Crime and corruption
Grant W. Walton and Sinclair Dinnen

Abstract
Concerns about crime and corruption in Papua New Guinea (PNG) predate independence and are considered by many to be a significant threat to its prosperity and stability. In this chapter, we examine understandings of, and drivers and responses to, crime and corruption in PNG’s recent history. We show how manifestations of and responses to crime and corruption have changed over time and across space. While these two concepts clearly overlap (with corruption often regarded a crime and crime often facilitated by corruption), for analytical purposes they are treated here as two distinct concepts. We argue that it is important to recognise the networks and relationships that animate crime and corruption and the responses to these challenges. It is also important to understand the ways these challenges and responses change over time.

Introduction
For outsiders as well as many citizens, crime and corruption are viewed as significantly curtailing the fulfilment of Papua New Guinea’s (PNG’s) development goals. Reflecting on the occasion of PNG’s 10th independence anniversary, the country’s first prime minister, Michael Somare, remarked:
I will now turn to what I consider to be the greatest threat to our country, crime, and here I'm referring to both street crime and official corruption. Unless we can control it, it can destroy all the advances we have made in the last ten years. It must be controlled before it destroys us. (quoted in Connell, 1997, p. 274)

The nation consistently scores poorly compared to most other countries on international indices that track perceptions about the level of crime and corruption. However, such indices say little about how the various forms of crime and corruption manifest themselves and the diverse ways government, citizens and the private sector seek to address these challenges. In this chapter, we examine understandings of, and drivers and responses to, crime and corruption in PNG in the context of its recent history. In doing so we consider crime and corruption as two overlapping though heuristically distinct concepts (Dinnen, 1993). Certain types of corruption are indeed criminal offences (as the above quotation from Somare suggests), and criminals often use corruption to achieve their nefarious objectives. In this chapter, we broadly categorise ‘crime’ as concerning law, order and justice. Drawing on recent empirical work, our discussion of corruption focuses on abuses of public office, power, morals and institutions, as well as the broader networks that can help facilitate corruption.

The first section focuses on key law and order trends and responses set in the context of PNG’s recent history. The second section centres on corruption and anti-corruption. We conclude by highlighting the overarching themes that emerge from this analysis.

‘Law and order’ in the post-independence period

Concerns with violent crime and personal security feature prominently in external representations of PNG. Foreign governments regularly issue travel warnings, highlighting the risks posed to visitors by PNG’s high levels of violent crime. Port Moresby, the national capital, has been depicted as one of the world’s least liveable cities, largely owing to security problems. While such portrayals are contestable given their generality and the lack of reliable data on which they are based, security remains an everyday preoccupation for people throughout the country. Such concerns have a major impact on business confidence. Surveys of companies have
repeatedly identified law and order as among the top constraints to doing business in PNG (Fox et al., 2018). Indeed, World Bank research indicates that security concerns among the PNG business community are more than four times the regional average for East Asia and the Pacific, and comparable with countries like El Salvador, Venezuela and the Democratic Republic of Congo (Lakhani and Willman, 2014a, p. ix).

Concerns with ‘law and order’ first came to prominence in the late 1960s as the pace of decolonisation accelerated in preparation for PNG’s independence in 1975. Decolonisation involved a long, drawn-out process of social, political and institutional change, with a strong accent on state building. In terms of conflict stresses, this historical transition meant that the:

Fundamental opposition between indigenous people and colonial powers was displaced by a far messier array of local divisions, relating variously to precolonial antagonisms between different indigenous populations, the simultaneous exacerbation of conflict and suppression of warfare during the colonial period, uneven development, and corruption. (Otto and Thomas, 1997, p. 4)

Some of these divisions manifested in the outbreak of localised conflicts, most dramatically on the island of Bougainville, initially around the construction of the Panguna mine and much later with the decade-long Bougainville conflict (1988–97). The lead up to independence also witnessed the revival of tribal fighting in parts of the Highlands, while a moral panic grew around rising crime rates in Port Moresby as independence loomed.

Two aspects of the decolonisation process in particular had an important bearing on the emergence of law and order concerns. The first related to the repeal of discriminatory colonial regulations that previously applied to the indigenous population. Removal of restrictions on movement opened up the towns, formerly expatriate enclaves, to migration from rural areas. Young male migrants flocked to Port Moresby in search of adventure and a better life, with the capital experiencing a 12.2 per cent annual growth rate between 1966 and 1977 and doubling again in size during the first decade after independence (King, 1992). While available data were thin, increasing crime rates were accompanied by a growing chorus of voices warning of a serious emergent crime problem in Port Moresby (Clifford, 1976). The lifting of colonial restrictions on alcohol was viewed as another
contributing factor. According to Harris (1988, p. 8), who investigated Port Moresby gangs in the 1980s, the legalisation of alcohol provided ‘the spark which ignited the flame’ of urban gang growth from the mid-1960s.

The second aspect related to changes in government and administration, including the modernisation of the police and national justice system. The suppression of tribal fighting had been viewed as one of the Australian administration’s most significant accomplishments. Its reappearance in the late 1960s was seen by some as evidence of a withdrawal of government from rural areas resulting from the replacement of the old devolved system of district administration with a bureaucratic system of centralised government (Gordon and Meggitt, 1985). The relative success of the old system in suppressing tribal conflict was attributed to its mobility and physical presence in rural areas, primarily in the form of *kiaps* and their field police, and its ability to engage pragmatically with local forms of authority and dispute resolution.

By contrast, the modern justice system was found wanting on many fronts. In the first place, its concentration in urban locations posed difficulties of access for those living in rural areas. For others, the new system was also seen as overly formalistic and cumbersome compared to the more flexible approach it replaced (Dinnen and Braithwaite, 2009). It also inadvertently weakened the standing of the formerly powerful (colonial) police, now subject to regular and humiliating ‘defeats’ in court, often on obscure technical grounds. From this perspective, renewed fighting in the Highlands represented a return to forms of violent self-help in the absence of effective government alternatives for managing disputes.

Concerns with violent crime and personal safety became progressively more pronounced during the 25 years after independence, particularly in the main urban centres. Signs of pervasive insecurity continue to manifest in the heavy fortifications and razor wire adorning homes and other buildings, and the ubiquitous presence of private security across PNG’s urban landscapes. Streets empty as dusk approaches, and visitors are still routinely warned not to visit certain areas or walk after dark. During the 1970s, 1980s and for much of the 1990s, *raskol* gangs provided the folk devils in a prolonged moral panic around urban street crime. Port Moresby experienced cyclical patterns of outbreaks of criminal violence followed by special policing operations, entailing heavy-handed raids directed at the settlements viewed as incubators of *raskolism* (Dinnen, 2001). However, concerns with urban *raskols* appear to have diminished
4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION

during the first two decades of the new millennium. Support for this proposition is provided in a review of available crime data by the World Bank in 2014 (Lakhani and Willman, 2014b). While levels of crime and violence in PNG are high compared with other parts of the world, the review concluded that these levels may be stabilising and noted that in 2010 there was an overall reduction in recorded crime compared to 2000. More attention has been placed in recent years on serious problems of violent tribal conflict in some Highlands areas. High-powered weapons, local mercenaries (‘hire-men’) and guerrilla tactics have fundamentally altered the ground rules of tribal conflict and fuelled prolonged cycles of violence in several provinces. These forms of conflict have been aggravated by heightened contestation around elections and large-scale natural resource projects (Dinnen et al., 2010).

Violence against women and girls, including rape and other sexual offences, has been a longstanding concern. According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) World Report 2017, PNG is one the most dangerous countries in the world for women, with the majority experiencing rape or assault in their lifetime and women facing systemic discrimination (HRW, 2017). Deeply engrained social attitudes towards gender are slow to change, while the effects of economic globalisation, including growing inequalities, impact disproportionately on women and girls. The effectiveness of legal protections has long been hindered by weak enforcement. High-profile cases and persistent campaigning by local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and activists have contributed to growing awareness of the level of violence and abuse experienced by women and girls and have prompted government, donors and civil society organisations to initiate a range of legislative, policy and emergency responses in this area. One of the most significant law reforms was the enactment of the Family Protection Act 2013, which made domestic violence a discrete offence for the first time. Parliament also endorsed the first National Gender-Based Violence Strategy in late 2016. An ongoing spate of sorcery-related violence, often directed against women, has also precipitated awareness, engagement and law reform campaigns, including repeal of the colonial-era Sorcery Act 1971 (Forsyth and Eves, 2015).

The combination of weak enforcement agencies, porous borders (including a 750-kilometre land border with Indonesia), location as a regional shipping hub and rapid rate of economic globalisation renders PNG highly vulnerable to transnational crime. There have also been concerns that criminal syndicates have been using PNG as a transit point
for conveying illicit goods, such as drugs and weapons, to its southern neighbour, Australia. Evidence of such activity surfaces periodically in the media, as with the recent arrests of alleged members of a major drug syndicate in PNG and Australia following the crash of a light aircraft outside Port Moresby in July 2020 (Kenneth, 2020a).

Despite the prevalence of law and order concerns, available data remain patchy and unreliable, making it hard to quantify levels of crime and violence with any precision. A review of PNG’s criminal justice data in 1994 lamented the lack of systematic evidence that ‘could provide a rational basis for understanding the current context of crime and promoting feasible strategies for crime prevention, development and management of the criminal justice system’ (Zvekic and Wedderburn, 1994, p. 2). Not a lot has changed in the almost 30 years since. Levels of unreported crime remain extremely high, especially, but by no means exclusively, in rural areas where access to police and justice services are limited. The prevalence of informal approaches to managing disputes and infractions is another factor behind the low number of cases reported to authorities. Victimisation surveys also indicate considerable variations between urban and rural contexts, as well as within particular regional, rural and urban settings (Lakhani and Willman, 2014b).

**State responses**

State responses to PNG’s law and order problems have relied primarily on the criminal justice system, notably the police, courts and corrections. While expectations have often been unrealistically high, the limited effectiveness of these responses on levels of crime and violence has been a concern throughout the post-independence period. The complexity of this particular sector adds to its challenges, with different departments and agencies operating with relatively little coordination. In addition, the sector shares systemic issues with other parts of government, including severe resource constraints, modest institutional capabilities, and the operational challenges presented by the country’s topography and limited transport infrastructure. Over the years there have been numerous reports and policy reviews directed at improving responses to these problems.

Although undertaken almost 40 years ago, the 1984 Clifford Report remains one of the more insightful reviews (Clifford et al., 1984). It documented the shortcomings of individual agencies, noted the poor quality of data, and was critical of planning, budgeting and coordination
4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION

across the sector. The report also highlighted distinctive features of PNG’s broader regulatory environment, including high levels of legal pluralism and continuing reliance on informal approaches for everyday security and dispute resolution. It recognised how significant this informal layer of non-state regulation was in dealing with many kinds of problems at local levels. The report recommended further engagement with some of these informal approaches as a way of supplementing over-reliance on a fragile and expensive criminal justice system.

Despite the prescience of the Clifford Report’s efforts to broaden the lens on available resources for managing disputes and security, successive governments continued to be preoccupied with crisis management, relying on special policing operations and temporary crime control measures such as curfews to suppress surges in crime and violence. In the context of rapid population growth, urbanisation and globalisation in recent years, the scale and range of PNG’s law and order problems have progressively overwhelmed the criminal justice system. Although affecting all parts of the system, these pressures are most apparent in the police force, the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC).

While placing heavy reliance on the police as the frontline agency in responses to crime, no government has been prepared or able to make the necessary investment to build and sustain an effective national police organisation. Since PNG’s independence in 1975, the size of the RPNGC has increased by only around 30 per cent, while the overall population has more than tripled. Recent estimates are of an organisation of around 7,383 staff (Deloitte, 2020, p. 19) and a national population close to nine million. At 1:1145, the current police-to-population ratio is significantly lower than the UN recommended level of 1:450. Government pledges to increase the size of the force are unlikely to be realised anytime soon given severe fiscal constraints as accentuated by the economic fallout from the COVID-19 pandemic. Inadequate funding has been a persistent problem for the RPNGC. A recent study undertaken on behalf of the Papua New Guinea–Australia Policing Partnership (PNG–APP) demonstrated that the RPNGC was seriously underfunded. The study found that the RPNGC experiences an average recurrent funding gap of K126 million per annum and would require a one-off capital injection of around K3.9 billion to enable the organisation to deliver its service mandate (Deloitte, 2020, p. 5). An example of how funding issues can affect police operations was the recent stalling of investigations into the
massive drugs seizure following the light aircraft crash in July 2020 (see above). The media reported that this was a result of financial and other resource constraints (Kenneth, 2020b).

Household victimisation surveys confirm limited public confidence in the police (Guthrie, 2013). There is widespread scepticism about the ability of the RPNGC to carry out basic policing tasks, including responding to requests for help and investigating reported crimes. Lack of funds to buy fuel for police vehicles is a common reason provided for non-attendance. Flatlined budgets cover salaries but leave little to fund operational expenses, encouraging police to pursue rent-seeking opportunities. These can include payment for ‘turning a blind eye’ to infringements and illegal imposition of on-the-spot fines. It also renders the police highly susceptible to reliance on wealthy patrons, including political and business leaders, with the obvious risks this poses to police integrity.

Police performance and morale have also been affected by patronage networks and factionalism within the force, which have impacted on senior appointments and the conduct of some investigations. A 2013 baseline study of the RPNGC provides a depressing account of how these issues impact on everyday police practice, documenting low arrest rates; poor investigations, evidence collection and custody; and inadequate brief preparation, which results in low rates of successful prosecutions in the district courts and adversely affects committals to the higher courts (Coffey International Development, 2013).

Police brutality is another area of concern (Yakam, 2019). Although not all police engage in such behaviour, some have been involved in serious acts of violence, including unlawful killings, assaults and rape (HRW, 2005). As well as alienating many in the community, police abuses have also proven costly to government. A major review in 2004 found that outstanding legal claims against the state arising from unlawful police actions amounted to more than double the total police budget for that year (Government of Papua New Guinea, 2004). Recent years have seen growing debate around police brutality, in part responding to increasing coverage of such incidents in PNG’s vibrant social media, as well as reflecting the reformist agenda of Bryan Kramer, who served as police minister from June 2019 to December 2020, and David Manning, appointed as police commissioner in December 2019, amid growing public demand for
police reform. Kramer has been outspoken about problems of endemic corruption, illegality and brutality within the RPNGC. He recently stated that the police force he inherited on becoming police minister was:

In complete disarray and riddled with corruption. The very organisation that was tasked with fighting corruption had become the leading agency in acts of corruption. Add to that a culture of police ill-discipline and brutality. (quoted in Doherty, 2020)

PNG’s National Judicial System comprises two layers. The higher courts consist of the supreme and national courts established under the constitution and presided over by judges. The lower courts are the district courts established by legislation and presided over by magistrates. There are also a number of specialist courts, such as the coroner’s court, juvenile court and land court. In relation to criminal matters, most serious cases are tried in the national court, with less serious ones dealt with by district courts. The National Judicial System has been the beneficiary of donor support over many years and, although facing many of the same systemic issues, is generally viewed as the most professional part of the law and justice sector. A persistent challenge has been long delays in court hearings, often reflecting problems in the broader criminal justice system, including, for example, the collection of evidence and preparation of case files by police. These delays, in turn, contribute to overcrowding in correctional facilities (see below).

Although not part of the National Judicial System, the most accessible and widely used court in PNG is the village court. First introduced in 1974, village courts represent a significant institutional innovation in PNG’s law and justice system and, in many respects, embody the approach advocated in the Clifford Report. They were initially established to provide a form of accessible justice for predominantly rural areas, and are now also found in urban centres. In conception and design, these courts were intentionally hybrid, aimed at linking state and community approaches to dispute resolution and order maintenance at local levels. Staffed by lay magistrates, village courts are tasked with ensuring ‘peace and harmony’ in their respective communities, and with endeavouring to obtain ‘amicable settlement of disputes’ through the application of local custom. Created by statute with designated jurisdictional powers, the decisions of these courts are also subject to review by district court magistrates. They thus draw simultaneously on the authority of state law and local community norms. In recent years there has been growing appreciation of the actual and
potential role of village courts, scattered across the length of the country, to bring ‘substantial justice’ to ordinary Papua New Guineans (Goddard, 2009). While the sheer volume of village courts massively complicates the task of providing adequate administrative support and supervision, which can in turn lead to problems associated with lack of accountability, these courts have demonstrated an openness to reform and professionalisation. This is seen in the growing number of women who now sit as village court magistrates and officials in different parts of the country.

PNG’s prisons, administered by Correctional Services, have arguably been the most neglected part of the criminal justice system and have long struggled with inadequate funding. Overcrowding is a major issue and has been exacerbated by the large number of remandees (usually around a third of the prison population) awaiting trial in the courts. These have added to the pressures on staff and frustration among inmates, many of whom have to wait years before trial. The official mission of Correctional Services is to enhance public safety by providing secure and humane containment, and by rehabilitatating detainees. Resource constraints and lack of specialist staff impede the latter. Activities that do take place often depend on the voluntary sector, particularly the churches. As elsewhere, PNG’s prisons provide a fertile environment for building criminal identities and networks. Overcrowding, court delays and poor security practices contribute to regular mass breakouts from the largest facilities. Lae’s Buimo prison is especially prone to escapes. Built to accommodate 436 inmates, it currently houses over 1,000. Since 2015, there have been six major breakouts from this prison with 11 escapees recaptured, 32 shot dead and 138 still at large (The National, 2020).

**Capacity building and donor programs**

Given constraints on government finances, donor assistance to PNG’s criminal justice system has been an important source of support over many years. Most of this has been from Australia, PNG’s largest bilateral donor. Initially it took the form of institutional strengthening projects with individual agencies including the police, courts, prisons, legal services and the Ombudsman Commission. Support to the RPNGC used to be delivered by civilian advisers but has now been replaced by direct police-to-police assistance provided by the Australian Federal Police (AFP). Under the short-lived Enhanced Cooperation Program, uniformed Australian officers exercising police powers worked alongside their counterparts in
4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION

Port Moresby, but that initiative was abruptly terminated after a successful constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court. Since 2008, the AFP have been providing capacity building as advisers to the RPNGC under the PNG–APP. Australian assistance to other parts of the justice system is delivered on a sector-wide basis and is currently provided through the Justice Services and Stability for Development (JSS4D) Program, which focuses on priority areas identified by the PNG Government and heads of sector agencies.

The results from decades of donor assistance have been modest in terms of substantial improvements in the performance of PNG’s criminal justice system. This is particularly so in the case of the RPNGC, which has been the beneficiary of Australian support dating back to the late 1980s. While undergoing various iterations, involving changes in focus and mode of delivery, police capacity building has consisted mainly of training. Measuring the overall effect of donor efforts in this regard is difficult. Numerical indicators such as numbers of officers trained and equipment handed out do not tell us whether activities have changed policing practice. The fact that assistance continues to revolve around training and advising on broadly the same set of issues after more than three decades suggest limited impacts rather than major transformation. Capacity building has done little to address systemic challenges facing the police such as the vexed issue of resources. Recent observations, including, as we have seen, by a police minister, have drawn attention to important respects in which the organisation appears to be going backwards. Arguably the most realistic assessment of Australian support is that it has helped the RPNGC maintain a semblance of organisational functionality, rather than making a major difference to police effectiveness or improved security in the wider PNG community (Peake and Dinnen, 2014).

The limitations of organisational capacity building approaches are evident across the broader law and justice sector. A review of Australian law and justice assistance by AusAID’s Office of Development Effectiveness that covered various countries concluded that it had produced patchy results without necessarily improving the overall quality of justice received by citizens (AusAID, 2012). The reasons given for these results are germane to the PNG context. In the first place, lack of capacity is not always the binding constraint on institutional performance. Other more immediate factors include the dense network of informal institutions and practices overlaying the formal justice system. Second, capacity building programs are often overambitious in scope and there may be extremely limited
ability to implement them in low-capacity settings. Third, capacity building approaches often work towards best international practice and imported models, which are a poor fit in the local environment.

The issues of institutional transfer and fit are especially salient when considering donor support to the RPNGC and criminal justice system over the years. Much of capacity building has been predicated on the assumption that what ‘works’ in Australia and other metropolitan contexts can be transplanted directly to PNG. This raises fundamental issues around the appropriateness of the policing and justice models being transferred through donor engagements, issues that cannot be simply overcome with technical or administrative solutions and tweaked delivery modalities. Critical observers, going back to the Clifford Report over 35 years ago, have long argued that a more productive basis for reform would be to start by acknowledging the plural and networked character of security and justice provision in PNG.

The narrow focus on the RPNGC is at best only ever going to address part of the problem. For a start, this focus is almost exclusively on urban areas, even though most citizens live in rural localities, geographically and socially removed from the uniformed police. In these places, including in most urban settlements, everyday disputes and security are managed through community-based approaches that often rely more on restorative justice than investigation, prosecution and incarceration. Focusing exclusively on state policing can obscure the many examples of positive and often quite creative local responses to insecurity that draw on a mix of state and non-state resources with an emphasis on prevention and reduction (see section below on community responses to insecurity). It also neglects the increasingly prominent role of private security, which is examined in the next section.

**Private security**

One significant response to insecurity in PNG has been the dramatic growth in the private security industry (Dinnen, 2020). While broadly consistent with global patterns, there has been increasing demand for private security services, particularly from the business sector. According to the World Bank, more than two-thirds of businesses in PNG employ private security staff, spending on average 5 per cent of their annual costs on this, compared to an average of 3.2 per cent for firms in East Asia overall (Lakhani and Willman, 2014a). The increase in private security
companies has occurred against a background of significant development in the extractive industries and rapid economic globalisation. Additional boosts to industry growth in recent years include the hosting of Australia’s controversial offshore detention facilities on Manus Island and several major international events such as the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in 2018.

According to the industry regulator, the Security Industries Authority (SIA), the number of licensed security companies grew from 174 in 2006 to 566 in 2018 (Figure 4.1), with a workforce of over 30,000 licensed security guards (Isari, 2019; see Figure 4.2). According to the SIA the significant jump in the number of licensed companies between 2013 and 2014 resulted in part from their efforts to track down unlicensed security companies. The SIA figures do not, however, include what are believed to be a very substantial number of unlicensed companies and personnel providing private security services in different parts of the country. The number of licensed guards is, nevertheless, four times that of serving police officers, and exceeds the combined strength of PNG’s three disciplined forces (the RPNGC, PNG Defence Force and Correctional Service). By any account, the private security industry is a significant employer in PNG and a major player in the provision of security services.

![Figure 4.1: Growth of licensed security companies.](image)

Source: Security Industries Authority; figure adapted from Isari (2019).
Figure 4.2: Number of licensed guards.
Source: Security Industries Authority; figure adapted from Isari (2019).

Private security companies vary in size, services offered, areas of operation, as well as national origins. They range from transnational security corporations with global reach, to large locally owned firms, through to numerous smaller and often short-lived operators. Most are based in the main urban centres, but some also operate in rural areas where major resource projects are located. As well as static asset protection, other services include close personal protection, mobile escorts, security training, security assessments, emergency evacuations, rapid response capabilities, security fences, and sophisticated electronic surveillance and satellite tracking systems. The SIA estimated the value of the industry in 2018 as between K800 million and K1 billion.

As the industry has grown, so too have stories of violence, theft and other misdeeds by some private security personnel (Walton and Dinnen, 2020). The Security (Protection) Industry Act 2004 established the SIA to regulate the private security sector. Its key functions include:

- granting operating licences and guard permits to security companies
- specifying minimum standards of training and approving training facilities
- approving security equipment other than firearms
ensuring that companies and guards operate in accordance with their licences and permits
• drafting a Code of Conduct covering discipline and work ethics in the industry.

The resources available to the SIA to fulfil its role are, however, woefully inadequate and, as currently constituted, it has no real powers of enforcement to ensure compliance with the Act. Many industry insiders regard it as a toothless and largely ineffectual body. While amendments have been drafted to strengthen it, these have yet to be endorsed by the SIA Council and, as legislative amendments, also need approval from the National Parliament.

A close and mutually supportive relationship exists between the police and private security industry. Both sets of security providers undertake many of the same activities, with the SIA website stating that security companies ‘play an important role as a quasi-law enforcing agency beside the Police force’ (SIA, 2020). Strong informal networks exist, with many senior industry employees having previous police (or military) experience in PNG or overseas. Larger operators regularly assist police by, for example, providing fuel and tyres for vehicles, while the informal networks facilitate intelligence sharing. The private sector relies on the police to respond to serious incidents, receive and process crime reports, and detain suspects. Some private security employees also serve as reserve constables and, in that capacity, exercise the same powers as regular police.

Despite extensive interaction in practice, concerns have been raised in some quarters about the potentially negative impacts of the private sector on the performance and standing of the police. These include sensitivities about private providers encroaching on areas that some believe should remain the exclusive preserve of the public police. There are also concerns that the growing prominence of private companies diverts attention away from the need for adequate government support of the RPNGC, as well as perceptions that public–private security collaborations are more likely to privilege powerful business over the security interests of ordinary citizens. There is also resentment about international security companies among some locally owned operators who view the former as diminishing their share of this growing market.
Community-based responses to insecurity

Reflecting issues of limited access, affordability and, in some cases, preference, informal community-based approaches to dispute resolution and everyday security are widespread throughout PNG in both urban and rural settings. Operating alongside, and often together with, parts of the criminal justice system, are multiple local actors and mechanisms involved in problem solving and security provision in communities across the country. These are not simply remnants of traditional forms of dispute resolution and order maintenance but are often innovative local responses to contemporary problems. Given the absence or weak presence of the state in many places, and in the face of new stresses and forms of contestation, local actors have devised their own ways of dealing with them, albeit often drawing on older traditions. Some of these initiatives have achieved promising results, while others have not and, indeed, can exacerbate existing problems. Without proper accountability, informal responses to crime and violence can end up as violent forms of vigilantism, increasing the risks faced by already vulnerable groups, such as women, children and the elderly. However, this outcome is not inevitable.

Recent research has highlighted the important and constructive role of informal governance arrangements, including mediation services, in the regulation of PNG’s sprawling urban settlements (Craig and Porter, 2018a). While long depicted as dangerous places, crime surveys suggest that life in many settlements is no more violent than in non-settlement areas (Guthrie, 2013). Settlements are home to multiethnic and varied populations, including public servants and private sector employees, as well as those working in the informal economy. Residents rely on extended family, kinship and ethnic networks for managing disputes and personal safety. Komitis and leadership networks play a crucial role in social regulation within these localities, notably as a way of bringing together locally specific forms of authority with those of external agencies, for example through relationships with individual police officers, magistrates, private security companies or NGOs. These approaches are intentionally hybrid, drawing on available state and non-state resources. According to a recent study, it is this ability to ‘combine the authority of leaders and ethnic groups inside the blok and also draw in individuals with connections to the state, police, or others whose power and respect
is derived from a range of sources physically external to the settlement’ that is the key to the effectiveness of these local komitis (Craig and Porter, 2018b, p. 5).

There are examples of responses to conflict and violence in rural areas that also draw on a mix of state and non-state resources. An example is the Gor ‘community police’ in Simbu Province, established in the aftermath of prolonged tribal fighting and sorcery-related violence. Tribal and church leaders, with the tacit approval and support of provincial authorities, set up their own community police. They have received support, including some training, from the RPNGC, and initial assessments indicated a noticeable reduction in violence in that area (Bal, 2015). Another example is the District Peace Management Teams in Eastern Highlands Province, formed in response to tribal conflict. District Peace Management Teams comprise provincial and district officials, police, village court officers, community and church leaders. Trained in non-violent conflict resolution, they mediate between conflicting parties, broker ceasefires and help negotiate written peace agreements. Breaches of the agreements are reported to the police and offending parties can be penalised. This initiative also reportedly led to a marked reduction in tribal conflicts in the province (Allen and Monson, 2014). Another illustration from the Highlands is the peacemaking work of Operation Mekim Save in Enga Province, a culturally inflected local initiative directed at preventing and resolving tribal conflicts in that province (Pupu and Wiessner, 2018).

Gender-based violence has also prompted a range of highly localised initiatives in different parts of the country (Hukula, 2020). These include the impressive and courageous work of committed community-based organisations such as Kup Women for Peace, Voices for Change, Highlands Human Rights Defenders, Kafe Women’s Association, PNG Human Rights Defenders Association and Tribal Foundation. Enacting community by-laws and revitalising community governance arrangements has become a promising local response to problems of violence and social breakdown in some areas. For example, Voice for Change has worked with local leaders in Jiwaka Province to take ownership of gender-based violence and other law and order issues by creating community laws aimed at preventing and sanctioning this kind of behaviour. Local activists involved in such schemes have been supported by international NGOs and donors.
In reaffirming the value of local solutions to local problems, these initiatives also demonstrate the potential of hybrid and networked approaches that link together different actors and forms of authority (state and non-state) and enable them to work strategically to prevent, reduce and resolve violence.

**Corruption**

Many consider corruption in PNG a key threat to social and economic development. International indices suggest that corruption in PNG is acute, with Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) ranking the country as one of the more corrupt in the world. In 2021, PNG scored 31 out of 100 (with zero being highly corrupt and 100 very clean) and was ranked as the 124th most corrupt country out of 180 countries (Transparency International, 2022). However, it is important to note that the CPI has a number of limitations. In particular, CPI scores are based on assessments from international experts who may not live in the country, focus on the public sector (ignoring the private sector) and only apply to the national scale (thus overlooking transnational corruption). In this section, we go beyond the broad brushstrokes from international assessments to examine perceptions about, manifestations of and causes of corruption in PNG.

**Perceptions of corruption**

While there is much discussion about corruption in PNG, it is important to note that the concept itself is contested. Scholars have long argued about how to define corruption and who should define it. On the one hand, there are those who tend to see corruption as a universal concept, which has been a feature of life and governance in all countries throughout history (see Noonan, 1984). Many believe corruption can be effectively measured and define corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’, which means corruption is confined to state officials. This perspective is popular among international scholars (particularly economists and political scientists), international donors and some NGOs (such as Transparency International). Given its popularity, we can refer to this position as the ‘mainstream view’ of corruption.
On the other hand, other scholars believe that corruption is a social construct and that interpretations of this concept vary depending on social, political, cultural and economic factors (Harrison, 2006). Some of these scholars note that what is considered corrupt in one country or community is often not in another and argue that interpreting ‘corruption’ requires understanding the contextual factors that shape people’s lives and decisions. While increasingly popular (particularly among anthropologists and human geographers), these views are still on the margins of debates about corruption, so we can refer to this position as the ‘alternative view’ of corruption.

Over the past decade in PNG, researchers have sought to comprehend how Papua New Guineans interpret corruption and how these understandings differ or overlap with international definitions. Findings reveal that many Papua New Guineans do indeed reflect the mainstream view of corruption. A survey of over 1,800 people across nine provinces of the country found that 53 per cent of respondents defined corruption as ‘the abuse of public office for private gain’ (Walton, 2015). However, reflecting the alternative view, marginalised respondents were less likely to define corruption in this way. Rather, women, the poor and rural respondents defined corruption more broadly, focusing on local concerns and activities that did not involve public officials (Walton, 2015). Some in PNG justify corruption because of poverty and cultural obligations (see Walton and Jackson, 2020).

What do these findings tell us about corruption in PNG? Well, for a start, we need to be careful when assessing the nature of corruption in PNG. While international indices might suggest corruption is a major problem in the country, they fail to account for the lived experiences and perceptions of Papua New Guinean citizens. Taking these into account shows that, for some, particularly the marginalised, what some call ‘corruption’ is simply a way of responding to economic and cultural constraints. This is not to say that we should tolerate all forms of corruption. Indeed, it is difficult to justify grand corruption involving millions of kina. However, when examining corruption in PNG we need to take into account social, economic, cultural and geographical factors that might explain why some might support activities that others label ‘corrupt’.
Manifestations and causes of corruption

Keeping the above discussion in mind, it is worthwhile examining the drivers and manifestations of corruption – as the mainstream view interprets it – in PNG. In the lead up to independence, the Constitutional Planning Committee’s (1974) report identified corruption as a key risk to this new nation and recommended the establishment of a Leadership Code and Ombudsman Commission. Despite the concerns expressed by some of PNG’s elites about these institutions – for example, Julius Chan (2016, p. 65) argued against the establishment of the Ombudsman Commission and leadership code – both were adopted, in modified form, into the nation’s constitution.

When assessing the nature of corruption in the post-independence era, scholars and officials have identified two distinct time periods. The first epoch centres on the early years of independence until the early 1980s. While the newly independent country faced numerous challenges, until the early 1980s its public administration was robust and corruption was mostly kept under control (May, 2004; Pieper, 2004). This period saw smooth changes of government in 1980, 1982 and 1985 (May, 2004), and senior public administrators described public servants of this era as motivated, independent and professional (Pieper, 2004). However, by the mid-1980s service delivery had noticeably declined and by the 1990s, as May (2004) noted, corruption and nepotism had become particularly apparent. In their influential report, Clifford et al. (1984) observed numerous examples of potential corruption and warned that the extent of the problem was likely greater than available data suggested.

Since this time, there have been numerous corruption scandals involving public servants, politicians, private companies, landowner groups, citizens and non-citizens (for a list of some of these, see Barnett, 1989; Dorney, 2001; Jones, 2014; Larmour, 2012; Transparency International Papua New Guinea [TI PNG], 2017; Walton, 2018). Examples of 1980s corruption scandals include those in the logging industry forensically investigated in the Barnett Commission of Inquiry (Barnett, 1989). In 1997, concern about corruption increased after the government’s failed attempt to hire foreign mercenaries to fight in its long-running war in Bougainville. This event was beset by accusations of backroom deals and became known as the ‘Sandline Affair’ (after Sandline International, the
name of the company that provided the mercenaries), which ultimately caused the downfall of the then prime minister, Sir Julius Chan (Dinnen et al., 1997).

Corruption scandals, often involving senior public servants and politicians, continue to feature in national media and in online forums. For example, in 2020, former prime minister Peter O’Neill was arrested in relation to the purchase of generators (Davidson, 2020); he was later acquitted in the National Court (Post-Courier, 2021). This followed a failed attempt in 2014 to arrest the then prime minister over a government payment to a local law firm. While corruption scandals involving senior officials and, often, millions of kina, can be hard to keep track of, TI PNG endeavoured to describe the nature of these allegations in their report *Lest we forget*. It reviews 20 unresolved large-scale corruption allegations between 2007 and 2017, and shows how state investments and lease arrangements have contributed to potential corruption (TI PNG, 2017). In turn, over the past two decades PNG businesses have consistently cited corruption as a key constraint to business in the country (Fox et al., 2018).

Research with citizens and public servants also suggests that corruption is a part of many people’s lives. A survey with citizens in five provinces of the country found that 51 per cent of respondents had witnessed some sort of corruption, with males more likely to witness corruption than females (TI PNG, 2016, p. 19). Most respondents (73 per cent) were concerned about bribery, particularly during elections. Respondents believed nepotism was most prevalent in tendering boards, while misappropriation (or theft of government property) was most associated with the health sector (TI PNG, 2016, p. 22). Many public servants also believe corruption is common, with research conducted in 2018 showing that two-thirds of public servants across four provinces agreed that it is difficult to get things done without bribing government officials (Walton, 2019).

It is difficult to know whether corruption in PNG is getting worse. As discussed, corruption is a contested concept making measurement difficult; in addition, it is often conducted in secret and hidden from indicators that attempt to quantify it. One indicator suggests that, over the past decade, PNG’s efforts to address corruption have improved. According to the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators, PNG’s control of public sector corruption improved: from a percentile rank of 6.7 to 16.8 out of 100 between 2009 and 2019 (World Bank, 2020). However, the country’s score on Transparency International’s CPI has
only marginally improved: from a score of 25 (out of 100) in 2012 to 31 in 2021 (Transparency International, 2022). A 2015 survey of citizens found that 90 per cent of respondents said that corruption had gotten worse over the past decade (TI PNG, 2016, p. 7).

The drivers of corruption in PNG are numerous, multi-scalar and complex. Reflecting on the decline in PNG’s public administration from the mid-1980s, senior public servants have noted that poor governance was accompanied by a number of factors, including a move away from bureaucratic procedures, politicisation of the administration and the shift from expatriate personnel contracted within inline positions to providing advisory support (Pieper, 2004). Decentralisation policy may have also helped exacerbate corruption, with some concerned that the decentralisation reform of the 1995 *Organic Law on Provincial Governments and Local-level Governments* has politicised subnational bureaucracy and led to weaker accountability and greater opportunities for corruption and cronyism (Reilly et al., 2014). The increased District Services Improvement Program (DSIP) funding channelled to District Development Authorities (established by law in 2014) is also believed to be fuelling corruption in some districts. An auditor-general’s review found an array of problems associated with DSIP funds including ‘a pervasive breakdown in the DSIP governance framework; and ineffective spending of DSIP grants including potential misuse of DSIP funds’, and warned there was a ‘high risk of fraud’ (Auditor-General’s Office of Papua New Guinea, 2014, pp. 12–13).

For some, corruption is an outcome of the merging of traditional systems of governance with PNG’s weak state. Ketan (2004), for example, shows how the big man politics that leads to client–patron relations reflect the reciprocal exchanges of wealth embodied in the practice of *moka* by the Melpa people of Mount Hagen. From this perspective, corruption is part of a longer tradition of reciprocity. Clifford et al. (1984, p. 80) argued that corruption is particularly possible in PNG due to *wantok* obligations of reciprocal gift exchange and ‘a cultural lack of familiarity with written records’. Walton (2018) found that, because of the deficiencies of the state, it is the poor and marginalised who are most likely subject to the cultural, social and economic pressures that can drive what some label corruption. While subject to the same pressures, it is the enfranchised who are more able and likely to identify and report various forms of corruption – particularly corruption that occurs at the national scale (Walton, 2018).
Still, it is important to note that much of what is called ‘grand (large-scale) corruption’ involves a network of transnational elites and organisations. This is particularly the case in the logging sector, with transnational companies (especially those from Southeast Asia) long associated with corruption and human rights abuses (Barnett, 1989). Urban areas are also centres for transnational crime and corruption. Lasslett (2018) argued that urbanisation in PNG often features anti-competitive practices, corruption and violence facilitated by the state and transnational corporate interests (also see Chapter 7, this volume).

Transnational networks across the region can help facilitate the laundering of illicitly gained funds into offshore bank accounts and real estate. In 2015, an investigation by the NGO Global Witness and Australian media outlets showed how PNG politicians were investing corrupt monies into Australian banks and real estate (McKenzie et al., 2015). For its role in harbouring corrupt funds, Sam Koim, head of the now defunct anti-corruption organisation Taskforce Sweep (ITFS), described Australia as the ‘Cayman Islands of the Pacific’. Focusing on its transnational elements shows that corruption is not simply associated with state officials – it also involves a network of organisations and individuals from the private sector that move illicitly gained goods and monies throughout the world. In turn, corruption in PNG involves a myriad of actors that span the globe (see Walton and Dinnen, 2020).

The poor state of the nation's integrity agencies is another key driver of corruption, which is much more likely if people think they can get away with it. We have already highlighted the challenges facing the country’s police force. In the section below, we briefly examine some of the other state-based responses to fighting corruption and note that, while there are some bright spots, most agencies do not have the resources or mandate to effectively address corruption in the country.

**State-based responses: Anti-corruption and integrity agencies**

The PNG state funds a number of organisations to address government corruption and mismanagement. The RPNGC plays a critical role in addressing corruption – it is often the first port of call for citizens who want to report it. The Department of Justice and Attorney General also plays a role in addressing corruption, as it is the ‘central agency responsible for
the administration of legal services to the State and its instrumentalities, and the provision of law and justice services’ (Department of Justice and Attorney General, 2020). However, unlike the aforementioned agencies, only four organisations specifically focus on investigating corruption and wrongdoing.

The first is the Ombudsman Commission, which was mandated to investigate wrongdoing by those in government leadership positions through the nation’s constitution at independence in 1975. While an important anti-corruption organisation that has helped prevent ‘the decline of the executive and parliament into total irresponsibility and unaccountability’ (Ghai, 1997, p. 324), the Ombudsman Commission has long suffered from a lack of resources and an inadequate mandate to hold state officials to account (Walton, 2018). The second is the National Fraud and Anti-Corruption Directorate (referred to as the ‘Fraud Squad’), which sits within the RPNGC. The Fraud Squad has been involved in investigating many high-profile cases of alleged corruption; for example, it was at the forefront of an attempt to arrest Prime Minister Peter O’Neill in 2014 (AAP, 2014). Third, the Financial Analysis and Supervision Unit (FASU) was created through the Anti-Money Laundering and Counter Terrorist Financing Act 2015. The organisation operates within the Bank of PNG, and has a mandate to detect, deter and disrupt money laundering and terrorist financing activities (FASU, 2018). Fourth, the Auditor-General’s Office commenced operations in 1973 and was established as the country’s supreme audit institution under section 213 of the constitution in 1975. The organisation inspects, audits and reports on accounts, finances and properties of government departments, agencies and public corporations.

In 2011 Prime Minister Peter O’Neill promised to add to these key anti-corruption organisations by establishing an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). (An ICAC was first proposed in 1997 but ultimately failed to gain political support.) To pave the way for an ICAC, the O’Neill government first established the independent ITFS to investigate corruption in the interim. ITFS was initially successful; its investigations resulted in numerous arrests and the recovery of millions of kina from the proceeds of crime. However, in 2014 the agency turned its attention to O’Neill himself, helping to organise an arrest warrant for the then prime minister over allegations of corruption. ITFS was subsequently defunded after a lengthy legal battle ended in 2016, when
the court ruled the government’s decision to abolish ITFS was within the law. The Marape government has recently established an ICAC. While the ICAC legislation has been finalised, the organisation has yet to start operations.

Figure 4.3 compares the relative amounts of spending on and, after 2020, budget allocations (dashed lines) for each of these key anti-corruption organisations (figures have been adjusted for inflation so are comparable over time). It shows that the Ombudsman Commission and Auditor-General’s Office are by far the best funded. Funding for both organisations is set to decline under the Marape government. Continuing a trend set in 2017, the Marape government has spent more on the Ombudsman Commission than the Auditor-General’s Office. In comparison, other organisations receive small sums. Building on previous analysis (Walton and Hushang, 2020), recent analysis by Walton and Hushang has found that between 2008 and 2020 key anti-corruption organisations in PNG only received between 0.37 per cent and 0.27 per cent of the overall national budget, a paltry percentage that declined over O’Neill’s time as prime minister.

Figure 4.3: Funding for five anti-corruption organisations, 2008–22 (2021 prices).
Source: Calculations by Grant Walton and Husnia Hushang.
International donors have often augmented these anti-corruption efforts through technical support and other types of assistance. Indeed, for more than 15 years, Australia, PNG’s largest donor, has spent more funding on good governance programs than in any other sector (see Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2020). Some of these programs have encouraged innovative responses. For example, the United Nations Development Program and the Australian Government in partnership with PNG’s Department of Finance funded an anti-corruption phone service that allowed public officials to anonymously report cases of corruption through a mobile phone text messaging service (Watson and Wiltshire, 2016).

While these organisations go some way towards addressing corruption in the country (the problem would be greater if they were not around), their effectiveness is limited due to the lack of resources and limited mandate that makes it easy for political and bureaucratic elites to avoid prosecution. Their effectiveness in addressing corruption further is undermined by two other factors. First, most anti-corruption organisations are mandated to focus on public officials rather than the private sector or civil society – two sectors that play a significant role in delivering services across the country. Second, with some exceptions (see Walton and Dinnen, 2020), most anti-corruption organisations fail to focus on transnational corruption. Like state-based anti-corruption organisations in other jurisdictions, these organisations struggle to investigate and hold to account the transnational web of actors involved in corruption.

Non-state responses: Citizens and civil society

It is important to note that, in their everyday lives, many Papua New Guineans resist corruption. In focus groups conducted with citizens across four provinces in PNG, respondents spoke of directly confronting and even physically assaulting those involved in what they thought was corrupt behaviour (Walton, 2018). Likely because they dominate the police and other public institutions, men are more likely to report corruption than women (Walton, 2019; Walton and Peiffer, 2017). While it is true that some citizens might support and participate in corrupt practices (Crocombe, 2001), particularly bribery during elections, it is important to note that many also resist these practices. Citizens are also increasingly reporting corruption through social media and other internet portals. While Facebook continues to be an important source of information,
4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION

reports featured on that site are often unverified. The media also highlights corruption cases, though many journalists are threatened. In response, some have set up anonymous websites, such as pngicentral.org, that investigate and report on corruption.

Recent research on what might motivate citizens to report corruption has highlighted three key drivers. First, researchers have found that formal education is key in determining how likely it is that citizens will report corruption to authorities (Walton and Peiffer, 2017). In short, those who are educated above primary school level are more likely to report a variety of different types of corruption. Second, citizens are even more likely to report corruption if they trust that anti-corruption agencies will do something about it. Finally, citizens are far more likely to respond to corruption when they understand how it impacts on their local community (Walton and Peiffer, 2017). Overall, these findings suggest that supporting the formal education sector, strengthening anti-corruption organisations and raising awareness about how corruption impacts on local communities are likely to lead to more citizens reporting corruption.

PNG has a long tradition of civil society groups protesting against and building awareness about corruption. Mostly urban based, anti-corruption groups have involved leaders from PNG churches, political organisations and universities. For example, Melanesian Solidarity (MelSol), one of PNG’s most vocal civil society activist groups, was formally launched in 1984 (King, 2004). The organisation took up a wide range of issues in the 1980s and 1990s, including supporting the West Papuan nationalist movement, environmental preservation, landowner rights and militarisation (Standish, 1999). In 1997, MelSol played a critical part in organising community protests over the government’s failed attempt to hire foreign mercenaries to fight in its long-running war in Bougainville. Given that the government was negotiating with Sandline International (a company that was to provide mercenaries to the government), events around this negotiation became known as the ‘Sandline Affair’. With negotiations beset by accusations of backroom deals, the Sandline Affair brought corruption to the public’s consciousness like few other events before it. Groups like MelSol and the pan-denominational movement ‘Brukim Skru’ (‘Bend the Knee’) protested against the shady deals that had caused the crisis (Griffin, 1997).
While MelSol’s activism petered out in the early 2000s, grassroots movements have continued to protest against corruption across the country. For example, in the late 2000s grassroots groups held regular protests across Port Moresby calling for Prime Minister Michael Somare to resign over alleged corruption (Walton, 2018). In 2016 students across the country shut down major universities as they protested the O’Neill government’s alleged corruption and its undermining of anti-corruption organisations, particularly the Fraud Squad. This involved a showdown with police in Port Moresby, resulting in police shooting protestors.

These grassroots movements are joined by transnational NGOs, TI PNG being the most prominent. TI PNG commenced operations in 1997. Since its inception, the agency has campaigned against corruption and has worked with civil society organisations and the media to highlight the problems that cause corruption and offer solutions to it (Larmour, 2003). While a chapter of the broader global Transparency International network, TI PNG is managed by a local voluntary board of directors. Individuals, corporations and donors help to finance TI PNG’s activities, which mean it is better funded than its grassroots counterparts (Walton, 2018).

Civil society has played an important role in highlighting corruption in PNG. However, the sector faces numerous challenges. Many local civil society organisations lack resources and, as a result, have been unable to sustain their operations. Moreover, local organisations are sometimes tied to politicians, and civic leaders themselves have a history of running for parliament and, in turn, by their absence, weakening the anti-corruption movement while they pursue – and sometimes gain – political office (Walton, 2016). Civil society is also fragmented, with schisms opening up between local and transnational organisations (which have greater access to resources) (Walton, 2016).

Conclusions

This chapter has examined key understandings of, and drivers and responses to, crime and corruption. It has provided a nuanced account of crime and corruption, an approach often obscured by the popular indices that can frame discussions about these challenges. The chapter shows how manifestations and responses to crime and corruption have changed over time and across space.
Three key themes flow from this analysis. First, while crime and corruption are contested concepts, they both represent key challenges for PNG. Crime and corruption can undermine economic activity, social harmony and state stability. Both issues are regularly cited as key challenges for business in particular – indeed, a 2012 survey of businesses in PNG found that law and order and corruption were the top two reform priorities (Asian Development Bank and Institute of National Affairs, 2014, p. 4). Still, responding to these challenges requires a nuanced understanding of the social, cultural and economic forces that allow these problems to flourish. This requires looking beyond the assessments of crime and corruption rendered by international indices.

Second, thinking about crime and corruption requires recognising the networks and relationships between a variety of individuals and organisations. Networks of politicians, bureaucrats and businesspeople often perpetuate crime and corruption. Responses to these challenges involve networks of state and non-state actors and organisations. While many focus on the way state agencies and organisations address crime and corruption, our analysis suggests effective responses involve a melange of state and non-state actors and organisations. This often involves a hybrid configuration of different sources of authority, drawing on, for example, a combination of state, custom and religious values. Thinking about the networked and hybrid nature of these challenges rather than focusing on strict divisions between state, private sector and civil society has the potential to provide a more realistic assessment of the multifaceted quality of crime and corruption in PNG and the need for similarly multilayered responses.

Finally, crime and corruption, and responses to these challenges, are far from static. While some have been prescient in their assessment of the types of law and order challenges facing PNG (e.g. Clifford et al., 1984), the character of crime and corruption are continuously evolving. At the time of writing, PNG, like nations around the world, is dealing with the COVID-19 pandemic. As Kabuni (2020) has demonstrated, the PNG Government’s response to this pandemic through its state of emergency exacerbates the risk of corruption. Responses to crime and corruption have also changed considerably: citizens now report corruption and police brutality through social media and websites, and hotlines allow people to report corruption through their mobile phones. Global, regional, national and local events, as well as innovations and technological change will continue to reshape the threat of crime and corruption in the years
to come. Law enforcement and anti-corruption agencies need to adapt to these changes if they are to effectively address crime and corruption, especially as efforts to date have been wholly inadequate.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Fiona Hukula, Miranda Forsyth, Stephen Howes, Lekshmi Pillai and workshop participants for their feedback.

References


AusAID. (2012). *Building on local strengths. Evaluation of Australian law and justice assistance.* AusAID.


4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION


Isari, P. K. (2019, 15 July). *How the Security Industries Authority (SIA) is supporting the security companies address law and order issues in PNG*. Presentation to CIMC conference. Popondetta, PNG.


4. CRIME AND CORRUPTION


