Chapter 10 summarised ways that peacemakers can avert cascades of violence. This chapter moves beyond that to consider how peacemakers can promote cascades of nonviolence. Such promotion of nonviolence can go with the grain of what happens naturally because, like violence, nonviolence is contagious transnationally. Braithwaite et al. (2015) found that, for nonviolent civil resistance campaigns against autocratic regimes, the mounting of campaigns in foreign countries increased the likelihood of campaigns at home, especially for countries without a tradition of civil resistance.

In the next two sections of this chapter, we consider, in turn, the two revisions made to the propositions in Chapter 10: humiliation as a factor in cascades of domination and violence and democracy as a cause of domination. What are their implications for how leaders from below and institutions from above should build peace? The chapter concludes with a consideration of the implications of the revised 10 propositions for the contest between cascades of nonviolence and cascades of violence and domination. This analysis starts with a consideration of the more bottom-up dynamics of the idea of cascades of nonviolence or peaceful ‘regime-change cascades’ (Hale 2013). Here, key actors are civil society model mongers for peace with justice, although top-down institutions such as those of the United Nations are also important.
Our conclusion is that leaders might be more conservative in launching unintended cascades of violence and more assertive in promoting cascades of nonviolence. We argue that peace deals and peacekeeping work best when transitions are long and are crafted to prevent dominations of democracy. Normally, peacebuilders do best to defer elections and prioritise building a separation of powers. Peacebuilding must be an accomplishment of networked governance if it is to institutionalise the prevention of domination (Braithwaite et al. 2012).

We observe that there is a need for a UN transition strategy from a credible over-the-horizon guarantee to domestic security sector reform that enables a state to shut down even the most powerful mafias and any future warlords with the ambition of igniting a civil war. As discussed in Chapter 3, Toft’s (2010) data suggest that such security sector reform is imperative for sustainable peace. Carrots for warlords to join a peace tend to be gamed if they are not balanced with sticks when they break out from the peace deal militarily.¹ In Barbara Walter’s (1999, 2002) empirical analyses, peace endures when third parties provide credible commitments to enforce settlement terms. Without credible commitments, combatants game the peace to gain through deception what they could not command through battle. Toft’s (2010) conclusion about the combined importance of credibly delivering both carrots and sticks is supported by Regan’s (1996: Table 6) finding that third-party interventions are five times more likely to succeed when they involve a mix of military and economic strategies than when they rely on economic or military strategies alone. This was true in Regan’s data for both ideological and ethnic/religious conflicts. These empirical conclusions about regulating war are consistent with the criminological evidence on regulating organisational crime. Single deterrents tend to be ineffective on their own; what is effective for controlling organisational crime is a plural regulatory mix of sticks and carrots, of sanctions and supports that rehabilitate and transform organisations multi-systemically (Braithwaite et al. 2007: 312; J. Braithwaite 2016a; Schell-Busey et al. 2016).

¹ This can be conceived as a theoretical development in Valerie Braithwaite’s (2009) theory of ‘motivational postures’ in response to authorities. The postures are commitment, capitulation, disengagement, resistance and game-playing. According to the theoretical development advanced inductively here from the behaviour of warlords, game-playing is the motivational posture that cannot be regulated by carrots alone (without sticks).
UN peacemaking that precedes peacebuilding must offer carrots for rejecting military/political domination; however, the United Nations must also offer international commitment to enforcing the peace agreement by putting UN troops in harm’s way when necessary. Even before that architecture of commitment is put in place, conflict prevention must be more sensitive to averting humiliation. The first section of our conclusion advocates restoration through a human dignity framework as critical to peacebuilding.

Implications of proposition revision: Humiliation

There is a considerable literature on the importance of humiliation in fuelling conflict. The work of Evelin Lindner (2006) and her Human Dignity and Humiliation Studies network is one example. The imperative to avert humiliation in diplomacy has long been well understood by experienced diplomats. The first law of the Concert of Europe, which secured a century of major-power peace, was, after all: ‘Thou shalt not challenge or seek to humiliate another great power’ (Richardson 1994: 104). Diplomatic custom and convention are memory files of what diplomats have learned across the centuries about how to avert needless humiliation of an adversary, down even to the point of knowing who should sit where. Common courtesy is important but easy to neglect at times of war when events stir the contempt of adversaries. Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev (and indeed Margaret Thatcher) were models of that courtesy and mutual respect when they negotiated the end of the Cold War.

One of the most cited events of successful diplomacy that every international relations (IR) student has to learn about is the Cuban Missile Crisis, during which John and Robert Kennedy (Kennedy 1969: 62) and Nikita Khrushchev (1970: 493) saved the world from catastrophe by being attentive to a settlement that would allow the other to save face (Allison 1971; Braithwaite 2002: 188–9; Ting-Toomey and Cole 1990). In the midst of that crisis, however, the leadership of the US navy was less than attentive to the need to avert humiliation. Its submarines played aggressive cat and mouse with the Soviet navy, forcing its submarines to surface. It did this because it wanted to prove its superiority to promote lagging support for a campaign on Capitol Hill to fund its ‘Hunter-Killer’ anti-submarine program (Allison 1971).
Beyond the diplomats, there remain three levels to the humiliation-aversion challenge. First, the political leaders who sit above diplomats often survive by populist politics in which humiliation plays well. Donald Trump in the 2016 US presidential election campaign is just a more colourful version of an old kind of populism. George W. Bush could behave quite differently from the way presidents Reagan and Kennedy did by describing several states and their leaders as an ‘evil empire’. George W. also managed to compete with his father, George H. Bush, in coming up with new insults of Iraq’s Saddam Hussein, though in that he hardly surpassed the Kuwaiti leadership who, in the period before Saddam invaded their country, were clever enough to suggest publicly that Saddam had been born out of wedlock. In response, Saddam’s appeals to other Arab states to resist the US invoked humiliation: ‘Rebel against all attempts to humiliate Mecca’ (Braithwaite 1991b: 54). Second—as with the US navy during the Cuban Missile Crisis—admirals, generals and even police constables in UN peace operations often spark conflict by lesser sensitivity than diplomats to humiliation aversion. Third, diplomats unintentionally insult potential enemies because of imperfect local knowledge. Diplomats had no idea that establishing US military bases near the Muslim holy lands of Saudi Arabia in 1991 would be interpreted as such a humiliation that it would
motivate Osama bin Laden to declare a holy war against the United States: ‘Our Islamic nation has been tasting … more than 80 years of humiliation and disgrace’ (Osama bin Laden, quoted in Keen 2012: 210).

A general failing of diplomacy in the era of local wars at hotspots remote from capitals is that diplomats ply their craft in the politics of the capital (Autesserre 2010, 2014). They still practise a war-prevention diplomacy of the grand era of gunboat diplomacy, failing to work hard enough at understanding ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007) and village wars, or at understanding what would humiliate local chiefs, local religious leaders, local warlords and local women’s peacemaking groups.

There are two general lessons from all of this. One is a paradigm shift in diplomacy from a craft of the capitals to a craft of engagement with local hotspots of conflagration as well. The second lesson is that diplomacy is a craft that should be taught not just to professional diplomats, but also to neophyte politicians as part of their induction to parliaments, by the United Nations in its democracy promotion work (such as the UN Democracy Fund and the UN Development Programme), to military in the military academy, police in the police academy and to ground-level peacebuilding staff in mission training. In Western societies, all these categories of people need to receive certain simple messages of cultural sensitivity and recognise how national contexts of social hierarchies are critical to successful diplomacy—for example, the recognition that public image and deferring to a leader are more delicate issues in Asian societies than their own or that younger Western leaders need to behave especially courteously to older Asian officials. Australian prime minister Paul Keating would address Indonesian president Suharto as ‘bapa’ (‘father’), as Suharto himself had done to his predecessor, Sukarno. All categories of peacebuilding actors must learn that traditional chiefs in indigenous communities should be treated with respect and deference; that in some societies religious leaders can be more revered than political leaders; or that in some societies it can be rude to ask direct questions, so more indirect styles of communication must be cultivated. These examples are not overwhelmingly important in themselves, but discussing them cultivates a sensibility to the local and to the contextual character of humiliation and dignity.

Peace journalism training is also important. Even the highest-quality media organisations sell their product at times with reckless humiliation of enemy commanders. A widely syndicated Washington Post story in July 2017 on Islamic State’s failure to realise the extraordinary amount
of cobalt-60 they had available to them in a Mosul university laboratory was an important story to write (Warrick 2017: 11). Yet its tone did not need to be so humiliating towards Islamic State—crowing, gloating in embrace with relieved US and Iraqi officials over the stupidity of Islamic State in failing to achieve their objective of making a dirty bomb with precisely such ingredients. One official is quoted as saying: ‘They are not that smart.’ Thank you, Washington Post. That taunting will help energise Islamic State to prove they are smart enough to make that dirty bomb.

Democracy as a cause of domination

This section considers the implications of the new Proposition 5(a):

**Proposition 5(a):** Democracy can be a driver of domination and violence. Electoral competition can widen cleavages and create niches for violent groups to be enrolled by political parties to intimidate voters and opponents.

In many ways, what we have discovered in modern South Asia, and provisionally in the coding of 23 of the 39 Peacebuilding Compared cases globally, is Roland Paris’s (2004) conclusion on the limits of a liberal peace and on the virtues of institutionalisation before liberalism, before democracy and before markets. This is also Mansfield and Snyder’s (2007) empirical conclusion—that when domestic institutions are weak, the process of democratisation promotes war—and Collier’s (2009) conclusion about the impact of democracy on violence in *Wars, Guns, and Votes*. They argue that checks and balances in institutions—such as the rule of law—are what help democracies prevent civil war (see also Hegre and Nygård 2015). However, ‘it has proved much easier to introduce elections than checks and balances’ (Collier 2009: 44). Moreover, ‘taken together, the results on elections and democratisation are consistent: if democracy means little more than elections, it is damaging to the [good government] reform process’ (Collier 2009: 45). The reason is that good government is not the most cost-effective way of benefiting from power. If you can get away with buying elections, corrupting an electoral commission, intimidating or killing opponents, scapegoating a minority to cultivate majoritarian support, jailing strong opponents for corruption and running against weaker ones or simply miscounting the votes, once in government, you can reimburse these costs by pillaging the state. Incumbents do this by embezzling billions from state coffers, favouring cronies and family members with government contracts, welcoming foreign investors when
they make huge political contributions and through other strategies. If politicians try to win elections with good government, their capacity to benefit from power is much reduced. This is because good government means the rule of law and checks and balances on abuse of power that place limits on their pillaging of the state, or even prevent it. The best way to accumulate power and money is to win elections by methods that require the winner to misgovern.

Of course, once in place—with the rule of law and checks and balances such as parliamentary committees, audit offices, electoral commissions, anticorruption commissions, ombudsmen, human rights commissions, civil service commissions and independent judges and prosecutors—good government does become a good way to win elections. Checks and balances create a wonderful path dependency\(^2\) in this regard. Being cursed with lootable natural resources can increase a country’s susceptibility to corruption, civil war and many other problems. Yet, for countries with democratic institutions that include strong checks on the executive, resource rents do not predict corruption (Bhattacharyya and Hodler 2009).

This means there is something the international community can do about these problems. After civil wars that tear a country apart, the United Nations can put in place a UN transitional administration that is a hybrid of local, national, UN and broadly participatory deliberative governance (such as restorative justice) wherein both the local and the international install checks and balances and the rule of law. Indeed, many levels of governance do so. Success at this is difficult and a matter of degree, as revealed in the cases we have documented for Peacebuilding Compared, such as UN transitional governance in Timor-Leste (Braithwaite et al. 2012) and transitional governance hybrids with regional organisations of states in Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b) and Solomon Islands (Braithwaite et al. 2010c). Once these institutions take root, pillaging the state through bad governance becomes a way to lose elections. Opposition political parties then acquire enough clout—with support from the separation of powers, from a semi-autonomous legal profession, accounting profession, civil service and a vibrant civil society—to protect

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\(^2\) Path dependency means that decisions and options follow a trajectory dependent on past decisions and options. For example, ‘QWERTY’ keyboards were a mute force of history on the future of typewriter layouts. Computer keyboards then became path dependent on QWERTY.
the established checks and balances against political leaders who seek advantage by eroding them. The hard part is the transition to bedding down path dependency on a polity with checks and balances.

Other elements of Paul Collier’s work suggest that we can get better at that hard part. Indeed, Collier is convincing that it is in the economic interests of rich countries to invest in checks and balances. We refer to Collier’s (2007; 2009: 83–92) empirical work showing that the costs to the world economy of spending on peacekeeping are one-quarter of the benefits and, indeed, that post-conflict aid has a significantly stronger economic benefit than aid at other times. Of course, the main reason we invest in peace is not to increase the efficiency of our public investments in poverty reduction and productivity growth, but to save the next generation of children from cascades of violence. Collier’s (2009: 96) program of empirical research concluded that US$100 million spent on UN peacekeepers reduced the cumulative 10-year risk of reversion to conflict from 38 per cent to 17 per cent. That risk falls further to 13 per cent if the investment in peacekeeping is scaled up to US$200 million and down to 9 per cent with a US$500 million price tag. This is rather cheap in global terms. Collier’s team presented his conclusions on the benefits and costs for the world economy of investment in peacekeeping to a panel of Nobel laureate economists for the Copenhagen Consensus. This involved 10 rival research teams making a case for international public money to be spent on something. The Copenhagen Consensus panel’s verdict selected peacekeeping as one of their endorsed public expenditures.

There are data suggesting that older styles of peacekeeping that passively monitor truces and lines of control that separate armies are much less effective in reducing the recurrence of war than modern multidimensional peacekeeping with a transformative character (that goes to installing checks and balances) (but see Riordan 2013, who found older styles of peacebuilding have been strongly effective). Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 336) found that the greater effectiveness of a combination of treaties and transformational UN peacebuilding is particularly dramatic when local peacebuilding resources and capacities are low. In a follow-up of these data, Sambanis (2008: 23) found that UN peace operations reduce the risk of peace failure in the longer run by about 50 per cent. Quinn et al. (2007: 187) found the combination of a treaty and a peace operation reduced the probability of civil war recurrence by 54 per cent. These peace impacts persist after peacekeepers leave. Doyle and Sambanis (2006: 336) found that, without a treaty and UN mission, the statistical prospects of
successful peacebuilding in states of low capacity are extremely dim. This is a similar result to the meta-analyses of domestic reconciliation of serious crime through restorative justice: where restorative justice is hardest to do, it is most important to do, and restorative justice is maximally effective when we manage to pull it off with those hard cases (J. Braithwaite 2016b).

Other quantitative evaluations of the effectiveness of international peace operations likewise find many failures. Overall, however, they confirm a big statistical contribution of peace operations to building peace (Call 2012; Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Fortna 2008; Fortna and Howard 2008: 288–94; Gilligan and Sergenti 2008; Nilsson 2006; Quinn et al. 2007; Riordan 2013; Sambanis 2008; Walter 2002). Fortna (2003, 2008) also found a large tendency for ceasefires overseen by international peacekeepers to be more effective than those without peacekeepers. War prevention has features in common with crime prevention in this regard. One can be pessimistic about crime prevention because, when we are dealing with serious criminals who are in prison for the first time, a large proportion come back a second time. Yet, we know that the long-run historical project of progressively improving crime prevention interventions produces large effects in reducing the crime rate.

There is every reason to believe that peacekeeping can become even more effective by continuously improving the capacities of peace operations to become learning organisations of reflective professionals who benefit from past mistakes (Howard 2008). This can be achieved by investing more resources in learning to do forward-looking preventive peacebuilding well, and by running longer transitions that step-by-step bed down hybrid international–local checks and balances that morph gradually into national–local–participatory checks and balances. Usually that will need to occur under a new constitution. Indeed, peacekeeping has become more effective in keeping the peace in recent decades compared with its quantitative success rate during the Cold War (Fortna 2004). Even so, the failure rate remains high.

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3 Lise Howard’s (2008: 2) comparative study of completed UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations found an organisational learning culture in the peace operation to be the best predictor of its success: ‘UN peacekeeping tends to be more successful when the peacekeepers are actively learning from the environment in which they are deployed. In other words, rather than seeking to impose preconceived notions about how the missions should unfold, peacekeeping is at its best when the peacekeepers—both civilian and military—take their cues from the local population, and not UN headquarters, about how best to implement mandates.’
CASCADeS oF vIOLENcE

Critics have attacked these consistent findings of large effects of peacebuilding by arguing that the wars that receive UN peacekeeping are a decidedly non-random sample compared with the wars that do not. The qualitative analyses of Peacebuilding Compared, however, suggest that the wars that are more intractable and serious are in fact the ones that attract the investment in a UN peace operation. Fortna’s (2008) systematic quantitative data confirm this. When Gilligan and Sergenti (2008) corrected for the effects of non-random assignment with matching techniques, they found that the causal effect of UN peace operations in preventing war was even larger than would have been estimated had there been no correction for non-random assignment of UN missions.

This approach means taking time with the process of constitution-building: creating wide circles of participation. It means heeding New Zealand Māori wisdom: ‘Westerners say, don’t just sit there, do something! We Māori say, don’t just do something, sit there. Listen.’ The first post-conflict election of a legislature is normally best delayed until after the new constitution is entrenched in a vote by the whole society. Constitution drafting is best done without an incumbent government calling the shots, under a constitutional commission of respected local leaders from all walks of life who consult widely. If all credible political players are in a more ‘original position’ (Rawls 1971), unsure whether they are writing a constitution for a government that they or their political adversaries will lead, stronger checks and balances are likely to emerge.

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4 We are grateful to Mary Ivec for reminding us that this saying is often heard in restorative justice workshops.

5 Crises of the state are most productive when they usher in constitutional moments that put political leaders in a Rawlsian original position, where none can be sure who might seize power in the successor regime after the constitutional moment has passed (Rawls 1971). The most inspiring and transformational constitutional moments in the history of democracy illustrate this phenomenon. The American Revolution created a context in which no one knew who, among the founding fathers of the federalist debates, would come out of the ruck to become the first president of the United States. Many of those founders became presidents—Jefferson, Adams, Hamilton, Madison—but they had to live under Washington’s presidency first. They all argued for changes that would restrain an executive government that they feared they would have to live under themselves, as opposed to a disposition they would rule over as incumbents. The 1945 German and Japanese constitutional moments were both unusually inspiring ones that took constitutionalism to new global heights for similar reasons; all incumbents of executive power were out of their seats during the process. The 1996 South African Constitution is the most potent example of this Rawlsian insight about constitutions. When its parameters were first laid down in the peace negotiations from 1990, no one knew who would ultimately seize executive power. All the good money was on Mandela rather than F. W. de Klerk or Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi. Yet our South African interviews suggest that everyone knew that Mandela would only rule the transition, soon to hand over to a successor. No one knew if that would be Thabo Mbeki, Cyril Ramaphosa, Jacob Zuma, Allan Boesak or someone else. Indeed, no one knew whether the African National Congress would end up ruling in its own right, on the basis of
Prolonging windows of people power and UN transitional power is smart global governance for peace, freedom and development. It is smart because a peace process with a wider window at war’s end creates a special opportunity for a ‘critical juncture’ for setting up inclusive institutions (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012: 413).

One possible new normal of transition for war-ravaged societies would see the writing of new constitutions that institutionalise a decade of transition. The citizenry votes for a constitution that during its first decade accepts the United Nations as a transitional co-guarantor of the independence of their new accountability institutions. They do not vote for the United Nations as a long-term co-guarantor of the constitution, only as a medium-term co-guarantor, for perhaps 10 years. That is, the constitution would entrench an extra transitional layer of local–international hybridity of accountability for its first decade. This kind of new normal would delay elections until peace was well institutionalised and armed groups utterly demobilised. During this long period of preparation for democracy, donors would also have the opportunity to support other basics of good governance that Paris (2004) concludes, on the basis of his analysis of 14 transitions, allow elections that avert renewed conflict. These include maturing of political parties, maturing of cross-factional civil society groups that break down barriers between former enemies (thereby enabling grassroots reconciliation and self-regulation of hate speech) and the spread of political stability and effective administration across the territory. During the transition, the society would also have the opportunity to build its capacities for deliberative democracy. It would have the opportunity to strengthen the inclusion and powersharing that Call (2012) finds empirically to be the strongest predictors of non-recurrence of war (see also Hartzell 1999; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003). By first guaranteeing the growth of inclusive political institutions, inclusive economic institutions are likely to follow (Acemoglu and powersharing or in coalition. The greatness of the South African Constitution was born of a group of political leaders who were in a more original position than is normally the case in politics. Juxtaposed with these more successful post-conflict constitutional transformations, we can see that one learning from Nepal—and more so from Egypt—is that the first post-conflict election might best be deferred, with an extended transitional national unity government with a dual peacebuilding and constitution-building mandate.

6 This can include village-level deliberative assemblies, with budgets too small to be a honeypot for organised crime and which all villagers can attend to discuss on what to spend their village development budget. These are good venues for young future leaders to learn to be democratic (see Braithwaite et al. 2010a, 2012).
This approach is sharply at odds with ‘shock therapy’ liberalisation or the IMF conditionality. It is consistent with Hartzell et al.’s (2010) finding that adopters of IMF structural adjustment programs between 1970 and 1999 were more likely to experience the onset of civil war. Donors are not usually apolitical and neutral actors. They come in with their own agendas and their own assumptions of and interests in how to ‘fix’ a crisis.

As such, a new normal would use renewed military clout the United Nations can call in (with UN legitimacy) to track warlords away from the hope of taking over the state in the short term. The alternative carrots for them would be guaranteed incumbency in a well-heeled UN job and, as one of the constitutional commission members, a conditional amnesty for them and their troops during that decade, payments for each weapon surrendered, high-quality reintegration into business, job and educational opportunities, plus the more uncertain prospect of winning a much delayed election. It would involve a graduated strategy for embedding path dependency along the path to continuous improvement of the independence of accountability institutions.

Kosovo proved a disappointing initial attempt at some, but far from all, of the long transition elements described above. The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) privileged ‘stability’ over accountability institutions by granting impunity for the most powerful faction of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) when it assassinated many of its political opponents in advance of elections. UNMIK allowed the KLA to place a representative of its wartime Shërbimi Informativ Kombëtar (SHIK, Kosovo National Intelligence Service) in every key government agency. The SHIK man would threaten anyone who did not support the domination of the

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7 On Acemoglu and Robinson’s (2012) analysis, the Roman Republic’s comparatively inclusive political institutions allowed Rome to flourish economically and pacify a wide space of empire. From the time of Julius and Augustus Caesar, ‘Rome’s increasingly extractive political and economic institutions generated its demise because they caused infighting and civil war’ (p. 168). Extractive feudal institutions and war then took over the formerly pacified space of the empire. Likewise, war and poverty in modern Sierra Leone can be understood thus: ‘British colonial authorities built extractive institutions in the first place, and the post-independence African politicians were only too happy to take up the baton for themselves … Extractive political institutions lead to extractive economic institutions, which enrich a few at the expense of many. Those who benefit from extractive institutions thus have the resources to build their (private) armies and mercenaries, to buy their judges, and to rig their elections in order to remain in power. They also have every interest in defending the system. Therefore, extractive economic institutions create the platform for extractive political institutions to persist. Power is valuable in regimes with extractive political institutions, because power is unchecked and brings economic riches’ (p. 343).
ruling faction in decisions of their ministry or agency. When this was overlaid with liberalising IMF-enforced conditionality, privatisation was undertaken at bargain prices to asset strippers, cronies and organised criminals affiliated with the ruling faction (Marsavelski et al. 2017).

Distinguished Australian civil servant and peacebuilder John Wood (Interview, Canberra, 2015, No. 051501) gave another reason this vision could fail. It will fail if donors do not make it a peacebuilding priority from day one to support the local post-secondary education system to train future cadres of line auditing staff, particularly for societies where career opportunities for independent, technically competent auditing professionals have been absent. Not all education system deficits can be solved at once, but Wood is perceptive in seeing the education of auditors as one that frequently should be the first bottleneck to be fixed.

Plate 11.2 A Libyan schoolgirl stands in what remains of her classroom, 2012.
Source: Susan Schulman.

More generally, education is one of the best investments that can be made for long-run development (and therefore long-run peace). Collier and Hoeffler (2000: 23) found that increasing secondary school enrolment for males by 10 per cent above the global median reduces the risk of the onset of war to 30 per cent below the median. But this is expensive. New schools cannot be built everywhere at once. So, post-conflict education investment should start where it will best feed the peace. Schools can be built first in hotspots where poor fighters joined the conflict because they
suffered local oppression and inequality and felt that future opportunities were closed to their children. While incentives paid to male killers to hand in their guns can fuel resentment among their female victims, education carrots that go to the children of fighters are less controversial because the children of combatants so systematically suffer interruption to their education during a war.

Unfortunately, little of this strategy is the international community’s current preference. Western militaries prefer to do less of the cost-effective activity of peacekeeping so they can invest more in warmaking capabilities. Warmaking is much more costly than war prevention and crime prevention. To battle goes the glamour and glory for generals; this is their ‘core function’, their imaginary of the professionally excellent soldier. Western incumbent governments prefer to cut peacebuilding costs in post-conflict societies in the (usually correct) belief that if the country goes to hell as a consequence, that problem will haunt one of their political successors, not them. Chapter 2 argued that, both in the former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan, as their communist regimes collapsed, it was in the interests of the United States, Russia and European states to persevere with assertive joint diplomacy to tame armed groups and communal violence and invest in peacemaking that secured the rule of law and checks and balances. Yet, Soviet leader Gorbachev and US president George H. Bush decided it was in their interests not to spend resources on these objectives in Yugoslavia and Afghanistan, preferring to concentrate their resources and energies on pressing domestic concerns. The administrations of Boris Yeltsin and Putin in Russia and Clinton, George W. Bush and Obama in the United States continued for decades to bear massive costs in attempting to clean up the shambles left by the cheap diplomacy of their predecessors. The hope, of course, is that scholars can persuade voters in democracies that peace diplomacy on the cheap is bad governance—a short-termism in economics they should oppose. The evidence is strong that UN peace operations are more likely to be effective in preventing a return to war when they are of longer duration (Sambanis 2008: 29). Lengthening UN peace operations is a wise investment because of the evidence that the longer a peace can be held, the less likely is civil war to recur (Quinn et al. 2007), especially if the UN keeps working with locals at fixing governance problems and developing local capabilities.

Readers are perhaps thinking that our prescriptions are utopian. Undoubtedly, they are, although their realisation is a matter of degree. And, to a degree, the international community has begun to head in the
direction we suggest. In UN corridors there is an understanding today that a rush to holding an election and then pulling out of the peace operation is unwise. There is a recognition that moving to the first free multiparty election for 46 years in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in 2006, with the intention of withdrawing UN peacekeepers immediately after the election,8 served only to institutionalise the criminalisation of the state into the hands of the winning family. In civil society, the peace and democracy movement in Egypt and internationally now shares in a growing consensus that one tragic error of Egyptian civil society was to support a rush to a parliamentary election in 2011 and a presidential election in 2012, before a constitutional architecture—with agreed and entrenched checks and balances—was settled. Documentation, including lessons learned, is now available for longish and more successful transitions such as those in Liberia and Solomon Islands, where UN and regional peacebuilding became more active in embedding checks and balances.

Timor-Leste is the most refined and researched experience of the struggles and difficulties of a long transition. Timor-Leste was a difficult, imperfect journey of two steps forward, one step backward. Peace has been consolidated and the deeply impoverished economy has been growing briskly for many years now. Time heals, but economic recovery with political checks and balances heals even more. Collier (2007, 2009) argues that poverty is dangerous and that unchecked power also increases the risk of violence. Timor-Leste’s imperfect history of implementing checks and balances has been a great learning experience for the international community on hard questions such as how to ensure a diverse plurality of checks that enrich rather than destroy the capacity for decisive action by the executive government. These detailed challenges in the design of accountability institutions are not the topic of this particular book. In an earlier Peacebuilding Compared volume, however, we used the Timor-Leste experience to grapple in detail with how these dilemmas can be tackled (Braithwaite et al. 2012: 128–9).

What is extremely important to register as a conclusion of this book is that if the major powers had worked together and committed to invest both in financial terms and with technical assistance on a Timor-Leste–style transitional administration backed by UN peacekeepers in Afghanistan

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8 In the event, the United Nations had to fly more troops in after the election rather than flying troops out, because fighting broke out immediately after the election between supporters of the losing candidate and government forces.
in 1989, this might have prevented the rivers of blood that have flowed for two generations and greatly reduced the national debts under which NATO nations creak today. Similar points to those made about the failures of the major powers in Yugoslavia at the same time (Chapter 2) can be made about the failures of those major powers to pressure Pakistan and India in the 1940s and 1950s into a permanent Kashmir settlement to be overseen by a Timor-Leste–style UN transitional administration. Instead, what Kashmir got was ineffective cooperation between major powers whose diplomacy was enfeebled by what they saw as Cold War imperatives. From our interviews, it was evident that what Kashmir got was a largely symbolic UN peacekeeping operation that did little more than write reports when fighters crossed the Line of Control. We were told how big boxes of letters were sent to the UN mission and no one ever received a response. We have shown that what has cascaded from that diplomatic failure and underinvestment in peacebuilding has been a catastrophic cascade of violence that continues to jeopardise the nuclear non-proliferation regime, threatens nuclear terrorism and risks cascading mobile nuclear weapons into a nuclear contest with Israel (Chapter 5).

Timor-Leste is also instructive on the need for the United Nations to be ready to whisk military and police peacekeepers back into a country if the risk of civil war reignites. This happened in Timor-Leste in 2006 when the return of peacekeepers, enabled by the willingness of the Australian military to mobilise quickly, ultimately succeeded in helping the nation back on to a trajectory of peaceful development. Collier (2009: 85–9) has discussed the variety of options that are available for over-the-horizon guarantees for peace enforcement should new warlords decide to ignite violence during periods of post-conflict disorder. Collier (2009: 85) argues that the British military effectively made an over-the-horizon guarantee work to consolidate peace in Sierra Leone. In the late 2000s, there were only 80 British troops stationed in Sierra Leone, but the United Kingdom gave the government a 10-year guarantee that if violence were to ignite, troops would fly in overnight. Howard (2008: 338) sees UN learning in this:

When UN peacekeepers in Sierra Leone were attacked, rather than withdrawing the forces as was done in Rwanda, or not really doing anything, as in Bosnia, UN troops under siege in Sierra Leone were augmented by additional UN, ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States], and British troops.
Collier (2009: 86–7) further found that the French Government provided a similar informal guarantee to its former African colonies and that this informal over-the-horizon peacekeeping guarantee left Francophone Africa with a statistical conflict risk three-quarters lower than comparators.

This book shows that cascades of violence have overwhelmed much of South Asia because, while the British Empire left behind an incipient rule of law and democratic institutions, it did not leave a security sector capable of guaranteeing an orderly transition from colonialism. Britain also failed to do this in Africa, as did other European colonial powers, with disastrous cascades of civil war the result. Collier makes the point that the same thing happened in the centuries after the Roman Empire pulled out of Britain, leaving the region to civil war without any semblance of a state monopoly of force:

The history of Britain post-403 makes the post-colonial history of Africa look like a staggering success. Within a few years, the British had petitioned Rome to be recolonised: even heavy taxation was preferable to the absence of security and government. (Collier 2009: 173)

It is virtually impossible for a police force to survive a civil war without ceasing to be a servant of the rule of law. This is because, during war, a paramilitary organisation with armouries is like a 20-dollar bill sitting on the sidewalk, waiting for a warlord to pick it up and take it over. As Bayley and Perito (2010: 48) put it:

In post intervention environments, local police are normally unprepared, unwilling, or unfit to provide police services. As a result, looting, civil disorder, and crime increase until and unless the intervention forces in question take action.

As long as all armed groups are held in cantonment, transitional administrations have some time to assist with making the military part of security sector reform work. In contrast, for the police, the maximum challenges arise on day one after a ceasefire and cantonment. That is when there is maximum anomie on the streets. UN learning on how to repair the ship at sea, how to patch the holes in the ship of an emerging democratic police service, has been particularly slow. Yet international learning and patience with that crucial challenge are maturing (Howard 2008).
Cascades of nonviolence?

In many ways, it is a stretch to identify cascades of nonviolence in the history of South Asia since World War II. Yes, there have been dozens of armed conflicts and most of them ended at some point during these seven decades with a ceasefire and peace agreement of some kind. The pattern seems rather similar to the global pattern that is emerging in Peacebuilding Compared: peace mostly does not come quickly and easily and the successful peace agreement comes on the back of many, often dozens of, failed agreements and countless broken ceasefires. Chapter 5 found this to be the Indian pattern: policy learning accumulates from many failed peace agreements, while the final Indian peace tends to nurture reconciliation and reintegration and grant autonomy or powersharing concessions.

A pattern of intractability of conflict also seems an apt way to characterise war and peace in South Asia. Just as checks and balances in a polity have a profound but imperfect path dependence once in place, armed conflict is worse than path dependence once entrenched: it cascades to deeper problems. Peace seems settled for good, then war breaks out again between the same parties or it is started by a breakaway armed spoiler (Stedman 1997) from one of those parties. Even a peace agreement like the 1997 Chittagong Hill Tracts Accord that is celebrated internationally, with the prime minister receiving an international peace prize—and which does end a civil war—can usher in two more decades of intractable lower-level conflict that inflicts continuous militarisation, continuous violence, rape and land-grabbing, failure to implement most of the agreement and a persistent re-emergence of new generations of potential spoilers who are suppressed by violence from the state and from competing militarised factions. This is worse than a failure to move from negative peace to positive peace (conceived in this book as peace with justice); it is a partial and desperately flawed negative peace.

Two major wars that would have remained intractable were ended by decisive military defeats: the decimation of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in 2009 by the Sri Lankan state after 26 years and the defeat of the Pakistan state in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Liberation. The militarised termination of the Khalistan uprising in Punjab by Indian security forces was also rather decisive, although it was a militarised counterinsurgency accomplishment mostly of the police mobilising carrots as well as sticks, rather than a defeat through conventional
warfare. Other decisive military defeats, such as the fall of Dr Najibullah’s formerly communist regime in 1992 and of the Taliban regime in 2001 in Afghanistan, and the JVP’s first defeat in Sri Lanka, cascaded more civil wars.

The conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir have been both intractable and the most geopolitically significant in the region. These two conflicts have cascaded not only across South Asia, with terrorism in India’s metropoles and the rise of the Pakistani Taliban and Islamic State, but also across to Central Asia (Tajikistan, Uzbekistan), Chechnya (Russia), Xianjiang (China), the Middle East and even New York and Washington, and have destabilised the nuclear non-proliferation regime in places as far away as North Korea, Iran, Libya, Myanmar and Iraq. Kashmir and Afghanistan have seen many phases of their wars, dozens of failed peace processes in Afghanistan, more than 150 rounds of failed negotiations in Kashmir, hundreds of collapsed ceasefires, continuously failing UN peace operations and a ‘peace operation’ following the seemingly decisive military defeat of the Taliban in 2001 that has received more international funding than any in history—most of it wasted on dysfunctional ‘security sector reform’, quite a bit of it ending up in the Taliban’s pockets and in the pockets of Afghan commanders who sold weapons to their Taliban enemies. Iraq was a comparable failure of a ‘peace operation’ that prioritised ‘security sector reform’ funding that trained bad guys to shoot straight with American weapons.

This book is, nevertheless, about lifting our vision above the failures of Kashmir, Afghanistan and Iraq to see the peacebuilding glass half-full. We have seen that the quantitative work of Doyle and Sambanis (2000, 2006) and others shows systematically that, when peacekeeping is led by the United Nations rather than the United States, and is multidimensional, the effect size of the peacekeeping variable is substantial in reducing the incidence of war globally. As with international peace operations, so with domestic peacemaking, successes are less visible than failures to those not well read in the history of a particular country. Chapter 5 celebrated the peacemaking of Nehru, Indira Gandhi and legions of local peacemakers from civil society in preventing a regional autonomy struggle in Tamil Nadu from cascading into a major war. It was prevented from cascading into a much more terrible conflict than Kashmir’s wars by decisive concessions, with Tamil language rights and other autonomies transacted in a spirit of reconciliation. This was successful peacemaking of a kind that Pakistan failed to grasp in circumstances of some considerable similarity.
in Bangladesh. Chapter 4 shows that a formula similar to the Nehru/Gandhi model in Tamil Nadu was attempted with more mixed success in many north-east Indian conflicts. Uneven though the north-east Indian successes have been, many have ended protracted armed struggles for autonomy.

Chapters 5 and 9 in particular documented many qualified successes in reconciling ethnic conflicts. An example is the qualified success of finally securing a peace among the Naga—first, among Myanmar’s Naga minority, then, in Indian Nagaland in 2012, after so many prior failed peace agreements and the loss of perhaps 200,000 lives (Iralu 2003). Yet this must be balanced with failure to settle most of the Maoist/Naxalite conflicts in rural areas of half of India’s states (Chapter 5). Here, the dramatic contrast is with the Maoist civil war in Nepal. It was both more bloody and more successfully negotiated to a peace than any of India’s Maoist conflicts (Chapter 9).

Nepal’s game changer was the Citizens’ Movement for Democracy and Peace (CMDP). It persuaded the Maoist leadership that, if they renounced armed struggle and joined the nonviolent people-power struggle for constitutional reform that would overthrow the king, the Maoists would enjoy prospects of winning an election. This was persuasive because it was right: the Maoists did win the first post-conflict election, although they lost the second post-conflict election. The CMDP leaders also helped persuade Indian intelligence that this path to peace was in India’s interest. These overtures were so persuasive that India hijacked the peace negotiations! In the end game, however, it was the people power of millions on the streets of Nepal’s cities in 2006 that was decisive. Leader of the CMDP, Devendra Raj Panday, said: ‘It was the sheer numbers that lent us legitimacy’ (Interview in Kathmandu, 2014, No. 031415). The CMDP in its culmination was so massive that people power occupied the entire circumference of the 27 km ring road around Kathmandu and Lalitipur (Dixit 2011: 124).

Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) data on 323 resistance movements for maximalist societal change confirm this interpretation more systematically: nonviolent resistance movements had twice the success rate (53 per cent) of those that resisted regimes through armed struggle (26 per cent) in the long run. When nonviolent movements were strong enough to mobilise 3.5 per cent of the population on the street or through other forms of active political engagement in a sustained way, their success rate moved
to 100 per cent (Chenoweth 2013: 11). This initial percentage does not seem high, but it means massive mobilisation in absolute terms—100,000 people for Nepal. The 3.5 per cent result suggests there is a tipping point in cascades of nonviolence beyond which the security forces surrender the project of taming the crowd. The first 100 protestors on to the streets risk extreme violence, but each extra hundred that successively joins them enjoys lower risks, enabling a cascade to a tipping point where the security forces ultimately defect to the people. Organisational, as opposed to individual, auspices for a reasonably large initial surge on to the streets therefore increase the prospects of a rapid cascade of nonviolent resistance. These organisational auspices are documented for Nepal in Chapter 9; we can also see it with the first-mover role of the Polish trade union movement in commencing the European cascade of nonviolent uprisings that tore down the Iron Curtain. We also see this reality with people-power movements that in the end are captured by tyrants. The 1979 Iranian Revolution was mounted by a broad and plural political coalition, but was quickly captured by a ruthless theocracy, which had a superior organisational base in Islamic organisations. The Egyptian Arab Spring revolution in 2011 was plural on the streets, but then captured in quick succession by the superior organisational power of the Muslim Brotherhood and then the military.

The two main factors that drove the widespread initial success of nonviolence, according to these data, were that nonviolence was most effective when it could attract very large numbers of participants on to the streets and into the ranks of resistance campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011: 34–41) and when this, in turn, persuaded the security forces to withdraw support for the regime. Proposition 1 of our theory implies that, when regimes lose control of the means to crack down, they break down (Brownlee et al. 2015).

Even more instructive about the Nepalese case is that the unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by Maoists who joined arms with nonviolent people power swung the electorate behind them for a quick, clear path to power. What communists construed at first as the only successful communist revolution of this century seems quite an accomplishment. Yet this is exactly what happened to the African National Congress (of which the Communist Party was a major organisational member). When the leadership of Nelson Mandela and Oliver Tambo shifted South Africa’s resistance to Apartheid from armed struggle to a movement of nonviolent people power (the United Democratic Front), they won
(Braithwaite 2014a). Victory is what happened when Xanana Gusmao and José Ramos-Horta shifted the once Marxist Timor-Leste independence struggle from violence to nonviolence (Braithwaite et al. 2012). There are other historically recent cases of this ilk that are less familiar to most readers. An instructive one is the civil war involving the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (BRA) in Papua New Guinea (Regan 2010). This case is more persuasive concerning the potential power of a shift from armed to nonviolent struggle for justice because BRA leaders who joined the peace process became the first two elected presidents of the Autonomous Bougainville Government. In contrast, the longstanding leader of the BRA who held out for continuation of the armed struggle to victory, Francis Ona, was quickly marginalised by a war-weary people. He died a decade later without tasting power. When a people are so weary of war that a citizen’s movement can mobilise masses for peace, smart contemporary insurgents see the tipping point for defection to nonviolence.

Kashmir is a case where this did not happen. One reason is that, as with the Afghan Taliban’s early peacemakers, peacemakers among Kashmir’s jihadists were assassinated by Pakistan, by spoiler factions who agreed with the Pakistani prescription of continued insurgency within India and by deterrence-mad or retributive elements of the Indian security sector (Chapter 5). An even more important difference between Kashmir and Nepal, South Africa, Timor-Leste and Bougainville (or Northern Ireland) is that, in the last five cases, the international community gradually unified behind the good faith gestures of former insurgents for peace—even when they had been officially registered by the United States as terrorist organisations and/or communists. Chapter 5 interpreted peacemaking failures in Kashmir as the ‘India Shining’ effect. India was a shining light of democracy in the developing world, one that shifted from socialism to neoliberalism, from sympathy with Moscow to sympathy with Washington. The terrible paradox was that this allowed India to seem to the international community to have clean hands when it dominated Kashmir with democracy. When greater numbers of citizens pleading for azadi surged on to the streets of Kashmir in 2009 and 2010 than surged into the capitals of Arab Spring states, the indifference of Western states and Western civil society was near total. Westerners loved it when people power rose up against Muslim autocrats, but a Muslim uprising against domination by Hindu ‘democrats’—no thanks. In the 1980s and 1990s, Western diplomats and Western publics likewise declined to support massive surges of Muslim nonviolent resistance to Serbian
domination in Kosovo. In fact, the West actively punished nonviolence and then rewarded armed violence by supporting the KLA with NATO bombing when the KLA pushed aside nonviolent resistance (Marsavelski et al. 2017).

It was easier for Egyptian people power to persuade its military to defect from the regime to support the people because relatives of members of the military were assembled in Tahrir Square in 2011. Defection of the Indian military to people power in Kashmir was a taller mountain to climb because loyal Hindu soldiers from other Indian states were confronting Muslim protesters, most of whom had stronger loyalty to Pakistan than to India. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011: 48) data show that an important predictor of the success of nonviolent resistance is whether major factions of the state, particularly the military, defect to support the protesters. Even so, Timor-Leste shows that, with international support, people power can prevail against a foreign military of religious and ethnic others who stand fast against defection to the people. Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011) data show that the more total a resistance movement’s commitment to eschewing all forms of violent resistance, the more likely it is that the international community will support that nonviolent transition (Braithwaite 2014a; Schock and Chenoweth 2012).

In sum, Chapter 9 shows that the international community, late in the day (and late in the same way it shifted in South Africa, Timor-Leste and Bougainville), cascaded its support behind Nepal’s CMDP with total unanimity. This surge was in fact both very late and extraordinarily rapid and total. It was the end for the king. In Kashmir, the international community looked on as armed struggle shifted to mass nonviolent mobilisation and it felt sorry for India as its troops slaughtered children on the streets. The international community and media believed India when it lamented that Kashmir could elect whomever it liked to rule Jammu and Kashmir state.

While cascades of violence are relentlessly affirmed by our South Asian data, on first inspection, cascades of nonviolence seem a glass more than half empty. There is, however, a way of seeing nonviolent cascades in South Asia as half full, beyond Indian peacemaking cascades from success in Tamil Nadu to mixed success in north-eastern India and to greater success in pressuring peaceful resolution of the civil wars in Nepal and the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh. This involves seeing the progress of the nonviolence imaginary of which Gandhi was the most internationally
influential practitioner. That imaginary cascaded way beyond South Asia to Martin Luther King Jr in the United States, Nelson Mandela in South Africa and, to some extent, to Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar, who counted among those who acknowledged the influence of Gandhi in becoming advocates of a nonviolence that would settle only for a version of positive peace that meant peace with justice.

Moreover, as Chapter 3 argues, within South Asia, we can trace the influence on Gandhi of the nonviolence of his close friend Bacha Khan’s nonviolent movement against British colonialism and on behalf of Pashtun nationalism. On 23 April 1930, when Bacha Khan was arrested, protesters gathered in Peshawar’s Storytellers Bazaar. The British ordered troops to turn machine guns on the unarmed crowd, killing an estimated 200–250 people (Habib 1997). The ‘peace army’ acted in accordance with their nonviolence training under Bacha Khan, facing the bullets as the troops opened fire and continued to shoot (Johansen 1997). Two platoons of the the Garhwal Rifles refused to fire and were punitively court martialled, undermining the legitimacy of British rule. Bacha Khan’s funeral was a moment of awe and momentary triumph of nonviolence and his love for Afghanistan. Respecting his last wish to be buried in Jalalabad, Afghanistan, his funeral brought about a ceasefire in the Afghan
civil war, causing tens of thousands of Pakistanis to march peacefully through the Khyber Pass into the war zone. More than 200,000 people massed for a funeral attended by Afghanistan's president Najibullah in 1988. Erica Chenoweth's (2016a, 2016b) data show that before the time of the campaigns of Bacha Khan’s Peace Army and Gandhi’s Indian National Congress, nonviolent campaigns for regime change were almost non-existent globally.

Figure 11.1 Nonviolent and violent uprisings.
Source: Authors’ work, with thanks to Erica Chenoweth (2016a, 2016b: 2) for access to her Major Episodes of Contention dataset.

Figure 11.1 can be read as evidence of support for the existence of a growing global movement for nonviolence that was in large part given birth in imaginaries enacted in what are today Pakistan, India and Bangladesh. The failure of the international peace movement and peace journalists to mobilise support behind people power on the streets of Kashmir in 2009 and 2010, and the reversals of the Arab Spring after 2011, suggest this movement has a long way to go. Indeed, they suggest that nonviolent uprisings have become less effective in the present decade compared with previous decades (Chenoweth 2016b). A common cause of these failures is the jihad imaginary that cascaded from benign enough beginnings with the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East in the late decades of the
twentieth century and as a result of the war on Saddam Hussein in 1990 and the war on terror that included the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq. This was a jihad imaginary that cascaded to something progressively more violent in the trajectory from the Muslim Brotherhood to the Taliban, to Al-Qaeda, to Islamic State and to Boko Haram, and along other militant tributaries. It was precisely this ethos of militancy that motivated the spoilers of peace in Kashmir who assassinated jihadists engaged in constructive peace talks with the Indian state. It was Al-Qaeda and Islamic State activists with that ethos in Libya who, seeing the transformation from an authoritarian to a more liberal state that the Arab Spring delivered to neighbouring Tunisia, seized the initiative to steer the Libyan revolution on a barbarous path.

Anomic crises—chaos on the streets that questions who is in charge—create opportunities for advocates of a nonviolent politics that transcends the dominations of a Gaddafi-like regime. Equally, anomic creates opportunities for advocates of a more dominating rule by clerics even more barbaric and dominating than Gaddafi. Put another way, we see Proposition 7 of the theory as a contingent explanation of cascades of violence that can equally be hijacked to cascades of nonviolent resistance led from below. And we read failed peace processes in Kashmir, which led to the assassination of jihadist peacemakers without attracting much interest beyond Kashmir, as a conjuncture where the international community allowed Proposition 7 to be true and allowed anomic to cascade to violence. This when it might have cascaded to nonviolence with the right kind of international support and protection for the peacemakers. Astute and aggressive players can flip cascades of nonviolence to cascades of violence or they can use the opportunity of anomic to flip cascades of violence to nonviolence. The key variable is which side has the organisational base and strategy to do the flipping.

In terms of macro cleavages, we conceive three ‘master cleavages’ in south Asia:

1. A nonviolent South Asian imaginary with Bacha Khan and Gandhi as pre-eminent model missionaries.

2. An imaginary that cascaded from Marx and Mao to University of Kabul leftists, to a Soviet-backed communist regime in Afghanistan, to Marxist/Maoist armed uprisings across South Asia (from the Janathā Vimukthi Peramuṇa (JVP) in Sri Lanka, to Nepal and Myanmar, to rural uprisings in half the states of India).
3. A jihadist imaginary that cascaded from the medieval caliphate to the Muslim Brotherhood, to 1970s Islamist students at the University of Kabul, to the Taliban, Al-Qaeda, Islamic State and a complex archipelago of jihadist groups/cells/loners.

South Asia is one of the few regions of the world where the Maoist master cleavage still clings to significant vibrancy. The nonviolent imaginary of resistance to domination and the super-violent imaginary of jihadist resistance have spread activist hotspots to almost every country in the world.

From global to local contingency: Struggles, reconciliation and peace zones

The imperative for diplomacy to avert humiliation, discussed earlier, emphasised the importance of this at the level of village as well as national–international diplomacy. Upper-caste and police domination of indigenous and lower-caste people and women in Rolpa and nearby villages in the hills of Nepal gave rise to a local Maoist politics of resistance. That local imaginary of struggle against very local injustices found a larger meaning in terms of the Marxist/Maoist macro cleavage. This connected supralocal actors from Marxist parties and intellectuals in Kathmandu and ultimately an archipelago of local dominations and local Maoist imaginaries dotted across rural Nepal and down into rural India and Bhutan. Kalyvas (2003: 475) theorises such alliances as resulting in violence that aggregates the local and the supra-local, ‘yet still reflects their diverse goals’ in ‘complex and ambiguous processes that foster the “joint” action of local and supralocal actors’. Nepal and all our country cases are rich examples of concatenations of cleavages ‘loosely arrayed around the master cleavage’ or cleavages (Kalyvas 2003: 486).

According to Kalyvas, violence arises from master cleavages and from local cleavages, but, most importantly, from interaction between the two. For example, when thousands of Kurdish Yazidi women were drafted into sexual slavery from 2014 in Iraq and Syria, this did not motivate feminist fighters from all over the world to travel thousands of kilometres to join the fight against Islamic State. But, at the local level, the unequal treatment of Yazidi women did motivate Kurdish women to travel hundreds of kilometres—from across the border in Iran, for example—to join the fight.
And they motivated one another through a global feminist imaginary. Our key example is a Maoist class cleavage that enrolled a village-level gendered cleavage about rape by police; in reverse, local feminists enrolled the master Maoist cleavage to embrace specific local feminist objectives, such as female judges for the Rolpa People’s Courts. This upward enrolment infiltrated the Maoist political platform. The result was joint action that forged a majority-female Maoist army in Rolpa that advanced a Maoism that had a distinctively local feminist hybridity. As Jonathan Spencer (1990: 12) said about Sri Lanka, villagers did not ‘simply have politics thrust upon them; rather they appropriated politics and used them for their own purposes’. Often these are not political purposes. They may be about revenge, infidelity, piety, criminality, land, sorcery (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 29, 31, 67, 81, 95, 113, 123; Forsyth n.d.) or many other matters. Sometimes they are dominating and violent purposes; sometimes they are anti-domination and nonviolent purposes.

It follows from this approach, and from the data in this book, that Kalyvas’s analysis of the joint local/supralocal production of violence is frequently true of the joint local/supralocal production of nonviolence. Chapter 2 sought to illustrate from our fieldnotes the local jirgas and reconciliation committees where locals have parochial nonviolent projects about ending blood feuds, while police attend with the role of defending the integrity of the rule of law as an institution. At least some of them do. Ali Gohar and John Braithwaite were attending those meetings as emissaries of a supralocal imaginary of a social movement for restorative justice that in turn has linkages to the peace movement globally. Some of those sitting in the circle had some understanding of this restorative justice imaginary and approved of it, and even saw it as something inspired by Bacha Khan; others knew nothing of it and cared nothing for it. But, when the Australian Government and the Asia Foundation provided funding for the building where the reconciliation committee could meet, safe from the Taliban’s suicide bombers, those with no engagement with restorative nonviolence were nevertheless most pleased to seize this opportunity to end the cycle of murders in which their families were embroiled.9 They were, to a degree, model mercenaries with that foreign aid. Ali Gohar

9 An approach influenced by Kalyvas (2003) to understanding the cascading of both violence and nonviolence might avert the myopia of seeing warmaking as the business of states and peacebuilding as statebuilding. It might avert stigmatising local reconciliation as corrupting the rule of law and, on the other hand, avert romanticising the local as the repository of all things great (Wallis 2014: 347).
was a restorative justice model missionary and John Braithwaite a model monger, who moved Pakistan to his front burner for a period simply because its government and his friends invited him to visit (see Chapter 2).

In more direct ways, across the Peacebuilding Compared dataset, we see local peacemakers of many stripes. They often create islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) in circumstances in which the national politics of peace has totally collapsed. This is more than local peacemakers making a local contribution to a national peace, though they may do that as well. Peacemaking that builds a higher-quality peace locally—a positive peace as opposed to a negative peace—may create at a village level a peace superior to the negative peace forged at the national level, or a superior regional peace, as we have seen in Somaliland, Somalia and in nonviolence in North Nasioni, Bougainville (Braithwaite et al. 2010b: 36–40; Reddy 2012). This regional peace can then cascade more widely. Even when there is only one village where the killing is stopped, surrounded by hundreds of villages where violence escalates, that village can become the only safe space where peacemakers can meet to advance the project of cascading a wider peace. That is precisely what happened in Ambon, Indonesia, where the one de facto zone of peace, Wayame Village, was where the Muslim Concerned Women’s Movement and the Christian Concerned Women’s Movement were able to meet without being killed (Braithwaite et al. 2010a: 160–2). These brave women then guided the early leadership towards a sustained peace across Ambon and Maluku province 15 years on.

A contrast is Mindanao, Philippines, where a sustainable national peace has remained elusive so far in spite of many peace agreements. Here, Islamic State in 2017 took over: at the time of writing a terrible battle rages between Islamic State and the Philippines military for control of one of our Peacebuilding Compared fieldwork sites, the hotspot city of Marawi. Some Mindanao ‘peace zones’ were exploited by the state military. Other, church-initiated peace zones, and some established with UN support as part of the 1996 peace deal with the Moro National Liberation Front that led to more war with spoiler groups, were examples of islands of some success within a sea of failure (Avruch and Jose 2007; Iyer 2004; S-CAR 2015). They were limited successes not only in securing a limited local peace, but also in jump-starting modest local economic development as fighting continued around them. An example of much more contained local peacemaking success in the midst of even more devastating national/international failure were the efforts of organisations such as the Carter Center to assist in the negotiation of local ceasefires and humanitarian
pauses early in the Syrian civil war, at least so thousands of trapped refugees could be excised from the slaughter (Interviews with Carter Center leadership in the United States, 2013, No. 111301).

In Idlib City, Syria, it has been impossible for civilians to escape from the fighting and the domination of Jeish al-Fateh, which includes Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, formerly known as the Al-Qaeda regional affiliate the Al-Nusra Front. But civil society organisations including, prominently, the Idlib Youth Group, Women’s Fingerprints, Glimmer of Hope, the Association of Educated Women and the National Opposition for Idlib Intellectuals used nonviolent tactics to demonstrate to the militants that they could not govern Idlib City without the support of its people, and that support depended on giving the people a democratic voice and reducing oppressive violence against them (Taleb 2017).

In Latin America, there have been citywide peace and reconciliation processes as civil war continued to rage nationally. A move from ‘iron fist’ (mano dura) policies to violence prevention, reconciliation, reintegration and social development in Bogota and Medellin, in Colombia, in the 1990s saw homicide reductions of 65 per cent and 80 per cent, respectively (Mallonee 2015). For Medellin, which had a homicide rate of 400 per 100,000 before the intervention, this meant saving more than a few thousand lives every year (Braithwaite 2002: 212–13). This pacification of some of Colombia’s most violent cities may have shown a path in a way that assisted the wider peace now dawning across that country.

We saw in Chapter 4 that El Salvador was an example of a civil war that had a ‘successful’ peace process in 1992 in terms of terminating the war, but which delivered a peace in which more people were being killed in homicides by criminal gangs and femicides than were being killed at the height of the war. A March 2012 peace process among the major gangs, brokered by the Catholic Church, but driven at the time by the national government, resulted in a 14-month truce during which homicides per day fell by more than 60 per cent until the truce began to unravel in mid-2013 (Seelke 2015). Some of this decline may have been a result of gangs wanting to create an appearance of homicide reduction by ‘disappearing’ people rather than killing them openly in the street. Disappearances overall, however, were on a long-run trajectory of increase before the truce and increased somewhat less steeply during the truce (Carcach and Artola 2016: 16).
The Catholic Church's intervention strategy was based on the probably correct analysis that a root cause of gang growth was that El Salvador has one of the most extreme levels of economic inequality in the world. That root cause is probably multiplied by an honour culture in which men feel impelled to respond to humiliation, domination and violence with violence (see also Denny and Walter 2012). Therefore, a gang truce was needed that built hope through reintegration and educational and job opportunities for gang members and that gave an honourable path to ending cycles of revenge for the sake of the nation, sealed by the prayers of the church. This particular truce was politically corrupted and hardly secured this, with political parties using the church as a front for getting gangs to deliver votes in areas they controlled. Even so, it did work in reducing homicide. The aspiration of church leaders had been rather like the rationale for the Pakistani reconciliation committees, which reformed jirgas as a peacemaking strategy in a cultural context that demanded revenge in a similar way to the Salvadorian gang code requirements for retaliation (Braithwaite and Gohar 2014). The negotiated truce package in El Salvador included establishing high schools as ‘peace zones’, gang undertakings to end the recruitment of children and to eliminate death as a penalty for leaving a gang. It proposed targeting 18 municipalities as initial peace zones with weapons surrender and termination of all gang crime, including extortion and violence against women in the peace zones, followed by spreading peace zones from community to community (Wells 2013).
In the first 17 months after the government called off the truce and thrust the military on to the streets to battle the gangs, homicides per day increased by 57 per cent in the first year, then higher still to the highest level per day for a decade in the early months of 2015 (Lakhani 2015). By 2016, El Salvador worsened further to again become the only country in the world with an annual homicide rate above 100 per 100,000 adults. Law-and-order election auctions, as our Peacebuilding Compared interviews revealed in this El Salvador case, are a form of violence cascade. They share features with the cascades of crime–war caused by the invasions of Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. Across Latin America, we see model missionaries and model mercenaries of the ‘iron fist’ type in contest with missionaries of more restorative strategies.

The growing literature on peace zones informs model mongers of diverse options. Exploring them systematically remains an ambition for another book that evaluates the evidence on the effectiveness of peace zones in diverse sites, complementing books already addressing this topic (e.g. Hancock and Mitchell 2007; Odendaal 2013). Examples are not as diverse and rich in South Asia as in some other regions. There have been securitised equivalents to the peace zones idea in Sri Lanka and Afghanistan that were manipulated for military subjugation, just as the Salvadoran truce was manipulated for political party subjugation. These militarised peace zones were not cascades of nonviolence. They were closer to, or part of, the counterinsurgency (COIN) tradition of gradually expanding secure areas under state military control, in a line from Malaya (1954–60), Kenya (1955–60) and Vietnam (1966–75). A possible exception is Ahmadabad and the Sayid Karam District of Afghanistan’s Paktia province, which saw some impressive tribal leadership when tribal elders said to the Taliban and to American and Afghan government forces in effect:

We don’t like your war. Don’t fight it in our lands. If you try to, the noncooperation of the tribes with everything you try to do will make life difficult for you. (Interview with Paktia tribal leaders, 2014, No. 121406)

As of 2015, these districts continued to be free of fighting for many years, although all the claims about this case need more careful up-to-date evaluation by researchers on the ground in Paktia. South African

Arena hired former New York mayor Rudolf Giuliani and his consulting business (The Economist 2015) to fly in to advocate zero tolerance and prosecution of children as adults (Rodriguez 2015). The leftist government lost its nerve and renounced the truce to woo middle-class median voters in the lead-up to the 2014 election, which the rightist opposition almost won with 49.9 per cent of the vote.
peace committees had important local successes in preventing conflict in the early 1990s—for example, in steering African National Congress and Inkatha Freedom Party funeral marches along different routes so they would not clash (Peacebuilding Compared South Africa interviews). These peace committees have been modelled with some success in many African countries, with notable success in preventing electoral violence in Ghana, for example (Odendaal 2012). This model was also picked up, with very limited success, in the Nepalese village-level peace committees. Their accomplishments in Nepal were meagre because these local committees were captured top-down by the machines of the major political parties: ‘partyocracy in Nepal’ (Interview with Kathmandu newspaper editor, 2014, No. 031410; see also Odendaal and Olivier 2008)—another resonance with our El Salvador interviews. Odendaal’s (2012, 2013) study of peace committees in 10 countries concluded that they were much more successful at the subnational level and that six out of 10 sailed into political headwinds and failed to achieve legitimacy at the national level. Mixed results are also evident in van Tongeren’s (2013) evaluation across 10 countries. Peace zones, and the conditions for their effectiveness in cascading nonviolence and averting the pitfalls of militarisation, will engage the Peacebuilding Compared project with more systematic research in future. The peace zones literature is an immature one, with limited empirical rigour at this stage of its development.

Rethinking domination: Inequality, exploitation, crime and wars

An inference from our data has been that domination more richly and consistently explains violence than a thin conception of inequality measured by a national Gini coefficient. One way domination is thicker than inequality is that it better enables the integration of explanatory theory and normative theory (Pettit and Braithwaite 2000), specifically through its connection to a civic republican conception of freedom (as nondomination that is secured by separations of powers). Yet thin inequality is an important constituent of thick domination, so we must consider the vast quantitative literatures on the relationships between economic inequality, poverty, crime and war.
These bodies of literature are contradictory, contorted and confusing. At the individual level, people who are poor are much more likely to commit direct crimes of interpersonal violence such as assault, murder and rape, and common property crimes such as robbery, burglary and theft (Braithwaite 1979; but see Tittle et al. 1978). Unemployment may have a stronger impact on increasing the criminality of individuals with prior criminal records or with a propensity to crime than individuals who lack such predispositions (Aaltonen et al. 2013: 587). When it comes to major organisational crimes—corruption, embezzlement, price fixing, securities fraud, criminal profit shifting into tax havens, environmental crime, work safety crimes and genocide—poor people are generally not responsible because they do not have incumbency in the positions of organisational power required to be a lead perpetrator. In other words, opportunity is one variable that complicates the picture as we move from interpersonal murder to mass murder, from holding up banks at the point of a gun to pillaging them at the point of a pen (Marsavelski and Braithwaite 2018). Scions of high society can exploit the realisation that the best way to rob a bank is to own it; the homeless cannot. Systematic quantitative data on the relationship between organisational crime and inequality are scarce, though levels of organised crime (Pinotti 2015) and corruption are positively correlated with income inequality in the work of Lappi-Seppälä and Lehti (2014).

Most studies that compare census tracts of cities or whole cities, counties, states or standard metropolitan statistical areas find that districts and cities with higher levels of poverty or income inequality have higher crime rates (Braithwaite 1979; Chamberlain and Hipp 2015; Cheong and Wu 2015; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Scorzafave and Soares 2009), with poverty effects being somewhat more consistent than inequality effects on homicide in 47 studies analysed by Pridemore (2011: 752–3). With property crime, class-related opportunity structures again complicate the picture as we move from the individual level of analysis to ecological analysis. The richer opportunities in wealthy areas for crimes such as burglary and car theft have some effect in driving up rates in wealthy areas. Poor people who live close to rich areas commit more

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13 Time-series results on the impact on crime of changes in the level of inequality, poverty or unemployment have always been more inconsistent than data on individual poverty or ecological inequality cross-sectionally (see Brush 2007). Reconciling these differences in favour of seeing inequality as something that must be reduced to conquer crime has long been a focus of John Braithwaite’s research (Braithwaite 1979, 1991b; Kapuscinski et al. 1998).
property crime than other poor people. Poor areas adjacent to rich areas have higher property crime rates than poor areas far away from wealthy census tracts (Boggs 1965; Chamberlain and Hipp 2015; more generally on the spatial mobility of offenders, see Eck and Weisburd 2015: 17). When we aggregate to the societal level, statistical comparisons of societal property crime rates have limited meaning because some police forces are more efficient than others at recording petty property crimes (and the more common petty crimes drive the numbers, not serious crime). Also, in different legal systems, ‘burglary’, ‘break and enter’, ‘break without entering’ and ‘entering without breaking in’ can mean different things.¹⁴

With homicide rates, reasonably meaningful comparisons are possible, however, because it is hard for police forces to fail to record a body that turns up with a knife in its back. Homicide is also measured imperfectly, but has reasonably similar meanings cross-nationally. On the other hand, officially measured homicide rates tend to undercount homicide in the countries where it is worst and most militarised, as we saw with failures to count disappearances as homicides in El Salvador. With homicide, high income inequality is consistently associated with high homicide rates (Braithwaite and Braithwaite 1980; Fajnzylber et al. 2000; Hsieh and Pugh 1993; Nivette 2011; but see Pare and Felson 2014;¹⁵ Pridemore 2011).¹⁶ Evidence of low-income countries having more crime has historically been inconsistent, although in recent decades it has become quite a consistent pattern that the high-income societies of Western Europe and East Asia have extremely low homicide rates. With falling US crime rates, its exceptionalism from an association between high income and low homicide has reduced (Butchart and Mikton 2014: 12).

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¹⁴ When survey data are collected consistently across a large number of countries, as in Elgar et al.’s (2009) finding of a correlation of 0.62 between income inequality and rates of bullying in 37 countries, we can take an interest in the possibility that inequality is conducive to societal cultures of bullying. We should also be cautious, however, that the bullying measure might mean rather different things in translation among different tongues and societal contexts. In most, however, bullying has a meaning close to our conception of domination.

¹⁵ Pare and Felson (2014) find both strong inequality and strong poverty effects in increasing crime at the cross-national level. However, inequality effects disappeared after controlling for poverty.

¹⁶ Pridemore (2011) compares 47 studies to show that income inequality is consistently associated with higher homicide rates cross-nationally. His analyses further show that this relationship always remains if gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is included in the model. However, he finds in a number of studies that, when child mortality is included in the model, the income inequality effect disappears.
Countries with a wide gap between the rich and the poor (or countries with a high Gini coefficient for income inequality) very consistently have higher homicide rates.

Braithwaite (1991b) has argued that at the societal level even the complication caused by the organisational crimes of the rich can be elegantly resolved. In radically unequal societies, the rich tend to enjoy unaccountable power, while the poor are desperately powerless. A narrow elite puts in place extractive political institutions that concentrate power in their hands; they disable constraints on the exercise of that power. This in turn allows the elite to put in place extractive economic institutions that exploit the rest of society (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). The powerful are able to buy their way out of trouble with the law, while the poor are denied access to justice in radically unequal societies. Hegemony and the purchase of impunity create profound opportunities for crimes of the powerful; the degradation, hopelessness, loss of identity and meaning of the poor foster crimes of the powerless. Hence, unequal societies have both more crimes of the powerless because the powerless are exploited and more crimes of the powerful because the powerful exploit (Braithwaite 1991b). Inequality produces crimes of exploitation and quite different crimes of the exploited.

The quantitative literature on civil war, GDP per capita and income inequality seems at first to paint a somewhat opposite picture. It is poverty conceived as national GDP per capita that predicts war, not inequality between rich and poor. ‘The bottom billion’ in GDP per capita is at profoundly greater risk of civil war. Moreover, Collier (2007: 19–20) summarises the literature as clearly showing that poverty contributes to war and war (or the anticipation of war) contributes to disinvestment and poverty. Wars also last longer in low-income countries (Collier 2007: 26) than elsewhere. Fearon and Laitin (2003), furthermore, found that low GDP per capita and weak institutions are associated with the onset of civil war, but they argue that GDP may be a proxy for weak institutions.17 In most studies, countries with high income inequality do not have higher risks of war, although Collier et al. (2004) found that conflicts in unequal societies lasted longer than elsewhere.

17 The frequency with which infant mortality emerges as a considerably stronger predictor than GDP per capita of the probability of civil war recurrence (e.g. Quinn et al. 2007: 187) might mean that infant mortality is an even better proxy for weak governance institutions.
When we move down to the village level, as in Nepal et al.’s (2011) study of 3,857 Nepalese villages (Chapter 9), villages/districts with a wide gap between landlords and landless have higher rates of war deaths. Systematic qualitative comparisons of dozens of rural Indian districts that have and have not experienced Maoist uprisings likewise conclude that locally unequal development is the key variable (e.g. Chakrabarty and Kujur 2009), as opposed to national inequalities. Local dominations are critical to decisions to join civil wars in village societies. Rome is far away and most poor people do not know or care much about the politics of the capital. Mobilisation is local rather than national in terms of putting together armed units that are motivated to take and hold a district. As illustrated by the rise of the Nepalese Maoists and the Taliban from very local concerns, once a local armed group pacifies a remote niche, this can become a base for building bigger ambitions and wider imaginaries as victories expand opportunities for power and plunder, and as alliances are forged with other armed groups in control of other districts. Grievances over national inequalities are not as critical to this process as the aggregation of grievances over very different kinds of local inequalities.

This perspective helps account for why Philip Verwimp (2005) found that poor and tenant farmers were overrepresented among génocidaires, while landlords were disproportionately victims. Poverty and promises of wealth were associated with recruitment to rebel armies in Sierra Leone (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Catherine Riordan (2013) points to this research and other data to suggest a conclusion for the inequality–war relationship similar to Braithwaite’s (1979, 1991b) about the inequality–crime relationship:

Recent findings indicate that in societies characterized by greater levels of inequality, members of both wealthy and poor ethnic groups are more likely to be involved than those whose income is near the national average (Cederman, Weidmann and Gleditsch 2011). This could be explained by the engagement of the wealthy in conflict to defend their property, and the engagement of the poor in order to increase their wealth; or as a synergistic product of inequality: poor people increasingly participate in conflict as they become poorer, and wealthy people have more to contribute financially to conflict as they become wealthier, meaning that greater inequality drives greater participation into conflict (Esteban and Ray 2011). (Riordan 2013: 35)
Riordan’s interpretation of the data goes to the often heard rebuttal of the claim that terrorists are disproportionately poor people by reference to the wealth of Osama bin Laden or other terrorist leaders. Yes, top leaders may be disproportionately wealthy exploiters; however, the suicide bombers and foot soldiers are disproportionately poor, manipulated and exploited. The inequality–war relationship is complicated by the fact that fighting a war requires organisational capacity to mobilise many fighters and to buy credible weaponry. In this business, the rich have more organisational capacity (to enrol and coopt foot soldiers) than the poor, and greater buying power for weapons. Poverty and injustice do not cause war unless poor people with a grievance can connect with wealthy people who fund the logistics of feeding and arming troops. Barrington Moore (1966) reached the conclusion that landless peasants are unlikely to rise against their oppression unless some external power takes their side against the power that constrains them. Insurgencies of the disenfranchised do not scale up to winning wars without external sponsors. Aboriginal defenders of the Australian continent did not inflict major defeats on white land thieves because no external power, wealthy benefactor or diaspora was supplying arms to them. For the comparatively poor Taliban fighters of Kandahar in 1994, we saw that these financial backers initially were the Quetta trucking mafia who were fed up with being shaken down in this lawless zone, then, later, Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and Gulf petrodollars. Later, we saw that the destitute fighters of Peshawar’s refugee camps were connected to the wealth of Osama bin Laden.

Riordan (2013) goes on to argue that, as a long-deprived group in a society becomes better off, it has better means to engage in conflict (Besançon 2005). Consistent with Nepal et al. (2011), Riordan (2013: 35) then contrasts local with national inequality effects:

When examined at the micro-level, however, areas of countries which had more absolute poverty were more prone to outbreaks of conflict, suggesting that inequality increased the risk of conflict (Buhaug et al. 2011; see also Buhaug and Rød 2006). It seems that not only does inequality play a role in the incidence of conflict, conflict itself further exacerbates economic inequality, although this effect diminishes over time and inequality typically returns to pre-war levels within five years after conflict ends (Bircan, Brück and Vothknecht 2010).

The capacity and opportunity to mobilise against governments and to have complaints listened to reduce armed violence, as does the absence of state-led discrimination against certain groups (Braithwaite et al. 2010a;
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Cederman et al. 2011; Fearon and Laitin 2000, 2003; Goldstone 2008: 5; Gurr 1993, 2000; Linder and Bächtiger 2005; Rørbæk and Knudsen 2015; Wimmer et al. 2009). The World Development Report (World Bank 2017: 8–9, 119) has taken up this theme, showing that societies with more even internal balances of power have less violent national security outcomes. We can conceive this considerable body of studies in different ways as measuring the positive impact of inequality of political power on armed violence, as opposed to inequality of wealth, although these different forms of inequality are themselves correlated.

Such positive associations of different kinds of inequality are the core of the theory of intersectionality in feminist theory (e.g. Cooper 2015). Societies in which gender-based violence is normal in families are more likely to engage in militarism and war than societies with lower levels of gender-based violence (Cockburn 2001; Erchak 1994; Erchak and Rosenfeld 1994; Levinson 1989; see also Caprioli 2005; Hudson et al. 2009, 2012). One interpretation of this is that boys and young men who learn in families that they can get their way through violence experience reinforcement of violence that generalises to how they conduct themselves as men in the community and in international affairs (Patterson 2008). Societies where gender inequality is higher are more likely to deploy military power in conflicts (Caprioli 2000, 2003; Caprioli and Boyer 2001; Caprioli and Trumbore 2006; Hudson et al. 2009, 2012; Melander 2005; Sobek et al. 2006). In a variety of ways, Hudson et al. (2009; 2012: Ch. 4) have shown that states are more likely to enjoy security when the women who live in them enjoy security from domination. The evidence is consistent with the interpretation that gender inequality in a society grows sexual and gender-based violence and this increases the prospects of violence in the national and international politics of that society. Moreover, we have seen that, across South Asia, war has increased sexual and gender-based violence during and after conflict. So there is a recursivity that reinforces cycles of gender inequality, violence against women, war and then further increases in violence against women.

Intrasocietal violence against women is driven by an unequal politics of domination and humiliation in a way that helps us understand how violent patriarchy at home might promote armed violence against women abroad:

Humiliation [can] motivate violence among those humiliated and [more fundamentally] enables violence among those who humiliate. Hence, the degradation of women countenanced by men who do not grant women
dominion enables rape and violence against women on a massive scale in patriarchal societies, not to mention commercial exploitation of the bodies of women by actors who might ambiguously be labelled as white-collar criminals. Empirical work on homicides by men against women confirms that homicide can be viewed as an attempt by the male to assert ‘… their power and control over their wives’ (Wallace 1986: 126; Polk and Ranson 1991). (Braithwaite 1991b: 50)

Heirigs and Moore (2017) confirm that, after controlling for the Gini coefficient (and other controls), higher gender inequality is associated with higher homicide rates cross-nationally.

One reason exploited poor people find it hard to organise nationally for the violent overthrow of the state is that a society’s poorest people are often a minority. Consider the invasion of the continents of North America and Australia by comparatively rich people from Europe. The invaders quickly became organised in states such as Massachusetts and Virginia and then in federal states—the United States of America, Canada and Australia—militarised with the most modern technologies for killing. Aboriginal Australians and Native Americans could give the first settlers a difficult time in pushing back the invaders of their land, but, as soon as
European numbers grew and mounted troops followed, genocide quickly spread and resistance collapsed. Aboriginal Australians did not have the resources or the national organisational capabilities to unify sufficiently to fight a credible war against the white state. Of course, local grievances often triggered local uprisings, which created opportunities to ‘teach blacks a lesson’. But, once Aboriginal Australians were stripped of the land that was the source of their wealth, once their population fell to less than 3 per cent of the population of their colonised country—an impoverished, dispersed 3 per cent without the resources to buy the guns to take on the superior firepower of the colonisers—civil war was unthinkable for them.

Hence, the deepest structural inequalities in the world, such as those that Aboriginal Australians continue to suffer, rarely lead to civil war. That is one important reason the statistical association between national inequalities and war is inconsistent. Inequality drives high crime rates in a different way, however. Aboriginal Australians committed murder and were victims of murder at seven to eight times the rate of the general population between 1989 and 2000 (Mouzos 2001). Their overrepresentation in the prison system is even worse. In fact, it is twice as bad again. Aboriginal Australians are disproportionately victims of state crime such as police violence compared with richer people with lighter skin, because they are an impoverished people whose identity and sense of meaning have been decimated, who have lost hope for themselves and who struggle to pass on hope to their children.18

Domination and inequality are highly correlated phenomena. The inductive theoretical conclusion of this book is that domination rather than poverty is the best specification to explain civil war. We can focus on domination within a Kalyvas (2003) model of local cleavages that interact with supralocal structural inequalities. As in Nepal et al.’s (2011) data, because mobilisation against grievances is local, village dominations can give rise to mobilisation of local armed groups, especially if supralocal linkages enable local access to organisational and financial capacities for

18 Restorative forms of indigenous justice offer a limited micro strategy for resisting this form of domination. For example, in a recent Aboriginal sentencing circle in Canberra, Australia, Aboriginal elders asked a young man who committed a serious crime whether he was Ngunnawal, who was his ‘mob’ or tribe? He said he did not know who any of his relatives were. He was sentenced to producing a research report on who his relatives were and what his identity was. The elders offered their support on his journey of finding them. Two months later, he reported back not only on who his newly discovered mob were, but also on offers from his mob to help him with rehabilitation, with finding meaning in his identity and fighting nonviolently for it (Braithwaite research notes).
army formation. Chairman Mao understood this. It is why Maoist strategy was about building rural armed groups around the local grievances of the most immiserated peasants, who were most dominated by their landlords. Then Maoists spread this strategy from hotspot to hotspot until, ultimately, these village struggles connected. An armed countryside ultimately surrounds the capital. Our empirical conclusion is that dozens of Maoist struggles, mostly in quite remote regions of South Asia, continue today to successfully exploit local grievances and cause local killing. They are not so successful at connecting today (except in Nepal until 2006) and not so successful today in spreading a Maoist imaginary.

This book also explored the rise of very different kinds of grievances over local dominations typified by the rise of the Taliban. While local jihadist groups derive their sense of domination from the militarised oppression and exclusionary practices they experience in their corner of the Kashmir Valley, the Swat Valley, Iraq or Libya, as with Maoism, their sense of local grievance is connected to a global imaginary (about jihad against oppression by Western infidels and their Eastern dupes). Peacebuilding Compared finds that refugee camps and madrassas near them funded by jihadists are critical local sites for allying resentment over the local experience of domination to global cleavages, to a global domination imaginary and to global crowd-sourcing from rich sponsors.

This is another sense in which national inequality is not the best specification with which to approach domination. So why is national inequality not the best way to see the effects of domination? Why is domination at the local level (which intersects with more global imaginaries of domination) the more pressing imperative for civil war prevention? The domination of being a Palestinian refugee in Lebanon or Syria with no job, no home, no right to return home, no country, no access to education and subject to targeting and systematic murder by foreign armies illustrates why. In Peshawar, Al-Qaeda proved more adept at fixing those dominations than the UNHCR and Western humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) (see Chapter 9, particularly Box 9.2). In addition, global domination of Muslims must be addressed. It is just as hard to reverse the colonial occupation of Arab lands by the West during World War I or the humiliation of the Mughal Empire by the British army in the previous century, as it is to reverse the European decimation of Aboriginal Australia or the indigenous nations of South Africa. Yet Apartheid can be dismantled and discrimination against Aboriginal Australians and Aboriginal land rights can be tackled—for example, through achieving
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Australia’s ‘closing the gap’ targets. Likewise, discrimination against Arabs in Israel can be confronted, Palestinian land rights can be addressed with justice, Palestinian refugees can be given their right to return to their homeland and bombing of Gaza’s economic infrastructure and cutting off its economy from global markets (which delivers Gaza a 43 per cent unemployment rate) can end. In South Asia, Muslim Kashmiris can be given an active voice in shaping a permanent peace settlement for Kashmir that they view as fair in all circumstances, against the background of the complex of geopolitical realities that confronts their valley. Hindu and Sikh Kashmiris can likewise be respected with an active voice in those same processes.

An important recursive relationship here is, first, that state-based discrimination, particularly as measured in the Polity dataset, is associated with higher armed conflict (Akbaba and Taydas 2011; Cederman et al. 2011; Gurr 1968, 1970, 1993, 2000; Regan and Norton 2005; Wimmer et al. 2009; but see Jakobsen and De Soysa 2009). Vadlamannati (2011) has confirmed Gurr’s (1970) ‘why men rebel’ conclusion on quantitative data across nine north-east Indian states. He found that poverty (compared with the rest of India) and economic and political discrimination explained outbreaks of violent conflict after controlling for income, population pressures, state capacity, ethnic affiliations, forest areas, peace years, neighbouring conflict incidence and distance to New Delhi. Furthermore, Rodrik (2000: 25), using the Polity dataset, showed that the ability of non-elites to access political institutions increases national economic growth. In other words, while national income equality might not consistently predict reduced armed conflict directly, poverty reduction does, and the non-discriminatory access of non-elites to political institutions predicts poverty reduction.

The ruthless exploitation of Muslim societies by Western oil magnates and multinationals, backed by gunboat diplomacy, has already receded; however, Muslims still experience so many other forms of humiliation and stigma in and by the West. Some Westerners consider insulting the prophet Mohammed a show of pride in the exercise of their freedom of speech. A president like Donald Trump can see humiliation of Muslims as paving the path to the White House. Some Westerners view 'banning the
burqa’ as a secular security policy that applies equally to all, as a measure to liberate women, and not as a policy of religious discrimination. International human rights law is Western dominated, grounded in international law that comes from Christendom, closed to Sharia concepts of rights such as the right of a victim of serious crimes such as murder to forgive their perpetrator (J. Braithwaite 2016b). Sharia law is treated with utter disrespect in Muslim-minority countries; oaths are sworn in courtrooms on Bibles and when swearing in presidents and judges, while the holy Koran rarely enjoys such respect. All this, combined with popular culture that is disrespectful to Muslim beliefs and customs, leaves young Muslims feeling humiliated and dominated. These global dominations must be connected to the observation that most of the dominations local Muslims feel have a local character. In the 2005 Cronulla riots in Sydney between ‘Aussies’ and ‘Lebs’ (Lebanese), resentment over racism towards ‘Lebs’ had been palpable in restorative justice conferences over incidents of racial and religious abuse in Sydney high schools years in advance of the riots. Local restorative justice over local dominations in high schools, refugee detention centres, prisons, workplaces and rural towns is a way that countries such as Australia can struggle against these dominations that can lead some young Muslims beyond rioting with knives to suicide attacks with bombs and recruitment to Islamic State.

That is also a reason the restorative reconciliation committee work in the areas of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan, described in Chapter 2, is important. As Braithwaite and Gohar (2014) argue, the reconciliation committees matter because they help prevent the cascading of civil war by resolving local dominations and humiliations and restoring order to areas where a collapse of the capacity to regulate violence gives the Taliban a foothold.

We see these reconciliation committees as rituals of anomie reduction, humiliation reduction and revenge reduction. For children who have been dealt a wretched hand in a refugee camp, as a survivor of a family wiped out by a drone, reconciliation rituals must also do better at offering placement into a high-quality education, to receive excellent vocational training and job placement into an economy that pays decent wages to people from impoverished backgrounds. Integration of economic justice and restorative justice is difficult but achievable. For the rape victims of Rolpa, integration of restorative forms of justice and economic justice in the People’s Courts was critical (Braithwaite 2015). Halving national gender inequality or the national Gini coefficient on its own is unlikely
to have much effect on the probability of further civil wars. The powerful
linkage is to harness national equality policies to local reconciliation that
heals local hurts, restores local dignity, repairs local harms and reverses
local discrimination against the poor and excluded. On our analysis,
healing of cleavages with an integrated local–national strategy might make
a difference. Our micro–macro method leads us to see the interaction
between local, national and international imaginaries of domination and
injustice as needing a reparative policy yeast for the bread of positive
peace to rise. That is why we suspect brute structural remedies to national
injustice cannot do the job in isolation.

Let us, then, be more specific about the hypotheses we have induced
from these varieties of data. National inequality reduction on its
own bears a weak relationship to reduced prospects of war. National
inequality reduction coupled with local inequality reduction, however,
contributes to effectiveness in peacebuilding that reduces the prospects
of war. Combining global reductions in inequality with addressing global
imaginaries of domination and with national and local reduction of
inequality can, even more strongly, reduce the incidence of war and crime
on the planet. Reducing gender inequality at all levels seems particularly
strategic. These seem to us the conclusions most consistent with the
current state of the diverse kinds of evidence on inequality, crime and war
that we have considered.

National income inequalities between Muslims and non-Muslims
therefore matter, even if local and global dominations and humiliations
seem in our data to matter more. Having individual young Muslims
being economically marginalised, unemployed or treated unjustly by the
police certainly renders them more vulnerable to terrorism, just as it leaves
them more vulnerable to all other forms of violent crime. Muslims who
experience these things are more susceptible to recruitment to violence
in the same way as non-Muslim young people who experience them are
susceptible to crime. Reducing poverty helps—that is certainly a challenge
of national policies. Of course, very few young Muslims who experience
poverty become suicide bombers. Single acts of crime rarely make
a difference to the state of anomie in a society. Even so, a society that lifts
its young people out of poverty can have less crime and chaos on its streets
and fewer people who are susceptible to recruitment to violent jihad in
prison or in front of their internet screen. Jihadist strategists learned the
lesson that poor children who need an education, or bereft refugees, are
good targets. They learned that rural anomie enables the seizure of local power. So why cannot those who work against their violence give priority to fixing these same dominations?

Changing tack, one critical reason that states with low GDP per capita have recurrent civil wars is that poor states cannot afford good state institutions, especially accountability institutions, and have not even learnt how to build them. As a result, the state often falls prey to criminalisation. Ultimately, ambitious alternative leaders seize opportunities to use armed force to overthrow the criminals who strip state assets. Sadly, the successors are often warlords who have the ruthlessness and resources to organise armies. Usually, their ambition is also to criminalise the state for their advantage. Hence a fundamental way to prevent war is to help states grow out of poverty and grow their institutions. This is also Paul Collier’s (2007) empirically grounded prescription about ‘the bottom billion’.

Equally, it follows that an imperative is a security sector that does not dominate the society through militarisation, and especially does not further dominate refugees through militarisation. Rather, a security sector is needed that protects citizens from domination. That means a community policing service that protects women from rape. It means a state military (with support from UN peacekeepers, if necessary) that can subjugate any and all other armed factions that threaten domination of people who live in the community. A police force that protected women from rape was what was missing in Rolpa, Nepal (Chapter 9). Indeed, the problem was police and their proxies perpetrating the rape. A legitimate state military that could shut down armed gangs dominating the people was what was missing in Kandahar in 1994, in Libya since 2011 and in the DRC for decades. Our propositions are about how the security sector can be either the principal driver of dominations that cause war or the principal guarantor against domination. Many Western states and some developing states have legitimate security sectors under democratic rule-of-law control. They do the job in preventing the worst dominations that can cause armed conflict, so there is no mystery about what is needed. This imperative, however, has sadly eluded the security sectors that impose militarised domination in all the major South Asian states.

This is not to say that these militarisations are cut from the same cloth. No other South Asian society has the degree of militarisation of politics of Pakistan or an intelligence service as powerful as the ISI. Myanmar did until quite recently, however, and perhaps still does. Bangladesh,
Afghanistan and Sri Lanka have more militarised security sectors than Nepal, Bhutan or India (except in Kashmir). In each chapter, we have shown that the qualitative texture of how institutions are militarised is quite distinctive in each of these societies. It follows that each society needs nationally attuned accountability institutions crafted to call their distinctive dominations to account. In rural Kashmir, that means something very different than in Mumbai.

In sum, even though low GDP predicts war but less so crime, and national inequality predicts crime but less so war, both crime and war can be reduced by tackling poverty and inequality in an integrated way at all levels. Part of the integrated social justice strategy required also involves making power accountable at all levels, especially the power of the security sector, and tackling domination and humiliation at the local level, the refugee camp level, the bank level, the national level and at the level of global imaginaries and global institutions. Most importantly, these strands of a web of peace must be joined up. That is difficult and patient work for weavers of a fabric of peace and non-domination. Expressed another way, reducing inequality at the national level is part of an integrated peacebuilding design that can help create an enabling environment for crime and war prevention at the local level. Quality schools and jobs near refugee camps might be more important to crime–war–suicide prevention than macro national equality; yet, without national institutions for creating good schools, good jobs and good state services for placing disadvantaged people into them, local jirgas or peace committees cannot pull in the state welfare capabilities to realise their potential for crime–war–suicide prevention. Wherever poverty remains at the local level, wherever desperate refugees congregate, local domination will drive crime and will drive war when it connects to a more global imaginary of armed struggle against injustice.

Restorative justice that is also locally redistributive can therefore help. Peace committees that listen to stories of dominations and humiliations at all these levels and follow up on plans to ensure that domination and humiliation end can help. Reconciliation with social justice is required at higher levels for more aggregated dominations. Reconciliation with social justice at the local level must be put in the context of local dominations and humiliations. That is why the reconciliation committees in rural Pakistan are important as both peacebuilding and crime-prevention initiatives. For groups who have suffered national degradation, this aggregates to the importance of national reconciliation, reintegration and ‘justice as a better
It goes to reform of the International Criminal Court and the International Court of Justice so they can play not only important legal justice roles but also social justice and reconciliatory roles to reintegrate the victims of domination. It means strengthening UN peace operations to be always able to stand behind state security sectors when they need help to protect their people from domination. Of course, when state security sector actors are doing the domination, the international role shifts from supporting that security sector to transforming it, and regulating it through international support for domestic accountability institutions. A UN peacebuilding imaginary of strengthening non-domination in a wide variety of ways is needed, from gender rights to children's and victim's rights and to the rights of indigenous peoples to their forests—to strengthening the entire spectrum of accountability institutions. This means economically efficient investments in peacebuilding, particularly in funding accountability institutions. Then societies can be enabled to lift their people out of poverty by resisting the criminalisation of the state. This means freeing the shackles of corruption and crony capitalism. All this is hard to do; yet societies are variably successful in doing it. It is hard because it is complex and because it requires more resilience than that enabled by the resources available to the forces for inequality, domination or corruption. Ours has been a long account of the interscalar relationships among domination, inequality and violence that is more complex than most such analyses. Chapter 12 turns to the complex character of helping societies to learn from each other’s failures and successes with these challenges.

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20 We are indebted to Clifford Shearing for the expression ‘justice as a better future’ as an articulation of the kind of justice poor South Africans wanted during the 1990s in Zwelethemba Model peace committee meetings.

21 Kathryn Sikkink’s (2011) empirical work on the ‘justice cascade’ across all states that experienced transition between 1974 and 2004 and Olsen et al.’s (2010) dataset on human rights prosecutions, amnesties and truth commissions are more or less consistent in finding weak effects of each of these transitional justice interventions on their own. But, when human rights prosecutions, truth commissions and amnesties are all in harness during transitional justice, or when at least two of the three are in harness, there is a solid impact in reducing subsequent repression and human rights abuses. Moreover, this impact cascades to geographically proximate countries in Sikkink’s results. As in our earlier analysis, these results can be interpreted as further evidence for an integrated approach to supports and sanctions if transformation to non-domination is to be accomplished.
Conclusion: A cascades mentality

Peace movement activists might concede a little admiration for the strategic thought of Chairman Mao, Che Guevara and Islamic State strategists. They had an imaginary of a diaspora of warriors against injustice in remote locations who could ultimately connect to achieve transformative things. They advanced their imaginary in circumstances in which their followers were geopolitically weak. Che Guevara (2003: 350) expressed it as ‘[c]reate two, three, many Vietnams’. Their accomplishments were not small: reversing the military gains of a decade of fighting by Western militaries in Iraq, inspiring platoons of peasants to take over a country as massive as China and even the smaller transformations in Cuba or Nicaragua.

Model mongers of the peace movement likewise have a bold imagination. Weak cells of nonviolence activists can connect through a global imaginary of peace with justice, but only as long as they can be relevant to the hurts that people feel locally. They can work at establishing little zones of peace in the midst of desperate lands such as Somalia, Syria, Yemen and Afghanistan, or even in implausible toeholds for reconciliation committees safe from the suicide bombers inside the fortified walls of Pakistani police stations. Kathryn Sikkink’s findings about the ‘justice cascade’ of transitional justice human rights prosecutions and truth commissions (see footnote 22) are rather like this:

[T]he justice cascade started in domestic politics in the semi-periphery and diffused outwards and upwards through horizontal diffusion from one country to another, and then via bottom-up vertical diffusion from individual countries to international organisations and international NGOs. (Sikkink 2011: 250)

Many jihadists had a cascade imaginary of jihad in Indian Kashmir, then in Afghanistan, then across Pakistan to beyond the old Mughal Empire, connecting to a modelling of violent jihad across the Middle East and North Africa through Central Asia. So, too, can peacemakers have an imaginary of peace in Kashmir spreading infectiously to help peace in Afghanistan. That, in turn, can help peace in Balochistan, Iranian border regions and Central Asia. If that regional peace could eventually grow so strong as to enable nuclear disarmament of India and Pakistan, that would renew mightily the vitality of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. If at least there could be a nuclear arms reduction and stabilisation treaty
between an India and a Pakistan that both flourished economically in a peaceful trading relationship, the risk of nuclear terrorism could recede worldwide. Then one long-term hope for a cascade of peace might be Israel beginning to feel more secure about nuclear disarmament because it would live in less fear of nuclear attack from Saudi Arabia or Iran supported by a mobile Pakistani nuclear capability.

To achieve that first step of peace in Kashmir, international support must surge behind hundreds of thousands of nonviolent protesters for peace with _azadi_ on the streets of Srinagar the next time a local surge equivalent to the events of 2009 and 2010 occurs. The global peace movement can aim to make it a vote-catching imperative for political leaders in New Delhi, Islamabad, Washington, and Berlin to listen and then support a final overdue diplomatic surge to peace in Kashmir. In that peace process, pressure must come for peace that surges bottom up as well as top down, that softens the Kashmir border in a way that truly means something to ordinary Kashmiris and that takes concrete measures to end the militarisation of Kashmir—to end domination by democracy, the brutalisation of youth and the rape of women and liberates the promise of Kashmiri economic opportunity.

The peace movement can aspire to educate the great powers about the precise reasons that, since 1989, great powers have acted against their own interests in Afghanistan and against the interests of the people of Afghanistan. The peace movement fared better at this project of learning from errors of history in Vietnam because it persuaded the centre and leftist parties of democracies that Vietnam was a reckless and immoral folly. The peace movement has not convinced the Democratic Party in the United States of that, nor many of the world’s social democratic parties.

Today, some leadership towards educating the West of its folly is beginning to come from the most unlikely of places among some of the most experienced military commanders. February 2015 saw Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, leader of the US Army Capabilities Integration Center at its Training and Doctrine Command, point a finger at US doctrinal delusions that took root in the 1990s after the seemingly quick Gulf War ‘victory’. It was known as ‘the revolution in military affairs’. That 1990s lingo included ‘full-spectrum dominance’ and ‘rapid, decisive operations’. ‘War was going to be fast, cheap and efficient’, General McMaster lamented (Brannen 2015: 1). After $1 trillion of US defence
spending in Afghanistan and Iraq and a decade and a half of making things worse, the language with which Donald Rumsfeld dressed up these ‘fast, cheap and efficient’ invasions rings hollow. McMaster said:

I think in many ways what we learn from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq could in the future be as important as the outcomes of those wars. If we learn the wrong lessons, we’ll engage in the kind of self-delusion we engaged in in the 1990s. (Brannen 2015: 1)

McMaster had been there before. As a young major, McMaster published a book called *Dereliction of Duty* (1998), which was openly critical of what he saw to be failed leadership during the Vietnam War. Intriguingly, General McMaster was appointed in February 2017 as President Trump’s third choice as National Security Advisor. So, there could be a glimmer of hope there for a voice that might moderate President Trump’s propensities to cascade violence.

This book argues that the critical lessons to learn are about the catastrophic ways violence can cascade. One reckless lesson would be that we should draw back from peacebuilding because it is costly. That is the reasoning that for decades caused underinvestment in constantly working at peace talks on Kashmir, underinvestment in UN peacekeeping, in rebuilding and reconciliation after the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan. Western peacekeepers should have had boots on the ground in Libya to disarm militias under a UN flag after the fall of Gaddafi. That work would have been dangerous. Yet, for a Europe reeling from thousands of deaths in the Mediterranean Sea of refugees launched from chaotic Libya and reeling from the Manchester bombing of May 2017 launched from Libya, we can look back on UN peacekeeping as a risk that should have been taken. There has been underinvestment in supporting cascades of nonviolence and in preventive diplomacy to stop cascades of violence in these places. Social movement energy to educate the world community is a starting point for a surge upwards of the graph of nonviolent struggles in Figure 11.1 during the decades ahead—old friends Gandhi and Bacha Khan shining.