first priority. New targets for measurement are also selected at that point.

Unfortunately, evidence-based guidance on what to do in real-world policy dilemmas is usually thin and misleading. It will often be the case that the best evidence we have on which strategy to layer next will be grounded in feedback on what went wrong in our first layer of strategy. Layering assumes that, in a complex world, we must step, learn, adapt and take another step. Each layered strategy is a safety net covering the failure of the strategy before it. We design redundant diversity into our layers of strategy so we might cover the weaknesses of one strategy with the strengths of another.

Critics of this approach to business regulation, called responsive regulation, say it expects too much of street-level regulators, police or strategic corporals to learn how to fail, learn and adapt to failure. One reply is that this is how ordinary people learn to be good gardeners or good parents (Braithwaite 2011). Biologists have a word for describing the process of how solutions emerge from failure, of how to reject the majority of adaptations that fail and adapt the tiny few that make things
better. It is achieved without an organisational genius in charge and is called evolution (Harford 2011). Former Australian prime minister Paul Keating rated Deng Xiaoping the most brilliant political leader of the twentieth century. Yet Deng was no analytic whiz-kid like Donald McNamara or even Tony Blair. His most famous saying was ‘cross the river by feeling the stones’. Deng meant feel your way forward in an uncertain world you are not smart enough to understand; stay grounded as you probe incrementally. Our key task as peacebuilders is to help peace operations acquire an improved capacity to adapt as systems—that means nurturing variation and selection, just as in evolution. It means ensuring that templates do not kill off variation and selection.

There are various theories about how to order the layering of strategies. Economic theory counsels attempting the cheapest strategies first in an iterated search to maximise cost-effectiveness. Of course, policy dialogue can result in cost being just one of the considerations in a conversation about layering strategy. The approach suggested here puts more emphasis on first trying evidence-based theories from the realm of the known. Successive layers then become progressively less evidence-based. Even as this is executed, evidence-based theories provide an array of generative metaphors to guide disparate, redundant attempts to improve things. Republican political theory (Pettit 1997) suggests that we should attempt less dominating, more procedurally fair strategies before we attempt more punitive and dominating strategies such as war or locking alleged criminals in prisons. By resorting to more deterrent, less respectful forms of social control after more dialogic forms have first been tried, coercive last resorts come to be seen as more legitimate. When regulation is seen as more legitimate and more procedurally fair, compliance is more likely (Tyler 1990; Tyler and Huo 2001) and the dangers of anomie can be tamed.

Ambiguate and adapt to failure in the face of complexity

As each layer of strategy fails, process evaluation suggests adaptations. These are discussed in conjunction with layers of a regulatory pyramid discussed in advance as safety nets to catch failures at lower layers of

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3 Paul Keating said this in a conversation with John Braithwaite and has said the same publicly.
strategy. Generally, however, good peacebuilders make lateral moves first to adapt a strategy that is failing in the face of complexity (Braithwaite 2008: 97–100). An extra ingredient may be added or a counterproductive piece excised from the strategy. Andrews et al. (2015) emphasise the importance of strengthening the authorising environment to ‘push problem driven positive deviance’. Conservative UN bureaucracies need reform to authorise positive deviance that adapts in response to failure. Widening networks of engagement for solving the problem is the most generically useful strategy of adaptation.

Ambiguation of objectives and strategies is imperative in a complex world. In a known world, ambiguity is bad. Positive science requires clear definition of concepts to be tested with precision about where they explain and where they do not. The known world of this normal science is one we can categorise. When a situation fits the clearly defined category, science tells us what policymakers can do with what effects. It can reveal what best practice is and which policy template or standard operating procedure will work.

In the world of complexity, this ‘flight from ambiguity’ (Levine 1988) is dangerous. As we are tossed hither and thither on the winds of complex social climates, it can be best to adapt our definition of what a sail is so we can deviate and adapt with new kinds of sails that catch winds of social change in innovative ways. Premature closure is a pathology of the way liberal peace templates have failed to progress. Most social theory is banal in its first iterations; peacebuilding theories tend to stay banal because peacebuilders are weak at savouring and tweaking the ambiguities of theories to develop them into something less banal. Theorists who view their contributions as mostly provisional and mostly wrong are excoriated for constantly shifting the goalposts by graduate students interested in testing a theory. Responsiveness to complexity requires iterative shifting of goalposts. Through the process of adaptation, we learn that it is impossible to kick goals with most static theories of intervention. But, if we iteratively adjust the goalposts, it becomes possible to kick increasingly valuable goals. Normative theory (ordered sets of propositions about the way the world ought to be) can invite redefinition of explanatory theory (ordered sets of propositions about the way the world is). Normative-explanatory adjustment becomes part of the iterated goalpost-shifting response to complexity (Pettit and Braithwaite 2000).
Productive social science has both moments of ambiguation that play with the utility of new ways of conceptualising theoretical concepts and moments of disambiguation when the community of scholars decides to settle on a conceptualisation, which, for the moment, seems most fertile. Then scholars collect systematic comparable data on the efficacy of the theory conceptualised in that way. The careerism of scholars who dislike the thought that the data collection for their PhD was based on a now obsolete conceptualisation drives social science theory development to periods of excessive disambiguation. Static, banal theories with concrete goalposts that fail to give birth to fertile policy innovations survive far too long.

To improve the responsiveness to complexity of peace research, we must work harder at techniques for improving ambiguation. Organisation theorist Gareth Morgan’s (1997) *Images of Organization* has a sweeping strategy for ambigating how we see organisations. Morgan views organisational action simultaneously through multiple organisation theory lenses. One of the great social science books, Graham Allison’s (1971) *Essence of Decision*, accomplishes brilliant insight from seeing through three different lenses how Kennedy and Khrushchev saved the world from catastrophe at the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis.

**Assess meta-strategies for layering strategies**

Responsive peacebuilding is an example of a meta-strategy. It is a strategy about how to layer strategies. There have been some encouraging evaluations of responsive regulation in domains ranging from securities regulation to tax enforcement (Braithwaite 2014, 2016a). Responsive regulation comes in variants that involve pyramids of enforcement strategies (such as Figure 12.1) and pyramids of networked escalation where more and more network partners are engaged with the regulation challenge at different layers of the pyramid.
The social sciences are replete with examples of meta-strategies. Motivational interviewing is a kind of iterative meta-strategy: it gives rise to many different change strategies that are chosen by the counselling client rather than a counsellor; it is a flexible, contextual and responsive practice that unfolds differently in every case depending on how the client frames what motivates them as an individual. Meta-analyses of 119 studies, half of them randomised controlled trials, have shown motivational interviewing is effective as a meta-strategy for selecting what individuals do about health objectives such as cleaning their teeth properly, losing weight or conquering an addiction (Burke et al. 2003; Lundahl et al. 2010, 2013). Likewise, problem-oriented policing is a kind of meta-strategy for street-level selection of diverse problems for police to tackle and how to tackle them. It, too, has been a subject of encouraging meta-analyses, showing that problem-oriented policing reduces crime (Weisburd et al. 2010). Randomised controlled trials show that ‘positive deviance’ in development practice—for example, searching for deviant
rural village practices of positive nutrition and encouraging modelling of those practices by others in the village—works better in comparison with village education programs on nutrition best practice that often fail (e.g. Bradley et al. 2009). Positive deviance, again, is something that can work even though it is unknown and highly variable because it is ‘deviant’ (Green 2016). Partly, it works by the power of model mongering and localism; partly, it works because it appeals to tastes adapted to unique contexts. It energises because someone in the community has identified the solution. So it focuses on their assets and knowledge rather than their deficits.

When a responsive regulator addresses a problem with a layered sequence of responses, or when a problem-oriented police organisation attempts one strategy after another at a hotspot until it pushes down the crime rate, or a clinician tries one treatment after another to fight a cancer; if the crime or the cancer stops, we have no idea what stopped it. What we did was too complex to permit that kind of scientific knowability. It may have been a lagged effect of something lower in our pyramid of responses that we wrongly thought had failed. It may be the last layer of our response before the problem is solved, as we tend to presume. Quite likely, it will actually be a complex interaction between what we did in our last layer of intervention and certain aspects of all the previous layers. It may even be a simple linear cumulative (additive) accomplishment of all the layers together. Responsive peacebuilding means that policymakers have a meta-strategy that is committed to probing with one strategy after another, starting with evidence-based strategies and moving to progressively less evidence-based, but more contextually attuned, strategies as each layer seems to fail. Then it sticks with that process until the problem goes away. The empirical prediction about such a meta-strategy is that meta-analyses will show it to succeed, without revealing why it succeeds. All we get to know from that iterated process is that we stuck with the problem until it went away. We can read the meta-analyses that suggest that problem-oriented policing works, that motivational interviewing works at the end of its iterated reframings of motivation, that positive deviance strategies for improving village nutrition work, that a multidimensional mix of strategies works in controlling corporate crime (Schell-Busey et al. 2016) and that multidimensional UN peacebuilding works as converging on a paradoxical insight. This is that, in a world of complexity, it is more possible to discover the meta-strategies that work best than it is to move single strategies from the realm of the knowable to the realm of the
known. For example, the meta-strategy of ‘search for positive deviance’ may be more useful than learning what are the particular forms of positive deviance that worked in particular villages. To use another example, it is easier to know that a vague, heterogeneous concept such as problem-oriented policing or motivational interviewing works than it is to know that it works because it fixes the street-lighting at hotspots or discovers some specific motivation for losing weight. And this is a methodologically impressive paradoxical finding because it is harder to muster the statistical power to show the efficacy of heterogeneous than homogeneous interventions.

A cascades imaginary for complexity

At the end of Chapter 11, and indeed throughout the book, we have seen that a cascades imaginary requires nuance and responsiveness to complexity. For example, we saw in Chapter 10 that there is little that is linear about cascade effects. Long periods of stability followed by sudden tipping points into seeming chaos recur repeatedly in this book. Yet, can we present readers with a theory of tipping points? No. All we are smart enough to say is that quantitative analyses using only linear methods are certain to mislead. The discussion of linear multiple regression studies of relationships between inequality/poverty and war and crime illustrated this in quite a detailed way at the end of Chapter 11. Qualitatively, it is extremely clear that linear assumptions mislead when we see societies such as Nepal peacefully knuckle under to extreme inequality for centuries. Then, when violent resistance to it erupts, it erupts only in a few places. Most locales with extreme inequality continue to be peaceful, leading many normal social scientists to wrongly conclude that inequality is not a cause of war. Only limited linear explanation of a relationship between inequality and resistance is on offer. Yet, tellingly, the Nepalese eruption that was driven by inequality spread most rapidly to the locales with the greatest local-level inequality of a particular kind. And qualitatively there is little doubt from our interview data that a profound sense of grievance over inequality motivated these Maoist uprisings.  

4 Certainly, we interviewed Maoist party leaders in Kathmandu whose behaviour is open to the interpretation that they harnessed grievance about inequality to their greed, but there was no possibility of this interpretation making sense for the many Maoist commanders and male foot soldiers who started the war and for the many women we spoke to who were pushed by systematic rape to pick up their men’s guns after they fell.
If inequality and perceived injustice persist in the longue durée, the day comes when a spark ignites them. Because reducing inequality is a good thing to do, activists are often model mongers waiting for the right moment to destabilise an unjust equilibrium. Inequality reduction improves even more important challenges than preventing war, such as improving public health (Friel and Marmot 2011). Because justice as non-domination is normatively good in itself, prudent peacebuilders commit to social democratic struggle for structural shifts in inequality, as opposed to neoliberal politics that tolerates or embraces inequality. But more than that is required. When a particular grievance of Nepalese peasants against landlords results in war, after centuries of failure to reduce inequality against the resistance of those who control the wealth, rapid reaction for inequality reduction in that place is needed from the international community. First, peacekeepers might be needed to stop the war from spreading and to prevent poverty from getting worse as a result of war. Second, rapid-impact projects—which alleviate the hunger of peasants at these hotspots, provide schools for their children and fund community development to build village livelihoods—are needed. This can be followed by prioritising the inequalities that are the focus of violent grievance for longer-term reforms to education inequality, health inequality, land reform and total abolition of the caste system as structural foundations of rural oppression. The international community did see the imperative to support the postwar Maoist Government from 2006 to achieve these things. Sadly, and as usual in the implementation of such ambitions, implementation was imperfect and unsustained. As usual, powerful cronies, and the ‘partyocracy’ that displaced monarchy and feudalism, resumed the project of bleeding the country to enrich themselves. Such failure is, however, always a matter of degree; partial failure is better than total failure.

What we are saying here is that the flawed quantitative literature on the relationship between inequality and violence is sufficient to show in combination with such qualitative diagnoses that constant vigilance for rapid reaction to particular inequalities in particular places, for learning fast from failures, is needed: fail, learn, adapt in inequality reduction at hotspots. This is needed in combination with longer-term structural change to attenuate inequality as a dormant, structural risk factor. War as a response to inequality in this sense is like fascism as a response to economic hardship between the World Wars, or the global rise of far-right political leaders today such as Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen,
Geert Wilders or Britain’s new Conservatives who led Brexit. Neo-authoritarianism as a response to crisis was a weak relationship for a long time before it passed a tipping point to cascade far-right politics. It was evident in the hotspot of John Braithwaite’s marginalised post-industrial hometown of Ipswich, Queensland, much earlier when Australia’s most successful far-right politician, Pauline Hanson, first came to power in 1996. Better solutions to specific local grievances such as fears about immigration, which we discuss under Proposition 6, are needed to foil fascism in combination with the long-term focus of non-right parties on inequality reduction, including reduced inequalities between metropoles such as London (or Brisbane, in the case of Pauline Hanson) and struggling peripheries of their societies.

All this means that there is no need to be paralysed because the big risks to societies cannot be read off from the size of coefficients on long lists of variables plugged into simple linear regression analyses. There is no need to be paralysed because the authors of this volume failed when they set out to move from a list of propositions generated inductively from data on violence to a diagram that would show interrelationships among those variables. As it turned out in our analysis, everything had moments of being very related to almost everything else, and to many other things. Feedback loops abounded. A parsimonious theory seemed just too severely at odds with the complexity we were documenting. We are left with our humble list of 10 recurrent patterns, although, in this chapter, we argue that a parsimonious meta-strategy of how to reduce violence is more feasible than a theory of violence. Our failure to develop a simple theory is no reason for analysis paralysis. Who knows, perhaps a parsimonious theory will be constructed from the dataset when it is complete in 2030? More importantly, there is no need for paralysis until then because peacebuilding can become a complex adaptive system. Critics rightly assert it is currently a simple-minded maladaptive system ensnared by overly parsimonious frameworks such as liberal peace theory and theories of rebuilding failed states (e.g. Paris 2004). It fails very frequently in the longer run. As argued in Part I, Autesserre (2010, 2014, 2017) is insightful in showing that peacebuilding is also insufficiently responsive to local complexity. For all those flaws of oversimplification, this book has concluded that, on average, UN peace operations have contributed a great deal to creating a more peaceful world (Call 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008: 288–94; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Nilsson 2006; Quinn et al. 2007; Riordan 2013; Sambanis 2008; Walter
2002), as has mediation of peace agreements (Human Security Research Group 2014: 174–5; Karstedt 2017; Regan et al. 2009). Moreover, as Lise Howard (2008) has shown, the failure rate can be further reduced for peace operations that learn and adapt after failure. In that kind of responsive peacebuilding in the face of complexity, we will now argue that our revised list of 10 propositions is helpful in guiding adaptation.

In the next section, we show that, for each of our propositions, there are many layers of complex response available, so, when one approach to peacebuilding fails, there are many other options to attempt a layered approach to responsive prevention of violence.

**Connecting the 10 propositions to adaptation to complexity**

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

Defiance is common, even for small and legitimate escalations of coercion. Yet complexity demands special vigilance in monitoring those cases of defiance that spread like a brushfire. As soon as defiance begins to cascade, political leaders normally should seek to calm the cascade by sitting down to listen to grievances in reconciliation meetings. A minister for national security must reflect on the fact that a police officer who follows her orders to remove protestors from a certain place is not going to tell her if one of the protestors was sexually assaulted by the police. There are so many possible complex causes of reactive violence like this. They are often unknowable to political leaders, at least in the moment of crisis.

For all social problems, be they domestic crime or a national security threat, the more banal general implication of our insights is a disposition of extreme reluctance and caution in escalating coercion. All competent political leaders try and try again to solve problems non-coercively. The great ones try even more times with ever greater patience and reconciliatory guile; they are the leaders who can summon special creativity in widening contract zones to create peaceful win–win resolutions. ‘The most urgent priority is patience’, as a Catalonian saying goes. Great leaders pause and consider complexity—in particular, they consider what a simple coercive
intervention to stop something could escalate to. They are leaders like Deng Xiaoping who can survive and transcend something as violent as China’s Cultural Revolution in the 1960s through ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’.

The paradox of a layered pyramid of responses to war prevention and crime prevention is that, by keeping severe deterrence in reserve until many kinds of preventive diplomacy have been attempted, we actually sharpen the Sword of Damocles, rather than blunt it through overuse (Braithwaite 2002; 2018).

Proposition 2: Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

Even when greed rather than grievance is the root cause of violence, those who are greedy enough for power to mobilise mass violence never achieve this in our South Asian data without mobilising a sense of legitimate grievance among those who are asked to risk their lives in the fight. The key to averting violence here is for good people to support those who are determined to articulate the grievance and get it fixed without selling the state to ambitious tyrants who use them and their grievance. Education of nonviolent activists in the art of model mongering is our insight here about managing complexity. Nonviolent activists should have a suite of reform projects in their top drawer, not just one or two. When a political crisis occurs, they must be better prepared than violent predators. They must have an aptly responsive reform project ready to bring to the frontburner and bring to the boil. If this fails to draw enough nonviolent defiance on to the street, if the number of protestors does not pass the tipping point to mass mobilisation, if the police then crack down on them easily, they move this reform campaign to the backburner, awaiting a more ripe moment. If our group sees another nonviolent opposition mobilise more successfully with an anti-domination reform project that they have moved from their backburner to their frontburner, our group should consider joining them on the street to push opposition beyond the tipping point of mass mobilisation. Our group might move the other group’s more resonant project to our frontburner. This is ‘crossing the river by feeling the stones’ for community groups. The model monger for nonviolent transformation to resist domination does not understand the complexity of which appeals to mobilise the crowd in history will cascade
past tipping points. Hence the model monger always has many reform projects on many backburners awaiting the ripe moment for the crowd in history.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

A conclusion of this book has been that an advantage hawks often have over doves is that the simplicity of their appeal means they can mobilise political support for it quickly during a crisis. In Chapter 2, we saw this with the bitter tragedy that drew our forebears into World War I. Complexity theorists have a more complex political message to sell. They also have a task of mobilisation more complex than the massing of armies to send hawks’ preferred message. Doves must ask who has the ‘Awareness, Motivation and Pathways’ (AMP) to prevent war (Honig et al. 2015). Chapter 2 argues that, in 1914, the two most powerful nations, Britain and Germany, had awareness of the peril, had the realist motivation of less to gain and more to lose by war than lesser powers that were cascading the world to war and they could have forged a path—British–German détente—if only they had had the diplomatic imagination to do so. We have also argued that the UN Security Council today makes it more possible to slow the hawks than was the case in 1914.

Moreover, Track II diplomacy today often brings doves from many countries around tables of second-track diplomacy that open up possibilities for persuading the world that doves have forged paths that might save the world from cascade to catastrophe. The Track II participants are normally people who have good connections to one or more of the principals in a conflict; they engage in dialogue rather than negotiations. Track II diplomacy is a key institution for generating new and creative responses to complexity and then making them available to Track I foreign ministers and presidents. The final section of this chapter explores some options for further improving second tables of preventive diplomacy in a world where hawks are likely to continue to dominate at the first table of international politics where the leaders of great powers sit.

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5 Systematic research on the effectiveness of Track II diplomacy has been quite limited. Böhmelt (2010) found for 295 international disputes that Track I diplomacy, with its superior resourcing and capacity to actually negotiate deals, is more effective than Track II. Böhmelt also found, however, that in processes where Track II interacts with Track I, so that Track II helps with ‘outside the box’ solutions, Track I becomes even more effective.

6 Here, we are adapting Putnam’s (1988) ‘two-level game’ of international politics.
**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

A lesson these authors have learnt from Peacebuilding Compared is that John Braithwaite was probably wrong to argue in earlier times for the new state of Timor-Leste not to have an army (because no army it could build would ever protect it from powerful neighbours such as Indonesia and Australia). Timor-Leste, Braithwaite wrongly argued, could do more to secure peace by investing in development than by investing in weapons. Viewed through a complexity theory lens, this has proved too simple an argument for nonviolence in the analysis of this book. The subsequent history of Timor-Leste, and other post-conflict societies like it, has thrown up a great diversity of internal violent threats that have required a monopoly of legitimate armed force sufficient to deter their take-off. In a complex post-conflict environment, there are many people with ‘awareness’ of the opportunities available through violent mobilisation, with ‘motivations’ of greed or grievance, or both or more, so ‘paths’ for them to arm themselves must be closed as soon as they start. The AMP of armed groups can sometimes be shut down only by repairing disintegrated capacities of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space.

The need to have a well-armed security sector at the peak of a post-conflict responsive peacebuilding pyramid does not challenge the ideal of visibly having it, but never having to use it, because forms of peacebuilding lower in the pyramid work so well in combination. There are also implications here for the training aspect of security sector reform. Militaries in post-conflict societies should receive training in the lessons of complexity learnt under Propositions 1 and 3 above. Yes, they have the hammer they must have, but they can learn the art of reluctance to use it to hammer every nail they see, learning instead how to sit in the circle to reconcile grievances in local spaces that are safe only for armed soldiers to enter.

**Proposition 5(a):** Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

The theory that institutionalising democracy is a good thing is another example of an analysis that proved too simple. Peacebuilders who enter post-conflict societies with templates for building democracy proved dangerous people in our data. Wise democracy builders concentrate at first
12. CONCLUSION

on building critical foundations of democracy, such as an independent and competent judiciary, gradually building one strong branch after another in separations of powers that temper centralised power (Krygier 2015). Generally, it will be prudent to monitor progress and setbacks in this task, waiting for the right time to build the top floor of elections supervised by an independent election commission on foundations that have been a long labour of extended post-conflict transitional administrations that draw legitimacy from the United Nations and from inclusive dialogue with the peoples of the society.

Proposition 6: Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

A multilayered strategy of many responses to the refugee problem is needed. Each of these layers of response will fail much of the time. The first layer is massive investment by the international community in the UNHCR, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) and NGOs that respond to the needs of refugees and migrants. The kinds of refugee and migrant response situations that Europe faces in an unusually big way at the time of writing are cheaper to deal with by massive investments in refugee services in the countries to which they first flee. Refugees and IDPs who are found there, who start with no means or desire to travel further from their homes, are probably more than 80 per cent of refugees and IDPs and more than 90 per cent of those in most desperate need (Betts and Collier 2017). One objective of the international community can be to stem the flow from those places by better meeting those desperate needs. It is desirable to stem the outflow of the most highly educated professionals from war-torn societies by persuading them that the international community is investing in the peacebuilding needed to end the conflict so safe return becomes the refugee imaginary. When they are stuck in refugee camps while waiting just across the border from their homeland or on a journey of transit to the West, the aim is to provide their children with greater levels of excellent education, health care and food than they were receiving at home. This is so more people choose to remain poised with dignity for return home at war’s end. Refugee camps must also, of course, be made more temporary. Just over half the world’s
refugees are trapped today in long-term, pathetically under-resourced refugee camps (Betts and Collier 2017: 70). Refugee camps are inevitable, but they need not inevitably be ‘nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap’ (Proposition 6).

The complexity of this task is in seeing just where a massively increased pot of international money for refugees should be quickly deployed to care for and create livelihoods for refugees close to home. Which are the refugee sites that host governments would quickly close because of domestic political opposition? Which are those that would be sustained because, for example, local contractors who benefit from providing services to refugees persuade their government that the job opportunities they are creating in a region of high unemployment actually does some good for the host country? Which are those that should and would be sustained because local businesses suffer labour shortages in that particular region of the country to do the kind of work that the refugees are keen and able to supply? Which are those that would be sustained because the host country genuinely cares for the suffering of the refugees or because it wants to help the international community end a war across its border that is bad for its own security and economy? Which are the refugee sites that will actually prove more attractive to refugees than taking their chances in a flimsy boat on the Mediterranean? Refugee planners need to fail, learn and adapt by finding that this camp is one that refugees flee from (for example, a dangerous transit camp in Libya) and this is one they flee to (a locale in Libya that has caring management, superior security, job opportunities and good medical care), shifting strategic funding to the latter. As we know, desperate refugees are forced to remain in some of the most horrific camps or detention centres without any choice of leaving them. We do not suggest we stop working in these camps, but we do believe strategic and careful funding and harnessing of hope are the best responses in dire conditions.

Nodes of labour shortage that refugees can fill also exist in the West. For example, a Deloitte report found a win–win result from 140 refugees who were privately sponsored to fill 70 newly created jobs in the economy of the remote town of Nhill in Australia, which has a population of only 2,300. Nearly all of these jobs were in the poultry industry and had been unable to attract Australian workers. The refugees from Myanmar have re-energised the formerly struggling town, culturally and economically, adding $41.5 million in value to its tiny economy (Medhora 2015).
Plate 12.1 ‘The Beast’ (*La Bestia*) carries half a million immigrants from Central America to the US border every year.

Source: Keith Dannemiller, 2014.

Our Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork in El Salvador found that NGOs that work with refugees are desperately underfunded. Funding them is, of course, in every way a more fecund investment in growing security and development than building ever more expensive walls at the Mexico–United States border. For the largest refugee group fleeing to the United States today—Salvadorans fleeing postwar gang violence that is worse than the violence of their war—high-quality refugee transit camps are needed in Mexico. When young Salvadorans suffer some of the awful things they experience at the hands of human trafficking organisations increasingly controlled by the very kinds of violent gangs they are escaping in El Salvador, these high-quality refugee camps can be safe havens to which refugee NGOs can take them. There they could be given safety, quality food, education and health care, free transport back home if that is the option that they have learnt from bitter experience they would actually prefer, access to US immigration officials who could give them quick determinations in Mexico on whether they would be granted refugee status, as many of them should (and, if so, transporting them safely, without charge and with resettlement assistance in the United States). Those in neither of these categories could be assisted to return to safe circumstances in El Salvador, assisted with housing and vocational training in safe parts of the country where some of the large pot of
international investment in refugee problem-solving might be invested at the source of the problem. Criminologists know how to cue development assistance to build safe communities in safe zones of a country that is racked by widespread violence. Livelihoods can be created in these peace zones even surrounded as they are by hotspots of violence. Churches are supporting local NGOs to do this kind of work with IDPs in El Salvador. Providing strategic funding to them is critical.

Similar initiatives are needed in southern Libya for desperate people who have been trafficked from further south. The need for new oases of livelihood development in the Sahel, the poorest region of Africa, as in El Salvador, is imperative regardless of the refugee challenge. There could be no higher priority for investment in building such oases of community development of peaceful livelihoods than refugees fleeing violence. There are no universals about how to do this well; it is a locally variegated challenge. The task is complex and local in the texture of what drives people to flee in boats as refugees. In Sri Lanka (Chapter 8), for example, human rights groups need more support to demand protection for Tamil villages that are subject to military violence and rape because they were on the wrong side of the civil war a decade ago. Since the fall of the Rajapaksa regime, this has begun to happen, but human rights NGOs are still excessively creatures of the cities, failing to document and protect in the remote villages where the worst military vilification persists.

When creating safe spaces in safe zones of opportunity in war-torn countries fails, when creating high-quality refugee camps that create new educational and employment opportunities for returnees in transit countries such as Mexico fails, the world must step up to the challenge of refugee resettlement. It is not doing so. The paradox of Proposition 6 is that Western fear of terrorism incubates more terrorism in refugee camps in countries like Pakistan (Chapters 6 and 9). William Maley (2016: Ch. 4) has documented how fear of terrorism motivates Western countries to spurn refugees from the two countries with the largest, most desperate need for resettlement—Syria and Afghanistan—and to favour the comparatively less desperate and tiny Bhutanese refugee population. Bhutanese refugees in Nepal are certainly deserving (Chapter 9), but it is ridiculous and reckless that fewer Syrians (7,021) or Afghans (3,331) than Bhutanese (8,395) were resettled in 2014. The reason, according to Maley (2016) and Susan Banki (2008: 49), is a search for refugee populations like the Bhutanese that allow Western governments to fill their refugee quotas ‘without turning to those populations viewed as potentially dangerous’
(Banki 2008: 49)—those from the Middle East and Afghanistan. Eighty per cent of more than 1 million refugees who crossed into Europe by sea in 2015 were from just three countries: Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan (Maley 2016: Ch. 1). Systematically, the international community has walked away from the biggest part of its preventive challenge, from the very refugee camps most likely to drive terrorist recruitment according to the pattern identified in Proposition 6.

Much more can be done by undercover operatives approaching human traffickers pretending to be refugees, offering exploitative traffickers payment recorded by a hidden camera and then locking them up. But Maley’s point is that the human trafficker problem is structurally one of the market (a black market) solving a problem of state failure to resettle the most needy refugees. If we fix that structural problem first, we might destroy the business model of traffickers and thereby reduce the supply-driven pressure from marketing by human traffickers to desperate people. Then, in time, we can get on with the more complex business of reducing demand for their services by rebuilding safety, town by town, in places such as Syria and Iraq so most refugees will choose to return to their homes from the camps.

It is not that any of this is so difficult to do. It is that the complexity of the politics of doing it is to date beyond our wit. The final and most important of the many layers of prevention of the growth in refugee flows is, of course, the main topic of this book: preventive diplomacy and peacebuilding that stem cascades of violence before they ever take off to the point where violence is further cascaded by refugee flows.

**Proposition 7:** Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

Among our propositions, this one is a rarity in that we can look to contemporary Western democracies for clear guidance on what to do. There are great limitations to US, British and German democracy, yet these are not anomic societies. The rule of norms is as important to keeping them stable as the rule of law. Recent US history has seen two of its most extremist presidents, George W. Bush and Donald Trump, assume power in circumstances that half the population had reason to feel were the result of an unfair or illegitimate election. Yet when the Supreme Court declined
to invalidate these election declarations, both losing candidates and both outgoing presidents called on the people with eloquent sincerity to support the man they reviled. In more anomic societies, where democratic norms are less consolidated, defenders of democracy must be more alert to emergent threats for guns to replace votes in deciding such successions.

Chapter 11 mentioned how in Ghana the National Peace Committee pre-emptively headed off this threat when they saw it coming, speaking informally with the presidential candidates and then calling on them publicly to declare that they would abide by the declared election result. They did and no civil war ensued (Odendaal 2012). Chapter 11 also showed how local peace committees can be another layer of response alert to local threats to the normative order. An example was South African steering of the routes for opposing funeral marches in opposite directions to avert threats to norms respecting the sanctity of funerals. Nipping unpredictable local cascades of anomie in the bud is best attempted first with the local knowledge of wise heads on the ground at the community level.

The teaching of civics as part of the education system is another important layer of response in imbuing commitment to the rule of law. Reintegrative shaming of norm infractions, as opposed to stigmatisation that can create oppositional subcultures of resistance to the normative order, is important for defending a normative order (Ahmed et al. 2001). One good way to institutionalise this is through restorative practices that can iteratively fail, reconvene with new participants and new resources, fail again and then reconvene until they succeed. Restorative justice is philosophically committed to averting stigmatisation, to promoting respect and reintegration and to preventing shame from being used as a weapon of domination. Rape must be shamed; rape victims must not. Rapists must not be stigmatised but led to AMP: awareness of patriarchy, motivation to change and a path to change through reintegration. The particular example of rape and normlessness sets us up for Proposition 9 of the complex challenges of crime–war cascades. It introduces an understanding of how closely related these challenges are.

**Proposition 8(a):** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation, domination and humiliation. Militarisation, domination and humiliation recursively risk further cascades of violence.

The world’s powerful and respected militaries are those most strategically placed to prevent cascades of militarisation. A leading example of how not to do this was the School of the Americas, established by the United
States during the Cold War, initially in Panama (relocated to Fort Benning, Georgia, when it was kicked out of Panama), to train tens of thousands of Latin American soldiers to terrorise their societies through a radically militarised approach to crushing the left. As SOA Watch, among others, documented, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and US army manuals used in this training justified terrorising civilians, advocating ‘executions, torture, blackmail and other forms of coercion’ (Priest 1996: 1). In a perverse way, this terrible history, combined with the more recent experience of Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay, could give the US military the street cred with authoritarian armies to reform itself to become a leader in inculcating opposition to torture, respect for human rights and refusal to humiliate prisoners and enemies. This opportunity is profound because all militaries value exchanges with and learning about the tactics and weapons systems of the world’s most powerful militaries. An approach that was responsive to the complexity of cascades of militarisation could make training units available in the world’s most powerful militaries. These units could have special sensitivities to ethical military training for referrals from security sector reform groups in peace operations. In a case such as Libya, perhaps a less powerful military but one more respected in Libya would be best for this role, such as Jordan’s.

Earlier in this chapter (and in Chapter 11), we discussed responding to the complexity of how and where cascades of domination and humiliation unfold in the consideration of local dominations and humiliations of lower-caste peasants by upper-caste landlords in Nepal. We saw in that discussion that prioritising educational, employment and land reforms in the times and places where these sparks of domination and humiliation unexpectedly first flare is important to the complex art of peacebuilding.

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

We have argued that crime prevention is war prevention. This is certainly an argument for structurally sound and universal crime prevention policies. Yet 99.99 per cent of crimes do not lead to war. This is a complex nonlinear relationship. The crimes that are sparks usually have a violent and vivid character in which the alleged offender(s) are seen as representatives of the political other. The rape of Muslim women by the police in Kashmir (Chapter 5), the shooting of children in demonstrations in Kashmir and the political assassination of three pre-eminent Gandhis in India illustrate
a phenomenon seen— with risks of cascades to violence—in many Peacebuilding Compared cases. In Chapter 5, we saw how wise nonviolent heads used these horrible events, with variable success, to reinforce values of nonviolent rather than violent struggle against domination. Gandhi’s assassination in 1948 and president Ramos-Horta’s grave wounding in Timor-Leste in 2008 were examples of historical moments when wise leaders used the tragedy to turn the society sharply towards nonviolence. Decisive action against police alleged to have raped demonstrators is obviously important. Decisive denunciation of assassinations of the kind Serbian political society failed to deliver for the murder of Archduke Ferdinand in 1914 is also obviously important to halting cascades ignited by criminal sparks. We also saw an important layer of prevention in police station reconciliation committees in north-western Pakistan preventing blood feuds from cascading in unpredictable ways into local wars in areas where the risks of local cascades of violence are unusually extreme and geopolitically risky.

In a wider sense, all crime prevention is armed conflict prevention on our account—as is all domination prevention, predation prevention and humiliation prevention because crimes that cause wars are interpreted as vivid and utterly illegitimate exemplars of a recurrent pattern of domination, predation or humiliation. The complexity of which of millions of police assaults on black people will lead to riots and sniper fire across many US or French or British cities is as hard to predict as which rapes in a developing country will spark a civil war. We see recurrent elements of these cascades often enough: the original crime is immediately given a meaning in the rhetoric of recurrent political oppression (hence, the preventive relevance of making crime less recurrent and oppression less recurrent); this particular crime instantly mobilises anger on the streets by friends and relatives of the victim; others join; a police officer overreacts and uses excessive force in unsuccessful efforts to restore order quickly; word of both the crime and the excessive use of police force cascades as activists mobilise to publicise this evidence of a surge of oppression that demands resistance; more people cascade on to the streets of many places; nonviolent activists are unable to control those elements of these crowds who explode into violent resistance; representatives of the perceived other group (the police or the racial or religious other) are murdered. Then police violence cascades back at the protestors. Not only can we not predict which of the resultant blood feuds will cascade to civil war; we cannot predict any of the stages of such cascades, starting with which of countless assaults or rapes or police shootings will be interpreted widely.
as an act of political oppression. Yet we can understand the cumulative consequences of each of the earlier occasions when citizens lumped assaults with a shrug that signified to them that they live in the kind of society where oppression of their group happens all the time. A high rate of violent crime and a sense of anomie create the foundations for a future spark that ignites a wildfire.

Cascades of war to crime involve quite different challenges. In a case such as El Salvador, we saw under Proposition 6 that decent treatment of refugees fleeing to the United States held the key to preventing the war-to-crime cascade that left El Salvador with by far the highest homicide rate in the world both immediately after its civil war and still at the beginning of 2017. In the case of US veterans of the wars in Vietnam, Iraq and Afghanistan returning home, some were quite widely stigmatised and desperately needed the unconditional embrace of their loved ones, sometimes for comfort from the cold shoulder of partners who divorced them. The war machines of states overinvest in desensitising soldiers to violence and underinvest in veteran aftercare. Investment in social workers who sit in the restorative circle of family support for returning veterans can harness those families to the project of being the first responders for the complex task of detecting and smothering sparks that lead from war to crime or from war to self-harm. If specialist veterans’ courts for criminal defendants have a restorative character in the way they connect veterans to specialised helping human services that include the warm embrace of a veteran community that is both the key source of their post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and the solution to it, they can also be an effective response (Baldwin and Rukus 2015; Hartley and Baldwin 2016). Hitler might have benefited from restorative circles of support after he recovered from the bitterness of defeat and the trauma of gas that blinded him in a regiment of 3,600 men, of whom only 611 survived (Solleder 1932).

Veterans’ courts are just one possibility. John Braithwaite remembers how important the warm embrace of the Ex-Prisoners of War Association was to his father, who was one of six who survived from 3,000 victims of a war crime, the Sandakan Death Marches and prison camp in World War II. He remembers how important it was to his mother, who also lost her first husband to the Death March. Most interestingly, he remembers how moved his grandfather was when, at the Ex-Prisoners of War Association picnic,

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8 This counts the Japanese deaths in counter Death Marches enforced by Australian troops against Japanese prisoners of war. See Dick Braithwaite’s history of Sandakan and of his family on this (R. Braithwaite 2016).
John was awarded a scholarship for his education; old Joe Braithwaite was moved by the fact that veterans could self-organise to embrace their own in social support. Joe fought opposite Hitler in the trenches near Ypres. Like Hitler, he was gassed, carrying a horrible lifelong cough, and, like Hitler, most of the rest of his regiment did not survive. Veteran-organised care for traumatised veterans cascaded care and love across the generations of John Braithwaite’s family. All victims of war deserve no less.

**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

The way to prevent the genocide that was to come in Cambodia was to prevent the escalation of war in Vietnam more than a decade earlier and to follow that with peacebuilding and development assistance in the struggling communities where the Khmer Rouge rose to power in Cambodia. We also argued in Chapter 2 that the way to prevent the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica was for the United Nations to reinforce the peacekeepers who wanted to hold their ground to protect civilians there. Then, if those reinforcements were insufficient or did not work, to try something else until the genocide was stopped. The way to prevent the Rwandan army counter-genocide against Hutu refugees in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 1996 was to move their refugee camps back from where they were seen as threatening Rwanda and to place UN peacekeepers between those camps and the Rwandan army. While it was right for the United Nations to meet its responsibility to protect the cowering citizens of Benghazi in 2011, it was wrong for the United Nations to allow this to push on to a war of regime change and then to cut and run, refusing to put UN peacekeepers in harm’s way after anomie set in following the rape and murder of Gaddafi. NATO was wrong to invade Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 in circumstances from which it was destined to cut and run.

The cascades we have just described were all complex and no one was wise enough to predict the complexity of how they would cascade. Political leaders can, however, be tougher on their societies in asking the cut-and-run question up front, and can decide on a disposition to be less willing to unsheathe their sword in the first place as an outcome of that conversation with the society. These are conversations about unknowable
complexity. The point is to look that complexity in the eye before the event rather than after it. It is to humble the arrogance of power that seeks to use its hammer on many imagined nails.

Carpentry is a subtle craft, not one of brute force. The carpenter who makes a chair does not follow a known recipe of how much sawing, hammering, planing, sanding and gluing to do. Rather, the gifted chair-builder looks at the grain of the timber as it appears in the process of the chair’s emergence, going with the grain, reinforcing the beauty and strength of the timber as it emerges. Securing peace is likewise not amenable to recipes and templates; it is a craft of complexity, particularly of watching and listening for unpredictable ignition points. It is also a craft of participatory multilevel meta-governance by and of states, markets and civil society (Jessop 2017). And it is a craft of watching for surges to replace militarised politics with the politics of nonviolence, as happened in such unpredictable ways in recent years in Sri Lanka, Nepal and with such extremes of unpredicted disappointment in Myanmar (Chapters 8 and 9).

Open-source preventive diplomacy

It is a worthwhile ambition to plug away for another 14 years of data collection to reassess after 2030 whether we see our 10 cascade propositions continue to account for patterns of global violence. Yet the understanding of complexity advanced in this conclusion means that the propositions would remain no more than patterns, heuristics that prompt us to discover trial-and-error solutions to emergent risks of cascades of violence. So, what might be a way to put the research in this book to work now in preventing wars that might otherwise occur between now and the 2030s?

We think the best here-and-now improvement our work might contribute to world order would be improving preventive diplomacy (Evans 1993). We advance an open-source approach to that challenge as one way to go in a complex world prone to the kind of cascades revealed in this book. A starting point is to consider how and why our understanding of international affairs has failed us in the past. Robert Jervis’s (2010) Why Intelligence Fails is instructive. He diagnoses why US intelligence

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9 We are indebted here to Malcolm Sparrow’s (2011) metaphor in The Regulatory Craft. Business regulation, woodwork and the regulation of war are very different kinds of activities but each is evidence-based in ways that make it more a craft than a science.
agencies failed to warn of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, for example. Jervis was in the privileged position of being a CIA consultant with wide access to their intelligence on Iran (and other cases of intelligence failure). Jervis begins with the reality check that the CIA had only two political analysts for a country as geopolitically important and diverse as Iran and two economic analysts (who were working almost exclusively on Organisation for Petroleum Exporting Countries issues). Other Washington intelligence agencies had no Iran experts in 1979:

Like many people who did not know the government from the inside, I had assumed extensive coverage of every country. In fact this was out of reach, and remains so … I was also surprised that the CIA in particular and the government in general did not engage in more thorough and detailed research.

…

Until the crisis, intelligence on Iran did not receive much of an audience. This also surprised me, although it should not have. Top officials are incredibly busy, and even thirty years ago, when they probably read more than is the case now, intelligence about a country that did not require immediate decisions could not attract many readers. This not only lowered the analysts’ morale but meant that their reports did not get the kind of questioning and critical scrutiny that could have helped keep them on their toes.

…

I had expected, again naively, that even if policymakers did not read long intelligence papers, the members of the intelligence community would constitute a sort of intellectual community, with people probing, commenting on, and criticizing one another’s work. In fact, this was not the case, and contacts among the people working on Iran were relatively infrequent. (Jervis 2010: 21–2)

To make all of this worse, Jervis found that the CIA had a vertical orientation rather than a horizontal approach to learning. In particular, CIA analysts expected a chilly reception if they reached out to academics. Their ethos meant they felt uncomfortable even talking with people without clearances about questions that puzzled them. This added up to a culture of evidence gathering without peer review. The culture of short briefing notes that could be fitted on a page or two meant that footnotes that cited sources for assertions (and sources that refuted them) that might be checked by peers came late to the US intelligence community.
One example of an upshot of all this was that no one ‘understood the role of religion or [Ayatollah] Khomeini … and did not see the beginnings of what we would now call radical or fundamentalist Islam’ (Jervis 2010: 25). A widespread problem was that intelligence agencies could get away with the basic methodological error of searching on the dependent variable—for example, searching for when something resulted in war without searching with equal diligence for cases where that same phenomenon resulted in peace.

One of the very unhealthy sayings of Australian academics about quick and dirty research is that it could be ‘good enough for government work’. This can mean inattentiveness to citing sources and unaccountability to peer review. But it can also mean the timidity of style and aversion to bold analysis that Jervis has not been alone in discerning in government writing. This is the biggest difference between university research and policy analysis by state officials. University researchers are rewarded for being ‘out there’ with bold and interesting analyses. If they are wrong in them, they are mostly simply ignored; if their ideas are widely cited as insightful, their careers flourish. For government policy analysts, in contrast, their incentives are to use cautious language and stay with the pack. If they go out on a limb with their analysis, bureaucratic rivals who have an opposing analysis might inflict damage on their careers when they are proven wrong. Consider the intelligence community’s ‘slam dunk’ conclusion that Saddam Hussein was lying about having ended his production of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in 2003, when even president Bush expressed surprise at how little evidence the CIA could share with him:

Most strikingly, no one proposed a view close to the one we now know to be true. Indeed, as the president’s WMD Commission put it in its post-mortem, ‘Failing to conclude that Saddam had ended his banned weapons program is one thing—not even considering it as a possibility is another.’ (Jervis 2010: 128)

In light of Jervis’s insights, it might be argued that university academics have a comparative advantage for developing ideas of preventive diplomacy that respond to complexity and challenges of distinguishing the knowable but unknown from the unknowable. Even for the most geopolitically insignificant of countries, there are dozens of good scholars around the world who are genuine experts on that country—of course, concentrated particularly in the universities of that country itself, but also in think tanks beyond universities, such as the International Crisis Group, and in media
organisations. The community of scholars for any country is bristling with bold ideas concerning the risks that country faces and poses. It may be that a high proportion of those provocative ideas are wrong or trivial in practice. Structurally, however, the community of university scholars is horizontally rather than vertically organised and has an open culture of contestation of provocative ideas. When it comes to seizing preventive diplomacy initiatives, political leaders must be helped regularly to be bolder. Jervis (2010: 166), intriguingly, quotes former US secretary of state Dean Acheson saying to presidential scholar Richard Neustadt: ‘I know your theory [that presidents need to hear conflicting views]. You think Presidents should be warned. You’re wrong. Presidents should be given confidence.’ Perhaps they need both warning and confidence in good measure.

The scholarly community is not afflicted with the kind of siloing between Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and CIA intelligence that contributed to the failure to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States (Jervis 2010: 185). So, it should be possible to harness the international scholarly community to compensate with preventive diplomacy ideas that counter the five key weaknesses we identify in intelligence agencies (with thanks to Jervis for stimulating them). The intelligence weaknesses are:

1. poor early warning capability
2. siloing
3. timidly clinging to the middle of the road
4. weak peer review
5. a sloppy culture of accountability for sources and research standards.

If we could manage to achieve this, it would not be the only domain where humankind has learnt that a move from closed bureaucracies to open contestation of ideas in universities is the better way to innovate in problem-solving.10

10 There were many decades in the middle of the twentieth century when it was reasonable to think that private corporations such as pharmaceutical companies were innovating in the most important breakthroughs for treating diseases; today, it is clear that universities are the source of the most important ideas for preventing the biggest threats to our health (Drahos with Braithwaite 2002). Jervis (2010: 179) himself cites the examples of internal diagnoses of the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) Challenger disaster compared with those of university researcher Diane Vaughan (1997) and the Catholic child sexual abuse scandals as examples of failures of closed bureaucracies, even the most technically advanced ones, to come to grips with root causes and consequent preventive possibilities.
The preventive diplomacy wiki proposal

Others undoubtedly might suggest better ways of mobilising universities to preventive diplomacy challenges. Here is our suggestion to stimulate debate. A leading university could establish a Preventive Diplomacy Wiki. Researchers from anywhere in any language could propose a preventive diplomacy idea that should be seized. The proposal would explain why seizing it would be a good preventive response to uncertain risks of violence cascades. State-of-the-art electronic translation from one language to any other might be used—a technology expected to improve rapidly—and then human minds could wiki nuance into translated texts if the idea was important. Normal citation of sources and empirical evidence would be expected on the wiki. As soon as the preventive diplomacy strategy was posted, it would be open to other scholars to insert footnotes that contest its evidence and conclusions. These contestations could/should be signed. While commentators would be encouraged to give as much information about their identity as possible, it might be better to allow a Russian intelligence officer who wants to contest something to do so anonymously, rather than to give them no choice but to create a fictitious identity for the purpose. It would actually be important to encourage intelligence agencies to assert that certain claims were false according to evidence available to them, the nature and source of which they might be unwilling to disclose. Such information can be valuable and can be misleading, as we have learned in researching this book. The crucial thing is to have a method of analysis, such as subjective logic (Jøsang 2016), that weighs the trustworthiness of a particular assertion by a particular anonymous or semi-anonymous source. Evidence that is clearly detailed by identified and respected sources who engage in systematic fact-checking would, of course, be given more weight by readers of the wiki.

Each year a panel of distinguished scholars and retired diplomats would meet to decide the 10 best preventive diplomacy ideas for that year. They would be announced and honoured with publicity and modest monetary prizes. The Preventive Diplomacy Wiki might then send each of these proposals to separate panels of distinguished experts on the country/
region concerned. This expert panel could produce whatever kind of evaluation report on the preventive ideas they chose. They could work as a team to code a matrix of the probability of the claims made about each cascade risk and the confidence in each of those probabilities, both in fuzzy verbal categories (see Table 12.1). Such analysis of contested facts could be entered into subjective logic software such as Intelfuze developed by Veriluma (Pash 2016; Pope et al. 2006; Shaw 2016) to estimate which are the biggest risks and how promising are the different elements of the preventive diplomacy proposal, in the judgment of these experts, for treating those risks.

Subjective logic software was developed by researchers at the Distributed Systems Technology Centre, a University of Queensland Cooperative Research Centre that engaged participation from many Australian universities and research institutions and leadership from many minds (cited in Jøsang 2016), including Simon Pope (now with Microsoft), Audun Jøsang (formerly of Alcatel, now Professor of Informatics at the University of Oslo) and David McAnally (a mathematician from the University of Queensland and University of Melbourne). Together, this large team developed the algorithms and concepts that are already being used by at least two national intelligence agencies. Subjective logic does not assume linear relationships between variables; it allows some variables to be coded quantitatively and in an uncontested way and other variables to be coded in a granular and contested way and some important conjectures to be noted qualitatively, but coded ‘don’t know’. Put another way, these software developers are advancing methods for dealing with radically mixed data of variable knowability and with many holes. It is therefore one possible systematic approach to a vast amount of information in conditions of cascading complexity.

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12 Alan Hajek commented on a draft of this chapter that perhaps fuzzy probabilities could also be appropriate—for example, intervals.
13 See also: www.veriluma.com (accessed 4 March 2017). The original patent cites the earlier software, ShEBA (Structured Evidence-Based Analysis of Hypotheses).
14 Linearity or nonlinearity of effects is managed ‘subjectively’ inside the heads of analysts. For example, based on whatever evidence about the nature of the relationship between inflation and war is known to the analyst, the analyst might judge that rising inflation in a particular country will only very slightly increase the risks of war; but, after a tipping point where it cascades to hyperinflation, it will greatly increase risks of war.
Table 12.1 Likelihood and confidence in fuzzy categories.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Likelihood categories:</th>
<th>Absolutely not</th>
<th>Very unlikely</th>
<th>Unlikely</th>
<th>Somewhat unlikely</th>
<th>Chances about even</th>
<th>Somewhat likely</th>
<th>Likely</th>
<th>Very likely</th>
<th>Absolutely</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Confidence categories</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No confidence</td>
<td>E</td>
<td>9E</td>
<td>8E</td>
<td>7E</td>
<td>6E</td>
<td>5E</td>
<td>4E</td>
<td>3E</td>
<td>2E</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low confidence</td>
<td>D</td>
<td>9D</td>
<td>8D</td>
<td>7D</td>
<td>6D</td>
<td>5D</td>
<td>4D</td>
<td>3D</td>
<td>2D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some confidence</td>
<td>C</td>
<td>9C</td>
<td>8C</td>
<td>7C</td>
<td>6C</td>
<td>5C</td>
<td>4C</td>
<td>3C</td>
<td>2C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High confidence</td>
<td>B</td>
<td>9B</td>
<td>8B</td>
<td>7B</td>
<td>6B</td>
<td>5B</td>
<td>4B</td>
<td>3B</td>
<td>2B</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total confidence</td>
<td>A</td>
<td>9A</td>
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<td>7A</td>
<td>6A</td>
<td>5A</td>
<td>4A</td>
<td>3A</td>
<td>2A</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Source: Jøsang (2016: 49).
Again, subjective logic is just one of many options for responding to complexity and subjecting each of the most worthwhile proposals on a preventive diplomacy wiki to more detailed and rigorous analysis. There is undoubtedly much wisdom also to be drawn from decades of experience with refining details of the Delphi method, for example, since it was first developed for the Pentagon by the Rand Corporation in the 1950s and 1960s. DelphiCloud has given much thought to the problems of overconfidence and groupthink, adapting in an evidence-based way by giving people an opportunity to express opinions privately without pressure from a group, but following that with discussion sessions where participants trade evidence and share analyses. In aggregating to a collective view, DelphiCloud gives more weight to the analyses of people whose assessments have proved robust in the past on that kind of question.

The 10 best proposals each year and the analyses of them by expert panels could be published in an annual review of preventive diplomacy, which could be provided free of charge to all institutions involved in Track II diplomacy. The problem with the social science academy that this proposal seeks to remedy is that our incentives are to publish either empirical findings or social theory. The remedy advanced here is to make it also academically prestigious (prize-winning, income-generating, citation-generating) to come up with one of the best preventive diplomacy ideas based on one’s detailed knowledge of a particular country. The other thing that appeals to us about it is that, as we have seen with the prevention of disease (Dukes et al. 2014), universities taking back leadership in applied research excellence from closed bureaucracies could put it on a more ethical footing. While it is open to an intelligence agency like the CIA to propose to its political leaders that its best idea is to deploy drones on missions of extrajudicial assassination in countries against which the United States has not declared war, or to establish an institution like the School of the Americas in Panama, such proposals could not possibly win prizes on an open-source preventive diplomacy wiki led by university professors.

This would be because the test for excellence would not be advancing any single national interest. The test would be war prevention. If the analysis of this book is right, many of the best ideas would actively prevent cascades of militarisation rather than promote new forms of militarisation.

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12. CONCLUSION

(in the way drone warfare has). The wiki would come up with ideas on how to apply regulatory theory to making the nuclear non-proliferation regime more effective. It could never laud military interventions to smash Weapons of Mass Destruction. It could develop many creative new layers of strategies to enrich meta-strategies that grapple with complexity.
Appendix: Summary of proposition conclusions for each country case

Table A Summary of proposition conclusions for each country case.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Propositions</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>4</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>5(a)</th>
<th>6</th>
<th>7</th>
<th>8(a)</th>
<th>9</th>
<th>10</th>
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<tbody>
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</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✗</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

✓ = country case mostly supports  
✗ = case does not support  
- = missing data

Table A summarises overall patterns of support for our propositions. Each tick or cross represents not one data point, but an inference from many different conflicts within that case, from many transitions to violence and away from it that occur at different times in different spaces within that one country since World War II. All countries have a broad pattern of support for the propositions except Bhutan, for which support for our propositions is strongly challenged. All propositions have an overall pattern of support except Proposition 5 on security dilemmas as a driver of violence; after Partition, Proposition 5 is mostly not supported across the region. Across the entire period since the end of World War II, however, even Proposition 5 has half the country cases in support. So
it is premature to discard Proposition 5 for future hypothesis testing on new Peacebuilding Compared cases. Its replacement, Proposition 5(a), on democracy as a driver of domination, has greater, though not perfect, support. The differences are not so great as to make it worthwhile to list separate results for the original Proposition 8 and for Proposition 8(a), with the emphasis on humiliation added. The addition of that emphasis on humiliation does, nevertheless, notably strengthen the explanatory power of Proposition 8. Now we provide a brief narrative summary of our empirical findings for each country case on each proposition in turn.

**Proposition 1:** As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

**India supports.** With both rioting and insurgency, politicised breakdown of pacification has a history of frequent repetition, yet being quickly repaired when a state monopoly of force reasserts domination of violent defiance with effective policing. Wilkinson (2004) shows how Indian police can shut riots down when they do their job. Kashmir is the big exception, where defiance effects consistently exceed deterrence effects. In Kashmir, armed force is massive, but does not monopolise the space.

**Pakistan supports.** US drone warfare in Pakistan against the Taliban is a classic example of defiance effects exceeding deterrence effects in spatial contexts where no force can monopolise coercion. The jihadist imaginary that brought so many in Pakistan to support the resistance of the Afghan Taliban to the NATO invasion has helped defiance effects to consistently exceed deterrence effects for insurgency inside Pakistan.

**Bangladesh supports.** Violence has cascaded in the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) as militarisation and coercion have cascaded. On the other hand, 1997 was a moment when defiance took a major step backward when the high levels of coercion that only India’s army had at its command were deployed to force the CHT insurgents to hand in their weapons and embrace the peace process.

**Sri Lanka supports.** Erroneously, the young Marxists of the Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) calculated that, by threatening military families, growing sections of the military might defect to them. Instead, the JVP triggered a cascade of slaughter of their own cadres. On the other side, the armed
conflict was likewise a strategy of harnessing the defiance of those who had already been attacked: ‘The JVP concentrated on recruiting members from houses set on fire and families in which brothers or fathers were killed or a female harassed or raped’ (Gunaratna 2001: 295). The Tamil Tigers case is also a fit with this proposition. Defiance cascaded until a stable state monopolisation of armed force was re-established during the past decade.

**Bhutan supports.** Nepalese Maoist defiance on infrequent occasions has overcome deterrence, but, overwhelmingly, the Proposition 1 dynamic is evident in deterrent effects that exceed defiance effects in a society where there has never been a serious fragmentation of a monopoly of armed force.

**Afghanistan supports.** As coercion escalated with the 2001 invasion, both deterrence and defiance increased to the point where deterrence of the Taliban exceeded defiance effects between 11 September 2001 and 2003, and perhaps even until 2005. From then on, as the Taliban regrouped and retrained with Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) support, they ceased viewing themselves as outmatched by the combined might of NATO powers and the Northern Alliance. For at least the past 13 years, defiance effects have exceeded deterrence effects and violence has cascaded.

**Nepal supports.** Operation Romeo against rural leftists in 1995 was a classic example of a punitive campaign that could not sustain deterrence effects that exceeded defiance effects. The political machinations of the king in making the police—rather than the army—do most of the fighting in this war condemned it to fail in securing deterrence that exceeded defiance.

**Myanmar supports.** Bamar, British, Japanese and junta dominations of Myanmar’s core were all accomplished by levels of deterrence that suppressed defiance. The defiance of the Communist Party of Burma collapsed after it no longer had the support of a power greater than the junta (China). The Myanmar army, however, continues to find it impossible to sustain a level of deterrence that exceeds defiance of their coercion in many more far-flung parts of the country that continue to be under the effective control of ethnic armies. Deterrence has always exceeded defiance in the core of the country, while, in many parts of Myanmar’s hard-to-control periphery, proud traditions of ethnic defiance have always exceeded deterrence.
Proposition 2: Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

India supports. Cascading of both violent and nonviolent imaginaries is most evident in Kashmir. *Gulami* (slavery) and *azadi* imaginaries cascaded. Islamic imaginaries linked Kashmir to Palestine (as in ‘stone-pelting’ and *azadi* in the intifada). Scripts such as jihad, martyr, stone-pelter, *azadi* and intifada became transplants from one insurgency to another in mutually reinforcing narratives of Muslim oppression by imperial powers and religious domination by Hindus, Christians, and Jews. More widely, Paul Brass’s (2003) ‘institutionalised riot systems’ involve a conversion specialist who is usually a politician who crafts a violent political imaginary, ‘converting’ potential triggers into a riot imaginary, into riots escalated by news networks. Partition was a contagion of violence. Naga insurgency was modelled by other insurgencies. A contagion of communal violence occurred as violence entrepreneurs in one part of the country emulated scripts learnt in other parts of greater India, horizontally from insurgency to insurgency and vertically (as in the Assam insurgency cascading down to the Bodo insurgency, cascading to one Bodo faction fighting another). Support for separatist insurgency inside Pakistan also cascaded down from India (particularly in East Pakistan and Balochistan) and from terrorist bombings in major Pakistani cities organised by Indian intelligence—in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for insurgency inside India. The split of India and Pakistan contributed to the cascading of further partition imaginaries across greater India.

Pakistan supports. The Pakistani state promoted violent imaginaries and jihadist imaginaries through its education policies, with education through extremist *madrassas*. The state’s wider jihadisation of politics started from the early decades of Indian confrontation over Kashmir. The jihadist imaginary was the genie the ISI and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) let out of the bottle because they believed in the 1980s that only radical Islamists would have the fanaticism to throw themselves across the border at the Soviet war machine in Afghanistan. Pakistan also supported the Afghan jihad to motivate jihadist attacks across the border into Indian Kashmir. The Pakistani state eventually learned that even when they could shut down jihadist armed groups, they could not shut down their jihadist imaginaries.
**APPENDIX**

**Bangladesh supports.** A militaristic imaginary of the state, of praetorianism and coups, was modelled from Pakistan to Bangladesh through modelling institutions such as cadet schools. The Awami League forming its own paramilitary organisation that challenged the military opened cleavages with the military that led to the first military coup in Bangladesh. Just as coups and insurgencies have implemented violent imaginaries in Bangladeshi history when cleavages have widened, so a politics of nonviolence has frequently surged in response to the opening up of cleavages.

**Sri Lanka supports.** The JVP uprisings were classic mid-twentieth-century insurgencies in that a Marxist imaginary cascaded violence. Suicide vests that were invented by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) cascaded globally, mainly by Islamic jihadists. The violent imaginaries they represent cascaded when architectures of extreme coercion began to crack and when cleavages in Sri Lankan society began to open. The JVP’s opening of cracks in state coercion created opportunities for LTTE violence, and vice versa.

**Bhutan supports.** Diffusion of nonviolence cascades through the modelling mechanism more than does diffusion of violence. Indeed, imaginaries of nonviolence cascade profoundly across Bhutan’s history.

**Afghanistan supports.** Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders found they could imbue a new generation with a jihad imaginary in Pakistani madrassas. Modelling widely diffused a jihad imaginary that conceived jihad against US forces in Afghanistan as noble work. Jihad against communism, as cracks began to open in its power structure, was a model for jihad against NATO capitalism when cracks began to open in its domination of Afghanistan.

**Nepal supports.** A distinctive feature of the Nepalese case is cascading of a violent feminist imaginary of insurgency. This was driven by systematic state rape that fractured the legitimacy of the state. The feminist imaginary also changed the outcome of this conflict in more decisively feminised ways than for any other conflict in Peacebuilding Compared to date. Yet, in the end game, it was a nonviolent imaginary, which was also quite feminised, that cascaded massively and decisively in 2006 to peace and a moment of major political transformation.
CASCADeS OF VIOLENCe

*Myanmar supports.* Each time the architectures of coercion—by colonial power or by junta power—have begun to crack in Myanmar’s history, violence has cascaded. Yet, it was the nonviolent resistance to this fracturing architecture of coercion that ultimately prevailed as a reaction to it. This was the triumph of the National League for Democracy (NLD) assuming power in 2016.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

*India supports.* Partition of India and Pakistan resulted from a variety of deliberate tactics by the British Raj to divide the minority Muslim community from the Hindu majority in the self-rule movement. Religious animosities that were prised open failed to preserve colonial rule, and instead cascaded to violence. At Partition, violence was greatest in Punjab, where the Raj, during and after the mutiny, concentrated its recruitment of ‘martial races’ as mercenaries to be set against the ethnic other. Fear concerning these cleavages became a resource for violence entrepreneurs who mobilised around them to attack, rape, murder and drive out the religious other. Similar dynamics were fuelled by India with the partition of Bangladesh from Pakistan.

*Pakistan supports.* Sometimes the Pakistani state and military worked in alliance with the Taliban, the United States, Iran and *lashkars* (civilian militias armed by the military) in the Swat Valley to open up cleavages and unsettle power balances. On other occasions, they worked against each of these actors in alliances with their enemies. These complex shifts in alliance structures cascaded violence.

*Bangladesh supports.* Violence has particularly escalated in the history of Bangladesh when internal cleavages connected up to cleavages between India and Pakistan or India and Bangladesh. The biggest war in the history of Bangladesh, in 1971, is an example of this, as is the country’s biggest insurgency, in the CHT in the late twentieth century.

*Sri Lanka supports.* The JVP argued that the Sri Lankan Government was allowing the country to be held hostage to Tamil division and Indian imperial designs. There was paradox therefore that the LTTE had provided weapons, landmines, explosives and training to the JVP to weaken the Sri Lankan military, which would have to fight on two fronts. The LTTE threat cascaded through the intentional agency of LTTE strategists of violence to the JVP becoming a more credible threat.
paradoxical cascade was of the Government of Sri Lanka replenishing the firepower of its principal enemy, the LTTE, so it could kill 1,200 Indian peacekeepers. Sri Lanka had become a country with wars across multiple cleavages among four major combatants: the Sri Lankan military, the Indian military, the JVP and the LTTE. Some of these combatants chose to escalate violence not only against enemies, but also against ‘friends’. They did this to goad their friends to resist their enemies. As a result, cascades of violence became convoluted and virulent. Organised crime then saw opportunities to enrol political parties to their projects, even to seek to take them over.

Bhutan does not support. There are many cleavages in Bhutan, but none of them has so substantially unsettled power imbalances as to cascade widespread armed violence.

Afghanistan supports. Jihadists put in play formidable dynamics of cascade–cleavage–alliance that cascaded violence and unsettled power balances, recurrently and in different combinations across the past four decades.

Nepal supports. The cleavages that opened up were between the king and the political parties and, ultimately, between the king and the Government of India. In the initial rise of the insurgency, the depth of local village-level cleavages between upper-caste landlords and the lower-caste landless was decisive. The Nepalese case therefore supports Autesserre’s (2010, 2014) and Kalyvas’s (2003) analyses on the importance of how local cleavages enrol national and international ones, and vice versa.

Myanmar supports. Our Myanmar narrative is of ethnic armies that have aligned at different times with and against each other and with and against master cleavages over colonial, junta, communist and anti-communist (Kuomintang) control of spaces. Myanmar’s master and secondary cleavages have experienced ever-changing realignments that have unsettled power balances and recurrently cascaded conflict.

Proposition 4: Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

India supports. Disintegration of a single armed force obviously occurred at Partition and helped cascade violence. These circumstances continued after Partition in parts of India’s periphery, most persistently in Kashmir. With both rioting and insurgency, politicised breakdown of pacification
has a history of frequent repetition in the face of legitimate armed force temporarily walking away from its peacemaking obligations, yet being quickly repaired when armed state force reasserts domination of the space.

**Pakistan supports.** Pakistan has become the most extremely violent society in Karstedt’s (2014) data, particularly because of the dynamics of the way the Pakistani Taliban has disintegrated pacification and triggered extreme state violence.

**Bangladesh supports.** The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) gained a foothold in the Rajshahi Division for the same reason the Taliban won a foothold in rural Kandahar province in 1994. There was a rule-of-law vacuum—an absence of any effective governance in these spaces—that attracted the most brutal of forces. India’s earlier support to insurgents in the CHT and before that to the militarised Awami League created more fundamental fragmentations of the state monopoly of armed force that cascaded more deadly violence than jihadist groups such as the JMB have ever cascaded in Bangladesh.

**Sri Lanka supports.** The state monopoly of armed force began to fragment from the 1970s, creating an extremely violent society that has become less violent in recent years under a re-established state monopoly of armed force.

**Bhutan supports.** No disintegration of a state monopoly of legitimate armed force has occurred in Bhutan and no major armed violence has occurred, as would be expected in these circumstances according to the proposition.

**Afghanistan supports.** The disintegration of the communist monopoly of armed force by the mujahidin almost four decades ago ended the last semblance of a monopoly of armed force in Afghanistan. Consequently, violence was incessant across these four decades. Post-2001, Afghanistan certainly experienced little semblance of a state monopoly of armed force. Northern Alliance armed capability was factionalised, at cross-purposes, under the control of disparate warlords and never really under the control of president Karzai. President Bush and president Karzai were fighting different enemies.

**Nepal supports.** A militarised police controlled by the executive government and an army controlled by the king did not make a great formula for pacifying Nepal. Fragmentation of the state monopoly of force became
profound and was compounded by political parties controlling violent youth wings that terrorised political opponents. This fragmentation of the monopoly of force continued to cascade violence after the peace of 2006.

*Myanmar supports.* Wa State illustrates the limits of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify Myanmar. The United Wa State Army is a criminalised drug and weapons trading organisation backed by China, and is untouchable by the Myanmar military. Wa State is a de facto Chinese colony that is unregulated by Myanmar state power. Between Wa State and a pacified core of the country lie many semi-pacified regions where the state monopoly of force is fragile and violently contested by organised crime and ethnic militias.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

*India supports.* Partition fuelled security dilemmas over where India ended and Pakistan began. Many communities felt they must drive out the religious other to create the fact on the ground that their religious group dominated their district. They believed that, if they did not, the religious other would soon drive them out.

*Pakistan does not support.* The Pakistani side of the Kashmir Line of Control has not been awash with violence to the degree of Indian Kashmir as a result of the ongoing cascade of violence prompted by the security dilemmas of Partition. Baloch insurgents and Bangladesh Liberation War fighters alike took up arms to push back domination, not because they were in a security dilemma. Pakistan is more afflicted by violence than India as a result of a more widespread militarisation of violence, the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and its morphing into armed criminality and the rise of insurgency in Balochistan. These conflicts do not readily lend themselves to explanation in terms of security dilemmas, however.

*Bangladesh does not support.* State violence against the Awami League in 1971 and against CHT indigenous peoples later in the century hardly occurred because the state was in a security dilemma. Rather, this happened as a militarised political choice. Insurgents fought back against these waves of violence because state forces attacked them.

*Sri Lanka supports.* Assassinations on both sides in the failed JVP uprising of 1971 motivated both to settle scores in 1987. The security forces argued that the government had erred in not wiping the JVP out in 1971. This
perception also encouraged the security forces in 1987 to believe that, ‘unless we wipe them out first, they will wipe out not only us but also our families this time’. This perceived security dilemma magnified and cascaded common criminal threats into an imperative for war. The JVP prematurely resorted to armed struggle against the government because of its analysis that, if they did not strike first, the state would wipe them out in the way that the Indonesian Government had wiped out its communist party in 1965.

_Bhutan does not support._ There has been no significant security dilemma dynamic that has left people feeling insecure.

_Afghanistan supports._ Afghan national and NATO security forces put the Taliban in a security dilemma by murdering or sending to Guantanamo Bay so many talib who tried to surrender in 2001–03. The Taliban continues to put surrendering talib in a security dilemma by letting them know that, if they do surrender, they will be killed. This means they have to fight locals who might kill them before they surrender.

_Nepal does not support._ This civil war was caused not by a security dilemma, but by domination that engendered Maoist resistance, though one might say that women fearing rape joined the war at a later stage because they were in a security dilemma that motivated them to fight before they were raped.

_Myanmar does not support._ Propositions 1–4 provide a better account of the root causes of conflict in Myanmar than the security dilemmas invoked in Proposition 5. At times, when there has been fear of ceasefires being broken with ethnic armies, subsidiary security dilemma dynamics have had moments of relevance.

**Proposition 5(a):** Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

_India supports._ This revised proposition was written in response to the way democracy has been an instrument of domination in Kashmir, widening cleavages and creating niches for violent opposition as the alternative to the ballot box.
Pakistan supports. Prime minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto’s resumption of civilian government in the context of the militarised Pakistani state brought to power a man who was a greater extremist on militarisation of the state than Pakistan’s military rulers, more enthused about firing up civil war in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and Balochistan and more committed than the military rulers to acquiring nuclear weapons. This was simultaneously a populist strategy for winning votes and one of trying to prevent a military coup. Anomic conditions have motivated major parties to forge alliances with criminal gangs who help them strongarm their way to electoral domination.

Bangladesh supports. At the end game of their careers, the most senior Bangladeshi generals only make it right to the top by backing the incumbent dynasty or the dynasty they believe will win the next election. Once they take sides in dynastic politics to boost a surge to the top, they might last at the top only as long as that side keeps winning elections, unless they are clever in the way they change sides at the right moment to assist the successor dynasty back to power. This interplay between democracy and militarisation helps build a democracy that is a driver of domination. The militarised two-party system is also reinforced by money politics. Our interviews with business leaders and lobby groups indicate that they best serve the interests of their business by not supporting third parties and by making large payments when asked by both dynastic parties. This symbiosis between military politics and money politics engenders a two-class system or a ‘two-networks’ system. The depth of the Bangladeshi class structure is bifurcated into a military class who do military politics and a business-political class who do money politics. Together, they help democracy deliver domination.

Sri Lanka supports. Majoritarian violent populism had electoral appeal in Sri Lanka and was an obstacle to peace and a driver of a politics of domination during the decades of conflict until 2015.

Bhutan does not support. Democratic institutions have not been drivers of violence on any large scale.

Afghanistan supports. There might perhaps be some support for this before the communists came to power, but, once they did, and under the Taliban, there was no democracy that could be a driver of conflict. Since 2001, we have seen there is plentiful evidence of electoral competition opening cleavages, of political leaders enrolling and supporting non-state armed
groups or bits of the armed state, of political adversaries in democratic contests being falsely outed to one armed group or another to get them killed, eliminating them as a source of electoral competition.

Nepal supports. Political parties controlling militarised youth wings in Nepal terrorise political opponents, especially at the time of elections, and mobilise violence against village leaders who refuse to organise their village to vote for their party sponsors. This has cascaded violence and domination.

Myanmar too early to call. The NLD’s electoral victory in late 2015 and assumption of power in 2016 have given Myanmar only months rather than years of democratic experience in more than half a century. Given that the elected NLD Government has such limited control over the army, one might have hoped that Myanmar would prove a case where democracy would not be a driver of domination. Management of the Rohingya crisis gives pause to that hope. Militarised violence against Rohingyas has been politically popular in Myanmar and the international community has been shocked that Aung San Suu Kyi has not spoken out against it. Time will tell whether we will look back on it as violence that was worsened by democratic populism that trumps rights. At this stage, the state of the evidence makes that likely.

Proposition 6: Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

India supports. At Partition, Muslim refugees cascading from India to Pakistan, and Hindus from Pakistan to India, travelled long distances to areas where they became the ethnic other. Refugee camps created hardships as well as food and land shortages for locals in many districts where refugees settled. This resulted in cascades of ethnic violence, sometimes years or decades later, between refugee communities and the local ethnic group. One devastating example was Biharis who migrated to East Pakistan in 1947, where they suffered marginalisation.

Pakistan supports. The Baloch army was decimated by herding large numbers of displaced persons—mostly women and children—on to the plains and attacking them, thereby drawing the Baloch fighters down
from the hills to defend their families. Afghanistan’s wars caused floods of more than 6 million refugees into Pakistan. This dramatically upset traditional balances and historically harmonious relationships with Hazaras in Balochistan, for example. The major reason for death in armed conflict and terror incidents being concentrated in border areas is millions of Afghan refugees destabilising these areas, with the madrassas near the border accounting for most recruits for the Afghan jihad.

**Bangladesh supports.** Many of those targeted for belonging to a group perceived to have supported Pakistan in the 1971 war fled to West Pakistan, where they became unwelcome refugees, cascading further internal conflict there. Thousands of non-Bengalis, mainly Biharis, killed and were killed and more than a million who had fled their homes ended up huddled in refugee slum settlements inside Bangladesh. In 1997, India stopped food supplies to hungry CHT refugees in India and inflicted violence on them to pressure them to return to Bangladesh and join a CHT peace deal.

**Sri Lanka supports.** In 2009, the Tamil Tigers sent a female suicide bomber to mingle with a group of escaping refugees; this operation killed 20 soldiers and eight refugees and justified counter-violence against the refugees. The example is just one illustration of support for Proposition 6 from the murderous end game of the civil war. It is a proposition with recurrent explanatory power in this case.

**Bhutan supports.** Bhutanese refugee camps in Nepal became nodes of Maoist armed resistance, distribution of weapons and crime.

**Afghanistan supports.** Refugee camps for Afghans in Pakistan may have, across time, accommodated as many as 6.2 million people (Maley 2016: Ch. 3). We have seen that young people in these camps were systematically targeted for recruitment by Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and often vilified and punished by their enemies.

**Nepal does not support or only weakly supports.** Refugee camps were not critical sites of Maoist recruitment or targeting in this conflict. Refugee and IDP numbers were low compared with most major civil wars. There were periods when whole communities moved away from their villages to fight from the hills, but this was mostly transitional, as Maoists retook most such villages.
CASCAdeS of VioLenCe

Myanmar supports. The Rohingya crisis is an example of grave contemporary risk from refugee exclusion—indeed, a case where many not unreasonably regard it as a genocide against refugees by a targeted group. Rohingya refugee targeting could fuel an ever-widening cascade of violence unless a politics of reconciliation, inclusion and practical help with food, health and safety is embraced.

Proposition 7: Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

India supports. Cascades of violence created an anomic culture in Kashmir that denies legitimacy to the security sector. The Indian state intentionally constructs anomie in Kashmir—for example, by funding many newspapers to sow confusion over who is in charge, what the rules of the game are and what are the facts. They do this systematically on Facebook as well. The general atmosphere of anomic violence provided cover for revenge killings or for the settling of longstanding property disputes by driving individuals off their land.

Pakistan supports. Anomie is an intentionally created normlessness that is a cornerstone of Pakistani militants’ strategy. ‘Eliminating the socially and politically influential to create a social vacuum’ is an example, as is ‘coopting criminal gangs of the area’ to create chaos that the Taliban can fix with Sharia law and also so the criminals can ‘give them an understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of law enforcement agencies in a particular community’ that they set out to destroy (Hussain 2013: 17). Political parties reinforce anomie by forging alliances with insurgent groups, with the mullah–military complex and with organised crime groups who mobilise force to help them win elections.

Bangladesh supports. In the CHT, we found a state military that allowed enough pacification to justify its presence and enough anarchy to allow itself to profit from organised crime. Military leaders profited from semi-unsettled conditions of anomie. In more anarchic spaces such as the CHT, armed men can get away with revenge. Anomie creates spaces where resentments that have nothing to do with the war—about a property dispute, a sexual relationship or a gesture of disrespect—can trigger a revenge attack.
Sri Lanka supports. The JVP was called the ‘night government’. People did not know what the rules of the game were during all three of Sri Lanka’s major armed conflicts, and people struggled to decide who to support and who to be seen to follow in regions of shifting control.

Bhutan supports. There was no disintegration of a monopoly of armed force and no significant cascade of anomie, as would be expected under this proposition in these circumstances.

Afghanistan supports. We have seen that anomie was the very condition in Kandahar province that brought the Taliban to local power from 1994 in circumstances where security had disintegrated. We have also clearly seen that in Afghanistan no one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. We have seen that anomie has cascaded further violence.

Nepal supports. Nepal was a classic case of Durkheimian anomie. Not knowing what the rules of the game were and not knowing who was in charge afflicted everyone, particularly in areas in transition from government control to control by the United People’s Revolutionary Committees. Anomie also afflicted the security sector and this cascaded violence.

Myanmar does not support. It has always been clear who is in charge of the core of the Myanmar state and what are the rules of the game. The master cleavages opened up by the Communist Party of Burma and the NLD were rebellions to overturn that clearly articulated order. Rebels proposed clearly articulated alternative orders. There are some anomic regions of the periphery of the country, but, again, most of the conflict there is motivated by a clearly articulated alternative vision of a federalist Myanmar. Peripheral pockets of anomie may therefore be better seen as results of the contestation of those alternative visions rather than as causes of it.

Proposition 8(a): Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation, domination and humiliation. Militarisation, domination and humiliation recursively risk further cascades of violence.

India supports. Kashmir’s initial violence cascaded militarisation, domination and humiliation. In contrast, the initial violence was moderated in Tamil Nadu and pacified through inclusive powersharing and negotiated concessions, which became a positive model for pacification
of cascades in north-eastern India. That conceded, the Kashmir cascade was massive. One interstate war cascaded to four more interstate wars, to nuclearisation of confrontation and to an internationally cascading Kashmiri insurgency. The rapid militarisation of Pakistan cascaded to a greatly increased militarisation of India, especially in Kashmir. When global jihad spiked, communal violence in India—the starting point of our cascade—also spiked. Obversely, India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons cascaded to Pakistan doing likewise and, in turn, cascaded nuclear secrets between Pakistan, North Korea, Libya and Iran, and cascaded a new domination of the world by fear of nuclear terrorism.

**Pakistan supports.** Starting with the Kashmir conflict after Partition, much of the militarisation in South Asia was ‘intelisation’, with Pakistan’s ISI the most aggressive agency in intentionally seeking to divide other societies in the region by supporting violent projects of internal dissent. Other regional intelligence services, particularly India’s Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), responded in kind, promoting violent insurgency inside Pakistan. The humiliation of Pakistan’s military defeat in Bangladesh motivated a restoration of Pakistan’s martial dignity by all-out war in Balochistan during the 1970s.

**Bangladesh supports.** Because military politics and money politics cascaded across time and across space (from Pakistan) in the history of Bangladesh, violence cascaded down to a civil war in the CHT, and from the instability there across to insurgencies back in India, where all these cascades began, and into Myanmar. Smaller indigenous groups who have been deprived of literacy often feel they are treated contemptuously, as primitives, by the Chakma. The Mru resistance to the Chakma through the Mru Bahini militia illustrates one upshot of this humiliating domination.

**Sri Lanka supports.** Sri Lanka cascaded enormous violence, militarisation, domination and humiliation. The residues of these cascades remain strong in Sri Lanka today.

**Bhutan supports.** There have been only limited cascades of militarisation in Bhutan and no cascades of it to war and crime. Hence the condition of low cascading of militarisation and absence of cascades to war and crime supports the proposition.

**Afghanistan supports.** We have seen that militarisation, domination and humiliation have cascaded recursively with further cascades of violence without end since the 1970s.
Nepal supports. War militarised a police that cascaded torture, rape, disappearances and other forms of domination to brutalise the oppressed people of rural Nepal, driving forward recruitment into the People’s Liberation Army. This cascade also militarised the youth wings of political parties. After the 2006 peace agreement, armed groups morphed into 119 armed criminal gangs involved in kidnapping, extortion and robberies in the Tarai. Rape was a key instrument of militarised humiliation.

Myanmar supports. It is clear that violence, militarisation and domination have been mutually reinforcing in the history of Myanmar since World War II and indeed for much longer. This, in turn, has cascaded humiliation, as we see vividly today with the plight of Rohingyas.

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime-war-crime cascade from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

India supports. Kashmir reveals a diversity of less visible war-crime cascades down to the creation of organised criminal gangs, assassination of alleged informers, a personal revenge culture, a gun culture, a rape culture, a culture of torture and an anomic culture in which domestic violence, crime and suicide have escalated. Insurgency cascades to state crime (such as disappearing people, fake encounters), which in turn cascades insurgency, which cascades political assassinations, which cascades more state crime and more insurgency.

Pakistan supports. Many examples of attempted and actual assassinations of top political figures escalated long-term patterns of violence and cascades of militarisation across Pakistan and beyond. Insurgency also cascaded to crime with insurgents or hardmen pretending to be former insurgents cashing in on anomic to establish organised crime groups. Narcotics trafficking funds Taliban and Al-Qaeda purchases of weapons from the same black market pool that is used by common criminals.

Bangladesh supports. A terrible feature of the 1971 war was the militarisation of rape. There were more than 25,000 officially recorded cases of forced impregnation (D’Costa 2011). In the CHT, as the number of army posts and Bengali settlements increased, rape of women and children increased. As political parties in the CHT became more criminalised, police and military informants allege that each party used firefights with the other as an excuse to eliminate their own in ‘crossfire’. Likewise, critics of the
military allege that the military finds the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (JSS) – United People’s Democratic Front (UPDF) conflict a useful pretext for military murder of troublesome members of both groups. The military then blames the killing on the other group. The military extorts healthy rents from illegal logging, tobacco, tourism and other businesses that operate in the CHT. The wives of military officers have often ended up beneficiaries of land in the CHT stolen from those driven off it or illegally purchased national forest reserves. In these ways, war and crime have mutually cascaded.

Sri Lanka supports. The LTTE was involved in transnational crime, took relief goods from local and international donors and then sold them to the black market and forcibly took lands from minority communities—as did the state military. Our Sri Lanka chapter is the one in which we most systematically work through the multiple ways in which crime cascades to war and war to crime.

Bhutan does not support. Crime-to-war or war-to-crime cascades have not occurred in the modern history of Bhutan.

Afghanistan supports. The crimes of gangs in Kandahar cascaded to a new surge of civil war that brought the Taliban to power. Al-Qaeda’s crimes of 11 September 2001 cascaded to the NATO war against the Taliban. That war cascaded to criminalisation of the Afghan state and perhaps contributed to the criminalisation of some other regional states such as Iran. Box 9.1 illustrated crime–war–crime cascades at the local level with shocking power through the story of the 2011 killing of an Uzbek mullah and two women in a NATO night raid. Stories of this kind are many in Afghanistan.

Nepal supports. For the security sector, the war strategy defined rape of Maoists as patriotic rather than shameful. This rape accelerated and feminised the conflict. War allowed drug trafficking and many other crimes to cascade out of control.

Myanmar supports. War-to-crime cascades are especially strong in Myanmar, with spikes in the drug trade and other organised criminality historically associated with spikes in armed conflict. Beyond attacks on state security forces by armed groups often sparking spirals of revenge killings, there is, however, more limited evidence of individual crimes sparking war.
**Proposition 10:** When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

**India supports.** India’s support for the CHT insurgency, followed by withdrawal of support many years later, illustrates Proposition 10’s cut-and-run tactics. Colonial withdrawal and Partition after World War II were also a devastatingly mismanaged form of cut and run by an external power that felt it no longer had the security sector resources to manage a secure sequencing of disengagement.

**Pakistan supports.** The North-West Frontier tribal areas have been to Pakistan what Vietnam was to the US military and Afghanistan to the Soviet military. On many occasions in history, right up to 2015, the Pakistani military has attempted military surges to dominate the North-West Frontier. On none of these occasions has it succeeded in establishing a state monopoly of armed force. Every time, ‘the costs of shutting down the violence came to exceed the benefits of winning’, so the economics of war dictated an accommodation with tribal militias that left the tribal frontier lands a launching pad for future cascades of violence. Even the Pakistan military attacks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which were motivated by repeated attempts to assassinate president Musharraf, attempts launched by Taliban and Al-Qaeda–affiliated armed groups based there in the early years after 2001, were so unsuccessful that Musharraf himself ‘concluded that he had no option but to negotiate with his would-be killers’ (Gartenstein-Ross 2010: 29). These military surges tended to be taps turned on when new fires started, but turned off when the fire got hot.

**Bangladesh supports only weakly.** Bangladesh supports this proposition in only a limited way. One motivation for withdrawing financial support for the CHT insurgency and for starving and inflicting violence against indigenous CHT refugees to force them back to Bangladesh may have been to cut costs and reduce local frictions associated with the refugee population housed in India. It was also about reducing international friction with Bangladesh. The main reason in 1997, however, was that the new Awami League Government was seen as more friendly to India than
its predecessor. It became the right time to cut support for refugee camps for insurgents because India came to have less interest in destabilising Bangladesh.

*Sri Lanka supports.* The behaviour of Indian peacekeepers after they lost 1,200 troops and quit Sri Lanka fits Proposition 10. At a local level, before 2009, there is also some fit with a cut-and-run interpretation within the Sri Lankan military when desertions were cascading under withering LTTE attacks on particular fronts.

*Bhutan does not support.* The dynamic of war followed by festering violence driven by cutting and running from the war never happened in Bhutan’s recent history. This also means the history of Nepal neither refutes this proposition nor supports it.

*Afghanistan supports.* From 2014, if not before, the United States, following the lead of many of its allies, concluded that it should cut and run because the costs of continuing to fight no longer seemed to justify the benefits.

*Nepal does not support.* There was no cut and run by an interventionist imperial army that found the war too expensive. The only cut and run was by the international diplomatic community in its support for the king. The denouement of this conflict was about conflict transformation led from Nepalese civil society.

*Myanmar does not support.* China has always interfered formidable in Myanmar, though not by invasion in recent centuries. This has been more a case of governance of Myanmar at a distance. Nor did the British Empire really cut and run; it was pushed out militarily by the Japanese. No power vacuum was left for them to return to after Japan was defeated and General Aung San stood ready to take over.
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*Cascades of Violence* is one of the few books that all at once constructs a sophisticated and innovative theoretical framework, relies on a wealth of primary material, and presents extraordinary comparative breadth and depth. It will be of great value to students and scholars of violence.

– Séverine Autesserre, Barnard College, Columbia University, author of *Peaceland* and *The Trouble with the Congo*

This book can be a key text not only for academics but also policymakers and practitioners to understand the complex dynamics of peacebuilding, crime and nonviolence in South Asia. The authors have powerfully articulated both the macro contexts of the causes of crime and conflict, and the lived experiences of marginalised peoples such as the indigenous, minorities and tribal communities of South Asia.

– Sara Hossain, Human Rights Lawyer, Bangladesh; Member, International Chittagong Hill Tracts Commission; editor of *‘Honour’: Crimes, Paradigms, and Violence against Women* (with Lynn Welchman)

Braithwaite and D’Costa’s metaphor of violence cascades is the starting point for a landmark analysis of complex reciprocal relationships between war and crime. Years of exhaustive fieldwork across seven South Asian societies form the foundation for the authors’ powerful insights into war, crime and the interconnected humanitarian efforts at their prevention. This book’s remarkable formulation and analysis of 10 provocative propositions yields hopeful lessons that illuminate new pathways to the reduction of war and crime. Yet as thorough and comprehensive as this classic volume may be, its greatest gift is as a starting point for a new generation of scholarship targeting the complex, changing and still insufficiently understood worlds of war and crime. Responding to a world overwhelmed by inhumanity and atrocity, this book persuasively provides guideposts for reversal and restoration, a world of more peaceful possibilities grounded in social science and law.


Lovers of peace should read this book. It is a treasure trove explaining cascades of peace in South Asia. One special treasure is the way it explains how indigenous conflict resolution systems of South Asia—for example, the Jirga of Afghanistan and Pakistan—if understood and used properly by the powers, could bring peace to Afghanistan. Similarly, if local wisdom and ground realities had been promoted in Kashmir, this could have saved South Asia bloodshed which has been its lot for 70 years. With peace in Kashmir, South Asia today could be an oasis of peace, instead of the string of violent hot spots this book documents. Peace was possible in Kashmir if only the nonviolent movements had been nourished which sprung from the soil of South Asia, one being the Servants of God, led by Abdul Ghaffar Khan (1890–1988) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, another the nonviolent movement led by Gandhi. This insightful book explains how we can learn from the history of South Asia to make the world a more peaceful and interconnected place.

– Ali Gohar, Just Peace Initiatives
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