Early in 1972, two political surprises changed the pace and the nature of devolution, bringing in new men, new vision and new energy. Prime Minister Gorton was alienating his Liberal colleagues. When they had passed over Hasluck and selected this little-known war veteran, they imagined him to be a hawk in the war in Vietnam and a conservative at home. His economic and cultural nationalism shocked any Liberals who were not already offended by his autocratic style. Opposition gathered behind the Treasurer, the conspiratorial Sir William McMahon (Whitlam mocked him as ‘Tiberius with a Telephone’). The feud reached its climax when Malcolm Fraser resigned as Minister for Defence and triggered a spill in the leadership of the parliamentary Liberal Party. When the party met, it was evident that Gorton had lost a great deal of support, so he yielded to McMahon as party leader and Prime Minister. Since the Country Party supported Gorton (and had a history of thwarting McMahon), the new Prime Minister was more than usually suspicious of its leaders. He sacked Barnes as Territories Minister and replaced him on January 2 with Andrew Peacock — by telephone, naturally. The pretext for Fraser’s exit was Gorton’s handling of the call-out of the Pacific Island Regiment for a possible crisis in Rabaul. It was mere coincidence that a Territory issue ignited an Australian crisis. Gorton had little interest in Papua New Guinea, and McMahon even less: as Prime Minister, he showed no interest in the young Peacock or his portfolio.

Andrew Peacock, raised in a professional Melbourne family, studied law on his way to a career in politics. He was only 26 in 1965 when he became president of the Victorian Liberal Party. The next year, when Menzies retired, Peacock inherited his blue-ribbon seat of Kooyong. ‘The colt from Kooyong’ was so handsome, articulate, sociable, talented and ambitious that his continuing rise seemed inevitable. At 30, he was Minister for the Army. As Minister for Territories in 1972, he enjoyed an unusually free hand at an unusually critical time. Where Barnes was elderly and wooden, Peacock was young and silkily gregarious. Unique among ministers, he knew Papua New Guineans personally: he had met them — and of course remembered their names and their interests — when they were officer cadets and he was Army Minister. Barnes’s off-the-cuff comments cast doubt on his commitment to devolution but Peacock embraced it wholeheartedly. This was not a policy that he had developed but it was he who animated it.
Peacock was delighted by the quality of his departmental officers. He knew little of them before he met them and — on the basis of Barnes’s public persona — imagined a stuffy group, pursuing an unimaginative agenda. The extent and the direction of their policy ideas was a revelation. The respect was mutual: John Greenwell reckoned that ‘Peacock’s charm and diplomacy were most effective’ not only to make allies of Papua New Guineans but ‘to dispel the bad attitudes which marked the Administration’s relations with the Department, a hostility justified by past performance, notably Warwick Smith’s’. The Minister could master a brief and advance an agenda gently but firmly.

On his very first day in office, he flew to Port Moresby with Alan Kerr, the first of a score of visits that year. But when he landed, there were no politicians. The second House had risen and polling for the third would run from February 19 until March 11. Every politician was out on the campaign trail. Even when the winners (trailed by some incredulous losers) returned to Port Moresby, they had little time for Peacock. Instead, they got down to bargaining for office in the first of Papua New Guinea’s now-famous bouts of horse-trading. Only in this final stage did Australian officials recognise the possibility of a Somare-led Cabinet. Only on April 20 were divisions called in the new House and the game was over. Even then there were rites to observe: the Administrator’s Executive Council (the source of constitutional legitimacy) did not meet until May.

Meanwhile, Peacock was not a man to hang around. He and Kerr drove to the university at Waigani and talked for hours with anyone available. The students and staff were amazed that he came at all, let alone debated subjects such as self-government and independence. Barnes would never have gone there informally. His baffled visit to the Administrative College (Chapter 3) revealed only too clearly his unease with educated Papua New Guineans.

Like Barnes, Peacock welcomed target dates for constitutional advance, but he did not impose them. He cut the link between economic development and constitutional change, and he assumed that there would be a direct transition from self-government to independence. He always emphasised that there was real power to be grasped: the new regime in the House would be ‘in effect the first government of Papua New Guinea’. These statements did no more than restate the policy that Gorton and Barnes had announced, but Peacock’s audiences could believe that the Government was ‘looking forward, and fostering further constitutional change, rather than standing back passively’. His tenure was brief and his policy initiatives few. He did amend the Papua New Guinea Act to increase the size of Somare’s ministry; he did accept the motion of the House to start internal self-government on December 1, 1973, or as soon as possible thereafter; and (see below) he discussed details of the timing and the forms of the transfer of powers. But policy-making was not his key contribution. Papua New Guineans were bowled over when he sat with them, shared a beer or a meal or a party, and listened rather than lectured.

As matters turned out, his opposite number and collaborator was Michael Thomas Somare. The young teacher and journalist was a natural conciliator, preferring to build consensus on a compromise rather than insist on a position and confront opponents. With these skills and a low-key manner, he built a multi-party coalition into a surprising
majority, and held together an awkward amalgam of nationalists and separatists, radicals and managers. At the same time, he had to fence with a sometimes overbearing Australian Government. When Georgina Beier designed the cover for a study of Papua New Guinea politics, she chose to show Gough Whitlam towering over the diminutive Somare, uncomfortable in Western attire — and another Somare in traditional finery looking self-possessed.

As late as the first sitting of the House, there was lively doubt about the composition of the de facto government. United Party and Pangu members displayed precocious mastery of manœuvre. Before the opening of the House, each claimed the numbers for victory with such optimism that more adherents were claimed than there were members. The United Party, with at least 40 members, nearly formed a majority on its own. Prudently, they kept their members together — and beyond the courtship of other party leaders — in Port Moresby’s Salvation Army hostel. They were at a disadvantage, however, in having lost most of their European leaders, and there would be a new mood in the new House, in which the average age (35) of members was several years younger than that of the second House. The House also included several members, such as Father John Momis and John Kaputin, who possessed much better formal education than their predecessors. United had also lost its absolute grip on Highlanders, with the formation of the National Party, led by the canny Western Highlander Thomas Kavali and the flamboyant Iambakey Okuk from Simbu. Separatists and secessionists were bound to feel more comfortable with Pangu; and independents (lumped together with John Guise under the rubric ‘coalition supporters’) were also likely to lean towards Pangu.

The pivotal group was the People’s Progress Party. If Pangu represented mainly public servants with a rather corporatist tendency, PPP was wedded to free enterprise and was in other ways more conservative. PPP’s leader, Julius Chan, son of a Chinese businessman and his Melanesian wife, had studied in Australia for four years before a traffic accident triggered his premature return to the Territory. He joined the Department of Native Affairs as an auditor — and suffered blackballing by the Aviat Club — before taking over the family business in New Ireland in 1963. He won a seat in 1968 and, by 1970, he was parliamentary leader of the PPP. Unlike other successful politicians, Chan came across as a thoughtful, unemotional but clear speaker. In 1972, he was more interested in the quality of the new institutions than the speed with which they were realised. (Paulus Arek, the chair of the latest Constitutional Committee, felt more comfortable in PPP than in Pangu, but he and his colleagues were nonetheless committed to devolution.) After holding out until the last moment, the PPP group threw their weight behind Somare, and were rewarded with the main financial portfolios. At 33, Chan was Finance Minister and three years later became Deputy Prime Minister. Pangu and PPP had divergent values, and Chan saw business (including his own burgeoning companies) as quite compatible with office. Despite these differences, and occasional racist sniping at Chan, the coalition provided six years of stable government.

The forging of an effective team was not all solemn negotiation. The most extrovert new minister was Iambakey Okuk, elected from Simbu to the surprise and annoyance of the United Party. He was a brave and effective campaigner, but new to
government. When he resolved to sack the head of his department (Agriculture, Stock and Fish), it fell to Tos Barnett to take him aside and explain that he must do it formally and correctly, or not at all. Okuk was so enraged that he pulled a phone out of the wall and threw it — to the consternation of a Japanese delegation in the outer office, waiting politely for an interview.12

Peacock formed an instant and warm relationship with Somare, with whom he shared many traits. Somare told the House of Assembly, with pardonable exaggeration, that

the appointment of Mr Andrew Peacock … heralds a new era in Australian policies in Papua New Guinea. The Australian Government has drawn up a plan of movement towards self-government.13

Each was a fine communicator of mood; neither was a deep thinker nor burdened by awkward political principles. Somare was the perfect partner; but it is often overlooked that the whole coalition supported his push for early self-government and independence. The separatists (from Bougainville and the Gazelle) were at least as committed to national independence as they were to decentralisation, so they had to work within the coalition. John Guise must have regretted the timidity that cost him leadership, but as Somare’s deputy and a mentor to younger Papuans he had no regrets about the road they travelled. It is difficult to imagine the United Party of 1972 becoming effective either as a government or as a partner in devolution.

**Gough Whitlam and Bill Morrison**

Peacock would have enjoyed completing the task that he embraced with such zest, but it was taken out of his hands. McMahon’s government was no more united than Gorton’s: at the end of 1972, for the first time in a generation, they lost an election. It fell to Gough Whitlam and Bill Morrison to complete the transfer of powers.

Whitlam was the first Prime Minister to take office with a vision for the Territory. He had first visited the territory as a RAAF navigator in 1945. Through his wife, Margaret, he was connected to Mick Leahy and claims to have learned from him, though it is impossible to imagine cosy chats between the urbane patrician and the rough prospector. As early as 1959 he took part with Hasluck in talks on the dependent territories of Melanesia. The next year, as Labor’s deputy leader, he took several colleagues on a long tour of the territory while his party leader, Arthur Calwell, led a ‘simultaneous but different itinerary’.

And he developed an alternative approach, although (Chapter 5) he was a solitary figure for some years. He and the Fiji-born and socially progressive South Australian Don Dunstan talked the Labor Party Conference of 1963 into ‘a specific and advanced policy on PNG’. The rupture became overt in 1965 when Whitlam told a seminar in Goroka that the world ‘will think it anomalous if PNG is not independent by 1970’ (Chapter 5). His interventions reached a climax in 1969–70 with his headline-grabbing
visit to Rabaul and the issue of ‘Labor’s Plan for New Guinea’ in Port Moresby. The party accepted his vision just in time. Only in June 1971 did the National Conference declare that ‘the Labor Party will ensure the orderly and secure transfer to PNG of self-government and independence in its first term of office’. During the 1972 election campaign, Whitlam spelt out his vision of Papua New Guinea’s place in the context of Australia’s interests. Labor had four commitments:

First, to our own national security;
Secondly, to a secure, united and friendly Papua New Guinea;
Thirdly, to achieve closer relations with our nearest and largest neighbour, Indonesia;
Fourthly, to promote the peace and prosperity of our neighbourhood.

Linking Indonesia and Papua New Guinea revealed the importance of Territory stability to Australia’s relations with its more populous neighbour. A stable Papua New Guinea was threatened by ‘immense and intense centrifugal forces’. Whitlam still maintains that Papua New Guinea’s unity came under ‘desperate and disparate challenges’:

I hear it asserted that my government was in error in pushing PNG into independence too soon … I simply assert that, had we delayed PNG independence, even for another year, we would have put the country in the gravest danger of breaking up.14

The man Whitlam chose as Minister for Territories came from a radically different background from Peacock.15 William Leonard (Bill) Morrison was destined for Labor as surely as Peacock was a born Liberal. The son of a butcher, his youth in the Sydney suburb of North Curl Curl was dominated by surf lifesaving. Teachers at North Sydney Tech introduced him to Dos Passos and other leftist literature — and to economics. A scholarship made him ‘the first surfie to go to university’, where he took Honours in Economics. Self-consciously working class among students from private schools, Morrison became deliberately abrasive, as rough as Peacock was smooth.

After university, he applied for every possible job: he was making sausages when he heard that he had been accepted as a cadet in External Affairs. In a 20-year diplomatic career, he served in London, Moscow and Washington, before moving to Bangkok and Kuala Lumpur. In Bangkok, the punctilious ambassador, David Hay, was offended by Morrison’s flashy sports car, but became reconciled to his capable, if rakish, second secretary. Moving to Malaysia as Deputy High Commissioner, Morrison was impressed by the way the Government managed foreign aid, and was struck by the fact that a police field force could manage the country’s border with more finesse than an army. He was there when Philippines forces invaded Malaysian Sabah. As Australians commanded Malaysian naval vessels, Australians were on the front line of Malaysia’s counterattack: Gorton insisted that the vessels be recalled and the Australians removed. Morrison was in Kuala Lumpur when he met Whitlam and began discussing Papua New Guinea. He was already marked as ‘political’ in the diplomatic service. His opposition to the Vietnam War denied him promotion until Sir James Plimsoll succeeded Sir Arthur Tange as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs in 1965. When he announced that he would seek election to Parliament (in the Sydney seat of St George), Morrison was brought home to the ‘purgatory’ of the Aid Branch, the least prestigious section of the service.¹⁶

Elected to Parliament in 1969, he was active in parliamentary and party committees on foreign affairs. He was 44 in 1972 when he was appointed Minister for Territories. From his background, he brought a wealth of ideas about colonialism and decolonisation. He believed (with Whitlam) that it was safer to decolonise too fast than too slow: his Malaysian experience suggested that delay might allow radicals to hijack nationalist movements. In Papua New Guinea, Australia would have to take the initiative, since the ministerial members had obviously failed to change the distribution and exercise of power. A firm and short deadline would ensure movement towards devolution. He had formed a strong preference for police rather than soldiers to manage border disputes; he had seen the perils of military alliances and hoped to avoid a defence treaty that would bind Australia to Papua New Guinean adventurism. He had also matured into a determined operator, who seemed forthright to those who agreed with him but abrasive and abusive to those who crossed him.

Morrison was fortunate in the quality of the staff he inherited. As Secretary, the courteous and cautious Hay was the antithesis of the brusque minister. They had worked in Bangkok with roles reversed, and it is remarkable that such different men could cooperate. Hay was a meticulous supervisor of the complex affairs of the department, and sure-footed in dispelling the animus between Canberra and Konedobu. He knew what difficulties Leslie Johnson would endure as Administrator, and made every effort to ease them. Greenwell’s legal expertise made him an excellent manager of the transfer of statutory powers and he and the affable Kerr were on good terms with the politicians and public servants of Konedobu. Don Mentz (the only officer who had worked in a Territory Administration) was well across the economic and financial issues. And some of the more acerbic officers had left: John Ballard and Gerry Gutman as well as Warwick Smith had moved on. Morrison was less impressed by the Territory public servants, with the important exception of Johnson, whose easy manner and sharp mind inspired general confidence. Morrison and Whitlam admired his rapport with Somare and others, and were pleased to inherit him as Administrator.

Unlike the courtly but tongue-tied Barnes, Morrison enjoyed an easy passage in Parliament. He recalls only two parliamentary questions on Papua New Guinea. When Peacock asked the first, he also sent a note that this would probably be his last, and so it proved. This silence was the more remarkable in view of the opportunities for debate, as so many pieces of legislation had to pass through Parliament unchanged (Morrison believes that 280 acts were amended). Within the Labor Party too, the old gradualism vanished. Papua New Guinea was once again a bipartisan issue, but now on the basis of decolonisation.

Morrison accepted that self-government should begin on December 1, 1973, but he wanted to speed up the transfer of powers: by that time ‘all the powers would not only have been transferred but the Papua New Guinea Government would also already be exercising those powers’.¹⁷ He was keen to begin shifting foreign affairs and defence
powers as well, although these were explicitly reserved until independence. He always advised Papua New Guineans that the critical change in the exercise of powers was not independence but self-government, in order to ‘demystify’ independence. This approach meant that he wanted to shorten the gap between self-government and independence, when Australia would be responsible but not in control. He was most anxious lest self-government initiate ‘a period of lethargy’ that would ‘encourage proponents of secession … to place pressure on the newly empowered self-governing House of Assembly’. Curiously, it fell to Hasluck — as Governor-General, opening the Australian Parliament — to declare that

My Government will move with due speed towards the creation of an independent, united Papua New Guinea. Legislation will be introduced to provide for Self-Government on 1 December 1973 or as soon as possible thereafter.

Whatever he felt, Hasluck refrained from comment, just as he had while Barnes undermined his vision and Peacock undid it. The House of Assembly put up sterner resistance. On March 1, 1973, Matiabe Yuwi proposed a referendum on a date for independence, nominating 1974, 1976, 1978, 1980 or even later. This motion lost very narrowly (41 to 40). Unimpeded by the Australian Parliament or the Papua New Guinea House of Assembly, many powers of self-government were transferred several months before the target date.18

The Papua New Guinea Office and the Liaison Unit

The transfer of powers was impeded by the unique relationship between Australia and Papua New Guinea. Goode points out that legal control lay with the Minister and

the point of coordination was the Department of Territories in Canberra rather than the Administrator and his Secretariat as was usual in British colonial practice.

[Until self-government was achieved], the Papua New Guinea Act barred the conferring of powers on PNG Ministers by acts of the House of Assembly, which complicated the mechanics of transfer and necessitated a good deal of enabling legislation. [As an unfortunate result, the] transfer of power frequently entailed both detailed legislative and administrative action.19

When the Department of Territories dissolved, therefore, a complex and critical agenda remained. While 200 Territories staff transferred to the new aid agency, a smaller unit was mandated to complete the transfer of powers. Formally, the Papua New Guinea Office was a unit in the Department of External Affairs, responsible to Morrison as ‘Minister Assisting the Minister of External Affairs for Papua New Guinea matters’. Greenwell was its first head and Kerr his deputy. Kerr dealt with the mechanics of transfer while Greenwell dealt with legal and constitutional matters, ensuring that the
Papua New Guinea Act fell down in stages, and that complementary legislation and provisions were ready to start up in Papua New Guinea. Their establishment of 40 staff shrank as functions were transferred. Once the task was well in hand, Kerr succeeded Greenwell and — like the Cheshire Cat — the office faded away. In 1974, Kerr and a few others transferred to the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet with vestigial responsibility.

The residual Canberra department created an outpost in Port Moresby. Confusingly, like its headquarters in Canberra, it was often called the Papua New Guinea Office. It was from this vantage point that Christine Goode took part in and recorded the shifting relations with the local government. Patrick Galvin went to set the office up in January 1972, when it had nine staff. He was well equipped, having managed the Territories Department’s International Relations, liaised with the UN, the South Pacific Commission and the OECD. He had also worked on Irian Jaya, aid and trade treaties, and he was well acquainted with senior officers in the Territory. As the office expanded (to 70 staff by independence) and diversified its activities, it formed the kernel also of Australia’s diplomatic representation.

Its counterpart in Konedobu was a much smaller unit headed by Tos Barnett and reporting to Somare. From teaching magistrates at the Administrative College, Barnett had gone to the university Law Faculty, where Vice-Chancellor Gunther noticed his skills and determined to use them elsewhere. An unwieldy committee of Australian men was pondering the transfer of powers. Gunther suggested, and Johnson agreed, that Barnett should manage this committee. He disbanded it at once and replaced it with three men: Ilinome Tarua, Brian Edie and himself. The Australian, Edie, was an industrious administrator. Tarua, from Kwato in Milne Bay, was one of the first Papuan lawyers. The trio advised Somare and other ministers on two main topics: ‘issues involved in the transfer of powers and functions’ and ‘preparations to achieve independence.’

They began placidly, expecting self-government in 1978 and independence even later. Pangu’s victory changed the pace of their work. It also introduced an odd difficulty. Barnett had helped Voutas in managing Pangu’s election campaign, but Barnett’s unit was answerable to the Administrator, not to Somare. In Voutas’s view, therefore, Barnett was ‘politically the enemy’. When he and others refused to talk to Barnett, the job became impossible. Barnett and Johnson suggested that the problem would disappear if the unit could be transferred whole to Somare. After an interview with the mandarin Tange, this proposal was accepted. Barnett’s unit reported to Somare and only through him to Johnson. Barnett’s main Australian counterpart was Kerr, while day-to-day matters were managed in the increasingly important Port Moresby-based Papua New Guinea Office. He had little respect for many public servants in Canberra, but he developed great respect for Greenwell and Kerr.

By July 1972, three months after they formed a government, Papua New Guinea ministers began talks on self-government with Peacock and Territories Department officials, using the Gearing-Up Program as the basis for discussions. Peacock explained that their purpose was ‘to discuss in concrete terms the transfer of further powers’.
As a Constitutional Planning Committee had been created, and a date for self-government accepted, Peacock hoped to agree on

a provisional or tentative timetable for the transfer of further powers and an agreed list of the administrative and legislative steps which have to be taken in order to give effect to that timetable.\textsuperscript{24}

It was optimistic to suppose that the Gearing-Up Program would be accepted without debate or amendment. Somare used his opening address of the talks to explain his anxiety. He agreed that a long delay in handing over responsibility might sour relations between the two countries, and ‘we are glad that our views on this issue seem to be shared by a progressive Minister … and by his Departmental officers’. But he set out principles that should govern the discussions. First, his government would ‘take the initiative in preparing the country to accept the idea of self-government and independence’ and would not press for the legal handover until the House of Assembly expressed its will on the subject. Second, until that handover, ‘there must be the maximum possible involvement of Papua New Guineans in the policy-making for, and the practical administration of’ government. Thus ‘all practical day to day administrative decisions must be made here’ and, unless vital Australian interests were affected, ‘the policy should be decided here also by my government’. Australian advice would be welcome, but ‘we must get used to making our own decisions’, so Australians would intervene only rarely. Third, the approach should involve Papua New Guinean ministers and officials as fully as possible.

Somare’s fourth and final principle reflected a rather different mood. Taken aback by the thoroughness of the Gearing-Up Program, ministers realised that they were poorly briefed and they wanted to postpone discussions until they could master the issues. Somare confessed that his government could not yet formulate policies on critical matters such as development planning or even electoral arrangements. For this reason, he wanted the present meeting to be treated as preliminary.

This was a moment of recognition. The Papua New Guineans had approached self-government with more enthusiasm than anxiety. Only when they saw the thoroughness of the plan did they recognise that Australia might shed powers faster than Papua New Guinea could pick them up. Both sides agreed on the destination, but serious differences might emerge on how — and how fast — to get there.

Confident that both sides wanted the same outcome, the Australians began to sound out the UN. The Trusteeship Agreement required that independence be endorsed by the General Assembly after an Act of Self-Determination by the people of the territory. The form of this act was a matter of great importance. The Australian and Papua New Guinea Governments wanted the simplest possible mechanism — a single majority vote in the House of Assembly. But the UN could demand a plebiscite, or even separate plebiscites in New Guinea and Papua. UN compliance could not be taken for granted. There were precedents for separate referenda: before British Togoland joined the Gold Coast, and when the British Cameroons merged with Nigeria. France had opposed these
assimilations of non self-governing territories (like Papua) with Trust Territories (like New Guinea). The prospect of a single plebiscite was alarming enough. Not only was Somare keen to avoid it, Whitlam feared (and Morrison was sure) that a referendum would be lost, with dire consequences for the Territory and the rest of Australia, which might not be able to disentangle itself.\textsuperscript{25}

With some anxiety then, Peacock sent Greenwell to New York in June 1972 for talks with the Secretary-General and others.\textsuperscript{26} He and Foreign Affairs worked closely, to great effect. Stanley Pearsall, Australia’s representative to the Trusteeship Council, restated the position that self-government would be achieved at a pace determined by the House of Assembly, that the Chief Minister expected it in the lifetime of the present House, and that Australia would give every encouragement. The Australian delegation included three Papua New Guineans — Simon Kaumi (the Electoral Commissioner), Anton Parao (United Party) and Gavera Rea (Pangu) — who answered questions on the election, Bougainville, cargo cults and the fact that the United Party was limited mainly to the Highlands.\textsuperscript{27}

Happily, a Visiting Mission of the Trusteeship Council, including members of the more radical Committee of 24, had overseen the 1972 election and described it as ‘thorough, comprehensive and fair’. With the House’s legitimacy endorsed, the UN was content that its majority vote would be sufficient. Opening the Session of the Trusteeship Council, the Secretary-General rejoiced that the Visiting Mission report confirms the uninterrupted march of this Territory towards the objectives of the Charter … a coalition Ministry has been formed and we are pleased to note the growing sense and form of unity for this new country and its now rapid movement towards self-government and independence.

Behind the formalities there was much camaraderie, suggesting that the Trusteeship Council was never likely to be a high hurdle. Australian diplomat Robin Ashwin congratulated the new President of the Trusteeship Council, the American W. T. Bennett:

\begin{quote}
Mr President, we have seen you managing a visiting mission swimming in its underpants off the beach at Arawa in Bougainville. We have seen you ably conducting a meeting of some 70 male candidates for election to the House of Assembly at a Women’s Training Centre in Kundiawa in the Chimbu.\textsuperscript{28}
\end{quote}

On December 7, ABC News reported that the Trusteeship Council, by acclamation, adopted a resolution expressing gratification about the schedule for full self-government.
Appendix: The Third House of Assembly and the First Cabinet

David Hegarty’s analysis alludes to the uncertainty of party affiliations:

The actual number of members belonging to the parties was a little uncertain. A reasonable estimate showed Pangu twenty-four, PPP eleven, National Party seven, Mataungan Association three, Coalition supporters twelve, and the [United Party] forty-two.

**Pangu**
- Michael Somare: Chief Minister
- Paul Lapun: Mines
- Ebia Olewale: Education
- Albert Maori Kiki: Lands (later, Foreign Affairs and Trade, and Defence)
- Gavera Rea: Labour
- Reuben Taureka: Health
- Boyamo Sali: Local Government

**Coalition Members**
- John Guise: Interior
- Paulus Arek: Information and Extension Services

**New Guinea National Party**
- Thomas Kavali: Works
- Iambakey Okuk: Agriculture, Stock and Fisheries
- Sasakila Moses: Forests
- Kaibelt Diria: Posts and Telegraphs

**People’s Progress Party**
- Julius Chan: Internal Finance
- Donatus Mola: Business Development
- John Poe: Trade and Industry
- Bruce Jephcott: Transport
Footnotes
1. Ian Hancock, *John Gorton: I Did It My Way*.
2. Interview, Andrew Peacock.
3. Interview, John Greenwell.
8. Interview, Tos Barnett.
12. Interview, Tos Barnett.
15. Interview, Bill Morrison.
18. Goode, ‘Preparation and Negotiation’.
20. Ibid.
21. Interview, Pat Galvin.
22. Ilinome Tarua, discussion by panel of constitution-makers, Port Moresby, March 28, 1996.
25. Interview, Bill Morrison.
26. John Greenwell’s files: the Trust Deed, Greenwell to Hay from New York, May and June 1972, on his soundings of UN officials on the form of the act of self-determination; Greenwell to Kerr, May 26, 1972, on a constitutional commission; Greenwell to Kerr, May 26, 1972, on Marianas; Greenwell to Hay, June 6, 7192, reporting Ambassador Plimsool’s views and the Secretary-General’s speech.
27. Ibid., June 8, 1972.