On Saturday, 18 May 2019, the incumbent Liberal–National Coalition parties surprised most observers by winning a majority of seats in the House of Representatives. Although the win was narrow—the conservative parties won 77 seats in the 151-seat chamber—this gave them a majority in the lower house of the national parliament. Using new data from the Cooperative Australian Election Survey, this chapter addresses and empirically evaluates some of the narratives about voting behaviour that emerged out of this shock election result, including claims about economic interest, age and ethnicity.

Following this unexpected outcome, one of the narratives that developed around the result was that Prime Minister Scott Morrison’s suburban ordinariness provided him and the Coalition parties he led with an advantage over the parties of the left. The left-of-centre Labor Party had, in some accounts, been portrayed as representing inner-city elites, allowing the Liberal–National Coalition parties to win the support of struggling workers employed in manufacturing and retail (see Wright et al. 2019). This included claims that the Labor Party’s negative gearing policies—and other plans to tax ‘aspirational voters’—actually hurt the very voters they were meant to help.

Related to this, the major parties’ strategies in 2019 appeared designed to segment the electorate by age: Labor’s housing affordability policy potentially disadvantaged older voters to the benefit of the young, while the Coalition defended the rights of older voters to enjoy the benefits
of superannuation and property-related tax minimisation policies. On the surface, these strategies appear sound. Older voters make up a large (and generally Coalition-voting) segment of the electorate.

Another narrative was that the ‘ethnic’ vote helped the Coalition win the election, stopping Labor ‘in its tracks’ (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). In particular, it was asserted that the Australian Marriage Law Postal Survey run by the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) in September 2017 activated the socially conservative politics of certain groups of voters, especially within the Chinese community, with ‘ethno-religious prejudices around sexuality and gay culture’ having ‘a devastating impact on the ALP vote where they were activated’ (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). During this opinion survey regarding the legalisation of same-sex marriage, the Labor Party largely supported the ‘yes’ case. Conversely, the Coalition was more ambivalent, with some high-profile supporters in its ranks and a large number of opponents. When the parliament subsequently voted to change the *Marriage Act*, almost all Labor parliamentarians voted in support, while several high-profile Coalition members voted against or abstained. It has been argued that this process helped the Coalition lock in the support of socially conservative ethnic groups.

We test these ideas in this chapter. Did the Coalition win working-class voters, or ‘battlers’, and is there evidence that the Labor Party’s tax policies (in this instance, negative gearing) helped drive these shifts? Was this also associated with a large age-related electoral cleavage? Is there evidence of an ‘ethnic vote’ and was this associated with opposition to same-sex marriage?

We examine these questions using the Cooperative Australian Election Survey (Ratcliff and Jackman 2019). This comprised a sample of 10,316 respondents stratified by age, gender and State collected through the YouGov online panel between 18 April and 12 May 2019. These data were weighted by age, gender, education, language spoken at home and State.

Using these data, we find that older, higher-income voters who owned their own homes continued to support the Coalition at higher rates, whereas lower-income renters and younger voters supported Labor. Support for negative gearing was more concentrated and opposition diffuse. This suggests that Labor’s policies on housing affordability and taxation may have been an electoral weakness, rather than a strength. However, this was not for the reasons claimed in the popular narrative.
There is also very little evidence for the assertion that ethnic minorities favoured the Coalition, that they thought the rights of same-sex couples had gone too far or that their attitudes towards this issue drove them towards the Coalition in greater numbers.

**Vote by age**

Very rarely in Australian electoral politics has either major party made explicit appeals to voters based on their generation or age cohort. This changed in 2019. Both the Labor Party and the Coalition engaged in strategies that incorporated policies that overtly appealed to voters belonging to different age or generational groups. This may not have been intentional (other groups may have been the targets), but regardless, the outcome was the same.

The Labor Party’s dual-pronged housing affordability policy—comprising a commitment to reducing franking credit dividends for some self-funded retirees and a cut to negative gearing offsets for property investors—would have disadvantaged (wealthier) older voters and benefitted younger (less affluent) individuals (Kehoe 2019). Negative gearing essentially allows the unrestricted use of tax losses from investment properties to be offset as tax deductions from most other sources of income. Conversely, the Coalition defended the rights of older (income- and asset-rich) voters to enjoy the benefits of existing tax minimisation policies available through superannuation and property investment (Millane 2019).

On paper, these clashing approaches were sound. Older voters have traditionally supported the Coalition in greater numbers. As the population ages, this group increasingly makes up much of its electoral base. The parties of the left (particularly the Greens) have performed better among younger voters for decades, with Labor doing better with those aged under 65 than over and appearing content to lose the support of some older voters in 2019. Labor’s shadow treasurer Chris Bowen told voters that ‘if you don’t like our policies, don’t vote for us’ (Kehoe and Cranston 2019).

Labor may have been willing to adopt this strategy due to the perception that it had a (potentially temporary) electoral advantage from a surge in the enrolment of young people during the 2017 marriage law postal survey (Betigeri 2019). However, this narrative may not be entirely accurate.
It may be intuitive that young Australians were energised by an issue particularly salient to them and would enrol and vote. Indeed, enrolment among young Australians (aged 18 to 25) increased from 73 per cent in 2011 to 85 per cent in 2018, reversing a previous decline (AEC 2019). However, it is more likely that increased enrolments prior to the 2019 election were due to the AEC’s policy of direct enrolment (ANAO 2016). In 2019, approximately two-thirds of all electoral enrolment in Australia occurred through direct updates of the roll by the AEC.

While this difference may seem technical in nature, it is substantively important. Previously unenrolled voters who were mobilised to enrol so they could have a say in the marriage law postal survey have, by definition, at least a minor interest in one contemporary policy issue. Previously unenrolled voters added to the electoral roll do not necessarily have any passing interest in politics and there is no reason for us to assume that they would turn out to vote, given they did not actively enrol themselves. In that sense, stories of ‘declining youth turnout’ are better characterised as the continuation of an existing trend rather than any new phenomenon. In other words, similar raw numbers of Australians are voting, but the pool of enrolled voters is growing (through direct enrolments).

**Individual behaviour in 2019: Same old, same old**

If anything, the parties’ segmentation of the electorate by age or generational cohort in 2019 reinforced existing patterns. Many young voters abstained, and those who voted tended to support Labor and the Greens. Despite pre-election narratives suggesting young voters would play a disproportionately important role in the outcome, they were unable to remove the Coalition Government.

As a baseline, we can reasonably assume that these intergenerational patterns have become a relatively fundamental feature of contemporary Australian politics. Based on both the Australian Election Study and now the Cooperative Australian Election Survey data, there are clear trends and cross-sectional data. As can be seen in Figure 12.1, a clear pattern concerning age and partisan choice remained at the 2019 election. Young voters preferred Labor over the Coalition, with the Greens only a small way behind the major centre-right parties.
Moreover, young voters were the most likely to not enrol or abstain from voting, either risking a fine for non-attendance or avoiding enrolment in the first place (as shown in Figure 12.2).\(^1\)

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\(^1\) Of course, since being enrolled in an online survey panel and being willing to complete a survey about politics are likely correlated with the act of enrolling and voting, there are limitations to what we can learn from these data about the act of abstaining.
The framing of particularly salient issues in the 2019 campaign—tax policies, housing affordability and wage and wealth inequality—may have been designed to appeal to younger voters, driving them towards the Labor Party and away from the Coalition (and perhaps the Greens). This does not appear to have gone according to plan.

The expectation that Labor’s housing policy—which included reducing the tax breaks available to landlords and therefore their incentive to bid real estate prices higher—would appeal to younger votes may have been reasonable. Younger voters are less likely to own their own home and more likely to rent than older voters. However, although these younger voters were less likely to agree that landlords should be able to use losses from rental properties as a deduction on income tax through negative gearing (Figure 12.3), they were not more likely to disagree. Rather, they were more likely to not hold an opinion on this issue.

Figure 12.3 Support for the use of negative gearing for investment properties, by age

Note: The question asked was: ‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements. Landlords should be able to use losses from rental properties as a deduction on income tax (through negative gearing).’

Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
As a result, this issue did not necessarily drive these voters towards the Labor Party. As Figure 12.4 highlights, the relationship between attitudes towards negative gearing and voting intention was strongest for voters aged between 50 and 69. Younger voters, aged between 18 and 29, were much less likely to vote based on their attitudes towards negative gearing. Although we cannot prove the direction of causality, this may suggest that opposition to negative gearing was diffuse and Labor’s policy on this issue did little to benefit the party during the campaign.

**Economic voting in 2019**

Our finding that attitudes towards negative gearing had only a limited association with voting intentions among the young may suggest that the explanation of the result adopted by some in the media—that traditional voting patterns based on economic cleavages have broken down—has some validity. These claims are similar to the ‘death of class’ thesis, in which it was asserted that (now irrelevant) economic cleavages were a part of specific historical processes linked to the Industrial Revolution (Clark et al. 1993; Pakulski and Waters 1997). As the major political issues of the Industrial Revolution were resolved, ideologies and issues related to economic class became less important. According to these arguments, demand for significant (economic) policy difference disappeared. Instead, class consciousness and economic cleavages have been replaced with social and post-materialist politics (see also Inglehart 1977, 1990, 1997, 2008).
Many of these claims, however, are based on confusion between aggregate movements in voting choice and the behaviour of individuals (see, for instance, Atkins 2019; Crowe 2019; Wright et al. 2019). These writers find that electorates with lower than average incomes, lower levels of education and greater numbers of renters moved towards the Coalition. Besides linking (often small) swings with overall levels of support, they are also guilty of ecological fallacies.

Although the type of occupation an individual has can play an important role in their economic interests and political preferences, this is not necessarily the only (or even most important) driver of politicised economic cleavages. A meaningful analysis of economic interests (or economic class) is driven not by the colour of a voter's collar alone, but also by their access to resources and their relationship with capital (a simplification of the arguments put forward by Braverman 1974; Wright 2000: 25).

Using this more nuanced understanding of economic interests combined with our data, we undertake a deeper analysis of economic voting at the 2019 election. We start by operationalising this concept of economic interests through the examination of voting intention as a function of proximity to capital and access to resources. For this exercise, we consider a voter who owns their own business or a private trust as being closer to the interests of capital and a voter with a higher household income as having greater resources. The results indicate that the commentary on the Coalition’s status as the party of the battler has been mistaken.

While the Coalition received some of its highest support from those earning $208,000 or more who own a business or a trust (approximately 60 per cent of the voters who gave the Liberal–National parties their first preference in 2019), the picture was very different among those who could be better described as working class (see Figure 12.5). Associated with, but not necessarily caused by, Labor’s policy on housing affordability and taxation, the Coalition also did well among high-income homeowners, while Labor did better with low-income renters (see Figure 12.6). Although, as with age, Labor’s advantage with lower-income renters and workers was smaller than the Coalition’s lead among higher-income and capital-owning voters.
Of course, some blue-collar workers voted for the Coalition. However, if we adopt a meaningful definition of the working class—voters who work in blue-collar jobs or sales and services, with lower to middle incomes and who are employees—we find they did not actually provide the Coalition with significant support. Approximately 25 per cent of those with average to lower earnings (with household incomes below $78,000 per annum) supported the Liberal and National parties with their first-preference votes. Conversely, about half of those with the lowest incomes (less than $26,000 per annum) voted Labor. The self-employed in blue-collar and sales and service occupations, with incomes above $208,000 per annum, were the ones who overwhelmingly voted for the Coalition. Contrary to many of
the claims made since the election, higher-income voters were the ones who swung away from Labor, defecting to the Coalition in greater numbers than those with lower household incomes (see Figures 12.7 and 12.8).

As we might expect, based on self-interest, voters who owned their own homes (including those with a mortgage) and those with high household incomes were more likely to support the use of negative gearing by landlords (Figure 12.9). These voters were also much more likely to vote for the Coalition (Figure 12.10). However, as discussed above, support for negative gearing was more concentrated, while opposition was diffuse. While those who benefited were more likely to support the Coalition, those who would not benefit—namely, lower-income voters who did not own their own homes—were more likely to not hold an opinion. As with younger voters, their partisan choice appears to have been less associated with their attitudes towards negative gearing. The only high-income group that voted strongly for Labor was that of high-income voters who opposed the use of negative gearing for investment properties.

![Figure 12.7 First-preference defections from Labor for the House of Representatives, by household income](image)

Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Figure 12.8 First-preference defections from the Coalition for the House of Representatives, by household income
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).

Figure 12.9 Support for the use of negative gearing for investment properties, by home ownership and household income
Note: The question asked was: ‘Please say whether you strongly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree with each of these statements. Landlords should be able to use losses from rental properties as a deduction on income tax (through negative gearing).’
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Vote by ancestry

A final narrative surrounding the election result asserted that the Coalition won with the support of the ‘ethnic’ vote. Specifically, one claim was that the same-sex marriage plebiscite activated the socially conservative politics of certain groups of voters, especially those from the Chinese community (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). Is there any evidence that Chinese voters are more conservative on gay rights? Or that the Chinese vote swung away from the Labor Party and influenced the election outcome?

Changing patterns in and attitudes towards immigration

Interest in the possible political influence of the ethnic vote is not new. It attracted a great deal of scholarly attention in the 1980s, when multiculturalism was at its peak. During this period, it was well established that the Labor Party had the edge over the Coalition among Australia’s ethnic population (Pietsch 2018), although there was variation across different groups (Pietsch 2017b). This was particularly the case for Australia’s new migrant populations from Asia.\(^2\) Part of the interest in the

\(^2\) In part due to the Hawke Labor Government’s actions following the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989, when it extended temporary permits for Chinese Nationals in Australia and granted permanent visas to 42,000 Chinese temporary visitors (see Pietsch 2018).
Voter Behaviour

Ethnic vote is due to the changing nature of immigration to Australia. During the later years of the 20th century, it became more multicultural, temporary and skills-based, focused on workers and students.3

These changes in the nature of the immigration system ignited a public debate on population pressures, housing and job security during the 2019 NSW State election, which was held only months before the federal election. This issue became highly salient during the State campaign, with a video released showing NSW Labor Party Leader Michael Daley saying: ‘Our children will flee [Sydney] and who will they be replaced with … they are being replaced by young people from typically Asia with PhDs’ (Pietsch 2019). Federal Labor immediately went into damage control, concerned about the upcoming federal election and a number of marginal seats with high populations of Asian voters. Revealing the high degree of sensitivity in some of Labor’s key migrant-heavy seats about perceptions of racism, Daley later offered his resignation so as not to hurt the federal election campaign.

The 2019 election and the Chinese vote

During the federal election campaign, there was a great deal of concern about how both of the major parties were being perceived among Asian migrants in key marginal seats. This was particularly evident in the middle-suburban Melbourne seat of Chisholm, where it was claimed that East Asian voters made up more than 30 per cent of the population and would be decisive in the outcome for that electorate. In particular, it was pointed out that approximately 20 per cent of Chisholm residents spoke Chinese (Pietsch 2017a). Both the major parties recruited Chinese candidates to

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3 In the 1950s, almost half of all new migrants arriving in Australia came from the United Kingdom. This declined to 18 per cent by 2016. Over the same period, immigration from the People’s Republic of China shifted from a very small proportion of arrivals to Australia to one of the largest (Simon-Davies 2018). By 2016, 3.2 per cent of adults in Australia (including just over 1.6 per cent of citizens) were born in China, and more than 5.7 per cent had Chinese ancestry (including more than 3.6 per cent of citizens) (ABS 2016). In 2017, only 32.5 per cent of the total visas allocated were for permanent residency (Simon-Davies 2018) and many of these applications for permanent visas came from former international students. In recent years, the government reformed the visa system to narrow the list of occupations eligible for permanent visas, adjusted the points test used to evaluate applications, with a stronger emphasis on higher education and English-language ability, and made changes to temporary migration, restricting the type of occupations for which temporary visa applicants could apply (Boucher and Davidson 2019).
appeal to the ‘ethnic’ voter. The candidate for the Labor Party was Jennifer Yang from Taiwan and the Liberal Party candidate was Gladys Liu from Hong Kong.

At first glance, the claims that the ethnic vote (particularly the Chinese population) swung to the Coalition and helped it to hold marginal seats, such as Chisholm, seems reasonable. Liberal candidate Gladys Liu narrowly won the seat with an active campaign against the Safe Schools program, which was introduced into Victorian schools by the State Government to address the issue of bullying of lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex (LGBTQI) students. According to Liu:

> The Chinese believe same-sex [marriage] is against normal practice [and] … Chinese people come to Australia because they want good … things for the next generation, not to be destroyed—they use the word destroyed—[by] same-sex, transgender, inter-gender. All this rubbish. To them, they are just ridiculous rubbish. (Burton-Bradley 2019)

Comments made by Liu in 2016 also surfaced during the campaign, in which she described LGBTQI issues as ‘ridiculous rubbish’ (Burton-Bradley 2019).

There was also concern that the Liberal campaign displayed Chinese-language signs at polling booths with the appearance of official AEC notices, telling voters that the ‘correct’ way to vote was to put a number 1 next to the Liberal candidate. These signs were the subject of a High Court challenge (see Chapter 3, this volume). A similar campaign was observed on WeChat, a Chinese-language social media platform, providing how-to-vote instructions that recommended support for Liu (see Karp 2019). There was some concern that this signage would take advantage of language (and other) barriers and divert Chinese-speaking Australians towards the Coalition (Pietsch 2018).

Testing these claims

Combined, these claims assert that the Coalition benefited from the Chinese vote, which was more socially conservative than the rest of the electorate, open to manipulation due to language barriers and strategically located in marginal electorates (including Chisholm). We question these assertions.

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4 Initially, with some federal funding.
Some of these election narratives regarded the Chinese vote as critical in key seats such as Chisholm in Melbourne and Barton in Sydney (Jakubowicz and Ho 2019). While the Chinese vote is large in these electorates and a few others, it makes up a smaller proportion of the electorate than many of these claims suggest. Most observers mistake the total Chinese population for the citizen population. While more than one-quarter of Chisholm’s adult population is ethnically Chinese (self-identifying as having Chinese ancestry), most are not Australian citizens and could not vote in the federal election. Similarly, while nearly one-quarter of Chisholm residents aged over 18 reported speaking a Chinese language at home, most of these Chinese speakers were not Australian citizens. Overall, 14 per cent of Chisholm’s adult citizens had Chinese ancestry and just over 11 per cent spoke a Chinese language at home (ABS 2016). This makes the Chinese component somewhat less dominant in these areas than is sometimes asserted. Additionally, regardless of the size of the Chinese vote in Chisholm and similar electorates, there is little evidence Chinese social conservatism (if it exists) was decisive in any way. The first-preference and two-party-preferred swings against the Coalition were actually larger in Chisholm than the Victorian average, suggesting that any appeal to Chinese social conservatism or tricks designed to take advantage of language barriers provided little benefit to the Liberal candidate.

There are also doubts about whether Chinese Australians are actually more socially conservative than other voters, and whether they shifted to the Coalition in 2019. We test this by examining voting intention by respondents’ ancestry and attitudes towards same-sex marriage (Figures 12.11 and 12.12). We find that, generally speaking, there is little difference in the attitudes towards same-sex rights by ancestry and that Chinese voters (in our sample, at least) are actually less likely than other voters to say same-sex rights have gone too far.
Figure 12.11 First-preference vote intention for the House of Representatives, by ancestry

Note: Points are scaled by the number of weighted respondents identifying with each ancestry category. Respondents were able to select two ancestry categories.
Source: Data from Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).

Figure 12.12 Belief that rights for same-sex couples have gone too far, by ancestry

Notes: The question asked was: ‘The statements below indicate some of the changes that have been happening in Australia over the years. For each one, please say whether you think the change has gone too far, not gone far enough, or is it about right. The rights of same-sex couples.’ Points are scaled by the number of weighted respondents identifying with each ancestry category. Respondents were able to select two ancestry categories.
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
We also examined the rate of defection of voters with Chinese ancestry and other voters from the Labor Party and Coalition between 2016 and 2019. Shown in Figures 12.13 and 12.14, these indicate that Chinese Australians did not shift their party support from the Labor Party to the Coalition at a greater rate than other voters. The Coalition may have been slightly more successful holding on to Chinese-ancestry voters, but not to the extent that it would likely have made a major difference to the election result.

**Figure 12.13 First-preference defections from Labor for the House of Representatives, by Chinese ancestry**

Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).
Figure 12.14 First-preference defections from the Coalition for the House of Representatives, by Chinese ancestry
Source: Ratcliff and Jackman (2019).

Discussion and conclusion

The 2019 Australian election was framed around significant policy differences, with real winners and losers. As a result, narratives developed around the (generally unexpected) outcome. It was claimed the centre-left Labor Party had become the party of the elites and its negative gearing policies had reduced its support among the very voters they were meant to help, who instead voted for the Liberal–National Coalition. It was also asserted that the ‘ethnic’ vote helped the Coalition win the election, with the 2017 same-sex marriage postal survey activating the socially conservative politics of certain groups of voters, and in particular the Chinese community.

We find there is little evidence to support these narratives.
Chinese Australians do not appear to have favoured or swung towards the Coalition. There is little evidence that they thought the rights of same-sex couples had gone too far or that attitudes about this issue drove voters towards the parties of the centre-right. We also find that the traditional economic cleavages remain intact. However, we also find an equally powerful counternarrative to these—one that is supported by the data. Labor made the most explicit pitch to younger, generally lower-income renters—or at least, against older, more affluent voters—of any major party in recent Australian history. It was also expected to win. It did not.

One possible reason is that support for negative gearing is more concentrated, particularly among those likely to benefit from it: the older, the affluent and those who own real estate. Conversely, opposition is limited and diffuse. Those less likely to benefit are generally more likely to not hold an opinion than oppose the policy. Arguably, this limited any electoral benefits Labor may have been able to obtain from its policy in this space.

As the electorate continues to age, the strategy adopted by Labor will probably struggle to attract sufficient numbers of voters in a sufficient number of electorates to win a majority in the House of Representatives. This is not to say that the Labor Party is incapable of forming government in Australia, either now or in the future. However, it may suggest that the dividends earned by electoral strategies that explicitly target younger voters over older ones may decline over time. Moreover, the most salient issues among the population generally—economic management, health, education and the environment—increasingly involve intergenerational trade-offs. An issue such as climate change may be viewed as a form of zero-sum calculation for many voters. For every younger person whose future welfare may be enhanced by actions to reduce the potential effects of climate change, the return from an older voter’s superannuation may be jeopardised. The policy reality of this calculation is largely irrelevant. Perceptions are potentially more important. Current and future governments in Australia face the challenge of convincing older generations that they will not be bearing the costs of long-term policies addressing Australia’s structural policy challenges.
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