

Chapter 2

Emulating Australia

Political Education

Tessie Lavau's curiosity was widely shared but seldom satisfied until 1962 when 'native leaders', including nominated members of the Legislative Council, asked to visit Australia to see how government worked.¹ Their interest delighted the officials who were planning to create an elected legislature: a tour might produce 'men who know what we are talking about when we ask them to consider further changes'. All official thinking accepted that Papua New Guineans must understand the workings of Australian government, not that Australians should understand Papua New Guinea society.

Selecting a party was tricky. Each district should send one person and David Fenbury (Secretary of the Administrator's Department) told DCs that the tourists must have 'the basic education or the native intelligence to absorb the lessons they will learn' about Australian institutions. They need not be election candidates but they must be 'the sort of people who would naturally be associated ... with any discussions about constitutional reform'. Fenbury — years ahead of his time — noted that 'use of the pronoun "him" is not intended to preclude consideration of females'. But this was mere rhetoric: no women were considered.

If gender was a barrier, opposition to the Administration was not. Antagonism — in moderation — might even attract favour.² *Kiap* Johnston was in two minds about Lukas Chauka of Mouk Village in Manus. Chauka was a kinsman of the soldier and 'cargo cult' leader Paliau Maloat, and served as Vice-President of Baluan Council in Manus. He was illiterate and spoke no English, but was fluent and self-assured in Tok Pisin.

He would not be afraid of speaking his mind in public and he has on several occasions shown that he can mix reasonably well with Europeans.

He did make 'radical statements' and sometimes denounced the Administration, 'but I don't believe that he believes the truth of these statements'. For United Nations visitors, he staged a play to dramatise how the missions and private enterprise 'wanted to do everything to help the natives but were prevented ... by the Administration'. Afterwards,

however, 'he was quite pleasant and adopted an entirely different attitude, blaming the sloth and ignorance of the people for their standard of living, etc.'

Shallow antagonism might be just the ticket. Chauka had surely been helpful; he was obviously intelligent, he had 'sound ideas' and he wanted progress for his people — but might he 'go to extremes'? He was related to Paliau Maloat, the charismatic ex-serviceman whose independent spirit and ideas worried officials. Chauka got the nod but most *kiaps* favoured men whose attitudes were well known. All were in their prime, with more than average exposure to government and missions. They all owed their selection to the patronage of a DC. Some were public servants or teachers. Bin Arawaki was visiting Port Moresby to observe the Legislative Council. Kup Ogut had a son at school in Queensland (and needed permission to visit him). Vin ToBaining quit to join the committee that was reforming the legislature.

The Touring Party

Papua	Address and District	Age	Occupation
Gabriel Ehava	Gulf	45	farmer and Ministerial Member
Robert Tabua	P&T Daru, Western	42	public servant [clerical]
Oala Oala Rarua	Konedobu, Central	34	teacher seconded to Administrator's Department
Leatani Baloiloi	Esa'ala, Milne Bay	36	public servant [interpreter]
Timaeus Sambubu	Saiho Hospital, Northern	40+	public servant [lab assistant]

New Guinea

Vin ToBaining	Vunamami, East New Britain	40+	farmer
Simogen Pita	District Office, Wewak	40+	farmer
Lukas Chauko	Baluan, Manus	43	villager
Paul Lapun	Mariga Village, Bougainville	36	farmer
Eritus Hitter	Lualul Village, Kavieng, New Ireland	37	agricultural field worker
Yakutung Saki	Finschhafen, Morobe	42	farmer
Stahl Mileng	Marup Village, Karkar, Madang	40	mission teacher
Bin Arawaki	Okuyufa Village, Eastern Highlands	35+	farmer
Kup Ogut	District Office, Mt Hagen, Western Highlands	40	entrepreneur
[none from Southern Highlands]			

The head of Information and Extension Services, L. R. Newby, led the group. Since travel was governed by rules for the Removal of Natives, Newby had to extract from the Director of Native Affairs 'a General Exemption under his Circular 53/63 of 17th April 1961, to permit the members of the party to proceed to Australia for special studies'.³ He and *kiap* P. J. Walsh then assembled the party for a fortnight's preparation, bought them warm clothes to cope with Canberra's chilly spring, and escorted them through Australia.

Their curriculum was decided by the Territories Minister himself.⁴ It was typical of Sir Paul Hasluck to supervise his officers in detail. In doing so, he revealed how limited was the constitutional change he expected.

I would not puzzle them at this stage with Federal problems ... and would keep them away from any State Parliament ...

Give concentrated attention to the Federal Parliament. What they want to learn is about —

- a elections
- b parties – the role of Government and Opposition
- c how the Parliament works – how it does things – and they need time with officers of the House to see how the business is prepared ...
- d they need to get the idea of argument according to rules
- e they need to learn from members how they look after their constituents
- f they need to see how joint parliamentary committees work
- g they need to learn how Cabinet works
- h they need to learn how Ministers work and the relationship between Ministers and their departments, leading to the role of the public service
- i they should spend a good deal of time seeing departments at work ...
- j they should appreciate, too, the working of the press gallery and the broadcasting system and the reason for the attendance of people in the public gallery.

Lest his officials miss the point, he added:

Costs can be cut, the joy-ride element reduced and the purpose of the visit better served if you concentrate the visit on Canberra. Consequently cancel all the planning you have done and work along the lines indicated above.

The members were given 10 shillings (approximately five dollars in today's terms) a day and clothing, but no one organised afternoon tea (the approved form of interracial socialising) before they left Port Moresby. Their days were devoted to instruction and their evenings to Australian films and discussions.

They spent 19 cool days in Canberra, then a planned town of 60,000 people that offered few distractions from daily briefings, visits to institutions and important people, and debriefing sessions. They met Prime Minister Menzies, the Leader and Deputy Leader

of the Opposition, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Assembly, the Knight-at-Arms and the Usher of the Black Rod, Hasluck himself, the Chief Electoral Officer, and many public servants. Their relaxation was no joyride either: the War Memorial, the American Embassy, the New Guinea Association, the Canberra Club and Rotary. They spent three days in the Snowy Mountains, an evening with the Queanbeyan Council, and a day with a shire council. They did no shopping. The Australia they saw was the Australia the Minister selected for them to see — and emulate.

Hasluck had little interest in party politics (see below) and his tour program was heavily weighted towards government, mainly the formal and even ritual elements of governing. What did they make of their crash course? Oala Oala-Rarua alone reported at length in writing, a guarded account that dwelt on matter-of-fact issues and which thanked the organisers. He was impressed by the ‘amount of money needed for the Parliament, the parliamentarians, the officers, clerks and typists, and all the people who work behind the scenes — the public servants’. He quoted Menzies’ lofty view of the Opposition — ‘It keeps me and my ministers on our toes’ — not an alternative government but a stimulant for those in office. He and his colleagues were startled by the oppositional role of parties and they thought the Territory ‘too immature’ for them. The relations between a minister and his department fascinated him. Only on the subject of the Senate did he criticise Australian practice, observing that its original function (a house of review) had been displaced (and devalued) by party politics.

Evidently the party had

- agreed to be selective in telling of their experiences and will, inter alia, mention:
- the importance of an opposition,
- the inevitability of parties and the risk of having too many,
- minister’s responsibility to parliament for his department’s actions,
- minister’s accountability to parliament,
- a member can be voted out of his seat, but only at elections,
- the Senate has been captured by party politics & is no longer a watchdog,
- [and] governmental operations similar at state and federal level.

Newby urged DCs to promote meetings, and required the tourists to convene discussions and report. A few obliged, including the ultra-reliable Lukas Chauka, who must have misheard the party line: instead of the agreed agenda, he exhorted his compatriots to work hard — just like Australians.⁵ Nowhere in Canberra did they see that ‘the State’ needed more to make it work than the observance of parliamentary rituals.

Hasluck’s Vision

The martinet who knew exactly what Papua New Guineans needed to know was Paul Hasluck, a patrician Liberal from Perth. Then in his fifties, he had been a journalist, a historian and a diplomat before he entered Parliament. He became minister in 1951 in a new Territories portfolio, which was separated from External Affairs and added the Northern Territory to Nauru and Papua and New Guinea.⁶ He was determined to master the issues and formulate policies himself. He abhorred the trappings of

a colonialism which he conflated with British practice. On his first visit to the territory, he was ‘revolted at the imitation of British colonial modes and manners’ by officials who imagined wrongly that ‘such was the way in which one ruled dependent peoples’.⁷ His revulsion embraced Administrator Colonel J. K. Murray, an agronomist by training — and a Labor Party appointee.⁸

Hasluck was fastidious about the language of policy and (in 1956) reminded his staff

not to use ‘native’ as a noun ... [T]here are undoubtedly many unpleasant associations ... and a suggestion of inferiority, and these terms are undoubtedly objectionable to maladjusted people like the Indians.⁹

Alas, the mind-set was more stubborn than the word. The Territory evolved from Papua and New Guinea into Papua-New Guinea and then shed the hyphen, but ‘Papuan or New Guinean’ was clumsy, so the people dangled semantically between an unacknowledged colonial past and an unspecified future. The future was unclear because Hasluck also eschewed ‘colony’ (which implied eventual independence) and preferred the less precise ‘territory’, which let him duck the question of destiny. ‘Self-determination’ was the slippery term used in discussing possible futures: a path that might lead to independence, or to incorporation into Australia, or to a status not yet invented.

Hasluck relished being ‘virtually the Premier and the whole of a state Cabinet’.¹⁰ A better description was that of the French statesman who likened him to an inspector-general. For a politician, Hasluck had little stomach for politics. He was lucky that his portfolio was in effect non-political, which might explain why he stayed in it for 12 years. Cabinet had scant interest in his work and the Labor Party exempted Territories issues from criticism. The journalist Peter Hastings exaggerated only slightly when he called Australian policy a ‘bipartisan meeting of closed minds’!¹¹ Hasluck belonged in the ‘progressive’ tradition that despised compromising politics and pinned its faith on technical expertise to achieve material advance. He was keen to deliver services, especially health and schools, and he was good at extracting government grants for them. He hectored the officers of his department and he kept a tight rein on Territory government in frequent visits and direct talks with the heads of its departments.¹² He saw himself as the most distinguished intellectual in Cabinet. In 1967, when Prime Minister Harold Holt drowned, Hasluck made his bid to be Prime Minister — by telling colleagues that he was available, and passively awaiting their judgment.¹³ Sir Paul ended his career as Governor-General, a position in which he ran a high risk of being ‘revolted at the imitation of British colonial modes and manners’.

Once he had appointed his own administrator (Cleland) and remade the department, he focused on the extension of government reach and the gradual spread of education. A decade later he was pursuing the same goals, which he restated in a public address in Port Moresby in 1960. He would not permit more elected members of the Legislative Council: there would be no more European elected members ‘until we could get native elected members’, and he wanted ‘increased native membership to be effective and not a sham’. For years it had been his policy ‘to prepare the native people’ for such

a role. But he was at pains to distinguish an enhanced role from real self-government. Before the Territory could become self-governing:

it has to see great social advances (i.e. changes in the way people live and in their relationships to one another and to the community at large). It has to see great economic changes so that the people can earn a living at a decent standard and so that the country can support its services even if other countries still finance its development. It has to see the growth of local administration and political capacity.

These changes are not made by a stroke of the pen or by the passing of a resolution but by hard work year by year.

And 'social, economic and political change 'will only come with the help of Australians'.¹⁴

Hasluck's intellectual strength and political frailty emerge in an exchange in 1961 provoked by the United Nations. He always refused to set target dates for self-government, much less for independence. On the other hand — to soften that refusal — he was willing to set and meet educational, social and economic goals. In 1961, the department proposed these targets for the next five years. The plans went from Cabinet to an interdepartmental committee, with 12 pages of Hasluck's commentary, which explained 'where we are going and what is the best way to get there' and computed the necessary 'scale and direction of our effort'.¹⁵

This quintessential statement of Hasluck's program began by delineating Australia's interests. Foremost was

a sense of trust towards the people [of the Territory] and [Australia's] national self-respect and pride, derived both from past history and a present wish to succeed before the eyes of the world ...

There were strategic interests, 'mainly to deny the use of the area to any other power'. There were potential economic interests in agriculture (to complement rather than rival Australia's produce). There was also a need to ensure stable government.

Since Australia's tasks could never be fully accomplished, 'we will be perpetually fighting for time and perpetually called on to justify our actions'.

If we are to carry this job through 'to the end', two questions we have to ponder are: (1) What is the point in the progress of the country and its people which we would regard as 'the end' so far as our efforts are concerned; (2) is it best to try to reach that point of time more quickly or more slowly ... ?

Our thesis has been that social and economic advancement is the only sound foundation for political advancement and that a system of justice and competent and honest public service are just as important for self-government as an elected legislature or indigenous political leadership.

This meant the creation of something like the institutions, the values and the personnel of an Australian State. That extraordinary ambition implied nearly infinite resources over a very long time, but external pressures and internal change made self-government likely long before the Territory was ready. Self-government would happen

before the economic and social advancement has gone far enough for the Territory to support itself financially, provide food and work for its people from its own resources at the higher standards they are seeking, staff its public services, and protect the individual through the Courts, to say nothing of assuming the responsibility for foreign affairs and defence.

Since constitutional advance might outstrip institutions and personnel, Hasluck proposed 'degrees in self-government' on the model of Australia's own constitutional history. He recalled that the eastern Australian colonies had enjoyed limited autonomy for decades after 1851 (when Britain delegated certain powers to colonial law-makers): they gained more powers with Federation in 1901, more again with Dominion status between the two world wars, leading to virtual independence in the present. Hasluck hoped that Australia might supervise a self-governing Papua New Guinea in much the same way that Britain had overseen the Australian colonies a century earlier, delegating powers gradually and cautiously.

This was a very different scenario than was being played out in Britain's African colonies, where independence came only months after self-government. How could this heterodox strategy survive misunderstanding and denunciation?

Our only hopes of doing that lie in geographical propinquity, economic ties to the Australian market, the undoubted feeling of loyalty to the Throne which the indigenes at present have, and the possibility that through our diplomacy, aided by ANZUS, the United States may help us to do in our situation what the British Navy did in the nineteenth century for the Australian colonies.

The 30-year horizon was chosen deliberately. Papua New Guinea would need judicial and other specialists, budget support, defence aid and marketing assistance for at least that long.

Would Australia want to share this staggering load? And should progress be as swift as possible, or deliberate and slow? Present policy aimed at a sound rather than a swift result:

It will need courage, skill and patience under insult to maintain that in the face of international pressure and segments of opinion among Australian 'intellectuals'. I suggest we should still try to maintain it.

Hasluck anticipated the need to double Australia's grant in the next five years. Even so, the Administration would achieve much less than it should in land management and

agriculture, health services and schools. This work could be supplemented by international agencies, but only technical (and 'non-political') bodies such as the South Pacific Commission, the World Health Organisation and the Food and Agriculture Organisation. Several pages of calculations canvassed ways to save money, but the funds sought were the least that would suffice for this grand design.

The Territory's itemised needs suggest how much Hasluck hoped to achieve, how little had been done and how few resources were available. He wanted to double the size of the Public Service in order to:

- raise school enrolments from 150,000 to 350,000;
- enrol 10,000 secondary scholars, 2,000 technical students and 2,000 teacher trainees;
- build or rebuild 70 smaller hospitals (base hospitals were already in place) ;
- provide antenatal care to 60 per cent of women (compared with the current 20 per cent);
- survey 40-50,000 people each year, for tuberculosis, to cover half of the population;
- extend government influence to the whole population by 1963, and control by 1966;
- extend Local Government Council coverage from 350,000 to 800,000 people;
- raise production of cocoa and coffee by 100 per cent;
- raise production of rubber, logs and sawn timber by 50 per cent;
- create 7,500 land blocks, inspecting 250,000 acres 'for those native farmers who do not have access to suitable land under customary native land tenure'; and
- double the mileage of roads.

Even if all programs succeeded, the Territory would remain an archipelago of insular societies, linked by an over-stretched administration and funded by a minute cash economy. But each tentative step would lead in the direction of Australian ways of doing things.

In the usual rhythm of government, the submission was sent to an interdepartmental committee, which endorsed its analysis but thought that self-government might arrive in 20 years, or even 10. They were amazed by the Territory's backwardness. Some areas were not yet under regular administration: only 73,000 people (12 per cent of those of working age) earned wages, 17,000 in government and 56,000 in private enterprise (mainly plantations). Of the half-million children of school age, only one-quarter were at school, including 3,000 in post-primary education. The committee agreed with Hasluck that there must be balance — and therefore linkage — between economic, social and constitutional change. Since they could imagine no way to speed up the lethargic pace of economic development, they assumed that political change must also be glacial. They therefore followed each step of Hasluck's argument and endorsed his targets, suggesting only that grants or loans might be sought from a wider range of sources.¹⁶

Alas, this proposal failed to capture the attention of Hasluck's colleagues. Four months later, he wrote to Menzies more in anger than in sorrow:

You will recall that the Government has undertaken to give to the United Nations target dates for social, educational and economic advancement ... and that ... a great deal of work was done by my department in preparing papers for Cabinet ...

In the event Cabinet did not choose to consider these papers.¹⁷

His argument failed to impress his colleagues, but it does explain what is otherwise anomalous in his public statements. After he left office (as Nelson points out)¹⁸ Hasluck claimed that he had always envisaged self-government as the outcome of his policies; but as minister, he had said that he could not foresee

the day when Papua and New Guinea will become a member of the Australian Commonwealth on exactly the same terms and in exactly the same constitutional relation as the six States ... There is no reason whatsoever why they should not enter into relation with the Commonwealth on terms to be negotiated ... when Papua and New Guinea can speak as one people.¹⁹

His imagined future embraced self-government and a 'permanent constitutional link' because of his — unique — belief that the UN would accept decades of self-government. If the UN knew any Australian history, it was unmoved. If Hasluck had known less constitutional history and more of international relations, he would not have devised that scenario.

There was more obvious consistency in Hasluck's demand that the Territory's destiny was singular. To knit its peoples into one community and one polity required 'even development' so as to equalise economic conditions and opportunities. In Downs's words: 'policies of gradualism were pursued ... to allow the more backward areas to "catch up".'²⁰

A peculiarity of this submission was the importance attributed to the UN. Australia reported to the Trusteeship Committee of the Security Council in respect of New Guinea (but not for Papua). The Trusteeship Committee sent a mission every three years. These friendly meetings usually proposed minor reforms, but, in 1960, the UN General Assembly created a parallel Decolonisation Committee (the Committee of 24) to help dismantle all colonial relationships. The Committee of 24 embodied African and Asian sentiment, and was surprised that colonial rule in the Pacific was seldom challenged. Only a handful of member states of the South Pacific Commission were independent, and the Commission (unlike the Organisation for African Unity) was a mainly technical body, exchanging information and insights among the colonial powers.

The Committee of 24's bark was fierce but its bite was toothless. What mattered (as Hasluck knew well) was the view of the Western powers, and especially the United States. When the US and Britain withdrew support from the Netherlands, for example, Dutch rule in West Papua came to an abrupt end: as Irian Jaya, the territory became a province of Indonesia.²¹ In a revealing encounter with Whitlam, the French statesman

Couve de Murville told him that the enthusiasts would eventually get round to Papua New Guinea,

‘but it depends on whom else they have to eat first.’ He referred to Rhodesia and to British African territories ... next, he said, the attack would be concentrated on Portuguese and Spanish African territories; it might take another four or five years for them to be ‘digested’; after that attention would no doubt turn to New Guinea.²²

That level of Western cynicism blunted UN resolutions. Foreign Affairs reassured the Department of Territories in 1961 that

It would not be surprising if so long as we are able to tell the same story about our territories as we can today and stand firmly by it the [Trusteeship] Council becomes a bore to many members. The Africans are plainly not interested in New Guinea, more enlightened Asians realise already that it presents special problems ...²³

The UN Visiting Mission of 1962, chaired by Sir Hugh Foot, was unusually effective. Nevertheless, when they insisted on discussing self-government and target dates, Hasluck would not be pushed either.²⁴ In respect of political targets, he had made his position clear to the Secretary of the Department: ‘You know my views about target dates. I recognise that we have to supply [to the UN] some appropriate eye-wash from time to time and we can provide it on request.’²⁵ That splenetic statement also reveals Hasluck’s scepticism about most planning. Downs quotes him saying that ‘I regard social planning in any except the immediate and visible situation or the specific social task as revealing the arrogance of the feeble or the self-deception of the dreamer’.²⁶

It was in this spirit that Hasluck adopted Foot’s advice and invited the World Bank to survey the Territory. That survey found less than £20 million of exports and imports worth £30 million. The terms of trade were surging the wrong way and there was no sign of new sources of revenue (the World Bank ruled out mining). Australian grants provided three-quarters of government receipts and only one-fifth of that was designed to create income.²⁷ Spate, Belshaw and Swan had reached that conclusion a decade earlier, but they believed that ‘native agriculture’ was a basis for development, whereas the World Bank could not conceive such a strategy. They proposed that economic development be given priority, ignoring Hasluck’s preference for even development in favour of ‘concentration of effort’. ‘Native agriculture’ would not be the foundation of this strategy.²⁸

The Australian Context

Because Papua New Guinea was an Australian territory, several Commonwealth departments had branches there. The more important were Army and Navy, Attorney-General’s, Civil Aviation, Meteorological Bureau, National Development, Prime Minister’s (for the Public Service Board and the Auditor-General), Shipping and Transport, and Works. There were also half a dozen agencies, including airlines, the Reserve Bank and

the Australian Broadcasting Commission.²⁹ In theory, they could ignore the Minister for Territories and even defy the Administrator, although they seldom did.

To develop his ideas into policies and programs, the Minister for Territories had a department of Commonwealth public servants. Hasluck wielded rare influence over them because he had largely created the department. The 1930s department had been swept aside by war and its peace-time revival was threatened by the Army's Directorate of Research and Civil Affairs (DORCA), a clutch of scholars in uniform. DORCA reported to the Minister, Eddie Ward,³⁰ but Ward was distracted. He had to divide his time between Territories and his other portfolio, Transport; and he spent much of his political capital defending himself from a Royal Commission. By 1949, there were 78 staff in the department, but they clung to passive traditions so that policy and programs languished.³¹ Downs regrets the waste, with 'Administration committees considering prospects and objectives, an isolated Administrator waiting for decisions from Canberra and a Minister preoccupied by political events'.³²

Matters improved in 1949 when the Liberal-Country Party coalition won office. Territories gained a high-profile minister in Percy Spender, but it was submerged in the more prestigious Department of External Affairs. Little attention was given to Papua New Guinea before Hasluck became minister in 1951 of a portfolio that split from External Affairs. He seized the chance to rebuild the department with C. R. (Esky) Lambert as secretary. When he left a dozen years later, few officials could recall any other minister. In principle, the department developed policy while the Administration carried out programs. That gave immense authority to Hasluck. His searching visits made him the sole point of coordination, because heads of Territory departments often reported directly to him. Like every commentator on these years, Downs calls them 'the Hasluck period'.

No other minister enjoyed (or endured) such disinterest from Cabinet. The fact that the Territory did not elect anyone to the Commonwealth Parliament helps to explain this. Any debate on Melanesians was uncomfortable since one base of Australian identity was the aspiration of 'White Australia' — continental apartheid. Commitment to White Australia was reinforced by the Pacific War, during which fear of invasion was intensified by resonances of half a century's lurid fiction about the yellow hordes. White Australia justified discrimination among immigrants, which produced an increasingly 'white' society:

Non-Europeans in Australia, 1901–47³³

<i>Year</i>	<i>Country of Origin</i>			
	<i>China</i>	<i>Melanesia</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Japan</i>
1901	32,997	9,654	7,637	3,593
1933	14,249	3,098	3,098	2,466
1947	12,094	1,638	2,898	335

In anxious isolation from other cultures, official Australia saw no need to modify its antique notions of racial hierarchy. Prime Minister Menzies — Knight of the Thistle, Warden of the Cinque Ports and devoted monarchist — reviewed his ideas about

colonial rule only when British Tories began to devolve power in Africa.³⁴ Meanwhile, he was smugly deaf to the racism that informed his government's policies:

*It is our national desire to develop in Australia a homogeneous population in order that we may avert social difficulties which have arisen in many other countries. [And] we are ... a friendly people not given to making distinctions among people on grounds of race or religion.*³⁵

His myopia was widely shared. His Minister for External Affairs, Richard Casey, was a patrician who had served Australia in Washington and the Raj in Bengal, without denting his ethnic self-assurance. To win friends and disarm critics, he wanted to project this cosy image — which inadvertently listed the Government's sensitivities:

the absence of racial prejudice in Australia, the idea of Australia as a waterless land unsuitable for mass settlement, ... our progressive social reforms and the egalitarian nature of Australian society, ... the primitive nature of our aborigines and of the New Guinea peoples, and even the beneficial aspects of colonial regimes.³⁶

The causes of anxiety were communism and Asian nationalism. Together, they made 'Asia' almost as menacing in the 1950s as it was in the 1850s. By contrast, the Territory posed resolvable problems rather than moral dilemmas. Although its undeveloped state was almost as embarrassing as the survival of Aboriginal Australians, the place and the people could be managed by paternal officials.

Many of Hasluck's policies survived his departure. Papua New Guinea must be one entity and its cultural divisions must not be exacerbated by uneven development. The task of modernisation was immense; it was Australia's task; and it would take many skilled people, a very long time, and huge resources. The outcome would be a society, an economy and a bureaucracy that increasingly resembled Australia's. At an unhurried pace, Melanesians would be initiated into Australian-style representative government, beginning with local councils. To the philosopher-minister, this was quite consistent with decades of patient tutelage leading to — and beyond — self-government.

Hasluck maintained that Australia's relations with Papua New Guinea were unique. That assertion helped to nullify British precedents and blunt UN resolutions — but it was also true. These polities were linked — and divided — by Torres Strait. It was therefore apt that the government of the Territory was shared by two agencies. Relations between Konedobu and Canberra were usually cool and often tetchy, yet each needed the other. The Administration was not an embryonic state: it had no capacity to make policy. Rather, it was a colonial regime whose officers served out their careers in the Territory, interacted with Melanesians and were often touched by them. The department was part of the Commonwealth, whose officers moved to and from other departments, and they might never visit the Territory. This awkward complementarity mirrored the difficulty of their mission: to mediate radically different economies, societies and cultures that were, and would forever remain, close neighbours.

Footnotes

1. Papua New Guinea Archives, DIES file ES/59/53, Political Education Tour, 1962. D. M. Fenbury [Secretary, Department of the Administrator] to District Commissioners, July 5, 1962.
2. Ibid., W. J. Johnston (acting DO, Lorengau, Manus District) to DC, Lorengau, August 20, 1962, and DC to Fenbury, August 21. I am indebted to Stephen Pokawin for information about Lukas's family.
3. Ibid., T. W. Ellis (DC, Mount Hagen) to DIES; L.R. Newby to DCs, September 4, 1962.
4. A 452 62/1850, Political Education of Native Leaders, Hasluck's minute of May 22, 1962.
5. Ibid., Newby to DCs, October 24, 1962; and Newby to party members, November 19, 1962, and responses gradually petering out by the middle of 1963.
6. I use the term 'Department of Territories' throughout, although it often had other names, such as the Department of External Territories.
7. Paul Hasluck, *A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951-1963*, Melbourne University Press, 1976, p. 14.
8. Brian Jinks, 'Papua New Guinea 1942-1952: policy, planning and J. K. Murray', PhD, University of Sydney, 1975.
9. A 452, 62/3210, Minister's minute, January 27, 1956.
10. Paul Hasluck, *A Time for Building*, p. 6.
11. Interview, Jim Byth.
12. Ian Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship: Papua New Guinea 1945-75*, AGPS, Canberra, 1980; Jinks, 'Papua New Guinea 1942-1952'. Couve de Murville described Hasluck as his own inspector-general; Hasluck, *A Time for Building*, p. 407.
13. Ian Hancock, *John Grey Gorton: He Did It His Way*, Melbourne University Press, 2002.
14. A 452/1 61/3897. Hasluck's address of July 10, 1960, sent to External Affairs on July 14, 1960.
15. A 452 61/1785, Hasluck to Prime Minister Menzies, May 5, 1961.
16. A 452 61/1785, External Affairs to Territories, June 2, 1961, enclosing the report.
17. A 452 61/1785, Hasluck to Menzies, October 20, 1961.
18. Hank Nelson, 'The Talk and the Timing', in D. Denoon (ed.), *Emerging from Empire? Decolonisation in the Pacific Islands*, Department of Pacific and Asian History, ANU, 1997.
19. Hasluck, *A Time for Building*, pp. 86, 239.
20. Ibid., pp. xviii-xix; and Hasluck, 'Australia's Task in PNG', cited in Downs, *The Australian Trusteeship*, p. 93.
21. C. L. M. Penders, *The West New Guinea Debacle: Dutch Decolonisation and Indonesia, 1945-1962*, Crawford House, Adelaide, 2002; Stuart Doren, 'Western Friends and Eastern Neighbours: West New Guinea and Australian self-perception', PhD thesis, ANU, 1999. In 1963, Dutch New Guinea became the Indonesian province of Irian Barat, renamed Irian Jaya in 1973. From 1998 until 2003, it was permissible to use the names Papua or Irian Jaya; now the region has been divided into two provinces: one is Irian Jaya Barat and the other is Papua or Irian Jaya.
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