Recognising cascades in India and Kashmir

Diverse cascades

This chapter suggests that neither a ‘healing touch’ (Ahmed 2010) nor a determined Indian effort to broker a political solution, either in Kashmir or with Pakistan, has ever been accomplished by Indian policy, including during the thaw of 2002–07. Generations of lives have been lost to military overreaction and political underreaction. It shows how the communal violence of the Partition of India cascaded into violence inside Kashmir, into interstate war and to wave upon wave of insurgency across 68 years. The first interstate war cascaded to four more wars in the next half-century. This quickly cascaded to northern Pakistan becoming a training centre for violent jihad in Kashmir, then in Afghanistan and then in Indian Punjab (where Sikhs were dragged into communal conflict, then civil war). This then cascaded to attacks on Indian parliaments and cities and, globally, to diffusion of violent jihad to Indonesia, Chechnya, Britain and beyond.

The most deadly cascade in this case is from interstate war to internal insurgency, particularly to Indian military violence against Kashmiri civilians, which cost several times the number of lives of all the interstate wars across the Kashmir border. The most worrying cascade is to nuclear brinksmanship in the gaming of the conflict by the Pakistani military, in particular, and to a nuclear terrorism risk in Pakistan. Our research in
Kashmir reveals a diversity of less visible cascades down to the creation of organised criminal gangs, assassination of alleged informers, a personal revenge culture, a gun culture, a rape culture, a culture of torture1 and an anomic culture in which domestic violence, crime and suicide have escalated.

India’s story is a long one that can be traced back to the earliest histories of civilisation. Our version of this Indian story is also long, though we begin it only at Partition. India’s colonial legacy sets the scene for cascades of violence in Kashmir. We discuss the attempts of Jawaharlal Nehru to nurture a low-violence India with strong democratic institutions; the militarisation of Pakistan, and how that cascaded to a greater militarisation of India; followed by India and then Pakistan becoming nuclear powers. We then consider Kashmir as the most extreme example of the hollowing out of democratic institutions, as India rejected socialism and faced the choice between liberal capitalism, authoritarian capitalism and crony capitalism. This is followed by an analysis—through a cascade lens—of Kashmir’s five wars since 1947. This structure allows us to uncover the many different kinds of cascading violence in the micro dynamics and global dynamics of those conflicts. We hope to show the value of a methodology that recognises the multiplicity of cascades in play. We list 26 cascades in the chapter’s conclusion.

A key understanding from this chapter is that, if we develop the tools for diagnosing the multiplicity of such cascades, we will better calculate the true costs of playing the violence card. A diagnostics of cascade recognition can motivate peace processes that otherwise seem impossible. In the concluding sections of this chapter, Kashmir is advanced as such a case, where recognising the cascades in play could be the basis for a peace process that leads to a wider India–Pakistan accord and regional religious and political reconciliation. While Kashmir is our primary focus in this chapter, we recognise that it is certainly not the only important armed conflict in India, and we do explore the patterns of these other conflicts. However, we conceive of Kashmir as the most strategic one for our focus because conflict in Kashmir helped catalyse many of the other

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1 This included torture by militants: ‘The house opposite to ours was a JKLF [Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front] torture cell. Does any Kashmiri Muslim talk about torture by militants? They only talk about the Indian state’ (Interview with Kashmiri Pandit leader, 2012, No. 101247). All citations of the above kind are interviews conducted by the authors together.
armed conflicts in India. More importantly, though, Kashmir is in focus because peace with justice in Kashmir could help catalyse a wider South Asian peace.2

The key policy inference is that, by learning to recognise the multiplicity of cascades, we can learn to avert policy miscalculations about benefits of war that are grounded in undercounting cascades. A second policy issue considered in the conclusion of this chapter is whether or not incremental confidence-building peacebuilding may be presumptively the preferred approach. In cases where confidence-building has repeatedly failed over a long period—leaving a legacy of distrust-building instead of trust-building—a grand bargain to reconcile many cascades at once may be a strategy to consider.

Setting the scene: The National Congress legacy

This chapter emphasises Kashmir as a weak spot in India’s democratic record. A weakness as important as it is, Kashmir must be put in perspective within an overall democratic accomplishment. It is an accomplishment that we might connect to the fact that the Indian National Congress was a vibrant, participatory democratic movement from its foundation in 1885—a very different beast from the party machine it became by the later decades of the twentieth century.

It was a common journalistic theme in the middle decades of the twentieth century that violence would disintegrate India as a democracy (see e.g. Harrison 1960: 338). India, in fact, became the only major country to be decolonised since World War II that has remained consistently democratic since independence. Elections regularly change governments and, compared with most states, in India, there is relatively less control over the operation of political parties and the formation of new organisations in civil society. We find that the most important difference between India and Pakistan (Chapter 6) is that the military and intelligence services in India are firmly under the control of an elected civilian administration. This has important implications for cascades of violence. Although

2 We carried out 71 interviews, some with more than one person, mostly with people in Indian-administered Kashmir, Ladakh and Jammu in 2012, including many resistance leaders. These included some Indian military and police interviews and UN and diplomatic interviews in New Delhi, New York, Pakistan and elsewhere in 2013 and going back to 2007.
its critics argue about the integrity of India’s record of respect for civil liberties, its freedom of the press and robustly independent courts are rivalled by few postcolonial societies. The security forces of India have created and armed proxy civilian militias to kill insurgents and to do the dirty work of counterinsurgency. India is the only country we know where the Supreme Court has ruled to stop such activities: in 2009, with respect to counterinsurgency against Maoists in Chattisgarh (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 32; Supreme Court of India 2011). India also has a more independent and professional civil service than most postcolonial states.

There have been five outbreaks of war in Kashmir: a major war with Pakistan at the time of Bangladesh’s independence; some minor border wars with China in the 1960s; diverse civil wars in Assam, Punjab and West Bengal (demanding the creation of Gorkhaland); a long-running armed secession that started in 1955 in Nagaland on the Assam–Burma border; and Naxalite/Maoist conflicts in at least 13 states where mostly indigenous people have struggled for autonomy from oppression. Yet per capita war deaths in India since independence have been much lower than for portions of the British Empire in the region that broke away from India before independence, or, indeed, which never became part of it: Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Nepal, Afghanistan and Pakistan.

3 The Indian Supreme Court scrapped the controversial Section 66A of the Information Technology Act in March 2015, which suggested more stringent policing of social media. However, it stressed the need for a new law to regulate social media in August (Shreya Singhal vs Union of India, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 167 of 2012, Supreme Court of India, available from: www.lawkam.org/caselaw/section-66aitact-shreya-singhal-india/8559/, last accessed 20 January 2018; Sriram 2015).

4 In this chapter, we use Naxalite and Maoist interchangeably. The Naxalite movement started in Naxalbari, West Bengal, in 1967, after police shot dead nine women and children during protests in which peasants demanded implementation of a court order against a landlord. In 1968, a year of New Left take-off globally, the Naxalite movement spread to many parts of West Bengal and other states where most people went hungry for half the year. It struggled to build support in most parts of Kerala and other areas where empowered local Panchayats had addressed problems of food security (Chakrabarty 2012: 38–9; Rammohan 2012: 349) and in districts where there was not the kind of police overreaction to protest that occurred in Naxalbari. The uprisings seemed to have been crushed inside five years, but Naxalism has surged back to be stronger today, after several cascades of renewal since a period of quiescence from 1972 (Nayak 2012). As with the Taliban in Kandahar in the mid-1990s and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) in rural Bangladesh from 2001, the Naxalites offered rule of law and development services in districts where a vacuum had been left by the state. As one eyewitness account put it: ‘In areas where the government has hardly any presence, the Maoists help the villages in constructing irrigation canals. They also educate the villagers against the problem faced by them. This makes an impact. And, through this process, they become a part of the village. Once inside a village, the extremists offer instant justice for internal problems like theft, cheating, vandalism and land disputes in the area, drawing villages closer to them. It is at this stage that the villagers develop a trust in them and are ready to protect the Maoists from the police’ (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 193). The power of the Naxalites has spread because they had a reputation of protecting the poorest people from common and corporate crime, although there are also many areas where they have lost support because their own armed tyranny made things worse for the poor.
These countries have separately and collectively experienced far higher rates of war deaths than the world average. The violence that cascaded in these cases included an allegiance between Britain and a dominant group. The dominant group and the British together violently subjugated other groups (with the dominant group being Bamar in Myanmar, Singhalese in Sri Lanka, the Punjab-dominated Muslim League in Pakistan, Bengali landlords in Bangladesh, the Nepalese monarchy in Nepal and Pashtun royal lines in Afghanistan).

Breakouts of communal violence in post-independence India—between Hindus and Muslims, Hindus and Sikhs, ethnic majorities and indigenous minorities and more—have been widespread, with many thousands of serious incidents of injuries to people and widespread destruction of property (Kohli 1990: 7). Paul Brass emphasised that riots are preplanned productions in ‘institutionalised riot systems’. They have a functional utility for many individuals and groups that prevents them from effectively dealing with violence (Brass 2003: 32–4). Brass identifies two critical characters—the ‘fire tender’ and the ‘conversion specialist’—in the functioning of the riot system.

[The] fire tender … moves about the city uncovering incidents ostensibly to prevent such incidents from turning into communal riots. However, the actual effects of his actions and those of others who play this role is to keep the embers from dying out.

[The] conversion specialist is usually a politician who plays the key role in ‘converting’ potential triggers—instantly transmitted by the news network—into riots … The news is transmitted instantly from the scene to persons in the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) who then decide whether or not it is worthy of their attention and action. If deemed so—that is, if the political context is such that ‘political capital’ can be gained from it—then a group will be rushed to the scene. They will not necessarily rush with the intent to begin a fracas, but they will go to observe, to confront, and, if necessary, to decide whether or not further forces should be mobilized. (Brass 2003: 33)5

In terms of our Proposition 2, Brass’s conversion specialists of institutionalised riot systems are interpreted as politicians who craft a violent political imaginary that ‘converts’ triggers into a riot that spreads the violent imaginary and escalates it through the news network.

5 Sangh Parivar, a movement of Hindu nationalist organisations in India, has been implicated in the riots, particularly the RSS, Bajrang Dal and the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP).
Wilkinson (2004) provides an important insight into what sets the riot system in motion. According to his realist understanding of electoral politics, there is impetus to control the violence if minorities are critical to state political leaders for votes. In multipolar Bihar and Uttar Pradesh (UP), where Muslim votes mattered, the riots were ruthlessly controlled. But Maharashtra, where Muslim votes mattered less, saw the deadliest anti-Muslim pogroms. Wilkinson’s study demonstrates that political parties have the power to both inflame and control violent riots. Wilkinson’s (2004) study of 167 Muslim–Hindu communal riots found that most led to no deaths. In 80 per cent of cases where deaths did occur, fewer than 10 people were killed.

Communal violence in which hundreds of people have been killed has been less frequent in India than in Indonesia (to take a comparably diverse, though smaller, postcolonial society). Although even Indonesia has a low frequency of such slaughter per capita, it had many more deaths from communal violence in four years from 1999 to 2004 than India had in the 54 years from 1950 to 2004 (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 184). Annual statistics do not exist for China, but it is possible that India has less frequent breakouts of community violence than China, given that the Chinese Communist Party itself estimated that there were more than 200 rural protests a day in China, mostly about local corruption and inequality (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 84). China has also been rather successful in quelling these before they cause loss of multiple lives. It is not in these diverse mega-states but in smaller states, such as Yugoslavia and Burundi, that we find higher statistical incidence of war deaths per capita.

Three of the four most prominent Indians since independence—Mohandas (Mahatma) Gandhi, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi—fell to assassins; the first to a Hindu, the second to a Sikh, the third to a Tamil. Yet, overall, India’s homicide rate is considerably below the world average and particularly far below the average homicide rate of postcolonial states. It has been steady around the most recent (2014) rate of 3.2 per 100,000 population for the past six years (UNODC 2013). On the other hand, we see that many forms of state violence have cascaded, partly from Kashmir. Particularly important among these forms of state violence are torture and disappearances.6

6 This is why India scores highly on Karstedt’s (2012, 2014) Violent Societies Index.
How do we interpret the success of the three Asian mega-states—Indonesia, China and India—in achieving comparatively low death rates from homicide, sectarian riots and war during recent decades compared with smaller Asian states such as Sri Lanka and Nepal, and middle-sized ones as well, such as the Philippines, Bangladesh, and Myanmar? We interpret it in the same way we interpret the success of large developed mega-states such as the United States, Japan and, indeed, the Soviet Union during its decades of high growth and high industrialisation before the information economy began to threaten Soviet disintegration in the 1970s. All of these mega-states created large pacified spaces of comparatively low violence (Morris 2014). This was possible because the very success of these states meant that ‘one legitimate monopoly of force dominated all other armed groups in their territory’ (Proposition 4) so that, across their vast pacified spaces, ‘deterrence effects against violence exceeded defiance effects’ (Proposition 1). Indeed, we read the structurally comparatively pacified character of mega-states such as India as one of the most persuasive forms of evidence for Proposition 1. Yet we reveal in this chapter many ways this interpretation requires qualification for India.

India is one of the faster growing economies in the world. It had the seventh-highest level of gross domestic product (GDP) at the time of writing, and has been moving up that league table very fast (World Bank 2014). It has been much more successful at growing its middle class than at conquering poverty. India’s Human Development Index ranking in 2013 was 135 (UNDP 2013). Like many developing countries, India started out with an immiserating colonial legacy of extractive exploitation of its agriculture that reduced agricultural productivity (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Per capita agricultural production continued to fall, by 14 per cent, in the final four decades before independence, and, in food grains, by 24 per cent (Chandra et al. 2008: 14).

7 This exploitation is also relevant to the intensification of leftist extremism in India. The Naxalite message of struggle and hope was an alternative for many who might have joined the 100,000 Indian farmers who committed suicide in the first decade of the twenty-first century. Some 48 per cent of these mostly middle-aged men had informal loans from moneylenders or relatives that they could not repay (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 198–9). The Naxalites stood up for indigenous people whose forests were being destroyed by corporate interests in mining and forestry and for landless and impoverished farmers. Naxalites delivered immediate results for desperate people by taking over land belonging to non-cultivating owners and killing moneylenders, landlords, foresters or politicians who were causing local oppression, or threatening them with death unless they softened oppression. They forced landlords to reduce rents, exploitative traders to cut prices and corrupt politicians to reverse exploitative policies secured by bribes. They enforced increased minimum wages. They destroyed legal documents that exploited the poor, declared mortgages and loan agreements void, confiscated hoarded rice and tried and executed corrupt business leaders. They frequently then became local oppressors themselves.
The most influential founders of India—Gandhi and the country’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru—had a strong commitment to conquering poverty. In retrospect, we can see that Nehru’s development model was excessively statist. He had access to limited bureaucratic competence and deployed much of that scarce resource to managing state-run businesses. He failed to harness entrepreneurship in the private sector to develop private managerial competence. Nevertheless, Nehru did make some impressive progress in freeing up the oppressive legacy of rural landlord exploitation through land reforms that returned fields to peasants. In Kashmir, under Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah’s governments in the 1950s, land reform was more radical and transformative than elsewhere in
India: large landed estates were abolished, land was seized from absentee landlords and distributed to tenants, no one was permitted more than 6 acres (2.4 hectares) of cultivable soil and holdings beyond 22.5 acres (9 ha) were seized without compensation. One of the reasons some other states, such as Kerala, have been able to resist the widening of Maoist rural insurgency is because of a reasonably effective, egalitarian land reform that has delivered land and agricultural development to the landless (Heller 2000, but see Oommen’s 2014 critique of widening inequality in Kerala). Nehru believed in decentralisation of power. He devolved power to state leaders who had even more radically anti-feudal land policies than his own, such as Sheikh Abdullah. But, more commonly, Nehru devolved it to pro-feudal state leaders, half of whom bequeathed low-intensity rural Maoist insurgencies to their successors of the twenty-first century.

The federalism bequeathed by Nehru initially devolved a lot of power to state governments. Later, it began to do so to local elected Panchayats (village councils) that mandated one-third of elected seats for women and other seats for lower castes and tribal people in proportion to their representation in the local population. This happened when Panchayats were constitutionally entrenched in 1993. The Panchayats were preceded in 1952 by the Community Development Program, with Block Development Officers whose job was to improve rural life through innovations in agriculture, water tanks and wells, communications, health, education and other dimensions of village life. Nehru wished for participation and self-reliance to ‘unleash forces from below among our people’ (Chandra et al. 2008: 186). Better plant seeds and better roads, among other changes, resulted, and agricultural productivity improved. Over time, however, the system became more bureaucratised and less about self-reliance. Thus, the move was made to elected Panchayats in 1957.

Unfortunately, all these forms of decentralisation often became devolution of the power to corrupt and to embezzle from public offices. Land reforms were among egalitarian reforms that were corrupted by state and local elites for the benefit of ruling families. Local Indian elites had learned how to capture local rents from the indirect rule of the British Raj and the Mughals before that. To this day, the absence of robust anticorruption institutions is a principal obstacle to poverty reduction. Still, there is an impressive list of egalitarian legacies of the Nehru governments. In the five-year plan period for 1961–66, for example, male university student numbers increased 14 per cent and females 78 per cent (Bazaz 2005: 47).
Institutional hollowing and security strengthening

Kashmir is a crucial example of a massive security sector keeping the lid on violence in a crudely coercive way. The coerciveness of it also causes cyclical blowing of that lid. Kohli (1990: 15) argued that while Nehru’s statist development did see the federal government initiate transformative change, the weak developmental capabilities of the state actually became weaker after Nehru’s death. The state had limited capacity to persuade people to follow state initiatives or to build consensus. Increasingly authoritarian and oligarchic central control in Indira Gandhi’s time caused the paradox that the very strategy that allowed her to cling to power undermined her capacity to use that power for constructive ends (Kohli 1990: 16). When institutions that had failed loyalty tests to the centre had been weakened, institutional support to implement reforms hollowed out. Institutional capacity to respond constructively to conflict, such as that between haves and have-nots, has been one casualty of that institutional corrosion. Peacebuilding responses became crudely coercive. Coercive policing can, in the long run, increase the appeal of undisciplined political mobilisation of religious, ethnic, caste and other groups. Such vicious circles have, according to Kohli (1990), eroded the Indian state’s capacity to be a problem-solving state—including in matters of violence reduction.8

Nehru’s Indian National Congress was a party of the poor, but, in Indian politics today, a ‘political party that represents the poor will be a poor party. A party with very meager funds’ (Roy 2004: 114). Money politics is, indeed, a structural way for contemporary democracy to drive domination. Arundhati Roy goes too far when she describes Indian democracy as ‘the biggest publicity scam of this century’ (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 148). Yet, with Kashmir and with the Naxalite grievances, there can be little doubt she is right. In Chapter 7, we see a similar pattern in Bangladesh of dynastic populism at the centre combined with mobilisation of communalism from below (which is then controlled

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8 This has been a theme in the writing of Arundhati Roy (2004: 110): ‘In recent years, the police have repeatedly opened fire on unarmed people, mostly Adivasis [indigenous people], at peaceful demonstrations. In Nagarnar, Jharkland; in Mehndi Kheda, Madhya Pradesh; in Umergaon, Gujarat; in Rayagada and Chilika, Orissa; in Muthanga, Kerala. People are killed for encroaching on forest land, as well as when they’re trying to protect forest land from dams, mining operations, steel plants.’
violently). This pattern corrodes institutional capacity to manage conflict constructively. The state is delivered a bureaucracy that is loyal to dynastic power rather than responsive to the people and to drivers of conflicts that oppress citizens.

Kohli (1998: 12–13, 31) argues that when state authority is well institutionalised in developing country democracies, and when national leaders act in an accommodating manner, violent internal conflicts usually follow an inverted U-shaped curve: violence from time to time escalates, but a combination of firm institutional capability and responsiveness to accommodate demands can bring it under control. Another theoretical language for this is responsiveness—institutional capability that is firm, fair and listens in its responsiveness. The responsiveness idea is the same as in Kohli’s (1998: 13) model in Table 5.1: institutional strength combined with accommodation or responsiveness to grievances permits reconciliation of violence before it escalates beyond control (see Chapter 12).

Table 5.1 Trajectory of self-determination movements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Central authority</th>
<th>Well institutionalised</th>
<th>Weakly institutionalised</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Leadership strategy</td>
<td>Accommodating</td>
<td>1. The inverse ‘U’ curve of ethnic politics (e.g. Tamils in India, 1950s and 1960s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Unaccommodating</td>
<td>3. Demands and repression cycle (e.g. Sikhs in India’s Punjab, 1980)</td>
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Ali Ahmed (2010) explores three case studies—Kashmir, Punjab and Indian intervention in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka—to sustain a conclusion similar to Kohli’s. Violence begins to cascade in Ahmed’s account. He diagnoses all three cases as involving insufficient security sector moderation at the moment of outbreak of a crisis. On Kashmir, he cites the analysis of Ved Marwah, advisor to then governor of Kashmir, Jagmohan Malhotra, in January 1990. Marwah was present at the key meetings that crafted the initial response to the take-off of the insurgency in that month. The key overreaction was killing 30 demonstrators at Republic Day celebrations in Srinagar on 26 January 1990. This ‘had grave consequences for the situation in Kashmir. It gave a tremendous boost to militancy in the Valley’ (Marwah 1995: 79). Governor Jagmohan then:
made matters worse for himself by taking no disciplinary action against the police officers guilty of grave professional lapses. The Governor succumbed to the usual plea that taking action against the police would demoralize the force. (Marwah 1995: 79)

While a degree of escalation of security sector response was inevitable to face the impending will to insurgency at that time:

It would take over a decade before the political need to win hearts and minds asserted itself as the premier policy yardstick in the policy of ‘healing touch’ after the 2002 elections. (Ahmed 2010: 301; see also Anant 2011)

Indian military leaders insist that their philosophy is now ‘soft on the people and tough on the militants’ (Interview with Indian lieutenant-general, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101216). They said in our interviews that there has been a shift of philosophy both in Kashmir and with the Naxalite conflicts. Yet, the fact remains with the latter that four civilians are being killed for every militant who is killed.9 Ahmed (2010) concludes that suppression must be leavened by responsive political measures. He reads this as fidelity to the Clausewitzian principle of the primacy of the political over the military. In each case, the initial overreaction fed the insurgency, making the situation worse before it got better.10 Indian internal security policy is characterised as a ‘strategy of exhaustion’ that can work on the de-escalating side of Kohli’s inverted-U, as illustrated by peacebuilding in Punjab, Mizoram and Nagaland. Yet pursuit of a ‘position of strength’ proved elusive for more than a decade of great human and economic costs when the initial response was violent overreaction.11

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9 However, there is a sign in some military posts in Kashmir that soldiers are proud to be photographed in front of: ‘If you have them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow.’

10 The escalating beginning of Kohli’s (1998: 13) inverted-U.

11 Ahmed (2010: 310) observes that the first lesson is the trite but timeless adage that ‘prevention is better than cure’. Second, the political prong needs to be as much in evidence as the military prong of strategy, to capitalise on gains made by the military prong. Third, the military instrument is essentially blunt. ‘Careful civilian control is necessary to ensure that the crisis is not set off into a downward spiral, increasing the salience of the military template … an attention span going beyond the initial crisis point [is needed]’ (ibid.).
Violence cascades from Partition

This section articulates how a cascade of violence can transform the drivers of violence, as in Kashmir, where religious identity was not initially a salient driver of violence.\(^{12}\) We also sketch out briefly the dynamic of cascades of indigenous violence and state violence.

The Quit India movement from 1942 was intended to be nonviolent. In the event, it became much more random and violent than earlier campaigns led by India’s anticolonial movements. Academics noted various reasons for this, such as the arrest of Gandhi and other strategists of nonviolent discipline at the outset (e.g. Keay 2010: 498). Also, the element of British resistance to independence of dividing Muslims against Hindus and martial races (whom it militarised in the service of the Raj) against others had succeeded to a degree.\(^{13}\) By May 1947, it had become clear to the people of India that partition of greater India into what were to become Pakistan and India was likely. Bengal, Bihar and Punjab were soon in flames and major conflagrations also occurred in Lahore, in New Delhi itself and in many lesser cities. The people of Bengal and Punjab also realised that their provinces would be divided. Anxiety escalated over where India would end and Pakistan would begin. Security dilemmas were on the rise (Proposition 5).

Some violence entrepreneurs saw opportunities to grab land and businesses, to loot and stake a claim to a region for Hindu or Muslim dominance by driving out the religious other. The first acts of such communal violence, which may have been in Lahore and Amritsar (Desai 2009: 265), became a contagion (Proposition 2). Women were not only victims of rape by the other community, but were also pre-emptively killed by their own community to preserve the honour of their family rather than allow them to be raped (D’Costa 2011). This relates to Proposition 9: impending civil war cascading to sexual violence and rape. Estimates of the number who died range from 500,000 to 2 million. There are no reliable figures. While the contagion spread quickly, in most places where it broke out, it

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\(^{12}\) We describe these more fully for the case of the indigenous peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh in Chapter 7. In the conclusion of the book, we conceive this as a broader South Asian cascade of violence.

\(^{13}\) Lange and Dawson (2009) find that, among 160 countries, those with a history of British colonialism experience significantly more inter-communal violence than former Spanish or French colonies. Lange and Dawson interpret this in terms of British strategies of divide and rule and institutionalisation of an ethnically based division of labour and ethnically based hierarchy.
was extinguished within days by the security sector’s response to protect minorities being targeted. In no city did it continue cascading from suburb to suburb for more than a few months.\(^\text{14}\)

This contagion left an indelible script in the Indian imaginary: rising communally against the religious other in looting, burning and raping at times of hatred or perceived oppression. Sadly, Indian secularism became an embattled ideal as a ‘million mutinies’ (Desai 2009: 452) could be put down only by force. They resulted in militarisation of the police, torture and tyranny that became a threat to Indian democracy. As Kak (2011a: xiii) deftly conceptualised it: ‘the very long embrace with militarization had seriously dulled the government’s reflexes’—a dulling we find to be even deeper in our Bangladesh and Pakistan cases in Chapters 6 and 7 (Proposition 8). The worst instances were the slaughter of 3,000 Sikhs by New Delhi Hindu mobs in the days after Indira Gandhi was killed by her Sikh bodyguards and the killing of 2,000 Muslims and a smaller number of Hindus in Gujarat in 2002 after conflict escalated over the burning of a train in Godra. The violence in Gujarat bore an ‘uncanny’ resemblance to riots in New Delhi in 1984 and Bombay (now Mumbai) in 1993 in which a legislative majority ‘let loose the fury of a mob’ following a sudden traumatic event ‘while keeping the police passive’ (Desai 2009: 412).

Wilkinson (2004) has shown that there is a history of cascades of violence of this type across hundreds of such communal riots. When the police show resolve to prevent violence from spreading, however, they have overwhelmingly succeeded in doing so throughout Indian history. A firm police presence protecting civilians can shut down security dilemmas whereby ‘we must attack the communal other before they attack us’ (Proposition 5). Wilkinson found that the cases involving a lot of killing are ones in which the police fail to show resolve. Failure of resolve, in turn, occurs because their state government is politically reluctant to allow the police to control a group that delivers electoral support to the party in power. We can see this pattern instantiated from the bloody beginning of postcolonial Kashmir. The army and the extremist Hindu organisation RSS were involved in loading hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Jammu Muslims into army trucks to be slaughtered. When he learnt the extent of the slaughter, chief emergency administrator of the state Sheikh Abdullah

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14 Fiction and films after Partition, and scholarship in the 1990s, explore the pain, trauma and loss of Partition. In this sense, Saadat Hasan Manto’s stories, films such as Tamash and the work of Veena Das, Urvashi Butalia and Ritu Menon on human suffering are particularly noteworthy.
was shocked. Yet, when first advised that the Muslims were being driven out, Abdullah took no steps to stop it, saying: ‘Why should I care for Jammu Muslims? They have never accepted me as their leader’ (veteran freedom fighter Krishan Dev Sethi, quoted in Rasool 2009: 28).

The Jammu ethnic cleansing of Muslims was indeed cleansing of political opponents of the Sheikh. Poonch and Jammu Muslims supported the rival party, the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference, and possibly the rival political objective at that time of integration with Pakistan. So, there are both frequent cascades of communal rioting in India and many more infrequent cascades of political exploitation of that violence by state governments.

A result, in turn, has been politicisation and militarisation of the police as an institution—cascades of tyranny of the police baton in response to cascades of communal rioting. Naxalite/Maoist resistance cascaded not only to police tyranny, but also to other grievances, of economic, indigenous and geographic marginalisation. This, in turn, triggered cascades of escalated police armed violence against rebels. It also saw the state sponsor anti-insurgent militias. Cascades of state-sponsored private militias are also part of the Kashmir tragedy. Their work has had the effect of extinguishing a fire with gasoline, as in Iraq, Syria and so many other contexts. Naxalite rebellion has also become more widespread and more violent in the upshot, with Naxalites thrusting many states into conditions approaching civil war and controlling 20 per cent of India’s forests.

In the aftermath of the communal violence of Partition, Nehru assured the 45 million Muslims who remained that they could live safely in India. He led the nation in mourning the loss of its dearest son, Gandhi, to the violence. Nehru also worked hard to head off future conflict with marginalised tribal peoples through a policy of integrating them into the

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15 Likewise, one of the reasons low-intensity Maoist insurgencies afflict some rural areas of half of India’s states is that state political leaders have tolerated or encouraged them because the insurgents mostly killed party-political opponents of those state leaders in the regions that Maoists control (Chadha 2005: 375–6; Routray 2012: 319). In Chapter 9, we see that Nepal’s king also tolerated Maoists when they killed members of the political parties who opposed the monarchy.

16 For details, see Chapter 2, this volume.

17 More so in Chhattisgarh, where 16 of the state’s 20 police districts have been deemed Naxalite areas, with 531 armed incidents and 413 deaths in 2007 (Thornton and Thornton 2012: 153–4). More than 1,000 people were killed in Chhattisgarh alone between 2009 and 2013, in over 2,000 separate incidents. Jharkhand had a similarly high toll for the same period, with 862 deaths (Ministry of Home Affairs 2014). Bahree (2010) estimates the number displaced as 100,000, with almost 5,000 civilians and insurgents dead across India in the conflict between the Maoists and the security forces.
opportunity structure of Indian society while preserving and valuing their distinct identity and languages (Ministry of Information and Broadcasting 1954: 582).

One of the reasons caste has been so important to India is because of its usefulness in highlighting the social and economic ‘backwardness’ of groups and individuals. Caste groups have used census reports to construct solidarities at regional levels and to demand caste mobility and solutions to their disadvantage (Shaikh 2011). Nehru’s government legislated for reservation of seats for Scheduled Tribes, just as it did for Scheduled Castes, in parliaments and the public service. Ninety-eight of 489 seats in the national parliament and 669 of 3,283 seats in state assemblies were reserved. The first postcolonial government in India established Tribal Advisory Councils in all states with indigenous communities and a Commissioner for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes within the Indian separation of powers to audit whether safeguards provided in law were honoured in practice. In Assam, which had the highest density, with some 100 indigenous groups, autonomous districts were established to provide a degree of self-governance. District and regional councils took on certain legislative and judicial functions under the jurisdiction of the Parliament of Assam.

Sadly, landlessness, unemployment and educational disadvantage continued to impoverish these peoples. Anupama Rao (2009: 26) observes that the paradox of Indian democracy—where commitment to substantive equality of groups coexists with the recognition of the politics of caste difference—has created conditions in which Dalits have been subjected to new forms of political violence. State and local governments often did not share the central leaders’ commitment to affirmative action and some state bureaucracies, notably the police, were racist or discriminatory. This meant that, on a wide front, as in wealthier countries such as Australia, Canada and the United States, institutions designed for the benefit of indigenous people did not deliver. Worse, elites often misappropriated funds intended to benefit indigenous people. Forest contractors and other land-grabbers who schemed to steal the heritage of tribal peoples also successfully lobbied for the transfer of effective advocates for tribal people within the civil service. Oppressors harnessed laws for forest rights, which were intended to secure the heritage of indigenous peoples, to exclude them from their own land. Some indigenous peoples who had formerly been majorities now became minorities in their own lands.
This oppression cascaded to a proliferation of protest movements to assert welfare, development and land rights for tribal peoples. Dalits and tribal populations also turned away from what they perceived as the Hinduism of their oppression. Both Buddha and B. R. Ambedkar became important icons for Dalit emancipation (Rao 2009: 180–6). Gender, caste and sexuality became symbolic markers for the Dalits, manifested on Dalit and poor bodies as sites of state violence. When protests and nonviolent movements so often failed to achieve results, some tribal protest movements turned to armed struggle. The state’s counterinsurgency response was another cascade of violence. It was often brutal and directed not just at armed rebels, but also at unarmed civilians from surrounding villages. This brutality tended to escalate the cycle of violence, motivating more bodies to join the armed rebels in the bush. In Assam, another profound cause of armed conflict was a decision by the Assam Government in 1960 to make Assamese the sole official language of the state. This was part of the context that made it imperative to respond to the Nagaland and Mizo insurgencies by constituting Nagaland as a separate state from Assam and Mizoram as a Union Territory separated from Assam. In general, however, as we see in the next two chapters, Pakistan handled less responsively than did India its less complex language challenges. Starting with Nehru, and continuing through to Indira Gandhi’s willingness to concede substantial language autonomy to Tamil Nadu to end secessionist sentiment there, Indian leaders mostly navigated a sensitive and prudent journey to a highly workable degree of language unity within diversity.

Similarly, in the aftermath of Partition, India was more successful than Pakistan at systematically redistributing wealth from richer to poorer states (Chandra et al. 2008: 155). In contrast, West Pakistan discriminated against its peripheries (such as Balochistan) and against East Pakistan (later Bangladesh). Pakistan sought to subdue disenchanted regions militarily whereas India, partly because it was spending a much smaller proportion of its budget on the military, could afford to buy their integration with development assistance. The Indian choice was an integrative and peacebuilding investment, though we see that it has not worked in Kashmir. One senior police interviewee from Assam (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101221) noted that part of the success of peacebuilding in Assam was active civil society engagement with the police, while in Kashmir, civil society avoids open engagement with the police.
In many other parts of India such peacebuilding has continued to work throughout the seven decades since Partition. Peace accords have tended to have a standard set of elements, as Bajpai (2010: 60) has explained. First, they underwrite combatants’ assurances that they will lay down arms and renounce secession from India in return for payment for their guns and other payments. Second, all accords provide for the rehabilitation and reintegration of militants and agitators.18 Third, all accords provide for the protection of ethnic identities. ‘[V]irtually every accord allows local religious and customary laws to govern economic activity, ownership of land and forests, civil and criminal law, and language and migration’ (Bajpai 2010: 60). Accords in the north-eastern states mostly include provisions to protect minorities, usually by instituting autonomous councils inside states, with special powers over crucial issues such as land disputes, but with the central government having ultimate authority to dissolve them. These councils have not always functioned well and have often been starved of resources by state governments that resent the limited challenge to their authority that they represent. Some accords have created new autonomous states, such as the breaking up of Assam into the ‘seven sisters’. Many of these states, including Nagaland and Tripura, have been successful. For example, Mizoram today has a literacy rate of 89 per cent—second only to Kerala—and 81 per cent of the population lives above the poverty line. Some commentators look back on a past folly of insisting on retaining large states when in India the largest states are the ones that have fared worst at development and smaller states have mostly enjoyed better governance (Chadha 2005: 409).

In sum, we might say of insurgency in India the same thing that we concluded about communal rioting. Insurgency breaks out with great frequency in India and, when it does, it cascades. However, as with communal rioting, when insurgency does break out, it is mostly extinguished before large numbers of lives are lost, in comparison with death tolls from insurgencies across the rest of the world. Ultimately, the security services do their job in asserting their overwhelming power advantage over the insurgents (Propositions 1 and 4) and, ultimately, Indian democratic institutions choose to be responsive in crafting

18 Although, with Maoist conflicts, as in Kashmir, there have been many ceasefires and peace talks that have been a ploy by the state to trap and kill those who participate in the talks (Bhaduri 2012: 19). There have been many other peace accords where there was either an inept failure to bring all the potential spoilers to the table or a continuation of the British tradition of divide-and-rule accords that had the intent of setting one group against another to pursue political objectives by violent means while wearing the mantle of the peacemaker (Chadha 2005: 426–7).
a democratic and reintegrative peace agreement, as opposed to the kind of peace imposed after the Sri Lankan civil war from 2009 (Chapter 8). Kashmir is the most important exception to this pattern. While across India high-frequency communal rioting has mostly been suppressed quickly with low loss of life, high-frequency insurgency has mostly been suppressed very slowly with low loss of life. With insurgency, the Indian state has been willing to wait out resistance and has been patient with the irritation of insurgencies that cause fewer than a few hundred lives to be lost each year. No state has had as many long-duration insurgencies as India. Kashmir is the longest. Naga resistance and separatism started in 1947, turned to armed struggle in 1955, mostly ended by all spoilers with the peace agreement of 2012, but continued to flare low levels of mostly inter-communal violence since. A consequence of the protracted nature of these struggles is that, while the lives lost to the war are very low in most years, over the whole period of the conflict, the aggregated number of lives lost is large—perhaps as high as 70,000 in the case of Kashmir since 1990, with tens of thousands more in the previous 43 years (Chatterji et al. 2009; Reuters 2008; Sidhu 2006), and claims of as many as 200,000 dead over 50 years in Nagaland (Iralu 2003).

Another consequence of longevity is a lot of cascading. We describe how Kashmir cascaded across India, the region and the globe. The Naga insurgency cascaded into Myanmar and became a model (Proposition 2) for other separatist insurgencies in north-eastern India, from Manipur to Mizoram, Tripura and other parts of the original state of Assam, and also in Punjab and West Bengal. According to Chadha’s (2005: 28, 230) historical analysis, Nagaland started an insurgency ‘domino effect’, which itself was one of many centrifugal tendencies initially encouraged by the All-India Muslim League’s demand for Pakistan. Depending on the ethnic group involved, support for the north-eastern insurgencies cascaded:

- across from Pakistan—for example, into Mizoram, where General Ayub Khan had hopes of ‘repeating another Kashmir’ (Chadha 2005: 343), and, more recently, where the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) expanded its client base to Naxalite groups (Ramana 2005, 2010)
- across from Bangladesh, which continued support for many north-eastern insurgencies after it separated from Pakistan (Chadha 2005: 420)
- across from Myanmar (where the Naga insurgents had many bases), from Nepal—with the Gorkhaland insurgency’s claims for Nepalese language rights (Chadha 2005: 283)—and through infiltration of
Pakistan’s ISI in Nepal to support any and all Indian insurgencies across the Nepalese border, in addition to Nepalese Maoist support for Indian Maoists (Ramana 2010: 158)

- across from China—for example, to Manipur (Chadha 2005: 315) and the Maoist insurgencies
- across from China via Bhutan (Konwer 2012: 120; Rammohan 2011: 83). Six different Indian armed separatist movements have had bases in Bhutan. India retaliated against Chinese support for insurgency by itself cascading support in the past for the (mostly nonviolent) Tibetan resistance movement against China.

This horizontal cascading was complemented by vertical cascades, as in the Bodo resistance to the 1985 Assam accord that Rajiv Gandhi had signed with the All Assam Students Union and the All Assam Gana Sangam Parishad. Groups such as the National Democratic Front for Bodoland took up arms for a separate country for the Bodos when they felt they were sold out by more powerful groups who had negotiated the Assam accord. It took until 1993 to see a Bodo peace negotiated with the Bodo People’s Action Committee to establish the Bodo Autonomous Council. This did not hold until another peace was negotiated, with the Bodo Liberation Tiger Force, in 2003. In recent times, the Bodoland Territorial Council government, led by former Bodo Liberation Tiger Force leaders, has experienced renewed fratricidal clashes from the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (Konwer 2012: 118). As we see for Bangladesh in Chapter 7, here, insurgency cascaded down from one excluded ethnic group to another group even more excluded by that group. In Manipur, there were around two dozen armed groups (Singh 2012: 74).

There was also some cross-border cascading with the Maoist insurrections across central India, with some support coming from and to Nepal. More interestingly, in 2001, Maoist groups collaborated to plan a ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’ that would traverse connected forests across Andra Pradesh to Nepal, crossing Maharashtra, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Bihar in between, to allow easy movement of fighters and arms from one part of the zone to another (Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009: 164). Figure 5.1 shows formidable progress towards this cascade objective by the present decade. The peak years for security force members being killed by Maoists

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19 For details, see Chadha (2005: 256–7).
were 2007 to 2010, when well over 1,000 were killed; the number of insurgents killed has a more erratic and uncertain pattern across space and time, with 2016 being perhaps the worst year in a decade.\textsuperscript{20}

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure51.png}
\caption{Chronic conflict in India, 2015.}
\end{figure}

\footnote{All the numbers for which sources are cited above and in the following paragraphs are rubbery, but are broadly consistent with numbers used by major international media organisations, including the BBC and Al Jazeera.}
This Compact Revolutionary Zone strategy was facilitated in September 2004 by the merger of the two largest Maoist networks, the People’s War Group and the Maoist Communist Centre, to form the Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI-M), which now has the organisational capacity to create foundations for insurgency in 15 states—foundations that have realised a credible insurgency in a majority of them. It has an estimated 15,000 armed underground rebels, with estimates of 25–40 per cent women, mostly under 25 years of age and many of them students (Ramana 2010: 151–3). The CPI-M now has trained organisational competence in the cascading of armed struggle. The theme explored in this section—how violence cascaded from Partition down to many local armed conflicts—is resumed as a major theme of the next two chapters and of Part III of the book. In the next section, we turn to the specific case study of this long and wide cascade, which is the key focus of this chapter: Kashmir.

While this book concludes that Pakistan is a more militarised state than India, we should never underestimate the historical significance of how formidable the Indian military has long been. At independence, India received 66 per cent of the British Indian Army—nearly 310,000 troops. Over the next five years, the army managed to recover from losing Muslim units to Pakistan and British technical staff and its strength increased to 400,000 soldiers. After the Sino–Indian War in 1962, the number increased further, to 825,000; after the Kargil War, it increased again to an estimated 1.3 million. This made the Indian army the second largest in the world (Wolpert 2006). Since 1991, female officers have also joined the army. During World War II, the Indian army became the largest volunteer army in history, with 2.2 million men fighting in Abyssinia, Eritrea, Italy, the Middle East, North Africa and Sudan (Wolpert 2006: 51).

The struggle against domination in Kashmiri history

Kashmir is nestled in the north-west Himalayas, enclosed by mountains except for a few passes into its rich valleys. For all but a few months of the year, the most elevated regions—which are the predominantly Buddhist region of Ladakh on the Indian side of the Line of Control—are cut off from the predominantly Muslim Kashmir Valley and Jammu, which is today predominantly Hindu. In this circumstance of being rather cut off, Kashmir developed a sense of separateness of identity. It invented its own
script and a literature that was rather independent of the larger literary traditions that surrounded it. When it came into contact with them, it enriched them. In the opinion of Jawaharlal Nehru, Kashmir ‘dominated the intellectual scene of the country for 2000 years’ (B. Puri 2011: 119).

Remoteness, however, did not prevent invaders from penetrating its passes and subordinating its people. Indeed, invaders viewed Kashmir as a great prize because of its natural splendour and the agricultural productivity of the Kashmir Valley, with its bounty of temperate fruits that are hard to grow at lower altitudes to the south. For half a millennium, Kashmir has not been ruled by Kashmiris, though Kashmiri tradition clings to fond memories of the periods of rule by Kashmiri kings such as Lalitadiya-Muktapida (725–53 AD) and Zain-ul-Abidin (1420–70 AD). Kashmiri identity is a memory file of domination by India or Pakistan, the British Raj, the Dogra Hindu Maharajas, who were sold Kashmir by the British in 1846, Sikh rulers before the Dogras, Pathans (Pashtuns) before them and Mughals from 1586.

Kashmiris view themselves as suffering centuries of slavery to these rulers. Gulami (slavery) is a big word in the Kashmir imaginary (Proposition 2):

In the village they understand the narrative of gulami. Not always the narrative of ‘occupation’. Old and contemporary poets use gulami. Gulami of the Maharaja. Of the Mughals, of India now. (Interview with Srinagar non-governmental organisation (NGO), 2012, No. 101234)

For Kashmiris, azadi—endlessly chanted at their demonstrations—means ‘freedom’ in the ancient republican sense of freedom from slavery or freedom from domination by the other. Azadi is not about the neoliberal individualist freedom of choice that has growing currency in India today; it is a community vision of freedom as release from slavery and domination. It is a way of seeing liberty that is refracted through those successions of dominations by foreign invaders. None of those successions—passing domination from one overlord to another—better epitomises Kashmir’s ethos of enslavement than the fact that the British sold them to the warlord Maharaja Gulab Singh in 1846 after the first Anglo–Sikh war for 7.5 million rupees and an annual tribute of six shawls spun from pashmina wool. The system of beggar, or forced rural labour, of mostly landless peasants without compensation that was imposed by the Dogra Hindu Maharajas was oppressive. It was overlaid with deep indebtedness to absentee Hindu landlords and moneylenders. A human rights group told us they received complaints from rural areas today of a continuation
of forced labour ‘as porters, as human shields, as carpenters’, required by the military—sometimes with rape and sexual harassment being part of the complaint. Another rights NGO had surveyed 50 villages in which they found 6,888 cases of forced labour (Citizens’ Council for Justice 2012). Thus, in local eyes, gulami persists.

There was also industrial slavery and early industrial resistance. Shawl weavers went on strike the year after Maharaja Gulab Singh took power in 1847, and again in 1865, demanding decent wages and relief from heavy taxation. The silk factory workers’ strike of 1925 laid a foundation for the general uprising against Dogra domination in 1931 in which young Sheikh Abdullah rose to prominence. The silk industry provided the bulk of employment in the Kashmir capital, Srinagar, and its surrounding region.

As the Quit India campaign gained traction and the British prepared to leave, the 1940s became a time of hope for liberation in Kashmir. Its population at that time was 77 per cent Muslim—with a Buddhist region in the north and a significant Sikh population—but was ruled
by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh. While Muslim expulsions have left Jammu with a Hindu majority population today, in 1947, even in Jammu, 61 per cent of the population was Muslim; it was 95 per cent in the Kashmir Valley and 88 per cent in the rest of Kashmir (Koithara 2004: 32). Singh feared both Indian democracy and the prospect of Pakistan’s Muslim domination. He hoped to opt out of both and persist in his independent rule.

Sheikh Abdullah had emerged by the time of Partition as the most popular leader of Kashmir’s Muslim Conference. He was respected by Nehru and, by 1947, was minded to take Kashmir into India when he became convinced that Kashmiri independence, while he desired it, was not feasible. He secured from the Indian National Congress a special article (Article 370) in the constitution that restricted the Indian parliament’s authority over Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) to external affairs, defence and communications. There was a consensus view among the Congress leadership in 1947, advocated by Gandhi, that Kashmir must be given the choice of joining either Pakistan or India, according to the freely expressed will of the people. He also commended the people of Kashmir for averting communal violence in the lead-up to independence. Indeed, while Hindu–Muslim animosity has salience in Kashmir today, it had little among ordinary Kashmiris in the run-up to Partition.

Tolerance in the Kashmir Valley was promoted with the slogan ‘Beware of communal demon; protect motherland and liberty’ (Bazaz 2005: 44). The Kashmir Valley had a syncretic ethos of ‘pride in inhabiting a cultural space between Vedic Hinduism and Sufi Islam’ (Khan 2010: 40). This was not a case of ancient hatreds that were bottled up until the historical moment when they would burst open. Nor was this so across India at Partition:

There is wide scholarly agreement that partition came about not because Hindu and Muslim masses had difficulty living together but because the elites of the two communities could not agree on political power sharing. At that time the religious and cultural anxieties felt by Muslims at large were wholly secondary to the political fears of their leaders. (Koithara 2004: 28)

This is not to deny that there were inter-religious historical dominations in Kashmir that had left scars, which could be exploited through religious mobilisation. The scars were also used for political mobilisation, but they were causally secondary rather than causally prior. Those scars in Kashmir,
as in other parts of greater India, were about centuries of foreign Muslim domination (Proposition 8) followed by two centuries of deterioration of the Muslim position under the Raj. This was festered by British exploitation of Hindu–Muslim differences to secure British dominion. Sustainable peace has so far proved difficult, with a multiplex array of dozens of foreign, Indian and Kashmiri spoilers.

Pre-empting the plebiscite

In 1947, the Pakistani leadership did not accept the idea of a Kashmiri plebiscite to allow its people to decide which way they should go, even though a significant current of Muslim opinion in the Kashmir Valley craved union with Pakistan. While this remains a minority first preference compared with that for independence for Kashmir, to this day in the Kashmir Valley, there is much more shared identity with Pakistan than with India, as is clear when residents of the valley near universally celebrate Pakistan’s cricket victories and India’s defeats. In our discussions with young university and college students in Kashmir, many repeated this allegiance to Pakistan, yet this enthusiasm is relatively tempered by Kashmiri concerns about military domination in Pakistan, fear of exchanging one *gulami* for another and the fact that economic development in Pakistani Kashmir is stunted in comparison with Indian Kashmir. From 1947 to the present, a significant strand of Kashmiri Muslim political analysis has been that, even if independence for Kashmir is the best option, it is not sustainable in the face of a tug of war between India and Pakistan, both of whom believe Kashmir is legitimately theirs. According to their analysis, joining Pakistan is the best of the feasible choices. While Sheikh Abdullah alternated throughout his life between support for independence and support for India as the exigencies of history unfolded, the 1944 constitution for an independent Kashmir approved by the Muslim Conference undoubtedly reflected the majority long-term aspiration (for details, see Ali 2011: 34).

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21 A 1995 poll found 72 per cent support for independence in the Kashmir Valley, with 77 per cent opposed to a future with India (Jha 1995). A 2010 British poll found support for independence varied from district to district in the Kashmir Valley, from 74 per cent to 95 per cent, while in four predominantly Hindu districts of Jammu support for independence was practically zero.
On 22 October 1947, Pakistan decided to pre-empt the options by sending in Pashtun tribesmen led unofficially by Pakistani officers to join up with pro-Pakistan Kashmiri fighters to take Kashmir for Pakistan. The Maharaja’s army was no match for them. As they pushed towards the capital of Kashmir, Srinagar, on 24 October, Maharaja Hari Singh appealed for Indian military aid. On 26 October, the Maharaja acceded to India—abandoning his hopes of an independent kingdom—to secure his state against Pakistan with Indian military power. He also agreed to Sheikh Abdullah ascending to the leadership of the new Indian state’s administration. Gandhi was less than total in his commitment to nonviolence at this moment; he supported the deployment of Indian troops to drive out the Pakistani and Kashmiri Muslim troops marching on Srinagar.

Following the advice of the last viceroy and first governor-general of India, Lord Louis Mountbatten, and mindful of the looming prospect that Kashmir would become an ongoing provocation for war between India and Pakistan, the Indian Cabinet referred the Kashmir crisis to the UN Security Council on 30 December 1947. Because Pakistan was the aggressor, Nehru hoped the United Nations would order the complete withdrawal of Pakistani armed elements from all of Kashmir so the people of Kashmir could determine their own future under UN supervision. It is a great tragedy that this UN peace and transitional governance diplomacy failed. Nehru had miscalculated. The beginnings of Cold War politics that left the United States and the United Kingdom closer to Pakistan than to India were already present. Thus, on the UN Security Council, the United States and the United Kingdom were more sympathetic to Pakistan than Nehru had hoped.

Pursuant to one of a succession of UN resolutions, India and Pakistan agreed to a ceasefire to the first Kashmir war, on 1 January 1949. By then, each side was exhausted and convinced it could not make significant gains across the ceasefire line, which left India with 63 per cent of the landmass of Kashmir and 72 per cent of the population. The proportion in Indian Kashmir increased in the 1950s; in 1963, Pakistan ceded the least populous 19 per cent of its part of Kashmir to please its ally China; and in the 1971 war India further pushed back the Line of Control. Indian-administered Kashmir became the only Muslim-majority Indian state.
The Partition war of 1947 had been a substantial conflict in which thousands of troops and unknown thousands of civilians were killed in the Kashmir Valley. Jammu also suffered an orgy of Hindu and Sikh killings and expulsions from Muslim-majority districts and Muslim killings and expulsions from Hindu-majority areas. Pakistani infiltrators, driving Hindus and Sikhs from their homes in an attempt to communalise conflict, became a recurrent tactic and cascaded violence in Kashmir for the next half-century—as did threatening or killing former insurgents who participated in peace talks or elections. In 1949, the UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) was deployed to monitor the truce along the ceasefire line—a function it continues to fulfil at the time of writing.

Both sides failed to comply with a 1951 UN resolution that called for withdrawal of Pakistani troops from the region of Kashmir under its control. Compliance would have allowed the Srinagar administration to rule the whole state until a referendum was held. Pakistan refused to withdraw its troops and to allow the side of Kashmir under its control to be ruled from Srinagar. In response, India has since steadfastly refused to conduct a referendum. At a series of meetings of seven Commonwealth prime ministers in January 1951, Pakistan accepted—but India rejected—an Australian proposal that Commonwealth troops be stationed in Kashmir to enable a plebiscite (Rahman 1996: 92–3). One exceptional moment was an agreement and joint communiqué on 20 August 1953 between Nehru and Pakistani prime minister Muhammed Ali Bogra for a plebiscite in Kashmir. India told the UN Security Council that it wanted someone from a small neighbouring country as the plebiscite’s administrator. Muscular US diplomacy on the Security Council derailed the plebiscite in the post–Korean War/Cold War climate, when the anti-imperialist Indian National Congress was seen as unfriendly to America. The United Nations proposed US Admiral Chester W. Nimitz as administrator, but India walked away (Chandra et al. 2008: 206).

In his book, *The Untold Story of the People of Azad Kashmir*, Snedden (2012) provides an alternative history of the Kashmir dispute, locating its origins not in the invasion by Pashtun tribesmen from Pakistan, as India has consistently claimed, but in protests in Poonch and Mirpur by people long disenchanted with Hari Singh’s rule. He argues that the people of Poonch and Mirpur eventually ‘liberated’ themselves from the Maharaja’s rule and formed the government of Azad Kashmir in October, before the
king acceded to India. Snedden proposes that the people should decide the fate of Kashmir. In our explorations of various stages of the Kashmir dispute below, we recognise how difficult that task might be. Snedden (2012) argues that the uprising in Poonch, in the west of Jammu province, in the summer of 1947 was the beginning of the revolt against Kashmir’s maharaja—predating and encouraging the tribal invasion. According to him, this indicates that the armed campaign against the maharaja, and indirectly against Kashmir’s prospective accession to India, was instigated by citizens of the princely state and not by outsiders. This challenges the Indian account that the invading force of Pashtun ‘raiders’ from Pakistan started the fighting. Snedden writes:

The Poonch uprising and the violence against Muslims in Jammu province commenced, and were well under way, before Pakistani Pukhtoons invaded J&K on 22 October 1947 … these actions may have inspired the Pukhtoon’s invasion. (Snedden 2012: 63)

Snedden’s revisionist localising narrative of a conflict widely characterised as international bears a striking resemblance to Autesserre’s (2010) revisionist localising narrative of the origins of war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) (in Part I, this volume).

Various conflicts between India and Pakistan embroiling Kashmir, political and social changes made on the ground in J&K and the global war on terror have also transformed Kashmir. On 24 May 2004, Indian prime minister Manmohan Singh noted in his interview with Jonathan Power:

Short of secession, short of re-drawing boundaries, the Indian establishment can live with anything … we need soft borders—then borders are not so important. People on both sides of the border should be able to move freely. (Sardar 2011: 22)

Pakistan’s former president Pervez Musharraf also raised the idea of a soft border during his visit to India in 2005. Both sides, however, have different perceptions of a ‘soft border’. While Pakistan would not accept making the Line of Control into a permanent border, with bus services already introduced between Srinagar and Muzaffarbad and various other people-to-people contacts between J&K and Azad Kashmir, Pakistan is prepared to go as far as making the Line of Control a soft border.
War again: 1965, 1971

Another lost opportunity to secure enduring peace in Kashmir came in 1964 when a dying Nehru sought to redeem his greatest policy failure. He released Sheikh Abdullah from prison and put a new set of options on the table in a letter to Pakistan. These included a UN plebiscite and an autonomous Kashmir federated between India and Pakistan. Pakistan saw the approaching death of Nehru as a time of opportunity, of Indian weakness. The Indian economy was struggling in 1965. It was a period when Pakistan was growing strongly. Pakistan had also prepared for the uncertainty of Nehru’s death in 1964 with a substantial military modernisation with American help. Pakistan made the calculation at that time that it might have an advantage over India in military preparedness and resolve, one that might prove only temporary, with plans for Indian military renewal in train. It foolishly decided to put this theory to the test. Pakistani forces had been infiltrating J&K since 1964, in Operation Gibraltar. Tension escalated between India and Pakistan in January 1965. Border clashes broke out. These became serious in the Rann of Kutch, although British mediation led to a ceasefire. Further tensions, following Pakistan’s infiltration of 3,000 insurgents to start an uprising in Kashmir, escalated to high-intensity interstate war along the Punjab border later in 1965. The United Nations brokered another ceasefire, in January 1966, and ‘the war of 1965’ was at an end. Pakistan went into the war with hopes that the Chinese were poised to ‘resupply the Pakistan army and create a diversion on India’s eastern frontier, with the Indonesian navy steaming to the rescue and other Islamic states promising support’ (Keay 2010: 548). Pakistan yielded to pressure from the great powers for a ceasefire before any such hoped-for escalations came into play. Had Pakistan toughed it out militarily on this occasion, it is hard to assess whether it would have created a bloody stalemate that led to the permanent settlement it wanted. Thankfully, both the United States and the Soviet Union saw that this could only have been accomplished by escalating to one of the most terrible wars of the twentieth century.

India entered the 1971 war in East Pakistan in support of those fighting for an independent Bangladesh (see Chapter 7), which it justified by the flood of millions of refugees from East Pakistan into West Bengal, India (Proposition 6). Indian intervention to protect the people of East Pakistan from the slaughter was decisive in turning the war into a major defeat for West Pakistan. During the war, hostilities also broke out across
the Kashmir ceasefire line. Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi and her Pakistani counterpart, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, met at Simla to negotiate a peace when the Pakistani forces surrendered. It was agreed that the two countries in future should resolve their differences bilaterally and through peaceful means. India returned 93,000 Pakistani prisoners of war in return for an additional, strategically important 733 square kilometres of Kashmir becoming part of India. The 1971 ceasefire line became the Line of Control that both sides agreed not to transgress.

Politics of hope and despair: The 1987 election

Most elections held in Indian J&K, beginning with the first in 1951, were marred by electoral fraud orchestrated by the party ruling in New Delhi (mostly the Congress Party). This continued, with seven of the first eight elections held between 1951 and 1987 (Snedden 2012: 240) also being discredited by electoral fraud orchestrated by the New Delhi government. After Bakshi Gulam Mohammad’s party won the 1957 and 1962 elections with 95 and 97 per cent of the seats, respectively, Nehru wrote to advise him to lose a few seats in future to improve the image of Indian democracy (Wani 2011: 171). As the 1987 election approached, there had been a total collapse of popular confidence in the J&K National Conference leadership of Farooq Abdullah, son of Sheik Abdullah. The National Conference continued to tout Kashmir autonomy rhetoric, but it had been captured as a pro-India party. Both it and the Congress Party had no substantial support in the Kashmir Valley. Violence such as bombings had escalated in the 1980s.

In this environment, the major resistance groups unified under the banner of the Muslim United Front (MUF), the formation of which was a watershed because it was a unification of disparate groups, some favouring independence, others favouring rule by Pakistan. They shared the ambition of ridding Kashmir of corrupt pro-India parties and winning power for azadi groups using constitutional means at the ballot box. This momentum seemed unstoppable, particularly among the young. Turnout at the 1987 election was high. Instead of being declared as victors, however, successful MUF candidates were imprisoned without charge or were charged with disloyalty to India. In some electorates, gangs of thugs took over polling booths and issued results; in others, ballot papers were
changed en masse or official tally announcements were simply revised. By a variety of rigging tactics, the election result announced in 1987 was that a National Conference–Congress alliance would form a government with an overwhelming majority.

The people engaged with the 1987 election in a politics of hope, yet it produced a politics of despair when the upshot was another pretence of democracy. The reality of a state that was dictatorial and centralist for Kashmiris pushed aside the pretence that it was democratic and federal. This was compounded by 40 years of corrupt misrule by defectors to India—40 years of drastic erosion, piece by piece, of the autonomy that Sheikh Abdullah had negotiated after Partition, 40 years of brutality by the security forces (Proposition 8) and a sharpening of the Islamic imaginary pushed by the globalisation of Islamic resistance to imperialism, particularly in Palestine and Afghanistan (Proposition 2). Victory of the mujahidin in driving the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan in 1988–89 cascaded to confidence that India could be forced to quit Kashmir. While the Pakistani militants who had infiltrated J&K in 1947 and 1965 had failed to fire up mass Kashmiri mobilisation, the people of Kashmir did not need to be pushed by Pakistan in 1987; armed struggle was the way forward. After modest beginnings in 1989, countless young men and women prepared for full-blooded breakout of armed struggle in January 1990:

Our one objective, our one desire, guerilla war, guerilla war;
There is only one way to freedom, guerilla war, guerilla war.
— Anthem of the J&K National Liberation Front

As we see in the next section, the Jammu and Kashmir National Liberation Front (JKNLF) imaginary and surge to readiness in the 1980s came at a time when Pakistan was also more ready and able to support insurgency than during other periods of the long struggle. This was an example of a cleavage putting alliance cascades on the march and unifying formerly divided opposition groups into an insurgency (Proposition 3). Thousands of young men travelled across the border to Pakistan in search of insurgency training and arms; they cascaded back ready to die. ‘Children no longer dream of becoming doctors or engineers; their ambition is to become mujahids’ (Indian journalist, 1992, quoted in Bose 2005: 116).

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22 The reaction was a sudden change of sentiment among young Kashmiris; the ballot box had been tried and tried again and, in 1987, they felt it could never be trusted again.
Unlike previous phases of the long conflict, when most fighters were from the Pakistani side of the Line of Control, from 1990, the trained fighters were overwhelmingly Indian citizens. Of 844 guerillas killed in fighting during 1991, only two were not Indian residents of J&K.

Updating Swami’s (2006: 175) study with data from the Indian Ministry of Home Affairs shows the government’s estimate of the number of conflict killings from 1988 to 2011 at 45,348. This does not include Pakistani soldiers killed in the Kargil War and in other border skirmishes or Pakistani civilians killed during this fighting. All the senior Kashmir Valley journalists we interviewed put the total at closer to 70,000 since 1990, as do the human rights groups and the J&K Civil Society Coalition whose members conducted the door-to-door surveys on which the 70,000 estimate is to some degree based (e.g. Citizens’ Council for Justice 2012). The figure of 70,000 since 1990 is also common among Muslim and critical writers (e.g. Kak 2011a: x), though some reputable senior journalists put it at 100,000, as do many politicians (fieldnotes 2012). Over 100,000 could be a conservative number for the total number of conflict killings in Kashmir since 1947 when we add probably more than 20,000 soldiers killed in interstate wars across the ceasefire line and many thousands of insurgents, military, police and civilians killed during the first 40 years of conflict. Amnesty International and Asia Watch sources suggest 17,000 were killed in the period 1 January 1990 to 30 June 1992 alone, including 200 schoolchildren and 358 other people who were burned alive. In this two-and-a-half-year period, Amnesty and Asia Watch recorded 2,839 women raped, 4,258 women sexually incapacitated through torture and 25,185 people ‘disabled for life’ (Rahman 1996: 157). Security forces across Kashmir have committed sexual assaults with impunity, in what has been described as a systematic and widespread tactic against the civilian population (Asia Watch 1993; Chatterji et al. 2009). Photographs are often taken of these rapes to provide the option of destroying the reputation of targeted women. Female political activists and other targeted women have also been photographed walking down the street, with their heads subsequently doctored on to obscene photographs, in campaigns to destroy their reputations (Interview with a senior lawyer, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101220).
Swami’s (2006: 175) official Indian data show a pattern where civilian deaths were overwhelmingly Muslim. Yet, when the violence surged in early 1990, more than 100,000 Hindus of the valley—known as Kashmiri Pandits—fled their homes, with at least 30 killed in the process, and with a large number of rapes of Pandit women. Kashmiri Pandit Sangharsh Samiti (KPSS), a civil society group in Kashmir that looks after the affairs of the remaining Pandits, notes that there are currently 3,400 Pandits in Kashmir. Others have placed the number at around 2,700. Rejecting estimates of the death of between 3,000 and 4,000 Pandits as propaganda, the KPSS believes that 650 Pandits were killed in the Kashmir Valley over the past 20 years. Many of these were on a JKNLF hit list for assassination of pro-India leaders and Pandits believed to be intelligence agents. Pandits fled because they were terrorised into fleeing. Other Pandits fled because Indian officials advised them to leave, according to Muslim leaders, to discredit the Muslim community. A standard script of the Muslim politics of denial of atrocity is to suggest that this was the only reason, or the real reason, Pandits fled. A few thousand Pandits stayed or returned later, some of whom were protected by their Muslim neighbours. The 1990 displacement of Pandits has become central to the narrative of the conflict highlighted by the Indian Government. Pandits themselves see their cleansing as part of an ‘Islamisation/Talibanisation’ of Kashmir (Interview with Pandit leader, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101238). The state narrative gives this special focus because, as Bose (2005: 124) points out, the ‘independent Kashmir’ narrative fails to accommodate adequately the ‘multiple political allegiances regarding sovereignty and citizenship that exist even in the Kashmir Valley’ (let alone in Buddhist Ladakh). The Pandits shared a history, a culture, an ethnicity and a language with the valley’s Muslims, but were loyal to India as a community, and therefore were estranged from the ‘patriotic’ upsurge of the anti-India cleavage. While Kashmiri Muslims feel mutilated and defiled by the security forces, Hindu refugees feel uprooted and betrayed by the government and by Muslim militants (Varshney 2010: 153).

Swami’s (2006: 175) data show that attacks on Indian forces declined sharply in 1996 from a peak in 1992, with a further sharp drop in 2004. These years were turning points after which many local insurgency groups based in the Kashmir Valley had their backs broken. Popular leader Yaseen Malik led the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), which had descended from the JKNLF, to a ceasefire in 1994 and renounced
violence. Violence continued to cascade after 1996 without a reduced overall death rate, largely at the hands of the Indian state itself: the *ikhwanis* (‘renegades’) militias it had created, many of which had morphed into violent criminal gangs, and foreign militants who kept coming in from Afghanistan and Pakistan, many of whom also morphed into criminal gangs, terrorised people in the Kashmir Valley. Pakistan was encouraging battle-hardened mujahidin exhilarated by their defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan to do the same to India. The foreigners sought to impose an anti-Hindu and anti-Sufi Islam that was at odds with Kashmiri beliefs. The switch of Pakistan’s support from Kashmiris who fought an Islamic war of national liberation to Deobandi Sunni extremists was a switch to fighters who were more extreme in their hatred of India, more dedicated to an intolerant form of Islamisation of Kashmir and more under the control of the ISI (Pakistani intelligence). By 1999, the uprising:

partly was being sustained by people’s often corrupt ability to make money from it: militants, from fighting for the Pakistan military and/or from extorting Kashmiris; Indian forces, possibly from payments to allow insurgents to cross the Line of Control or to release captured militants and Kashmiri traders, from the large Indian forces’ presence. (Snedden 2012: 242)

Looting of banks has been another profitable activity when armed groups seize control of an area. As this book progresses, we see these grievances cascading to greed (Collier 2007, 2009) to the point where a grievance–greed distinction has little purchase.

In 2000, the most dominant armed group, Hizb-ul Mujahideen, declared a unilateral ceasefire that India reciprocated for a period. Four of the five Hizb-ul commanders who signed the ceasefire were assassinated, with the fifth surviving two attempts on his life (Kaur 2006: 24). The ceasefire thus collapsed quickly and Hizb-ul Mujahideen remains responsible for the majority of attacks today. Fighting continued at a high level well into the 2000s and has not ceased at the time of writing. September 2016 saw

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23 The JKLF was founded in 1966 and became internationally known after its cadres hijacked an Indian Airlines domestic flight and took it to Lahore in 1971. Amanullah Khan and Maqbool Bhatt are two of its veteran leaders who operated from the United Kingdom, where the JKLF has a large support base. Maqbool Bhatt was executed in 1984 in India and Amanullah Khan returned to Azad Kashmir. The JKLF split into two organisations after Yaseen Malik in J&K pledged nonviolence.

24 Financial support from the Kashmiri diaspora, particularly in the United Kingdom and the Middle East, has been more important than the one-quarter of the militancy’s financing that has come from Pakistan (Chandran 2006: 55) (Proposition 6).
17 Indian soldiers killed by insurgents in Indian Kashmir near the Line of Control, followed by Indian army retaliation and new civilian protests, then state killings of 90 protestors and the blinding of many more with pellet guns in the next eight months (Safi 2017), curfews, disconnection of the internet and mobile phone networks and disappearances. The Indian Government of prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee attempted new peace initiatives in 2000–01, including a unilateral ceasefire for Ramadan that was extended twice, Track II talks inside Kashmir and five long Track I meetings between Vajpayee and Pakistani president Musharraf. The talks collapsed, the politics changed after 11 September 2001 and Vajpayee urged president Bush to extend his war on terror to Kashmir.

In the early 1990s, whole suburbs of Srinagar were no-go zones for the security forces—part of ‘liberated Kashmir’. By 1996, all but a few rural areas were under Indian control by day. The partial military victory was, however, a political defeat as the resistance energised by repression shifted to nonviolent forms of resistance that will have greater resilience:

David Barsamian: You’ve written: ‘The new generation of separatist leaders seem to have made a conscious decision not to take up arms, a move to retain moral supremacy over Indian occupation. This represents a major shift in tactics.’

Parvaiz Bukhari: I believe so. I think it’s been a long process of internalizing what armed rebellion achieved and what it did for Kashmir. If there was a belief in 1990 that it was possible to overthrow Indian control of Kashmir through an armed rebellion, people have now realized that it was not militarily possible and it was not an achievable military objective. People have also realized over the period of time that what was sought to be crushed militarily has in fact become more entrenched and more widespread, and more pronounced and more clear in people’s minds. Since Kashmiris also have lived the experience of military response to their armed uprising, in the process they’ve also discovered the power of peaceful protests. So if there was a silent debate within Kashmiri society, particularly young people, after the events of 1990 about what an armed insurgency or armed militancy or armed rebellion could achieve, over a period of time—and post-9/11 also helped clarify a lot of thinking about it—it was that it can only serve a purpose of making a point, of creating a political space that has to be used in different ways. (Baramian 2012: 5)

Snedden (2012) conceives the post-1987 Kashmir conflict as passing through five phases: a euphoric first phase that ended in 1993, during which Kashmiri-led militants were gaining the upper hand against
a rattled Indian military and when militants believed *azadi* was just over the horizon; a second phase (1993–99) of lost hope, when Kashmiris recognised India’s military resolve to crush the militancy, when ‘perhaps as many as 10 per cent of Kashmiris experienced torture’ (Snedden 2012: 242) and when Kashmiris began to see Pakistan’s help as not altogether altruistic; a third phase (1999–2003) of momentum for more ceasefires and dialogues due to war-weariness; a fourth phase (2004 to mid-2007) during which it seemed that dialogue might be consolidating peace and renewing Kashmiri democracy; and a fifth phase, from mid-2007 to the present, during which it has seemed unlikely that the insurgency will end or weaken further, elements in Pakistan have worked hard to reignite communal tensions inside Kashmir, nonviolent resistance has surged and stone-pelting increased against security forces, who responded by killing many of the stone-throwers.

This has possibly been modelled from the Palestinian *intifada* (Proposition 2). We could call Snedden’s current stage a loss of confidence in confidence-building, a phase in which hope has been lost that confidence might cascade. Perhaps this is a stage when peace can be consolidated only with a bold grand bargain that embraces Kashmiri empowerment in a peace process that delivers a form of *azadi*-autonomy meaningful to Kashmiri Muslims and that both India and Pakistan might accept. As Behera (2016: 41) conceives the problem of more than 150 rounds of peace negotiations between India and Pakistan over Kashmir to date, they have been ‘state-centric peace processes’ at odds with the plural social realities and multiple fault lines involved.

**The Kargil War of 1999**

Pakistanis generals have been convinced that predominantly Hindu India has been dominating primarily Muslim Kashmir for decades. The moral high ground of saving Kashmiris was matched by the logic of compensating for profound structural asymmetries with its powerful neighbour. Pakistani defence planners attempted to gain the upper hand in South Asia’s enduring rivalry in the winter of 1998–99, when Indian troops vacated their high-altitude posts believing that extreme weather and difficult terrain would deter the infiltrators. By the end of April 1999, Pakistani soldiers occupied about 130 posts covering approximately 100 kilometres (Wolpert 2006: 7–8) and Kashmiri militants infiltrated Indian
territory across the Line of Control. It may be that the incursion was
designed initially as a ‘limited probe’—a modestly calibrated incursion
to test Indian will to defend its territory and risk Pakistan’s new nuclear
capability (Ganguly 2002: 121). This military strategy is characterised by
a willingness to reverse course if firm opposition that clarifies the enemy’s
resolve is encountered. Pakistan’s mistake may have been to dramatically
expand the probe when no resistance was encountered initially. On the
Indian side, after its troops bumped into the incursion and took some
heavy losses in early May 1999, it then felt there was no choice but to drive
out the large-scale incursion despite escalation risks. The Indian armed
forces launched their major counteroffensive, codenamed Operation
Vijay (Victory), in the third week of May 1999.

India bombarded the incursion with heavy artillery and air attacks on
their bunkers. US Commander-in-Chief of Central Command, General
Anthony Zinni, visited Pakistan to tell prime minister Nawaz Sharif to
withdraw, dismissing suggestions that withdrawal be linked to talks with
India about the future of Kashmir. Pakistan’s leaders miscalculated the
West’s concerns about escalation to a nuclear exchange and about Kashmir
as a ‘tinderbox’ and a ‘flashpoint’ (Ganguly 2002: 123).

Prior to the Kargil conflict, both the Indian and the Pakistani elites
believed that nuclear capabilities were largely for political leverage and
deterrence. The Kargil War was accompanied with direct and indirect
threats about nuclear capabilities from both sides. The chilling possibility
of escalation to a nuclear war made the world take action. Sharif agreed
to US demands to withdraw after another stern encounter, this time with
president Clinton in Washington on 4 July 1999. Clinton threatened to
issue a statement exposing Sharif’s support for international terrorism
and Osama bin Laden, in particular (who had allegedly funded Sharif’s
election campaign) (History Commons 1999). All the United States asked
India to do was refrain from a wider invasion of Pakistan in response to
the Pakistani incursion, which was its intention in any case. In addition to
putting Kashmir back on the international agenda, which was oblivious
to it, one aim of the infiltration was to jump-start the flagging insurgency
inside Kashmir. It did achieve this, though only in a modest way (Ganguly
2002: 118–27). Its larger effect has likely been to prompt new Indian
doctrines of willingness to engage in ‘limited war’ with Pakistan, to pursue
Pakistani forces across the Line of Control and to develop strategies to
prevent such limited war from escalating towards the nuclear threshold
(Ganguly 2002: 126).
General Pervez Musharraf (2006: 98), who was then the Pakistani military commander in Kargil, argued that the Indian losses were at least twice the 600 killed and 1,500 wounded that India had publicly admitted. This was fewer than the 4,000 Indian losses in 1971, 3,000 in 1965 and 1,900 in 1947–48 (Widmalm 2006: 145). Most commentators believe the Pakistani losses were higher in Kargil and certainly much higher across these four interstate wars, although there are no reliable numbers. The next round of tensions, in 2002, saw 1 million troops massed for another possible confrontation at the Line of Control after the terrorist attacks launched from Pakistan on the parliaments of both India in New Delhi and J&K in Srinagar. On this occasion, war was averted after a tense year-long military build-up and stand-off. The typical number of monthly artillery exchanges before the 2003 ceasefire was over 400,000 rounds (Samii 2006: 243).

Part of Pakistan’s miscalculation in Kargil was that it was seen as such a formidable violation of Indian territory that Pakistan confronted near universal international opposition. Ataov (2001: 160) found that a critical difference between 1999 and all previous India–Pakistan hostilities was that this time China struck a posture of neutrality. China offered no encouragement or assistance to Pakistan and, indeed, joined hands with the United States in counselling withdrawal and honouring the Line of Control. In managing to accomplish this Chinese policy shift, Pakistan had inflicted an acute diplomatic reversal on itself.


Although the political narrative of the Kashmir dispute has been told countless times, this scholarship has largely overlooked the influence of nonviolence in the political mobilisation of Kashmiris. In our field research, we found that nonviolence featured importantly in Kashmiri imaginaries of peace. However, many of our younger respondents also expressed increasing disillusionment with nonviolent means to bring about political and social transformation.

In other words, youthful strategists of nonviolence honour the sacrifices of the martyrs of the armed struggle because their own nonviolent resistance is motivated by standing on the graves of these martyrs. A new hedging
of a nonviolent imaginary alongside one of armed struggle blossomed this
century (Proposition 2) among activists who were not missionaries of any
one model of resistance, but were model mongers.25 Many of the young
people we spoke to in the Kashmir Valley also saw armed struggle as not
only a past that motivates, but also a possible future they can return to:

People are not against violence as such. Violence and nonviolence are just
different strategies. The society thinks militancy should not be part of the
strategy at the moment. (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101234)

Peace is institutionalised occupation. (Interview in Srinagar, 2012,
No. 101210)

No one here subscribes to nonviolence as a doctrine. (Interview with
human rights advocate in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101237)

Nobody knows what the next form of resistance will be. (Interview with
a leader of the 2008 uprising, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101220)

Part of their politics of hope is seeing a history of alternating from one
tactic to another as each fails in different periods of resistance. None of
the people to whom we spoke argued for a total renunciation of violence.
None paid homage to Gandhi or Gandhian strategy. Armed struggle
lays a foundation for the possible future success of nonviolent struggle;
nonviolent struggle lays a foundation for the possible future success of
armed struggle. Or at least their willingness to return to armed struggle is
part of what one day will motivate India to come to the negotiating table
with the people of Kashmir—to deliver a political solution that will give
India some kind of peace and Kashmir some kind of azadi.

Continued political stalemate and everyday violence have created an
atmosphere of fear in the Kashmir Valley. The near renewal of a full-scale
interstate war across the Line of Control in 2002 frightened all parties
and motivated the November 2003 formal ceasefire previously mentioned
along the India–Pakistan border, the Line of Control and on the Siachen
Glacier (where there was no Line of Control). The ceasefire was renewed
in August 2005. The India–Pakistan Composite Dialogue seemed to be
making progress in the years immediately after its initiation. In April
2005, a bus service linking Pakistan to Indian-administered Kashmir
commenced and continues today.

25 We have articulated these concepts in Chapter 3 under Proposition 2.
Between 1990 and 1994—the optimistic years of armed struggle for Kashmiris—5,119 people were killed and thousands more captured. Total deaths per annum as a result of the Kashmir insurgency decreased from a peak in 2001 of 4,500 to 777 in 2007; known infiltrations across the Line of Control fell from a peak of 2,400 in 2001 to 499 in 2007; and violent militant incidents (including explosions, arson and abductions) fell from 2,900 in 2000 to 1,050 in 2007 (Snedden 2012: 244).

This seeming progress began to fall apart in many ways from mid-2007. The India–Pakistan ceasefire across the Line of Control faltered. The Composite Dialogue collapsed as president Musharraf’s authority eroded. Pakistan perceived India to be fomenting violent resistance inside Pakistan in Balochistan and in the North-West Frontier Province (which had become Khyber Pakhtunkhwa). After the Mumbai terror attacks in 2008, many former Indian participants in Track II Kashmir diplomacy pulled out in disgust. Inside Kashmir, most of the resistance became as convinced as ever that the 700–800 militants who remained active in Kashmir (Snedden 2012: 245) constituted a card they wanted to be able to hold and play. Yet intent crystallised to escalate nonviolent resistance.

Plate 5.3 The Taj Hotel, Mumbai, after the 2008 terrorist attack.
Source: Arko Datta/Reuters/Picture Media.
On three occasions—in 1990, 2008 and 2010—Srinagar, a city with a population of 1.2 million, has been able to attract a million demonstrators on to its streets from the Kashmir Valley and, in late 2016, perhaps hundreds of thousands were on the streets again, though this is even less well documented with the internet disconnected.

In 2008 and 2010, YouTube, Facebook and Twitter were important in mobilising the populace by bypassing the media that were in the pay of the state. After 2010, the state more ruthlessly regulated the mass media in Kashmir. Young people reported through social media in ways that reached beyond Kashmir. MC Kash’s rap videos took off from a base in live audiences inside Kashmir. YouTube took his voice to outside listeners who would never see Kashmiri newspapers or television. It did so with more evocative flair than newsprint. His ‘I Protest’ is poetically compelling. ‘Take It in Blood’ was written in honour of Parveena Ahangar of the Association of the Parents of Disappeared Persons to grip the imagination of Kashmiris with her struggle to trace her disappeared 16-year-old son.

Plate 5.4 Kashmiri villagers, Tral, 38 km south of Srinagar, during the funeral of Burhan Wani, Hizbul Mujahidin chief of operations, 9 July 2016.

Source: Dar Yasin/Associated Press.

26 www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFDrRaLcUvQ (site discontinued).
27 See: www.youtube.com/watch?v=MAOgT49w2Co.
The triggers of the mass demonstrations in 2010 were different from those of 2008 and the somewhat smaller ones in 2009. In 2008, the issue was controversy over a land deal favouring a Hindu shrine board; in 2009, it was the rape and murder of two women by the police in Shopian;\(^{28}\) while in 2010, the death of a 16-year-old boy after being hit by a tear-gas shell was the trigger. Less interesting than what triggered them is how ready people were to be triggered and how, once demonstrations were under way, they were most fundamentally about \textit{azadi}. \textit{Azadi} is what everyone was chanting in the Kashmir Valley then and again late in 2016. It is hard to confirm activists’ claims that there were 1 million people in the streets in both 2008 and 2010,\(^{29}\) as they say there were in the May 1990 demonstration at which the killing of demonstrators ushered the take-off of the insurgency (Proposition 9: crime to war). There were also large numbers in 2009. Activists claim that there were more demonstrators on Srinagar’s streets in 2008 and 2010 than in Tahrir Square in Cairo in 2011. Egypt captured the imagination of the West in a way that Kashmir—part of liberal, shining, democratic India—did not. The difference between the Arab Spring and Kashmir was that, in the West, the response to the uprisings that started in Tunis and Cairo was: ‘What should we in the West do to respond to this?’ With Kashmir, there was no energising of a policy conversation in the West about the mass uprisings. It was not a failure of the international media or of social media pick-up; it was a failure of international civil society to demand policy responses from their governments that might have built momentum for transformation. This, in turn, was a case of the international community taking the lead from a sophisticated Indian media narrative: ‘That it’s all so complex. It’s simple. They made it complex’ (Interview in Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209).

One of the most visible changes in the Kashmiri resistance since 2008 has been the choice of weapon of the youth who feel politically and economically disempowered. Street protests are now accompanied by the hurling of stones at state security forces. Popularly known as the stone-pelters of Kashmir, the young men represent Kashmiri youths’ anger

\(^{28}\) One significant effect of the Shopian rapes trigger of 2009 was that it sparked, for the first time, large protests in New Delhi in sympathy with Kashmir and against the activities of state security forces.

\(^{29}\) One highly respected human rights leader claimed in an interview with us that, on 25 August 2008, 1.5 million people were on the streets of Kashmir, 1.2 million of them in one place. Perhaps all we can be certain of is that there were hundreds of thousands of people on the streets in 1990, 2008 and 2010 and a large number in 2009 and 2016.
towards India. Omar Abdullah, the J&K chief minister in 2010, called for the Indian army to be deployed after more than a decade’s absence to assist the state police and paramilitary forces. He said:

For over 20 years, the security forces were conditioned to believe the biggest challenge was militancy. Now it’s youngsters hurling stones that whiz at them at 40 miles an hour. Obviously, the response has to be different. (Wax 2010: 1)

A study conducted by a New Delhi–based NGO found that 39 of the 97 cases of killings in 2010 by the police and the paramilitary—for which the demographic information was documented—were of students (Ahmad Dar 2010).30

In June 2010, the Indian army also killed three Kashmiris on a ‘fake encounter’ mission and later claimed they were Pakistani infiltrators. Eventually, in March 2011, the state government admitted that 5,228 young protesters were arrested in 2010 in Kashmir, of which 4,900 were later released. In a May 2010 press release, the J&K state government revealed that 1,811 youth, against whom 230 cases were registered for ‘involvement’ in stone-pelting during the 2010 and 2011 unrest in Kashmir, had been granted amnesty under the scheme announced by chief minister Omar Abdullah. He made it clear that the amnesty would not be extended to those who were involved in arson and damage to public and private property:

We have decided to give the youths a second chance. Cases against all the youths arrested on charges of stone-pelting, but not involved in arson, registered during last year’s disturbance will be withdrawn. Their involvement in these [stone-pelting] cases may not affect adversely in the verification of these youths for obtaining [a] passport, service verification and for obtaining loans for education/jobs. (DNA India 2014, cited in D’Costa 2015b)

A child’s and/or a young adult’s social and political identity is shaped by the world to which she or he is exposed. For Kashmir’s younger generation, stone-pelting or writing graffiti are rituals of resistance through which they take some control back from the authorities and make choices in their everyday lives. In Kashmir, childhood/youth is militarised and resistance movement events are heavily politicised.

30 Similarly, in the 2008 protest, in which over 70 people were killed, most were young people. There were also incidents where youth, including juveniles, were arrested under the Public Safety Act 1978.
The interview below between Arif Ayan Parrey and a stone-pelter articulates how the young generation identified with stone-pelting as the only politics of resistance available to them:

Parrey: But is it not wrong to subscribe to violence as a practice?

Anonymous stone-pelter [mostly students and boys who pelt stones at the police in azadi demonstrations]: Don’t give me this nonviolence falasferry [Kashmirified English word ‘philosophy’ whose meaning is closer to ‘sophistry’]. It makes me sick. My heart is turned to stone, I strike it and it hurts my hand.

Parrey: What is that?

Stone-pelter: Shakespeare. Anyway, tell me, what do you subscribe to personally, violence or nonviolence?

Parrey: Nonviolence.

Stone-pelter: Bah, I tell you nonviolence is not going to work in Kashmir. It worked in India because the British were outnumbered 100:1, according to the most conservative estimates. If a hundred people refuse to cooperate with one person, he cannot possibly continue to live, let alone rule. The situation in Kashmir is different; we are so small in numbers … We will come out in a different way; we will invent new methods of protest and one day Kashmir will have justice and freedom. That is the only parameter of success for stone-pelters; so, yes, we will succeed.

Parrey: Mr Stone-pelter, thank you for taking time out from your busy schedule for this interview. As I have already told you, I don’t believe in violence, so I cannot wish you best of luck for your future endeavors. But I must say it was an enlightening experience to have this conversation with you.

Stone-pelter: The pleasure is all mine, brother. Before I leave, I want to gift you something. Please accept this stone from me as a token gesture. Just in case. (Parrey 2011: 37)

In 2010, thousands of people were on the street every day for three months. Overwhelmingly, both the demonstrators and the police wished to avoid violence, but there were some spoilers on both sides of the barricades. The mainstream Indian media frequently conspires with the spoilers of both sides to focus their cameras on the spoilers to project a narrative of protester violence that is at odds with the majoritarian nonviolence of a demonstration. During the 2008 uprising, 65 demonstrators were killed by the police and 116 demonstrators were killed in 2010—a remarkably
large number of them teenage boys. Young women made up a large proportion of the demonstrators in 2008, 2010 and 2016 and were often at the front, although women almost never engaged in stone-pelting (until 2016) or insurgency training in Pakistan.

Plate 5.5 Young Kashmiri stone-pelters attack Indian security forces during a protest in Srinagar, 16 July 2016.
Source: Dar Yasin/Associated Press.

These numbers, according to the empirical work of Chenoweth and Stephan (2011), are normally predictive of success in achieving the objectives of a resistance movement. However, in their analysis of 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns (1900–2006), Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found another variable to be a predictor of long-run success in achieving their objectives that is not at all present in Kashmir. This variable is persuading the state’s military to defect to the resistance. One reason for the power of this variable is that, when mass demonstrations get beyond manageable proportions for the security services, it is hard to disperse them without causing a crush that will kill neighbours, friends or relatives of some of the soldiers or police who fire the tear gas or the live rounds. In Kashmir, however, most of the security personnel were not Kashmiris; they identified with India and not with the people who chanted rejection of India. This was not what the Egyptian soldiers in Cairo faced, nor the Tunisian soldiers in Tunis, during the Arab Spring. In spite of this, the 2008–10 street uprisings in J&K formed
a political foundation because ‘Kashmiris took back their dignity’ and could no longer be ruled by fear of violence (Interview with civil society leader, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209). This, in turn, caused the Indian state to reduce the violence of its response to protest. As a result, ‘if they beat someone in public now, they might be confronted by citizens who take offence. Or [make] a complaint’ (Interview, Srinagar, 2012, No. 101209).

Panic set in for the Indian security sector in 2008 about how to manage this different and new scale of challenge. Coverage of such a large event by the national and international media demolished New Delhi narratives that the problems of Kashmir were caused by Pakistan and a tiny minority of Islamic fundamentalists. Even local shop proprietors, who might be expected to be harbingers of the Indian middle class, were joining in the chant of ‘azadi, azadi’ and often joining the march as the demonstrators passed their stores. After the 2010 agitation, which had a level of mass participation at least equivalent to that in 2008, the Indian Government appointed three ‘interlocutors’ to mediate the Kashmir dispute. Our interviews revealed widespread cynicism that the work of the interlocutors was a sincere engagement with the political demands of the people of Kashmir that would lead to a genuinely participatory peace process. Indeed, it is hard to see evidence of their work moving to a deep process.

In March 2015, following the election in India of BJP Prime Minister Narendra Modi, a Hindu–Muslim coalition government—the BJP and Peoples Democratic Party (PDP)—was established in J&K for the first time. While both Modi and the new Kashmiri leadership have promised a renewed peace process, Modi quickly walked away from peace talks with Pakistan after Pakistan embraced peace talks with insurgents inside Indian Kashmir. A new attempt in January 2016 came under pressure from militant attacks in India, particularly Punjab, which Indian commentators blame on infiltrators from Pakistan attempting to spoil any peace dialogue. International military incursions then reignited from September 2016.

Important democratic developments in civil society include new forms of mobilisation narratives of state victimisation, pre-eminent among which is the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons and its leader, Parveena Ahangar. Her struggle was the subject of MC Kash’s rap video ‘I Protest’ discussed earlier. Parveena Ahangar’s son, Javed Ahmed, was picked up by National Security Guards in Srinagar on 18 August 1990. After Ahangar spent years searching for her son, a man who had shared a prison cell with the boy came forward to tell her that her child had lost hope, withered
away and died. As he was dying, he was saying ‘I want my mother’—a narrative that inspired Ahangar’s activism and the movement she built (Interview with Parveena Ahangar, Srinagar, 2012, No. 0012199). The Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons has contributed organisation of constant (monthly) small protests outside government offices at which relatives, including those known as half widows, whose husbands disappeared and are still missing, hold posters with images of their loved ones, demanding to know what has become of them. These have been important in establishing a continuity of public resistance that is hard for authorities to control with violence. This kind of protest is still laying a foundation today for future mass uprisings in Kashmir.

Cascades of insurgency

The feature of Kashmir’s cascades of violence that startles is that they have been driven along a perverse path of democracy deployed as an instrument of domination. The Kashmir election of 1987 ushered in the largest surge of armed violence because it was rigged and because it followed a history of resentment at recurrent electoral fraud. India has reason to be proud of its struggle to be democratic. So it is an alarming tragedy of Kashmir’s cascades of violence that we show India to have been propelled by a variety of democratic pretences: pretences of rule of law, of village democracy, of state democracy, of freedom of speech and of freedom of assembly that in reality has been regulated by live rounds aimed at the heads of young protestors and pellets aimed at their eyes—in other words, rights ritualism (Charlesworth 2012).

Swami (2006: 138) concludes about armed resistance in Kashmir that ‘[t]he proliferation of jihadist groups from 1991 onwards can be seen as the dense branches at the top of a tree, whose roots lie in the Partition of India’. Pakistan may have lost wars in Kashmir in 1947 and 1965, and another against India in Bangladesh (and Kashmir) in 1971, but it did not give up on Kashmir and on destabilising India by destabilising Kashmir. It trained thousands of young men—almost certainly tens of thousands—with assistance from Chinese trainers and military supplies, to be ready and armed for insurgency inside J&K.
This capacity for insurgency was also aided by a gift that fell into Pakistan’s lap with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Western, Arab and Asian Muslim aid flooded to Pakistan to equip and train mujahidin to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. This mandate to cascade violence into Afghanistan was a cover for cascading violence in new ways, and on new fronts, into India. The Afghan jihad minded the United States to overlook Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons and motivated China to support Pakistan’s nuclear program as a way of simultaneously checking Indian and Soviet power. The Afghan jihad gave Pakistan cover in the 1980s to back an insurgency aimed at carving out a Sikh state of Khalistan from Indian Punjab. The civil war in Indian Punjab was waged not just with AK-47s and AK-56s, but also with RPG-7 rockets, Chinese-made machine guns and night-vision equipment that had been supplied to the ISI for deployment to Afghanistan. Pakistan also moved to support insurgencies in north-eastern India and terrorist cells inside the metropolitan Indian heartland. Raising the temperature of the Kashmir insurgency—through high-profile bombings during the 1980s, for example—was therefore just one front of a cascade of covert confrontations with India, whose military superiority, demonstrated in 1965 and 1971, precluded open confrontation. The United States and China were well aware this was happening with their money and equipment, but viewed India as a Soviet ally at the time, so they looked the other way as most of their weapons and funding were used to foment the regionalisation and then globalisation of escalating Islamist terrorism. In sum, jihad in Kashmir and Afghanistan cascaded each into the other. Kashmir cascaded into Afghanistan and Afghanistan cascaded back into Kashmir—thus enabling cascading into Indian Punjab and the north-eastern Maoist insurgencies—and into terrorism in India’s metropoles. All this, in turn, cascaded to interstate Pakistan–India attacks at the Line of Control, which persist at the time of writing.

Pakistan’s strategic establishment also came to believe—as a result of the experience of Soviet defeat in Afghanistan—that it could do to India in Kashmir what it had done to the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. Moreover, freedom fighters inside Kashmir came to believe that if the mujahidin

31 It was more possible for the ISI to arm and train Naga, Mizo and other insurgents in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and to hook them up to Chinese support before 1971 when the Hill Tracts ceased being part of Pakistan (Raman 2008: 7–8, 85). However, there were periods after 1971 when there was Bangladeshi support for insurgencies inside India—something the ISI encouraged Bangladesh to do.
could defeat a power as mighty as the Soviet Union, they could defeat an adversary as weak as India. This analysis in Srinagar and Islamabad helped set the scene for the tragic escalation of armed struggle in J&K in the years after the rigged 1987 state election. There were two main strands to the lessons the Pakistani strategic elite drew from Afghanistan. The first imaginary was that, with the right kinds of support, irregulars could bleed a superpower ‘at relatively little cost to its patron-state’ (Swami 2006: 145). Second:

[T]he proxy war could be calibrated to a point where it was not worth the while of an adversary to punish the sponsor-state by going to war. ‘The water in Afghanistan,’ [Pakistani president] Zia-ul-haq had told his spymaster in December 1979, ‘must boil at the right temperature’. Could the water be heated up to a similar point elsewhere as well? (Swami 2006: 145)

The cascade mechanism here is emulation or modelling (Proposition 2). Saudi, CIA and ISI funders were ‘model mercenaries’. Osama bin Laden was an example of a ‘model missionary’, with madrassas as the mission schools where the model was taught. Jihadi groups that experimented with one insurgency and terror tactic after another were ‘model mongers’. This is an example of diffusion and modelling in global politics (Braithwaite and Drahos 2000; Rogers 1983; Rogers and Shoemaker 1971; Simmons et al. 2007)—that is, an example of the power of humanly articulated futures formulated from reflection on the past enactments of others.

For Praveen Swami (2006: 172), Pakistan’s covert wars against India in the late 1980s and 1990s were a ‘nuclear jihad’, in the sense that they would not have been possible without Pakistan’s rudimentary nuclear weapon capability being an open secret. Swami believes India would have gone to war against Pakistan to end the bloody escalation of its Punjab war of 1988–89, especially when it was combined with the evolution of a similar escalation in Srinagar. What pulled India back from the brink

32 This interpretation is reinforced by the fact that inside Punjab the Indian security state was willing to mobilise massively to ensure that ‘deterrence effects exceeded defiance effects’ (Proposition 1). Proposition 10 of our theory was not in play in Punjab. That is, the strategic interests of India in suppressing the separatist uprising in Punjab were so profound that there was never any prospect of the Punjab insurgency escalating to the point where the Indian state would conclude that the costs of continuing to suppress the cascading violence could exceed the benefits of winning the civil war (see Brass 1988; Jeffrey 2013). Ganguly and Bajpai (1994: 411) refer to this approach as ‘doing a Punjab’. Mathur (2011: 3) sees Punjab as a case of counterinsurgency success by a government staying the course by projecting ‘an aura of invincibility while retaining a sense of solidarity with the local population’. It was also assisted by sufficiently sealing the Pakistan–India border against external support flowing into Punjab so that infiltration into Kashmir became a more effective priority for the ISI.
of a war to end this escalation was fear that a conventional incursion into Pakistan might attract a nuclear response. This period of South Asian history seems consistent with Glenn Snyder’s (1965) stability–instability paradox: fear of escalation against a nuclear adversary secures stability from major attacks while leaving incentives for low-intensity conflicts that respect dangerous thresholds. Pakistan’s aim was a jihad in Kashmir that imposed costs that might bring India to the negotiating table to make concessions without causing all-out war between the two states. The escalation of pressure by Pakistan may have gone closer than was prudent to causing India to declare war in 1990. This ‘nuclear jihad’ was brinksmanship of a deeply dangerous kind. And the ‘bleed India’ strategy failed to lever any concessions on Kashmir.

The nuclear front of the escalation of confrontation was the most worrying for the rest of the world and also for India. Unfortunately, Pakistan became the site of the world’s most rapidly expanding nuclear program at the time of writing and its biggest nuclear terrorism risk—partly because concentrations of Taliban and Al-Qaeda terrorists grew inside its borders and partly because of its tactic of protecting its weapons from pre-emptive strikes by regularly moving them in risky journeys on its roads. Nuclear risks also cascaded because Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan funded his nuclear program in Pakistan by trading knowhow for Libyan cash, by selling weapon-related technologies and likely by trading weapons knowhow for missile knowhow from North Korea and probably Iran as well.

Pakistan’s attacks in 1947, 1965 and 1971 were an excuse for India to acquire nuclear weapons as a deterrent against a neighbour with demonstrated hostile intent. In reality, future regional and great power parity with China was India’s reason for becoming a nuclear power. India followed the policy of ‘responsible nuclear powers’ of renouncing first use. When Pakistan justified its acquisition of nuclear weapons with the provocation of Indian nuclear capability, Pakistan, of course, did not renounce first use. Indian nuclear weapons were not intended to deter use of superior Pakistani capabilities. Pakistan’s nukes were intended to deter Indian conventional and nuclear superiority. To do that, Pakistan needed a first-strike deterrent threat. So, India lost out militarily in competition with Pakistan as a result of them both becoming nuclear weapons states. India lost the unchallengeable military superiority over Pakistan that had been apparent in the wars of 1947, 1965 and 1971. The best counter it
can offer to a first-strike threat to many of its cities is the threat that India’s ‘response strike would be a large-scale society-destroying one’ (Koithara 2004: 114)—a terrifying brink both states must act to move back from.

It was the nuclear backstop against a massive conventional invasion of Pakistan that moved Pakistan to chance the folly of the 1999 Kargil War. This was a bellicose cascade from the 1971 war when Kargil was territory lost from Pakistan to India. While Pakistan overplayed its hand in that war, the evidence is clear that India was cautious to ensure that its military and diplomatic riposte to the Kargil incursion was measured rather than overwhelming because of concern over Pakistan’s new nuclear capability and its willingness to indulge first use. Nuclear weapons have therefore played a role in the cascading of violence in South Asia that is utterly different from their role in the Cold War stalemate:

Nuclear weapons were used to compensate for the perceived conventional inferiority of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization], but the US was not interested in using military force to upset the status quo in Europe. In South Asia, however, nuclear weapons have helped Pakistan compensate for the conventional superiority of India, and Pakistan has been interested in using military force to upset the status quo. (Ganguly and Wagner 2004: 481)

Pakistan’s ongoing sponsorship of young men from J&K to enter Pakistan for insurgency training and then return as members of Pakistan-controlled cells has caused a different kind of cascade of violence. Kashmiri nationalists with distaste for Pakistan pulling the strings set up jihadi groups that were independent of Pakistan. They organised their own training on the Indian side of the Line of Control. This complemented the normal dynamics of factionalisation in anti-establishment movements. It produced a reality in which there were two dozen significant armed jihadi groups (Sreedhar and Manish 2003) and perhaps a hundred tiny ones. In the early 1990s, the groups that were more independent of Pakistan became militarily more significant than jihad sponsored from Pakistan (a situation that was reversed in the periods before and after the peak 1989–93 phase of the conflict).

From 1991, Pakistani intelligence ceased funding the JKLF because it was more pro-independence than pro-Pakistan. This cleavage induced another counter-cascade that energised competing jihad groups. Pakistan built up a formidable new pro-Pakistan force in the Kashmir Valley, Hizb-ul Mujahideen (discussed earlier), which was linked to the
conservative Islamic party in Pakistan and Bangladesh, Jama’at-i-Islami. The ISI also encouraged zealous Islamic organisations inside Pakistan, such as Harkat-ul-Ansar, to join the Kashmir war (Bose 2005: 127). In recent decades, Pakistani state encouragement and funding are no longer essential; jihad has cascaded to the point where it is effectively privatised and globalised in its funding sources.

A response to these cascades of violence was, of course, a cascade of much more deadly state violence—as Swami’s (2006: 175) statistics confirm. This included new tactics of violence such as the ‘crackdown’. A crackdown cordons off a village or neighbourhood thought to include hostile actors. Adult and adolescent males are extracted, leaving women and children in their homes either wondering what is happening to their young men or themselves becoming victims of sexual assault or other forms of violence. In a common form of the crackdown, all the men are walked past several informers sitting in cars. If one of the informers beeps their horn, that is sufficient evidence for targeting a person as a likely jihadist or jihad sympathiser and he is taken away—often never to be seen again.

This awesome, unaccountable power of informers over life and death arose from the fact that Indian security forces did not care if they made a lot of mistakes. They preferred to terrorise the families of jihadists, but if they terrorised the entire civil society of the Kashmir Valley along the way that was fine, too. There was, at least until quite recently, a Kashmiri police policy of giving ‘blood promotions’ to police who kill militants. A senior police officer interviewed in 2012, who was otherwise a progressive ‘hearts and minds’ officer, defended this policy by saying how hard it is to motivate police officers, especially local Kashmiri ones, to be brave in confronting militants. He regarded it as necessary to reward bravery in this way. But he regretted the problem of police manufacturing fake encounters to kill someone and claim a ‘blood promotion’. Fake encounter police murders to secure blood promotions is another to add to our list of types of Kashmiri cascades of violence (Proposition 9: insurgency cascades to state crime).

The military rightly perceived a unity of community support for azadi in the Kashmir Valley, though it was a unity partly forged by their state terror. The exceptions to that unity were those Kashmiri Muslims put on the state security payroll. Just as some jihadists defected to careers as organised criminals in the private sector, others defected to organised crime in the public sector by joining the police, sometimes in secret roles, sometimes in senior and strategic roles (Baramian 2012: 3). Kashmiris who feigned support for azadi while lining their pockets were everywhere:
Several times I’ve met top, powerful officials who mention there are anywhere between 150,000 and 170,000 people who work as informers at various levels. Some of them do it voluntarily and some are trapped in a situation where they’re compelled to do that. Imagine in a society that is just 7 million, if you have 150,000 informers. (Interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, cited in Baramian 2012: 2)

Other senior journalists we interviewed quoted similar numbers (up to 200,000 and down to 90,000), sourced from their conversations with intelligence officials. Exaggerating these numbers could be a tactic by those intelligence officials to promote distrust and fragmentation in the resistance. However real or exaggerated they are, they have been real in their consequences in causing fragmentation of valley society:

I suspect him. He suspects me … The military pay people for information. So students who are short of money are tempted to text someone they know in the military with a certain piece of information about someone and ask for money. (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233)

Widespread killing and shunning of suspected informers have been part of the response that has cascaded from Muslim society (Proposition 9: war cascades to crime). State creation of hundreds of NGOs, particularly human rights NGOs, has been another strategy for expanding intelligence networks. This simultaneously secures the objectives of managing the impression of a vibrant democracy, with a vibrant civil society of active human rights NGOs, and the objective of intensifying surveillance.

Ceasefires in the Kashmir Valley, of which there have been many, have generally failed to dampen these cascades of violence. In 1994, after his release from prison, Yaseen Malik declared an indefinite JKLF ceasefire, ‘partly to preserve what remained of the JKLF’s cadre’; yet the security forces seem to have killed hundreds of JKLF members after the unilateral ceasefire (Bose 2005: 130). In some cases, groups of leaders who negotiated ceasefires perished soon after the agreement—some killed by the security forces after they laid down their guns, others killed by competing jihadi groups (or their own) as traitors for laying down their arms. Sadly, the peace processes in Kashmir have mediated the cascading of war to crime (Proposition 9).

As is so common in other conflicts, yet another cascade then arose from the climate of chaos and violence that provided cover for criminal entrepreneurs. Many ‘politically shallow people’ and ‘opportunists’ who joined the freedom fighters formed criminal gangs (Bose 2005: 127).
Others, who were professional criminals to start with—including foreign professional criminals—joined and exploited the anomie to expand their criminal repertoire from nonviolent crime to violent organised criminality. Kashmiris referred to this as the new ‘gun culture’.

In turn, the whole pattern of destabilisation across Kashmir and Punjab caused yet another cascade of violence. In the mid-1980s, Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi decided to play the same as Pakistan, inside Pakistan. ‘Gandhi set up two offensive desks in the Research and Analysis Wing [RAW], CIT-“X” and CIT-“J”, both tasked to retaliate against Pakistan’s support of terrorism’ (Swami 2006: 153). Beyond a series of bombings in Lahore and Karachi, little is known about what they actually did. The violence they cascaded back to Pakistan was presumably significant, however, as it resulted in a meeting brokered by Jordan between ISI chief Hamid Gul and his Indian counterpart in India’s RAW, A. K. Verma. At this meeting, India agreed to end reprisal bombings in major Pakistani cities in return for Khalistan groups being restrained from executing attacks in India’s urban centres (Swami 2006: 154). The agreement seems to have been less than perfectly implemented on both sides.

In an earlier round of Indian retaliation for Kashmiri terror, Rajiv’s mother, Indira Gandhi, had been able to inflict a more devastating cascade. Her decision to ban all Pakistani flights over India to East Pakistan in January 1971 was made in response to the hijacking of an Indian Airlines aircraft by JKLF militants.33 It played an important role in enfeebling the capacity of Pakistan to hang on to East Pakistan in the independence war of 1971. Prime minister Indira Gandhi then pressured Sri Lanka to deny Pakistan refuelling facilities, thus restricting Pakistan’s capacity to reinforce and supply its military in the east (Raman 2008: 10). Indian intelligence was also preparing East Pakistani insurgents for the future civil war. Finally, when mass slaughter and mass rape set in as the Pakistani military pre-emptively struck against its enemies in the east (D’Costa 2011), the Indian army went to the aid of the east and crushed the West Pakistani forces, enabling the splitting asunder of Pakistan. Ultimately, therefore, while the moves of Indian intelligence to internally destabilise Pakistan were less persistent in the use of terror than the ISI’s efforts to bleed and destabilise India, it was India’s internal destabilisation work that had more devastating impacts.

33 Swami disagrees with this view and suggests that the flights had been restricted since 1965.
Kashmir and global cascades of peace and terror

During the 2008 US presidential campaign, Barack Obama gave speeches that identified resolution of the Kashmir crisis as a key to peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan. By the time Obama appointed diplomat Richard Holbrooke to broker peace in Afghanistan and Pakistan, in January 2009, frenetic lobbying by India had excised the words India and Kashmir from his portfolio. Regional experts such as veteran CIA officer Bruce Reidel (2008) had for some time been arguing that peace could not be secured in Afghanistan without a resolution in Kashmir. One reason is that Pakistan’s regional strategic thinking is utterly infused with fear of encirclement by India, particularly in Kashmir, on one side, and an Afghanistan under Indian influence on the other, after the United States withdraws. Pakistan wants Afghanistan to deliver ‘strategic depth’—a buffer zone, a place to retreat to in the case of an Indian invasion of Pakistan.

Peer and Polakow-Suransky (2010) argued that back-channel talks, rather than overtly pushing India on Kashmir, can move India towards incremental steps for a Kashmir resolution. They contend that back-channel talks came close in 2007 to securing a mostly autonomous Kashmir with demilitarisation and a softening of the existing borders between India and Pakistan. These talks were derailed when president Musharraf was ousted in August 2008—and more so after the Mumbai terror attack in November 2008. Cynics see this as a story about cascades of militarisation in Pakistan, as the Pakistani military refusing to give up one of its cards (Pashtun proxies), which gives political relevance to the military as the only guarantor against the risk of terror-led disintegration.

Jonathan Tepperman (2010) also believes ‘the road to Kabul runs through Kashmir’ and that there are levers available to engage India with a Kashmir peace process. He quotes Sumit Ganguly as suggesting that if a permanent seat on the UN Security Council could be dangled in front on India, it ‘would roll over on any issue’. Robert Fisk (then Middle East Bureau Chief for the Independent) argued that ‘[m]any of the Taliban come from Kashmir, and the Pakistan military and the ISI have boosted their support for the Taliban because they believe the Indians are backing Karzai. By allowing India to control the fate of Kashmir, we have not only helped Pakistan to disintegrate, but ensured that Pakistan forces will help the Taliban, and the war will continue in Afghanistan’ (Fisk, quoted in Haqqi 2012: 1). Ahmed Rashid (2010a) argues that the ISI’s decision to allow Afghan and Central Asian terrorist groups to operate from Pakistani soil for decades has radicalised Pakistani Pashtun tribes, who are linking up with militant jihadists in Pakistan’s Punjab and Sindh provinces with the aim of overthrowing the Pakistani state. Surprisingly, the ISI for decades remained optimistic that it could control them while retaining them as a proxy force for a final settlement in Afghanistan. The Pakistani Taliban are still sufficiently out of control at the time of writing (see Chapter 6) that many ISI analysts today have doubts about this.
We discuss this further in the next two chapters. This widely held thesis is that the whole region, including Afghanistan, will continue to be wracked with war until India and Pakistan negotiate a Kashmir peace rather than negotiate by proxy war. Unfortunately, there are still elements of the ISI who lean towards proxy war at the time of writing.

Teresita and Howard Schaffer (2011: 2) take the thesis a step further by proposing a grand bargain, initially between Pakistan and the United States, but eventually involving India:

[G]ive Pakistan what it wants in Afghanistan—but on two conditions: Pakistan assumes responsibility for preventing terrorism out of Afghanistan, and Pakistan agrees to settle Kashmir along present geographic lines.

Given the imperative for Afghanistan to lead its own peace, ‘giving Pakistan what it wants in Afghanistan’ hardly seems a promising formula. Moreover, we argue later that any kind of Kashmir settlement that involves only negotiations among states without engaging Kashmiri civil society is also certain to fail. This is not the only reason that a grand bargain of the sort the Schaffers propose is not appealing. We must be cautious about the tendency, ‘almost a reflex—among foreign-policy thinkers to advocate for grand bargains’ (Greenberg and Radin 2012). Greenberg and Radin argue that American strategists are particularly susceptible to US leadership reaching for:

the seductive, completionist idea of the grand bargain—gathering all concerned players around a table, putting every contested issue in the pot and coming up with a comprehensive agreement that pretty much settles everything. The implication is that the parties in the conflict could not or would not have come up with such a fine solution on their own and that an overarching solution is preferable to incremental negotiation. (Greenberg and Radin 2012: 1)

Grand bargains can short-circuit processes that might build confidence with an end run by diplomats of major powers. Nevertheless, grand bargains that are cooked slowly from below by local parties—a ‘slow-food’ approach to peacebuilding (Boege 2006)—with support from major powers, are possible. Indeed, where all confidence in confidence-building has collapsed—as seems the case with the collapse of the politics of hope in 2003–07—a grand bargain cooked from below may be a viable remaining strategy. Our hypothesis here is not that grand bargains are a better strategy than confidence-building. Quite the reverse.
When confidence-building has been tried again and again and failed to the point of hopelessness, then, if a grand bargain is possible, top down and bottom up, it becomes an alternative strategy.

In the case of Kashmir, there have been approximately 150 failed dialogues between India and Pakistan. Consider the sequence of peacebuilding failure and success that we saw in Aceh in Indonesia: repeated failure of confidence-building because of a history of bad faith, followed by a successful grand bargain negotiated as ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: Ch. 6). The more decades a militarised conflict has been cascading multiple forms of violence, the harder it is for incremental confidence-building to earn trust and the more appealing becomes the search for a breakthrough grand bargain. On the other hand, there is still a long list of confidence-building measures that have been advocated by local civil society, human rights groups and international think tanks such as the International Crisis Group (ICG 2004) that have never been attempted.

The complex challenges of a slow-food approach to a grand bargain would probably need deep and long Track II diplomacy before the principals began to contemplate grand bargaining. Yet, where that could be accomplished, the idea of a grand bargain is attuned to the challenges of how to respond to regional cascades of violence. Where one conflict has cascaded into causation of another and another, a grand bargain that encompasses all of them has a comprehensiveness advantage compared with any one solution on its own—a singular solution that could be unravelled by the very causes of the other two that brought the conflict into existence in the first place. One party to a grand bargain can promise to eliminate the root causes of someone else’s conflict in return for another party removing the proximate causes of its conflict. A grand bargain is also a way of responding to diplomatic apathy that says the world has learnt to live with Kashmir and does not care enough to take diplomatic risks for it. The answer of the grand bargain theorists is that the conflict is not just about Kashmir, it is also about Afghanistan, Pakistan, 9/11, Bali, Mumbai and Paris. While we see no specific grand bargain proposals of promise on the horizon for Kashmir, we are attracted to the form of a grand bargain constructed from below as a path well suited to the challenge of cascades of violence, and particularly well suited to cascades that incremental confidence-building has failed repeatedly to stem.
Occupation by democracy

Outside of Srinagar, for those living in the qasba [old part of the city] and the small town, the real face of power was clearer, and usually sign-posted in the middle of the main street. ‘Town Commander’, the modest tin boards said. Lettered in just below, the name and phone number of a major of the Indian Army. (Kak 2011b: 34)

As armed insurgency began to decline, Kashmiri civil society returned to nonviolent struggle for a plebiscite. Indian militarism and Pakistan’s infiltration have, to a considerable degree, been managed by both states because of the serious repercussions of a full-scale war: India had been deterred from attacking training camps and insurgent strongholds in Pakistan by fear of escalation to a nuclear war and Pakistan lobbied with US policymakers to intervene by arguing that resolving the Kashmir dispute is the key to South Asia’s nuclear disarmament (Chadha 2005; Khan 2010).

One of the important factors is long-term reduction in the risk of conventional and nuclear war in a region of the world increasingly important for global trade and development and for the confidence of stock markets. Few other parts of the world have suffered four interstate conflicts—with numbers of battle deaths that define them as wars—in the back half of the twentieth century, combined with countless minor incidents of cross-border incursions of troops, cross-border artillery exchanges, many of them massive barrages, and aircraft shot down. A fifth, more complex war raged from 1990 as a civil war inside Kashmir, with state proxies on both sides, for more than a decade into the twenty-first century. It cost several times more lives than the four combined interstate conflicts between the Indian and Pakistani militaries across the Line of Control. In the twenty-first century, it is probably correct to say that no other flashpoint has seen crises in which more than a million troops have massed to square off at an international border, even if full-scale war has been averted so far in this century.

The Pakistani Government continues to support a plebiscite with two options—India or Pakistan—though there have been times when its leaders have suggested openness to an independence option. Pakistan’s support for a plebiscite has at times been more tactical than genuine. Most azadi activists in J&K want a plebiscite with three options on the ballot—India, Pakistan or an independent, reunified J&K—with the outcome
to be settled by a simple majority of the joint electorate of Pakistani and
Indian citizens of J&K. The Indian Government, however, dismisses any
plebiscite as ‘irrelevant, obsolete, and unnecessary’. The standard line of
the Indian Foreign Ministry is:

the question of a plebiscite in any part of India, including Jammu &
Kashmir, simply does not arise. The people of Jammu & Kashmir have
exercised their democratic rights repeatedly, as have people in other parts
of India. (Bose 2005: 166)

Reasonable arguments can be put for the alternative—dialogue among all
parties within J&K—in search of a powersharing transitional compromise.
All parties might concede that a winner-take-all referendum could be
destabilising in that it would leave supporters of minority positions
aggrieved. The standard line of the Indian foreign ministry above is not
one of those reasonable arguments. This is because there has only been
an appearance of the people of J&K ‘exercising their democratic rights
repeatedly’. We have seen that elections have mostly been rigged in Indian
J&K, with electoral fraud the norm rather than the exception. The state
has been ‘ruled by compliant cliques, usually of limited representative
class or none, installed at New Delhi’s behest’, with the autonomy
once guaranteed by the constitution ‘eroded and virtually destroyed by
authoritarian central intervention, operating in collusion with those
compliant local elites’ (Bose 2005: 237). State governments understand
that their survival depends on the goodwill of New Delhi rather than
the goodwill of the people of J&K. The people have been unable to exert
legitimate democratic power. The victors in democratic struggles have
instead been able to indulge the power of predation, to line their pockets.

The level of contrivance in creating an appearance of democracy is in
a sense an impressive feat of central state capacity. New Delhi has
ways of reminding J&K politicians, whenever they ponder democratic
responsiveness, of the demise of state leaders who defied New Delhi on
rare occasions in the past. Democracy’s charade is constructed by carrots
more than by sticks. In the 2000s, New Delhi sought to coopt members of
the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (a coalition of 30 azadi parties formed
in 1993) who could be bought. Doubtless it is a little crude to describe
their renunciation of independence as being bought, just as it would be
crude to so describe the ultimate submission of Sheik Abdullah, his son
and grandson as chief ministers. Carrots were mixed in with release from
prison and overtures about how much can be achieved for their people
from inside the palace. Yet the carrots can be crude if the Indian media is
correct when it reports that Hurriyat defectors were ‘guaranteed electoral victories. At least 17 of the 87 seats in the assembly would be kept aside as “safe seats” for such elements’ (Bose 2005: 239). A democracy elegantly contrived.

Early on, democracy was contrived even more crudely. The first election of 1951 was of Sheikh Abdullah during one of the periods when he was out of prison because he was pliable to New Delhi. His National Conference won every seat in the assembly of 72 seats. Only two seats were contested. The nominations of competing candidates, apart from these two, were simply rejected. By the end of 2002, after widespread and serious allegations of human rights abuses by Indian military and paramilitary forces, the Indian Government was persuaded to organise elections in J&K to form a new government. Nyla Ali Khan (2010: 110) writes about her experience at that time and mentions that the paramilitary forces intimidated and coerced voters in many areas. Nearly 1.5 million citizens who were entitled to vote were not registered, and women mostly did not participate in the electoral process.

Some of the more recent contrivances at the local level have been equally inelegant. As Arundhati Roy (2009: 3) puts it evocatively:

> Elections have become a finely honed instrument of the military occupation, a sinister playground for India’s deep state. Intelligence agencies have created political parties and decoy politicians, they have constructed and destroyed political careers at will.

Our interviews revealed how the military at times seeks to rig Panchayat elections. They call a targeted leader to visit the military camp regularly. Locals then perceive that village leader as being a useful bridge to the real government power in their area: military power. The military then forces that leader to run for the local election and gives him or her support. Ambitious politicians harness military collaboration for their projects as well. They get the military to arrest a political troublemaker. The troublemaker is tortured. Then the very politician who targeted them makes noisy mock complaints to the military, banging on the door of the military commander, pleading for the release of the troublemaker, who is then in their political debt when released. Released militants cannot get a job. So, pro-India politicians bring them under their wing after they appear to get them released and promise to protect them from more torture and from being disappeared. They then use them as listening posts and to coerce people.
A variant of this method mentioned in another interview was the village party leader paying informers to find out about people’s politics. This information can be used for the local military commander and the party leader to arrest a young person who, on the one hand, is attracted to militancy and, on the other, is attracted to the party leader’s ‘reform’ party. The commander arrests them. The party leader bangs on the commander’s door demanding release and the young person, on release, is turned away from the insurgency and towards electoral politics. In the process, the party leader gains credibility in the village for standing up to the military:

After decades of this step-by-step, one-by-one building of a politics of collusion, collaboration and consent, resistance, they believe, can be undermined … There is an expanding web, [a] matrix of collusion created by these means. (Interview in Srinagar, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

Some join this web of collusion, some go to prison to be tortured, while other young people disengage to a privatised apolitical world of Facebook superficiality. Yet, contemporary Kashmiri resistance politics is about revealing that kind of collusion for the collaboration it is.

An important part of the appearance of democracy in Kashmir is reporting by the Indian public relations machine of high voter turnouts in elections:

State-backed militias take people at gunpoint to the polling booth to get up the turnout percentage and to increase the odds of favoured candidates. Then the state is able to announce her democracy is working. So democracy increases domination. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

Another informant described an incident in 2008 in which the local military commander abducted the wife of the village headman and took her to the military post. She was kept there all night. People assumed she was being raped. The village head banged on the door of the post through the night. In the morning, his wife was released to him. The military commander asked her to say if anyone had harmed her during the night. She said she had not been touched. Then the commander told the village head to put aside his resistance to getting the village vote out for a favoured candidate on election day. If he did not, his wife would be picked up again and, this time, his men would rape her all night—democracy increasing domination again.
New Delhi preaches democracy, but on the ground practices occupation … Control is routed through democratic practices … Disempowerment through democracy. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101209)

A senior bureaucrat said that, in some situations:

[the] village votes partly to protect the headman … The military is generally not bothered by who wins. They are only interested in the show of it. The army is in power regardless of which party governs. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101229)

Our Kashmiri informants reported annoyance at the way Western diplomats praise India for the high voter turnout in recent J&K elections. Indian power has always prevented international election monitors or the UN mission from monitoring elections in J&K. That said, a former senior Indian defence official argued that rewards by the military are more important than force in getting villagers out to vote: ‘I don’t have a responsibility to give you medical care or repair your roads and don’t come asking me to do that if you don’t get out and vote’ (Interview in New Delhi, 2012, No. 101208). There is a systematic policy of rewarding villages that are subservient to the appearance of Indian democracy with the bribe of development assistance. One informant spoke of the state intelligence strategy at the time of the 2008 protests as using families, in part, as a barometer of public sentiment. They estimated that, as of 2008, there were only 160 families in the Kashmir Valley who benefited from India, and, while they were powerful families, this was not enough to control the valley. The objective was to double this number of families in 10 years and rely on them to spread the Indian state’s narrative.

The people of J&K have been denied a politics of hope that they might be heard. Being denied elections that fit the definition of that term is just one dimension of denial of voice. Denial of listening by the international community is another. Denial of justice is another. Independence of the judiciary is one of India’s democratic strengths, yet the executive often simply ignores court orders in J&K. Moreover, in the Kashmir Valley, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act 1958 (AFSPA) and the Public Safety Act 1978 (PSA) cut the rule of law from normal democratic operation. The AFSPA grants the security sector sweeping powers to arrest, kill on suspicion and search and destroy property suspected of belonging to insurgents. The PSA allowed detention for up to two years without trial and without charges being laid. Reduction of this period from two years to one in response to international human rights critics in 2011 has not
made much difference, as those released after one year are immediately charged with something else as soon as they leave the police station—sometimes with this recurring three or more times.

For me, both as a journalist and a Kashmiri, Kashmir is nothing more than a huge, huge jail today, where no rules apply, where every rule applies, where the only objectives of the state are to control the people. (Interview with Parvaiz Bukhari, cited in Baramian 2012: 5)

Law is a facade that helps create the illusion of democracy. Democracy is a tool to crush us and so is law. (Interview with Kashmiri law professor, 2012, No. 101241)

The awful irony here is that the sheer frequency of atrocity shortens the media’s attention cycle for each atrocity, leading to ‘atrocity fatigue’. A fresh, vivid crime against humanity will be more newsworthy than a stale one, though it too will occupy only a short new window of media attention. The consequence is that announcing a ‘full and painstaking’ inquiry that runs for a long time (and never produces a public report) works in cooling community outrage. Arundhati Roy (2009: 2) finds this to be a more general phenomenon of checks and balances in Indian democracy being corrupted into covering for one another, instead of checking on each other:

‘The hoary institutions of Indian democracy—the judiciary, the police, the ‘free’ press, and, of course, elections—far from working as a system of checks and balances, quite often do the opposite. They provide each other cover to promote the larger interests of Union and Progress. In the process, they generate such confusion, such a cacophony, that voices raised in warning just become part of the noise. And that only helps to enhance the image of the tolerant, lumbering, colorful, somewhat chaotic democracy.

Democracy has not only been marginalised in Kashmir, but also criminalised:

So many things become sedition. Telling the truth is sedition. Genuine democratic politics is a crime … The policy is to criminalise all forms of dissent. And to reward coopted participation and to encourage the private sphere. To divide and conquer and fragment. (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101210)
This journalist went on to argue that speaking truth is a criminal act, is criminalised, even when speaking the truth of the obligations that UN resolutions impose on India.

Freedom of movement is also a facade in Kashmir. Even Kashmiri Pandits (Hindus) complain of this tyranny:

> We have seen the worst face of Indian democracy for the last 60 years because of certain politicians here. I have never seen the soft face of Indian democracy. Why am I asked to show my ID when I am a staunch Indian, when I am wearing my red thread? (Interview with Kashmiri Pandit leader, 2012, No. 101247)

Voice through freedom of the press is another strength of Indian democracy. It has not been shut down in J&K. It has been watered down, wilfully diluted, awash with fake news filtered through the deep state. In fact, there were six or seven dozen daily newspapers in Kashmir during our 2012 fieldwork! Only occasionally are they shut by the state. The government is their largest advertiser. This encourages great confusion and a cacophony of media voices that engender a politics of complexity. It is a puzzlement politics of citizens not knowing what to believe from this chaos of voices. On the account of several journalists we interviewed, it is a kind of intentional construction of anomie (Proposition 7) (and hopefully normless paralysis of analysis) by overloading democracy with plurality of political and religious thought:

> Human rights groups and academics [which are often funded generously by the state] are part of the security grid. Their job is to produce understated reports that render abuse and tyranny uncertain and debatable. They also play into the strategy of complicating things by saying Ladakh is Buddhist and Jammu is Hindu [when the Muslim populations of these areas are large]. (Interview, Kashmir, 2012, No. 101209)

Yet, Kashmiri journalists who step too far over certain lines are warned, threatened, fired, beaten, shot at and occasionally killed. ‘If you want to work objectively, there is no safety for your life. Do you want to live with your family or be objective’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101213). Mostly, journalists receive a warning shot first—simply a call from the military to say they did not like a story. The response escalates if robust reporting continues. In one case, the boss of a journalist said: ‘We got a call from the military to say you are becoming a nuisance.
People are talking about bumping you off’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101209). Those who write desired stories reap financial rewards from the state:

‘The press as a whole has developed a kind of organic relationship with the state … They don’t always take money … The police and intelligence push for certain journalists to be placed in media organisations.’ (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233)

The government has a rating system for journalists: ‘If you are category one, every phone call is tapped’ (Interview with Kashmiri journalist, 2012, No. 101213).

When journalists submit stories of torture and state brutality in Kashmir to the national media, editors ‘tend to say this is boring’. The military wants torture and killing to be vivid, as when they attached a bomb to the body of a person who lodged a criminal complaint against the military and blew him to pieces in a place where many locals witnessed the horror (see Hernawan 2013), thus receiving a lesson about the folly of lodging complaints against the military. But they want the terror to be narrowcast to a local audience, not broadcast. Narrowcasting of this kind is not easy to manage. One reason is that the military sometimes feeds stories to the media about abuses by adversaries in the police, and vice versa. Both use militias to do much of the killing that they wish to see done in a public way. The risks of narrowcasting being broadcast were realised in one case in 2009 where 11 boys, detained for participating in demonstrations, were humiliated through the filming of their forced sodomy of each other. This story was broadcast and a responsible officer was prosecuted and executed as a result. Another instance—the of a detained man having his feet cut off and being forced to eat flesh from his feet, thighs and other parts of his body—found its way into a human rights documentary.

A symbiotic relationship between the media and the state is secured by issuing local television licences to business supporters of pro-India parties. Government officials are also located in media offices to check the front page and ensure that a terrorism narrative, or a ‘Pakistani stooge’ imaginary, is used to describe any armed action. As with managing the appearance of electoral democracy, so the appearance of a free press is managed. Journalism that is extravagant in its radicalism is okay because ‘rhetoric is allowed, substance is not allowed’ (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233). An example of forbidden substance is outlining how the security establishment controls Kashmir. The journalist explained that one of his senior colleagues had obtained a copy of the standard operating
procedures for the security forces in managing protests: one was to ‘keep the press away from protestors’. Part of this media strategy is to drown out the minority who persist with moderately robust journalism in the face of these sticks and carrots. Srinagar has had more newspaper and television outlets than any city these authors have experienced.

Facebook is managed but only infrequently shut down when the security forces are losing control of the streets. Part of managing the impression of freedom and democracy is to cultivate Facebook and Twitter to overwhelm the internet with ‘frivolous stuff’, which allows politically extravagant and inflammatory content, but suppresses politically serious and politically dangerous communication. Those responsible for the latter can be visited and threatened, arrested or can disappear. At times of crisis for the state, all texting, the internet, Facebook and other social media are shut down. But the normal micro-regulation is to allow use of Facebook—even to allow someone to say something politically disapproved by the state—but to then organise ‘40 or 50 people to attack him in the alternative space’ (Interview with Srinagar journalist, 2012, No. 101233) to discredit and ridicule the politically disapproved idea and the politically disapproved person. ‘Nothing happens by default here’, this journalist continued. Likewise, if a journalist writes a truth about the security services, 10 other journalists can be enrolled by the military to question the veracity of the story and discredit the journalist. In 2016, Kashmiri human rights activists were complaining about Facebook taking down their content documenting security sector abuses. Facebook issued a statement explaining its actions in these terms: ‘There is no place on Facebook for content that praises or supports terrorists, terrorist organisations or terrorism’ (Geelani 2016). There is an important warning from Kashmir here. Facebook self-regulation that crushes nonviolent Muslim cries for freedom from oppression, that silences pleas for respect of their human rights, can be coopted to a fabric of ‘unfreedom’ that causes young Muslims to see violent jihad as the only path left open to them.

**Domination by democracy**

Domination by rule of law complements domination by democracy. Institutions inspired by the aspiration to control domination have been coopted to an insidious craft of domination. We challenged one Kashmiri leader with the fact that J&K chief minister Omar Abdullah repeatedly and publicly expressed his commitment to abolishing the *AFSPA*:
CASCAdeS of VioLenCe

It’s a game. He presents himself to the people as a moderate wing of the resistance. But he is in the game with the state that the state controls and he well understands the rules and limits of the game and the appearances he must create to survive politically. He must be seen to be resisting martial law while actually being part of the state apparatus that preserves it. (Interview in Kashmir, 2012, No. 101210)

The security forces are effectively empowered by the state to remove or kill off the voices they do not wish to be heard. A prime way that the appearance of rule of law is kept up is by the ritualism of calling inquiries into atrocities:

The ‘democratically elected’ governments since 1996 have ordered scores of probes into human rights violations. During Farooq Abdullah’s rule (from 1996 to 2002) at least 40 inquiries were instituted into custodial killings, disappearances, rapes, and other rights abuses by the armed forces. The People’s Democratic Party-led coalition government ordered 28 from 2005; in the governor’s rule (from June 2008 to December 2008), six probes were ordered; the ruling National Conference–Congress coalition has announced 14 probes since January this year. Ordering a probe into rights abuses has become the customary ritual of the authoritarian democracy in the state. The emphasis is on the announcement of the probe. Time takes care of public resentment, which fizzles out with each passing day, and a fresh killing or rape necessitates another probe. (Yasir 2015)

It is clear, then, from our narrative that state violence cascaded into escalated insurgent violence and to other forms of violence as well. It is equally clear that the escalation of state tyranny in the 1990s ultimately succeeded in suppressing a mass insurgency. Tyranny worked up to a point. But not totally, as there are still jihadists who occasionally prick India and make it bleed. More fundamentally, enhanced rather than diminished nonviolent resistance capability was the legacy of the tyranny. India’s folly has been to think that time is on its side in Kashmir, that with time and unwavering military resolve it could mostly crush the armed struggle. This is true. With time, it could consolidate the Line of Control as an international border and cause Pakistan to give up the project of taking back Kashmir by military means. India’s error was in failing to see that, in the decades up to the 1980s, they might have negotiated a peace with Pakistan that included a political settlement on Kashmir that might have been accepted by the great powers, the international community and the people of Kashmir.
Today, there is no prospect that the people of Kashmir would submit to a bilateral agreement between India and Pakistan brokered with the great powers. They would effectively resist any agreement in which the people of Kashmir—its entire political spectrum—are not full negotiating partners. Large sections of the international community and many major states would back them in that resistance. By bludgeoning the people of Kashmir, India has terminated the political possibility of a purely bilateral international settlement. At the same time, they have created in Kashmir a people who have more enmity towards India than they ever had in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s or 1970s.

A better long game would have been more like the one India played with the multiple insurgencies in its north-east, with Pakistan's and China's support for those insurgencies. A still better game would have been the way Nehru and Indira Gandhi worked persistently at a preventive political solution to separatism in Tamil Nadu from the 1940s to the 1960s, which prevented insurgency before it took off. The Tamil Nadu population is almost as large as that of Germany and larger than France. Tamil Nadu was too big to ignore and too big to risk subjugating. So New Delhi embraced responsiveness to Tamil Nadu's wishes about having laws written and adjudicated in Tamil and many other matters. Widmalm (2006: 97–108) points out that the situation with the demand for independence for Dravida Nadu was similar to the course of Kashmir in many ways. But the Indian National Congress did not try to corrupt the state electoral process in Tamil Nadu. Because the Congress was able to persuade the leaders and people of Tamil Nadu that their voice could be heard through state politics, they were also persuaded that democratic politics in pursuit of Tamil autonomy inside India could achieve more than appeals to separatism or violence. In contrast, Kashmir was considered a zero-sum contest with Pakistan. Both sides irrationally viewed it as an existential struggle quite unlike other conflicts such as Tamil Nadu. Indira Gandhi had a revealing exchange with Tariq Ali that reflects how this was true on both sides:

Meanwhile her ‘sources’ had informed her that Pakistan was preparing a military invasion of Kashmir. Could this be so? I doubted it. General Zia-ul-Haq was brutal and vicious, but he wasn’t an idiot. He knew that to provoke India would be fatal. In addition, the Pakistan army was busy fighting the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. To open a second front in Kashmir would be the height of irrationality.
‘I’m surprised at you,’ Mrs Gandhi said. ‘You of all people believe that generals are rational human beings?’

‘There is a difference between irrationality and suicide,’ I said (a judgment I have since had cause to revise).

She smiled, but didn’t reply. Then, to demonstrate the inadequacy of the military mind, she described how after Pakistan’s surrender in Bangladesh her generals wanted to continue the war against West Pakistan, to ‘finish off the enemy’. She had over-ruled them and ordered a cease-fire. (Ali 2011: 45–6)

Democracy is part of the answer to generals who see nails when they have a hammer. As Indira Gandhi implied, Pakistan has been more adventurist in warmongering than India because India has been more under civilian democratic control. India may have failed to prevent a preventable Punjab insurgency and then prolonged it—as Ahmed (2010) concluded—because its initial military reaction was excessively brutal and insufficiently alert to political solutions. Likewise, there were missed opportunities for political solutions and excessive police brutality that escalated the Assam and Naxalite insurgencies. Yet, overall, moderate civilian voices in Indian democracy have been loud and often effective enough to prevail over crude militarists, as have moderate voices within the military and the police. So India overall has done fairly well with holding its massive complexity together by dialogue in search of political solutions to conflict. Pakistan, in contrast, allowed itself to split in half and has ceded parts of what is left to the tyranny of terror organisations. Kashmir is the greatest exception, where Indian democracy has fared as badly as Pakistan, or worse, at responsive politics.

An important feature of democracy’s domination has been the widespread practice of sexual and reproductive crimes by the security forces in Kashmir (Proposition 9). During our interviews with women activists, we were told about an incident in Kunan Poshpora, which still haunts Kashmiriis and fuels the politics of retribution by the resistance movement. On the night of 23 February 1991, 125 soldiers of 4th Rajputana Rifles, of the Army’s 68th Brigade, entered villages in the Kupwara district of Kashmir, separated men from women and raped, sexually tortured and humiliated girls and women aged between 13 and 60.
In 1991, the Indian state—on the basis of an investigation driven with inherent biases, as reported by Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights (n.d.)—called the allegations a ‘massive hoax orchestrated by militants and their international allies’. Again, in 2014, during a hearing about the Kunan Poshpora case, the army’s counsel reiterated similar sentiments by describing the statements of victims as stereotyped and ‘like recorded rotten stereo sounds that play rape all over again’ (Pervez 2014). The case was reopened in 2013—a year in which 70 more cases of sexual violence by the security forces alone were registered. It was a move that was jarring to the military establishment of Kashmir. The Jammu and Kashmir Coalition for Civil Society, a human rights organisation representing the victims, and the ‘We Demand Justice for Kunan Poshpora Survivors’ campaign, which filed a Public Interest Litigation (PIL) in 2012 to reopen and reinvestigate the case, have consistently highlighted how the army has deliberately delayed the process (Pervez 2014).

Kunan Poshpora and numerous other cases of sexual violence and rape by the security forces have made Kashmir’s women wary of men in uniforms. Despite the army’s civilising rhetoric of peacebuilding in J&K in recent years, the ongoing targeting of women makes Kashmiris deeply resentful not only towards the army, but also towards the state it represents.

**Democracy as the problem**

In the 1950s, B. R. Ambedkar—one of India’s most respected reformers, its first law minister and the primary drafter of India’s constitution—warned that democracy in India is ‘only a top dressing on Indian soil, which is essentially undemocratic’ (cited by Roy 2015: 1). Indeed, Kashmir is that great failure of Indian democracy and Indian wisdom in finding some sustainable form of azadi that can triumph over militarism (Proposition 8). Arundhati Roy sees Kashmir as the prism through which we can see the epic scale of what is at stake in the modern world. Roy (2009: 2) worries:

As a writer, a fiction writer, I have often wondered whether the attempt to always be precise, to try and get it all factually right somehow reduces the epic scale of what is really going on.
Perhaps, she wonders, the transformative power and more evocative precision of poetry are better tools:

Something about the cunning, Brahmanical, intricate, bureaucratic, file-bound, ‘apply-through-proper-channels’ nature of governance and subjugation in India seems to have made a clerk out of me. My only excuse is to say that it takes odd tools to uncover the maze of subterfuge and hypocrisy that cloaks the callousness and the cold, calculated violence of the world’s favorite new superpower. Repression ‘through proper channels’ sometimes engenders resistance ‘through proper channels.’ As resistance goes this isn’t enough, I know. But for now, it’s all I have. Perhaps someday it will become the underpinning for poetry and for the feral howl. (Roy 2009: 2)

India is the swing state in the future of capitalist democracy. Gorbachev steered the Soviet Union to devolve briefly into liberal democratic capitalism. Putin now reassembles the old regime as an authoritarian capitalist empire (Thornton and Thornton 2012). China has already pioneered its own form of authoritarian capitalism, which, under the current leadership, is becoming more authoritarian rather than transitioning towards a liberal path. India is the big swing state that will decide whether the more dominant variety of capitalism will be authoritarian capitalism ruled by cabals of cronies, Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism or German/Nordic collaborative social democratic capitalism (Hall and Soskice 2001). Narendra Modi’s ascent to the prime ministership in 2014 would seem to suggest a shift towards Anglo-Saxon liberal capitalism. Yet, as a state leader, Modi revealed significant and assertive authoritarianism in responding to the religious other. Economic reform is now used in conflict-prone J&K, north-eastern India and Naxalite regions to depoliticise development and to crack down on the people, especially the poor and minorities. Gujarat, where earlier there was a robust trade union movement, has seen a substantial decline in mobilisation of the working class, job cuts, exploitation of Muslim workers and an increase of Hindu nationalism among Hindu workers.

Authoritarian capitalism is reflexive and ‘develops out of systems of labour control existing prior to the transition to capitalism at the centre and its expansion from the centre’ (Foweraker 1981: 192). The landowning class is often the most powerful stakeholder in authoritarian capitalist systems.

35 Somewhat sidelining India’s icon of nonviolence, Gandhi, Modi championed the nineteenth-century Hindu revivalist Swami Vivekanda, who was known for his assertive cultural nationalism.
Examples are Russia in the nineteenth century and Brazil and much of Latin America after their independence. Labour is very strictly controlled and managed in such a system. William and Songok Han Thornton (2012) argue that authoritarian capitalism has been shaping up as the winner in India since 2008. One reason, they argue, that India misses a lot of investment that goes to China is that Western corporations are attracted not only to the dynamism of Chinese growth and productive capability (India has that, too), but also to the fact that they will not have to worry about strikes in China or Chinese media exposés of their labour or environmental practices. Once the deal is done with the right Chinese Communist Party officials, they will manage the red tape. Courts do not overrule party officials in ways that can happen in democratic India.

In the pushback from liberal capitalism in its heartland, we see the opposite side of this coin with US President Donald Trump and far-right European politicians. They have a will to crush trade unions, minimum wages and regulation of labour rights as part of their authoritarian policy package for forcing jobs back to the United States and Europe, respectively.

There are arguments that run the other way. Democratic capitalism may be more sustainable, more responsive and more innovative as societies move from industrial to post-industrial wealth creation. Manuel Castells (1996) points out that the Soviet Union had much stronger growth than the United States and the rest of the capitalist world during the era of industrial capitalism. Moscow and St Petersburg could build better subways than New York and London; Russia could crank out tanks, MIGs and AK-47s with exceptional efficiency. It was when information capitalism first arrived during the 1970s that Moscow could not cut it at the networked governance of innovation. India was initially better positioned than China to become an innovative information economy, though Chinese opening up and investment in the best Chinese universities, which were once far behind Indian universities, and Chinese excellence in industrial espionage have put that in the balance.

There is every hope that India will continue to choose to be an open, democratic, responsive economy in preference to the admitted charms for ruthless corporations of authoritarian capitalism. On the other hand, the hollowing out of Indian democratic institutions discussed in the work of Kohli (1990, 1998) has been happening at the behest of central party...
Wilkinson’s (2004: 44–5) Uttar Pradesh data show that the predicted number of deaths in Hindu–Muslim political violence increases by 75 per cent if there was a close race in the previous election in that town.

Many countries that have experienced war and international peacekeeping sign up in a peace agreement to internationally supervised elections. As in Cambodia, these elections are often window dressing for authoritarian control. The DRC is a distressing case of a nation that has conducted post-conflict elections under UN supervision. As we saw in Chapter 2, the way DRC democracy works is that the ruling party of Laurent Kabila sells off the country’s national resources in gold, diamonds, coltan and other minerals to foreign corporations at bargain prices for his party’s and his own enrichment. Some of those riches are paid to local party bosses to coerce and reward people for voting them back at the next election. Authoritarian capitalism with regular elections keeps key players in the West happy enough—the mining companies, the democrats, the peacemakers—and keeps exploitative local party elites even happier. But it crushes their people with a negative peace without justice—the faux democracy of authoritarian capitalism. The peace, the democracy and the crony capitalism are not sustainable for the long term.

Here we have the terrible predicament of the world in which Indian citizens are the swinging voters. China makes no pretence at being democratic. It markets a Beijing consensus as more business friendly and more respectful of the tyranny of other sovereigns than neoliberal capitalism. Singapore represents the more realistic choice for India. Singapore works hard at a charade of liberal democratic politics, while the reality is that only its economy is liberal. Its polity is bubbling with contestation of

36 Authoritarian capitalism, as Russian elites have discovered, and as Indonesian president Suharto and his Filipino counterpart Ferdinand Marcos discovered, is better for lining the pockets of ruling elites than capitalism with a robust separation of powers. This is why there is a genuine contest between some form of democratic capitalism and authoritarian capitalism for the soul of India. Socialism is now scratched from the race. Sadly, the people-power revolution in the Philippines has reverted to authoritarian capitalism, as have various of the flower revolutions of Eastern Europe. Indonesia could go that way as well, though so far its democracy continues to consolidate, if not without setbacks. Vietnam has consolidated towards authoritarian capitalism, and the semi-democracies surrounding India—Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka—as we discuss in Chapters 6–9, teeter towards the allure of militarised forms of authoritarian capitalism.

37 One of the attractions that Congolese capitalism shares with Suharto’s crony capitalism in Indonesia, or Putin’s Russian capitalism, is that the group of party officials who need to be bribed is quite narrow compared with the chaotic capitalism before Putin, when so many had to be bribed. So Putin became more electorally popular than his predecessors, just as Suharto was more popular with the people of Indonesia than Sukarno and his more chaotic coalition.
ideas on matters of economic policy, over which different factions of the bureaucracy fight for innovation and ideas. But it is quiescent on the political front. Many Western optimists believe that there is an inevitable transition where the final stop sees authoritarian capitalist states transform into liberal capitalist orders. Now that we have seen the transition go the other way in cases from Russia, China, the United States under Trump and Eastern Europe, even in Poland (which sparked the great rebellion against authoritarian communism) and in the inspiring people-power case of the Philippines, we are no longer so naive about this.

The West is much more unrealistically optimistic about Indian politics than Chinese politics, yet for reasons of the same naive neoliberal evolutionary faith. The fantasy of this faith is that India is just further along the road to liberal democratic capitalism and is progressing at a faster pace. In fact, like Kohli (1990, 1998), we have argued that there are important ways that Indian democratic institutions have headed in the reverse direction since Nehru. Because the West believes whatever fits its master narrative of historical triumph for liberalism, it wants to believe that ‘India Shining’\(^\text{38}\) has restored democracy to Kashmir, has kept its media free, has rebuilt rule of law and has cracked down on the human rights abuses that its security forces foolishly inflicted on the citizens of Kashmir in the past. As one Srinagar journalist lamented to us, ‘even Al Jazeera’ is infatuated with liberal India Shining and is not interested in covering human rights abuses in Kashmir. Kashmir is a worrying case study of democracy’s swing state because it shows how, Singapore style, a charade of democracy can leave India beloved by the West.

The reality of authoritarian Delhi control of a recalcitrant people is barely a blip on the West’s radar. That accomplishment has been more impressive than anything the Chinese Communist Party has managed. Kashmir is more militarised and more brutalised by torture and disappearances than China, with Xinjiang as a clear exception to that. Under India’s supposedly federal democracy, Kashmir’s chief ministers have been more effectively subject to recall by party bosses in New Delhi than Chinese provincial leaders are subject to recall by party leaders in Beijing. The party in control in Delhi has dictated who will win most elections, unless this is too slow for them; on several occasions, they have fired chief ministers and replaced them with governor’s rule, which is direct rule from Delhi.

\(^{38}\) India Shining was a marketing campaign about optimism in the Indian economy promoted by the BJP.
Though there is no pretence of democracy by China, a People’s Liberation Army major could not put up a sign that describes herself as ‘Town Commander’. Of course, such signs do not exist on the roads that tourists travel in Kashmir. Here is the even more remarkable and worrying Indian accomplishment—that the West can still be infatuated with India Shining even after its tourists travel to Kashmir in large numbers. They travel freely about the tourist areas without realising that even local Kashmiris need a permit to visit one-third of J&K. The worry is that elites from many countries are honing their skill sets at coaxing and caressing Western investment with a cloak of democratic contrivance. In Kashmir, this cloak conceals a bloodbath of tyranny with more sophistication than in other Peacebuilding Compared cases.

Until India looks the tyranny that is Kashmir in the eye and fixes it, its democracy will be at risk of cascading authoritarianism. Likewise, it must look honestly at the way many marginalised peoples who turned to the Naxalites have had their forests stolen by corporate mining and forestry interests and local party cronies. These threats to democracy are not contracting. They are happening because of the way Nehru’s successors hollowed out the democratic institutions he and the Indian National Congress struggled to erect. Kashmir is the most hollow democracy of any Indian state. We have argued that it is a place where democracy has been coopted to a project of subjugation. When this happens in India, it matters so much more than when it happens in the DRC, not because the people of Congo matter less, but because no one speaks a democratic imaginary of Shining Congo.

The DRC has been greatly influenced, and greatly bought, by authoritarian Chinese capitalism. Is Kashmir the precursor of a more sophisticated, nuanced and beloved Indian authoritarian capitalism that will come to influence and buy other African states? Or will India forge from the ideals of the Indian National Congress a different path from First-World capitalisms, from communism and from the new authoritarian capitalism of the old Second World? Can Kashmir play a part in that better future? Can Kashmir become that ‘dazzling gem on the snowy bosom of Asia’ of the azadi imaginary in the 1944 J&K National Conference Constitution? We think so, as we argue in our concluding sections. The Asian century can be a century of greater peace and richer democracy than the American Century or the European centuries that preceded it. No country is in a better position than India to lead the world to a better future path of peace, prosperity and democracy. To realise its promise as the great swing
state that can lead the world away from the dangers of authoritarian capitalism that consumed the world in the 1930s (and could do so again), India must desist from gaming democracy and return to the authenticity of commitment to democracy of Gandhi and Nehru.

Democracy as a cause of war

A popular Western narrative is the democratic peace theory: democracies never go to war against one another (see e.g. Babst 1964, 1972; Doyle 1983; Rummel 1983, summarised in Gleditsch 1992). Part II of this book is about democratic India and an intermittently democratic Pakistan and Bangladesh going to war with one another quite a lot. This chapter has explored the fictions and contrivances of Indian democracy that count among the deepest sources of grievance in Kashmir. Proposition 8 of our theory (domination recursively cascades to further violence) takes a particular form in Kashmir, where democratic contrivance has been a form of domination that has cascaded insurgency.

Paul Collier (2009) is one scholar who has systematically advanced the empirically grounded thesis that the form democracy has taken in many impoverished societies has undermined peace. His interpretation of why this is so is that, in societies such as the DRC, as we illustrated in Chapter 2, politicians win elections by methods that require them to misgovern. In particular, to survive, they are required to dismantle the separation of powers. For Collier, this means that a democracy without checks and balances conduces to corruption and state criminality of multifarious forms. This prevents societies from lifting themselves out of ‘the bottom billion’. Societies stuck in the bottom billion of the planet’s poor suffer recurrent violence. Misgovernance driven by criminalisation of the state is also a problem for more economically successful societies, including India, where 34 per cent of the winners of the 2014 elections had criminal indictments pending against them (Fukuyama 2014: 547).

Following Collier (2009), and following our Kashmir case, we might consider an alternative cascade hypothesis:

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39 The idea could be traced back to Immanuel Kant’s (1963) essay ‘Perpetual peace’, in which he elaborated that a republican form of government was essential for perpetual peace. Kant also believed that, in a system of government in which citizens could vote and determine the political outcomes, nobody would vote to go to war unless their country was under attack.
Electoral democracy cascades peace and crime control when complemented by robust separations of powers; electoral democracy without separations of powers cascades civil wars, coups and criminality.

Part III of this book resumes the debate about this competing hypothesis.

A peace process for Kashmir

India has always been the stronger adversary in the long conflict with Pakistan and Kashmir. Its margin of superiority, especially economically, but also militarily, has grown continuously since 1947. It is well satisfied with having managed at Partition to hang on to a Muslim-majority area that it wanted, and well satisfied with a 1948 ceasefire line that left it with most of the territory, most of the population, the capital city, nearly all of the most productive and resource-rich regions of Kashmir and areas that were strategically important to forward Himalayan defence against China. Ongoing tension is likely when ‘power advantage and satisfaction with the status quo rest with the same party’ (Koithara 2004: 24). The weaker parties—Pakistan and the people of Kashmir—were the ones who wanted a referendum that might unsettle this status quo and who started five wars, countless minor cross-border incursions and recurrently massive nonviolent mobilisations to unsettle it.

Pakistan’s wars have given India an excuse to move towards nuclear parity with China. India has had the view that time is on its side in Kashmir. In time, the United Nations gave up on the idea that Kashmir is a Security Council issue on which anything could be achieved. The Security Council gave up in the 1960s and in 1971. After Pakistan’s worst military defeat by India, in exchange for the return of 93,000 prisoners of war in the Simla agreement of 1974, even Pakistan signed up to resignation that Kashmir would thenceforth be a bilateral issue. Since Simla, UN secretaries-general have privately and even publicly conceded that the UN resolutions of the 1940s and 1950s calling for a plebiscite are now ‘obsolete’. Time consolidates territory captured long ago with the weight of history. Time also consolidates the inertia of the international community that, with good reason, believes in recognising long-established international borders as inviolate, however unjustly drawn, for the sake of stability and war prevention.
India can also look back with satisfaction to the passing with time of a situation in which the United States was its adversary and an ally of its enemy, Pakistan. Today, the United States is more strongly allied to India than to Pakistan, largely because of the way Pakistan has played its security politics. The year 1999 also saw the watershed of the first Pakistan–India war in which China did not back Pakistan and supported US diplomacy for an unconditional Pakistani withdrawal. Beyond these great powers, India has more diplomatic friends than ever; Pakistan fewer than ever.

A former leading Indian defence official argued that India is more stoic than Western countries. In Kashmir, it has lost five times the number of troops lost by the United States in Afghanistan, but the official said these losses do not attract headlines in Indian papers: ‘Ability to absorb pain delivers power to India’ (Defence interview, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101208). All these arguments seem to converge on the analysis that all India need do is stay the course and pretend to engage in peace chatter now and then, always contriving disengagement before any unsettling of the status quo occurs. Kashmir may have come at a large price for India, but it has blooded India into a much more feared regional military power than the pacific state with a low defence budget in which Nehru believed. With India’s burgeoning GDP, the economic burden of Kashmir is less painful every year.

So, it seems peace hits a realist impasse. Not so in our analysis, in spite of all we have just said. India might cling to all these benefits that time has already delivered as it engages with a future peace process. But India can now move on to securing new benefits. Among these are taking the diplomatic respect it currently enjoys to an even higher plane as a peacemaker. Thereby, it could become a deserving Permanent Member of the UN Security Council. Another is slashing the fiscal burden of a million security sector employees in Kashmir. Another is creating its own region as peaceful; this is a contemporary requirement for a nation to become a great power. Disintegration or humiliation in Pakistan strengthens the hand of militant jihadists in ways that threaten regional peace and India’s security. China matured into this realisation after it settled its savage 29-day border war with Vietnam in 1979, which took tens of thousands of lives.40 If India wants to be a great power, it must show the regional maturity towards Pakistan that Deng Xiaoping and his successors showed with Vietnam after 1979.

40 The 1979 war between these former allies against the United States was another cascade from the Great Indochina War. China saw the war as necessary because it perceived Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia as part of a Soviet scheme to encircle China with Moscow’s allies (Zhang 2015: Ch. 8).
There is another central strand to the Indian ‘time is on our side’ analysis. With time, the resistance and will to independence inside Kashmir will be worn down and surrender to reality. Yet, this has not happened. Kashmiri opposition to integration within India has been much more widespread and heartfelt since 1987 than it was in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, 1970s and the first seven years of the 1980s. Young Muslims in the Kashmir Valley today are more ready than ever to sacrifice their lives through nonviolent or violent resistance—through whatever means it takes.

Subjectively, Kashmiris believe they have been discriminated against by the Indian state. Objectively, the people of Kashmir have been denied their rights under international law, denied rights to self-determination through a referendum that was repeatedly reaffirmed by overwhelming UN votes, repeatedly promised by prime minister Nehru in the years before and after Partition and affirmed by India’s signature on the 1948 peace agreement to end the first Kashmir war. Objectively, Kashmiris have suffered six decades of crimes against humanity, including mass murder and mass rape (Khan 2010: 108), detention without trial, disappearances, torture and electoral fraud. The quantitative cross-national evidence is strong on the effects of this kind of domination: state-led discrimination against a people (as opposed to ethnic conflict that is not congealed as state discrimination) is a profound predictor of political instability (Goldstone 2008: 5; Gurr 2000).

The evidence is even stronger that war recurs when there is a combination of: a) state discrimination against a people; with b) long periods of military brutality against them; and with c) the blockage of genuine opportunities for a voice that might resolve grievances (Braithwaite et al. 2010a; Walter 2004). We have shown that Kashmiris have had their voice blocked through the ballot box, through the courts and through peace dialogues in which they were parties whose voices were not heard. Pakistan has not been voiceless in international forums and peace negotiations, but the majority of the people of Kashmir—who want neither Pakistan nor India—have been voiceless. The people of Kashmir have suffered these three conditions in an unusually long-term way. So the structural preconditions for Kashmiris giving up on their resistance are not propitious. Our interview evidence from the ground is that they will not give up. If India wants to avoid the fiscal drain of a million security
personnel in Kashmir\footnote{One million if we include military, police of various kinds, special police officials and village defence committees.} for the next six decades, it had better rethink its ‘time is on our side’ analysis. If it does not like the indignity of cricket matches at which Indian citizens boo the Indian team and cheer India’s adversary,\footnote{It was alleged in our interviews that former West Indies cricket captain Viv Richards said that his team never enjoyed as much support from the crowd in the West Indies as it did in a game at Srinagar. The Srinagar authorities were forced to respond to the problem of the crowd throwing their sandals at Indian cricketers by requiring that spectators leave their sandals at the entrance and watch the game barefooted! In 2014, the Meerut police brought sedition charges against a group of Kashmiri students for supporting Pakistan against India during an Asia Cup match.} it had better not schedule any in Kashmir.

We suggest India might take a page from its own history and engage in a genuine political dialogue with the \textit{azadi} parties of Kashmir (along with the pro-India parties) in the way it did with the Dravidian separatists of Tamil Nadu.\footnote{The movement for Dravida Nadu (a wider southern Indian state) was at its height from the 1940s to the 1960s, but, due to fears of Tamil hegemony, it failed to find any support outside Tamil Nadu.} That means deep dialogue not just with handpicked elites. The international experience is that ‘autonomy arrangements that are negotiated in a democratic and participatory fashion have a higher rate of success than those which merely end up being inter-elite bargains’ (Ghai 2000: 160)—that is, the slow-food approach to peace, with justice and democracy checked by genuine separation of powers (Boege 2006; Braithwaite et al. 2012). Dravidian identity, like Bengali identity, was no less separate from the Hindi/Hindustan Indian identity than Kashmiri identity. The Indian National Congress did not afflict the Dravidian separatists with decades of torture and disappearances. It did not wipe out families because their son supported Dravidian armed resistance. Far from discriminating against them, India discriminated in favour of Dravidians by, for example, allowing them the privilege of writing their laws and conducting their justice and their education in a Tamil voice. By allowing the Tamil separatist parties to contest elections that were not rigged, India converted them into self-determination and autonomy parties for the relatively autonomous Indian state of Tamil Nadu. Difficult as it would be, if India now wants to build on the gains it has won in Kashmir, the Tamil Nadu path is one it might ponder.

There are some positives in the current peacebuilding context. The people of Kashmir want a peaceful solution and are weary of killing. The diplomatic relationship between India and Pakistan was set back in
2008 and considerable shooting and displacement of people are occurring at the time of writing, but the diplomatic relationship is better than it was in the twentieth century. The youth of both countries are in favour of India–Pakistan dialogue and reconciliation. Political leaders who grasp that future will have a special place in South Asian history. Across all of Pakistan there is cross-cutting acceptance, including in the military, that Indian military superiority and an utter absence of international support mean Pakistan can never wrest Kashmir from India. The Pakistani political class generally accepts that adventurism in its relationship with India strengthens both the Pakistani military and jihadist groups that are also a threat to Pakistan itself.

While many Pakistani military leaders continue to support retention of its jihad terror card, they have now come to terms with the limits of the ‘bleed India’ strategy and the folly of thinking that India might quit Kashmir in the way the Soviet Union quit Afghanistan. On the other hand, Pakistan can now see the fact that securing regional peace is a step India must take towards becoming a great power, that only Pakistan can deliver India this regional peace and that this is a splendid bargaining chip for Pakistan. There would be great economic benefits for Pakistan in a sustainable regional peace.

The international community, in turn, must reframe its thinking about interests to see that a genuine peace process that is clearly in the interests of Pakistan and the people of Kashmir now might also be redefined to fit the interests of India in the terms just argued. The international community might consider letting go of the glib realism that sees a referendum as being off the table because India is the more powerful party, because India does not want it or because history has proven it a nonviable option. India is not more powerful than concerted US–EU–Chinese–Pakistani–Kashmiri pressure for sustainable peace between Pakistan and India, combined with pressure from a peace movement within Indian civil society. Referendum options that are put back on the table are not necessarily options that will prevail. But unless a referendum is allowed back on the table in some form, as an option legitimated by the integrity of international law, not one of the many spoiling azadi parties on both sides of the Line of Control will come to the table.

Once all the players are at that table, India’s position will be strong. It knows Pakistan will not support independence for Kashmir, that the United States will not want a new Islamic state in Central Asia and
that China is adamantly opposed, believing independence for Kashmir could encourage a Muslim uprising in Xinjiang and independence demands in Tibet (Ganguly 1997: 144). India has many alternatives to independence for Kashmir that it can also table for discussion. It can promise to withdraw half a million troops from Kashmir and reform its police force. It can promise to release all political prisoners. It can establish a Kashmiri-controlled anticorruption commission and a truth and reconciliation commission. A Kashmiri-controlled electoral commission is something Professor Abdul Gani Bhat of the Hurriyat Conference has suggested is critical to the Hurriyat interpretation of ‘self-rule’ (Wani 2011: 142)—‘self-rule’ being the heart of General Musharraf’s earlier ‘enlightened moderation’ formula (Musharraf 2006). India might promise to reinstate all of the autonomy provisions Nehru negotiated with Sheikh Abdullah 60 years ago that it has since wound back. Or it could offer Kashmiris the opportunity to write their own constitution a second time (Ganguly 1997: 149). It might explore the ‘protectorate option’ of Amitabh Mattoo in which the Kashmir Valley would be turned into a protectorate in which India controlled only defence (Ganguly 1997: 144). It could explore what Sumantra Bose (2005: 248–61; 2010: 220) has called a ‘cascading autonomy’ response to cascades of violence, an autonomy within autonomy or a federation within a federation, where Jammu would enjoy much more autonomy within J&K than it does today, and also perhaps Leh and Kargil could enjoy more autonomy.

India can promise international supervision of elections, even UN supervision (as opposed to supervision by Indian electoral institutions), until such time as the legitimately elected J&K parliament votes by a two-thirds majority to reinstate its faith in the rule of Indian electoral law. Instead of agreeing to change the border, after an agreed period of sustained peace, it could agree to make the border irrelevant, porous—dismantling the Gaza-style fence Israel assisted it to build along the length of the Line of Control, allowing visa-free travel across that border, customs-free trade across it and a resumption of traditional Kashmiri trading relationships with Lahore, exploiting the cheaper transport costs of export through Karachi (rather than through Indian ports). India can propose special development assistance to Kashmir that is much cheaper than half a million troops. It could be funded by the tourism and trade benefits a peaceful Kashmir would deliver to India. Through suggesting some package of such things as an alternative to independence, India
could stand tall with an enhanced international reputation if the effect of this was to force Pakistan to promise similar things to Kashmiris on the Pakistani side of the Line of Control.

There would be dignity for azadi parties in the Kashmir Valley if their struggle with India allowed them to believe that their sacrifices had led them to secure a greater degree of self-determination for Kashmiris inside Pakistan as well as for themselves. Pakistan might back down with dignity from its claim to all of Kashmir if it can say to its people that it has extracted promises of deep autonomy and freedom from oppression for Muslims in Indian Kashmir. Both Pakistan and India could take pride in creating greater freedom for Kashmiris on the opposite sides of the Line of Control, and their electorates might embrace that narrative of peace and freedom. In short, there are rich pluralities of options for Pakistan, India and Kashmiris to craft a peace agreement into a win–win–win contracting space.

The challenge is persuading India to reframe its ‘time is on our side’ analysis to ‘time has been on our side and now we can imagine an even better future, a just and peaceful one’. Indian political will to do that reframing against the resistance of its military hawks, its Hindu radicals and the extremist nationalist elements of its media must come from its own civil society and from the international community. So why should the international community care enough to pressure Shining India, geopolitically potent India, in that way?

Kashmir approaches Palestine as an enduring source of grievance in the Muslim world. Grievances that motivate international terrorism need to be resolved one by one, starting at the top of the list with the oldest, seemingly most intractable conflicts in Palestine and Kashmir. For most of the past quarter-century, Pakistani-administered Kashmir and its region have been a more important and longstanding base for the international export of terrorism than Palestine or any other node of terrorist training. Perhaps no other tinderbox has caused senior officials of the CIA to write analyses that a greater risk of nuclear conflict resides here than existed at the

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44 Azad Kashmir has its own president and prime minister, but, in practice, it has been under the control of Pakistan’s Ministry for Kashmir Affairs, with northern areas under the control of the Force Commander Northern Areas—notwithstanding the 1979 establishment of the elected Northern Areas Council.
time of the Cuban Missile Crisis. No other nuclear power confrontation has been so characterised by brinkmanship and miscalculation (especially on the Pakistani side) and by regulation of nuclear weapons ill disciplined enough to pose a risk of nuclear terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan’s nuclear competition has increased the nuclear risks in a diversity of non-proliferation states as worrying as North Korea, Libya and Iran. The only historical precedent of two nuclear powers directly fighting each other was the minor Sino–Soviet border clashes of 1969 that cost fewer than 100 lives and have not recurred. ‘They [Pakistan] say if the Karachi Stock Exchange crashes, we reserve the right to conclude that it is an Indian conspiracy to cause the crash. That’s scary’ (Interview with Indian participant in Track II diplomacy, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101231).

It follows that the international community has betrayed future generations by failing to persistently confront India with these global security facts to coax and caress a Kashmir peace. As Snedden (2012: 247) points out, a creative approach to Kashmiri ownership of a local peace process could transform Kashmir from diabolical obstacle to a bridge for a wider India–Pakistan peace and reconciliation. The international community’s failure has been driven by inertia that India has brilliantly orchestrated. Dazzling as the Indian diplomacy has been in persuading the world that domination is democracy, that the status quo is immovable, this status quo can be moved if the international community persuades India that it will be better off when it moves onwards and upwards from it. Its children will be safer from terror and from fear of nuclear catastrophe. When it calls out the charade of democracy in Kashmir, India’s democracy will be safer from corrosion within, from falling prey to its own spin. Checks and balances that protect democracy are strengthened when they crunch a country’s hardest cases. So, the right thing for the international

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45 The very short missile flight time from each country to major cities in the other conduces to greater risk of miscalculation than was seen in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vice-Admiral Verghese Koithara (2004: 111) finds that ‘as far as continuous real-time monitoring of the opponent’s nuclear delivery systems is concerned, both sides are effectively blind. This places a heavy premium on strategic warning. Relying on strategic warning without corroboration from nuclear specific technical intelligence can lead to miscalculations’. Other Western states have been as concerned as the Americans about regional nuclear and domestic terrorism risks alike. According to Wikileaks, on 18 July 2008, a senior British official told the Americans that ‘stabilising Kashmir is important for the UK’s domestic security reasons’ (L. Puri 2011: 64).

46 One senior Indian military officer argued that, in the event of diversion of nuclear assets to non-state actors in Pakistan, it would be unwise for India to intervene because of nuclear provocation risks, and therefore: ‘The US must have some plan to take control of advanced nuclear assets [in Pakistan] if they fall into the hands of terrorists’ (Interview in New Delhi, 2012, No. 101205).
community is to lobby for Indian succession to permanent membership of the UN Security Council, conditional on India doing what is in its national interests to do and what international law obliges it to do in Kashmir.

It is not for us or for the international community to say for which of a wide plurality of possible options the political leaders of Kashmir, Pakistan and India should opt. We do not express any view for or against independence. We simply urge a genuine peace process that leads to a deep Kashmir–Pakistan–India peace agreement. The United Nations should move Kashmir back to a central place on its agenda because such an agreement is feasible with international diplomatic imagination. This would prove to Muslim youth globally that the world is serious about grappling with the longstanding humiliations used to justify violent jihad imaginaries. And it would be redemptive of a terrible history of UN failure of the people of Kashmir. The United Nations, the West, India and Pakistan can all humbly seek reconciliation with the suffering of the people of J&K.

Recognising cascades to end them

Let us, then, list 26 different kinds of cascades considered in this chapter.

1. The Partition of India and Pakistan resulted from a variety of deliberate political and violent tactics by the British Raj to divide the minority Muslim community from the Hindu majority in the self-rule movement (Dutta 2012). Religious animosities that were prized open failed to preserve colonial rule, and instead cascaded to violence. This started with the British defeat of the 1857 rebellion, which ‘damaged the syncretic, tolerant, and sophisticated culture and composite Hindu–Muslim Indo–Islamic civilisation that the Mughal court under the last emperor had fostered’ (Dalrymple 2007; see also Lange and Dawson 2009). At Partition, violence was greatest in Punjab, where the Raj, during and after the mutiny, concentrated its recruitment of ‘martial races’ as mercenaries to be set against the ethnic other (Proposition 3).

2. As Partition approached in 1947, communities became fearful about where India would end and Pakistan would begin. That fear became a resource for violence entrepreneurs who mobilised around it to attack, rape, murder and drive out the religious other (Proposition 3).
3. A contagion of communal violence occurred as violence entrepreneurs in one part of the country emulated the scripts learnt in other parts of greater India (Proposition 2).

4. This contagion made many communities feel they were in a security dilemma: if we do not drive them out to create the fact on the ground that our district is dominated by our religious group, the religious other will soon drive us out (Proposition 5).

5. Muslim refugees cascading from India to Pakistan, and Hindus from Pakistan to India, travelled long distances to areas where they became the ethnic other. Refugee camps created hardships, and food and land shortages for locals in many districts where refugees settled. This resulted in cascades of ethnic violence, sometimes years or decades later, between refugee communities and the local ethnic group (Proposition 6). The worst example was the case of the Biharis who migrated to East Pakistan in 1947, where they suffered marginalisation. During the civil war of 1971, Biharis worked with the Pakistani army to slaughter thousands of Bengalis against whom they had local grievances. In turn, Bengalis slaughtered thousands of Biharis inside Bangladesh when they won the upper hand.

6. Leaders in the Kashmir Valley campaigned successfully to resist this cascade in 1947. But in Jammu, where Muslim and Hindu numbers were more equal, mass slaughter of Hindus by Muslims and of Muslims by Hindus cascaded, leaving most districts of Jammu overwhelmingly Hindu, with some surviving Muslim enclaves.

7. Pakistan sent irregulars (Pashtun tribesmen) led by military officers initially to areas where fellow Muslims were being driven out of Jammu, particularly Poonch and Rajouri. They recruited local mujahidin for an uprising to take all of J&K for Pakistan. They marched on Srinagar, defeating the maharaja’s army in battle after battle (Proposition 3).

8. This externally accelerated internal insurgency quickly cascaded to a full-scale war between the Pakistani and Indian armies and air forces for more than a year of fighting in 1947–48.

9. This war cascaded to three further Pakistan–India interstate wars across the 1948 Kashmir ceasefire line—in 1965, 1971 and 1999—and countless minor incursions that led to loss of life, artillery exchanges and downing of aircraft, plus crises that nearly led to full-scale wars between India and Pakistan in 1983–84, 1986–87, 1990 (Sidhu 2000) and 2002. The fifth and bloodiest cascade has been the
insurgency within Indian-administered Kashmir from 1990 to the present. While it was a civil war, when the local insurgency faltered, Pakistan sent in new waves of foreign mujahidin from Afghanistan and other parts of Pakistan.

10. Violence in Kashmir cascaded from the Cold War. ‘India and Pakistan could not be in the same Cold War camp’ (Interview with retired Indian general, New Delhi, 2012, No. 101204). Arms, training and diplomatic support were received from the United States, the Soviet Union and China (including nuclear arms in the last case) when belligerents adopted aggressive positions. Great powers repeatedly refused to seize opportunities for peace during the first 40 years of the Kashmir conflict for fear that doing so could offend a vital South Asian Cold War ally.

11. The rapid militarisation of Pakistan (the topic of the next chapter) therefore cascaded to the greatly increased militarisation of India, especially in Kashmir. Obversely, India’s acquisition of nuclear weapons cascaded to Pakistan doing likewise and, in turn, that cascaded nuclear secrets between Pakistan, North Korea, Myanmar, Libya and Iran (Proposition 8).

12. When interstate war was on the boil, internal insurgency in Indian Kashmir was energised (notably in 1965 and 1971, although not very successfully, and in 1988–89 and 1999, more successfully). When internal insurgency was unusually active, interstate military tensions escalated.

13. Pakistan-trained armed insurgency cascaded to the formation of competing local militias that were pro-independence rather than pro-Pakistan. When these local jihadist groups became dominant between 1989 and 1994, Pakistan responded by cascading the creation of new jihadist groups that followed its orders. Fighting flared between these competing groups. More recently, leaders of major insurgency groups have declared themselves for neither Pakistan nor independence but for Al-Qaeda or the caliphate of Islamic State (Safi 2017). The increasingly fragmented insurgency was rife with spoilers who would kill jihadist leaders who participated in ceasefires, negotiations or even talks about talks (Proposition 2).

14. Sponsorship of jihad by the Pakistani state, to energise and communalise jihad inside Kashmir through attacks on Hindus and Sikhs, as well as on Indian security forces, cascaded to privatised
jihad with insurgency increasingly funded by private religious groups in Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and diverse Gulf state business benefactors (Siskand 2001).

15. Pakistan decided to destabilise India indirectly when it could not succeed directly in Kashmir by supporting various insurgencies in Punjab and in north-eastern India through the provision of arms, training and safe havens for infiltration from Pakistan. These, in turn, cascaded horizontally from insurgency to insurgency and vertically (as in the Assam insurgency cascading down to the Bodo insurgency, cascading to one Bodo faction fighting another) (Proposition 2). Pakistan also supported some Maoist insurgencies, which were also designed to cascade from state to state (facilitated by the movement of weapons and insurgents across the linked up ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone’). The Punjab civil war cost 25,000 lives (Singh 1996), although none of these separatist wars delivered on the intent of contributing to the breakup of India.

16. A cascading of support for separatist insurgency inside Pakistan by India (particularly in East Pakistan and Balochistan) and terrorist bombings in major Pakistani cities organised by Indian intelligence operatives—in retaliation for Pakistan’s support for insurgency inside India—contributed to the splitting asunder of Pakistan with the independence of Bangladesh (Proposition 2). This war cost more than 1 million lives and the mass rape of hundreds of thousands. It also contributed to Pakistan’s current instability.

17. Chapter 6 argues that the humiliation of Pakistan’s military defeat in Bangladesh motivated a restoration of Pakistan’s martial dignity by all-out war in Balochistan during the 1970s (this lays one foundation for revision of Proposition 8 to 8(a) in Part III).

18. Some of the more than 100 Kashmiri jihad groups mutated into organised criminal gangs (Proposition 9). Others defected to become ‘renegade’ militias in the pay of the Indian deep state, who killed people India did not like and civilians the ‘renegades’ did not like, and who raped ruthlessly (Proposition 9).

19. By far the most deadly escalation was of internal Indian state violence, though there was also some Pakistani military violence against Kashmiri elements inside Pakistan who did not submit to the ISI’s orders. Indian military violence converted waves of Kashmiri families to support for the azadi jihad. In turn, as the jihad grew from 1987, Indian military violence ratcheted up further in response, with
security force deployment doubling from the level of the 1980s, then
doubling again by the mid-1990s and doubling again in response to
subsequent surges (Proposition 8).

20. Another cascade of this sort was in the recruitment of informers in
the pay of the Indian security services. This, in turn, cascaded to
assassinations of those alleged informers (Proposition 9).

21. Another insidious cascade was formed by the fake encounters
contrived by police who wanted to collect a ‘blood promotion’
by killing an alleged militant who was supposedly resisting arrest
(Proposition 9).

22. The atmosphere of anomic violence provided cover for other kinds of
revenge killings or for the settling of longstanding property disputes
by driving individuals off their land (Proposition 7). Crime rates
increased; domestic violence surged. A revenge culture and what
Kashmiris called a ‘gun culture’ took hold (Proposition 9). Both
civil society and the security forces imbibed this revenge culture.
Durkheimian anomie was also associated with a massive spike in
self-violence and depression, the levels of which had previously been
very low: suicide rates may have soared as much as twenty-six-fold in
the Kashmir Valley after the 1989 insurgency (Pandit 2011: 210–13).
Suicide and trauma impacts seem to be the worst in rural areas of
Kashmir. Adverse mental health impacts that cascade from witnessing
atrocity in Kashmir seem to be at least as great—and probably
worse—as those from surviving it (DasGupta 2012) (Proposition 7).
Ghobarah et al. (2003) show, in cross-national data, that suicides
(and homicides) increase after nations experience civil wars and
that increased rates of homicide cascade after the war to countries
contiguous to the one that has experienced a civil war (Proposition 9).

23. Another statistically minor but politically notable form of crime
that has cascaded from these roots of communal violence in South
Asia is political assassination. Mohandas Gandhi, Indira Gandhi
and Rajiv Gandhi—half the leading political figures of India’s first
half-century—were killed by assassins. Former Pakistani prime
minister Benazir Bhutto was shot, probably by the Pakistani Taliban,
following the fate of her brothers Murtza (shot by an assassin) and
Shahnawaz (poisoned, presumed assassination). Former Pakistani
president Musharraf survived several serious assassination attempts
by Islamist extremists. His predecessor and successor, Nawaz Sharif,
has also survived several assassination attempts. Pakistan’s first prime
minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, *Quaid-i-Millat* (Father of the Nation), in the aftermath of recriminations over the foreign policy mistakes that led to the loss of Kashmir and the conduct of the 1947–48 war with India, was killed by an Afghan assassin’s bullet in 1951. Afghan intelligence, which has not been contradicted by the US Government, concluded that Pakistan’s ISI organised the Haqqani network’s attempt to assassinate Afghan president Hamid Karzai in 2008 (Rubin 2008). In the next two chapters, we argue that the cascades of violence that start in the narrative of this chapter cascaded to the assassination of the first two Bangladeshi leaders. Many state, province and district political leaders, and many judges and prosecutors, have also been assassinated in India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Afghanistan (Proposition 9).

24. The wars in which Pakistan attacked Indian-administered Kashmir gave India an excuse to acquire nuclear weapons. This cascaded to Pakistan doing the same, which cascaded to an internal nuclear terrorism risk inside Pakistan as the country became increasingly unstable.

25. Insurgency in Kashmir predated the creation of the State of Israel and the communist regime in Afghanistan. Scripts such as jihad, martyrdom, stone-pelting and intifada have been transplanted from one insurgency to another in mutually reinforcing narratives of Muslim oppression by imperial powers and religious domination by Hindus, Christians and Jews (Proposition 2). Northern Pakistan became a node of mujahidin training for Kashmir from 1947, later for Afghanistan and finally for a global jihad in which training was acquired for jihad from Indonesia to the United Kingdom and in countless other corners of the world. When the Kashmiri jihad became less energised, struggles in Palestine and Afghanistan re-energised it, as the ham-fisted war on terror created a community of shared fate among all jihadist groups. It was this community of shared fate that enabled the bold imaginary of a global Islamic State.

26. When global jihad spiked, communal violence in India—the starting point of our cascade—also spiked. The killing of dozens of Hindus in Gujarat and the killing of thousands of Muslims in retaliation in Gujarat in 2002 came soon after the 11 September attack on New York. This was the most bloody case of Muslim–Hindu
violence since Partition. This cascade was not limited to India; 2002 was also the peak year for terrorist bombing incidents in the history of Indonesia (at least as far back as the statistical record goes) (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 14).

It is important to stand back to see how long and variegated is this list of ways that violence begets violence. The longevity of the list helps us recognise that the cascading has continued for 70 years. By listing them this way, we also begin to see that one cascade interlocks with a predecessor. It is clear from our narrative that we do not see cascade dynamics as the only dynamics that drive each of these cascades forward. Each cascade is embedded in a web of factors that includes many non-cascade drivers. In addition, we get glimpses in this chapter of how cascades of violence are connected to a related kind of cascade: cascades of militarisation. In the next two chapters, on Pakistan and Bangladesh, we explore in more detail how cascades of militarisation lead to cascades of violence, which lead to further militarisation and to hawkish politics. We come to interpret this as a more general dynamic of cascades of domination and cascades of violence intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement.

Recognising the diversity and persistence of cascade dynamics is a corrective to single-level objectives such as regime change in Iraq, which are then evaluated as successes or failures according to whether that single-level change occurs. We would prefer an evaluation methodology more like this one, which seeks inductively to reveal and follow all that cascades from an initial military response. Another possibility that has been explored is opening out to a methodology that charts where confidence-building peacemaking has failed. This invites exploration of contexts in which grand bargains might be considered.

**India Shining or shaking?**

On balance, India has a good record of democracy-building and peacebuilding. A persistent disaster such as Kashmir must be balanced against larger triumphs such as the peaceful and democratic integration of Tamil Nadu into India. It should be balanced against many insurgencies in the north-east of the country that were managed with excessive force at

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47 Some have emphasised that this incident was a pogrom and not a communal riot, as Muslims were particularly targeted.
first, but in the end allowed reintegrative, responsive political solutions to trump brutal ones. Yet we also find that India today is a more militarised state than it was during Nehru’s long rule. Kashmir is an important reason for this (Proposition 8). We also find merit in Kohli’s (1990, 1998) analysis that institutional checks and capacities of Indian democracy have been hollowed out to a degree. Militarised competition with Pakistan has been a contributor to this.

The great contest of global politics today is no longer between socialism and neoliberal capitalism, but between liberal capitalism and the authoritarian models of capitalism in Russia, China and much of Asia that have outperformed liberal capitalism since the financial crash of 2008. This and the fact that India is the large swing state in that contest mean that South Asian wars and terrorism—that push India to more authoritarian, more militarised models of capitalism—are a concern. Step by step, India can continue to struggle against its colonial legacies to become a democratic, peace-loving Permanent Member of the UN Security Council that leads the world towards some kind of contemporarily relevant amalgam of the visions of Gandhi and Nehru for peace with justice, for the suppression of *gulami*. Liberation from *gulami* in Kashmir is important enough to be one entry ticket to that future Indian global leadership.

A peaceful institutionalisation of genuine democracy and meaningful self-rule in Kashmir is therefore important not only for more global concerns about nuclear security, for harmony and free trade among Pakistan, Bangladesh, India, Afghanistan and beyond, but also for the future of capitalism and democracy globally. Kashmir is a fissure that continues to transform India Shining to India–Pakistan–Bangladesh shaking towards more authoritarian, militarised futures. Kashmir shows that democracy is no peace potion. Indeed, it shows that elections can be a profound threat to peace. Democratic forms and appearances can be captured by the darkest tyrannies and the most brutal violence. Yet, those J&K National Conference delegates who gathered in 1944 to draft a constitution for an independent Kashmir seemed to have the political instincts required for peace with justice when they aspired to democracy with *azadi* that conquers a history of *gulami* and of domination. Without restoring integrity to democracy in Kashmir, South Asian peace and free trade are a hollow hope. Kashmir is key to Indian leadership that shines freedom globally.
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