We claim we have been practicing the Nixon Doctrine even before it was announced.

– Thanat Khoman, foreign minister

If the year 1968 was an annus horribilis for the discourse of anticommunism, it was also an annus mirabilis for Thai détente. The prospect of American retrenchment from the region following the Tet Offensive, when the North Vietnamese forces launched surprise attacks against South Vietnam on 30 January, placed pressure on the anticommunist discourse. This raised discursive anxiety for Thailand’s security and diplomacy. The former Cold Warrior and long-serving foreign minister Thanat Khoman, seeing the changing international dynamic, initiated the concept of ‘flexible diplomacy’ to meet the anxiety. Initially, this concept comprised three main characteristics: anti-Americanism, regionalism and détente with the communist powers. By the end of 1968, flexible diplomacy and détente were used interchangeably. This chapter argues that Thailand’s changing discourse occurred even before the Nixon Doctrine. We can say that Thailand was bending before the wind.

1 ‘FM: We back China’s entry’, Bangkok Post, 18 September 1971.
2 It should be noted that détente with the Soviet Union had earlier been attempted by the US administrations prior to Nixon, such as John F Kennedy’s failed détente in 1963. See Jennifer W See, ‘An Uneasy Truce: John F. Kennedy and Soviet–American Détente, 1963’, Cold War History 2, no. 2 (2002): 161–94.
This chapter traces the discursive descent of flexible diplomacy by first closely analysing Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman’s speeches between 1968 and 1969. It then examines a change in institutional practices within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, exemplified in the training programs of the newly established Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs (DVIFA). Both discursive and non-discursive practices rendered the formation of détente proponents possible.

3.1. Discursive Practices: Discourse of ‘Flexible Diplomacy’

Prominent narratives of the changing trajectory of Thai foreign policy often posit the Nixon Doctrine as an important milestone.3 The doctrine arose when, on 25 July 1969, newly elected US president Richard M Nixon signalled the American retreat from Vietnam and the prospect of withdrawal from the region, including Thailand.4 Amid the prospect of a communist takeover of Indochina, the possibility of US retrenchment aroused anxiety among the Thai political elite. What would be the security arrangement with the US, and how would it ensure Thailand’s national survival? However, while Thailand’s decision to establish relations with the communist powers undoubtedly followed a transformation of US foreign policy, it was not directly caused or influenced by the US. In fact, the discourses and practices of détente preceded the American decision to demilitarise and deescalate the Vietnam War.5 In other words, Thailand was bending even before the wind began to blow.

The new course began shortly after President Lyndon Johnson dramatically reversed his Vietnam policy in March 1968. After the Tet Offensive, Johnson ordered a halt to the surgical bombing of Indochina, and began peace talks with the North Vietnamese. By that time, Thanat Khoman, Thailand’s long-serving and astute foreign minister since 1958, and other

---


like-minded diplomats began to realise that Thailand’s former diplomacy of strategic dependence on the US was no longer tenable. He declared that: ‘The United States has tried to raise doubts in our minds and it has succeeded. It has succeeded in raising doubts in its own mind.’ Thanat sought to find Thailand’s own response to the changing international and regional circumstances. By 1968, Thanat started to call for a reduction of the US military presence in Thailand, and more nuanced and more balanced relations with other great powers, particularly the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). He proposed a so-called ‘flexible diplomacy’. By 1969, the Thai Foreign Ministry had decided to reconsider the situation as ‘the old era passes and the new one comes’.

3.1.1. Thanat Khoman’s Foreign Policy Options

The events of 1968 situated Thailand in a rapidly changing world, leading to a paradigmatic rupture in its foreign policy. Thanat Khoman was a leading voice in this newly emerging discourse of ‘flexible diplomacy’. With great uncertainty about the role of the US in Southeast Asia, Thanat began to reassess policy options in case of American retrenchment. He came up with five possible options that can be described as: non-alignment, bandwagoning, neutralisation, bipolarisation and regional cooperation.

The first option was non-alignment or non-involvement. For Thanat, a ‘policy of not being involved with one side or another’ was ‘not very easy’, and:

not a cure all, it is not even a safe device, because those who chose to follow a non-aligned policy have been the first to be subject to attacks and also to threatening dangers.

In his historical understanding, those non-aligned countries were ‘those who suffered most’ from their non-alignment strategy. This was because the great powers were ‘not willing to recognize that you are in the middle

---


and that they should come to trample upon you’. According to Thanat, the non-aligned countries were ‘under boots, under the threat, under the guns, or right in the middle of the danger’. They were ‘right in the firing line’. As such, for Thanat non-alignment policy was not a suitable option.

The second option was bandwagoning, meaning a policy of coming to terms with the sources of danger themselves, especially the PRC. In Thanat’s words, this option was to ‘win their favors’ and while equivalent to détente, Thanat at the time did not see it as such. In relation to this course of action, he questioned why Thailand should go ‘straight to the sources of danger and try to reason with, argue with them, and to come to terms with them’. According to Thanat, while this offered a practical solution, from his recent experience, it was not yet possible. As a small state, he puzzled

who are we … to dare to go direct to the source of danger? What result can we expect from having direct discussion, heart to heart discussions, and try to come to terms with the possible source of danger.

For the time being, this option was not viable. However, Thanat still kept this policy option open for the future. As he succinctly asserted:

We do not lose hope. If tomorrow, there are straws in the wind, and if the wind begins to blow and if the straws begin to fly, we may decide to go directly and face the dangers, and try to talk and see what is going to happen. But so far there has been no indication … There have been no straws and no winds.

As a result, Thanat concluded:

I don’t expect that in the case of Thailand, we can produce the straws and make the wind blow. But we keep our fingers crossed and we keep in the back of our mind the possibility.

---

9  Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 250.
10  Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 251.
11  Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 251.
12  Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 251.
This possibility was the option for détente with the communist powers in the near future, which would be the bedrock of his flexible diplomacy.

The third option was neutralisation, where the state officially declared its nonparticipation in any conflicts or wars. Thanat condemned ‘liberals’ in the West, who suggested that those Southeast Asian nations threatened by communist encroachments should ‘bow to such threats and neutralize themselves’. In an address to the University of Minnesota on 22 October 1968, Thanat stated:

> The authors of neutralization plan who do not call for similar neutralization on the part of the Marxist regimes, contend that the actual and potential aggressors may grant them a lease of free national life. The least one can say is that such a proposal is entirely one-sided and does not take into account the realities of life in Southeast Asia where bitter struggles are going on between the expansionist forces and those which staunchly resist Communist expansion and conquest.¹³

For Thanat, this unilateral neutralisation policy was a worst-case scenario that he ruled out from the outset. He said that

> even if you join them because you cannot lick them, even if you join them, you are also licked. Even if you join them, you have to expect tanks, guns and troops to come to your doors. So it does not solve the problems … If you join them, you have to bow your heads very low, you have to follow the dogmas strictly to the letters and spirit. If you try to move a little bit away, you are either a revisionist or deviationist, with all the risks that accompany such qualifications.

Thanat admitted that, ‘Of course you can survive; for how long, you don’t know’.¹⁴

Thus, ‘If you want to survive as free men, free nations’, contended Thanat, ‘neither of these solutions, non-alignment, win their favors, or even join them, will enable you to enjoy life as free peoples and free nations’.¹⁵

The fourth option was what Thanat termed the ‘bipolarisation’ policy, which was predicated upon

---

¹³ ‘Address by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the University of Minnesota, USA’, 22 October 1968, in Jain, China and Thailand, 142.

¹⁴ Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 253.

¹⁵ Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 251.
the coexistence of two centers of powers, one respecting the other and one allowing the other to exert its rights and influence without undue interferences. If such a situation is not recognized and one side even goes so far to seek the destruction of the other, such a proposition becomes wholly impractical.\footnote{Address by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the University of Minnesota, USA, 22 October 1968, in 
Jain, \textit{China and Thailand}, 141.}

In a Southeast Asian context, this policy of ‘bipolarisation’ meant that there should be two poles or centres of power – namely the US and the PRC. Both would be obliged to guarantee peaceful coexistence among secondary or small states. However, for Thanat, this ‘bipolarisation’ policy ‘didn’t work, because China didn’t play the game’.\footnote{Thanat Khoman, ‘Transcript of H.E. Thanat Khoman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interviewed by Edwin Newman of WNBC Television’, New York, 2 November 1968, in 
\textit{Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Vol. 2: 1968}, 294.} Elsewhere, he contended:

\begin{quote}
neither a neutralization plan nor even a bipolarization policy has been able to guarantee [small states] a peaceful and free existence, because some parties have shown themselves to be unwilling to play the game.\footnote{Address by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman at the University of Minnesota, USA, 22 October 1968, in 
Jain, \textit{China and Thailand}, 143.}
\end{quote}

Thanat’s fifth, and perhaps most reasonable, option – and what Thailand was ‘trying to perform now’ – was regional cooperation and regional solidarity in Southeast Asia.\footnote{Thanat, Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 251.} Thanat said that Thailand was at the forefront of developing regional organisations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – which was established by the Bangkok Declaration on 8 August 1967 – in Southeast Asia, and also the Asian Pacific Council (ASPAC) in the Asia-Pacific region. These groupings could offset the risks of ‘the withdrawal of the United States from this part of the world’.\footnote{Thanat Khoman, ‘Transcript of an Interview given by H.E. Thanat Khoman, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand to Mr. Friedhelm Kemna, Southeast Asia Correspondent of the Die Welt of Hamburg and Berlin at the Foreign Ministry’, Bangkok, 29 November 1968, in 
\textit{Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Vol. 2: 1968}, 308.} Thanat suggested:

\begin{quote}
we are doing this to enable us to deal more effectively and more adequately, not only with our foes, potential and actual, but also with our friends … We can deal on a more equal footing and more equal basis with our friends.
\end{quote}
Thanat claimed that this possibility was ‘the practical and pragmatic policy’.  

In his other interviews and speeches, Thanat also included the second option of détente with communist powers as one of the practical and pragmatic policies as well. Both policies – regional cooperation and détente – would be mutually constitutive and inextricably intertwined. However, subsequently, the former was less strategically and discursively important than the latter. Above all, these foreign policies required Thailand to rely on itself, and to work with other nations in Asia-Pacific. As he put it in December 1968:

Now we in Asia do not want to rely on outside powers. We want to rely on ourselves and that is why Thailand for instance has been developing its own national strength in many fields, political, economic, social, cultural fields also. Thailand … has been making strenuous efforts to develop regional solidarity not only in Southeast Asia but in the Asian and Pacific region with Japan for instance.

To put it differently, by 1968 Thanat attempted to lay out the basis for individual and regional self-reliance, thereby replacing excessive dependence on external powers. Thanat repeatedly claimed that this was a change in Thai foreign policy, and we can agree that the salience of these policy options was part and parcel of the new discourse of flexible diplomacy from 1968 on.

The chapter now turns to examine ‘flexible diplomacy’, a concept that Thanat coined in 1968. At the outset, flexible diplomacy comprised three main characteristics or discourses: increasing doubts on Americanism, regional cooperation and cohesiveness, and détente with the great powers. As Thanat Khoman summarised:

There are three big question marks. One is the uncertainty of the future attitude and policy of the US, which has been created by the Americans themselves through their mass-media, academic

---

21 Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 254.


and political channels … The second question mark was what will be the future policy of Communist China. And the third question mark was what we are trying to do to fill the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of western colonial powers to try to forge a new working relationship in order to prevent the Asian Communist powers from filling that vacuum with their own authority. We have had many set-backs with ASA [the Association of Southeast Asia] and ASEAN. What will be the outcome of our efforts to create regional solidarity and cooperation? All these questions should be dealt with together.

3.1.2. Discourse of Anti-Americanism

The first discourse involved increased scepticism of American policy. Thanat began to identify the danger of being drawn into a highly dependent relationship with a single world power. An architect of the Thai–US security alliance in the 1960s, he had originally believed the US presence to be beneficial. The objectives of the US and Thailand were aligned during the Vietnam War. That is, containing communism. Thanat said that he had advocated ‘close cooperation with the United States because our objectives were similar. I did not want, and still do not want, Thailand to be swamped by Communism’. But in 1968, for Thanat:

the United States, for domestic reasons, was no longer able to pursue that objective … It became obvious that the objective to resist [the communists], under which Thailand had joined with the United States, was no longer there. The objective was changed on the part of the US. It was not we who changed; it was the US that changed. I felt that the presence of American forces in Thailand had lost its justification.

ASA was a nascent regional organisation formed by the Philippines, Thailand and the Federation of Malaya (nowadays Malaysia) on 31 July 1961. It was the predecessor to ASEAN.


In early March 1968, Thanat responded to possible US disengagement or withdrawal from Vietnam and the region with irritation. ‘Some people in the United States are advocating that the United States should get out’, he exclaimed, ‘I think those people, who talk so loudly about withdrawal, are not quite realistic’. He said that:

the recent experience that we have got from our friends … opened our eyes … We here in Thailand, and I should say in Asia in general, have been rather innocent and naïve. We have had a rather simple or simpleton approach that peoples are either friends or foes. That is not so. There may be foes among our friends [by which Thanat meant some senators and congressmen as well as various media].

Furthermore, between 1968 and 1969, Thanat emphatically complained that the prospect of American retrenchment from Southeast Asia was not compatible with the image, status, prestige and responsibility of the US as a superpower. For him, this would inevitably lead to an erosion of American power and credibility, both in Southeast Asia and in the international system in general. First and foremost, the effects would be directly felt by the US itself. In August 1968, he argued that:

[the] US remains a great power. But if the domestic public opinion in the United States should force the administration to forsake its responsibilities in other parts of the world, then of course the effects will be felt by none other than the United States itself, and the American people. Because then, the US will not be able to perform the role of a great power. Because if you are a great power, whether you like it or not, you will have to bear certain

---


the people who should feel concerned in the first place, are not the Thais or the Southeast Asians, but the American people because they are well developed enough intellectually, morally and physically to understand what such a decision would mean for the United States. We are a small people around here; we are not the defeated people of the great powers. Quite frankly, I do not see much choice before the United States or before us: either keep on doing what we all have started doing or else call it quit and leave the whole place to the Communists, just to satisfy certain senators, certain newspapers and radio and television commentators. That is all there is to it.


28 Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 252.
responsibilities. You cannot shake off your responsibilities and remain a great power or otherwise your influence, image, your presence will be eroded.\textsuperscript{29}

On another day, he again stressed the requirements of great power responsibility:

As a leading power in the non-Communist camp, if the United States were to say well, alright, we decided to retrench ourselves and recoil into our own hell, in ‘our fortress America’, the major effect will be felt by the United States and by the American nation, even more than by the rest of the world … If that were to be the case, then the United States will have relinquished its role as a major power, a world power, to become only a regional power … Would that be advantageous or disadvantageous to the United States’ position as a world power?\textsuperscript{30}

Even after Richard Nixon won the presidential election, Thanat warned of the degenerating effects of ‘neo-isolationism’ in the US. In December 1968, for example, he stated emphatically:

a world power like the United States in my opinion can afford to isolate itself only if it renounces its role as a world power. I don’t think a world power can retreat into Fortress America.\textsuperscript{31}

Although he had discerned that the Nixon administration would reduce military involvement in Vietnam, Thanat still wanted to believe that the reduction would be gradual. In his opinion:


\textsuperscript{30} Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Miss Frances Starner of the Far Eastern Economic Review and to Mr. Donald Kirk of the Washington Star’, 243.

American troops will be withdrawn from South Vietnam in proper time. The question is to withdraw them in a gradual and appropriate way and not in a sudden massive pull-out because then all the efforts and sacrifice which have been made for many years with the cost of so much money and so many lives may be lost.\footnote{Thanat, ‘Transcript of an Interview given by H.E. Thanat Khoman to Mr. Wortelboer, Representative of KRO Television of Holland’, 316.}

Subsequently, Thanat suggested that Thailand could no longer rely on America’s protecting presence, and should pursue self-reliance. In his speech on Tokyo television on 25 February 1969, Thanat said:

> there must be a recognition and perhaps acknowledgement of the fact that the intervention of outside powers in dealing with Asian problems may not be the most effective nor the most desirable device for their settlement. Either those powers may become tired of the exacting ordeals or their domestic public opinion may find the burden of responsibility too heavy for their taste … We would do well, therefore, to acknowledge this new mood and prepare ourselves accordingly.\footnote{Quoted in John LS Girling, ‘Thailand’s New Course’, \textit{Pacific Affairs} 42, no. 3 (Fall 1969): 349.}

In July 1969, Thanat relayed the same concept of self-reliance at Thammasat University:

> Thailand must consider the situation as the old era passes and the new one comes and above all we must strengthen ourselves to meet possible dangers from all sides. For with the possibility that the US would withdraw from the region, we must not continue to rely on others. We should be as self-reliant as we can. However, we must cooperate with all nations on an equal basis and status.\footnote{‘Thanat Khoman’s Speech at Thammasat University’, July 1969, in Jain, \textit{China and Thailand}, 161.}

of America’s commitment to protect Thailand’s security, as promised in the SEATO obligation (1954) and the Thanat–Rusk joint communiqué of 1962:

We will honor our obligations under that treaty. We will honor them not simply because we have to, because of the words that we have signed, but because we believe in those words, and particularly believe in them in association with a proud and a strong people, the people of Thailand. We have been together in the past, we are together in the present, and the United States will stand proudly with Thailand against those threaten it from abroad, or from within. 36

In response to Nixon’s pledge, which seemed to be in contradiction to the Guam Doctrine, Thanat proclaimed:

We told President Nixon that Thailand is not going to be another Vietnam. We told him that we never asked for American soldiers to come and fight in defense of Thailand. We pledged that we will not ask for American soldiers to come and fight in defense of Thailand in an insurgent war. This includes even a covert invasion of the kind North Vietnam is carrying out against South Vietnam. 37

He constantly repeated that the existence of American troops in Thailand were specifically intended for the Vietnam War, rather than for a local fight against communist insurgencies in Thailand. 38

Thanat, first of all, had raised doubts about the US’s commitment to Thailand. As he told members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand on 19 August 1969:

36 Quoted in Randolph, The United States and Thailand, 138. My emphasis.
38 For example, Thanat said that:

The purpose for the American forces stationed here in Thailand has been linked with the Vietnam War. American forces in Thailand … are not here to help Thailand defend itself against Communist activities. American forces are here in Thailand to fight the war in Vietnam from Thailand and not to engage physically in fighting Communist activities here in Thailand.

The partners to the Treaty will carry out that treaty obligation only if their national interests are concordant with us, but not otherwise. There are many escape clauses, called by such names as ‘constitutional processes’ and so on and so forth. So, we believe that we can rely on ourselves, and only when our national interests are concordant with the national interests of others can we expect other nations to carry out, to implement, their obligation, not otherwise.  

Consequently, ‘relations between Thailand and the United States’, Thanat suggested, ‘will evolve toward a more selective basis’. 

Secondly, Thanat began to press for the pullout of American forces. On 20 August 1969, he formally proposed to US ambassador Leonard Unger that the process of ‘immediate evacuation’ of 49,000 US military personnel stationed in Thailand had to commence. Two days later, he announced that negotiations on American withdrawal would start soon. This idea was not so appealing to the military elites who did not want US troops to leave the country, and felt that the security of the regime was inextricably linked to the US military presence. The military government, led by Prime Minister Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn disagreed with the urgency of the issue, and instead suggested a mutually agreed-upon ‘gradual reduction’. On 25 August, Prime Minister Thanom said that the discussions had not yet got underway: ‘a mutual agreement must be reached first’. The next day, a joint Thai–American statement stated that ‘talks to arrange for a gradual reduction of level of United States forces in Thailand consistent with the assessment of both governments of the security situation would be held in the near future’. On 3 September, Thailand and the US began a series of bilateral negotiations, led by Thai Foreign Minister Thanat and US Ambassador Leonard Unger, to discuss this gradual reduction of US troops in Thailand. During the talks, Thanat pulled back from his initial position towards a more gradualist position.

By 8 September, Thanat declared that the Thai Government was ‘willing to discuss the prolongation of the presence of US forces in Thailand as desired by the US government’. The first pullout of troops, which was

---

39 Quoted in Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 127.
42 Quoted in Randolph, *The United States and Thailand*, 140.
essentially a symbolic gesture, was proclaimed on 30 September 1969, stating that 6,000 US military personnel were to be withdrawn from Thailand by July 1970. They were to be pulled out ‘as expeditiously as possible consistent with the operational requirements related to the Vietnam conflict’. Nevertheless, there was no mention of any schedule for the withdrawal of the remaining 42,000 American forces. Another 10,000 were withdrawn the following year, reducing the total US forces in Thailand to 32,000 by June 1971.

While the Thai military elites attached to the Cold War discursive hegemony preferred the preponderance of American troops in Thailand, Thanat consistently pushed for the withdrawal of American military forces from Thailand. As he summed up, the Thailand-initiated withdrawal program for the American forces had ‘improved Thailand’s position and given Thailand greater freedom in the conduct of its foreign policy for its own national interests and the interests of the region’. By 1968, the discourse of scepticism of Americanism, or even anti-Americanism, was widening and deepening in Thai politics.

### 3.1.3. Discourse of Regional Cooperation

The second discourse was regional cooperation and cohesiveness. From 1968, Thanat proposed that if the US were to withdraw from the region, a power vacuum would open up. In addition to the policy of national self-reliance, he forcefully recommended regional cooperation, solidarity and cohesiveness as an attempt to avoid any contending powers filling the strategic gap or seeking their own domination in the region. As he stated on television in December 1968:

> this is why Thailand has been in the forefront in advocating greater cooperative efforts among the nations of this area, to work together, to think together, to join together in common endeavours, to preserve peace and to safeguard our national and regional interests in this part of the world.\(^{46}\)

---

In other words, efforts to build such regional groupings as ASEAN and ASPAC were meant to ‘outweigh the withdrawal of the United States’ from Southeast Asia. As he pointed out, ‘whether the US stays around here or not, it is in our interest to develop regional cooperation’.47 To a certain extent, the prospect of American disengagement, according to Thanat, provided a ‘sense of urgency’ as well as ‘a greater sense of responsibility’ for countries in the Asia-Pacific region to shape their own destinies, and to protect their own security and national interests.48 The ultimate aim of regional cohesiveness was to obtain a negotiating position vis-à-vis the great powers. Although still ‘very young, very tender, very soft, and perhaps very inefficient’, a regional grouping was for Thanat an ‘entity of respectable size’ – with more than 200 million people. As he explained:

> We are doing this to enable us to deal more effectively and more adequately, not only with our foes, potential and actual, but also with our friends. If one is better organized, our friends will respect one more. They will not trample upon your foot, step on your toes, they will listen to your voices and your opinions, and they will respect your interests. If you are separated … you do not count much. But if you are joined together, becoming a respectable and sizable entity in terms of population of resources, and also of prestige, then you become somebody … We are doing this so that we can cope with foes and we can deal on a more equal footing and more equal basis with our friends.49

Thus, by working together, the region could build a larger or cohesive ‘power base’ which would ‘afford us an entity which can cooperate more closely with friendly and like-minded nations on a more equal footing, to ensure peace and stability in the region’.50 Due to its respectable size and influence, a regional grouping could also have a greater say in global

---


49 Thanat, ‘Statement by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Members of the Foreign Correspondents’ Club of Thailand’, 254.

politics and deal adequately with the great powers. For Thanat, his idea of ‘collective political defense’ was not, and could not be, a military organisation. As he reiterated:


none of us in Southeast Asia can be considered a military power: no military potential, no industry to support a military power. Therefore, we must use other means than military means to shore up our positions, our independence and our security. The only available means are diplomatic and political ones, political consultations, political and economic cooperation.

‘Anyone who has any sense’, Thanat concluded, ‘can see very well that ASEAN cannot and will not be turned into a military organization’.  

In contrast to a collective defence system like SEATO, a new regional grouping would be based on a system that Thanat termed ‘collective political defense’, not military, but political, economic, socio-cultural and technical cooperation with the neighbouring countries. As Thanat observed:

I do not think that military alliance is an answer to the problems … Because we in this part of the world, we are smaller nations, we have no military potential, and even if we were to pull together our military resources, it will not be sufficient to stop or to prevent military incursions by big nations like Communist China. Therefore, we believe that we should try to deter the other side, the aggressive regimes, from taking military actions through political means, through building up of regional solidarity and regional cohesiveness rather than expecting results from military means.

Thus, from 1968 Thanat sought an alternative to the former policy of dependence on the American security alliance by trying to build up a non-communist counterweight in Southeast Asia through ‘regional cooperation’. Nevertheless, over time, he grappled with the pressing question of American retrenchment by attempting to lessen the hostility of the communist powers, particularly Communist China. In March 1969, while Thanat still discerned that the PRC had aggressive intentions

against Thailand, he was shifting the discourse of regional cooperation to help ‘induce Communist China to come out and work with us’. He said the PRC might even agree upon true peaceful coexistence.\footnote{Thanat Khoman’s Address at a Luncheon hosted by the American Management Association in Bangkok, March 1969, in Jain, \textit{China and Thailand}, 156.}

Crucially, therefore, Thanat suggested détente with the communist powers before the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine. That is to say, from early 1969 the discourse of regional grouping was already signposting and anticipating a future détente with the communists. In February 1969, Thanat said:

the key to a lasting peace in Asia rests in cooperation among the non-Communist nations. Only if we succeed in working together among the non-Communist nations will the Communist nations come and talk to us. The Communist nations will never agree to discuss and build peace unless they know that the other nations of Asia want peace and that they are organized to preserve and maintain it.\footnote{Thanat Khoman, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Choi Ho of the Chosan Daily of South Korea’, Bangkok, 27 February 1969, in Collected Interviews of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Vol. 3: 1969, 450.}

In the \textit{Times} article in August 1969, titled ‘Withdrawal and a New Era’, Thanat wrote:

Thus far there has been no dialogue with and no change of heart on the part of the Asian Communists. Nevertheless, renewed efforts must be made to establish, at least in the initial stage. Such efforts can hope to meet with success only if the Asian nations organize themselves in a constructive manner. They will thus be in a better position to persuade the Communist reactionaries to forsake war for a more productive and mutually beneficial collaboration.\footnote{Thanat Khoman, ‘Withdrawal and a New Era’, \textit{Times} (London), 18 August 1969.}

This required ‘some readjustment’ of attitudes within Thailand to ‘envisage a further widening of collaboration. This would include cooperation with the Marxist regimes if they should relinquish their policy of expansion and domination’.\footnote{Thanat, ‘Withdrawal and a New Era’.} Thus, the practical and pragmatic discourse of détente with the USSR and the PRC loomed larger than the more aspirational discourse of regional cohesiveness and solidarity.
3.1.4. Discourse of Détente

The third discourse was détente with the communists. Between 1968 and 1969, Thanat began to rethink how Thailand should choose to live with the communists. One of his policy options was détente. While this was not deemed an option at the time, he believed that it would be a ‘practical and pragmatic policy’ in the future. He noted that any mention of opening dialogue with the Soviet Union and the PRC tended to be misinterpreted as a Thai foreign policy moving toward a neutralist position. He contended that this was a ‘complete mistake’. It was ‘not inevitable that the Communist aggressors would continue to be aggressive’. Thanat suggested that Thailand should prepare a policy to deal with the communist powers and that it would be better if Thailand adopted a ‘practical and pragmatic policy’. In particular, this meant being ‘more flexible in its policy towards China’. To date, Thanat admitted that it was the Chinese who showed no desire to meet. Yet, ‘if Beijing were to show any indication that it is approachable, I myself would recommend my Government to sit with them, to talk with them. But there has been no such sign’. In the future, he continued:

when Communist China should come back to its senses, and would want to deal with other nations on an intelligent, reasonable basis, Southeast Asia shall not and should not be caught unprepared to deal with it, to preserve peace and strengthen our national independence.

By late 1968, Thanat had reassessed Thai foreign policy in order to best deal with the communist powers, and decided that Thailand could pursue two separate approaches. On the one hand, Thailand could pursue regional cohesiveness in order to establish collective negotiating powers vis-à-vis the communists. On the other hand, Thanat began to contemplate a bilateral approach of détente with the communists.

On 26 February 1969, at a press conference in Tokyo, Thanat Khoman spoke of Thailand’s willingness to have ‘serious talks’ with the communist countries, especially the PRC. This was the first time Thanat advocated

the opening of an unprecedented Thai–Chinese dialogue. Though it was not directly aimed at paving the way for diplomatic relations, this was a ‘peace offensive’ towards the PRC. Thanat asserted that Thailand was not ‘anti-Communist or anti-Chinese’. The objective of the negotiations was to find out ‘what we can do to live in peace’. ‘To show that Thailand is not anti-Communist and anti-Chinese’, Thanat stressed, ‘we are prepared to sit down and talk – and have meaningful discussion – with Beijing to establish peaceful coexistence’. He contended that ‘Thailand wants a dialogue and expect China to respond to a dialogue’. In Bangkok, when he was asked by the foreign press, Thanat replied:

By saying that we are willing to sit down and meet them – enter into contact with them – we want to show that we are willing to take responsibility in our hands and try to deal with the problem ourselves, not depend on the other nations to try to solve the problem for us.

The foreign minister also reassured foreign reporters that Thai foreign policy was not anti-Chinese. On the contrary, it was the Chinese who were ‘anti-Thai’, as illustrated by the alleged declaration of Foreign Minister Marshal Chen Yi that the PRC would launch a guerrilla war against Thailand. Thanat said that he wanted to know what China’s genuine intentions and motivations were. Indeed, for him, this was the ultimate purpose of the decision to engage with the Chinese – to clarify exactly what they meant by declaring war on Thailand. ‘We want to know whether that was what they intended to do, whether they intend to pursue that, and what were their motivations.’ Thanat wanted to sound out what possibilities there might be for peaceful coexistence between the two countries.

Thai foreign policy towards communism should thus become ‘more flexible’.

In March, in a television interview, he strenuously urged that he was:

---


61 Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Choi Ho of the Chosan Daily of South Korea’, 452–53.

62 Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Choi Ho of the Chosan Daily of South Korea’, 453.

63 Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Peter Kumpa of the Baltimore Sun, Ian Wright of the Guardian (London) and John Sterling of the London Observer’, 428.
willing to meet a representative of Beijing at any place, at any
time, if such a meeting would help bring peace in Asia. It was
necessary to draw China out of her isolation so that she could
become a member of the Asian family.\textsuperscript{64}

In other words, by early 1969, Thanat made a public offer to meet with
the representatives of the PRC at international venues.

Thanat also said he would be prepared to send an emissary to Beijing,
and hypothetically suggested that MR Kukrit Pramoj, a well-renowned
politician and influential publisher of the \textit{Siam Rath} newspaper, or Klaew
Norapati, a key socialist member of the Parliament, might be suitable
emissaries to Beijing. However, Kukrit abruptly dismissed the whole idea
of talking with the PRC as utterly useless:

\begin{quotation}
If the purpose of talking with China is to ask China questions
on why they want to destroy Thailand, then it is a waste of time,
since we clearly know the answers, that is, that Thailand is on the
American side.\textsuperscript{65}
\end{quotation}

Thanat repeatedly denied any change in Thai foreign policy in the media.
He said that the goal of foreign policy, which remained the protection of
Thailand’s independence and survival, had never changed. However, he
argued that the means to that particular end needed to be adapted to cope
with the changing global contexts. As he put it:

\begin{quotation}
realizing the present situation, the changes in world powers’
positions and policies, we had to adopt a more direct approach in
our policy. It does not mean that we have changed our policy. Our
policy remains the same. We shall never depart from the principles
underlying our moral and intellectual stand.
\end{quotation}

What was different now however was that

\begin{quotation}
a defensive policy is no longer possible. We have no other choice
but to go ahead and face the trouble as it comes, to go to the
source and try to meet the contingencies which may arise.\textsuperscript{66}
\end{quotation}

\textsuperscript{64} ‘Thanat Khoman’s Statement in a Television Interview, 2 March 1969’, in Jain, \textit{China and
Thailand}, 155.

\textsuperscript{65} \textit{Siam Rath}, 19 March 1969.

\textsuperscript{66} Thanat Khoman, ‘Post-Vietnam Period – A New Era for Asia?, An Address by Foreign Minister
Thanat Khoman to Member of the Thai-American Technical Cooperation Association’, Bangkok,
31 March 1969, in \textit{Collected Statements of H.E. Dr. Thanat Khoman, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Kingdom of Thailand, Vol. 5: November 1968–October 1969} (Bangkok: Department of Information,
In other words, Thailand had to go:

[to] the source of the danger and try to argue, to reason with them, and to find out whether there can be any possibility for them to relent in their militant policies or to have peaceful coexistence and cooperation with us.\(^{67}\)

He termed it a more ‘forward approach’. Suppose the Chinese Government were to respond in kind, Thanat argued that the Thai Government would not hesitate to meet with the Chinese to end the hostile situation and to return to ‘the status of 1954–55 when, at the Bandung Conference there was an attempt to create a certain sense of solidarity and peaceful coexistence’; he reaffirmed that this change is not a ‘personal policy of the Foreign Minister but the official policy of the Government of Thailand’.\(^{68}\)

Asking what would happen if the Communist Chinese asked Thailand to recognise them, Thanat replied that ‘the question of the recognition of either Beijing or Taiwan as the legitimate government is not a question for outside powers to resolve but for the Chinese to resolve themselves’.\(^{69}\)

For Thanat, the main point at the moment was to find out whether there were any possibilities for peaceful coexistence between Thailand and the PRC. Thanat publicly proclaimed that Thailand was willing to talk with the communists, by hoping that ‘in our lifetime we may see the change of policy from enmity to a more friendly cooperation’.\(^{70}\)

In brief, the recurring discourse of flexible diplomacy that Thailand embarked upon in the late 1960s was how to act upon in a so-called post-American world. It sought to deal with the communist powers in a more balanced and flexible diplomacy in a rapidly changing global–regional complex. As Thanat had suggested provisionally in September 1968:

---

\(^{67}\) Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Beryl Bernay of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Derek Davies of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Joonghee Park of the Central Daily News of South Korea, Jung Suk Lee of the Dong-a Ilbo of South Korea and Kim Willenson of UPI’, 487.

\(^{68}\) Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Beryl Bernay of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Derek Davies of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Joonghee Park of the Central Daily News of South Korea, Jung Suk Lee of the Dong-a Ilbo of South Korea and Kim Willenson of UPI’, 489.

\(^{69}\) Thanat, ‘Interview given by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Beryl Bernay of the Westinghouse Broadcasting Company, Derek Davies of the Far Eastern Economic Review, Joonghee Park of the Central Daily News of South Korea, Jung Suk Lee of the Dong-a Ilbo of South Korea and Kim Willenson of UPI’, 488.

\(^{70}\) Thanat, ‘Post-Vietnam Period – A New Era for Asia?, An Address by Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman to Member of the Thai-American Technical Cooperation Association’, 491. My emphasis.
What we are trying to do is to have political cooperation not only between the countries of Southeast Asia but between the countries of Southeast Asia and the outside powers, like the US, like the Soviet Union and in the future, I don’t know when, with Communist China. This is what we are working at. We hope that within our life time, we will be able to see a new basis of cooperation first between the countries of Southeast Asia, next between the countries of Southeast Asia and the outside world on a more equal footing than it is the case now.71

This reappraisal of policy discourses brought about a reassessment of Thailand’s relations with the communist powers in the 1970s. While Thanat constantly said that there was no change in the direction of Thai foreign policy, this new course sought to shift toward diplomatic flexibility and resilience. This unwittingly contributed to a new discourse of flexible diplomacy or détente with the communist powers.

3.2. Institutional Practices: Institute of Foreign Affairs and the Emergence of Détente Proponents

Old diplomats never die they give way to the young ones.
– Thanat Khoman, foreign minister72

The discourse of détente also had a non-discursive, institutional dimension. This section examines the institutional practices of diplomatic training, through the newly established Institute of Foreign Affairs at the Foreign Ministry. As one of the key sites and process of subject formation, the institute was central to constructing the identities of those of détente proponents in Thailand.

In the literature, there are two broad interpretations regarding the role of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). The first is what I call a personal(ised) politics paradigm. Many scholars claim that the Foreign

Ministry had a relatively minor institutional role and influence in foreign policy formulation throughout the Cold War. The key foreign policy decisions were made by the military government and the foreign minister himself. As the Thai political scientist Suchit Bunbongkarn put it:

foreign policy formulation has been dominated by the cabinet, particularly the Foreign Minister. The military, long dominating the political scene in Thailand, has also been a powerful force in setting the course of the country’s foreign relations. The MFA has been left to be merely a policy implementation mechanism of the government.\textsuperscript{73}

Some scholars traced the marginalisation of civilians from the foreign policymaking process to the military authoritarian regime of Field Marshal Phibun in the 1950s.\textsuperscript{74} However, from 1958 on, when Thanat Khoman was an influential and (over)confident foreign minister (1958–1971) under the Sarit and Thanom regimes, the MFA increasingly became his ministry. Some scholars suggest that Thanat’s decision in foreign affairs, with his authoritarian style, was paramount:

Thanat seldom used the Ministry’s staff for advice and consultation before reaching his decision. Most of the major issues and policies were decided by Thanat himself and the Ministry’s departments concerned were usually asked just to provide justifications for the adopted policies.\textsuperscript{75}

The second interpretation is a bureaucratic politics paradigm. This position claims that, despite his discreetly personalised leadership, Thanat had a small group of trustworthy and loyal diplomats, who acted on his behalf.\textsuperscript{76} Thanat’s close aides included, among others, Anand Panyarachun, Sompong Sucharitkul, ML Pirapongse Kasemsri, Arsa Sarasin, Manaspas Xuto and Pracha Gunakasem. With degrees from English-speaking universities, they helped draft Thanat’s policy statements as well as speeches. According to one study, Thanat preferred policy recommendations by Anand and Sompong to those of


\textsuperscript{75} Suchit, ‘The Role of Social Science’, 118.


Beyond these two paradigms, this chapter suggests that flexible diplomacy can be understood in terms of institutionalised practices and power/knowledge. In the late 1960s, Thanat’s Foreign Ministry established the Institute of Foreign Affairs – which was later known as Devawongse Varopakarn Institute of Foreign Affairs (DVIFA). Its role was to professionalise and depoliticise diplomats through technocratic training in line with the newly emerged discourse of flexible diplomacy. Since then, diplomats have been trained to be ‘docile’ bodies that followed the rules and norms of diplomatic discourses and practices.

In Thailand, diplomatic training was initially aimed at enhancing the capacity of diplomats in terms of knowledge, skills and competence, attitude and appropriate manners to reckon and grapple with the changing international situation. At first, the training was by nature temporary and ad hoc. Learning was achieved by doing, or on-the-job training, as well as through an informal system of apprenticeship whereby senior diplomats would pass tacit knowledge to junior diplomats. In 1962, proper training began with occasional in-service training, including practice-oriented seminars on drafting official letters (in both Thai and English languages), official rules and regulations, and diplomatic protocols, as well as other practical and tacit knowledge. There was no permanent curriculum. The MFA also invited former ambassadors and distinguished experts to give talks on various topics. In 1963 and 1964 it trained junior...
diplomats who were about to hold positions abroad (20 and 40 diplomats, respectively), and in 1966, it extended the program to include those civil servants in other ministries who would be positioned abroad (53 in total). Diplomatic training continued in 1968 (for 60 third secretaries), and in 1969 (two courses for new diplomats – 28 and 20 respectively – and another for 31 first secretaries). \(^{82}\)

The Institute of Foreign Affairs was officially approved on 12 December 1967, to become part of the Personnel and Training Division within the MFA. It was Thanat’s desire that diplomatic training should be ‘routinized and permanent’. \(^{83}\) His aim was to systematically and effectively train and educate diplomats at every level – from junior to senior. Civil servants from other ministries were also welcome. Five training curricula were set, covering: (1) orientation of new diplomats; (2) junior diplomats who would hold positions abroad; (3) attachés and third secretaries; (4) second and third secretaries; and (5) the English language. Between 1970 and 1973, five formal training programs for new diplomats, totalling 209, were provided annually. Additional training occurred twice in 1971. \(^{84}\)

The Institute of Foreign Affairs was officially opened during the foreign ministership of Charunpan Isrankul na Ayuthaya on 14 February, 1974, and diplomatic training has continued ever since.

In general, diplomatic training involved education, seminars, formal training and development, coaching, mentoring, on-the-job training and rotation. The point, to use Thanat’s words, was to transfer a stock of tacit knowledge, or know-how, and practices (acquired through experiences) from ‘old diplomats’ to ‘the young ones’. Arguably, however, the knowledge that diplomats, particularly Thanat and his associates, passed on to other diplomats in the MFA was not the old knowledge, but in fact the new emerging discourse of détente.

Like Thanat, many of these ‘experts’ – most notably Anand Panyarachun, Sompong Sucharitkul and ML Pirapongse Kasemsri – had previously been attached to the Cold War hegemonic discourse, especially during the Sarit

\(^{82}\) ‘Background of Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Institute of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), Library and Archives Division, MFA POL2/PM2517/9, MFA, Thailand, 1–11.

\(^{83}\) ‘Background of Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Institute of Foreign Affairs, MFA, Library and Archives Division, MFA POL2/PM2517/9, MFA, Thailand, 3.

\(^{84}\) 28 diplomats attended the first training program between 3 August and 12 October 1970; 22 diplomats between 2 August and 29 September 1971 and 51 diplomats between 1 November and 29 December 1971; 37 diplomats between 21 February and 24 March 1972; 71 diplomats between 30 April and 20 June 1973. See ‘Background of Training, Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Institute of Foreign Affairs, MFA, Library and Archives Division, MFA POL2/PM2517/9, MFA, Thailand, 3.
and Thanom regimes, but gradually became détente proponents in the early 1970s. They changed their identities and subject positions, largely due to the new discourse of détente. In other words, subject positions emerged only in and through diplomatic practices. Anand’s speeches at the UN provided good examples. In November 1969, he gave a harsh statement at the UN General Assembly proclaiming that Communist China still maintained ‘hostile behaviour and inflexible policy’, and had not given up its ‘aggressive proclivities and expansionist tendencies’ towards the neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia, including Thailand. But his view began to change following the Chinese entry into the UN in 1971 (see Chapter 4), and Anand soon became one of the key figures in negotiating a rapprochement with the PRC. As Director-General of the ministry’s Economic Department, Sompong also played a key role in concluding the trade agreement with the Soviet Union in 1970.

Outside the close circle of Thanat, others, such as Major General Chatichai Choonhavan, then Ambassador to Switzerland, were pro-détente. In 1971, Chatichai was asked by Thanat to go to Rome with him to make contact with the Chinese. Between 1972 and 1974, he became deputy foreign minister, during which time he conducted so-called ‘petro-diplomacy’ with the PRC, which began to sell petroleum to Thailand at reduced prices. Chatichai subsequently served as foreign minister (1974–1975) during the Kukrit Pramoj Government, overseeing the normalisation of formal diplomatic relations with the Chinese in 1975 (see Chapter 5). Détente proponents who shared knowledge of flexible diplomacy thus emerged in and through emerging diplomatic practices of détente.

### 3.2.1. Diplomacy as Power/Knowledge

Taking diplomacy seriously as power/knowledge addresses the shortcomings of the paradigms of wise and competent leaders and of bureaucratic tussles. It sheds light on power in and through diplomatic practices in five ways.  

---


First, diplomacy as power/knowledge was socially productive and constitutive. Through training and exercises, it established and constituted diplomatic subject positions. Diplomacy individually reconfigured social agents into ‘docile’ diplomats as a part of a specific historical bloc/group in the diplomatic site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In this case, the ‘docile’ diplomats produced since the late 1960s were détente proponents. Like disciplinary power, institutionalised diplomatic power via diplomatic training involved not only bodies but also actions – or their potential actions (what they can or cannot do) – as its main targets.87 This kind of power was individualising power in the sense that training positively developed and harvested diplomats’ capacities. Diplomatic discipline led to a less centralised, but much more economical and effective, power over individual bodies through institutional training.

Second, diplomacy had a practical character. It positioned career diplomats as competent players, with a specific set of tacit knowledge and competent skills, for making sense of and dealing with the changing international situation. Diplomatic competence was a ‘socially recognized attribute’, rather than an individual attribute, whereas the struggle for competence was never-ending and inseparable from the struggle for recognition within the diplomatic site.88 As Foucault put it, ‘a body is docile that may be subjected, used, transformed and improved’.89

Third, diplomacy was deeply relational. Diplomatic training, in either informal or formal forms, was a system of apprenticeship that emphasised the master–apprentice relationship. For Thanat, it was about the relationship between old and young diplomats. Skilful or competent diplomats were not measured according to their individual attributes. Rather, they were competent because they were locally situated in a hierarchical order of the Foreign Ministry, as well as immersed in the emerging patterns of diplomatic discourse. The practice of apprenticeship provided the condition of possibility for this hierarchical structure and social stratification to dominate in the MFA. This was a ‘sense of place’ that diplomats embody,90 while a community of Thai diplomats, despite their heterogeneous and dispersed nature, also gradually emerged.

---

89 Foucault, *Discipline and Punish*, 136.
Fourth, diplomatic power was effective in the sense that it installed and produced a certain regime of truth, namely the knowledge of flexible diplomacy. Diplomacy was constructed as a sphere of expertise that required a particular kind of knowledge and a particular kind of ‘expert’, namely trained diplomats, rather than amateurs, including military elites or politicians. This new knowledge of flexible diplomacy shaped the way of doing things, particularly in regard to pursuing diplomacy with the communist powers. They also legitimised the dominant roles of the MFA over this emerging area of expertise.

Last but not least, diplomacy was highly political. Diplomacy as power/knowledge was inseparable from the struggle for authority or influence in the contestation of power. Diplomats sought to establish their mastery of the diplomatic game by framing particular issues as ‘diplomatic’ ones, and positioning themselves as technocratic, professionalised and depoliticised ‘experts’. In other words, there was a ‘diplomatisation’ of political issues, which can be read as a depoliticisation or technocratisation of diplomatic issues. In this sense, the struggle for diplomatic competence was fundamentally the struggle for hegemony in the foreign policymaking process and in the public spheres in general.

In sum, reconceptualising flexible diplomacy as a technique of power and knowledge formation helps understand those diachronic changes of subject positions – from Cold Warriors toward détente proponents. The incremental intensification of détente practices was in turn an emergence of a new mode of control and surveillance in Thai diplomacy. Through diplomatic schooling, a group of individuals were trained to be diplomats as well as docile bodies. However, the role of social agents was significant and irreducible to languages or discourses in the sense that they performed, as well as were performed, in and through diplomatic discourse. Agents with specific subject positions were not purely rational actors, but socially and institutionally embedded actors performing within the field and relationship of power. Diplomatic practices are then an institutionally and socially embedded way of doing things diplomatically.

3.3. Conclusion

International uncertainty, in particular the worsening situation in Vietnam and the prospect of American disengagement from Southeast Asia, brought about discursive anxiety within the minds of many Thai
foreign policymakers, most notably Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman during the late 1960s. This chapter has examined the emergence of détente or ‘flexible diplomacy’ with the communist powers, as a new paradigmatic and pragmatic discourse in order to manage this rising anxiety. It argues that this discourse, which challenged the anticommunist one, predated the enunciation of the Nixon Doctrine. In the process, the discourse of détente, coupled with a change in institutional practices, formed a new subject position in Thai politics: that of détente proponents in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and beyond. Thailand’s perceptions of the Soviet Union and the PRC were incrementally transformed from ‘enemies’ to ‘friends’. The next chapter will examine the first episode of détente with the Soviet Union and the PRC between 1969 and 1971, and the roles of those détente proponents, especially of Thanat Khoman.