14. The impact of Chinese state capital during the iron ore boom

Luke Hurst

China’s recent push into global markets has been supported by a large banking system, which is dominated by state-owned and state-shareholding banks, massive foreign exchange reserves and a managed exchange rate (Laurenceson 2008: 92; Song 2015: 200). But increasing the ability of Chinese investors to access state capital, to which foreign competitors do not have direct access, can affect the ability of non-Chinese competitors to compete for market access on commercial terms.

To gain a better understanding of the impact of Chinese state capital and investment abroad on global markets, this chapter analyses the extent and impact of Chinese procurement activities in the global iron ore market during the iron ore boom from 2002 to 2012.

The Chinese Government perceived the initial price boom following China’s demand shock as a signal that the ‘big three’ Asian market exporters—Rio Tinto, BHP Billiton and Vale—held, and were exploiting, market power. To break up the perceived dominance of the big three, the barriers to market entry for fringe iron ore producers needed to be reduced.

To reduce these perceived barriers, the Chinese Government looked to support the development of fringe production and increase iron ore imports from Chinese-invested resources. In 2011, Li Xinchuang, Deputy Secretary-General of China Iron and Steel Association, said: ‘China currently owns less than 10 per cent of imported iron ore. We should seek 50 per cent of ore from Chinese-invested overseas resources in the next five to 10 years’ (Zhang 2011).

To assess the impact of China’s international procurement strategies on the competitiveness of the iron ore market during the iron ore boom (2002–12), this chapter applies investment theory to a unique dataset of Chinese iron ore investment abroad. This chapter is structured as follows: first, it draws out Chinese iron ore procurement trends based on a unique dataset of 30 Chinese iron ore investments and 20 long-term contract (LTC) transactions; second, it outlines the extent of Chinese government support for overseas iron ore investment during this period;

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1 I am indebted to David Murphy, Shiro Armstrong, Peter Drysdale and Ligang Song for comments on drafts of this chapter.

2 In 2006, China surpassed Japan as the largest holder of foreign exchange reserves globally—of about US$1.3 trillion at the end of June 2007 (Zheng and Yi 2007: 18).
next, the data on Chinese international iron ore procurement are examined; after
that, the chapter assesses the impact of Chinese state-backed procurement on iron
ore market outcomes, specifically whether Chinese state support provides advantages
for Chinese iron ore investors over the short and long runs, and how state support
affected international competitors’ access to iron ore investments and supply.

Overview of Chinese iron ore procurement

Before the collapse of the benchmarking system in 2009 (Humphries 2018), iron
ore market access was generally secured through LTCs or vertical integration.
The choice between LTCs and vertical integration was largely based on the
ownership, location and internalisation advantages of investing, such as the buyer’s
preference for *ex ante* contracting costs and *ex post* monitoring and negotiation costs
associated with LTCs (Caves 2007: 16).

Firms’ preferences for LTCs or vertical integration and the locations in which
these different types of transactions take place provide insight into the motivation
of buyers and the barriers they perceive in securing supplies. To analyse Chinese
iron ore procurement following the recent demand shock, data were collected
on a sample of 30 Chinese overseas iron ore investments and 20 LTC-only deals
between 2002 and 2012; this is not a complete list but provides a representative
sample of the publicly available information on Chinese iron ore procurement.
The sample includes iron ore LTCs and investments (but not failed transactions,
such as the 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up) from publicly available sources and
the Intierra database.\(^3\)

Table 14.1 provides an overview of the 30 Chinese overseas iron ore investments
undertaken between 2002 and 2012. The projects were worth a total of
US$36.5 billion and were concentrated in the period after the Global Financial
Crisis (GFC); US$26.4 billion of the investments took place between 2008 and
2010 (72.2 per cent of the total value over the period 2002–12).

The economies of scale required and the capital-intensive nature of iron ore
projects mean there is often a long lag between investment and production.
Figure 14.1 shows how the lag between investment and production may impact
Chinese projects: less than 50 million tonnes per annum (Mt/a) was planned to
reach production by 2012. By 2018, the reported planned output of the Chinese
iron ore investment projects sampled was 315.2 Mt/a (planned output data
were available for 16 of the 30 projects). For context, the Australian Bureau of
Resources and Energy Economics (BREE 2019) reported that, in 2018, global
iron ore exports were approximately 1.547 billion tonnes.

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\(^3\) www.intierra.com/ (accessed 1 March 2013).
Table 14.1 Chinese overseas iron ore investment, 2002–12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>No. of investments</th>
<th>Total value (US$m)</th>
<th>Average value (US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34.8</td>
<td>34.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7,455.7</td>
<td>7,455.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2,154.9</td>
<td>2,154.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6*</td>
<td>17,522.6</td>
<td>2,920.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5,824.1</td>
<td>582.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3,004.5</td>
<td>600.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>228.4</td>
<td>114.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>275.7</td>
<td>68.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36,500.7</td>
<td>1,216.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Includes the successful US$14 billion Chinalco acquisition of 9 per cent of equity in Rio Tinto.


Figure 14.1 Potential supply increase from Chinese overseas iron ore investments, 2002–18 (Mt/a)


Table 14.2 provides an overview of the 20 LTCs entered into by Chinese iron ore buyers in 2012. Chinese iron ore LTCs range from 0.5 to 20 Mt/a over three to 15 years. The available data on 20 LTCs entered into by Chinese importers (as at 2012) accounted for at least 64.9 to 95.1 Mt/a in 2012.⁴

⁴ The 20 LTCs recorded in the Tex Report (2013: 202) represent just 8.7 to 12.8 per cent of China’s total iron ore imports in 2012 (743.4 Mt).
Table 14.2 Chinese iron ore LTCs, 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chinese firm</th>
<th>Supplier</th>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Period</th>
<th>Volume (Mt/a)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rizhao Steel</td>
<td>Mt Gibson</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>Lesser of life of mine or 15 years</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rizhao Steel</td>
<td>OneSteel</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>July 2008 – June 2018</td>
<td>&gt; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haixin Steel</td>
<td>OneSteel</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>July 2008 – June 2018</td>
<td>&gt; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanshan Guafeng</td>
<td>OneSteel</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>October 2007 – 2016</td>
<td>&gt; 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jinxin Steel</td>
<td>OneSteel</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>January 2008 – December 2017</td>
<td>&gt; 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baosteel</td>
<td>FMG</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>5–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei Iron &amp; Steel (Tanggang)</td>
<td>FMG</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>10 years</td>
<td>5–20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Xinxing Ductile Pipes</td>
<td>Vale</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shanxi Zhongyang</td>
<td>Vale</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Long term (from December 2008)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zongtian Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>Vale</td>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>Long term (from December 2008)</td>
<td>N/A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebei Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>Aurox Resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rockcheck Steel</td>
<td>Aurox Resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15 years</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bactou Steel</td>
<td>Centrex Metals</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shenyang Orient Steel</td>
<td>Centrex Metals</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>5 years</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hunan Valin Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>GWR Group</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>15 years (from August 2008)</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China Minmetals Corp.</td>
<td>SNIM</td>
<td>Mauritania</td>
<td>2008–12</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worldlin</td>
<td>CLM</td>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>7 years from 2007</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nanjing Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>Grace Wise</td>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>June 2011 – May 2021</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tonghua Iron &amp; Steel</td>
<td>IMX Resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1.2–1.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sichuan Taifeng Group</td>
<td>IMX Resources</td>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>3 years</td>
<td>1.2–1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

FMG = Fortescue Metals Group  
SNIM = Société Nationale Industrielle et Minière (National Industrial and Mining Company)  
N/A = not available  
Table 14.3 shows that over the period 2002–12, Chinese overseas iron ore investments were concentrated in Australia, with 19 investments made, worth US$31.3 billion (the average size of each project was about US$1.65 billion); five smaller investments were made in Canada, worth a total of US$651.8 million (US$127.7 million each, on average); while the remaining six investments were spread across five countries, with an average value of US$903.1 million.

Table 14.3 Chinese overseas iron ore investment by country, 2002–12

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Host country</th>
<th>No. of investments</th>
<th>Total value (US$m)</th>
<th>Average value (US$m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>31,333.3</td>
<td>1,649.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>651.8</td>
<td>127.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peru</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,330.4</td>
<td>665.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brazil</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,121.8</td>
<td>1,121.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>426.2</td>
<td>426.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,241.3</td>
<td>1,241.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>396.0</td>
<td>396.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>36,500.8</td>
<td>1,216.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 2009, the Chinese iron ore investors’ preference for Australian projects appears to have changed. Just one Chinese overseas investment in iron ore was made outside Australia between 2002 and 2008, and none of the seven LTC-only deals was with any country other than Australia before 2007. From 2009 to 2012, 10 of 21 Chinese overseas investments in iron ore took place in countries other than Australia, and five of the 13 LTC-only deals were with countries other than Australia.

Chinese iron ore investors were initially drawn to Australian projects due to the relatively stable institutional environment, established infrastructure, technical mining knowledge and close geographic proximity. The freight-sharing mechanism, which provided Chinese importers with about 80 per cent of the transport cost differential until 2010, made Australian production expansion particularly attractive for Chinese iron ore investors as the price of freight soared in the short run as the boom in international demand for iron ore developed (Hurst 2015).

Over the decade following the surge in China’s international iron ore demand, Australia’s operating environment became less attractive to iron ore investors. The cost of doing business in Australia rose due to the appreciation of the Australian

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5 The 2008 freight-sharing mechanism.
dollar—from an average of US$0.54 in 2002 to US$0.85 in 2008 before peaking at US$1.10 in 2012—and there were growing labour shortages\(^6\) in the mining sector. In 2011, Liu Han, former chairman of Hanlong Group,\(^7\) said:

> Australia and Brazil both have great resources, but they don't provide many opportunities for Chinese investors due to rising cost pressures and policy barriers. Furthermore, most of their sources and the attached infrastructure are controlled by the largest mine companies. (Zhang 2011)

Large-scale investment failures in Australia seared Chinese investors and increased the relative attractiveness of pursuing projects in other locations (Laurenceson 2012). Two investments were particularly destructive to the perception of Australia as a stable and friendly investment location for Chinese iron ore investment: the CITIC Pacific Mining Sino Iron Ore project and the failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up.

The CITIC Pacific Mining Sino Iron Ore magnetite project in Western Australia, announced in 2006, experienced cost blowouts and delays. The budget for the project more than tripled by 2012—from an estimated US$2.5 billion to US$7.8 billion—because of poor due diligence, the rising Australian dollar and rising labour costs (Garvey 2012). In response to the CITIC Pacific Mining failures, China's State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC) suspended all investments in magnetite projects in Western Australia as of 2011 (Hurst et al. 2012: 21). By late 2018, CITIC had poured more than US$12 billion into the project amid multiple writedowns and continuing legal disputes with Australian leaseholder Mineralogy (Thompson 2018).

The failed 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up, worth US$19.5 billion (9.5 per cent equity), would have been the largest Chinese commercial investment abroad ever at that time. In its initial form, the deal would have reserved 30 per cent of Rio Tinto's iron ore production for a jointly run marketing company selling exclusively to China (Uren 2012: 106). The failed deal followed the successful 2008 investment by Chinalco, worth US$14 billion, for 9 per cent of Rio Tinto's equity.

The 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco deal fell apart due to failures by all those involved. The ad hoc foreign investment policy reforms undertaken by the Australian Government during the proposal screening process were perceived by many as signalling likely bias in Australia's investment review process against Chinese state-owned investors. For example, the then Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) general manager, Patrick Colmer, was quoted in a leaked US Embassy cable about the new foreign investment guidelines, which had been introduced during the 2009 Rio Tinto–Chinalco review process:

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6 Chinese investors are unable to import labour into Australia.
7 Hanlong Group is a conglomerate with holdings in mineral exploration and other industries. Its subsidiary Hanlong Mining failed in a takeover bid for Sundance Resources, which owns mining rights to the Mbalm and Nabeba projects in Cameroon and Congo (Ker 2013).
The new guidelines reduce uncertainty for potential investors, but pose new disincentives for larger-scale Chinese investments.

… The new guidelines are mainly due to growing concerns about Chinese investments in the strategic resources sector. (Wikileaks 2009)

The failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco tie-up was eventually rejected when Rio Tinto’s board withdrew support for the deal before the Australian Treasurer ruled on whether the investment was in the ‘national interest’. But even without the government making the final call on the fate of the tie-up, the saga caused significant uncertainty and frustration for potential Chinese investors in the Australian investment process and heightened public anxiety about Chinese state-owned investors.

Chinese foreign investors, especially state-owned investors (discussed below), have often struggled to engage in Australia’s investment environment and build local legitimacy.

The failed Rio Tinto–Chinalco deal also brought to bear the inexperience of many Chinese investors in foreign markets and their ignorance of the importance of establishing legitimacy with the host public. According to Pokarier (2004: 218), identity is a key part of nationalism and therefore fear of investment from culturally separate countries is to be expected; this is especially true for state-owned foreign investors, which may be seen as pursuing government strategies over profits. A report by the Chinese State Council’s Development Research Centre revealed that Chinalco had not been able to match BHP Billiton in terms of its lobbying of the public and policymakers:

BHP Billiton took advantage of its skilful mass media propaganda and lobbying capacity to arouse the public emotions so as to influence the judgment of the government policy makers. BHP Billiton tightly seized the point that Chinalco had the state-owned background. (Uren 2012: 109)

State support for Chinese iron ore investment abroad

State support for Chinese overseas iron ore investors was provided through the state-owned banking system, which provided preferential access to financing to increase imports from Chinese-owned iron ore projects. Financing was available from two state-owned policy banks—the China Export–Import Bank (China Exim Bank) and China Development Bank (CDB)—which provide ‘policy finance’, often on concessional terms; and four state-owned banks (SOBs), which are mandated to finance state-owned enterprise (SOE) activities and to support state industrial plans (Laurenceson and Chai 2010: 22; der Heiden and Taube 2011: 60–72; Wilson 2011: 270).
Information is scarce on the terms of financing for Chinese iron ore projects. Data collected by Wilson (2011: 269–70) on the source of financing for Chinese iron ore projects between 2002 and 2010 are used here as a proxy for the extent of Chinese state engagement in iron ore investment.

Table 14.4 presents the data for 32 international iron ore investments undertaken by Chinese investors. It shows that the average value of privately funded projects was lowest at US$27.2 million (across two projects), while SOB-funded projects were worth, on average, US$943.7 million (across 21 projects); sovereign wealth fund (SWF) financing averaged US$475.9 million (across two projects); policy bank–funded projects averaged $367.8 million (across six projects); and there was one provincial bank–financed project worth US$1.3 billion. The average equity taken by state-financed investors also appears to have been higher than that taken by privately financed investors, who took 16.5 per cent equity, on average. SOB-financed projects took, on average, 32.2 per cent equity, SWF projects averaged 57.5 per cent, policy bank–funded projects averaged 43.1 per cent equity and the provincial bank–financed project took 100 per cent equity.

Table 14.4 Source of iron ore investment funding, 2002–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of finance</th>
<th>No. of investments</th>
<th>Value (US$m)</th>
<th>Average value (US$m)</th>
<th>Average equity (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Private bank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>54.3</td>
<td>27.2</td>
<td>16.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOB</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>19,816.9</td>
<td>943.7</td>
<td>32.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWF</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,427.6</td>
<td>475.9</td>
<td>57.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy bank</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2,206.7</td>
<td>367.8</td>
<td>43.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial bank</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1,300.1</td>
<td>1,300.1</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>24,805.6</td>
<td>3,114.6</td>
<td>49.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Policy banks are the CDB and China Exim Bank.
Sources: Wilson (2011: 269–70); author’s calculations.

The data in Table 14.5 show that the sources of financing provided to private Chinese overseas iron ore investors included a private bank (one project, worth US$46.4 million) and SOBs (three projects, worth an average of just US$14.6 million). Financing for centrally owned SOEs’ international iron ore investments came from SOBs (nine projects, worth an average of US$1.8 billion) and policy banks (two projects, worth an average of US$603 million). Subcentral (provincial and prefectural) SOEs received financing from all sources; one project received US$7.9 million from a private bank, nine projects received financing from SOBs worth an average of US$365.7 million, two projects were funded by SWFs worth an average of US$713.8 million and one project received provincial bank funding of US$1.3 billion.
14. The impact of Chinese state capital during the iron ore boom

Table 14.5 Source of iron ore investment funding by firm ownership type, 2002–10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source of finance</th>
<th>Central SOE</th>
<th>Sub-central SOE</th>
<th>Private enterprise</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>#</td>
<td>Total value (US$m)</td>
<td>Average value (US$m)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private SOB</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SWF</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Policy bank</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,206.1</td>
<td>603</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial bank</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Wilson (2011: 269–70); author’s calculations.

As suggested above, the GFC appears to have encouraged a large increase in Chinese overseas investment in iron ore. According to CDB head Chen Yuan, investing in energy and minerals in the aftermath of the GFC provided a hedge against the declining US dollar and rising commodity prices. In 2009, Chen stated:

Everybody is saying that we should go to the international markets to buy up low-price assets. But I don’t think we should go to Wall Street. We should think more about making acquisitions or partnerships in areas with natural resources. (Downs 2011: 73)

A report published by Ernst & Young estimated that the market value of mining and metal companies dropped about 40 to 60 per cent due to the global economic downturn (cited in Yang 2009). In 2009, China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technology released the ‘Adjustment and Revitalization Program for the Iron and Steel Industry’ (Downs 2011). The program instructed ‘companies [to] seize opportunities and actively pursue the Going Global Strategy’—specifically, to make full use of three special funds: the Fund for Mining Rights to Overseas Mineral Resources, the Fund for Economic and Technical Co-operation Overseas and the Fund for Reducing Risk in Prospecting of Overseas Mineral Deposits. The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) also signed agreements on the protection of investments, with many countries and the state-owned China Export and Credit Insurance Company to provide investment insurance services (der Heiden and Taube 2011).

China’s iron ore investment push following the GFC is reflected in the data, with 27 of the 30 state-financed projects tracked in Table 14.5 occurring between 2008 and 2010. The international iron ore investments occurring between 2008 and 2010 accounted for 97.4 per cent of the value of state financing for iron ore projects from 2002 to 2010.

The increased push by Chinese investors into iron ore projects largely reflects the fact that Western banks were highly risk-averse following the GFC. Chinese state-owned lenders saw opportunities in investing in iron ore as projects struggled to attract financing (Hurst 2013: 528–9).
Impact of Chinese state procurement support on market outcomes

In 2011, Australian Senator Barnaby Joyce announced that Chinese state-owned foreign investors ‘have a long-term view, they don’t necessarily have to rely on the market principle’ (Grattan 2011). The remarks by Senator Joyce relate to the distortions Chinese state support might have on ‘competitive neutrality’. Competitive neutrality requires that government business activities should not enjoy net competitive advantages over their private sector competitors simply by virtue of public sector ownership.

The impact of Chinese state support on competitive neutrality has been cited widely in the academic literature. Proponents of the argument—that preferential access to state financing distorts the competitive landscape—conclude that Chinese state-backed procurement negatively impacts the ability of private sector actors to compete on commercial terms, and that access to state financing can lead to moral hazard as Chinese investors are able to overbid for procurement contracts without fear of reprisal if investments fail.

The Chinese Government offers several different kinds of loan finance, which have supported the majority of iron ore projects (Tables 14.3 and 14.4). Although information on the terms of individual iron ore loans is scarce, Bräutigam (2011) found that most loans made by China Exim Bank and the CDB (the two sources of official bank financing that are used as tools to support government policy) were made on commercial terms—London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) plus a margin—rather than on a concessional basis.

China Exim Bank’s main mandate in the iron ore industry is to facilitate exports and assist imports for Chinese companies with comparative advantages in their offshore project contracting and outbound investment, and to promote international economic cooperation and trade. To support its mission, China Exim Bank loans are given at LIBOR plus a margin, usually with a maturity of 12 to 15 years and a grace period of two to five years. A small proportion of the export buyers’ credits are offered at preferential rates, usually with a fixed interest rate of 2 or 3 per cent (Bräutigam 2009: 335).

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8 See, for example, Buckley et al. (2007); Sauvant and Chen (2014).
9 This refers to a situation where the agent is encouraged to increase their appetite for risk knowing that the cost of failure will be incurred by another party.
10 LIBOR is the interest rate applied to comparatively short-term borrowing of funds in the London interbank market (loans between banks). LIBOR is a preferential rate for low-risk borrowers and is often used as a baseline for less-preferred borrowers who pay a rate of LIBOR plus a margin.
11 When a donor government provides a loan at a rate equivalent to the private capital market plus a margin, this is not concessional as there is no subsidy at all (Bräutigam 2011: 755).
12 The lowest rate of credit for which information is publicly available was issued at LIBOR plus 1 per cent (100 basis points).
The CDB was originally set up to provide finance for China’s own development, but in recent years it has been providing very large lines of credit overseas. The bank issues commercial loans based on LIBOR plus a margin—usually at least 200 basis points (Bräutigam 2011: 206). For example, the 12-year Karara Iron Ore project loan facility was provided on competitive commercial terms principally by the CDB and the Bank of China, based on the US six-month LIBOR with a competitive margin (the actual margin was not specified publicly) (Gindalbie Metals Ltd 2010).

While the terms of China Exim Bank and CDB loans are generally based on international benchmarks plus a margin, the margin appears to be lower than that available to international competitors who do not have direct access to Chinese state financing. For example, Chinalco’s profits dropped by 99 per cent in 2008 owing to the collapse in demand for aluminium, and its original 2008 investment of US$14 billion for a 9 per cent stake in Rio Tinto lost 70 per cent of its market value—about US$10 billion by 2009 (Yao and Sutherland 2009: 829). Despite Chinalco’s losses, four of the biggest Chinese state-owned banks—the China Development Bank, China Exim Bank, the Agricultural Bank of China and the Bank of China—offered to lend US$21 billion, which was more than the US$19.5 billion required for the additional 9 per cent equity to fund Chinalco’s Rio Tinto tie-up (discussed above). Interest on the loan was just 94.5 basis points above the six-month LIBOR, and a repayment period was not set. In contrast, following Chinalco’s bid, BHP Billiton offered Rio Tinto a 15-year bond, which charged interest at 345 basis points above the six-month LIBOR (White 2009; Yao and Sutherland 2009: 832).

The above analysis indicates that Chinese overseas iron ore investors did have access to cheap state financing that was not directly available to competitors. Song (2015: 200–1) notes that the Chinese banking system is dominated by state-owned and state-shareholding banks, which traditionally favour SOEs. The favouritism towards SOEs by Chinese state banks is due to the perception that SOEs pose a lower risk or are ‘at least backed by the government in the event of loan forfeiture’.

In a paper analysing the impact of state financing on Chinese investment (across all sectors), Buckley et al. (2007: 514–15) concluded:

More challenging is the unprecedented finding that Chinese ODI is attracted, rather than deterred, by political risk (as measured conventionally and with market returns controlled for by market size). This suggests that Chinese firms do not perceive or behave towards risk in the same way as do industrialised country firms. In accordance with our theory, we attribute this to the low cost of capital that Chinese firms.

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13 To complement the increased access to state capital, the CDB set up branch offices in 2006. The branch offices operate out of Chinese embassies and are mandated to gather information about the host countries and establish relationships with local officials and businesses to support Chinese energy and mining companies to find investment opportunities. By the end of 2009, the CDB had established work teams in 141 countries, including 45 in Africa (Downs 2011: 28).
(for the most part SOEs) enjoy as a consequence of home country capital market imperfections. Indeed, state ownership can be considered as a firm-specific advantage for many Chinese MNEs [multinational enterprises] in this context.

… State-sponsored soft budget constraints make acquisition by Chinese enterprises a 'normal' mode of entering and penetrating a host economy … Over-bidding by Chinese MNEs is attributed to the absence of private shareholders and sanguine views of the associated technical, commercial and political risks, to limited fear of failure, close government support and low cost of capital.

There are two important questions arising from Buckley et al.'s (2007) conclusion that need to be addressed:

1. Has Chinese state support through low-cost capital provided ownership advantages for Chinese iron ore investors over their foreign competitors?
2. Has the access to state support for Chinese investors reduced opportunities for non-Chinese iron ore investors and procurers to compete on commercial terms?

Implications for non-Chinese iron ore investors

In line with the Chinese state’s objective of diversifying supply away from the big three, only three\(^{14}\) of the 30 Chinese iron ore foreign investments analysed involved any of the big three (all Rio Tinto). The three projects were Baosteel’s 2002 joint venture with Rio Tinto in the BaoHI Ranges, worth US$34.8 million, and Chinalco’s initial investment of US$14 billion for a 9 per cent share of Rio Tinto shares in 2008 and a 47 per cent (US$1.5 billion) stake in Rio Tinto’s Simandou development project in Guinea.

The desire to diversify supply away from the big three meant that Chinese investors were required to look to less well-established projects to acquire or develop, often entailing higher risk. These higher-risk projects frequently faced long financing lags with commercial banks (especially following the GFC), which created a new business opportunity for the CDB. According to the CDB’s (2004) annual report:

> A number of Chinese enterprises have been exploring opportunities overseas and some of the potential projects are relatively large. The high risk inherent in such projects and their relatively large borrowing requirements have made many commercial banks uncomfortable about participating in their funding. Many of the enterprises in search of financing for outbound investment have turned to us. In reality, these projects are typical of the development financing that we typically undertake and we are well positioned to be of service. We are known to have both the adequate resources to fund these projects and a demonstrated track record of achievement in effectively managing the credit risk.

\(^{14}\) Chinalco’s failed tie-up for a further 9.5 per cent of Rio Tinto shares worth US$19.5 billion was not included in the dataset.
Ownership decisions for international investors are largely based on a firm possessing advantages over competitors in the host country, such as managerial skills or proprietary knowledge. But the favouritism of China’s banking system towards SOEs and the involvement of the CDB and China Exim Bank have seen most of the financing for Chinese iron ore investments abroad provided to the largely state-owned iron and steel production (not mining) sector.

Of the 30 Chinese iron ore investments reviewed for this study, 21 were made by Chinese firms with an operating competency outside mining; only one is listed as a specialised iron ore miner. The lack of mining expertise by Chinese international iron ore investors suggests they have, on average, few long-run operational ownership advantages and instead rely on their access to cheap state capital to gain access to concessions. Access to cheap capital and support for Chinese investors abroad may have provided short-run ownership advantages over foreign competitors that do not have access to the Chinese state capital, as they are able to overcome financing lags and can potentially ‘overbid’ for projects due to the relatively cheap cost of capital (Buckley et al. 2007).

The short-run ownership advantages provided by Chinese iron ore investors’ access to state capital create the potential for moral hazard. Downs (2011: 61), however, suggests that, on a straight commercial basis, it may be rational for the CDB to offer lower interest rates than Western banks because it is backed by the Chinese Government; borrowers who fail to fulfil their loan agreements with the CDB risk angering not only the bank, but also the Chinese Government, which could lower the risk of moral hazard.

The acknowledgement of the lack of long-run ownership advantages of Chinese iron ore investors is shown in the trend towards taking minority equity positions (‘quasi-integration’) in partnership with specialised non-Chinese fringe iron ore firms (discussed above). The Chinese iron ore procurement data presented above, although incomplete, indicate that Chinese procurers are entering both LTC-only deals and vertical integration through minority ownership. The sampled Chinese iron ore investments exhibited a preference for joint ventures and minority acquisitions (22 of 30 investments) taking, on average, 41.1 per cent equity. Eight investments were wholly owned acquisitions or development projects.

Chinese iron ore investors—mainly steel mills—generally lacked the long-run ownership advantages required to develop complex iron ore mine projects. The lack of long-run ownership advantages caused Chinese iron ore investors to engage in quasi-integration, whereby they would take minority ownership shares and partner with specialised mining firms, which would develop and operate the projects. This quasi-integration provided increased supply security compared with LTC-only procurement and the needed capital for large-scale projects to overcome the lag
associated with finalising financing. The quasi-integration strategy also ensured project partners had specialised skills to develop complex mine projects while having more ‘skin in the game’ compared with contractors.

The preference to partner with non-Chinese fringe iron ore firms has meant that the provision of Chinese state capital has, in fact, increased access to partnership opportunities for non-Chinese iron ore investors, rather than reducing opportunities. The increased access to partnership opportunities is especially important in the context of the post-GFC business environment, which further reduced opportunities for non-Chinese fringe iron ore projects to secure financing.

Impact of Chinese state procurement on competitors’ market access

Analysts have also raised the issue of whether Chinese iron ore investors could use their advantageous access to state capital to limit market access for foreign competitors. These concerns were highlighted by Brahma Chellaney in his 2012 testimony to the US–China Economic and Security Review Commission hearing on ‘China’s Global Quest for Resources and Implications for the United States’. During his testimony, Chellaney (2012) stated:

China has pursued an aggressive strategy to secure (and even lock up) supplies of strategic resources like water, energy and mineral ores. Gaining access to or control of resources has been a key driver of its foreign and domestic policies. China, with the world’s most resource-hungry economy, is pursuing the world’s most-assertive policies to gain control of important resources.

Much of the international attention on China’s resource strategy has focused on its scramble to secure supplies of hydrocarbons and mineral ores. Such attention is justified by the fact that China is seeking to conserve its own mineral resources and rely on imports. For example, China, a major steel consumer, has substantial reserves of iron ore, yet it has banned exports of this commodity. It actually encourages its own steel producers to import iron ore. China, in fact, has emerged as the largest importer of iron ore, accounting for a third of all global imports. India, in contrast, remains a major exporter of iron ore to China, although the latter has iron-ore deposits more than two-and-half times that of India.

To assess Chellaney’s claims about the ability of Chinese investors to reduce market access for competitors, this study applies Moran’s (2010) scorecard approach, which attempts to operationalise a definition of ‘tying up’ resources. The scorecard identifies four fundamental natural resource procurement patterns a large buyer can take:

1. Special relationship with major producer.
2. Special relationship with competitive fringe.
3. Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output.
4. Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output.
The first of Moran’s (2010) procurement categories involves the investor taking an equity stake in a very large established producer to secure an equity share of production on terms comparable with other co-owners. This form of supply internalisation provides some degree of control to the investor over the long-run strategic decision-making of the project, and is zero-sum (tying up) as the acquired project is already in production; the investment does not expand production. The second procurement pattern describes when a buyer takes an equity position in a project that is yet to reach production on terms comparable with other co-owners; this strategy expands the overall supply base while providing the investor some degree of control over the long-run strategic direction of the project.

The third category of Moran’s (2010) scorecard occurs when buyers and/or their government make a loan to an already established producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan, such as an LTC. The LTC in category three does not provide long-term control over the operations of the producer but does increase the buyer’s legal claim to preexisting resource supply (zero-sum). This is seen as a strategy to tie up resources. The final procurement strategy in Moran’s scorecard occurs when a buyer and/or their government makes a loan to finance an up-and-coming producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan; this can include infrastructure for resources and resource-contingent loans. This category supports the expansion of the supply base without conferring long-term strategic control to the investor (categories are summarised in Table 14.6) (Moran 2010).

Table 14.6 Summary of Moran’s procurement scorecard

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Equity</strong></td>
<td>Category 1: Special relationship with major producer. Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in a ‘major’ producer to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable with other co-owners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-equity (LTC)</strong></td>
<td>Category 3: Loan capital to major producer to be repaid in output. Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a ‘price maker’ producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Expansion (positive-sum)</strong></td>
<td>Category 2: Special relationship with competitive fringe. Buyers and/or their home governments take an equity stake in an ‘independent’ producer to procure an equity share of production on terms comparable with other co-owners.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Category 4: Loan capital to competitive fringe to be repaid in output. Buyers and/or their home governments make a loan to a ‘price taker’ producer in return for a purchase agreement to service the loan.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Kotschwar et al. (2012: 27).

The procurement scorecard provides a useful method to proxy whether there are zero-sum (tying up) implications from a country’s procurement activities—that is, whether they consolidate their legal claim to resources, which is captured by the first and third categories. If the country’s resource procurement activities result in an expansion and/or diversification of supply beyond the growth of their demand, all consumers will have access to a more competitive export market; this positive-sum result is captured by the second and fourth categories in the scorecard.
Of the sample of 50 iron ore procurement arrangements entered into by Chinese investors between 2002 and 2012 (see Figure 14.2), three were identified as a special relationship with a major producer (Category 1); 27 were special relationships with the competitive fringe (Category 2); seven saw capital loaned to major producers for output (Category 3); and 13 procurement arrangements saw capital loaned to the competitive fringe to be repaid in output (Category 4). The results of the scorecard suggest the majority of Chinese procurement arrangements were in development projects and served to expand the competitive supply base over the long run rather than reduce market access for competitors.15

![Figure 14.2 Chinese procurement arrangements by category, 2002–12 (by number)](image)


The scorecard result is consistent with Moran’s (2010) analysis of 16 Chinese oil and mining procurement arrangements, which found that, in 13 of 16 cases, Chinese investors took an equity stake and/or wrote long-term procurement contracts with producers on the competitive fringe. In that study, the authors concluded:

Chinese investors will be more willing to take on new frontier—or even fringe—projects that the major established oil and mining companies might pass by ... Chinese efforts, like Japanese deployments of capital and purchase agreements in the late 1970s through the 1980s, predominantly help expand, diversify, and make the global energy-supply system more competitive. (Moran 2010: 2)

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15 There were eight LTC-only transactions, but only eight of the 29 projects with publicly available information recorded having an LTC with the Chinese investor recipient.
The findings of the scorecard analysis are also supported by the data collected on 32 iron ore investments between 2002 and 2010 by Wilson (2011). The investment data show that, in nine of 32 iron ore investments, no LTC was entered into by the Chinese investors. In the remaining 23 cases where LTCs were entered into, only 63.8 per cent of projected iron ore output was reserved for the Chinese investor. This provides support for the conclusion that Chinese procurement has expanded, not tied up, the competitive supply base.

The results of the scorecard analysis on Chinese iron ore procurement outcomes contradict Chellaney’s claim that China’s supply security strategy has locked up iron ore supply. Chellaney’s testimony is also flawed in its understanding of China’s iron ore endowments, as it overlooks the high average cost of China’s iron ore production and the fact that domestic producers would be unable to compete on the global market with the added cost of seaborne freight. Chellaney is also incorrect in his comparison between China’s and India’s iron ore protectionism. In fact, in 2011, Indian authorities adopted policies to ensure steel production would be served by its own iron ore supply—the same charge of nonmarket orientation that Chellaney levelled at China. On 2 January 2012—22 days before Chellaney’s testimony—the Indian Government announced a further increase of export tariffs to iron ore lump and fines of up to 30 per cent.

Conclusion

The Chinese Government viewed the iron ore price boom as a signal of a coordinated effort by the big three to inflate prices. In response, it moved to reduce reliance on the big three and to secure long-run market access for its steel industry by supporting international investment in alternative (fringe) supplies.

To reduce reliance on the big three and secure supplies for the Chinese steel industry, the Chinese Government supported investment in international iron ore projects to reduce the barriers for fringe operators to enter the market. Chinese Government support was delivered mainly through its state financing institutions in the form of project financing, insurance and information.

Prior to 2008, the majority of Chinese investments and LTC-only transactions were undertaken in Australia. Since 2008, the decreasing attractiveness of Australia as an investment destination due to the increasing cost of doing business and large-scale Chinese project failures have seen Chinese investors diversify in terms of destination. There are similarities between China’s movement away from Australia and Japan’s push into the Brazilian market, providing an example of the long-run contestability of the iron ore market despite Australia’s constrained bilateral monopoly with Asia (Hurst 2017: 48).
Analysis of Chinese iron ore procurement arrangements shows that state-owned financing institutions were involved in the majority of investments and most investments were undertaken by central and provincial SOEs in concert with non-Chinese partners. The link between the Chinese state and the firms procuring iron ore has led many commentators to raise concerns that the increased access to finance provides Chinese investors with advantages over other competitors and creates barriers for investors competing on commercial terms.

Chinese iron ore investors were most often operating outside their core competency and lack of long-run ownership advantages. The lack of iron ore development and operating competence meant they generally paired with a non-Chinese specialised iron ore fringe producer. The preference for quasi-integration through joint ventures with non-Chinese fringe iron ore producers means that Chinese state support effectively lowered barriers to market entry for non-Chinese fringe iron ore miners.

The second issue related to the strong link between the Chinese Government and firms responsible for the procurement of iron ore is the potential of Chinese iron ore procurers to tie up supply and reduce market access for foreign steel producers. Moran’s (2010) procurement scorecard was applied to data on a sample of 50 iron ore procurement arrangements to assess the claim that ‘[g]aining access to or control of resources has been a key driver of [China’s] foreign and domestic policies’ (Chellaney 2012). The application of the procurement scorecard to the Chinese iron ore procurement dataset suggests that instead of tying up resources, China’s aggregate iron ore procurement arrangements have led to a broadening of the competitive global supply base and increased access to iron ore for other buyers in the Asian market, as did Japanese procurement arrangements in the 1970s and 1980s.

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