

## Appendix: Methodology for Peacebuilding Compared

The methodology for this research consisted mostly of digesting a vast literature on peacebuilding in Timor-Leste. In addition, John Braithwaite and Adérito Soares shared two periods in the field in Timor-Leste together in August–September 2006 and September–October 2009. Hilary Charlesworth participated in the 2009 fieldwork and Leah Dunn and Andrew Goldsmith in a number of the 2006 interviews. Adérito Soares has lived most of his life in Timor-Leste and does today as a senior civil servant. He was also a member of the nation’s first Parliament that drafted the Constitution. Before that he was active in the clandestine movement. Adérito was able to do some crucial updating interviews in Timor-Leste during 2011 and has done many interviews and much participant observation for his own PhD research on the right to development, beyond the interviews listed in Table A1. In all of our cases, we have sought to engage participants in the research who have superior local knowledge and superior local language skills, as with Adérito Soares in this case, to compensate for the limited local sensibilities that John Braithwaite brings as the comparativist who leads all the case studies. John Braithwaite also travelled several times to Jakarta, twice to New York, to New Zealand, Fiji, Vanuatu, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, Bangladesh, China, India and across Australia for UN interviews. Kate Macfarlane and Leah Dunn assisted with UN peacekeeper interviews in some of these countries and also in Malaysia.

As in prior Peacebuilding Compared cases, we enjoyed access to very senior UN officials, to a number of former and current foreign ministers of Indonesia, Australia and Timor-Leste, two of Timor-Leste’s prime ministers, Prime Minister John Howard of Australia and top commanders of the militaries engaged in the fighting. Table A1 indicates that while we have worked hard at interviews over the past six years, the distribution of the interviews is not as well attuned to the research focus of this volume as we would have liked. Almost one-third of the interviews have been with UN peacekeepers. When the study began in 2005, the focus of the wider Peacebuilding Compared project was more on peacekeeping. That remains just one important focus of Peacebuilding Compared overall and also for this book.

**Table A1: Numbers and Types of Peacebuilding Compared Interviews, Timor-Leste Case**

Timor-Leste minister or elected official	16
Timor-Leste civil servant/judge	28
Political leader of oppositional group	2
Indonesian military	10
Other Indonesian leader	9
Falintil ex-combatant	4
Timor-Leste military (F-FDTL), petitioners	11
Timor-Leste Police (PNTL)	13
UN Police (UNPOL)	54
UN and international military peacekeepers (INTERFET)	45
Other UN officials	34
Lisan/village leader	7
Church leader	6
Women's NGO	4
Environmental NGO	0
Development NGO	12
Human rights/peacebuilding NGO	16
Other NGO	0
Journalist	2
Business leader	5
Clandestine network leader	5
Martial arts group leader	4
Other student/youth leader	1
Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, and so on)	26
Other international organisations (for example, World Bank)	6
Researcher/university academic	2
Victim/refugees	1
Other	0
Total interviews	297
Total people interviewed	323

In Table A1, as in previous such Peacebuilding Compared tables, interviews are assigned to one category that captures the role on which the interview was most focused. So while only one person is coded as a victim/refugee, many dozens of the people we interviewed could also fit that code. We also visited refugee camps and enjoyed casual conversations with many refugees that were not

coded as interviews and witnessed victim testimony at reconciliation processes. Many of the interviews coded as Members of Parliament, civil servants, PNTL and F-FDTL officers were also once members of Falintil, of the clandestine movement, of women's NGOs, or were *lisan* leaders in their village. President Ramos-Horta was coded as a 'minister', though he started out as an activist journalist and might have been so coded. We interviewed Minister Maria Domingas Alves twice and coded her as a minister, though we spoke as much with her about her pre-eminence as a women's movement leader and a leader of peace dialogues. So the data in Table A1 should be read only as a rough guide to the limitations of our data, which are nevertheless considerable. We should have interviewed more *lisan* leaders in more remote parts of the country than the half-dozen districts where we did limited travel. Only a few of those we interviewed were willing to confess any role in militias, though we suspect more of them played such a role. We should have travelled to West Timor to interview militia leaders in exile there. We failed to do any environmental NGO interviews and should have done more women's NGO interviews and interviews with more leaders of martial arts groups.

This book is part of a longer, 20-year project that started in 2005. In this period, we aim to code more than 600 variables—a number we continue to add to, concerning at least 50 post-1990 armed conflicts, including all the major UN and international peacekeeping operations since 1990. For the moment, the project is concentrated in Asia and the Pacific; then it will move to Africa. In the—we hope—unlikely event that we run out of steam before 2030, it could become just a study of peacebuilding in Asia and Africa. But we do then aspire to move on to the Middle East, Europe and finally the Americas. New cases where we are currently in the field are Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan.

There are multiple aims with Peacebuilding Compared. A very important one is books that explore a particular theme in the way that this one explores the error of misplaced realism and the struggle for republican separations of powers after a war. We hope to build inductively a theory of effectiveness in peacebuilding as we lay one thematic case study on top of those that have gone before it, in just the way we have sought to lay another brick with this book towards a more ambitious theoretical structure in the future. As we develop the theory, we also code the variables that allow us to test it more quantitatively by 2025. Hence, in the course of this study, we refined a number of new codes of separations-of-powers variables. Not only will these be coded for all future cases, we also returned to conflicts we have already coded and written up and have coded these new separations-of-powers variables motivated by the Timor-Leste analysis.

To qualify as an armed conflict for inclusion in Peacebuilding Compared, it must be a case where fighting started or continued after 1990. Military coups that do not result in large loss of life, such as those that occurred in Fiji during the

period of our study, do not qualify for inclusion. It must be an armed conflict in which one armed group with a command structure is engaged in group attacks with weapons on another armed group with a command structure. Unlike some quantitative studies of 'civil wars', here there is no requirement that one of the protagonists be a state (for example, Goldstone and Ulfelder 2005; Sambanis 2002). We see such a restriction as an analytic error that is well illustrated by the disparate militarised groups that were responsible for killing in our Timor-Leste coding: militias backed by the Indonesian military, PNTL and F-FDTL engaging in fire fights, different factions of F-FDTL doing so, even martial arts groups in a small way. We are open to revising this condition when we move on one day to consider whether cases such as Northern Ireland should or should not be included in the study, but for the moment minimum conditions for inclusion are that two of the following three conditions are met: at least 200 people were killed in the fighting within three years; at least 30 000 people were driven from their homes by the fighting between the armed groups; and an internationally sanctioned peacekeeping mission was sent to make peace in the war-torn region.

Including the last condition prevents us from excluding armed conflicts from consideration that started but were prevented from escalating into mass slaughter by peacekeepers. The analytic purchase of not excluding such peacekeeping 'success' cases is well illustrated by the understanding contributed by our analysis of the impact of the arrival of peacekeepers in Timor-Leste from 2006. In 2006–07, peacekeepers were the most crucial element of the separation of powers that prevented civil war. Timor is actually coded as two different conflicts: one from 1975 to 1999 in which the Indonesian military was a central combatant; and a different outbreak of armed conflict from 2006 to 2008 in which it was not. Across our 600 variables, these two conflicts are coded in radically different ways. The 2006–08 conflict, with 150 000 people fleeing their homes as a result of the fighting, meets the second as well as the third peacekeeping condition. It might even meet the killing threshold of 200 between 2006 and 2008; it is hard to be sure. So we include it on the basis that it meets two of our three conditions—in addition to the foundational threshold of involving organised combatant groups in battles with arms.

In the introductory chapter to each of the three previous books we have already published on the project, we have rather repetitively described in more detail the overall methodological rationale for the Peacebuilding Compared project and the conduct of its coding. Like this one, these books can be downloaded free from the Peacebuilding Compared web site, which also provides much additional information on the totality of the project and its methods: <<http://peacebuilding.anu.edu.au>>

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