Abstract

This chapter explores and offers a critique of the ways that foreign aid projects engage with the problem of violence against women in Papua New Guinea. Inspired by the work of Amartya Sen and Stephen Lewis, writers who bravely defend humanist ideals and enable the exposure of much of the empty rhetoric about diversity and equality as public relations talk, I argue that aid projects directed at reducing violence have failed because they do not confront the structural inequalities between men and women. The strategies wrongly assume widespread acceptance of human rights and ignore the anthropological analyses that reveal the deeply ingrained cultural attitudes and economic relations that naturalise female disadvantage and male entitlement. As such projects also sustain the unequal power relations between donor countries and the nations who are recipients of aid. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) that are directed towards redressing gender inequality are strategically inappropriate. In particular, the fine research that has been done by anthropologists on gender violence in Papua New Guinea and elsewhere in the Pacific has not really been ‘taken on board’ by aid agencies because it documents the fact that for women to gain the control over their own lives and bodies that ‘eliminating violence’ entails, men are going to have to lose it. Aid agencies negotiate projects with male politicians and these deals are underpinned by masculinist politics so the real nature of the changes required is never acknowledged.

Introduction

This chapter was inspired initially by my involvement in a seminar on auditing and ‘measuring’ gender in aid projects in which I participated as a board member of the International Women’s Development Agency, an Australian-
based NGO. The brief paper\textsuperscript{1} I wrote for that seminar set out arguments about the problems involved in dealing with the issue of violence and ‘measuring’ success or failure of projects. In the course of the seminar, through subsequent reading of the literature on gender and aid (see Crewe and Harrison 1998 for an excellent bibliography, but also the ACFID report 2010) and in the light of my own experience of working as a consultant on projects that had anti-violence components, I have become concerned about the ways that fundamental problems about the time, cost and nature of projects are not acknowledged. It was also inspired by reading the work of Amartya Sen (1990; 1992) and Stephen Lewis (2006), writers who I think bravely defend humanist ideals and enable the exposure of much of the empty rhetoric about diversity and equality as public relations talk—rhetoric that thinly disguises economic arguments that sustain the unequal power relations between donor countries and the nations who are recipients of aid.

Most of all, I think that the fine research that has been done by anthropologists on gender violence in Papua New Guinea (PNG)\textsuperscript{2} and elsewhere in the Pacific (see for example Jolly 1996, 2000) has not really been ‘taken on board’ by aid agencies—because it documents the fact that for women to gain the control over their own lives and bodies that ‘eliminating violence’ entails, men are going to have to lose it. Aid agencies negotiate projects with male politicians and these deals are underpinned by masculinist politics—so the real nature of the problems is never acknowledged. I have tried to enunciate some of those problems in what follows.

In 2000 the United Nations set the Millennium Development Goals (UNDP 2010). The eight goals set out strategies for dramatically reducing world poverty and established objectives that were deemed measurable and attainable. These goals explicitly include commitment to promoting gender equality and empowering women (Item 3) and the taskforce report Taking Action: Achieving Gender Equality and Empowering Women (Grown, Gupta and Kes 2005), sets out seven strategic priorities as integral to the third goal:

1. Strengthen opportunities for postprimary education for girls while simultaneously meeting commitments to universal primary education.
2. Guarantee sexual and reproductive health and rights.
3. Invest in infrastructure to reduce women’s and girls’ time burdens.

\textsuperscript{1} Macintyre 2006. The paper presented a critique of the notion that measurement of incidence is necessarily useful for policy formulation and a discussion of the problems of accuracy in data collection.

\textsuperscript{2} While some of this research is hard to find because it is contextualised in broader ethnographic studies, there is a solid body of work on gender violence since at least the 1970s, for example Counts 1990, Josephides 1985, Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1990, and the sections that anthropologists contributed to the major study by the Law Reform Commission in 1985, see Toft 1985 and Toft and Bonnell 1985.
4. Guarantee women’s and girls’ property and inheritance rights.

5. Eliminate gender inequality in employment by decreasing women’s reliance on informal employment, closing gender gaps in earnings, and reducing occupational segregation.

6. Increase women’s share of seats in national parliaments and local governmental bodies.

7. Combat violence against girls and women (Grown, Gupta and Kes 2005: 3).

These seven priorities constitute an integrated approach to eliminating inequality and empowering women and draw on decades of international research and reports on aid projects that have in various ways documented discrimination against women. The final one, ‘Combat violence against girls and women’, requires that governments and development agencies commit to programs and policies that confront and try to eliminate violence against girls and women. The use of the term ‘combat’ (and the struggle it implies) resonates with the rhetoric of ‘zero tolerance’ and accumulated knowledge of decades that has revealed the futility of campaigns that are not supported by laws, police action and public condemnation of violence against women. It was a term deliberately chosen by the authors for two other reasons: first, to stress the seriousness of the problem and the need for confrontation in developing solutions; second, because their first choice of terminology, ‘elimination’, was deemed unrealistic (Geeta Rao Gupta, personal communication, May 2008). In concert with the other MDGs there is recognition that improving women’s economic and political status, as well as providing better access to education and health services, will add to the armoury for this struggle. In this chapter, I concentrate on the third goal: promoting gender equality and empowering women. While acknowledging that the changes envisaged by the other six strategic priorities are critical to the elimination of female poverty, the problems posed by violence against women in PNG require an analytical approach to the cultural configurations of gender relations and the ideologies that sustain them.

The definitions of violence that are drawn upon and inform the Millennium Development Goals’ objectives are extremely broad. They include physical violence, sexual violence, psychological abuse and forms of neglect and coercion, as well as such culturally and legally-sanctioned practices as genital mutilation and corporal punishments. The strategies refer to violence committed in the context of war as well as domestic, intimate partner violence and criminal violence by strangers. They also embrace ideas such as ‘economic abuse/violence’ which cover forms of exploitation, deprivation and exclusion. In short, the task envisaged encompasses a vast array of types of violence, only some of which are universally recognised in law. In several countries, including PNG, where mutilation and beating are viewed as customary, the characterisation undermines the capacity of states to respond to acts of violence. More importantly, as they
are based on ideals of universal human rights for women, the violence that is to be combated includes acts and practices that are endorsed by state institutions in some countries.

An international problem

There is now a prolific international literature on violence against women. The number of reports, studies, projects designs and evaluations that have appeared in the last decade is quite overwhelming—as I have found in preparing this chapter. The major reports emanating from agencies such as UNIFEM, the United Nations, the World Health Organisation, the Asian Development Bank (to name but a few) draw on a vast literature from development projects as well as the academic studies based in several disciplines including psychology, sociology, anthropology, law and medicine. While there are some variations in findings that can be attributed to regional and/or cultural variations, the basic conclusions are consistent. Violence against women is an expression of deeply entrenched political discrimination against women at personal, local and national levels. Women's relative lack of power in domestic relations means that they are often incapable of resisting, escaping or changing the interpersonal dynamics whereby conflict is manifest in violence against them. Women's health suffers and women who are beaten are more vulnerable to a range of illnesses, many of which compromise their reproductive health. The propensity to be a both a perpetrator and a victim are socially transmitted to successive generations. Poverty and a lack of education are both implicated in the incidence of violence against women and the perceived tolerance of violence by women. The goal of empowering women in ways that will combat violence thus requires governments and aid and development agencies to work on several fronts and to ensure that gender disparities are reduced.

Australia and aid to Melanesia

Australian aid programs have attempted to deal with gender inequality in Melanesia for at least the past two decades (OECD, CRS Aid Activity Database), most recently through policies of mainstreaming. AusAID has guidelines that aim at integrating strategies for the achievement of equality for women within all projects, albeit diverse, including those for infrastructural and economic development. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the broad

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3 See for example the study of gender equity in international health (G. Sen et al. 2002); or the study of the economic cost of domestic violence (Yodanis and Godenzi 1999); the psychological effects of violence (Astbury et al. 2000); and the international legal issues (Meyersfeld 2003; Merry 2006).
implications and effects of mainstreaming gender, but it has to be acknowledged that the desired changes in empowerment for women so that violence is significantly reduced are, so far, not apparent. Lewis’ (2006) criticisms of gender mainstreaming policies as they have been applied in Africa probably holds good for Melanesia too. Too often attention to women’s specific disadvantages is minimal, the commitment to women’s concerns is left in the ‘too hard basket’ when local men refuse to cooperate and the gender components often become tokenistic in practice. While development theorists and practitioners have often been in the forefront of criticism of the alleged ‘trickle-down effects’ of economic improvements, frequently that is still the implicit assumption in practical engagements with recipients, especially apropos changing gender relations.

Combating violence against women has been continuously revealed as a complex and dispiriting task. The hundreds of reports and analyses on violence against women that have been generated over the past ten years are disturbing and depressing. They do not suggest that much change has been made in the prevalence of violence in any country since Beijing 1995 when it was internationally recognised as a problem facing women in all countries. In PNG the dimensions of the problem have not been systematically reassessed since the Law Reform Commission studies of the 1980s, although the report prepared by Bradley (2001; see also Garap n.d.) suggests that there has been no diminution of the problem in the intervening years and that in some areas of the country the situation is now even worse.

**Anti-violence campaigns and the problem of empowerment**

The situations in the two Pacific countries that I am most familiar with, PNG and the Solomon Islands, present innumerable implementation problems for campaigns to combat violence, not least because so many have been tried with such limited success. Let me illustrate this problem from my own experiences. Between 1999 and 2002 I was involved in Phase Three of the AusAID project with the Royal Papua New Guinean Constabulary. This phase, like its predecessors, had a well-developed gender component that included attention to gender equity within the police force; training in human rights and gender; attention to the needs of women and children in developing and implementing community-policing policies; and specific projects on the treatment of female victims of sexual offences and violent crimes, including domestic violence. The advisors

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4 The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW) based in Washington DC has an extensive database of studies undertaken by them for other international agencies including the United Nations. Online: http://www.icrw.org/what-we-do/violence-against-women, accessed 12 January 2011.
working on other aspects of the project were generally sensitive to the need for women’s issues to be raised in other contexts—such as discriminatory practices in promotion, disciplinary procedures and responses to crime.

Working on community policing issues meant that there were meetings with people, mostly in urban centres, throughout the country. The consultations with women in villages and urban communities invariably generated heated discussions about the problems they faced—in their homes, in villages, in urban areas—from their kinsmen, strangers and police. In every meeting I was struck by the fact that women were both insightful and eloquent in their analyses of social problems and the reasons for violence and crime in their communities. The interconnections between poverty, unemployment, lack of opportunity, inadequate government services, corruption and incompetence were drawn repeatedly.

Most women I know who have worked with Papua New Guinean women leave the experience with deep respect for them. I have inevitably felt privileged to work with women whose intelligence, warmth, resilience and humour is invested in a project even when they are faced with opposition and inadequate resources. In such contexts women emerge as capable, resourceful and powerful. In terms of their ‘power to’ accomplish things, women regularly display their capacity to make decisions and to act upon them. I have encountered many women who have been forceful and assertive in their dealings with others and have been surprised when the projects they have been involved with have petered out once external funding or support is finished. Sometimes the reasons are simply financial. But there are numerous instances where the demise of a project is attributable to internal dissension and/or conflicts with people in the community who resent the women’s power (Macintyre 2003).

In a discussion of the ‘gender agenda’ Emma Crewe and Elizabeth Harrison (2002: 49–68) observe that ‘“the power to” dimension fails to take account of what has been excluded from the observable decision-making process – that is, the way that institutional factors may succeed in excluding certain issues’ (p. 53). In many instances, including ones that they note, the ways that women enact their power to act precipitate conflict with those who (quite correctly) perceive this as an infringement on their power over the women concerned. Often, but not always, these people are men.

Let me illustrate with three examples. On Lihir, the descent system is matrilineal and rights over land are transmitted through the matriline. There is really no dispute about women’s rights in land and in negotiations with the mining company about land agreements men would regularly refer to their

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5 I worked on Lihir in New Ireland Province, monitoring the social impact of a gold mining project from 1995 to 2005.
'matrilineal system’. But women did not usually represent their own interests in public forums. Given that the negotiations with the mining company had no 'traditional' precedent and were carried out in accordance with the government regulations in the *Mining Act*, three prominent and highly-educated women attended a meeting and claimed their right to be involved in negotiations on the basis of their equal rights as citizens and their traditional rights as landowners. They spoke eloquently and vehemently. During this meeting the men (who outnumbered them three to one) were enraged by the women’s speeches and dismissed their arguments as ‘against custom’. The demeanour of the men present, especially the two most powerful leaders, was itself a display of power—they did not look at the women, some ostentatiously turned their faces away and they maintained wide-eyed, tight-lipped expressions of barely-contained fury. Shortly afterwards the landowners’ association insisted that there would be attention given to the needs of women and youth, but that women did not have the right to speak in the ways that these women had done. Such rights had to be *conferred* on one representative by the men who were in authority. The women incurred widespread disapproval from others in the community because they were behaving in ways that affronted *kastam* (tradition/custom). Many women I spoke with about the issue agreed with the arguments that the women had made but condemned them as *bikhet* (TP: arrogant, disrespectful), insisting that they should not have confronted men in this way. The women were effectively ‘put in their place’ and the only avenues for presenting their opinions once again restricted to the informal and personal domains where they could be ignored.

During my involvement with the AusAID police project as an advisor, one of the community policing advisors had assisted in setting up a system of dealing with women who were victims of domestic violence and sexual assault. His counterparts were policewomen and they had worked out a sequence of attending to the needs of the women in cooperation with the medical staff of the hospital and the local women’s organisation that provided aid and support for women. As part of the program, the project vehicle (funded by AusAID) was designated for community policing work, particularly for use by policewomen to take victims of violence to the hospital and the women’s centre. The policewomen had gained their vehicle licences—skills that were part of the capacity-building and gender-equity components of the overall project. The improvement of services and institutional responses to female victims of violence is regularly presented as a crucial part of programs aimed at combating domestic violence and sexual crime. This small program in a provincial town was highly successful and built up cooperative links between police, medical staff and the women’s group.
As soon as the male AusAID advisor left, the male senior officer at the police station commandeered the vehicle and prohibited the women's use of it. Cars, especially new ones, are symbols of male status and the man appealed to his superior rank. If the women resisted they would be guilty of insubordination. The response program fell apart—the time involved in walking to the hospital was considerable. Women who were battered did not like being seen walking through the town with police officers. In short, all the hard work of consultation, cooperative program development, capacity building and teamwork that had been part of the ‘gender agenda’ of this project was stymied by the senior men at the police station. These same men had attended the gender training programs, endorsed the strategies, could speak eloquently about the problems of violence against women in their region and acknowledged the need to develop a coordinated response. But they could not tolerate the affront to their status by having women drive around in a new vehicle and so were prepared to scuttle the whole program in order to retain their masculine privileges and enforce them in terms of the ‘chain of command’.

My final example suggests too that at an interpersonal level ‘empowerment’ through gaining knowledge and awareness of rights and capacities can be hazardous when men realise the implications for their authority. At a two-day workshop on domestic violence held in Port Moresby in 2002 as part of the community policing program, a group of women in public life discussed their experiences. The majority of them were highly educated and had senior positions in government departments or private industry. Of a group of twenty, only two indicated that they had never experienced violence from an intimate partner and several told harrowing stories of abuse resulting in severe injuries. One woman, a government employee, went home on the first day and informed her husband that she was now aware of her rights and would not tolerate his violence in future. He beat her and she appeared the next day with her face and arm bruised. Her experience generated an intense discussion of the ways that being educated and employed was perceived as threatening the status and authority of husbands—especially those whose education level was lower, or whose educational achievements less illustrious, or those who were unemployed or in a lower-ranked job than their partner. Resentment and hostility towards women who were thus branded as bikhet were apparently often expressed in violence—in one instance when the woman was sleeping.

This sort of reaction by men towards ‘elite women’ has been well documented by Laura Zimmer-Tamakoshi (1990, 1993, 1997) and Bradley (2001). It suggests strongly that in PNG education for women is not especially protective in the ways that are suggested in the MDG Taskforce volume (Grown, Rao Gupta and Kes 2005). This is not to suggest that it should not be an objective for improving women’s status, but that empowering women in this way might actually in PNG
be viewed as ‘disempowering’ men and so provoke violence. Indeed, while my own research in this area is limited, interviews with 160 educated women employed in the public sector and by mining companies reveals that a significant proportion either divorce or choose to remain single precisely because they find that men often perceive them as threatening and legitimate targets for violence (Macintyre 2011; see also Spark 2011). In the words of one woman:

I would marry if I found someone who was happy to let me follow my career, but here I am a manager of my section and that automatically means I am gossiped about as a bikhet. I have big difficulties with other men in [organisation] who are in lower-paid work. Other [male] managers try to ignore me in meetings. One actually told me that if I was his wife he would never let me stay in such a job (40-year-old woman in business enterprise, Port Moresby).

Empowerment has always seemed to me to be a very problematic concept. First, because the word itself suggests that power is somehow there to be given. Or even when it is used to refer to the process whereby women become aware of their own power, or capacity to change their lives, there is a lack of content to the concept—where does this power come from? In the aid context it carries overtones of donors conferring power and authority on recipients. In PNG ‘empowering women’ often means wresting power from men so that women might represent their own interests. As the cases above illustrate, this process generates conflict with men who correctly interpret it as an assault on privilege and a denial of their authority over women. Although male resistance to such changes are sometimes included as ‘risk factors’ in project designs, consultants are considered to be failing if they suggest that antagonism from men is inevitable and that this ‘risk’ is not only unavoidable, but will confound the strategy of empowering women. It is as if acknowledging the possibility will miraculously produce an efficacious solution. Or, as Crewe and Harrison conclude: ‘Those using “empowerment” as a development objective seldom take on board the political implication – that is, that conflict is accompanied by resistance, and the process of empowerment is not necessarily “win-win”’ (1998: 53). In PNG men regularly perceive women’s empowerment as a situation in which women win and men lose—and they find this intolerable.

Looking at men and change

Richard Eve’s report on violence for Caritas (2006) is indubitably the most thorough analysis of the current situation in PNG, but as he notes: ‘It is not easy to know whether Susan Toft’s speculation [that modernity and its implications for female resistance would mean an increase in violence] has proved correct,
since … nation-wide data on domestic violence over a long period of time is simply not available’ (Eves 2006: 32). However his research interviews revealed very similar views to those I have encountered. Service providers in health and welfare believed that violence was increasing in both incidence and severity (Eves 2006: 36). Women reported new forms and contexts for domestic violence. While many attribute violence to poverty, alcohol consumption and the frustrations arising from unfulfilled desires for employment, economic security and opportunities for advancement, the idea that violence against women is a ‘modern’ phenomenon arising from contradictions in everyday life is hotly contested. But Toft’s (1995a) prediction that resistance from women who become sufficiently ‘empowered’ to reject male violence will actually meet with hostility and greater violence often does seem to be fulfilled. Holly Wardlow’s work in the PNG Highlands (Wardlow 2006), Zimmer-Tamakoshi’s in both rural and urban settings (Zimmer-Tamakoshi 1993, 1997) and the many regional case-studies that have been published (see Counts, Brown and Campbell 1999) include numerous instances where greater awareness by women of their rights does indeed lead to resistance—but often this provokes greater violence from men.

Given that the emphasis on women’s empowerment as a way of reducing the prevalence of violence seems a hazardous strategy in the case of PNG, are there ways of confronting the problem head-on? Richard Eves’ conclusions suggest that shifting the focus of interventionist programs from women to men is essential. But he also envisages that this is problematic not only because of the lack of resources, but because programs directed at changing men’s attitudes have been most successful when they are small and enable men to be open about their experiences, attitudes and violent behaviour, making mass campaigns extremely problematic in PNG:

The general consensus in the literature on anti-violence interventions among men suggests that addressing men’s violence against women is accomplished more effectively with male facilitators in all-male groups (Berkowitz 2004a: 4). Experience from overseas has found there is a general reluctance by men and women to broach issues of gender-based violence in mixed settings. This is especially the case with sexual violence, such as rape, which men are less likely to acknowledge as a serious issue in mixed workshops (Eves 2006: 60).

Working with all-male groups of police, I found that men were often prepared to be disarmingly honest about their actions and attitudes to violence. Sometimes this openness was extremely disturbing. On several occasions men who could give excellent summaries of the human rights of women and their rights under the law (indicating that they had clearly understood the content of the training module) would conclude with comments such as:
But these laws and ways of thinking will never become popular (a term used in PNG to mean widespread or commonly accepted) because men do not believe these things are true about PNG women. They work for Australians, but not for us.

And

It will be fifty years before men in Papua New Guinea accept that women should not be hit – maybe a hundred.

Eves’ report suggests that such problems in adapting ‘awareness’ to the local situation occur frequently (2006: 62; see also Ch. 6).

The ideal of empowering women—ensuring that they gain awareness of their rights; enabling them to take action in their own interests; supporting them to develop institutions that provide support, advocacy and assistance, all entail disempowering men. These objectives require strategies for reducing or removing their power over women’s bodies; disallowing their use of force to pursue their own interests; removing customary or accepted rights to services provided by women; taking from men the rights and powers that entitle them to discipline and punish those whom they see as their social inferiors; and enabling women to participate in domains of power that men consider exclusively theirs. Moreover, men are alert to the implications for their authority if women’s rights are protected by the state and as John Taylor has indicated in his work on Vanuatu (Taylor 2008), they are prepared to defend their privileges as customary rights. Even if there are people in government who support such social, economic and cultural changes, the task cannot easily be represented as inspired by the favoured ‘bottom-up’ approach to aid that is universally supported. It is one that divides people, especially men and women.

**Violence and ideas of administering justice**

All analyses of violence against women observe the multi-dimensional character of the problem. All acknowledge that the most important task is changing the values and power dynamics that are the environment for violence. This understanding underpins the AusAID gender policies that aim for the integration of gender into all aid projects. On the other hand, there is a constant call by critics of development for all projects to accommodate the cultural and social values of the recipient countries and societies. This is the sort of ‘win/win’ optimism that is criticised by Crewe and Harrison (1998). In my opinion,
campaigns aimed at combating violence against women will fail as long as they do not confront the fact that such programs have to challenge some of the social values and cultural norms that are currently central to power relations in PNG.6

One of these programs has been the AusAID Law and Justice project—which has in many respects been very successful, especially in terms of capacity building and institutional change. Within that project considerable emphasis has been placed on the need to recognise traditional, negotiated forms of justice and dispute settlement. This attention to systems—that are familiar and appeal to customs that are accepted by people as legitimate and fair—is favoured by many Papua New Guineans as well as aid project advisors from Australia and elsewhere (see for example, ACFID: 2010). Most writers on the subject make an exception for cases of violence against women and children, stressing the need for a criminal justice approach that protects the victims and punishes the perpetrators.

This attention to criminalising gender violence is in keeping with ideals about having people ‘own the project’ and implementing international approaches to combating violence against women and children. There is a large body of literature that argues for improvements in police responses to violence; for the establishment of legal aid programs for women who have been assaulted; and for the training of magistrates and judges so that they apply the full force of the law and give sentences that indicate the criminal status of domestic violence. The arguments for restorative approaches come from a different perspective—one which locates problems in the ways that social attitudes diminish the significance of such violence—arguing that domestic violence is contextually different and that imprisoning or punishing men is socially disruptive. In some countries, especially those where ‘honour killing’ is socially accepted, courts regularly trivialise the suffering and deaths of women (see Ch. 5). But you cannot have it both ways and excepting some forms of violence against people as criminal while dealing with others as minor offences leads back to discriminatory practices.

In PNG the role of the police and the law and justice sector in dealing with domestic violence and sexual offences has been consistently criticised (see Ch. 7; Zorn 2010). At the same time the Australian aid programs aimed at improving their performance and reducing law and order problems generally have given much attention to restorative rather than retributive justice as the most desirable and culturally appropriate way of reducing crime and unrest. These

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6 For a discussion of this problem as manifest in Vanuatu see Miranda Forsyth 2009; Merry 2006 includes a discussion of this as a general issue in nations where there are dual or multiple systems of administering justice. See Jolly (2011) for a review of Forsyth and the specific problem of gender violence.
approaches stress the need to restore and sustain strong social relations in ways that maintain cohesion within communities. The relationship between husband and wife is recognised as one which is not unitary, involving kin on both sides.

But as Sinclair Dinnen (2002) and others associated with the Law and Justice Project have noted, the restorative justice ideals are in tension with analyses of the problems of female disadvantage and the relative lack of power that women have within Papua New Guinean communities as well as in the pursuit of justice. Qualifying his support for restorative justice, Dinnen writes:

Retributive justice will always remain an option for dealing with the most dangerous and intractable offenders. In addition, where there are significant imbalances in power between particular groups, as in the case of women appearing before Village Courts, ‘restoring’ relations may simply serve to reinforce these underlying inequities (2002: 11).

Restorative justice is often represented as the major way that pre-colonial Melanesian people administered justice within and between communities. This is a very partial and highly romanticised image that ignores the historical evidence for widespread tribal fighting (Knauff 2002: 89–156), extremely harsh punishments for crimes and often brutal treatment of women who breached social obligations (see for example Meggitt 1989). As I see it, a major problem in promoting customary forms of conflict resolution is that violence is often a socially-approved response to a grievance, affront or anti-social act. Corporal punishment of children is common in many communities and many people consider beating of a spouse acceptable in certain circumstances. On Lihir, in a study I carried out to see the circumstances in which people accepted or endorsed physical punishment by parents, spouses, police or senior men, I interviewed sixty women and forty men. I listed numerous scenarios: six in which I had observed a parent hit a child (all involving disobedience such as playing truant, or anti-social behaviour such as damaging a fruit tree); one when an older man beat a youth (for stealing betel nut from his basket); several when husbands had hit their wives for failing in their domestic duties and one instance when a woman hit her husband because he had been unfaithful to her. The overwhelming majority considered violence justified in all of the instances I had described. Only two women and one man regarded any of the violent acts as inappropriate or morally reprehensible.

In a similar exercise with a group of police women, discussing occasions when they had resorted to violence in their personal lives, the overwhelming majority affirmed that hitting a woman who was the lover of one’s husband or boyfriend was justified and acceptable, as was assaulting the offending husband. In
fact, many women who had been beaten by husbands suspicious of adultery indicated that their distress was due to the fact that they were innocent rather than the violence itself.

Abby McLeod observes ‘violence is also one of many remedies that may be legitimately employed in response to grievance’ (2002: 11). James Weiner, in the same paper, describes the ways that failure to resolve conflicts within a group often resulted in a rupture of sociality and refusal to compromise: ‘in the Foi social world, it is all or nothing. A quarrel, over property, over adultery, over sorcery accusation, inevitably leads to the departure of one of the disputing parties to another place, especially if powerful men are involved’ (Weiner, McLeod and Charles Yala, 2002: 2).

Such uncompromising responses are found in many Papua New Guinean communities where loss of face or public ‘defeat’ are viewed as intolerable. Most anthropologists who work in villages can give numerous instances where tensions between groups intensify to the point where accusations of sorcery and open arguments reach a point where one group is forced to relocate. Many such stories are attached to historical settlement patterns and land tenure systems. But discussions of restorative justice tend to ignore this long tradition of confrontation, conflict and community fission.

This all-or-nothing approach to conflict resolution is often linked to ideals of masculinity, and uncompromising or vindictive reactions to misfortunes or thwarted desires have been well-documented by anthropologists in a wide range of circumstances. The claim that ‘restorative justice’ was, or continues to be, the primary resort in village conflicts involving violence is not borne out by either historical or contemporary evidence. Wardlow’s essay on the Huli concept madane (2005: 57–71) explores the gender implications of violent reactions of men who feel humiliated, envious or resentful because their ‘sense of entitlement to something is dashed by another person’s refusal to abide by a promise or presumed obligation’ (p. 57). Madane thus explains (and is used to justify) the murders of Huli women who attempted to divorce husbands without repaying bride wealth, and of prostitutes who refused sex with ‘rural, unemployed men’ (p. 57) who could not pay them.

While Wardlow confines her argument to the Huli people, the emotional state and the types of violent behaviour it engenders are widespread in PNG. The Tok Pisin terms that I have most often heard for these are jelas (jealousy, resentment) and bel hat (anger, rage). While these emotions and actions are not confined to men, in discussions of violence and emotions a marked gender difference emerged. When men express resentment in violent rages or destructive acts, people were far more likely to interpret these as ‘righteous indignation’ and ‘justifiable violence’. When women behaved in analogous ways the emotion
and the violence was viewed more often as a sign of immature loss of control, undignified and inappropriate (see Ch. 5). Physical fights between women in public places that I have witnessed invariably drew onlookers who expressed amusement and ridicule at the spectacle, whereas assaults on women by men or fights between men did not. In one instance in 2001 when I observed a man assaulting a woman near Goroka market I asked two women standing near me to assist me in trying to help the woman; they refused on the grounds that the violence was so ferocious that the woman ‘must have done something really bad’. In village meetings associated with the police project, both men and women regularly explained their refusal to intervene in cases of domestic violence because the man ‘must have a reason’. Such responses indicate that there is a continuing belief that violence is justifiable in specific circumstances.

Zimmer-Tamakoshi, in her analysis of violence against women and rape as punitive (1993), elaborates the variety of ways that men justify assault, rape and pack rape in terms of righteous rage following rejection, insult or humiliation by a woman. In the contemporary case studies she includes and the historical examples she draws upon, she demonstrates that ‘violence against women has long been accepted in many PNG societies as a legitimate means of controlling women and expressing or affecting men’s relations with other men’ (2001: 574, emphasis added). It is this socially endorsed legitimacy that presents problems for all campaigns aimed at combating violence against women. For it is not only the legitimacy of violence that has to be questioned and rejected, but the deep-seated beliefs about gender relations on which such legitimacy rests. The research conducted in rural and urban areas as part of the Law Reform Commission studies of domestic violence in the 1980s revealed not only its prevalence, but the widespread acceptance of violence by both men and women. There is no evidence that this has dramatically changed in the last two decades in spite of successive campaigns that have attempted to combat the ideology of female inferiority and male entitlement that underpins community acceptance.

Within the police force, where ‘awareness’ levels are very high, police remain reluctant to prosecute and ambivalent about the criminality of intimate partner violence. Awareness as an aim in itself ignores the fact that this might not actually alter ingrained cultural attitudes. In workshops on gender and human rights that I conducted, the level of awareness and the knowledge of the law that police officers displayed was generally very high. I cannot think of one instance where a police officer did not describe a hypothetical case of domestic violence as anything but ‘criminal’ or ‘illegal’. Yet the majority confessed that when they were confronted by a woman wanting to lay a complaint they would first of all ‘counsel’ her. As police were not trained to counsel, nor encouraged to mediate between victims and assailants in any context, I invited participants to explain and discuss this strategy. Several explanations were offered. Women
were notorious for withdrawing charges or failing to attend court proceedings and police bitterly resented the waste of time and energy they expended in prosecuting to no purpose. In some areas where women’s families customarily demanded compensation for injury, women would come and report the crime in order to have leverage in compensation negotiations and once a payment had been made, would withdraw the charge or refuse to follow through—a tactic that was common in rape cases as well (see Forsyth 2009 for an analysis of the ways that people choose a judicial forum strategically). In some instances women did not want charges laid at all—their trip to the police station was simply in order to publicly declare a grievance and so ‘shame’ assailants. Once police felt able to air their feelings of frustration, the complexity of their responses emerged clearly. Often they were horrified at the injuries inflicted and so tried very hard to collect medical evidence and witnesses. Some were eager to show that they were enforcing the law diligently. But in almost every meeting where the subject came up, police recounted stories of women who repeatedly laid charges and then refused to follow through. These were the cases where police chose to ‘counsel’, a response which apparently involved giving a sympathetic hearing, driving the woman to the hospital when this was necessary and/or encouraging her to go and stay with relatives until the man ‘cooled down’. A few policemen admitted to sending such women away, dismissing their complaints as ‘humbug’.

Discussions with hospital staff about treatment of victims of rape and sexual assault revealed that they too were sometimes reluctant to respond in the ways that would assist in providing forensic evidence for criminal prosecutions. In some instances their reluctance was attributable to ‘compassion fatigue’ as some victims came in repeatedly and yet would take no action against perpetrators. Two nurses explained that they always tried to be sympathetic and supportive but were very conscious of the shame women felt at the prospect of having their injuries made public. They recounted stories about women who had been sexually assaulted in ways that damaged their genitals or caused internal injury and said that they sympathised with the women’s reluctance to have details of their injuries presented in court. They were personally appalled at the idea of photographing injuries or collecting forensic evidence from victims.

I have set down these instances from my own experience in order to expose some of the ‘on-the-ground’ difficulties posed by apparently sensible programs aimed at improving police response and improving medical treatment and the collection of evidence so that prosecutions are more robust. On the face of it, such suggestions appear sensible and relatively easy to implement. Establishing standard procedures for medical treatment, counselling and collection of

7 This term, now archaic in Standard English, is used by Papua New Guineans when speaking English and Tok Pisin.
evidence in rape or assault cases at hospitals appears an unremarkable objective. Discussions with relevant people in the Health Department and at various clinics raised no objections and the mood of such meetings suggested full commitment. Yet repeatedly such strategies foundered in practice. The reasons for failure are complex, but at base there is often an acceptance of violence as a justifiable response to behaviour that is considered intolerable. In PNG this allows men to view rape as a justifiable ‘punishment’ for women whom they consider immoral and for men to assault wives who fail to fulfil marital or domestic responsibilities.8

The really difficult task in PNG is therefore similar to that in most countries, one which UNIFEM has described as ‘revers[ing] ingrained cultural attitudes to violence against women’ (Heyzer 1998: 20). The methods that are usually advocated for effecting this transformation include: ‘Media campaigns, radio programs, films, and videos, as well as symbolic “tribunals” featuring personal testimonies of women survivors of violence’ (Heyzer 1998: 20). All of these methods have been used in PNG over the past twenty years. Street theatre groups in several major towns, posters, educational programs in villages, awareness programs through women’s organisations, training seminars through aid programs and churches have attempted to alter public attitudes and to bring messages about human rights to the ‘grassroots’ as well as in government departments. Some have failed because they have employed culturally inappropriate images (Eves 2006: 55 and Appendix 9: #88); often the messages are interpreted in ways that are not intended (Macpherson 2008), or even reinforce prevailing notions of masculinity and its entitlements. Eves’ study includes several examples where men completely ‘misread’ a poster. One policewoman told me of a village meeting where men were given a pamphlet that included an image of a man beating a woman and asked to comment on its message. The first four responses were all speculations about the behaviour of the woman that must have provoked the attack and the dominant interpretation was that ‘this is a picture of a man who is beating his wife because she must have been unfaithful.’

Many people believe that violence against women is increasing in PNG. In the absence of clear data that demonstrates this, one must retreat to the position that even if it were not, it is still at unacceptably high levels and substantial elements of the population still do not see it as either criminal or breaching women’s human rights. This leads us back to the problems posed by the Millennium Development Goal of women’s empowerment and the problem of how to combat violence against women. To date, many of the programs have been directed at

8 Notions of ‘immoral’ behaviour include failure to defer to men, being single, walking alone, speaking with men who are not relatives and wearing fashionable western clothing or make-up. Any of these things can be interpreted as displaying sexual availability. Within marriage, women reported that refusing sex and failure to have a meal prepared were common excuses for assault (see also Eves 2006: 24; and Spark 2011).
women. They do not have the political or social power to change the behaviour of men. Men are apparently not going to relinquish this power on the basis of arguments put to them about women’s rights, especially by women or foreign aid workers. As Eves (2006) and Michael Flood (2002–2003) have argued convincingly, men do not respond well to programs aimed at changing their behaviour when these are forced upon them by law (and one could add, by foreigners through aid programs). Awareness programs do not work well in PNG when men and women are in groups together. To date, most programs aimed at combating domestic violence have been conducted with women as the prime focus for awareness education and directed towards men in similar terms, that is with a view to establishing knowledge about women’s rights. There is obviously a need to rethink the assumptions behind this approach.

In exploring the problems specific to PNG, I have concentrated on what I perceive to be major obstacles and blind spots in the development of programs. This is not because I have in mind a fully-developed alternative approach, but because I think that the sorts of changes that need to occur will not really be effected by projects that are specifically focused on violence. Most writers who have tried to come to grips with the problem have regretfully concluded that change will be gradual and slow. Considering what might hasten progress or alter the gender inequalities that underpin violence, I think that the MDGs aimed at empowering women more generally necessarily have to precede campaigns that aim to combat violence.

If we re-examine the ‘strategic priorities’ outlined by the taskforce, then it is clear that if they were to be implemented in PNG they would have to be programs that were not ‘mainstreamed’ in broader projects, but were specifically designed to improve the lives of women. Mainstreaming, as Lewis (2006) has pointed out in his discussion of women and AIDS in Africa, does not work. It is a way of reducing costs that has been dressed up in the ideological language of egalitarianism. This would in some instances mean that the ‘community’ had to wait until women’s situation was materially changed. In the area of post-primary education for example, it would require that positive discrimination measures were introduced in order to rapidly increase the numbers of women involved. In health, it would require changes in the policies whereby cuts keep being made to services and recruitment, training and infrastructure. Programs aimed at reducing women’s workload, such as water supplies at village level, would have to be privileged over major works such as road building. Altering employment rates and salary differentials in women’s favour would require really dramatic changes in the formal and informal systems that prevail in the public service and would also entail specialised training programs.
Affirmative action programs have been controversial in developed countries. I believe that they would encounter considerable opposition in PNG as they would not only challenge current male prerogatives but disrupt established patterns of male patronage based on nepotism, political patronage and wantokism (from the TP word wantok, meaning relative, person who speaks the same language, compatriot—thus favouritism for one’s own kind). In short, the goals are probably unrealistic and do not fit easily into the current development goals of donor nations or the PNG government. They would almost certainly be opposed vehemently by neo-liberals who remain firmly committed to the view that foreign investment and privatisation will ensure economic growth and that this will have ‘trickle-down’ effects that eventually benefit women. Neo-liberals support the MDG strategy that would ‘guarantee women’s and girls’ property and inheritance rights’ as this would provide a means for introducing legislation privatising land. In the current climate, such legislation quite possibly could deprive women of the customary rights they already have in land and benefit men who are better placed to negotiate the formal legal system and register their titles. For, as revealed in the Lihir case, the ways that men dominate discussions over compensation for land in mining negotiations effectively exclude women.
and deprive them of their rights as citizens. Technically, the law requires equal recognition of women's rights of negotiation, but in practice men 'represent' them in contractual negotiations (see Macintyre 2007). The massive changes required would have to occur in concert to ensure that the desired relationship between the envisaged political gains was attained.

The bureaucratic solution: Monitor, audit, evaluate

The policy and discussion documents that construct the MDGs do acknowledge the massive dimensions of the task, but rather than dealing with problems of inertia, opposition and even obstruction that might occur in developing countries, they posit technocratic and bureaucratic solutions. These, I think, will make the task even more difficult in PNG, where there is already hostility towards forms of tied aid, to the constraints and bureaucratic reporting requirements by aid donors and to the notions of 'accountability' that are attached increasingly to funding. In identifying 'indicators' and quantitative measurement of the success (or otherwise) of aid interventions aimed at achieving the MDGs, the problems of designing, monitoring and evaluating projects will be dramatically increased. In the case of PNG, the lack of data that could provide baselines for the measurement of aid program success means that major research projects would have to precede any project. As all researchers into violence against women in PNG have noted, there is a dearth of reliable information on prevalence, regional variation and demographic factors.

At the conference devoted to the issue of gender indicators and the MDGs discussed above, I outlined the problems involved in accepting the indicator for achievement of the goal of 'combating violence against women' as a reduction in prevalence (Macintyre 2006). The research required to establish a base-line for prevalence would be costly, time-consuming and constitute an invasion of privacy. The difficulties encountered in East Timor by the research team (Hynes et al. 2003) engaged in a similar exercise there in 2002 would be compounded in Papua New Guinea. In an era where aid projects are increasingly evaluated in economic terms, the need for thorough research that underpins any project and informs monitoring, evaluation and assessment of its success has finally been recognised. The time and cost involved in getting the sorts of data that allow for such robust and consistent analysis have not.

The criticism of aid programs has escalated. Donor agencies, recipient governments and institutions, development economists and academics have all decried the failure of aid from various perspectives. AusAID is regularly berated for giving 'boomerang aid' (e.g. Aid Watch Website) whereby much of the
funding is allotted to the Australian companies who manage projects, or provide services, expert personnel and equipment. Sensitive to such criticisms, eager to demonstrate the success of aid programs and caught up in neo-liberal economic debates about efficiency and effectiveness at the cheapest possible rate, donor governments have increasingly embraced the managerial, corporatist ‘solutions’: they spend a great deal of money on public relations, generate glossy reports and websites so that the ‘taxpayer’ can see that money is being judiciously spent and audited.

Two of the major consequences have been the increased emphasis on measurement and on principles of economic efficiency and effectiveness. There are requirements of ‘accountability’, ‘transparency’ and outcome measurements that are similar to those imposed on business corporations. Increasingly, projects are required to produce reports that document, measure, evaluate, account for and justify the successes and failures of a project. This is a highly regarded activity by donor agencies as it is thought to provide proof of responsible use of taxpayers’ money or supporters’ donations and to justify policies and programs by demonstrating their economy.

In Australia (and in many other rich nations), this turn in policy has coincided with ‘outsourcing’ of aid projects to commercial companies who tender for contracts to deliver the services that are designated under the project agreement with the recipient government agencies. AusAID is therefore the agency that oversees contracts and manages them so that they achieve the goals that have been precisely described in the designs and log-frames that set out the details of a particular project. The processes ensure that an enormous proportion of the budget and time is expended on reporting to AusAID on progress and achievements. Obviously, as the commercial contractors have to maintain their reputations and demonstrate their efficiency, reporting is mainly concerned with showing compliance with the contract and timely presentation of the ‘deliverables’. In the case of awareness programs about gender violence, delivery of information and some form of recipient response that illustrates that the message has been received and understood is really all that can be expected.

Advocacy groups and NGOs such as Aid Watch rail against the Australian government programs for simply lining the pockets of consultants and enriching the companies who employ them, as a substantial amount of the cost of a project returns to Australia. This is certainly a matter of concern, but it also means that they carry the burden of accountability in the form of endless reports. In one project that I was involved with, I estimate that about 60 per cent of my time was spent reporting on what I had done. In another project, which entailed meetings and consultations with the intended recipients of the aid project, the proportion of time was similar. But as the travel and meetings had been set up
by AusAID to fill eight hours of each day, this meant that the four consultants had to then work until midnight in order to write up the material collected and develop the design of the project so that it reflected the consultations conducted.

In PNG the donors’ imposition of these requirements generates great tensions, first, because the doctrines of accountability in the forms of reports, acquittals and completed log-frames are non-negotiable. They are, and are recognised as, displays of bureaucratic mistrust in the competence and reliability of the people working on the project—both the consultants and the Papua New Guineans. They are effectively the donor government’s enactment of their power in the relationship and of their distrust in the recipient’s capacity to do what the donor wants. Second, they are resented because they demand familiarity with the arcane language of managerialism and so have to be written by the foreign consultants (or advisors) engaged. In short, the Papua New Guineans often feel suspicious of the reporting requirements that effectively silence their participation, contributions and evaluations. This resentment is compounded by the fact that it departs so dramatically from the rhetoric of partnership, participation, ‘ownership’, ‘capacity building’ and ‘institutional strengthening’ that accompanies the negotiations between donor and recipient in the initial stages of any aid project. The experience for all concerned is more often that of working within an alienating hierarchy in which the donor agency is the unseen overseer, the advisors are their agents and the Papua New Guinean ‘counterparts’ their dependent and untrustworthy recipients of aid that is designed and executed by foreigners.

The underlying rationale is economic. Ultimately, each aid project has to prove that the expenditure has been worthwhile and that it has achieved the goals that were defined in the initial framework. This seems unexceptionable. But when confronted by a goal such as ‘Reduce the prevalence of violence against women’, most people familiar with the problem would baulk at the task. I have become convinced that ‘awareness’ and educational projects aimed at women are, or should be, a minor component in the struggle to ‘combat violence against women’. It is not because I think there are no ways that this can occur—but because I believe that scrutiny of the numerous studies of such anti-violence awareness programs will reveal that continuing to promote programs explicitly aimed at such goals are unlikely to succeed.

The transformation of social and cultural values occurs in ways that are indirect and often tangential to the specific value privileged. Perhaps the best illustration of this is population control. For decades aid programs attempted to reduce population growth by directing campaigns at women. Family planning, contraception, advocating and providing safe abortion and improving access to services were the main ways that women in developing counties were encouraged to manage fertility and reproduction. These programs had limited success and
it was discovered that improving girls’ access to education had more dramatic effects. But improved economic circumstances and employment opportunities have had an even greater impact on population growth (Sen 1990). In India, the current economic ‘boom’ has apparently resulted in a discernible drop in the birth rate. I draw attention to this not because it provides an obvious template for changing rates of violence against women (although that might well be the case) but to suggest that ‘empowering women’ economically is much more likely to have positive effects on their autonomy than educating them about their rights. For, while domestic violence occurs across classes in all societies, prevalence is higher in poorer groups. Poverty remains one of the major reasons why women remain in violent relationships because women perceive, quite accurately, that they will be economically worse-off if they abandon a relationship.

Monitoring, auditing and measuring the effects of aid programs will not improve outcomes, mainly because these processes become ends in themselves. By definition they have to be processes required by the donor agency, so they reassert the unequal power relationship between donor and recipient: accountability becomes confused with accountancy. In 2000, the man who established Canada’s major international NGO (CUSO) and for many years was a force in the government aid agency (CIDA) Lewis Perinbaum, criticised this tendency, observing that the managerialist trend effectively stifled innovation and imagination: ‘Driven by the “donor-and-recipient” mentality, and trapped by monitoring and control mechanisms that generate bureaucracy instead of productivity and often impede development, CIDA is struggling against overwhelming odds’ (the Globe and Mail 2008: S12). A recent review of the Australian and Papua New Guinean aid relationship (AusAID 2010) pointed out failures in the ways projects have been implemented in PNG implying an awareness of such matters, but reaffirming the necessity of ‘[d]eveloping mechanisms to improve reporting, transparency and accountability’ (AusAID 2010: 55). While there are probably failures of accountability, the failure of projects aimed at reducing violence against women lies in the design of projects and the fact that ‘mainstreaming’ usually means tagging ‘gender’ (by which aid agencies usually mean ‘women’) onto other activities in which gender inequalities persist unchanged and unchallenged.

The Millennium Development Goals are aimed fundamentally at reducing poverty. Many of the strategies and policies are entirely consistent with this aim. But in the Western Pacific, where Australia is the major donor, the goals have become hijacked by neo-liberal economic rationalists and managerialists who lose sight of the goals as they impose more and more constraints on the ways that projects should operate. The ideal of ‘productivity’, of getting more for less, permeates the aid sector to the point where bureaucrats and others can refer to it as the ‘aid industry’ without a trace of irony. In the case of reducing
the prevalence of violence against women, the research required, the cooperative development of programs that will be effective, the systems of appropriate evaluation and the acceptance of these by Papua New Guinean men and women are going to cost a great deal of money.

As someone who is deeply committed to the ideals of aid being based on sound, thorough research and to the evaluation of projects as well as those of eliminating violence against women I am aware that some aspects of my arguments in this chapter might appear paradoxical or even contradictory. This is partly because I believe that many of the arguments for auditing and monitoring aid are just another way of reintroducing tied aid and of replacing humanist objectives with those of economic rationalism. Contracting aid services to agencies has resulted in the fragmentation of Australia’s overall aid strategy into distinct projects so that the integration of strategies aimed at improving women’s lives and reducing gender violence is nobody’s priority or responsibility. I also believe that the rhetoric of ‘win-win’ solutions to gender equality in PNG is cynical and ignorant (perhaps both). For women to gain equality in Papua New Guinea, men are going to have to relinquish privileges that are currently maintained by the threat of violence.

References


Gender Violence in Melanesia and the Problem of Millennium Development Goal No. 3


