This chapter affirms the broad conclusion that the cascade lens is strategic for averting large geopolitical errors and little local ones that can ignite fires that spread afar. Proposition by proposition, its assessment of our 10 starting propositions is more qualified. Cascades theory remains no more than a program of work for inductive theory development.

Our hope is that, for research questions such as how cascades work, inductive evolution not only of processual understanding but also of the definition of the analytic concepts themselves is advanced by the attempt to describe a holistic narrative of how violence cascades within and between societies. Can researchers manage a convincing narrative of the cascading of violence across a whole region? And can they manage to reject some unconvincing alternative narratives in so doing? Inability to give affirmative answers to both questions is one way of invalidating the cascade account.

1 Readers will have noticed that, rather than define all theoretical concepts at the beginning of this book, we defined only a few key ones up front, allowing the conceptualisation of other concepts to emerge inductively from a discussion of the cases. The reality with this kind of causal process-tracing research is that concepts begin the project meaning something less attuned with praxis using those concepts than is the case at project’s end. Social scientists straitjacket qualitative research too much when they shun conceptual ambiguity; it is better to explore and experiment with textures of ambiguity (Levine 1988). Likewise, we have communicated the methodological precepts of our research in small doses as they arise at conjunctures in the narrative that bring those precepts to life. In an era when keyword searches for ‘define’ or ‘method’ coupled with a specific concept are so easy, this seems a more illuminating and less tedious way to make methods important to the research.
Methods for evaluating cascades

One way of evaluating the 10 starting propositions would be to count how many of the eight country cases support each proposition. While an $n$ of 8 is tiny, one could argue the sample is more or less the population of South Asian states. According to the Peacebuilding Compared methodology, however, all this is barking up the wrong tree, or not the best one, because a better quantitative approach analyses armed conflicts rather than country cases. This is because we have seen that many contemporary wars are both subnational and transnational, driven by complex interactions between macro cleavages (including global ones) and very local cleavages. In a case like Kashmir, Peacebuilding Compared quantitative variables are mostly coded for Kashmir rather than for India or Pakistan, and coded for specific Kashmir conflicts involving specific combatants at particular moments in space and time. The conflict in Balochistan—mainly within Pakistan, though with overspills to Iran and Afghanistan, where we have done substantial fieldwork on those overspills—is coded as an armed conflict quite separate from the conflict between the Pakistani state and the Pakistani Taliban.

Ultimately, when we have coded all the Peacebuilding Compared variables for a larger, more representative sample of armed conflicts than the 39 we have preliminarily coded, quantitative analyses will be possible. In important ways, however, the qualitative process tracing (Bennett 2010; Bennett and Checkel 2012; Kay and Baker 2015) in this book is

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2 This connects to a wider epistemological resistance of the authors to organising social science knowledge around knowledge about states, as in political science, or societies, as in sociology. Eric Wolf (2010: 17) argues that no context should be thought of as internally homogeneous and externally segregated. For Wolf (2010: 3), ‘the world of humankind constitutes a manifold, a totality of interconnected processes, and inquiries that disassemble this totality into bits and then fail to reassemble it falsify reality. Concepts like “nation”, “society”, and “culture” name bits and threaten to turn names into things. Only by understanding these names as bundles of relationships, and by placing them back into the field from which they were abstracted, can we hope to avoid misleading inferences and increase our share of understanding’.  
3 Bennett and Checkel (2012) conceive process tracing as a mechanism-based approach to understanding the world that is methodologically plural. They define causal process tracing as ‘the use of histories, archival documents, interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process that a theory hypothesises or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence and values of the intervening variables in that case’ (Bennett and Checkel 2012: 8). Moreover, ‘process tracing [is] the analysis of evidence on processes, sequences, and conjunctures of events within a case for the purposes of either developing or testing hypotheses about causal mechanisms that might causally explain the case … it inductively uses evidence from within a case to develop hypotheses that might explain the case’ (p. 10) and help interpret other cases. Explanations are more convincing to the extent that the evidence is inconsistent with alternative explanations (p. 26). Bayesian logic further
superior to simply counting cases to understand cascades. The number of cases is not the crucial thing for theory development and evaluation because data are not created equal (in probative value). India is not only a bigger society than Nepal, it also has had a significantly larger number of armed conflicts. Bhutan is tiny and has had none, yet it has profound probative value as a case that did not cascade to war. As Chapter 9 argued, it was a methodological error to fail to give it more priority in our original project design, allowing us to be discouraged by its not having had a war and by the notorious difficulty of getting access to do social science research in Bhutan compared with other South Asian societies (Penjore 2013). Evidence blows many straws in the winds of war.4 While most cases might not discriminate between explanations at all, others might be ‘doubly decisive’ in confirming one proposition and simultaneously eliminating many others (Bennett 2010: 5).5

It follows that the quality of inference is based less on the quantity of facts at hand than on the contextual quality of how researchers drill down into processes that unfold into facts. More important still are processes that unfold into other processes that consolidate new configurations of social and political relationships. It also follows that the variable contestability of ‘facts’ can be productively viewed through different lenses. Moreover,

indicates that ‘process tracers should seek diverse and independent streams of evidence’ consistently with the idea of triangulation of data sources and types (p. 31). Its method questions theories that fail to explain cases in which it is most likely to apply (most likely cases) and expands the interpretative scope of theories that succeed in explaining cases in which it is least likely to apply (least likely cases) (Eckstein 1975).

4 Chapter 2 illustrates that it is no easy matter to discern which are the straws in the wind that provide neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for the onset of war. It is easy to infer that World War I did not cause the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand because his assassination preceded the onset of war. It is quite hard, though possible, to assess the counterfactual of whether World War I would have occurred had the Archduke not been assassinated.

5 ‘Process tracing involves the examination of “diagnostic” pieces of evidence within a case that contribute to supporting or overturning alternative explanatory hypotheses. A central concern is with sequences and mechanisms in the unfolding of hypothesised causal processes. The researcher looks for the observable implications of hypothesised explanations, often examining at a finer level of detail or a lower level of analysis than that initially posited in the relevant theory. The goal is to establish whether the events or processes within the case fit those predicted by alternative explanations. This mode of analysis is closely analogous to a detective attempting to solve a crime by looking at clues and suspects and piecing together a convincing explanation, based on fine-grained evidence that bears on potential suspects’ means, motives, and opportunity to have committed the crime in question … Careful process tracing focused on the sequencing of who knew what, when, and what they did in response … might, for example, establish whether an arms race caused a war, or whether the anticipation of war caused an arms race’ (Bennett 2010: 3–4).
as argued in Chapter 1, inference based on such analysis of contested facts can be combined with counterfactual analysis (Climo and Howells 1976; Fearon 1991; Lewis 1973; Stalnaker 1968; Weber 1949).

Inference based on analysis of contested facts also means subjective logic (Jøsang 2016) software might be used on a full sample to identify on a dynamic map of the world the most likely cascades of violence and whether any pose a plausible risk of cascading to World War III if they are not prevented. It remains to be seen, however, whether our final analysis will be systematic enough by 2030 to allow this. A matrix of the probability of the best-established cascade risks and the confidence in those probabilities—both in fuzzy verbal categories—might be possible. The challenge will be to do this with enough granularity. Subjective logic software that does not assume linearity of effects is developing fast. It allows some variables to be coded quantitatively and in an uncontested way, other variables to be coded qualitatively and in a contested way and other data to be coded ‘don’t know’. With more than 700 variables coded already, data reduction will be needed for input into such an analysis.6

So our final list of cascade propositions in 2030 may be a shortened list compared with the 10 here, or maybe not. Maybe it will be longer, depending on how much complexity the subjective logic analyses of that new era, and we as analysts, will be able to handle. A subjective logic framework (Jøsang 2016) involves a major advance on the present analytic frameworks used by intelligence agencies to warn what our preventive diplomacy priorities should be. Extant models require each piece of circumstantial evidence to be paired with a measure of how reliable it is: its probability.7 Jøsang sees this as flawed because it wrongly assumes a sense of certainty about the reliability of a piece of information. Jøsang (2016) in effect says: ‘What they really ought to say is “we don’t know

6 Recent developments in principal coordinates analysis (multidimensional scaling) for mixed qualitative–quantitative data with holes can be used to reduce the 700-plus variables before hypothesis testing. The nature of the dataset to be input into that analysis will be that some codes will be ‘facts’ (e.g. that a peace agreement was signed), others will be solid consensus interpretations of the facts, others will be coded as speculative and many will be coded ‘don’t know’. A variety of multivariate clustering analyses will answer questions such as: Which combination of five policies when all completed provides the best assurance of preventing the recurrence of war and preventing a high-crime postwar society? If there are only three that can be guaranteed, what is the cluster of three that is most important to fund in different war contexts? Which are the peacebuilding failures that are the strongest predictors of the recurrence of war and high postwar crime rates?

7 I am grateful to discussions with one former Peacebuilding Compared postdoctoral fellow and co-author, Mike Cookson, and to Roger Bradbury for alerting me to the potential of a subjective logic approach to cascades analysis.
this”. However, such input arguments are not permitted in traditional analytical tools.’ His solution is to provide an estimate of how certain each probability is, injecting an extra layer of subjectivity into intelligence analysis and bringing quantification to uncertainty itself.

Subjective logic encourages the analysis of arguments that may be completely uncertain and allows estimates based on such arguments, even though fraught with uncertainty. Jøsang (2016) contends that unless this is done, the uncertainty is swept under the carpet and frail humans become stuck in the preconceived notions that are the cause of so many intelligence failures. These failures can be seen more clearly in retrospect from the invasion of Iraq in 2003 (Jervis 2011) and the intelligence rationale for the appeasement of Hitler.

Tracing cascade processes from Balochistan across to Iran and Afghanistan, when this is a cascade that matters—as we do in Chapter 6—is superior to a nationalism of separate cases for Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Moreover, qualitative analysis of many cascades contained within a single massive country (such as India) contains infinitely more degrees of freedom for inference than might be suggested by an $n$ of 1. In Chapter 7, we discuss the cascades of armed conflicts nested within other armed conflicts right down to subconflicts among different armed factions within the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT). Contemporary civil wars—most dramatically in cases such as the Democratic Republic of Congo—are Russian dolls of wars within wars within wars (Chapter 4).

Chapters 9 and 11 discuss the failure of international comparative analysis to show large quantitative effects of income inequality (measured in certain ways) on the incidence of war. This is put alongside the substantial impact of inequality in intervillage comparative data from 3,857 villages (Nepal et al. 2011). We argued that this was because a cross-national study of inequality effects across, say, 100 societies suffers massive institutional heterogeneity problems with wars of local origin and local resilience. A study of inequality effects for 3,857 villages does not have these institutional heterogeneity problems. This, we argued, was why it contributes results more in accord with our qualitative tracing of causal processes. Communal rioting was what cascaded to interethnic or interfaith armed conflict in many Peacebuilding Compared cases. There are massive degrees of freedom in the qualitative discussion in Chapter 5 of hundreds of communal riots, for example, in the research of Wilkinson (2004), in the discussion in Part II of millions of communal riots across
South Asia or in the comparison of them with communal riots across other large pacified spaces such as China and Indonesia (see, particularly, Chapter 5). We hope such limited uses of quantitative data in this book go to the process-tracing contribution of reflection on what kinds of hybridity between quantitative and qualitative analysis permit doubly decisive inference.

All this means we cannot be myopic about where degrees of freedom to evaluate our propositions have come from in the course of our chapters. In that discursive spirit, let us now summarise what we think we have learned about the propositions across those chapters. The main point of this discursive spirit is not to confirm or refute the propositions—though that is always a possibility—but to refine inductively our sophistication about their complexity. ‘Confirming’ them is especially limited in its meaning when the propositions have partly been developed inductively by reflection on the very data from these case studies. It will become a more meaningful complementary exercise to the research in this book to confirm and refute the propositions when quantitative analysis becomes possible on a much larger number of conflict cases, beyond those within which the propositions were developed.

Notwithstanding all of the above reservations, the Appendix at the end of the book provides a summary country-by-country assessment of all of our cascade propositions for each country case. We do this to make our data more legible to scholars who wish to use them to complement their own country-by-country analyses of armed conflict. The Appendix also provides at least a crude summary of a general pattern of support for the propositions, with 74 of 88 evaluations of the propositions supporting them and not all the other 14 cases that fail to provide support to the propositions refuting them. The most consistent support is across India and Sri Lanka, and the least support is in Bhutan.

One thing that becomes clear from the following empirical summary of what we have found, of what is revealed in tracing the causal processes among these 10 propositions, is that we can see they are interwoven with an intricacy and recursiveness that are not easily captured by focusing on particular arrows that connect one proposition to another. War creates refugees; yet we have concluded qualitatively that refugees recursively make contributions to the ignition of wars. At some future date, perhaps, it will become clear that some particular causal arrows that link one
Evaluating the Propositions

proposition to another are most decisive. For the moment, that seems to push beyond the limits of what we can currently comprehend from our data. Our ideas for such arrows repeatedly failed our counterfactual tests.

The summary that follows under each of the 10 propositions is so short as to do injustice to the complex narratives within our chapters. Still, we suspect readers will benefit at this point from a stocktake that resists repetition of the empirical chapters and of the case made for each proposition in Chapters 3 and 4 and the Appendix. The pages that follow are where we do our best to make the character of the complexity clear. The best way to fully absorb where we have arrived is to jump back and forth between the terse stocktakes of the propositions in this chapter and their elaboration in Chapters 3 and 4 and the Appendix. Shuttling between the summary inductions in this chapter and their more detailed development in substantive chapters is also a good way to read the book. A final stocktake really only comes in 2030 with our final analyses on the full sample of major post–Cold War conflicts. The challenge is important enough to commit to patient long-term data collection and analysis. Yet, on something as important as the prevention of war, we have an obligation to help readers today make sense of such a large complex of data as they jump back and forth between our interim assessment in this chapter and the Appendix, to the motivating assessment of preliminary evidence of major cascades in Part I, to the more detailed narratives of South Asian cascades in each of the chapters in Part II and to our concluding analysis in Chapters 11 and 12. The even bigger obligation will be in 2030 to conclude where the sense-making that follows is wrong.

Proposition 1: As coercion escalates, both deterrence and defiance increase. The deterrence effect exceeds the defiance effect only at high levels of coercion. During the large range of values of coercion when defiance effects are steeper than deterrence, violence cascades.

For India (Chapter 5), we relied in part on Wilkinson’s (2004) quantitative analyses of communal riots that did and did not cascade. This analysis concluded that where policing agencies mobilised prevention and deterrence consistently, they steered away from violence with zero or near-zero loss of life. Going further, in his more fine-grained data for Rwanda and Yugoslavia, Klusemann (2012: 475) found that violence only escalated to major massacres when attackers were allowed to achieve ‘emotional dominance’, and this only passed the tipping point to massacre where:
soldiers accompanied attacks and where assaults started with and relied heavily on gun-fire and grenades in a dramatic show of force. Groups without soldiers and rifles did not achieve much in terms of violence. (Klusemann 2012: 475)

Klusemann concluded that killing is emotionally difficult for most people. An implication of this was that, in Rwanda, brave civilian leaders were sometimes able to pacify killing in their village. Therefore, relatively modest numbers of UN peacekeepers may have been able to deter the seemingly unstoppable slaughter of Rwanda at many of its killing sites.

Wilkinson’s (2004) data on communal riots can be read as data on civil wars that never started in the overwhelming majority of cases where security forces did not support the violence of rioters. The research on the civil war that did start in Indian Punjab, at a cost of 25,000 lives—and its cascade to and from the murder of prime minister Indira Gandhi by a Sikh extremist—is interpreted in Chapter 5 as a deterrence effect that ultimately came to overwhelm a considerable defiance effect. It was quelled by a state that offered both sticks of deterrence and carrots of inclusion to separatists and by a civil society that educated the community about the economic and social benefits of peace. Not a complete or perfect inclusion, perhaps, but enough inclusionary carrots to end the conflict. We see the combination of civil society’s silencing of a violent imaginary and an unwavering deterrence over many years by the security sector that was led by police officer Kanwar Pal Gill (K. P. Gill) in Indian Punjab (Jeffrey 2013).

On the other hand, the jihadist conflicts in Kashmir, Pakistan and Afghanistan have been given an opposite interpretation in our analysis. With the suppression of many South Asian violent jihads, we see considerable state promotion of a jihad imaginary and selective, vacillating deterrence. For example, Chapter 6 identifies wild swings from state support for insurgents in Pakistan to killing and torturing them (and civilians) in heavy-handed military operations; then a swing back to supporting, cajoling and caressing insurgents. This failed to create conditions for deterrence effects that exceed defiance effects.

US drone attacks in Pakistan illustrate the Proposition 1 dilemma of a deterrence that is so episodic and haphazard as to offer little prospect of an outcome other than the promotion of more defiance than deterrence. President Obama surged drone attacks in Pakistan after his first more
cautious year in office, but had completely eliminated them in his final year as counterproductive. Now his successor, Donald Trump, has started them again. Jennifer Carson (2017) has produced the best evaluation to date of high-profile targeted killings in the war on terror. Some targeted killings produce short-term deterrence effects in reducing lethal suicide attacks by the international jihadist movement, some produce a short-term increase in attacks, but most, including the assassination of Osama bin Laden, had no effect. Overall, there is no short-term deterrent effect. Given that lags in some of the defiance effects discussed in this book are much longer than those measured by Carson (2017)—for example, jihadist imaginary effects of US state criminality and increased recruitment to jihadist madrassas turning out active jihadists years later—we should emphasise that part of Carson’s conclusions that suggest this is an unwise policy because most of the targeted killings ‘either had no influence or were associated with a backlash effect’ (p. 191). Carson’s results are consistent with those of Dugan and Chenoweth (2012) on targeted extrajudicial assassinations of Palestinians. Chapter 9 concluded that, up to 2003, or perhaps 2005, deterrence effects on the Taliban exceeded defiance effects, but, after 2005, Taliban defiance clearly exceeded deterrence. This is a nice illustration of the methodological point made in the introduction to this chapter about having many extra degrees of freedom in the qualitative data by being able to see one kind of deterrence effect for one historical period, then a rather opposite deterrence impact for another period.

In Myanmar, the defiance of the Communist Party of Burma decisively collapsed when China withdrew its support for their defiance of the junta. Likewise, in the CHT conflict (Chapter 7), defiance was dampened by the withdrawal of Indian state support for the insurgency and the closing of the refugee camps in India that had sustained the insurgency. With this suppression of defiance, the spectre of Bangladeshi military deterrence became more potent. Bhutan (Chapter 9) also fits an interpretation of Indian hegemony as capable of this kind of pacification dynamic, as does Nepal to a degree. In Nepal and the CHT, we see defiance ascendant followed later by a period in which deterrence is ascendant—the opposite pattern to Afghanistan, where it was deterrence (by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Northern Alliance) that was initially ascendant between 2001 and 2003, while defiance has been ascendant for more than the past decade. Defiance was always going to be ascendant in
Nepal while the parliamentary parties attempted to fight a civil war with the police because they were reluctant to trust the Royal Nepal Army, which was loyal to the king.

In a way, Proposition 1 reveals what we see as the advantages of a discursive process-tracing approach to inference. More so than for most of our propositions, we see a set of times and places where deterrence works and another where it fails. Rather than interpreting a quantitative pattern to conclude that deterrence is therefore a variable of weak explanatory power, we work inductively with the patterns of data to develop a theory of the contexts in which deterrence is powerful and a much wider set of contexts in which it is weak or induces blowback. They are inferences that might be refuted by, for example, more richly detailed empirical analyses of the impact of drone assassinations on specific villages or of exactly how the civil war in Indian Punjab was suppressed.

In sum, Proposition 1 proves to be a proposition grounded in quantitative micro data (Brehm and Brehm 1981; Braithwaite 2018) that is a good fit to qualitative macro patterns of the cascades of violence across South Asia. That said, our grasp of the precise nature of the nonlinear tipping points to mass atrocity in the work of Klusemann (2012: 475), for example, remains limited. Braithwaite (2018) has made a more detailed case for a policy of ‘minimally sufficient deterrence’ and ‘dynamically responsive deterrence’ in response to Proposition 1.

**Proposition 2:** Violence cascades when violent imaginaries are modelled; nonviolent resistance cascades when diffusion of nonviolence grasps the imagination of the public. Both are most likely to occur when architectures of extreme coercion begin to crack or cleavages in a society begin to open.

The jihadist imaginary proved recurrent in its power to cascade violence, as documented in Chapters 5, 6 and 8, as did a Marxist/Maoist/Naxalite imaginary in Chapters 5, 7, 8 and 9. Kashmiri identity was understood as a memory file of imaginaries of domination by India or Pakistan, the British Raj, the Dogra Hindu Maharajas who were sold Kashmir by the British in 1846, the Sikh rulers before the Dogras, the Pashtuns (Pathans) before them, the Mughals from 1586 and imaginaries of _azadi_ (freedom) as resistance to domination (Chapter 5). _Azadi_ is also an imaginary chanted beyond Kashmir by Palestinians during the intifada, on the streets of many countries during the Arab Spring, among Persians...
during the Iranian Revolution of 1979, in the Green Movement against the Iranian regime in 2009 and in Kurdish uprisings against regimes of Persian oppression in Iran and Arab oppression in Iraq and beyond.

The power of the jihadist imaginary is evident in Pakistan’s inability to shut it down. Pakistani intelligence operatives had been effective in turning on and off the tap of terrorist actions by specific armed groups that gave meaning to the jihadist imaginary. Yet, they were utterly incapable of shutting down the violent jihadist imaginary itself. This goes to a general hypothesis about the challenge of regulating cascades of violence that is relevant beyond Pakistan: it is easier to shut down the control of territory by an armed group than it is to shut down the violence that arises from a violent imaginary it effectively promotes. As difficult as it is to win the awful battle against Islamic State being fought in Mosul as we write, it will be much more difficult to shut down Islamic State’s virtual entrepreneurs in Raqqa and the West who connect minds to an imaginary that persuades lone fighters to stay ‘behind the lines’ and launch creative lone-wolf attacks against the West (and China, India and Bangladesh, among other ‘enemy states’).

More optimistically, it is easier for hawks to prevail over advocates of nonviolence and repeatedly take their country into wars. It is harder for them to shut down a Gandhian nonviolent imaginary. How recurrent nonviolence imaginaries are is difficult to assess. Chapter 11 concludes it is a road mostly not taken, but more frequently taken in recent decades than earlier in the twentieth century. Bacha Khan and Gandhi, we conclude, have been critical model missionaries of tactics of nonviolent resistance to oppression. The globalisation of the peace movement owes a debt to them.

This book documents a great diversity of ways cleavages have opened: partition, terrorism, invasions (such as of Afghanistan), communal rioting escalating to civil war (Sri Lanka being a leading instance), violation of indigenous rights (the CHT), broken promises about regional autonomy (Balochistan), language rights and more. Rich creativity in the way violent model mongers have spread their Maoist or jihadist imaginaries to network across cleavages has been chronicled. Growing creativity is also evident among model mongers of nonviolence who agitate, scan and wait for the ripe moment for the surge of the crowd in history. There are tipping points in such surges, such as that seen in the surge of the crowd in Egyptian history on the Qasr al-Nil bridge to push aside police on
6 April 2011. That surge turned the tide against president Hosni Mubarak (Kilcullen 2013: 194–6). Our analytic grasp of how such tipping points are passed is still immature.

**Proposition 3:** Violence cascades through alliance structures when a cleavage motivates mobilisation of alliances or unsettling of power balances.

Chapter 5 argues that a colonial strategy of aligning ‘martial races’ with British military power recurrently unsettled power balances in many parts of greater India. Chapter 6 finds that the flight of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to the Pashtun belt of Pakistan unsettled longstanding hybrid governance arrangements, allowing mullahs and marginalised young men with guns, in alliance with foreign fighters, to seize power from tribal maliks and from the state. In Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement for Uzbekistan (IMU) is a good case study (Chapter 9) of how a cleavage in Uzbekistan can motivate alliances in these other countries and, more recently, in the alliance of the IMU with Islamic State. In turn, we have seen how Islamic State has forged—or claims to have forged—local alliances across the Muslim world and inside all NATO powers, inside China (Xinjiang) and inside Russia (Chechnya). Nepal (Chapter 9) is a case study in the Kalyvas (2003) tradition. We see in Nepal village-level cleavages—between upper-caste landlords and landless lower castes and indigenous women and men—connecting up to state and interstate cleavages that divided the king, the political parties and India. In Chapter 8, Sri Lanka showed how alliances with one’s enemy against a third enemy can cascade violence in ways that intractably and unexpectedly unsettle power balances. Chapter 7 shows how indigenous peoples in the CHT were able to enrol a cleavage between India and Bangladesh to their autonomy project. It also showed how India was able both to enrol indigenous insurgency and to shut it down, depending on what progressed India’s project of domination of Bangladesh. This pattern of switching on and off alliances across micro and macro cleavages was also evident in the relationship between Indian intelligence and the Nepalese Maoists (Chapter 9), as it was in the enrolment of India across Sri Lanka’s cleavages (summarised under Proposition 3 in the Appendix).

As the Appendix summarises, only seven of our eight country case studies support Proposition 3. There are many cleavages in Bhutan, but none of them so substantially unsettles power imbalances as to cascade widespread armed violence.
**Proposition 4:** Disintegration of the capacity of a single legitimate armed force to pacify a space through its domination over all competing armed groups enables the cascading of violence across that territory.

On the one hand, the collapse of Afghanistan into catastrophic cross-cutting violence, which totally destroyed Kabul after the retreat of the Soviets, supports Proposition 4. At the other extreme, so does Bhutan, which was seen in Chapter 9 as largely free of armed conflict because no credible challenge exists to the authority of the national army enforcing a policy that is tightly aligned with that of a regional hegemon, India. Pakistan’s military has more power within the Pakistan polity than Nepal’s army has in Nepal, or the army of any other South Asian state, and few states on the planet have more formidable military power than Pakistan. Yet, that military power has been contested and defeated by a combination of Bangladeshi separatist forces and the Indian military and by jihadists at various places and times, and has been severely contested by Baloch insurgents who have retained control over certain spaces for much of the past 70 years. Our interpretation has been that Proposition 4 gives a good account of why Pakistan has stood out as an ‘extremely violent society’ (Karstedt 2014) during the past decade. It also gives an account of why Sri Lanka preceded Pakistan as the region’s most ‘extremely violent society’ in Karstedt’s data until its frayed monopoly of armed force was re-established during the past 10 years. Sri Lanka no longer has a security sector challenged by the mass desertions it suffered in previous decades. Pakistan disintegrated more than India because it chose too many fights and vacillated with them. Thus, it has become a relatively uncontroversial interpretation to identify the absence of a single legitimate armed force in parts of rural Pakistan as a phenomenon that brought jihadist groups such as the Taliban to power.

In a more complex way, Proposition 4 is also seen in Chapter 9 as explaining how the Maoists in Nepal got into a sufficiently strong position to assume state power for a period. Although India has a profound monopoly of a single legitimate armed force across its vast terrain (Chapter 5), where an enemy such as Pakistan can ally with local cleavages—as it did so potently for a time in Punjab and as it continues to do in Kashmir—terrible brutality can cascade in these locales. Likewise in Myanmar, the formidable military machine of the junta sustained a massively dominant monopoly of armed force across the core of the country, yet suffered many cracks in that monopoly across many
peripheries of the country (Chapter 9), with the widest crack opening where China sustained contestation of the junta’s monopoly of force in Wa State.

**Proposition 5:** Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Chapter 5 is also particularly revealing on this proposition. It shows that while the security services in India normally mobilise rather effectively to subdue threats from the religious or ethnic other, when that capacity was not yet developed (at Partition), security dilemmas fuelled widespread violence. Moreover, when the political masters of the security services in a particular state have a political interest in inflaming violence, the security services fail to shut down security dilemmas. Security dilemmas did not loom as major explanatory factors in our Pakistani case. Baloch insurgents and Bangladesh Liberation War fighters alike saw themselves as taking to arms to push back domination, not because they saw themselves in a security dilemma. This was also true of most of the Maoist groups across South Asia and of the indigenous insurgents in the CHT. The young Marxist revolutionaries of the Janathâ Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) in Sri Lanka during the 1970s and 1980s, however, did view themselves as being in a security dilemma. Nevertheless, across our conflict contexts, the explanatory power of security dilemmas is not strongly recurrent, at least for South Asia, during the past six decades. We cannot think of any other large region of the planet where there have not been clear cases of international peacekeepers securing a security dilemma (Fortna and Howard 2008), but we find none in South Asia. Macedonia is a prominent example, discussed in Part I, where UN peacekeepers prevented the realisation of well-founded fears that the war in Kosovo would cascade into Macedonia, as it had cascaded from Serbia to Croatia to Bosnia to Kosovo.8

We drop Proposition 5 for South Asia in a spirit of caution for the whole Peacebuilding Compared project. In the preliminary coding of 39 armed conflicts up to March 2017, there are only 12 conflicts for which security dilemmas are coded as an important factor in the onset of armed conflict. As in South Asia, so around the globe, security dilemmas are, often enough,

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8 Most of the examples detected in the Peacebuilding Compared data are not so macro and prominent as Macedonia. Because they are much more micro, they are of underestimated importance in the international relations literature (Autesserre 2010).
powerful in explaining patterns of violence. They were tremendously important in massive slaughters such as the onset of World War I and in the Partition of greater India. But, for most contemporary conflicts, they do not seem to count among the most important explanations (so far).

In the next chapter, we argue for a forward-looking ‘cascade mentality’ that asks hard questions about how future escalations of deterrent threats might cascade. An example of an exceptionally hard question for which we should be seeking answers is what will be the cascade effects of drone and robot proliferation in warfare? In particular, what will be the effect on less technologically competitive economies of an era in which millions of dollars, as opposed to billions, may allow sophisticated states such as China, the United States, Japan, Iran and Israel in future to fly, ship and deliver by submarine pods millions of killer robots to invade a country? ‘No blood, little treasure sacrificed’ could be a formula for new cascades of predatory warfare (see Haldi 2003). Would technologically backward countries in the Middle East then see themselves in a security dilemma where they are at risk of Iran’s or Israel’s relentless waves of robots inflicting a low-cost decimation of their conventional defences? Will they then turn to embrace the interpretation of North Korean military strategists who say, as discussed in Chapter 2, that no country with nuclear weapons has ever been invaded? Will they decide that the mistake that landed Libya in its current chaos was to abandon a secret nuclear deterrent trajectory that previously had adversaries in fear of Libya? Will they turn to the interpretation of chaos in post-Saddam Iraq that the 2003 invasion was not caused by his weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program but by the fact that Saddam had dismantled it? Astutely or stupidly, could weak states jumping to such a security dilemma imaginary of the risk of new cascades of drone predation withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty? How can the nuclear non-proliferation regime be strengthened in response to this risk? How can we prevent its collapse if some states respond to waves of new technologies of domination by renouncing the norm against first use of a nuclear option, as Pakistan has already done?

Dropping Proposition 5 from our list and replacing it with a new Proposition 5(a) in the next chapter does not mean the security dilemma is unimportant to cascades of violence. It is simply to say that, after analysing our data, we can definitely no longer see it as among the top 10 patterns of cascading violence in South Asia.
Proposition 6: Refugee and IDP flows further cascade violence. Violence cascades when those displaced by violence displace others from spaces to which refugees flee. Refugee camps become nodes of hopelessness and resentment for those they trap. This makes them ideal recruiting grounds for those with weapons and cash to enrol bereft young refugees into armed groups. In turn, these recruitment practices inside refugee camps make camps targets for atrocity by enemies of the recruiters.

Refugee recruitment to, and targeting for, violence is found to be unquestionably significant in the chapters on India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Myanmar and even for incipient violence in Bhutan. Wars are found to make great contributions to refugee populations and refugee populations to wars. While there may be other variables that are more structurally foundational to the roots of specific conflicts than this one, none of our propositions is more consistently supported as genuinely important in our data. Nepal is the only South Asian exception to Proposition 6, helping explain both war and criminal violence. When one adds the recent European experience of waves of refugees destabilising regimes even as secure as that of German Chancellor Angela Merkel, the stupidity seems clear of wealthy economies declining to support decent housing, education, food, water and health care in many of the first arrival situations from which refugees fled. The insight of Osama bin Laden in providing that support in Pakistan in the 1980s and 1990s seems equally obvious.

Proposition 7: Cascades of violence that disintegrate the capabilities of one legitimate monopoly of force to dominate all other armed groups in a territory create conditions of anomie. No one knows any longer what the rules of the game are; no one knows who is legitimately in charge. Anomie cascades further violence.

Proposition 7 has recently been taken to heart globally in a most disturbing way by Islamic State. We saw in Parts I and II how the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Al-Qaeda in Iraq and various other jihadist, Maoist and other groups in South Asia came to power locally by targeting anomic spaces where rule of law had totally collapsed and chronic violence dominated daily life. The Taliban and other jihadist groups filled that rule-of-law vacuum with the rule of their Sharia law and dominated the space with a local monopoly of violence. The Taliban did not create the anarchic chaos in Kandahar; Al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Levant did not create the anomie and violence in Iraq and Syria. They sought it out and used it to advantage.
Islamic State has moved that strategy beyond one of selecting sites of anomie and exploiting them. That shift is to actively create anomie through disruptive barbarism. Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006) The Management of Savagery: The Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass is a key online text on this paradigm shift. The book finds virtue in the Al-Qaeda strategy of provoking cascades of military responses from superpowers to motivate recruitment and indoctrination of martyrs. This is linked to an attrition theory similar to Proposition 10. However, a kindred theorist for Islamic State, Abu Musab al-Suri, was critical of Osama bin Laden for attacks on superpowers that were so high profile as to cause the defeat of the Taliban in 2001, thus depriving the ‘holy war’ of a precious heartland (Rousseau 2015). The Management of Savagery argues that within Muslim states the imperative is campaigns of constant violent attacks that disrupt the rule of law, exhaust and disintegrate the local governance of violence and provoke state torture and other state abuses that motivate defiance (Proposition 1). As the writ of the state withers under the chaos, ‘savagery’ ensues: ‘management of savagery is defined very succinctly as the management of savage chaos!!’ (Naji 2006: 11).

Savagery is promoted by the various extremes of violence we see in the implementation of this theory by Islamic State. These excesses of bloodlust and beheadings were opposed by the Al-Qaeda leadership, as was the idea of ‘regions of savagery’ (Wright 2014). Jihadists, according to Islamic State proponents of the theory, have a tried and true blueprint to end the savagery: Sharia law, which moves society from the phase in which savagery is intentionally promoted to the calm waters of the new order of Islamic State.

Senior Iranian analysts we interviewed accused Israel and the United States of responding to the chaos of barbarism generated by Salafists with a strategy of ‘managed chaos’ that further exacerbated the chaos—for example, by leading from behind towards regime change in Libya and Syria. Their account starts with the ‘view from Tel Aviv’ that what is happening in Syria is fine because it has crippled one of Israel’s most hated enemies, Assad. Syria provided Israel opportunities to target Hezbollah, weakened Turkey (particularly in relation to Israel’s only regional ally, the Kurds) and contributed to a chaotic Middle East in Yemen and beyond, where most of Israel’s enemies have been fighting each other. The chaos of recent Middle East history has seen so much proxy warfare between Israel’s adversaries—between Iran and Iraq and between Iran and Saudi Arabia—and the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood from power in
Egypt, Saddam Hussein in Iraq and Gaddafi in Libya. Other Iranian analysts, including at the High Security Council, contended that there was a long history of US support for managed chaos in the Middle East to weaken its enemies. During the 1980–88 Iran–Iraq war, they allege, the United States was joined by some European powers who allowed the export of chemical weapons to Saddam Hussein so they could contribute to managed chaos. Western analysts have also articulated the view that US and Israeli strategy was to prolong the Iran–Iraq war, which was weakening the two regimes that they saw as most threatening to their interests in the Middle East (e.g. Alpher 1989; Pelletiere 1992: 111). A policy of managed chaos was why the United States barely criticised Iraq when it desperately resorted to chemical weapons attacks against Iranian troops heavily embedded in civilian populations during periods when Iraq was losing the war. At the same time, the Iranians allege that the United States leaked strategic intelligence and provided other covert support to Iran at times when it was losing the war. The Iran-Contra scandal was articulated as just the part of this that became public when the United States was revealed to be secretly providing weapons to Iran in breach of the arms embargo it had earlier demanded.

One interview with a senior Iranian government advisor went on to contend that the White House tends to think that when chaos is in the interests of Israel, it is in the interests of the United States. The exchange continued:

Iranian strategist: Some accuse Obama of not acting decisively on Syria because many in his administration were attracted to a managed chaos strategy; because they have a similar interest to their ally Israel in managed chaos.

John Braithwaite interjects: Hmm. I find it hard to believe that Obama would have wanted war to continue in Syria, or indeed chaos to continue and the bloodletting to continue across the Middle East, even if some in his Administration might think that way and have a similar view of it to what you call 'the view from Tel Aviv'.

Iranian strategist: Perhaps, or perhaps the presence of this view among his advisors made him more indecisive on Syria. It is wrong to speak of just the power of the Israel lobby [over the White House]. Some of them are the decision-makers and not just a lobby [from outside the walls of the White House]. (Interview in Tehran, 2017, No. 041717)
What is beyond argument is that conditions of extreme anomie are created by contests among some players who have a strategy of barbarism to intentionally produce chaos and others who have a strategy of managed chaos to harness that chaos. Israel and the United States are not the only players who can be accused of toying with a strategy of managed chaos. Russia has done so recently in Ukraine (Husaraov 2016). Our interviews make it clear that Iran has done so itself in Yemen, Lebanon and beyond to give the rest of the world the message that this is how Iran can orchestrate chaos if they do not stop treating it as a pariah regime that must be removed. And Pakistan recklessly promoted managed chaos in Afghanistan—for example, through its sponsorship of the Taliban in the 1990s and, earlier, during the Soviet occupation, through other mujahidin groups in collaboration with the United States. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Labrov (Whitney 2017) has been the most prominent proponent of the view that the US strategy in the Middle East and Libya has been to organise and manage chaos.9

Returning to barbarism as a strategy of chaos, Hussain’s (2013: 17) work shows that Pakistani Taliban strategy bans music and the arts, murders traditional elders and destroys communication networks and social institutions with the intent ‘to create a social vacuum’ in Pakistan. Likewise, the ‘co-opting of criminal gangs’ is used to drive out social order (Hussain 2013: 17). Normlessness is a cornerstone of a savage contemporary militant strategy that succeeds in cascading violence. Across many of our chapters, we have seen that these anomic conditions enable many forms of violence to flourish that have nothing to do with the war or the jihad—for example, revenge over a property dispute or an insult. This cascades to more anomie and more violence. Normatively, our conclusion is to see extreme disintegration of the normative order as dangerous. This is

9 ‘The concept of managed chaos appeared long ago as a method of strengthening US influence. Its basic premise is that managed chaos projects should be launched away from the United States in regions that are crucial for global economic and financial development. The Middle East has always been in the focus of politicians and foreign policy engineers in Washington. Practice has shown that this concept is dangerous and destructive, in particular for the countries where the experiment was launched, namely Iraq, Libya, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan … In Iraq, Syria and Libya, this chaos was created intentionally … Responsible politicians have come to see that the managed chaos theory is destroying life in many regions. Some parties can benefit in the short term from fluctuations on the raw materials markets provoked by the revolutions orchestrated by external forces, but this theory ultimately backfires at its engineers and executors in the form of massive migration inflows, which terrorists use to enter these countries. We can see this in Europe. Terrorist attacks have been staged even in the United States. The Atlantic Ocean has not protected it from the terrorist threat. This is the boomerang effect’ (Sergei Labrov, quoted in Whitney 2017).
not the same as saying that there is virtue in maximising social order or societal consensus over norms. This book finds virtue is in nonviolent strategies for challenging the dominating elements of social order, vice in barbarism as a strategy of disorder and vice in managed chaos as a response to barbarism. Our cascades analysis contends that managed chaos is a dangerous policy because the chaos that great powers believe they are clever in managing repeatedly cascades beyond their control to come back to bite them. Even if that were not true, almost 2 million dead in the combination of the Iran–Iraq and Syrian wars is too high a cost, as was the breakdown of the norm against the use of chemical and biological weapons in war for the first time since the early twentieth century.

We conclude that Al-Qaeda was right to see anomie as something that can be exploited to cascade the power of their violence. Islamic State is astute to see anomie as something that can be created to enable a period when their writ spreads. That is a very different claim, however, from suggesting that they will be able to hold those gains in any historical long run. Geopolitically, the globalisation of jihad enabled the re-election of a weak US president who had come to power in 2001 with the feeblest electoral mandate of any president. That president became a militaristic and authoritarian US leader (Proposition 8) who executed a profoundly unsustainable militarism (Proposition 10). Likewise, the jihad in Chechnya put the blossoming of Russian freedom into reverse with the repeated election of Vladimir Putin to realise his promise to be the strongman who restored Russian greatness by military power, starting in Chechnya (Cronin 2009: 131–7) (Proposition 8). The Putin strongman model is spreading authoritarianism regionally to previous leaders of democratisation and rule of law such as Poland and Hungary. The Bush (and now Trump) and Putin eras of militarism weakened both the United States and Russia, strengthening the rising geopolitical ascendency of China—propelling the world more rapidly towards an era in which the Chinese economy could well become more dominant.

Jihadist terror has therefore worked in turning the strength of great powers against themselves and also against each other. On this account, US diplomat Zbigniew Brzezinski’s bragging that the United States cleverly managed chaos by leading the Russians into the ‘Afghan trap’ through the 1979 Soviet invasion (Chomsky 2002: 40) can be reread as jihadists leading both Russia and the United States to actions that weakened each other through the blood and treasure they successively poured into Afghanistan. An argument of this book is that the geopolitics of the twentieth century
also opened with this dynamic: 19-year-old Bosnian Serb Gavrilo Princip of the Black Hand brought the Habsburg Empire down as a consequence of its militarist response to Princip’s assassination of Archduke Ferdinand. Terror has proved powerful in both centuries because of the cascade of unpredictable actions and reactions to the flailing of a wounded giant (Cronin 2009: 200).

One of the messages of this book is that great powers can be smarter than the Habsburgs, the Bushes and the Putins—overreacting less is more in the long game of responding to terror. It also concludes that anomie can be transcended by good community policing in local spaces. That is what we found the police station reconciliation committees are contributing in small but significant ways to peace in parts of Pakistan (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014).

In Myanmar, it has always been clear who is in charge of the core of the state and what are the rules of the game. The master cleavages opened up by the Communist Party of Burma and the National League of Democracy were rebellions against that clearly articulated order that proposed clearly articulated alternative orders. So Myanmar is the only country case that does not provide support to Proposition 7.

**Proposition 8:** Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation and domination. Militarisation and domination recursively risk further cascades of violence.

A wise observation of Audrey Cronin’s (2009: 204) analysis is that ‘the militarization of counterterrorism strategy can be counterproductive, even if every strategy for countering terrorism requires a military and coercive component’. Cascades of militarisation increase violence in all our country cases, and not only in terms of the direct violence executed by the military. This has never cascaded to war or to a large crime problem in Bhutan, but nor has Bhutan suffered the kind of cascading of militarisation that all our other country cases have experienced, so the Bhutan case actually supports Proposition 8 as well. All the militaries of the region have trained and supported proxy non-state militias to promote violence when the military wishes to turn on that tap. Pakistan is the state that has been most destructive of regional peace through a military intelligence wing that has sponsored terrorism in other countries and even on its own soil. Other South Asian states have followed suit—sometimes in retaliation for Pakistan’s sponsorship of terror in their territory. It is fair
to say that terrorism has globalised as a threat more from South Asia than from the Middle East. The Black Tigers of Sri Lanka have a special place in this global modelling as leading innovators with technologies such as the suicide bombing of ships, security forces and civilians and sophisticated planning of elite assassinations.

With the possible exception of Bhutan, all South Asian militaries have ‘disappeared’ and tortured large numbers of civilians. In every country in South Asia, one of the responses to conflict in society has been militarisation of the police. This has been extreme in Afghanistan and has enabled the police to count among the most efficient, well-armed thieves of the property of civilians in that country. The most extreme case of the militarisation of the police was Nepal, where the police had full responsibility for the conduct of the civil war against the Maoists during most years of that war. The kind of domination that most distinguished police militarisation in Nepal was not theft, as in Afghanistan, but rape, which in turn drove the feminisation of Maoism. ‘Blood promotions’ for police in Kashmir who killed jihadists created an incentive for ‘fake encounters’ in which police claimed to have killed a terrorist when in fact they had opted for the safer path to promotion: killing an innocent. This ‘body count as key performance indicator’ mentality was one reason the US war in Vietnam cascaded to such a bloody defeat. Land grabbing by militaries and police has been an important element of the militarisation of South Asian economies and societies. So has the phenomenon of militaries using their domination of a space to establish commercial monopolies run by them or by businesses owned by individual officers or their families. The militarisation of South Asian economies has contributed to growing police militarisation and competition between the military and police for control. In Kashmir, in Naxal areas in India and in the CHT, we see the police behaving more like the army and the paramilitia and village defence forces behaving more like police. In this way, militarisation cascades down within the security sector.

A particularly disturbing form of domination driven by militarisation in Kashmir was to transform democracy from an accountability mechanism in the hands of the people to a militarised tool of tyranny—domination by democracy. We demonstrated in Chapter 5 that domination by the rule of law was part of that. Abu Bakr Naji’s (2006) The Management of Savagery is one influential jihad strategy document that, as discussed under Proposition 7, picked up on the opportunity created for jihadist domination by a cruel and corrupted rule of law. Democratic contrivance
has been a form of domination that has cascaded Kashmir’s insurgency. The Kashmir election of 1987 ushered in the largest surge of armed violence among the many dozens of such surges in the history of the conflict because the election was rigged and because it followed a history of resentment of recurrent electoral fraud.

At the more micro level of inference, no fieldwork story could be a more salutary symbol of domination by democracy than that of the abduction and threatened military gang rape of the wife of the village headman, a sentence suspended for her on condition of her husband persuading the village to abandon their boycott of an election and turning out to vote to advance an optics of citizen participation in democracy for their district. The tragedy of Kashmir’s cascades of violence has been propelled by a variety of democratic pretences, by rights ritualism (Charlesworth 2012) and by pretences of rule of law, village democracy, state democracy, freedom of speech and freedom of assembly that in reality have been regulated by live rounds aimed at the heads of young protestors. India started its career as a young democracy under Jawaharlal Nehru with a radically less militarised state than Pakistan (and Bangladesh). The militarisation of democracy in Kashmir has done much to narrow that gap. This is why a sustainable peace in Kashmir is the most profound step that could be taken to reverse the militarisation of politics in both India and Pakistan. That peace demands not only a softening of the border between India and Pakistan in Kashmir, but also a softening demilitarisation on both sides. It is also Kashmir that cascaded nuclearisation of South Asia from India to Pakistan and the ‘intelisation’ of South Asia that cascaded from Pakistan to India and beyond. Nuclear disarmament is the most difficult part of the demilitarisation challenge in South Asia.

Nepal is a worrying case in the way it has seen the militarisation of party politics in the form of militant youth wings that threaten electors, candidates and political activists with violence. Across South Asia as a whole, we see the militarisation of youth (Luitel et al. 2010: 196) as leading a militarisation of not just politics, but also society. Chapter 6 identifies this dynamic in a different form in Pakistan, where major political parties enrol criminal gangs or the Taliban to help them win elections by threatening or killing credible political adversaries. Chapter 7 tells similar narratives for Bangladesh. In summary, this book has traced, right across South Asia, local causal processes whereby cascades of militarisation have led to cascades of violence, which have led to further militarisation and to hawkish politics.
This is the heart of the empirical conclusion of this book: that cascades of domination and cascades of violence are intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement, leaving democracy more an appearance than a meaningful guarantee. The appearance of democracy can be fine for people in the peacebuilding business who are model misers or model modernisers in the terms of Chapter 3. Chapter 12 argues, however, that model misers with templates can be useful, but more often are dangerous, and that model misers who are content with the appearance of democracy are particularly dangerous when they legitimate democracy as domination. We will return repeatedly to the importance of the empirical conclusion that cascades of domination and cascades of violence are intertwined in mutually reinforcing cycles. It goes to the limitations of static analyses of national income inequality, for example, as a correlate of civil war. Our dynamic case study analyses of local–national–international cleavages show that income inequality, especially between the landless and the land-rich, is important alongside other forms of domination—such as racial, caste or religious discrimination and discrimination against indigenous minorities—that are intertwined in cycles of mutual reinforcement between cascades of domination and cascades of violence. It is important to be able to see the imbrication of one in the other—for example, by seeing cascades of rape in Nepal, Bangladesh or Sri Lanka as both cascades of domination and cascades of violence.

On the basis of our fieldwork notes, we also see cascades of rape as cascades of humiliation that are perceived as dominating the dignity of a people. Because this is a local–national–international recursivity of domination and violence, it is not too surprising that, at the local level in Nepal, static analyses of the association between inequality and killing show a much more powerful impact of inequality than we see in most cross-national studies. Cross-national studies are simply too aggregated to catch the right kind of glimpse of the recursive power of domination and humiliation as a cause of war. At another level, methodological nationalism is not aggregated enough because our analysis identifies the key driver of Taliban or Islamic State fighters in Pakistan or Afghanistan to be a local sense of injustice for a child born in a refugee camp that local mullahs imaginatively connect to a global sense of injustice and a transcendent quest for God’s justice. In Chapter 11, we argue that a traditional jirga or a local reconciliation committee with a restorative character may be needed to remedy such a child’s sense of injustice, to restore their humiliated dignity—not to mention a path that gives them an alternative to seeking
the protection of the Taliban or Islamic State when petty local tyrants dominate them. And, in a way, that is exactly how jihadists have recruited refugees—with generous offerings of dignity to the bereft (see Box 9.2, Chapter 9). Local *jirgas* are best able to contribute to peace when they can call on the resources of a social developmental state that can supply high-quality educational opportunities to that child, welfare support for orphans and vocational training and job placement services that will keep the child out of poverty and within the embrace of remunerative work and dignified employment. The blunt force of a halving of poverty or income inequality on its own, in contrast, might do little to reduce Taliban and Islamic State recruitment.

Bangladesh is a salutary case for scholars of war and peace. One might expect it to be a peaceful place because its democracy is vigorously contested by parties that have been led by women for several decades. For some decades, it has been one of the world’s fastest-growing economies. It is a large society of 160 million people that has more ethnic and religious homogeneity than any society can claim, and a vibrant sense of national identity. Yet the remarkable thing is that it is a militarised society where politics is transacted through violence, where rape is widespread and in which a major civil war can be fought in a 98 per cent Bengali society between some of the non-Bengali indigenous minorities and the dominant group. Few societies better illustrate the folly of seeing elections and nation-building for national homogeneity as the foundations of peace.

Chapter 7 is a particularly variegated instantiation of how domination dynamics that cascade down to the CHT take many forms: cascades of exclusion, militarism, cronyism, corruption and money politics, cascades of mob violence, of land grabs in an overpopulated, flooded country, cascades of class politics and cascades of oppressive taxation—among other domination dynamics that flow down to the CHT. Domination through taxation is a good example of the fine-grained work of this chapter. Domination through taxation that promotes violence follows in a line from the oppressive taxation of the Mughals, the even more oppressive taxation policies of the British Raj and its successor states of Pakistan and Bangladesh, and the multiple oppressions of multiple taxations by not only competing Chakma-dominated insurgent groups, but also foreign insurgents such as Rohingyas from Myanmar. We must remember that the imposition of roadside taxes by a multitude of armed groups in Kandahar was the principal proximate cause of the rise of the
Taliban to power. A missing abstraction in many analyses of the onset of civil war is to fail to see cascades of taxation as cascades of domination that motivate both violent and nonviolent resistance.

These various cascades of domination are met from below in the CHT by brave surges of liberation from many sites such as universities, surges of resistance to domination, self-help and self-education, nonviolence, human rights activism and surges of empowerment and participatory village and non-governmental organisation (NGO) politics. So, we can conceive the nest of conflicts in the CHT in terms of contests between cascades of violence and surges of liberation from the bottom up. This is a good way of summarising our findings for Myanmar as well, and, indeed, in summarising our story across South Asia (Appendix).

**Proposition 9:** Crime often sparks cascades to war and war to crime. As crime–war–crime cascades from hotspot to hotspot, violence becomes less shameful and easier to excuse. When rape and violence become less shameful, this further cascades rape and violence.

It is not only violent crime that cascades to war. Under Proposition 8, we saw that no crime was more decisive in causing the 1990 take-off of the Kashmir conflict than electoral fraud: the stealing of elections. But disappearances, torture and the conclusion that democratic protest would be crushed violently were also vital to that escalation. Indeed, the 1990 take-off of the strongest escalation of insurgency was triggered by the killing of demonstrators in a May 1990 protest (Chapter 5). This is a recurrent pattern in our data: while deeper structural variables such as domination through democracy are root causes, the triggering incidents were often initially isolated acts of violence in a single place on a single day. It is also important to note that acts of violence on a single day were also important in triggering massive people-power uprisings, with Kashmir examples being the Shopian rape and murder of two women by the police that triggered the 2009 surge of nonviolent protests on the streets of Srinagar (and, indeed, New Delhi) and the 2010 surge of nonviolence after a 16-year-old boy was killed by a teargas shell.

In all of our South Asian country cases, except Bhutan, crime-to-war sparking of cascades is present and important. Chapter 5 argues that in many states where Naxalites rose to power in rural areas, they did so by protecting people from criminal predation by police, landlords and businesses, and from corporate crimes such as illegal logging. This was
also true of Nepal’s Maoists and of the Taliban in both Pakistan and Afghanistan (Chapters 6 and 9). Chapter 8 argued that improved democratic policing on the streets of Colombo might have prevented the slaughter of Tamils in racist riots that so shaped the imagination of young Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) leader Velupillai Prabhakaran and his lieutenants. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has been one of the greatest accomplices of cascades of crime to war in Afghanistan and Pakistan. We have documented in Chapters 4, 6 and 9 how false targeting information has been provided to the United States (for example, by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence, ISI) to secure drone attacks and night raids to eliminate political opponents or square vendettas and to eliminate or imprison in Guantanamo Bay Taliban leaders who were peacemakers.

In every one of our South Asian country cases, except Bhutan, war has also cascaded to a great deal of violent crime, including insurgents morphing into criminal gangs, transnational crime and domestic violence. In almost every conflict, war cascaded to large numbers of rapes, an exception being the military conquests of the Taliban in the 1990s, which may have reduced rape. In the process, domestic assault, rape and violence became much less shameful in societies recovering from war. This accounts for the longer-run empirical consequence of wars promoting high violent crime rates among combatant countries (Archer and Gartner 1984) and indeed for their near neighbours in subsequent decades (Ghobarah et al. 2003). No case is more dramatic than the militarisation of rape in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation cascading to the militarisation of rape in the CHT, where over 90 per cent of rapes have been committed by the military (Mohsin 2003: 54). This dimension of militarisation has constituted rape against the ethnic other as something that is less than shameful. Protracted cascades of warfare leave the legacy of a revenge culture in which crime rates increase because a right to revenge abrogates the moral bind of the criminal law.

In Pakistan, the ability of criminals to escape to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) beyond the reach of the law has helped preserve and nurture countless criminal careers and criminal organisations in a trajectory that has left Pakistan such a high crime society. Firefights with the enemy are used by insurgents in the CHT and beyond as an opportunity to assassinate factional opponents in ‘crossfire’. An assassination like that of India’s prime minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by a Black Tiger was both a crime caused by war and a crime that escalated war.
Part II demonstrates, across the region, many ways in which the criminalisation of society, enabled by a war, in turn enables the criminalisation of the postwar state. Sri Lanka under Mahinda Rajapaksa was a leading example for most of this century (Chapter 8), as was the Karzai era in Afghanistan (Chapter 9), the junta era in Myanmar (Chapter 9)\(^\text{10}\) and many other examples in our text. As in so many African cases, war cascades to crony capitalism in which a ruling family or families loot the society, often in collaboration with Western or Chinese mining corporations. In Myanmar, Woods (2011) has dubbed this ‘ceasefire capitalism’. War contributes to the macro political economy of a very real contest of world order between authoritarian and liberal capitalism.

In that contest India is the great swing state, which, if it joins China, Russia and a legion of post-conflict societies such as Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Philippines and beyond in the authoritarian capitalist camp, risks a global transformation in which authoritarian capitalism becomes the more dominant model globally. One reason we are in an era when authoritarian capitalist societies are growing faster than liberal capitalist economies is that leading firms in liberal capitalist states create a niche for authoritarian capitalism because they like to do business with a regime that will guarantee them no trouble from unions, environmental regulators, investigative journalists and other democratic nuisances. Already the era is past when a state (such as Thailand) that shifts to the authoritarian capitalist camp in a military coup has a great deal to worry about in aid and trade retaliation from the West. This is because authoritarian capitalist societies such as China and Russia now relish the geopolitical opportunity to fill such vacuums. One might go so far as to say that Russian and Chinese state power rewards the criminalisation of states as surely as does Western corporate power.

Hence we conclude that one of the dangers from not resolving peace with justice in Kashmir and beyond is that the long, gradual trajectory of the Indian state towards criminalisation since the nobler time of Nehru might ultimately see India abandon liberal capitalism in favour of the kind of authoritarian capitalist medicine Vladimir Putin promised Russia to cure ‘weakness’ in Chechnya. Liberal capitalism has afflicted

\(^{10}\) The successors to Rajapaksa, Karzai and the Myanmar junta, moreover, so far have made little progress in reversing this entrenched criminalisation of the state. There is a path dependency about criminalised states.
widening inequality and great domination around the world in the past three decades (Piketty 2014); domination by progressive globalisation of authoritarian capitalism would be decidedly worse.

Chapter 8 included a helpful interim summary of the multifarious ways in which Proposition 9 has proved correct across South Asia. Chapter 5 is also important in the way it concluded with 26 diverse types of Indian cascades, mostly of the war-to-war variety, but including crime-to-war examples. For most of South Asia’s armed conflicts, war kills fewer people than crime. In considering the sequence of violent crimes that help motivate wars, crimes against civilians during the war and postwar violent crime caused by the war, battle deaths are quite a small problem compared with crimes against civilians that are causally connected to the war. Chapter 8 argues that, given the profoundly recurrent nature of crime as a cause of war and war as a cause of crime, our cascades analysis is not an explanation of war but the beginnings of a theory of crime–war as inextricably imbricated forms of violence. Crime prevention is war prevention and war prevention is crime prevention. All our cases show how both crime and war create flows of small arms that feed back into the facilitation of more of both forms of violence (Duffield 2001: 132). Moreover, war cannot be understood only through an international lens because it mainly happens within nations rather than between them and, during the period since World War II, rarely afflicts whole nations. Rather, war behaves like crime in a variety of important ways we have specified, spreading from hotspot to hotspot, and leaving most of a societal space pacified and relatively free of violence.

Proposition 10: When war produces a cascade of violence that moves to many new spaces that bite back at a combatant nation, the costs of shutting down the violence in all those spaces can quickly exceed the benefits of winning the war. It can then be rational to cut one’s losses by pulling out of the war, leaving a festering cascade of violence behind, unresolved. The contemporary war economics of cascades therefore sustains cascades of violence (as we saw with cut-and-run policies in Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya).

We have seen that while the West interpreted the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Afghanistan in 1989 as a triumph of Western geopolitics, jihadists saw it as a jihadist victory that they could replicate against other great powers such as India (in Kashmir), China (in Xinjiang), the United States (ultimately, in Iraq, Syria and Afghanistan again) and Russia (again, in Chechnya) and its satellites (particularly in the ‘stans’). They focused
on the term the CIA itself often used post-Vietnam to describe cascades: ‘blowback’. We have seen how Abu Bakr Naji valorised the Al-Qaeda strategy of provoking a cascade of military responses from superpowers to motivate martyrs. Naji (2006: 7) quotes American author Paul Kennedy: ‘If America expands the use of its military power and strategically extends more than necessary, this will lead to its downfall.’

We have argued that because US strategic thinking overweights deterrence and underestimates defiance, it has been all too willing to walk into this trap set by jihadist strategists. American unwillingness to consider reconciliation with the Taliban in 2001, 2002 and 2003 (and with Ba’athists in Iraq) was a classic example of this error. We have also seen that the Indian military in Kashmir, and its 1980s adventure into Sri Lanka, likewise overvalued deterrence and underestimated defiance. The Pakistan military has even more perversely overweighted its deterrent capabilities in Kashmir and Bangladesh and its capacity to switch off militant jihad as readily as it switched it on. Obversely, the LTTE in Sri Lanka so overestimated its military prowess that it deluded itself into believing it could repeatedly prevail in conventional battles. Until General Sarath Fonseka took over, the Sri Lankan military underestimated the deterrent capabilities the Pentagon long believed Sri Lanka had.

Overall, the results summarised in the Appendix for Proposition 10 are more mixed than for our other propositions. There is strong support for Proposition 10 in India, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan, and also significant support in Bangladesh and Pakistan. Bhutan, Nepal and Myanmar are coded in Table A as failing to support it. The generalisation from this seems to be that where great powers do not commit their boots on the ground, Proposition 10 does not apply or applies only weakly.

It is obviously difficult to accurately judge how steep the deterrence and defiance curves are in Figure 3.1. Indian Punjab (Chapter 5) and Sri Lanka (both the Tamil Tigers and the JVP) (Chapter 8) were cases where state deterrence stayed the course until deterrence effects exceeded defiance effects, decisively ending insurgencies. We simply note the patience of hawks who spent most of their lives at the margin of public life. History’s patient hawks often seize centre stage by promoting an exaggerated potency of military deterrence as a simple solution to a nation’s problems in the ripe moment. Proposition 10 is about the way states gradually come to realise the complex morass their hawks can draw them into. As the costs of blowback pile up, states pull out, usually leaving a bigger mess than existed when they arrived—and a tangle of cascading violence.
In the aftermath of an event like the 9/11 Al-Qaeda attacks on America or the assassination of the successor to the throne of the Habsburg Empire, hawks do not have as much analytic work to do. They are model mongers who have their hammer ready to hit its nail. Doves, in contrast, need more time for analysis to grapple with the complexity of what a military response might cascade to and what might be the other tools that could provide a more suitable response to the crisis. One of the great things about the architecture of the UN Security Council is that it slows the pace of escalation to war that so overtook diplomacy in World War I (see Chapter 2). Security Council deliberation can prevent a conflict from spinning out of control during that window when the hawks seem to have a monopoly on the only response possible, giving doves time for research and development of alternative strategies to war. Rapid assembly of local regional experts is needed initially to create lists of problems war might cascade to—lists of preventive diplomacy options to put on the table—and then to start research on the highest priority items on these lists.

Nepal is a most instructive case where Proposition 10 seemed to have no explanatory relevance. This was because people-power diplomacy and Indian diplomacy, among other diplomacies, did creative work in crafting alternative peaceful constitutional paths that led all stakeholders (except the king) to believe they would be better off. While it is true that neither the Maoists nor the Royal Nepalese Army joined a ceasefire as a result of their balancing of deterrent and defiance considerations, the king abdicated because all powerbrokers turned on him: his military and police, India, the United States, the entire diplomatic community, the Maoists, the democratic parties and the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace. In that sense, many of the power dynamics of Proposition 10 are confirmed because the king’s power could never have held out in defiance of the military and the nonviolent power of all these social forces. Still it must be understood that it was diplomatic power backed by the enormous clout this alliance could muster that caused the king to abdicate. It did not happen at the point of a gun. Hegemonic nonviolence that unfolded on the streets did the most decisive work, according to Chapter 9. Chapter 11 argues that strategic nonviolence can usually find a path out of the deterrence trap.\(^\text{11}\)

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\(^{11}\) The deterrence trap was a term used by John C. Coffee (1981) to describe the dilemma with corporate crime enforcement of being unable to impose a fine sufficiently large to deter, yet which would not be so high as to cause the bankruptcy of the corporation, costing innocent employees their jobs.
Revising the propositions

The starting propositions were neither plucked from thin air nor derived from a particular theoretical tract in the literature. Rather they were shaped by:

1. preliminary reading of our data during the latter stages of data collection and analysis for South Asia during 2014
2. reflection on interpretations that enjoy empirical support in the prior theoretical and inductive literatures on conflict in South Asia
3. reflection on the early stages of our data collection beyond South Asia, glimpses of which are provided in Part I from our fieldwork notes from the Great Lakes region of Africa, Libya, the former Yugoslavia, Washington, New York, Beijing and beyond.

This means it makes no sense to conceive the research process as reaching interim closure of our South Asian data collection during 2017. There is no completion of the process of sifting through these data that leads to confirmation or refutation of any of these hypotheses. What our provisional results lead to is some revision of them as starting propositions. They still remain provisional and revisable, with more interviews and future developments in the history of these cases remaining a part of the Peacebuilding Compared project. At this stage, two revisions seem responsive to the more comprehensive analysis of the South Asian data possible in the course of 2014–17. First, with some hesitation, Proposition 5 is dropped:

Proposition 5: Once cleavages put alliance cascades on the march, security dilemmas can further accelerate the cascade.

Security dilemmas were important as an explanation of violence during Partition and have been far from absent since. But they are nowhere near as recurrently present as domination by democracy as a cause of violence, which is the theme of our replacement Proposition 5(a). We saw in Chapter 5 that this was a major theme in our Kashmir data. The conclusion of Chapter 5 was that electoral democracy cascades peace and crime control when complemented by robust separations of powers. Electoral democracy without separations of powers cascades civil wars, coups and criminality. In Pakistan, we discussed the importance of political parties hiring gangs of criminal thugs to terrorise their opponents (Chapter 6). Afghanistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka all manifest a combination of these two ways that democracy cascades violence, although in these countries this may not loom as such a large driver of violence as in India and Pakistan. Post-
conflict Nepal is characterised in Chapter 9 by a ‘militarisation of youth’ through militant youth wings of political parties that intimidate electoral opponents. So Nepal also strongly supports our replacement proposition. the Appendix finds Bhutan to be the only country case that does not support our replacement proposition and Myanmar a case that is too early to call:

**Proposition 5(a):** Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

For the 39 armed conflicts preliminarily coded for Peacebuilding Compared, 23 find a ‘Proposition 5(a) domination by democracy’ dynamic to be an important factor in the onset of armed conflict, while only 12 so far have coded a ‘Proposition 5 security dilemma dynamic’ as important. We must, however, remember that these are all post–Cold War conflicts. In earlier periods of history, when pretences of democracy were less widespread, the reverse may well have been true. This is made possible by the data reported in the *World Development Report* (World Bank 2017: 24) showing that, since 1985, the world has seen both a doubling of the number of countries that are electoral democracies and a decline of more than one-third in its measure of the integrity of elections worldwide. Average voter turnout worldwide has also declined by more than 15 per cent in the past 70 years (World Bank 2017: 228).

The second revision goes to the importance of the humiliation of a people and how this can motivate recourse either to armed struggle or to nonviolent struggle to redeem the dignity of that people. In Chapter 5, we saw that Kashmiris saw themselves as afflicted with *gulami* (slavery) and this required struggle for the dignity of *azadi* (freedom)—not just in the shallow liberal sense of having more choice, but in the deeper republican sense of seizing the dignity of shaking off chains of slavery, as in the republican political theory of Pettit (1997). We found *azadi* to motivate both violent resistance and nonviolent people-power surges on the streets of Srinagar. In fact, both the domination through democracy revision of Proposition 5(a) and this revision to Proposition 8 have implications for cascades of nonviolence (see Chapter 11) as well as for cascades of violence:

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12 Activists saw the 2008–10 street uprisings of hundreds of thousands of Kashmiris as a political foundation because ‘Kashmiris took back their dignity’ and could no longer be ruled by fear of violence (Kashmir civil society interview, 2012, No. 101209).
Proposition 8(a): Cascades of violence recursively cascade militarisation, domination and humiliation. Militarisation, domination and humiliation recursively risk further cascades of violence.

In Chapter 6, we interpreted the humiliation of the Pakistan army under its defeat in the Bangladesh War of Liberation as motivating ruthless militarisation of the conflict in Balochistan through a strategy of total civil war in the 1970s that included napalming Baloch civilians. Wars in Kashmir subsequent to that 1971 defeat can also be interpreted as attempts to reassert the dignity of the Pakistani military. A. Q. Khan’s imaginary and program to arm Pakistan with nuclear weapons was likewise a prideful antidote to the humiliation of Indian military domination. We can interpret the ruthlessly criminal annihilation of fleeing Tamil civilians and Tamil fighters alike in 2009 as a response to the repeated humbling of the Sri Lankan military in previous decades by LTTE fighters. The rape of Nepalese Maoist women in Rolpa by the security forces was a domination and a humiliation that motivated women to seize their dignity by feminising the Maoist struggle in a contribution that was critical to giving Maoist forces the upper hand. Indigenous children in the CHT have grown up seeing their mothers and/or fathers being humiliated at military check posts. The pattern of humiliation has been callous and an expression of prejudice and racism towards the ‘backward tribes’ or a deliberate method of domination. Decades of such humiliation from the state and its security forces have backfired and contributed to growing resentment among indigenous youth. The way the Bush administration and the Northern Alliance sought to humiliate Taliban leaders who wished to reconcile with the Karzai regime in 2001, 2002 and 2003 contributed to the passion of the resurgence of Taliban military power thereafter. Moreover, the administrations of both Bush presidents in 1991 and 2003 sought to break the power of Saddam Hussein in Iraq by so humiliating him that his own people would rise up to crush him and spurn his legacy. The defiance of Saddam in response to this, according to his own speeches, was about redeeming Arab dignity from the humiliations of Western domination and exploitation since the crushing of the Ottoman Empire. While they were political opponents of Saddam, the Salafist jihadists and

13 The level of vaunting pride was evident when, in 2013, John Braithwaite visited the home of a sardar in Quetta at a time when a political gathering of A. Q. Khan’s political party, preparing for the forthcoming election, was being held there. As he sat in the meeting, he looked through the interesting array of election materials and posters—all of which had the logo of a nuclear warhead prominently displayed to connote Pakistani national pride!
the Iranian Revolutionary Guards alike are motivated by Islamist oratory and propaganda tracts that bristle with humiliation over domination by the triumphant Western powers of World War I, who parcelled out their old caliphate to colonial humiliation.
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