

2. Papua

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Papua is interpreted here as a case with both high risks of escalation to more serious conflict and prospects for harnessing a 'Papua Land of Peace' campaign led by the churches. The interaction between the politics of the Freeport mine and the politics of military domination of Papua, and military enrichment through Papua, are crucial to understanding this conflict. Replacing the top-down dynamics of military-political domination with a genuine bottom-up dynamism of village leadership and development is seen as holding the key to realising a Papua that is a 'land of peace' (see Widjojo et al. 2008).

Papuans have less access to legitimate economic opportunities than any group in Indonesia and have experienced more violence and torture since the late 1960s in projects of the military to block their political aspirations than any other group in Indonesia today. Institutions established with the intent of listening to Papuan voices have in practice been deaf to those voices. Calls for truth and reconciliation are among the pleas that have fallen on deaf ears, which is an acute problem when so many Papuans see Indonesian policy in Papua as genocide. Anomie in the sense of withdrawal of commitment to the Indonesian normative order by citizens, and in the sense of gaming that order by the military, is entrenched in Papua.

Background to the conflict

Troubled jewels of cultural and biological diversity

The island of New Guinea and the smaller islands along its coast are home to nearly 1000 languages (267 on the Indonesian side) and one-sixth of the world's ethnicities (Ruth-Hefferbower 2002:228). It is the place we should go to think most deeply about the effect of ethnic fractionalisation on warfare and on peacebuilding with plurality. In this chapter, we use 'Papua' in the way most indigenous people of the western half (the Indonesian half) of the island of New Guinea use it. This might confuse in several ways. First, we will see that this

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region currently comprises two provinces of Indonesia: West Papua, with its capital in Manokwari, and Papua, with its capital in Jayapura. Second, 'West Papua' is a politically loaded term, which has been used since 1961 by Papuans at home and in exile to denote their aspirations for a sovereign state. Finally, Papua was historically the name given to the southern part of the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. That former colony is now part of the independent nation of Papua New Guinea. When we say 'Papuans' in this chapter, we mean the indigenous peoples of the Indonesian provinces of Papua and West Papua. We call residents of these provinces who have moved there from elsewhere in Indonesia (mostly since the mid-1960s) migrants.

Papua is the most troubled part of Indonesia today, suffering the greatest extremes of inequality and poverty, arguably the most debilitating levels of corruption and the worst conduct of the Indonesian military. Papua struggles through its fifth consecutive decade of intermittent armed conflict. It is one of the places in the world with a risk of civil war in the next few years.

Three colonial powers—The Netherlands, Germany and the United Kingdom—split the island of New Guinea down the middle, creating what is today Indonesian Papua and Papua New Guinea (see van der Veur 1966). New Guinea was once one of the most advanced regions of the world. Jared Diamond (1997:153) identified New Guinea as one of the three regions of the globe where food production arose independently, allowing the shift from hunter-gatherer to sedentary agricultural societies.² The other two regions of independent invention of food production were the Fertile Crescent of today's Middle East and what is today the eastern United States. The civilisational transformation to which intensive agriculture gave birth spread more widely from the other two regions than from Melanesia, from where it did not spread even to nearby nomadic Australia. This is surprising because 40 000 years ago, Australian Aborigines seem to have been more technologically advanced than Europeans, developing the earliest hafted stone tools (that is, mounted on handles) and by far the earliest watercraft in the world (Diamond 1997:297). Austronesian languages spread from Taiwan-Malaya-Indonesia across Papua and New Guinea to New Zealand and all of Polynesia and Micronesia, but not to southern New Guinea and Australia. Variations in topography, culture and physical environments, appear, however, to have vitiated against the rapid development and diffusion of new agricultural technologies from New Guinea's highland communities to the wider region.³

2 A fact recognised in 2008 when Kuk Swamp in the Southern Highlands of Papua New Guinea was included on UNESCO's World Heritage register (see <<http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/887>>).

3 The challenges to the transfer and development of such knowledge among cultural groups in New Guinea is apparent to linguists who have, for decades, sought to link non-Austronesian languages across the rugged interior and southern swamplands of the island (the 'trans-New Guinea hypothesis') (see Pawley 2005).

Today, it is not possible to drive into many highland regions of Papua, where two-thirds of the indigenous population live.⁴ Flying into the central highlands, you see something similar to what the first Westerners ‘discovered’ in 1938: the ‘Shangri-la’ of the Baliem Valley (see Archbold 1941). What they saw then and what you still see today is extraordinarily rich agricultural land producing a diversity of vegetables and fruit and supporting large populations of pigs. The pigs are auctioned through independently invented economic trading systems that parallel institutions that in the West in the past century made stock exchanges the drivers of capitalist development. Wholesalers and retailers of pigs at Jibama market on the outskirts of Wamena negotiate shareholdings in pigs and litters of pigs and deploy sophisticated arrangements for sharing the profits from the sale of pigs and pork. A large proportion of the men involved in this negotiation to this day wear only their penis gourd (*koteka* or *holim*) as clothing.⁵ The people of the highlands of Papua continue to be rich in their culture and agriculture and it is hard to find places on the planet less touched by globalising influences. In large areas of these highlands, sustained contact with ‘white’ or non-Papuan Indonesian ‘foreigners’ came only in the 1960s or early 1970s.

Poverty in historical perspective

Many Papuans living outside larger towns or district capitals have no electricity in their village (therefore no mobile phones or information technology),⁶ no piped water or road network and limited incomes to purchase basic foods that they do not grow themselves, such as rice.⁷ In the highlands, improved agricultural technologies are needed to deliver food security in the staple of sweet potato (especially to cope with drought-related famine and other factors that adversely affect food production) (see Ballard 2000; Bourke et al. 2001). The poverty rate in Papua is more than twice the national average and the Human Development Index (HDI) in the central highlands is the lowest in the country.⁸ Children might have access to primary school education but sadly it is very common for

4 There is a four-wheel drive/truck track from Nabire to Enarotali in the Paniai Lakes region of the western highlands and a road from Wamena towards the western highlands.

5 While some of the men at the Jibama market and in the streets of Wamena are dressed in *koteka* to pose for tourists (for money), many Dani come to Wamena for business or pleasure wearing their traditional *koteka* as they would in their village.

6 All district capitals now have local mobile phone coverage and some highland capitals today benefit from micro-hydro power and other hybrid forms of electricity generation.

7 Many Papuans have lacked sufficient protein and trace elements (such as iodine) in their diet, resulting in chronic disease in many communities. Recent socio-cultural changes have also redefined the diet for many (semi-)urban Papuans, shifting the staples for lowland/highland Papuans from sago/sweet potato supplemented by fresh fish/meat respectively, to rice or noodles with tinned fish or meat (pork).

8 The poverty rate in Papua is 41 per cent compared with a national average of 18 per cent (UNDP 2007a:1). The 2006 *Annual Report* of the UN Development Program for Indonesia gives the extremes for the HDI in the country—with Jakarta at 0.76 and Papua’s central highlands district of Jayawijaya at 0.47 (UNDP 2007b:5).

teachers to not turn up to school.⁹ Teachers dislike, even resent, postings to a comfortless life in highland villages remote from townships and most consider their remuneration for such postings inadequate. There are similar constraints on the provision of medicines and professional health care in many highland villages, where this is extremely limited or unavailable.

This could be read as meaning many lowland and highland Papuans are neither better nor worse off than they have been for millennia. The reality, however, is that many are worse off. Unfortunately, foreign contact brought diseases that Papuans had not suffered before, including venereal diseases that decimated some coastal communities in the early twentieth century (see Vogel and Richens 1989) and HIV/AIDS in recent decades. AIDS came with entrepreneurially organised prostitution—again, something Papuans believe did not exist before the Indonesians arrived.¹⁰ Many Papuans alleged to us that in recent years the military had brought in HIV-infected prostitutes from other parts of Indonesia (see Butt 2005, 2008). Informants allege that military officers own brothels and take protection money from others, though we are not able to confirm these allegations. Papua ranks second after Jakarta in reported AIDS cases,¹¹ with an infection rate 15.4 times the national average (van de Pas 2008:4).

Commercial development is also removing forests and causing erosion in some areas, making traditional agriculture and hunting more difficult. Tree kangaroos, deer, cassowary and other wild animals important to the diet of many indigenous Papuans are now scarce in many regions of Papua. Papuan traditions of self-sufficiency have been challenged by these changes and in some areas people recount stories of being hungry for the first time in their oral history.¹² Little of the benefit of the commercial development that has transformed these habitats goes to indigenous Papuans; it flows mostly to a diaspora of Chinese importers

9 As a result, truancy is common among children already struggling to adapt to formal education and/or disenchanted with past educational experiences (see Lake 1989). In 2007, it was reported that many children graduating from primary schools (especially in the interior) were illiterate and less than 30 per cent of the total adult population had primary school education (see Kompas 2007). Hernawan (2005:53) states that the literacy rate in Papua for women is 44 per cent compared with 78 per cent for Indonesia as a whole and 58 per cent for men compared with 90 per cent for the nation (figures that combine indigenous Papuans with migrants).

10 HIV/AIDS was first reported in Papua in 1992, introduced by Thai fisherman working in Indonesian territorial waters off southern Papua (under contract to PT Djajanti Group). These fishermen frequented prostitutes during their shore leave in the coastal towns of Merauke and Fak-fak (now part of Mimika Regency), where the first recorded cases in Papua were reported. These towns now have the highest number of confirmed HIV-positive cases (and deaths) in the province. Once the disease was introduced, other socio-cultural and political factors caused its rapid spread across the territory, although the disease remained poorly diagnosed in many parts of Papua and West Papua provinces (see Butt et al. 2002; Rees and Silove 2007).

11 Indonesia's AIDS Commission, March 2008, accessed 12 September 2008, <http://www.aidsindonesia.or.id/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1922&Itemid=124>

12 Although drought-related famine due to the El Niño–Southern Oscillation appears to be a longstanding phenomenon across much of Papua (see Ballard 2000).

and exporters, the Indonesian military and migrants from islands further west such as Sulawesi and Java. We will see that this is a structural driver of conflict in Papua.

As one travels from Papua New Guinea to the Indonesian side of New Guinea, it is possible to conclude that life is better on the Indonesian side because for half the population—the migrant half—it is. The roads foreign visitors travel on are in areas where migrants dominate. They are populated by large numbers of motorcycles and privately owned new cars. They are lined by much more expensive houses filled with people with more protein in their diet than in many parts of Papua New Guinea. The public buildings in the towns are far better appointed structures than elsewhere in Melanesia. Churches and mosques boast beautiful paintings and mosaics, coloured glass and varnished pews in architecturally fine buildings with fans that work! The schools in coastal towns are also better equipped than many schools in Papua New Guinea. In the highlands, however, school buildings reflect the near collapse of the education system. The buildings are neglected and frequently without furniture, teaching materials or teachers. One must resist the superficial urban impression that these Papuans are better off than their counterparts in independent Papua New Guinea.

Because migrants are seen as the political masters, elite Papuans see themselves as being on the same rapid trajectory as Aboriginal Australians were in the nineteenth century: towards becoming a politically dominated minority in their own land. In some parts of the highlands, traditional tribal warfare that was once self-regulated to result in only small numbers of deaths has hooked into resource developments in a way that has escalated internecine conflict.¹³ Papuans feel that the proliferation of Indonesian army posts represents the worst of the deterioration of their lot. They are a feature common to many villages across the numerous conflict zones of Papua. The military posts dominate their lives, dispensing torture and death. A common tactic for the military has been to kill a person with the intention of inciting a particular group to take revenge. The payback then gives the military a justification for widespread retaliation against the group. One villager told us in 2007 how she had made a 200-kilometre journey along the roads of southern Papua. She encountered 40 military posts at which she had to explain her travels, donating a packet of cigarettes at each post. We were told many stories of the difficulty of travel—constraints rarely imposed on non-Papuan migrants. We were also told of restrictions on urban Papuans returning to their own villages, leaving a deep feeling that there was no

13 Deaths from tribal warfare among indigenous Papuans are not on the scale of the conflicts in neighbouring Papua New Guinea (see Haley and Muggah 2006), where modern firearms are widely available (see Alpers 2005).

freedom of movement for Papuans in their own land. 'Even if you have a church social, you have to provide the military post with a reason for it and a list of the people who will be attending.'¹⁴

Traditionally the site of greatest population density and prosperity, the highlands of mainland New Guinea were marginalised by colonialism and imperialism—Dutch, Japanese, American-Australian and Indonesian. For much of the period of Indonesian administration, the highlands of Papua have remained at the periphery of development initiatives by the state. Reasons for this relative neglect related to the exploitative practices of the New Order, which focused on Papua's more accessible coastal resources, as well as the geographic impediments to infrastructure development in the mountainous interior. A consequence of this pattern of uneven development under the New Order is a shift in the demographic of independence guerrillas and activists. In the decades immediately after the transfer of the territory from The Netherlands to Indonesia, most of the resistance to Indonesian rule came from Papuan coastal elites. In recent decades, the majority of calls for Papuan independence and of guerrilla actions have been initiated by highland Papuans.

Papua, in summary, was for millennia a complex quilt of highly diverse local communities, many of which had intricate and highly developed trade and alliance networks.¹⁵ While conflicts were common between and among these peoples, most were relatively localised. Despite often fierce competition for resources among some coastal Papuans and endemic warfare among the larger polities of the densely populated highlands (see Heider 1965; Broekhuijse 1967; Koch 1967), Papuan communities generally lived within the limits of their natural environment.¹⁶ The fact that Papua was largely unknown and untouched by the spread of temperate-zone advances in agricultural technology, metallurgy and writing until so late in its history was one root cause for its comparative poverty today. We are following Diamond's (1997) analysis here. The other deepest root cause of the poverty and conflict in Papua is that it suffered two colonialisms instead of the usual one.

Although largely overlooked by Dutch colonialism until the twentieth century, many coastal Papuans were afflicted (often by proxy) with some of the neglectful extractive forms of Dutch colonialism for three and a half centuries, especially through the Moluccan slave trade to their west (see also Chapter 3

14 Quotes without citation are taken from our interviews for this research. For details on interviews, see Appendix Table A2.2.

15 For examples of these trade and alliance networks in New Guinea, see Elmberg (1968), Hughes (1977), Miedema (1984) and Pétrequin and Pétrequin (1993).

16 The large alliance networks of the agrarian societies of the highlands, combined with population pressures, appear to have resulted in large-scale conflicts throughout much of the highlands.

on the Moluccas).¹⁷ Coastal Papuans then suffered a second form of colonialism as the new economic and political opportunities in the territory in the late Dutch period were given to skilled and semi-skilled migrants from elsewhere in the East Indies (see Sharp 1977; Pouwer 1999:158; Chauvel 2005). This two-tiered colonialism accelerated with the transfer of the territory to Indonesia in 1963–69 and set the tone for the past half-century of repressive resource-exploitative colonialism at the hands of Indonesia.¹⁸ This latter era is more akin to the colonialism English settlers imposed on Aboriginal Australians, and it is seen that way by Papuans. The development economics literature shows that both kinds of colonialism in different ways have created conditions of increased wealth for settlers and increased poverty for indigenous inhabitants of the colonies. Statistically, societies that missed out on nineteenth-century industrialisation did better in the twentieth century when they also missed out on colonialism (for example, Japan, China, Thailand) and those colonised for the longest periods did worst (Easterly 2006; Acemoglu et al. 2004:66–70).¹⁹

Colonial disinterest in Papua

Europeans divided up New Guinea without conflict in the nineteenth century. It was a low priority for all of them. Sovereignty over the western half went to the Dutch in 1828, the south-east to the British in 1884 (ceded to the new Commonwealth of Australia in 1906) and the north-east to Germany in 1885 (occupied by Australian forces in 1914 and designated as a League of Nations-mandated trust territory under Australian authority in 1920).²⁰ After more than three centuries of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, by 1938 there were still only 15 European administrators in Papua and only 200 (mostly missionaries) European residents (Bertrand 2004:145). Since 1828, Papua had delineated the easternmost point of the Dutch East Indies. The territory acquired a new strategic significance in World War II. Pitched battles were fought between Imperial Japanese and Allied forces across mainland New Guinea and surrounding islands from 1942 to 1945, but this bloody conflict was restricted largely to coastal towns and their hinterlands. Hollandia (now Jayapura) became General Douglas MacArthur's headquarters for the Pacific War in mid-1944. The town was transformed into a staging post for more than 250 000 Allied air and sea personnel preparing to

17 The lack of significant Dutch interest or investment in Papua until the early/mid-twentieth century meant that Papuans benefited from a form of Dutch colonialism tempered by the doctrine of the Ethical Policy (see van der Eng 2004).

18 Sharp (1977:31) characterises this two-tiered colonialism as a 'caste barrier' based on racial/ethnic grounds deliberately intended to exclude Papuans from economic and political opportunities in their own land.

19 And countries with the longest number of years since independence have the lowest odds of experiencing a civil war (Hegre et al. 2001:39).

20 The territory of New Guinea was not officially under Australian authority until the Commonwealth of Australia passed the *New Guinea Act* on 9 May 1921.

retake the Philippines and the rest of Asia. In the immediate aftermath of World War II, a war-torn and cash-strapped Netherlands had its hands full at home and with its efforts to reassert its authority over an incipient nationalist movement in its East Indies colony. Papua's coastal and highlands peoples remained largely peripheral to this process until the late 1940s.

Christian missionaries played a key role in Dutch administrative expansion in Papua from their arrival in Dorei Bay (modern-day Manokwari) in 1855. Christianity made limited headway in Muslim (and Hindu) Indonesia, but its influence grew steadily in Papua in the early to mid-twentieth century, especially from 1928 when Catholic and Christian denominations came into direct competition for Papuan souls (see Pouwer 1999:164). The missionaries, working with attachments of native colonial police, virtually ended tribal warfare that had been endemic in Papua for as long as oral history recalled. Moral appeals that killing was forbidden by God did much of the work. We interviewed old men who remembered the arrival of the missionaries. They said that when mission moral appeals were ignored, the missionaries returned with armed police to enforce compliance. As in Papua New Guinea (Meggitt 1977), many Papuans were opportunistic in their associations with these missionaries, who brought with them valuable trade goods and a new sociopolitical order. The peace dividend that followed mission proselytising and schooling helped Christianity to sweep across Papua. It was a large dividend: it was estimated that before pacification of the Dani in the Baliem Valley, 1 per cent of the population was being killed each year in the mid-1950s (Bromley 1962b:23, 26).

The limited Dutch political and commercial penetration of Papua meant that educated young Papuans at the end of World War II had little stake in the incipient nationalist struggle for an independent Indonesia.²¹ They were not part of the political conversation among young nationalists from Java and other islands of the Dutch East Indies that began in the early twentieth century. Papuans had experienced Moluccan colonialism before, when the Sultan of Tidore collected taxes for centuries in north-west Papua, and some became slaves. The importance of Papuan slaves in rowing the vessels of, and in service to, royal courts elsewhere in the archipelago has been largely forgotten. The slave trade used Papuans in the production and trade of spices, especially in Tidore and Ternate, but it took them far and wide. Galis (1954:5) reports that 'in 724 an emissary of Çriwijaya to the Chinese court brought with him a slave girl from Seng-k'i [Papua]'.

Few Papuans imagined themselves to be part of the sovereign State of Indonesia proclaimed by President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta on 17

21 There was some influence among the Papuan elite as a consequence of the internment of communists and anti-colonial Indonesians in Boven Digul, in the south-east of Papua (see Chauvel 2005).

August 1945, two days after the Japanese surrender. They were also isolated from the bloody guerrilla war of independence fought by Indonesian nationalists against Dutch forces from 1945 to 1949. In November 1949, Dutch negotiators effectively excluded Papua from the Round Table Conference. The Dutch doubted that the native 'population of the territory itself could in a democratic way express the wish whether or not it wanted to be a part of Indonesia' and argued that the people of West New Guinea 'racially, linguistically and culturally cannot be considered to belong to the Indonesians' and needed protection as they were 'on a much more primitive level than any other people in Indonesia' (Secretariat of The Netherlands–Indonesia Union 1950:5).

Papua remained a colony of The Netherlands throughout the 1950s while the new Republic of Indonesia struggled to overcome internal dissent and separatist conflict. Papua became an important focal point for the nation-building activities of the Indonesian State, which asserted that the revolution would be complete only once Papua was 'restored' to the republic. Successive attempts by the Indonesian Government to bring the issue of the sovereignty of Papua to the United Nations during the 1950s were quashed by The Netherlands and its Western allies (see Subandrio 2000).

Australia, which had supported the nationalist struggle against the Dutch elsewhere in Indonesia, wanted a buffer between the new republic and its PNG colony.²² The international prestige of The Netherlands suffered a serious blow as a result of its brutal suppression of the Indonesian independence movement. Lijphart (1966:288) argued that retaining Papua afforded the Dutch an opportunity to salve their battered national self-image through national 'feelings of moral superiority' and 'egocentric altruism' even though their attempts to designate it a UN trust territory were thwarted internationally. The Dutch colonial administration was nominally supportive of Papuan aspirations for self-determination and through the 1950s strengthened policies to promote the 'Papuanisation' of the civil service and police.²³ While change was precipitous for many Papuans, international pressure for decolonisation (particularly from Indonesia) made progress seem slow. Only in 1960 did the Dutch Government unambiguously state its intention to grant Papuan independence by 1970. The first stage of this process came with the inauguration of a New Guinea Council (Nieuw Guinea Raad) in April 1961, a few months after the creation of a Papuan 'volunteer' defence force (Papoea vrijvilligerskorps or PVK).²⁴ On 1 December

22 See Nelson (2005:16–19) on this point. See Haupt (1970), Viviani (1973), Verrier (1976), Phelps (1996) and Doran (1999) on the dynamics between the Australian Government and its allies throughout this conflict.

23 Van der Kroef (1968:694) noted that in 1961 Papuans filled 4950 of the 8800 positions in the colonial administration and were of growing importance in middle and executive levels of government.

24 The notion of a 'volunteer' defence force reflects a stipulation in the *League of Nations Charter* (Article 22) to prevent in trust territories 'the establishment of fortifications or military and naval bases and of military training of the natives for other than police purposes and the defence of territory'. This provision is echoed

1961, responding to escalating Indonesian Government rhetoric and infiltrations intended to destabilise the colony, Papuan members of the New Guinea Council made their own assertion of sovereignty by declaring the independent nation of 'West Papua' with the 'morning star' flag (*bintang kejora*) the symbol of state and *Papua, My Homeland!* (*Hai Tanahku Papua!*) its anthem.²⁵ The response from Jakarta was swift.

On 19 December 1961, President Sukarno declared his 'three commands to the people' (*'trikora', tri komando rakyat*) for the 'liberation' of Papua.²⁶ Sukarno was struggling with holding his nation together, so an external challenge was seen as a strategy for unifying the nation. Papua was part of the imagined community of Indonesia (Anderson 1983), but Indonesia was not part of the imagined community of Papuans. The meaning of community for most Papuans did not run far beyond their clan, although a Papuan imagination was brewing, encouraged by the Dutch education system and ambitious Papuan urban elites. Survey research and other evidence from the early 1960s suggested overwhelming Papuan support for eventual independence and rejection of Indonesian rule (Saltford 2003:10). At the same time, as the head of one of the Protestant churches put it to us, 'few people in Papua actually want[ed] to fight Indonesia'. That was true in 1963 for both Papuan and Dutch forces and is still true today for most Papuans. The early stages of the Indonesian military campaign to liberate Papua were a disaster.²⁷ The Indonesian troops soon found that Papuans wanted to kill them rather than be liberated by them. We were told many stories of Dutch forces saving Indonesian soldiers from the Papuans. One founding Free Papua Movement (Organisasi Papua Merdeka, OPM) member told us how the Dutch had prevented him from killing the Indonesian paratroopers he captured, though before they were sent back to Indonesia, he made some of them who were Melanesian dig up and eat the soil 'of the land they had betrayed'.

In the international arena, the United States was concerned about the growing influence that the Indonesian Communist Party had in Sukarno's government. By the late 1950s, it was apparent that Indonesia was planning to use Soviet support for a military campaign to wrest control of Papua from the Dutch (Pauker

in the *United Nations Charter* (Chapter XII, Article 84). The Netherlands adhered to this and other UN charter provisions for trust territories from 1950 to 1963, suggesting that the Dutch sought to comply with (and gain legitimacy from) this international instrument.

25 This process began on 19 October 1961 with the election of a National Committee of Papuan leaders and a manifesto for an independent West Papua (see Chauvel 2005:21–5; DPD Pasifik 2000).

26 The three commands were: '1. Defeat the formation of the puppet state of Papua of Dutch colonial make; 2. Unfurl the Honoured Red and White Flag in West Irian, Indonesian native land; 3. Be ready for general mobilisation to defend the independence and unity of Country and Nation' (see President Sukarno's 'Trikora' speech, accessed 1 September 2008, <www.papuaweb.org/goi/pidato/1961-12-jogjakarta.html>)

27 Operations Mandala and Djayawidjaya, the major assault phases of the Indonesian military campaign in Papua, were averted by eleventh-hour diplomacy (see Kodam 1971; Platje 2001).

1961; van der Kroef 1961; Platje 2001). In the early 1960s, the United States effectively persuaded Australia and Britain to drop diplomatic support for the Dutch over Papua and bullied the Dutch into signing the New York Agreement (NYA). The NYA allowed for the first UN Transitional Executive Administration (UNTEA), which oversaw the transfer of the territory from Dutch to Indonesian administrative control by 1 May 1963. It was the first time that the United Nations was given direct executive authority for the administration of a territory (the next occasion was in Cambodia three decades later). A cohort of UN personnel and a UN Security Force (UNSF) were responsible for administering and policing the territory during the nine-month transition period.²⁸ The Dutch had managed to negotiate several face-saving clauses into the NYA, the most important of which was that Papuans would be granted an opportunity to ‘exercise freedom of choice’ on their future before 1969. Indeed, Article XVIII of the NYA states that such arrangements will include ‘the eligibility of all adults, male and female, not foreign nationals to participate in the act of self-determination to be carried out in accordance with international practice’. These deals were done with no Papuan involvement (see Chauvel 1997). It was all about the Cold War.²⁹ A 1962 memo to US President John F. Kennedy put it that ‘Indonesia is one of the truly big areas of East–West competition’ (Saltford 2003:15). US diplomacy delivered Papua to Indonesia as a crucial step along a successful journey through the 1960s to switch Indonesia from being an emergent Soviet ally to an American client (see Markin 1996; Simpson 2003).

The UN transitional administration of 1962–63 was not the finest hour for the United States, Australia or the United Nations, as attested by a fifth decade of conflict. The British Embassy in Washington, writing to its Foreign Office in 1968, concluded that it was unimaginable that the United Kingdom would see ‘the US, Japanese, Dutch or Australian government putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia on a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of primitive peoples’ (Saltford 2000:189). Saltford (2003:101) also noted that 30 members of the 54-seat Papuan Provincial Council were dismissed in 1968 because many desired a one-man one-vote

28 The NYA (Article VII) specified that the UNSF ‘will primarily supplement existing Papuan (West Irianese) police in the task of maintaining law and order. The Papuan Volunteer Corps [PVK], which on the arrival of the United Nations Administrator will cease being part of the Netherlands armed forces, and the Indonesian armed forces in the territory will be under the authority of, and at the disposal of, the Secretary-General for the same purpose. The United Nations Administrator will, to the extent feasible, use the Papuan (West Irianese) police as a United Nations security force to maintain law and order and, at his discretion, use Indonesian armed forces.’ In practice, the PVK was neutralised in February 1963, several months before the transfer to Indonesian authority (see Saltford 2000:120–4). These Papuans, together with their police counterparts, were among the earliest guerrillas fighting for independence from Indonesia (see below).

29 In our interview with John Perkins, author of *Confessions of an Economic Hitman* (2005, 2007), who was recruited through the US National Security Agency as an ‘economic hitman’ in Indonesia later in the 1960s, he said a second preoccupation was the assessment that expanding oil reserves would be discovered in Indonesia (this was already clear in Sumatra but also a significant issue in Papua) (see Poulgrain 1999) and control of them by US corporations was a key objective.

plebiscite, as stipulated in the NYA. Jakarta then dismissed the entire assembly and set up a new *musyawarah* (consultative council) of 1026 hand-picked representatives (see Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Irian Barat 1972). Of the 1026, 1025 voted to stay within the Republic of Indonesia in the long-awaited, so-called Act of Free Choice.³⁰ The international community was indifferent to the sordid proffering of carrots and military sticks used to secure this near-unanimous outcome. Indonesia was allowed to put this democratic veneer on the handover of Papua to Indonesia against the will of many of its people. It happened under the supposed supervision of a handful of UN observers whose influence and movement were restricted by the military. The majority of the UN General Assembly accepted the result and Papua legally became part of Indonesia.³¹

We might say that it was the anomic conditions of Sukarno's disintegrating sway over Indonesia in the inflationary 1960s that motivated the occupation of Papua as a project he felt might unify the nation behind him. The occupation followed by the sham Act of Free Choice ensured enduring anomie among Papuans. To this day, Papuans have contempt for the rules of the political game that Jakarta imposes on them.

Describing the conflict

Fighting begins

Armed resistance to Indonesian rule increased in the years after the Indonesian administrative takeover of Papua.³² Much of this early guerrilla resistance came from disenfranchised members of the Papuan Volunteer Corps, which was officially disbanded on 1 May 1963, when UNTEA left Papua. Together with members of the Arfak people (in the hinterland of Manokwari), they launched the first attacks on the Indonesian military in the mid-1960s (see Kodam 1971:121–8). Conventional historical accounts of guerrilla resistance in Papua recognise the emergence of an Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Movement by 1965 (see Djopari 1993; Ondawame 2001). On some estimates, the Indonesian military, responding to these early attacks, killed 2000 Papuans (Bertrand 2004:149). Indonesia's first Governor of Papua, Eliezer Bonay, estimated that

30 The official account of this 'Determination of the People's Decision' (Pepera, *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*) recognises the lone dissenting voice of Eduard Hegemur, a representative in the *musyawarah* for Fak-fak (see Pemerintah Daerah Propinsi Irian Barat 1972:201). Vlasblom (2004:474) notes Hegemur's speech as the one note of dissonance in the Pepera 'symphony' and that he 'was later arrested and severely maltreated'.

31 In the post-Suharto era, this Act of Free Choice has been under considerable scrutiny, most notably by a historical review commissioned by the Dutch Parliament (see Drooglever 2005).

32 It is worth noting that in the western highlands the Me (in the past known as the Ekagi or Kapauku) people have violently resisted foreign authority since the late 1930s (see Giay 1995:47–51).

about 30 000 Papuans were killed in Indonesian military operations from 1963 until the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice in August 1969 (Tebay 2006:5). From the beginning, the guerrilla campaign against Indonesia was episodic and disorganised, characterised by explosive uprisings. For example, in 1977, 15 000 Dani people rebelled in the central highlands. In response, Indonesian military aircraft dropped napalm and strafed many Dani villages. This bloody upsurge of the conflict saw a major military operation in Jayawijaya District that massacred, according to one count, 12 397 Papuans in 1977 (Tebay 2006:6). Another major upsurge was in 1981, when Operations Clean Sweep I and II reportedly killed at least 1000 people in Jayapura District and 2500 in the Paniai District, with thousands more reportedly killed in further major military operations in 1982, 1983 and 1984, and 517 killed in the last major operation of this phase in 1985 (Tebay 2006:6).

Since 1985, there has been no year in which more than 1000 Papuans have reportedly been killed by the military and in most years that number seems to have been much less than 100. It is common for non-governmental organisations (NGOs) to use 100 000 or 150 000, or higher, as estimates for the number of lives lost in the Papuan conflict since the 1960s. Australians will remember the six-figure estimates in advertisements during their 2007 national election campaign.³³ We have not seen evidence to support such numbers, and they seem too high.³⁴ We can say the loss of life in Papua has numbered in the tens of thousands but is undoubtedly much less than in East Timor since 1974 and in the purges against the Indonesian Communist Party at the time of Suharto's New Order coming to power in 1965. The last two conflicts clearly seem to have had a six-figure death toll and have been the two deadliest conflicts in the history of Indonesia (Cribb 2001). In these terms, Papua rates as the third-deadliest Indonesian conflict.³⁵ Aceh can be ranked ahead of it only by going back to count Acehnese fatalities in the fight for independence against the Dutch in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 6).

Torture rather than murder has become the dominant means of terrorising the people of Papua into submission (see Hernawan 2008; HRW 2009). Disappearances became more common than murder in the open. For example, after demonstrations in Biak in 1998, 33 corpses were found in the sea (Tebay

33 These advertisements are available online (accessed 12 September 2008, <http://www.freewestpapua.com.au/tvc_jan.php>).

34 See Ballard (2002a:96) for similar concern that these numbers could be exaggerated.

35 Conflict deaths in Papua and East Timor are not due merely to direct actions by the Indonesian security forces or independence guerrillas. In East Timor, as in Papua, sustained and sporadic military operations displaced thousands of villagers from their land and their homes in the past few decades, deliberately denying them food and shelter for prolonged periods and making them extremely vulnerable to drought, famine, disease and other maladies that frequently resulted in premature death. This is one of the reasons for the high loss of life in the case of East Timor. The lack of any systematic attempt to quantify the effects of such operations in Papua is one of the main reasons why figures for conflict deaths in Papua remain speculative.

2006:9). It is believed 139 Papuans were loaded onto two naval frigates, with the women raped on the decks. Only a few who jumped overboard survived to tell the tale (Elmslie 2002:242).³⁶ The UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women (Coomaraswamy 1999:18) found that women were raped, sexually mutilated and thrown overboard; corpses washed up on the coast showed signs of sexual mutilation such as removed breasts. When open murder does occur, it is of strategically targeted leaders or in a manner calculated to maximise terror.³⁷ A report from the Elsham human rights group described a Papuan having his flesh barbecued while the wife and children of the man were all forced to eat his flesh (Tebay 2006:7). When Indonesian soldiers killed Nalogolan Kibak, a prominent Amungme chief, 'a bucket was filled with his blood' and other 'tribal leaders, teachers and pastors of the area were forced to drink the blood' (Osborne 1985:71).

The Alliance for Democracy in Papua (ALDP) 2002, an NGO working on legal and human rights issues, has done a mapping study of 74 clearly established political killings in Papua between 1995 and 2005. It in fact found that the Suharto era did not have a higher rate of these killings than the post-Suharto era, or a different pattern in their nature. Only five of the killings went to court. In their view, the military was responsible for only 27 per cent of the killings, the police for 31 per cent, government civilian employees for 15 per cent, civil society killers for 15 per cent and 'corporate killers' for 14 per cent (unknown, 7 per cent).³⁸ The Catholic Church's Office of Justice and Peace in Jayapura found a similar continuity: the practice of torture that was a feature of the New Order regime in Papua had continued unabated in the decade since the fall of Suharto in May 1998 (Hernawan 2008).

Much of the terror inflicted by the security forces in Papua has been sexualised in a way that has motivated observers to join the OPM. In separate cases, we spoke with one informant who witnessed the penises being cut off a number of men in his village. Another informant saw the vagina cut out of a woman and her husband made to eat it.³⁹ In our research team, we have debated whether it is sensational or appropriate to report this, but the frequency of such accounts among our informants makes it important for us to address this issue (see also

36 Indonesian authorities on Biak claimed these bodies were villagers swept out to sea after a tsunami on the north coast of neighbouring Papua New Guinea. Rutherford (1999:51) offers a rather different analysis, suggesting 'the argument that the corpses could not be the demonstrators because they were *not* Indonesians suited the strange logic of Indonesian state terror and sharpened the point of the military attack...Extra-legal violence against separatists...is not intended to purify the nation of alien elements, but to demonstrate the state's ability to appropriate their potency, i.e. to "nationalize death"'.
37 See Ballard (2002b:17) on pain in Papua 'rendered visible for other observers'.
38 The total of these percentages is 109 per cent, suggesting that some cases fall under multiple categories.
39 Critics might also say OPM members have an interest in sensationalising these stories, but we interviewed others who themselves had suffered mutilation of their genitals and we were given digital photographs of the mutilated genitals of others by human rights workers.

Brundige et al. 2004:63). We report some vivid detail partly because we are shocked—not only in the Papuan case, but across the region—at the extent of this cruelly creative sexualised sadism (against the genitals of men and women, and routinely with audiences forced to watch). It was a feature of nearly all of the conflicts in the first four volumes of *Peacebuilding Compared* and one rarely mentioned in the published literature, perhaps because it was so offensive. We think it is a recurrent pattern of conflict in the region that demands analysis.

The most sexually sadistic side of humanity has a use in conflicts where the desire is not to kill people on a large scale and to avoid becoming a priority on the UN human rights radar. For decades, many individuals rumoured to be targets for assassination by the security forces have attempted to flee Papua. Some now live in exile overseas while others, such as Arnold Ap and Eddie Mofu, were killed (Budiardjo and Liong 1988:125–36). Vivid images of small numbers of horrific extrajudicial executions that are passed by word of mouth can cause individuals to renounce the independence struggle or flee the country. SMS (text message) campaigns during our 2007 fieldwork were doing the work of letting a person know that they could be a target for execution (even if they had not yet made it onto that list). When we were interviewing one human rights worker who was not a member of OPM, an SMS came in: ‘Recipients of this SMS are members of OPM and should be killed without judicial process.’ He said some days he received as many as 12 such messages. The Alliance of Independent Journalists (AIJ) in Papua told us no journalists had been assassinated in Papua because this would attract international attention. This does not, however, stop journalists moderating their stories when they receive this kind of SMS or when their office is mysteriously ransacked. We were told in late 2008 that this SMS terror campaign seemed to have stopped in mid-2008. Rightly or wrongly, Papuans are very inclined to believe when a political leader disliked by Indonesia dies that the military has killed him.⁴⁰ They are also inclined to believe when popular pro-independence politicians win elections that the Indonesian State manages to declare them the loser. So the extrajudicial killing problem is part of why Papuans do not believe they live in a democracy or under a rule of law in any sense of the term.

Flag raisings have been the most persistent provocations to which the military has responded with violence. For example, when six women attempted to raise the morning star flag in front of the governor’s office in 1980, they were arrested, raped and imprisoned for long terms (Bertrand 2004:153). On 14 December 1988, Dr Thomas Wainggai (the first west Papuan to obtain a PhD), his Japanese wife,

40 An example is the previous Governor of Papua, Jaap Solossa, who is believed by family members and journalists we interviewed, and by countless Papuans, to have been poisoned. Mainstream media reports suggest that Solossa died of a heart attack, but the fact that no autopsy was performed on his body fuelled suspicions among some Papuans about the cause of his death.

Teruko, and about 60 supporters gathered at the Mandala stadium in downtown Jayapura for a peaceful ceremony to raise the flag of the independent state of 'West Melanesia' (see Giay and Godschalk 1993:338–41). They were arrested, charged and convicted of subversion. Wainggai received a sentence of 20 years' imprisonment and his wife and many of his supporters received sentences of four to eight years, even though the military commander for Papua observed at the time that '[it is] really nothing more than a diplomatic group...it is not an armed movement' (Amnesty International 1994). In March 1996, Wainggai died in Cipinang maximum-security prison in Jakarta under conditions many Papuans regarded as suspicious. His imprisonment and death in custody have made him a key martyr to the cause of Papuan independence and have helped strengthen support for his so-called Fourteen Stars Movement (Bintang Empatbelas) for Melanesian Christian solidarity.⁴¹ In the post-Suharto era, this trend continues. Filep Karma and Yusak Pakage were sentenced to 15 and 10 years' prison, respectively, for raising the morning star flag on 1 December 2004 in Abepura. During their trial, Judge Lakoni Hernie was reported to have made the following statements:

'Smash in the head of Filep if he's naughty' (Uttered in a direction by the judge to the police to break up a public speech by Filep Karma on April 19, 2005).

'Don't bring the name of your God in here, your God has been dead a long time' (Uttered to Karma during the hearing, April 19, 2005).

'You be quiet, you want to die do you?' (Uttered by the judge while he was kicking and punching a female pro-Karma protester) (HRW 2007a:23–4)

We conducted sad interviews with friends and parents of Cenderawasih University students convicted over demonstrations in Abepura (2004–06) who escaped their torture in prison through suicide. Karma, who was sentenced to 15 years in the Abepura cases above, somehow managed to climb from his cell onto the roof of the prison and once again fly the morning star flag on 1 December 2005 (the first anniversary of 'Papuan independence' after his imprisonment). We will conclude that such extraordinary acts of defiance are the lifeblood of a spirit of *merdeka* (liberation).

41 Note that the morning star flag and 'West Melanesia' or 'fourteen stars' flag are different, although in recent years the Bintang 14 movement has appropriated the morning star (on the Bintang 14, see Giay and Godschalk 1993:340).

The meaning of OPM: organisation, army, movement?

Recent (and revisionist) histories of the struggle for Papuan independence frame resistance as a ‘traditional’ response by various indigenous groups in Papua to foreign domination. Some accounts associate millenarian movements and local acts of resistance during the Dutch era with forms of Papuan proto-nationalism (see Penders 2002:104–40), while others go further to suggest a pre-contact Papuan ‘people’ (Rizzo 2004:115). One Papuan elder we interviewed, however, argued that OPM was really a label created by the Indonesians that Papuans subsequently embraced for their movement for *merdeka*. This connects to similar debates about the role of the Indonesian military in the genesis of GAM (the Free Aceh Movement) that we take up in Chapter 6. This also accords with John Djopari’s (1993) popular history of the OPM ‘rebellion’ against Indonesia, in which he traces the earliest use of the term to guerrilla actions led by Terianus Aronggear in 1964 on behalf of an ‘Organisation and Struggle for a Free West Papua’.⁴² Djopari argued that the name of this organisation was later abbreviated to Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM) and that it was popularised by actions in 1965 by ex-members of the Dutch-era Papuan Volunteer Corps (Djopari 1993:100; cf. Singh 2008:129).⁴³ The rise of Papuan guerrilla resistance to Indonesia in the mid-1960s also saw a shift in Indonesian Government rhetoric towards Papua; the integrationist claims and anti-colonial critiques of the 1950s and early 1960s gave way to a new discourse that sought to distance separatist groups such as the OPM from the Indonesian mainstream.

McRae (2000:7) identifies three key features of an official discourse on separatists in Indonesia under the New Order (1966–98). First, the government ‘essentialises’ separatist groups such as the OPM, depicting them as ‘remnants of the movement in an ahistoric manner, and confined to categories familiar to the Indonesian population’—as a ‘security disturbing group’ (Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan, GPK), as communists or as foreign pawns. Second, it ‘operates on separatists themselves, in a normative depiction of separatists as mistaken, misguided or misled’ (vis-a-vis a ‘citizen who considers him or herself an Indonesian’). This ‘allows the mobilisation of corrective technologies against separatism, such as “territorial operations” and “*pembinaan*” (loosely—guidance)’.⁴⁴ Finally, McRae identifies a ‘third, more insidious aspect of this discourse [that] disallows the

42 It is worth noting that references to (and discussion of) the OPM were banned under Suharto’s New Order. This ban extended to John Djopari’s (1993) history of the OPM even though much of his account of the early years of the OPM was based on an official military history (see Kodam 1971).

43 See also Djopari’s (1993:105–9) analysis of the four key elements that gave rise to the armed struggle and Singh’s (2008:128–32) synopsis of these.

44 Indonesian Government rhetorical claims of misguided or misled separatists are clearly apparent in the presidential decision to grant amnesty to PVK/OPM guerrilla fighters at the close of the Act of Free Choice in 1969 (1A/1969 *Pemberian Amnesti dan Abolisi Kepada Orang-Orang Yang Tersangkut di Dalam Peristiwa Awom dan Kawan-Kawan. Peristiwa Mandacan dan Kawan-Kawan dan Peristiwa Wagate-Enaratoli di Irian Barat*).

political motives of separatist movements, and often implies that the separatists are spoilt or out of touch with reality'. All elements of this discourse are apparent in the approaches of the Indonesian Government to Papuan resistance in the past four decades and remain prominent today.

Many Papuans we interviewed, when asked to explain their anti-Indonesian sentiment, stated 'we are all OPM' (see also King 2004:93–101, 106–7). Such claims reveal the attachment many Papuans feel to a broad nationalist agenda in which the OPM is understood not literally as a 'free Papua organisation' but as a 'free Papua movement'. For these Papuans, being aligned with OPM is not about adhering to the strictures or structure of a political organisation as much as it is contributing to and asserting the continuing presence of a broad sociopolitical movement for independence. Papuan participation in the OPM is also a deliberate and emphatic rejection of Indonesian Government discourses intended to diminish the significance and popular appeal of this separatist movement.

The broad appeal of the OPM is symbolic. Few West Papuans today would identify with the socialist or anti-Western sentiment of early OPM leaders such as Jacob Prai. Similarly, support for the OPM is not founded merely on a collective sense of 'forced territorial incorporation into Indonesia, cultural imperialism, loss of identity, alienation of land and political repression' (Premdas 1985:1062). The resonance that many Papuans feel with the OPM is derived from the symbolism and mythology now associated with the guerrilla movement. OPM today is evoked by warriors in traditional battledress, armed with spears, bows and arrows and other traditional weapons and who carry the standard of the morning star.⁴⁵ In this way, Papuan resistance is represented as a timeless form of resistance to foreign domination and OPM warriors as champions of independence.

Much of the popular support for the OPM today is derived from the symbolism of the morning star, and from the sentimental and emotional attachment to this flag, to the anthem *Hai Tanahku Papua!*, to the Crown Pigeon of State and to the territorial and cartographic control of West Papua (as inscribed in the *Political Manifesto of the National Committee of Papua* in 1961) (see Griapon 2007). As Benny Giay (in Cookson 2008:354) has stated, 'Papuans have sacrificed much and some have given their lives [for independence]. Their struggle is embodied

45 In recent years, Papuans have rarely demonstrated or been photographed armed with machetes or other easily available 'modern' weaponry popular elsewhere in the archipelago (see Cookson 2008:121–2). There is a very practical reason for this: Papuans are, on occasions, permitted to carry traditional weapons in public, whereas modern weaponry is considered to be more 'threatening'. Recent imagery, however, contrasts starkly with clandestine photographs of OPM guerrillas from the New Order period (mid-1960s to late 1990s) in which members of the OPM typically present themselves with 'modern' firearms or other weapons (for example, Osborne 1985). See also Ben Bohane's photo essay with imagery from West Papua taken in 1996 (Bohane et al. 2003:93–151).

in these symbols.’ In this way, Papua is strategically essentialised (see Spivak 1988) and can acquire a symbolic life (as a nationalist movement) of unity and common purpose—transcending the personalities, ideologies and machinations of OPM internal politics.

If, as our informants and our observations suggest, OPM is more a movement than an organisation, how can we answer the question of how many OPM there are? Today the Indonesian State (and some Papuans) makes a distinction between OPM as a general movement for *merdeka* through armed struggle where necessary and the National Liberation Army (Tentara Pembebasan Nasional, TPN) as the military wing of OPM. Seth Rumkorem founded the TPN in 1970. A large faction split off from it in 1976, led by Jacob Prai. These groups subsequently reconciled, though only partially, after new major factional splits emerged in OPM, although Papuan resistance to Indonesia remained schismatic (see Singh 2008:134 and later discussion in this chapter). Such divisions, perhaps, need not be taken too literally as it is important not to reify OPM or TPN as more coherent organisationally than they are (see Osborne 1985; Singh 2008:132–6, 144–9). Many claimed that Richard Yoweni was recently elected chairman of both OPM and TPN (Bohane 2008).

When contemporary commentators discuss questions such as how many OPM there are, it is often unclear whether they are talking about the OPM as an organisation, an army or a movement. They frequently don’t say and they might not know, as no-one really knows. When one of the TPN/OPM commanders we interviewed in 2008 said he had 10 000 fighters at his disposal who had been issued an identity card, we didn’t know whether he was talking about OPM or TPN members, although it seemed certain he was exaggerating! The Indonesian military estimated publicly in 2005 that OPM forces totalled only 620 (McGibbon 2006b:28), but we don’t know if they were talking about OPM or TPN, and we suspected it was a number that understated OPM’s strength. Singh (2008:135) has provided the most detailed and contemporary estimate of 1695, listing the estimated number of fighters under the command of each of 23 OPM commanders.⁴⁶ In this chapter, we do not try to make a distinction between OPM and TPN or to guess the numbers involved in either. We use TPN/OPM only for informants who make a point of insisting on this identity.

Repression after the failed Papuan uprising of 1984 led to 11 000 people fleeing across the border to Papua New Guinea between 1984 and 1986, according to Amnesty International. A key feature of the 1984 uprising was the defection of 100 Papuans from the Indonesian military (Singh 2008:141). OPM throughout the past five decades has been highly factionalised (with two main factions for most of this period, with many divisions within factions). Singh (2008:134)

46 This is close to Bonay and McGrory’s (2004:440) estimate of 1600.

lists 21 OPM factions. OPM has been militarily, financially and organisationally ineffective, unfunded and untrained by any foreign interests, unable or unwilling to tax local communities in the way of GAM in Aceh (see Chapter 6) and prone to defection by leaders bribed by the Indonesian military to be its agents.⁴⁷ On the other hand, we interviewed OPM members who were agents of the organisation within the Indonesian military (unless, as was possible, they were double agents who were lying to us!). One former police officer we interviewed claimed to have run a network of 130 police officers who were underground OPM members; they helped OPM with all manner of supplies—ammunition, typewriters, food and of course information. OPM has access to arms and arms dealers across the PNG border willing to sell to them at high prices by international standards, and now and then OPM manages to capture military weapons. A more important capability of OPM is that it has access to an international safe haven in Papua New Guinea. Because OPM is popular with the people, villagers supply them while they hide in the mountains. OPM became increasingly internationally networked to support groups in Australia and elsewhere, with their own representatives in exile in many countries, with the World Council of Indigenous Peoples and particularly with human rights NGOs and churches internationally.⁴⁸ There remain some remote no-go areas for the Indonesian military in the highlands that some even claim are ruled by OPM (King 2004:117)—for example, in Puncak Jaya (Chauvel 2007:49).

In past decades, hostage taking has been used frequently as an OPM strategy to raise the profile of their cause, although press coverage has not always been favourable (see Osborne 1985:88–93, 103–6). In January 1996, several dozen foreign and Indonesian researchers and NGO workers were abducted in the southern highlands of Papua. This hostage taking, led by OPM/TPN leader Kelly Kwalik, resulted in a massive militarisation of the region. With hostages from Britain, Germany, The Netherlands and Indonesia, and mediation by the International Committee of the Red Cross, this action brought prominent

47 NGOs and churches that are critical of Indonesia also have this problem. They are tempted with bribes and they are infiltrated by paid pro-Indonesian agents who seek to open splits within effective organisational critics of Jakarta.

48 In recent years there has been a growing preoccupation with the identification of members/elements of this network. On 12 June 2006, a special delegation of members of the Commission 1 for Political, Security and Foreign Affairs of Indonesia's Parliament arrived in Australia with a diagram illustrating the 'Papuan Pro-Separatist Network in Australia' (*Jaringan Pro-Separatist Papua di Australia*). This diagram identified specific individuals and organisations by name and the details of these individuals and groups were published widely in the mainstream media in Indonesia in early April 2006 (in *Detik.com*, *Media Indonesia*, *Tempo* and *Republika*). The list was prepared by a group of senior Indonesian MPs with input from BIN (Badan Intelijen Negara), the country's intelligence agency (AAP 2006). There has been limited interest in this issue in the past among academics (May 1991) but in recent years there has been an efflorescence of interest. See also: King (2004:180–9) for a rich account of the many strands and dimensions of this network; McGibbon (2006b:90–4); Heidbüchel (2007:57–111) for a broad analysis of the contemporary actors and interests at stake in the conflict; and Singh (2008:211–21) for a tabulated list of 'West Irian Émigré Organisations Supporting Papuan Independence'.

international attention to the plight of Papuans in their homeland. After four long months of negotiations and demands by Kwalik, however, which included an independent West Papua, resolution came through a military operation personally overseen by General Prabowo Subianto, then head of Kopassus (the Indonesian Special Forces). This final engagement resulted in the deaths of several of the Indonesian hostages, but no foreigners. Numerous similar hostage takings through the 1980s and 1990s, such as one in October 1984 when 58 non-Papuans were taken hostage at a logging camp (Giay 2001a:138), attracted little international publicity, as no Westerners were involved.

In 2002, the OPM again attracted significant international publicity for its alleged role in a bloody attack involving foreigners in the PT Freeport Indonesia Contract of Work area.⁴⁹ This incident led to an investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the ambush, which left three teachers—two US citizens and an Indonesian—dead. A preliminary investigation by the respected Papuan provincial police commander, General Made Pastika (who later ran the 2002 Bali bombing investigation), suggested military involvement in the killings, but ultimately only OPM members were convicted of the murders (Hernawan 2005:79).⁵⁰ The OPM leaders we interviewed all alleged the military killed the schoolteachers (see also Kirksey and Harsono 2008). The murders could have been a response by the military to attempts by the US Freeport mine at the time to wean them off the company's largesse (Ballard and Banks 2007:22). When there was another attempt to do that in July 2009, there were a further series of perhaps six shooting incidents near the mine in which one Australian mine engineer and two Indonesians were killed and many others were wounded. Again, OPM and the Indonesian military accused each other of the attacks. Attacks continued, however, after seven 'OPM suspects' were arrested, with three wounded in one incident on 20 October 2009 (*Tempo*, 20 October 2009). Ambushes in which Freeport employees were shot continued into January 2010, weeks after OPM leader, Kelly Kwalik, who had been blamed, was shot and killed by the security forces (*Jakarta Post*, 26 January 2010).

49 PT Freeport Indonesia (henceforth Freeport) is a wholly owned subsidiary of Freeport McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc., a publicly listed US company.

50 Despite Pastika's honest and professional reputation, the formal separation of the police and military in the early years of *reformasi* created a great deal of tension between these two branches of the security forces. There were several serious fire-fights between police and military in Papua in this period, some resulting in deaths, as the two security services tussled over control of extortion and other rackets. Pastika was reassigned to investigate the Bali bombing before he completed his investigation on the shootings in Timika and the final police report did not implicate the Indonesian military in the attack.

Another important OPM strategy has been to draw attention to the brutality of the Indonesian security forces by raising the profile of Papuans seeking sanctuary in Papua New Guinea⁵¹ and Australia.⁵²

What the OPM does not have is any sense of a military strategy that could lead it to win or mobilise violence that could force Jakarta to the negotiating table. The same low-level guerrilla-war strategy has been deployed for almost five decades with only minor military accomplishments of killing or capturing handfuls of Indonesian soldiers.⁵³ There is a naive hope of Indonesia making similar mistakes to those it made in East Timor, handing victory to the OPM, but Indonesia has been careful to avoid the East Timor mistake of massacres of civilians in front of television cameras. It is also unlikely another President Habibie will come along who will grant Papua a UN-supervised referendum on independence.

Freeport

Papua became even more important to Indonesia when gold and copper production began at the Freeport mine, owned by the Louisiana Company Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold, in 1972. In 1995, Rio Tinto became a partner in Freeport's further expansion (Leith 2003:76). Freeport has been the biggest taxpayer in Indonesia for many years and probably will be for a few more decades to come. Since they began to exploit their Grasberg deposit in the early 1990s, they have been mining the richest single body of ore in the world. During the 1990s and through the current decade, the mine accounted for more than half the gross domestic product (GDP) of Papua (Hernawan 2005:53) and 2.4 per cent for all Indonesia in 2005 (Freeport Indonesia 2006:21). Counting indirect jobs, the company estimated that the mine added 283 000 jobs to the national economy in 2006 (Freeport-McMoRan Copper and Gold Inc. 2006:6). With time, the mine has provoked a profound escalation of momentum for

51 West Papuans sought sanctuary in Papua New Guinea en masse in 1969 after the Act of Free Choice, in 1984–85 after an unsuccessful Papuan coup (see Smith 1991:170–228) and again in the wake of the reprisals after the Abepura incident of 7 December 2000 (see HRW 2001c).

52 In January 2006, 43 Papuan refugees arrived in Australia and all were eventually granted asylum (see Nichols 2006). This is not to suggest that Papuans do not have legitimate reasons for seeking asylum. In late March 2006, a second group of Papuan students attempted to reach Australia by boat, fearing reprisals by the security forces in Papua after student demonstrations against Freeport (discussed later) in Abepura on 16 March 2006 got out of hand. Several members of Brimob, Indonesia's paramilitary police, were killed in the incident (see PGGP 2006). An Indonesian navy vessel intercepted this second boat of asylum-seekers en route to Australia. Navy personnel are said to have shot at the boat and its occupants before sinking the vessel and leaving the Papuans onboard to drown (many of the highlands students on board could not swim). This story was recounted to one of our informants in great detail by two survivors of the incident.

53 The most successful capture was of seven Indonesian officials, including some high-ranking army officers, in May 1978, the prize being Colonel Ismail, Commander of the Military Resort Command (Komando Resimen, Korem) for Abepura (see Samsudin 1995).

conflict, most recently in 2003 when the central government sought to separate the wealth of the mine from the Province of Papua by creating a new Central Papua Province centred on Timika, the town Freeport created.⁵⁴

As with the comparably vast mine in Bougainville (see Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6), tailings from the Freeport mine had a massive impact on the environment and on livelihoods, destroying sago, agriculture and fishing. The Contract of Work Freeport signed with the new Suharto regime in 1967 guaranteed Freeport a right to take over land and resettle the indigenous population without any obligation to pay compensation or consult with indigenous inhabitants of the mine site (Soares 2004:121).⁵⁵ The terms of the Freeport agreement were therefore worse than the Bougainville agreement. Adérito Soares showed that the Freeport contract was about showing the New Order was 'open for business' and strengthening its political access within the United States. This hope was realised with the appointment to the Freeport-McMoRan board of former US ambassadors to Indonesia, a former secretary of state in Henry Kissinger and a former director of the CIA (Ballard and Banks 2007:16). Ex-CIA and US military officers have headed company security.

The Amungme people consider the massive open-pit mine that was once a mountain

to be their ancestral grandmother, Tu Ni Me Ni...Freeport has decapitated Tu Ni Me Ni's head, is digging out her stomach and dumping her intestines in the rivers, a process that pollutes her life giving milk. To the Amungme, Freeport's mining activities are killing their mother...on which they depend for sustenance—literally and spiritually. (MacLeod 2007:29)⁵⁶

Indigenous people, angry about exclusion from their land or the unwillingness of Freeport to share their vehicles and other facilities with them in return for locals sharing the land with them, began attacks. Working with OPM, they attacked powerlines and oil tanks and cut the pipeline carrying copper concentrate to the port (Elmslie 2002:42). This invoked retaliation from the military; many died from air raids and mortar attacks on villages (Ballard 2001:25). In June 1977, a foreign pilot witnessed villages near Timika being strafed by Indonesian planes.

54 The division of Papua into three provinces was first mooted in 1982 and revisited again by the Governor of Papua, Rear Admiral (ret.) Freddy Numberi, a Papuan from Serui, in a letter to the Indonesian Ministry of Home Affairs in March 1999 (see Wanggai 2005). The division was formally recognised on 4 October with the passing of Law 45/1999 by the Indonesian Parliament (UU45/1999) but was almost immediately quashed by incoming President Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid's successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri, in her first decree of 2003 (Inpres 1/2003) reinstated the division.

55 The Indonesian Government passed its first Investment Law with provisions for direct foreign investment in 1967 (UU1/1967). Freeport was the first foreign investor of Suharto's New Order government.

56 See also Ballard (2002b:18).

In Papua, as in Bougainville, military and the police mobile brigade (Brimob) brutality fuelled support for independence. The difference between the two was the level of retaliatory slaughter that could be inflicted by the superior capabilities of the Indonesian, compared with the PNG, military. This meant that the OPM, unlike the Bougainville Revolutionary Army, concluded that it should stay its hand on its undoubted capability to shut down the mine, because the OPM was unwilling to inflict again this kind of price on its families and villages. On 14 September 2008, however, mortar rounds exploded at the mine and near Timika airport, without causing injury or much damage.

Freeport guaranteed loans of US\$673 million to Suharto cronies between 1991 and 1997 to purchase Freeport shares and other mine assets associated with agreed profit levels that Freeport also guaranteed. March 2002 saw Freeport declare to the markets one large loan default that required repayment by the company of US\$253.4 million (ICG 2002a:18). In 1996, indigenous group LEMASA filed a US\$6 billion claim against Freeport in the courts of its home state, Louisiana (Soares 2004:139), alleging seizure of sacred land, pollution and conspiring with the military to commit human rights abuses. While it failed legally, the leader of the suit, Thom Beanal, benefited from appointment to the board of Freeport-McMoRan's subsidiary PT Freeport Indonesia. A second suit led by Josepha Alomang also failed. Another response in 2001 was a Land Rights Trust Fund used in part to purchase a tiny shareholding in the mine in trust for customary landowners; Freeport voluntarily contributed \$500 000 a year to the fund backdated to 1996, increased to \$1 million a year from 2005. Freeport has sought to silence critics by spending other monies to support Papuans—for example, through scholarships to attend high school and university in Indonesia (BP also funds university scholarships), vocational training, hospitals, anti-malaria programs and roads. This has not been particularly successful. Critics say many of these investments benefit the mine and its migrant workforce more than Papuans, yet *Business Week* was apparently impressed enough to crown Freeport as America's most philanthropic company (Ballard and Banks 2007:22).

JB: Hasn't Freeport become more generous and sharing than they were 10 years ago [referring to the 'One Per Cent Trust Fund'—1 per cent of profits for community development]?

Two OPM commanders (in unison): They just give 1 per cent. Their money is bloody. [They then went on to argue that most of the money went into the pockets of the captive Papuans who managed their funds for them.] These people go on trips abroad with the money, [and] hire staff.

Another indigenous leader said: '1 per cent of what? We don't know what the numbers are on which they base the 1 per cent.' After we cited some data on

disbursements to benefit Papua, he sneered: 'They control the gold and they control the data. They are rich in gold and rich in data.' At the beginning of the interview, he said, shaking our Human Research Ethics information sheet: 'People who come with pieces of paper are people who like lies, like Freeport have pieces of paper for their story.'⁵⁷

Ballard and Banks (2007:21) argued that the 'One Per Cent Trust Fund' initiative was effectively hijacked by the security forces,

which insisted that the fund be disbursed among all of the neighbouring ethnic groups, the so-called 'seven suku [tribes]'. By putting forward their own clients as leaders of these groups, individual security units were able to siphon off the lion's share of the benefits earmarked for the indigenous communities.

Subsequent narrowing of the direct beneficiaries of the fund from seven tribes to the two whose lands suffered most of the impact of the mine created intertribal resentment and worsened other horizontal tensions that were already present. The five excluded tribes are overwhelmingly immigrants into the land of the Amungme and Kamoro, who arrived in search of Freeport-related employment, though it is more complex than that, with some tribes claiming enclaves within Amungme lands ceded in settlements of tribal wars of centuries past.

Objectively, the almost US\$200 million that Freeport claims to have contributed over four decades to the development of the Amungme and Kamoro and other indigenous people up to the end of 2005, including the \$1 million a year continuing into the trust fund, does not seem a big number compared with more than US\$7 billion the company claims to have contributed to Indonesia's GDP in 2005 alone (Freeport Indonesia 2006:21). Freeport seems to spend more on its US\$15 million-a-year internal security department ('Freeport's savage dogs', as locals commonly dub them) (Ballard 2001:29) to protect it from Papuans and more in payments to the military and police in the past to do so. Military payments of \$7.5 million were declared in 2004 (Ballard and Banks 2007:23). We were also told of a variety of additional off-the-books Freeport contributions to the military. Global Witness (2005) reports payments to individual officers, such as a total of US\$247 705 between May 2001 and March 2003 to the provincial military commander. The International Crisis Group (ICG 2002a:19) credibly suspected that peaceful protests in 1996 against Freeport were hijacked by the military and turned into riots with heavy losses to property and lives. A push

⁵⁷ Ethics Committee's note: indigenous people who struggle to read in their own language can see these pieces of paper as potentially some sort of trick by white lawyers to disadvantage them if some future conflict arises between them and the university. They are not completely wrong.

to extort US\$100 million from Freeport for a bigger garrison then followed. The company negotiated this down to \$35 million and subsequently to \$11 million annually (ICG 2002a:19; Leith 2003:241; Perlez and Bonner 2005).

Like the Timika elder who thinks Freeport controls the gold and the data, Freeport's occupational health and safety data could be read as too good to be true: no fatalities and a lost-time incident rate less than one-twentieth of that for mining inside the United States in 2005 (Freeport-McMoRan 2006:51)! On Freeport's cavalier reputation in the global mining industry for 'getting the rocks in the box' to the neglect of safety, the environment, production efficiency and other values, see Ballard and Banks (2007:13, 19). Flying over the environmental devastation caused by Freeport presents an awesome sight. Riverine tailings disposal has been occurring at the rate of 200 000 tonnes (Leith 2003:166–75) or 300 000 tonnes a day (Sumule 2005:111), wiping out vast tracts of rainforest. This is a level of tailings approximately at the combined level of the closed mines in Bougainville and Ok Tedi in Papua New Guinea. Overburden is removed at the rate of 750 000 tonnes a day, with one-third processed as tailings and the remainder dumped in valleys and lakes (Leith 2003:171). Freeport became the first corporation (in 1995) to have the Overseas Private Investment Corporation—a US government agency that insures political risk—suspend its insurance because of environmental or human rights concerns, perhaps a reason why it engaged in unusual forms of spying on its environmental critics (Fernandes 2006:90–1). In September 2008, Norway's Sovereign Wealth Fund sold its £500 million stake in Rio Tinto. The fund claimed that Rio, as a joint partner in Freeport's Grasberg operation, had failed to demonstrably improve environmental and other practices at the Grasberg operation (Robertson 2008).

The mine has created not only new inequalities between ethnic groups that do and do not receive largesse from the mine, but a new kind of class structure between those who have jobs and those who do not and between those who have supervisory positions (overwhelmingly migrants) and those who do not. Freeport's publicity said it pledged in 1996 to double the number of Papuan employees and then in 2001 to double it again—both impressive targets that were exceeded. After such dramatic improvement, however, in 2006, fewer than 27 per cent of 9000 direct employees were Papuan (Freeport-McMoRan 2006:5) and the percentage for the larger numbers of 'indirect' employees seemed worse. These numbers also compare unfavourably with BP's target of an 80 per cent Papuan workforce by 2026 (ICG 2002a:25).

Migration

The other factor that escalated resentment after 1969 was accelerating immigration from more westerly parts of Indonesia. By 1999, transmigrants funded by the

state to move to Papua probably reached 300 000 individuals (Mampioer 2008), although some reported figures were much higher than this.⁵⁸ The number of ‘spontaneous’ migrants was higher. The Suharto government had set a target of 1.7 million transmigrants—a plan to make Papuans a minority in their own land (Bertrand 2004:152). Transmigration settlements were targeted at strategic sites such as the area around PT Freeport’s Contract of Work and along the PNG border. Transmigration was abolished as a policy after the fall of Suharto in 1998, but spontaneous migration continued to accelerate. At the time of writing, the literature reported a range of figures, but it seemed Papua might not be far from the tipping point of Papuans becoming a minority. Indeed it is not impossible that it has already passed this point, as some allege Jakarta has a propensity in Papua for counting permanent migrants as temporary visitors. Almost a decade ago, the 2000 national census figures suggested indigenous Papuans were 68 per cent of the population, but these figures had their problems.⁵⁹ Tebay (2006:16) quotes local government figures for 2002 suggesting a figure of 52 per cent, but Elmslie (2007) reports 59 per cent for 2005 on the basis of Indonesian Statistics Office figures. What is clear from official data and local accounts is that migrants are now in the majority in all of the major towns across Papua. The ratio of Papuans to migrants continues to fall not only because of in-migration but because of high infant mortality,⁶⁰ AIDS and other health problems, poor nutrition and related human security issues that afflict indigenous Papuans much more than migrants.⁶¹

Many migrants have arrived in recent years because they have skills in oil-palm production. By far most of the better-paid waged employment—whether it is working in plantations, banks, airlines or mining, as drivers or even as shop assistants—is filled through immigrant networking. The civil service is an exception, where by 2002 the governor claimed 40 per cent of the workforce was Papuan (ICG 2002a:8), though this proportion still seemed lower than in 1961 under the Dutch (see Note 23). ‘There are no Papuan pilots. There are no Papuan doctors’ because, according to this NGO leader in Wamena, Indonesia thinks if Papuans are dependent on them for doctors, independence will be less attractive and more difficult for Papua. When it comes to the agricultural

58 Tebay (2006:16) cites an article in the Indonesian daily newspaper *Kompas* from 4 November 2002, which gives a figure stating that 546 693 transmigrants were moved to Papua in the period 1964–99.

59 Significant problems with coding of ethnicity are apparent in the 2000 Indonesian Census, which make it difficult to determine with any accuracy the ratio of indigenous to non-indigenous people in Papua. Similarly, there is a good deal of anecdotal evidence to suggest underreporting of migrant populations (as noted in the text), as well as indigenous populations living in more remote villages of Papua not visited by census takers.

60 One reason why is that immunisation of children occurs at a 50 per cent higher rate in Indonesia as a whole compared with Papua (Tebay 2006:21). Papuan infant mortality is three times the national average.

61 An example of this is the displacement of thousands of Papuans in more remote regions of the territory who flee their villages and gardens as a result of sporadic or continuing military operations. In late 2004, more than 5000 villagers were believed to be living ‘rough’ in Puncak Jaya District as a result of a military operation in the region (see Appeal 2004).

economy, migrant networking secures the best spots at markets for migrants; indigenous women can be found sitting on the hard unshaded ground outside the official markets trying to sell their produce. Migrant fishing technology is more efficient than indigenous fishing, meaning that Papuans often cannot compete with migrants in the market. The ethnic divide has become an ever-widening class divide. Its resentments are inflamed by widespread Indonesian racism towards Papuans, which blames them for being 'primitive', 'stupid', 'lazy' and worse (see Giay 2002; Berotabui 2007). As one European who lived in Papua for 45 years put it:

From the beginning when the Indonesians arrived, they treated the Papuans as the enemy; they don't love Papuan people; they have no appreciation of their culture and they do not try. There are some good ones among the Indonesians who do try and they do care, but most of the immigrants who come here get the money here to build a good home, perhaps back in Java, then leave...The Indonesians say to the Papuans, you have to love us, but they never learn the languages of the villages. They don't love Papuans, so why would they expect Papuans to love them?

The following quote from an interview with one Papuan leader indicates they have concerns about immigration destroying the holistic philosophy of land and environment in a similar way to logging and oil-palm development:

The transmigrants kill everything to make a rice paddy. They make a trap to catch all animals so they will not eat the rice. We depend on that animal. We are semi-nomads. Part of the way we get our food is hunting and gathering. Transmigrant agriculture kills all the deer, the cassowary and the kangaroos that we used to hunt.⁶² It was only in the late 1980s that the largest land clearing for rice got under way.

This old Papuan was well educated by the Dutch and had worked as a civil servant settling transmigrants. He was very ill when we interviewed him and died some days later, with pain in his heart for the future of his people. We dedicate this little piece of our text to telling his sad story. Here are some other snippets of the old man's wisdom:

[On human rights as the strategic struggle:] Papuans could never fight the Indonesian Army; [they have] so few weapons and no international support. Human rights are our best weapon. With them we get international support and the military knows it. That's why human rights activists are attacked as separatists.

62 Deer were introduced to Papua during the Dutch colonial period.

[On the power structure in Papua:] There is a pyramid of a great mass of uneducated and manipulable Papuans at the bottom. There are a few Papuans at the top who are used by Indonesia. In the middle are the middle class of migrants who run everything.

[On Papuan generosity in sharing their land even with Freeport:] We have no skills in bargaining about land rights. In our custom, land is not sold...[We agree to let them use it, then they put a fence up to keep us out. Our people are puzzled by Freeport] guards, security to keep Papuans out...[Puzzled by the lack of interest of these security guards in providing security for Papuans]. Companies have a kind of mafia to protect the company and not to protect the people.

The genocide argument

Indonesian nationalists believed that Papua was integral to the revolution and the nation from its inception. This contrasted with East Timor, which became integral to the national consciousness from 1975 when it was annexed by Indonesia. Until the early 1960s, Indonesian efforts to integrate West New Guinea into the republic were depicted as the liberation of Papuans from Dutch colonialism. After Papuan elites spurned this narrative, Indonesian 'benevolence' was reformulated as a colonial project to uplift the primitive peoples of the territory into civilisation. Some Papuan intellectuals came to see this as cultural genocide.⁶³ It had some totalising features in the 1960s and 1970s, such as banning Papuans from performing their traditional dances and requiring them to learn more refined Javanese dances instead! In 1971, Indonesia inaugurated 'Operation Penis-Gourd' to persuade highland men to abandon their penis sheaths as primitive and banning them from the streets of Wamena. Highland women disapproved and made ingenious use of government-distributed underwear as bags and headwear (Howard et al. 2002:6; see also Hastings 1982:159). When a highlander ginger group emerged after the congresses of 2000 to persuade the Papuan leadership to take a more radical line, they called themselves the Penis Gourd People's Assembly.

The more realist response to Papuan rejection of Indonesian liberation was, however, that of General Ali Moertopo in 1969, as quoted by prominent nationalist leader Thom Beanal: 'I came here not for you, but for your land' (cited in Wing and King 2005:46). Beanal in the same interview interprets the

63 It could be argued that the (broad) pattern of policy in Papua was consistent with the definition of 'cultural genocide' in the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (26 August 1994). The final version of this declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly in September 2007, did not contain specific reference to 'cultural genocide' although provisions for the protection of indigenous cultures remained (see Article 8).

spread of HIV/AIDS in a genocide framework. We heard this in dozens of our interviews. Incidents of authorities being advised of the arrival of AIDS-infected fishermen or prostitutes were ignored in a most cavalier fashion, it was alleged. Beanal says, 'I believe they allowed the virus to spread deliberately' (quoted in Wing and King 2005:48). As chairman, Beanal was a signatory of the Manokwari Declaration of Dewan Adat Papua (Papuan Customary Council) of 4 February 2005. Clause 7 calls for a UN investigation of genocide in Papua: 'We declare that there is a strong indication of a process of ethnic cleansing (genocide) in Papua Land since the integration in 1969.' Our repeated requests for evidence of Indonesian intent to spread AIDS always drew a blank. Respondents listened when we pondered if it might discredit their cause internationally to allege Indonesian genocide on the spread of AIDS without evidence of intent.

The rape of local women by the military and police has been a serious problem (Coomaraswamy 1999). Rape victims are sometimes threatened with death, as are members of their family and witnesses if they lodge a complaint about the rape (HRW 2007b:58–63). This leaves women in terror of walking to their gardens. The much more widespread problem and concern among women is, however, unwanted pregnancies fathered by Indonesian soldiers in circumstances that lie between rape and consent. 'Many women are afraid of the man with the gun.' When propositioned by a soldier, who might be a good man who is genuinely asking for consent, the woman might not be sure whether she has a choice. At military posts in villages, there is a lot of turnover as new rotations arrive from Indonesia. A culture has developed of departing soldiers advising arriving soldiers of the women in the village who are easy targets for sex. Once these women learn they have been so identified, they feel it is even more dangerous for them to say no. One of the main reasons for women being targeted in this way in the first place is that they are women who are 'not strong', meaning they are more frightened than other women of the soldiers and their guns.

In many Papuan communities therefore sex under the domination of the gun is seen as a bigger problem than rape; trauma from a single incident of rape, horrific as it is, is not as bad as the trauma of AIDS acquired by repeated fearful consent with soldiers who also frequent brothels with infected sex workers. When children are born of these liaisons, soldiers almost never take responsibility for the children, or do so only until their rotation ends. When the children are born with straight hair, they can be stigmatised and cut off from rights to land that accrue to legitimate children. Mothers might be stigmatised in their village by their own community and subjected to the 'settler gaze' of Indonesian society in regional towns (see Butt and Munro 2007). Children are condemned to poverty or a footloose life uncoupled from traditional inheritance and authority, ritually and spiritually disenfranchised. They were reported in our interviews to live psychologically unhappy lives. Adults are polite with

straight-haired children, but children at school can be less sensitive and ask them who their father is, or bully them. This is one of the most profound senses that military occupation is destructive of culture and social structure. Mothers in remote areas have therefore sometimes killed their children when they are born with straight hair (cf. Butt 2007:135–6). This is incidentally a case study of why it is imperative for any occupying military—especially peacekeepers who lean so heavily on legitimacy—to enforce a ban on all sexual liaisons with locals.

The first reference to the suggestion that Indonesian policy in Papua was ‘intended genocide’ appeared in an aerogram from US President Richard Nixon’s Ambassador in Jakarta, Frank Galbraith, on 9 July 1969, which stated that ‘[m]ilitary repression has stimulated fears and rumours of intended genocide among the Irianese’.⁶⁴ Papuans then picked up on the internationally resonant discourse of genocide.

Poisoning of food and alcohol sold in locales where the consumers were all Papuan was revealed in our 2007 interviews to be widely seen as the current genocidal weapon of choice, though in the course of 2008, as with the SMS terror campaign discussed earlier, we were told suspicious poisonings seemed to have ceased. One OPM informant claimed that 500 people had been killed this way across Papua in one month in 2007. There were also allegations of Papuans living in Java being poisoned.⁶⁵ One might be tempted to dismiss this as OPM propaganda were it not that international NGOs, missionaries and police based in Jayapura talked with workers from hospitals about 53 alcohol-poisoning deaths reported in the seven months of 2007 before our arrival for our first fieldwork (a huge number for a small city where probably far fewer than 100 000 people ever consumed alcohol). The police were convinced that these victims had been intentionally poisoned and said so publicly. The military leadership contradicted the police, saying there was no evidence for this, amid suggestions that it was military personnel who had sold the poisoned alcohol. In one village visited for interviews with a retired OPM fighter of the 1960s, old men and young women spoke of eight young muscular men with short hair in civilian

⁶⁴ This aerogram was included in a dossier of secret documents posted on the web site of the National Security Archive (NSA), a US NGO, in July 2004 (see Simpson 2004). When this NSA report was released, it was widely assumed (and reported) by pro-Papua activists that this report was an official government document and that it signified a change in US Government policy regarding Papua and an official recognition of US complicity in securing an outcome favourable to Indonesia in the Act of Free Choice. Such disinformation is common in Papua and helps to fuel expectation among pro-independence Papuans.

⁶⁵ On 18 October 2007, Sabar Olif Iwanggin, an employee of the Papuan human rights group Elsham, was arrested in Jayapura by members of the elite Detachment 88 Indonesia anti-terror squad and taken to Jakarta for questioning. After almost two months in custody, he was formally charged on 13 December with insulting the President of Indonesia after receiving and forwarding a derogatory SMS (text message) even though the message was widely circulated in Papua (and sparked by reports of Papuans living in Java being poisoned) (see INFID 2008 for a verbatim statement of the text message). Iwanggin’s case was brought to trial and the charges against him dismissed on 21 January 2008 after he had spent more than three months in detention.

clothes being seen by a villager injecting fruit such as pawpaws and bananas with a syringe. The village elders were called and could see marks on the fruit consistent with this. They fed the fruit to a dog that then died.

Brundige et al. (2004) document a history of poisonings going back to the early years of the conflict. One of the few documented quasi-traditional forms of reconciliation with the military involved the Indonesian Government giving a batch of pigs from Bali as a 'peace offering' to the Ekari people after a prolonged counterinsurgency among them in 1972 (see Hyndman 1987). Unfortunately, doctors traced the pigs as the source of an epidemic of cysticercosis that infected 25 per cent of the Ekari population, becoming one of the major causes of mortality among them, before spreading far and wide to other parts of Papua, killing unknown numbers of Papuans. Of course, proof of infection and the state as the source of the infection does not prove state intent to infect. The Brundige et al. (2004:75) team of Yale Law School students uses cases like this—cases of all the men in a village being rounded up and executed (no doubt about intent there!), codenames for military sweeps among civilian populations such as 'Annihilation', napalm and chemical weapons used against villages suspected of being OPM strongholds, forced labour (particularly for military harvesting of rare Merbau logs among the Asmat people) and the like—to make a case that '[s]uch acts, taken as a whole, appear to constitute the imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the West Papuans' and 'constitute crimes against humanity under international law'.

The difficult question, as the authors concede, is whether there is *mens rea* of genocide. We have not seen evidence of it. While we see something less systematic than 'imposition of conditions of life calculated to bring about the destruction of the West Papuans', we do think there have always been and still are some military officers and members of the Jakarta elite who see it as a desirable political objective to make Papuans a minority in their own land by deploying a variety of means (particularly migration) and to exterminate OPM fighters and even their families. We certainly suspect this is a minority view today and perhaps it was throughout Suharto's reign as well. We do not know. We do know the current President of Indonesia is by no means a genocidal man; indeed, we see him as a decent man and a peacebuilder who is yet to find the strength to stand up to certain homicidal elements within his security forces. He has quietly eased out some of the most brutal and anti-autonomy elements in the military who seized control of the Papua debate under his predecessor (McGibbon 2006b:54–7).

Most OPM (and many Papuans) believe they are being ethnically cleansed. For this reason, many OPM subscribe to a form of ethnic cleansing as rectification. They say part of the independence package should be that all migrants must return to where they came from. When we asked, 'Is that not ethnic cleansing?',

and is that not a problem with how the international community would see their cause, they said, 'No, we would ask them politely to leave. We would not burn and take their things or kill them.' What if they refused, we asked? What if they set up their own militias to defend their homes with guns? Well, yes, there would have to be force then. But look at East Timor, some said, the Indonesians were not forced to leave; they wanted to leave when the referendum vote for independence succeeded. In fact, some did stay, we pointed out, and burning and killing everything in their path was not a great way of leaving! Much more dialogue is needed to help Papuan activists see they are not the only ones living in fear. The Alliance for Democracy Papua showed us the results of a study they had completed of 160 Muslim women in Jayapura. They were most afraid of Papuans even though in Papua there had not been the systematic and violent attacks on settlers that the Aceh conflict saw repeatedly.⁶⁶ The fear of these Muslim women was that one day migrants like them would be killed by Papuans seeking independence. While most indigenous leaders in Papua, and many who have fled Indonesia, support the right of migrants to continue living in an independent Papua, a large proportion of OPM supporters within Papua seem not to.

The Chinese question

And what about the Chinese who had been trading with Papuans for centuries, we asked OPM leaders? Not much thought had been given to them and there were very different views about them, with a clear majority thinking they should be able to stay. 'The Chinese don't try to make us live like Chinamen. The Indonesians do try to make us live like Javanese, so there is no need to send the Chinese back. The Chinese are not our enemy,' said a highlands student leader. Chinese businessmen appear to have little interest in shaping the cultural or political milieu in Papua; the long history of anti-Chinese sentiment and discrimination elsewhere in Indonesia (especially on Java) is not yet apparent in Papua. The central importance of Chinese businesses to the local economy, however, particularly since World War II when the Dutch accelerated investment in the territory, makes them a key stakeholder group in Papua. Chinese entrepreneurship in Papua, as elsewhere in Indonesia and the region, appears to be opportunistic in its links to the military and the shadow economy. This pragmatic approach to commerce has led to Chinese businesses in Papua controlling much of the import and export trade and investment in

66 The terrible exception was Wamena in October 2000 when Brimob and Kostrad (elite infantry) fired on and killed demonstrators from migrants' homes. The Dani demonstrators later destroyed many of the migrant homes and killed a number of migrants (perhaps two dozen). Dani elders later described the police action of shooting on them from the homes as a deliberate provocation aimed at inducing a clash with settlers (HRW 2001c:13). If so, it worked. It was the first and last major incident of slaughter of migrants by Papuans and the decisive turning point that ended the Papuan spring of 1999–2000.

the province(s). Unlike Freeport, among firms such as Bintang Mas CV and other family owned Chinese businesses in the province, there is little public accountability or transparency, nor is there among their national counterparts, such as PT Djajanti Group. Chinese business interests have been instrumental in the transformation of Papua's towns into centres of commerce and consumption with tremendous social, cultural, political and economic implications. Direct foreign investment from China is also of growing significance in Papua, with large hotel chains such as Swiss-Bel (based in Hong Kong, not Switzerland!) now established in the provincial capitals of Manokwari and Jayapura. The importance of Chinese 'soft power' in the region is only now coming to the attention of scholars and governments in Indonesia and elsewhere (see D'Arcy et al. 2007; Wesley-Smith 2007). How Papuans will come to understand the transformations brought by such commercial interests over time and the role and responsibilities these businesses define for themselves remain unclear.

We will see in the first two volumes of *Peacebuilding Compared* a sad pattern across our cases—from Solomon Islands and Bougainville to Timor and across Indonesia from Kalimantan and Jakarta to Aceh, indeed in Java (particularly Jakarta in 1998)—in which the Chinese have been attacked, raped and looted as targets of resentment in conflicts that have not been fundamentally or centrally about them, and that this has happened repeatedly across the centuries. Papua is something of an exception. To date, in the past half-century of conflict in Papua, we have seen little evidence of Chinese Indonesians suffering horrific collateral damage.

The fall of Suharto and the 'Papuan spring'

When President Habibie relaxed some military control on succeeding President Suharto in 1998, demonstrations and flag raisings accompanied by singing of the Papuan anthem were organised in all the big towns of Papua, demanding a referendum on independence. Habibie sent advisors to the province, who reported back to him that most Papuans would support staying with Indonesia as long as their province was renamed from Irian Jaya to Papua and was granted some kind of autonomy from Jakarta. On 26 February 1999, Habibie was shocked when Thom Beanal, team leader of a group of 100 Papuan leaders (Team 100) who met with him, read a declaration that demanded independence. Habibie told them to think again. Dialogue with his government ended that day. A tragic consensus also crystallised among the Jakarta security and intelligence elite (led by the Ministry of Home Affairs and the National Intelligence Agency) as a result of the failed dialogue with Habibie, with consequences that persist to this

day.⁶⁷ First, the motives of all Papuans, regardless of their past or their standing within Indonesian society or government, were to be considered with suspicion (see Cookson 2008:45–54). Second, the pursuit of a policy to divide the province of Papua would help fragment the movement for Papuan independence. The fact that the division of the province was promoted in the early 1980s as a strategy to enhance development (Wanggai 2005) helped the Habibie government downplay the political imperative for the division.⁶⁸ On 4 October 1999, Law 45 (UU45/1999) was passed by the Indonesian legislature, dividing the (then) province of Irian Jaya into three separate provinces.⁶⁹ Protest and preparation for armed struggle accelerated in Papua. Events were pulled back from the brink by the inauguration of Abdurrahman Wahid on 1 November 1999. He responded to the protests by postponing indefinitely the planned partition of the province; he allowed morning star flag raisings as long as the Indonesian flag was raised as well. Some estimated that 800 000 people attended flag raisings across Papua to celebrate the thirty-eighth anniversary of the first raising of the morning star flag on 1 December 1961 (Bertrand 2004:155).⁷⁰

President Wahid visited the province on 31 December 1999 and is still admired throughout Papua for the way he conducted himself during this visit. He listened; he attended a Christian service at which he spoke of how ‘Jesus Christ was highly respected by the Muslim religion, and this surprised people and they really appreciated it’ from a man who came to power from his leadership of one of the major Muslim organisations in Indonesia. One leader of the Presidium said

we know you are blind but you are the first from Indonesia to see us Papuans. He also said that Irian was derived from an Arabic word meaning ‘naked’, so he wanted the province to use their name of Papua. He said if you wanted to fight for independence democratically you are free to. (Wamena interview)

67 In June 2007, leaders of the main churches in Papua released a special report in which they asserted that ‘two very secret documents of the Government of Indonesia have influenced and affected the way the Special Autonomy was inconsequently and inconsistently implemented’ (see West Papuan Churches 2007:1; Cookson 2008:44).

68 In 2002, a secret report from the head of the Institute for National Defence of the Republic of Indonesia (Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional Republik Indonesia, Lemhannas) made it clear that this was a key rationale for the division of the three provinces and argued that the division should proceed as stipulated by Law 45 of 1999 (Lemhannas 2002). It is reasonable to assume that this report was in part responsible for Presidential Decree No. 1 of 2003 (Inpres 1/2003), which called for the full implementation of Law 45 of 1999.

69 See <<http://www.papuaaweb.org/goi/index.html>>

70 This was a stark contrast with 1 December 2007, when we were in the highlands with an informant receiving reports of flag raisings around Papua. There were not more than two or three, brutally suppressed, but many families told us that at 5am that day they gathered together as a family to pray for independence, and they said confidently they believed that was happening in homes all over Papua. The struggle for independence seems deeply resilient in countless Papuan hearts.

Less punitive military leaders were also posted in 1999 to take over the security of Papua with a philosophy, as one general put it in his interview, of 'treating human beings as human beings'. He also said his policy was opposed by most generals in Jakarta. It did not last long.

The Indonesian security establishment and the Jakarta elite more broadly were not behind Wahid on Papuan reconciliation. The elite was still reeling from the vote for independence in East Timor that year. While Wahid's announced policy was to allow flag raisings, to tell Papuans that Indonesia was now a democracy in which they could give speeches in favour of independence if they wanted to, the military resumed crushing such speeches and flag raisings. The 1999–2000 dawn of freedom of assembly and freedom of speech in Papua was partial and short. The fraught national context of armed conflict in many other parts of Indonesia also affected Papua. For example, an influx of internally displaced persons (IDPs) fleeing the religious conflict in Ambon arrived at Sorong on 27 July 2000. Papuans turned out to protest their arrival, announcing their fear that they would bring religious conflict with them. The police fired on the protesters, killing five. Some days later, three more were killed in Sorong when the police lowered a morning star flag (Hernawan 2005:77).

Papuan nationalist leaders, acting decisively in the early period of *reformasi* in Indonesia, established new political leadership and organisational structures through two congresses in 2000 (Alua 2002a, 2002b). In February, every district in Papua was asked to send 10 representatives to a 'Great Consultation' (Musyawarah Besar, or Mubes). This meeting was followed by a Second Papuan People's Congress (the name recognising that the First Papuan People's Congress was held in 1961 when Papuan leaders declared their independence). At the Second Congress in May–June 2000, a further 10 representatives were added from each district in a process attended by 20 000 people. President Wahid, Freeport and BP supported the Second Congress financially (reportedly on condition that the conference would not call for a referendum on independence). At both events, there was mass participation by thousands of people, watchful that there would not be the kind of sell-out that happened with the Act of Free Choice in 1969. A Papuan Council (Dewan Papua) and a Presidium of the Papuan Council (PDP, or Presidium) were formed. The nationalist movement was galvanised and unified by the congresses under the leadership of Beanal, but most charismatically Theys Eluay, who had organised the flag raisings of 1 December 1999. While some OPM factions continued hit-and-run attacks during this period, the Presidium stood for peaceful negotiations and invited OPM leaders to be delegates. The inclusion of these OPM leaders represented a gradually evolving cease-fire that finally embraced nearly all OPM fighters.⁷¹

71 OPM informants told us, sometimes tearfully, of how tired they were of their suffering living in the jungle and how they did not want that life for their children.

In this way, the Presidium effectively took over from the OPM in 2000 as the principal organisational vehicle for Papuan nationalism. This process of consolidation was not negotiated without conflict. One OPM founder we interviewed described Eluay as a hypocrite who had sold out independence. He met Eluay on a number of occasions and urged him to lobby The Netherlands, Australia, Israel and the United States for guns to fight. 'He said we will get there the peaceful way, not through violence [our OPM fighter smirked at what he believed was Eluay's naivety]. He said this land is blessed by God. It will become a land of peace and he will stop the blood from being spilt.' The strategy of the Presidium was for a three-stage negotiation, whereas the mass of Papuans wanted independence immediately:

The first stage would be a commitment to non-violence by all parties, with a third party as a monitor. The second stage would be the upholding of the law and prosecution of human rights abusers. The third stage would be to re-open the discussion about Papua's incorporation into Indonesia in the 1960s and would bring in the United States and the Netherlands as countries that played a part in the original handover. (ICG 2002a:5)

The Presidium did not make it to first base. Wamena is the main urban centre in the highlands and a heartland of radical Papuan nationalism. A turning point away from freedom of assembly was violent clashes between Papuan nationalists and the military on 6 October 2000 in which 37 were killed, 89 injured and 13 000 became IDPs (HRW 2001). There was more violence at flag raisings in major towns on the 1 December 2000 anniversary of the 'declaration of independence'. The military was ready with reinforcements for this day, with 37 navy ships offshore (Elmslie 2002:xviii). On 2 December, five leaders of the Presidium, including Eluay, were arrested and jailed for some months on charges of separatist activities. The police and the military in Papua received instructions, as the Wahid presidency collapsed, to eliminate all separatist activities (Bertrand 2004:158). In January 2001, the more progressive military leadership of the Papuan spring was replaced. Major-General Mahidin Simbolon took over the province. He was a chief architect of the murderous militias of East Timor, regional chief of staff of the military when Dili was burnt to the ground in 1999, a veteran of six tours of duty in East Timor including the invasion of 1975 and a master of oppressive civilian containment (Elmslie 2002:xix).

The turning point away from reconciliation that began with the October 2000 killings, arrests and torture in Wamena ended with the assassination of Eluay by Kopassus on 10 November 2001 and the disappearance of his driver. Seven soldiers were ultimately convicted of the murder and sentenced to prison terms of 12–42 months, amid open national praise of the men by military leaders (Hernawan 2005:79). The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ryamizard

Ryacudu, described the soldiers as heroes for killing a 'rebel' (HRW 2007b:65). Theys Eluay was one of the most charismatic and talented leaders Papua had ever had. Today, he is a martyr to Papuans and his grave is a shrine.

In reality, like so many political leaders, Theys Eluay had a flawed past. As a leader who sought to become a big-man above other chiefs, he had a fraught relationship with his own Sentani people. He was one of the 1026 who voted for the Act of Free Choice in 1969. He joined Golkar, Suharto's military-based party machine, and became a member of the provincial parliament (King 2004:38). Many alleged he had business relationships with the military, including involvement in illegal logging. This enabled the military to spread the rumour that his was not a political assassination but a commercial killing over a conflict between (retired) generals seeking control of logging. They also spread the rumour that OPM rivals killed him, though no-one much believed that one.⁷² It was likely it was a political assassination. It was likely Eluay was a tainted man who found his greatest strength of character in his last years. It was likely he was moved by the students who taunted him to be willing to go to jail, like other patriots, for his beliefs. He was perhaps the nationalist leader who the military thought they had a chance of controlling in an era when the military lost control of the Indonesian State. In Theys Eluay's final years, however, the military totally lost control of him. His assassination was a measure of the fact that the military was regaining some control of the state by mid-2001. During their spring, Papuans saw that the rules of the game were up for grabs and that this anomic situation created an opportunity for transformation. By mid-2001, however, the military in Papua was dictating what the rules were; they were rules the military could play, but no-one else.

In July 2001, Megawati Sukarnoputri became president. Her approach to Papua was very different from Wahid's. She believed that Wahid had been weak in Papua. Wahid had put at risk the bold accomplishment of her father, President Sukarno, in integrating Irian Jaya into Indonesia. While Wahid sought to temper military crackdowns on freedom of speech in Papua, Megawati encouraged them. While Wahid responded to local aspirations for Papuan unity by resisting partition of the province, Megawati embraced her intelligence advice that this was the way to divide and rule Papua.⁷³ In no time, there were six game-

72 A similar deceit followed shortly after President Suharto extended his amnesty to PVK/OPM guerrilla fighters at the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice in 1969. Acub Zainal, Papua's provincial military commander at the time, ordered the assassination of the ex-PVK guerrilla fighter Ferry Awom and instructed his agents to spread a rumour that Awom had fled to Papua New Guinea (see Vlasblom 2004:490).

73 An ironic contribution to the literature in this regard is Ross's (2002:18) interesting analysis of how natural resource endowments can foster separatism. With justification, Ross praises BP for the socially responsible way (compared with Freeport) it has developed a vast natural gas field off the Papuan coast: 'This is precisely the kind of project that is likely to produce new grievances and add fuel to the separatist movement. BP has made an admirable effort, however, to anticipate this danger by engaging in widespread community consultations to minimize the costs placed on local peoples; by promoting community-based

playing regents with proposals to constitute new provinces with their town as the capital. These enjoyed varying, but considerable, support from the central government and from local military leaders who equated a new province with a need for a new military base.

Emergent ideologies after the Papuan spring

Our interviews reveal four ways of seeing this period of history that we consider in turn in the next few sections of this chapter. The first sees the police-military crackdown that stepped up with the Wamena killings and reached its peak with the imprisonment and ultimate assassination of Eluay in November 2001 as the last hope for a negotiated approach to freedom for Papua. This is the view of most ordinary Papuans⁷⁴ and it is the view of almost all Papuans—elite and poor—in the highlands. The major exceptions in the highlands are those who are on the payroll of the military or central state. Even many of them say one thing to their Indonesian masters and another in their village (and to foreign interviewers). The moment of profound hope that was in the hands of Wahid and Eluay dissipated with their demise. The special autonomy that emerged in the same year of their demise (2001) is seen in this majority view as a trick of the Jakarta elite. Prominent critics of the autonomy Papua was given in 2001 believe it has been vacuous so far (Alua 2007). Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, has described the implementation of special autonomy as '*kacau balau*' (chaos and confusion) (Tebay 2009:8). Including as it does a want of regulations for implementation, *kacau balau* has a meaning akin to anomie. Many of the benefits of special autonomy are flowing back to Jakarta and into the pockets of corrupt local cronies of the Jakarta elite;⁷⁵ they are not flowing to the long-suffering

programs to help distribute the benefits of development in sensible ways; and by not allowing the Indonesian military to station troops at the facility, so as to avoid the provocations and human rights abuses carried out by the military at some of Indonesia's other major extraction sites' (Ross 2002:18). Since the publication of Ross's article, this positive relationship between BP and elites in Manokwari has made it more attractive for them to support Jakarta's moves to separate them and BP's resource wealth from Papua Province and from Papua's comparatively resource-poor capital, Jayapura. District political elites also sought—so far unsuccessfully and with considerable conflict—to do that by creating a third Central Papua Province in 2003 that separated the resources around the proposed new capital of that province, Timika. Resource-responsive separatism is a game of Russian dolls that two can play. That is, separatists with an agenda of claiming resources as an indigenous right that should be prised away from the national capital can have them prised away from their provincial capital by the state. Both kinds of separatist move can engender the 'resource curse' conflict, as the Papuan case demonstrates.

74 The International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES 2003) found that 75 per cent of Papuans 'were aware of the aspiration for independence' and two-thirds of this group believed independence meant a separate nation. The West Papua National Student Union conducted a survey at the request of the International Commission of Jurists in Australia in 2001, finding 95 per cent Papuan support for independence. Neither of these surveys included migrant opinion in Papua (see further Maraki Vanuariki Council of Chiefs and Port Vila Council of Chiefs 2007:1).

75 One senior government official in Papua expressed the problem as follows: 'To get money actually spent you need to bribe people in Jakarta and locally. Thirty–forty per cent of the budget [is] actually spent on programs, 60–70 per cent [is] lost into officials' pockets.'

people of Papua. Many Papuan leaders we interviewed believed most of the special autonomy money was spent on the security services and on the needs of Freeport and other foreign investors for expenditure on ports, six passenger ships for transporting migrants (Chauvel 2007:34), security and other infrastructure rather than the spending on education and health ordinary Papuans wanted to see.⁷⁶ These are therefore the dominant two views: first, the view of the majority of indigenous Papuans that only a referendum for independence can deliver freedom for Papua; and second, the view of Indonesians who are not ethnic Papuans (and small numbers of Papuans on the Indonesian payroll) that the best future for Papua is the status quo of full integration with Indonesia.

One reason why the situation in Papua is inflammable is that the 'fight for independence' and the 'keep the status quo of integration' views are overwhelmingly majority views held along an ethnic divide of citizens who see themselves as Papuans and Melanesian versus citizens who see themselves as Indonesians who are not Melanesian. There are, however, also two minority views, which have only elite support, but significant elite support. These are the 'let's make special autonomy work' school and the less clear, more emergent 'Papua, land of peace' school, and hybrids of the two among actors with 'let's negotiate with Indonesia' agendas. For example, one hybrid found attractive by one senior OPM diplomat involved 'autonomy like in Bougainville and New Caledonia' where there could be a vote for independence after 15 years of Papuans preparing themselves to govern and improving education. We consider these in turn in the next two sections.

'Let's make special autonomy work'

On paper, the special autonomy deal that was secured in 2001 was a remarkable victory for Papuans. It was especially remarkable because it was delivered in the face of the demise of the Wahid presidency (that had been its lifeblood), the resurgence of the power of the military (which had been its fervent opponent) and the collapse of the authority of the Presidium as the legitimate broker of peaceful change in Papua with the imprisonment of Theys Eluay and its other leaders. Those who did negotiate the special autonomy deal on the Papuan side were brilliant and principled negotiators, but they were not the legitimate negotiators that the Presidium (and OPM) was at that time. Sadly for the future prospects of peace in Papua, a Presidium was crushed that initially came to the table willing to change its position to support special autonomy. In the face

⁷⁶ There is survey evidence from 323 Papuans suggesting this is rather the way the majority of ordinary Papuans think as well (Sijabat 2006).

of political harassment by the security forces, the Presidium finally opposed special autonomy and returned to hardline support for full independence and sympathy for OPM's armed struggle.

President Habibie's cabinet had taken the view that political decentralisation was a central plank of *reformasi*. District-level governments (*kabupaten*) were to be sites of greater political power. In addition to passing two general decentralisation laws in 1999, the Indonesian Government in 1999 and 2000 in resolutions of the legislature (MPR) advocated special autonomy laws for Aceh and Irian Jaya (Papua). The last were about decentralisation to provinces, whereas the earlier initiatives bypassed provincial governments to increase the authority and resources of district governments.

The then Governor of Irian Jaya, J. P. Solossa, assembled a team of intellectuals, current and former provincial leaders from the government, NGOs and churches, which drafted a special autonomy law and argued competently for it in Jakarta between April 2001 and the ultimate passage of a watered-down version on 21 November 2001. Included among the major concessions to Papuan aspirations by the legislature were

- a right to express cultural identity with a Papuan flag and anthem
- provincial control over all government affairs except defence, foreign affairs, monetary policy and the Supreme Court
- the Province of Papua to receive 80 per cent of forestry and fisheries revenue and 70 per cent from oil and gas production, falling to 50 per cent after 25 years
- future resource development to be more sensitive to customary land use claims than in the past
- the establishment of a Papuan People's Assembly (Majelis Rakyat Papua, MRP) to represent indigenous Papuans, comprising one-third community leaders, one-third religious leaders and one-third women
- a requirement that the governor, deputy governor and all regents (*bupati*) and mayors (*walikota*) must be indigenous Papuans
- the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission for Papua.

As amazing a list of concessions as this was, the governor's drafting team struggled for legitimacy. They faced protests when they sought to consult over the draft to the point where in the end very little of the intended consultation with the people of Papua over the content of special autonomy transpired. As one informant said, it was a bad process transacted in a bad political climate that led to a pretty good law. At the heart of the bad process was the decision of the central government to involve only those who were in favour of special autonomy, and to exclude OPM. OPM members responded by saying: 'Special

autonomy is none of our business. That's the business of opportunists' (OPM interview, 2007, Jayapura). Other OPM informants alleged that in the period when special autonomy was being drafted, some members of the Presidium were bribed, gradually transforming the Presidium into 'a machine to destroy the struggle', with it no longer representing the movement for *merdeka*. Certainly the international diplomatic community—not unreasonably—thought, and mostly still does think, special autonomy was the best possible hope for peace and for the aspirations of the people of Papua. Papuans did not get everything they wanted—there was: no right to a referendum if the provincial government was dissatisfied with the implementation of the law, less oversight of Indonesian military and police activity in Papua than was wanted and needed, less control over immigration to Papua, no Papuan human rights commission (only a branch of Komnas-Ham, the National Human Rights Commission, which was barely operating during our 2007 fieldwork after its director had received more than 100 threatening SMS messages), and an MRP that was stripped of legislative power to become only an advisory body. EU, US and Australian diplomats urged Papuan leaders to grab special autonomy as the best possible deal they could hope to get. Leaders in Wamena told laughingly of the struggles of the German ambassador to get past the military to meet with them in 2001. He then told them that if only they would get behind special autonomy things would improve, and in addition lots of European aid for Papua would also flow—but only if they renounced the armed struggle and supported special autonomy.

A compromise is always hard to sell to freedom fighters even if it makes substantial concessions to their positions, as the special autonomy law did. It is, however, impossible to sell if the fighters believe the behaviour of the enemy on the ground indicates that they have no intention of honouring it. Among the OPM hardliners we interviewed there was no trust in the Indonesian state or its agents in Papua. They, like many Papuans, had noted the provisions in the special autonomy law that permitted a Papuan national anthem to be sung and yet observed that the practice of the security forces was to arrest and beat anyone who sang *Hai Tanahku Papua!*. The special autonomy law also permitted (under certain conditions) the raising of a Papuan flag, yet the security services prevented raising of the morning star flag under any conditions—and on some occasions killed, raped, tortured or imprisoned those who did so. The terms of these provisions in the special autonomy legislation were ambiguous for many Papuans.⁷⁷ The law also stipulated that there would be a truth and reconciliation commission to expose the historical circumstances of Papua's integration into

77 The specific clause of the Special Autonomy Law (Chapter 2, Article 2, Section 2) stipulates that '[t]he Papua Province may have regional symbols as its greatness and grandeur banner and cultural symbol for the greatness of the Papuans' identity in the form of the regional flag and regional hymn which are not positioned as sovereignty symbols.' Government Regulation 77 of 2007 (PP77/2007) specifically stipulated the morning star as a separatist symbol to strengthen the legal basis for prosecutions related to flag raisings in Papua and elsewhere in Indonesia.

Indonesia (*Bill of Law of the Republic of Indonesia Number 21 of 2001 concerning the Special Autonomy of the Province of Papua*:Ch. XII, Art. 45); none was convened, or even planned. The Special Autonomy Law said new provinces could not be established without a majority vote of support from the MRP and the Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Papua, DPRP) (Ch. XXIV, Art. 6). The central government established one new province and attempted to establish a third without that democratic support and indeed in the face of overwhelming votes against partition. This was clearly in breach of Indonesian law; yet courts in Jakarta were persuaded to look the other way,⁷⁸ as they generally were when human rights cases came their way from Papua (see Robinson 2005).

The saga of special autonomy persuaded Papuans that they enjoyed no more of a semblance of rule of law under Indonesian rule than they did when the United Nations acquiesced in what they called the 'Act Free of Choice'. The special autonomy deal might be read as Papuan elite capitulation when the grassroots remained defiant. Indeed, many ordinary Papuans read it as Papuan elite capitulation to Indonesian insistence that independence is off the table. As one of the members of the Presidium conceded to us in 2007: 'Special autonomy turned out not to be a win-win solution, but a solution that was used to silence OPM.'

Financially, it is also hard to disagree with the majority Papuan view that the windfall of special autonomy is benefiting Indonesians and a handful of corrupt Papuan politicians. One church leader quoted an OPM commander as saying:

Special autonomy is a big cake offered by Jakarta out of pressure from the international community. There are two parties trying to get this cake. One is Papua; the other is Jakarta. Jakarta knows better how to get at the cake and they eat it up.

It is hard to know the facts. Papuans say, 'Show me the new school, the new hospital, show me the road, show me the running water and electricity that has arrived with the special autonomy money since 2002.' All we can say is that it is indeed hard to point to them. And it is hard to argue with the Catholic Bishop of Jayapura when he says that in fact, 'the education sector is getting worse, especially in the highlands and hinterlands'. The UNDP agrees: 'Papua stands out as one of the few "declining" regions, actually suffering a *deterioration* in [Human Development Index] status, which is mostly attributed

⁷⁸ Note Wing and King (2005:14) on the confusion related to the Indonesian Constitutional Court ruling of 11 November 2004 (Case No. 018/PUU-I/2003). The ruling was that Law No. 45/1999 (UU45/1999) and the Presidential Instruction of January 2003 (Inpres 1/2003) on the establishment of separate Central and West Irian Jaya Provinces violated the constitution, yet that West Irian Jaya Province existed as a fact on the ground. See also Stockmann (2004).

to declines in education and coverage and income levels' (cited in King 2006:11). A presidential decree of 16 May 2007 on 'the acceleration of development in Papua and West Papua' (*Inpres*, May 2007) has seen the central government retake control of swaths of budget decisions on the rationale that this will push forward development of the region. Papuans see it as a further step to crush the spirit of the special autonomy law and an opportunity for central government officials to eat more cake.

Such data as we have (for example, King 2004:90) suggest that a tiny proportion of the money has gone towards the people's priorities—education and health—with perhaps as little as 7 per cent on education and 15 per cent on health. Most of the money went straight to regents and mayors who had to deal with long lines of cronies and kin at their front doors with proposals for ad hoc construction projects and study tours to Jakarta, Bali or further afield. At the *bupati's* back door were local military and police commanders with proposals for investment in logging and other mutually lucrative enterprises. The monies that did arrive in Papuan budgets went to infrastructure projects demanded by the likes of Freeport and the military—investment in ports, roads (that help the military open up new areas for illegal logging) and the like. This dual dilemma of local kin patronage and central corporate–military cronyism is a recurrent problem in post-conflict societies that cries out for a more sustainable solution than the response of Australia in Solomon Islands (see Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 7) and the United Nations in Liberia of having internationals demand dual sign-off control over spending to ensure the money does go to paying teachers' and nurses' salaries.

One of the more amazing concessions from Jakarta in the 2001 special autonomy law was a guarantee that all the top political offices in the province must be held by indigenous Papuans in circumstances in which Papuans were on the way to becoming a minority of the electorate. Indeed some Papuan *bupatis* preside over towns that are more than 70 per cent non-Papuan. As one senior bureaucrat interviewed in Jayapura put it, however, in a sense, the military commander outranks the *bupati* in the locality⁷⁹ and also 'the central government still appoints senior officials'. The central government also controls the budget process, so the province can pass laws that regulate gas, forestry and mining, but the national government then overrides them using regulatory laws for these sectors that apply nationally.

Those of the 'let's make special autonomy work' persuasion include the current Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, and a highly influential member of his staff, Agus Sumule (one of the very capable members of former Governor Solossa's

⁷⁹ This relationship is not merely anecdotal. It is recognised administratively through the 'regional leadership council' (*Muspida*), which since 1963 has been headed by the military commander in Papua.

team that drafted the law) and many in the international diplomatic community. Even these advocates tend to agree that the deliverables have been disappointing so far and that there has been a lot of corruption, but these problems can be, and are beginning to be, tackled. The international community needs to work with the Papuan political elite to put pressure on the president, who possibly has good-faith commitment to making special autonomy work but so far has been too weak politically to stand up to the military so that it can be allowed to work. If there could be a large reduction in the military presence in Papua and an anti-corruption campaign with teeth, the freedoms and prosperity promised by the law could progressively be delivered. These advocates tend to see the first step as to reverse the increasing militarisation of Papua, to stop fresh battalions and deeper Kopassus and Brimob entanglements, and reduce military numbers. This process should also involve more effective training in riot prevention and control as well as clear disciplinary measures against the use of excessive force—all of which have been woefully inadequate in curtailing security sector violence in Papua.⁸⁰

One constructive suggestion from Father Neles Tebay OFM (2006:60) has been that

[t]he religious leaders need to encourage the Papuan provincial government and the two West Papuan state universities to set up an advocacy team in Jakarta for implementation of the Papuan Special Autonomy Law. Members of the team would include both Papuans and non-Papuans living in West Papua and Jakarta. They should be experts in different fields, trusted by indigenous Papuans, deeply concerned at the deteriorating situation in West Papua and committed to making West Papua a land of peace. The team would act as a guardian of the special autonomy law and persuade governments at different levels to implement the law in its original spirit.

Papua, land of peace

At the beginning of the current decade, most of the religious leaders of Papua (of all faiths) were full of hope for peace, as the Presidium had successfully persuaded many OPM fighters onto the path of peaceful negotiation. While some religious leaders remain in the 'let's make special autonomy work' camp, this commitment is hard to find among highland pastors. The religious leadership has attempted to keep a space open for peacebuilding by sustaining a 'Papua Land of Peace' campaign. This campaign does indeed embrace a wide church. Devotees of all

80 An example of this is the continued reliance by security forces in Papua on live rounds to disperse gatherings instead of a variety of non-lethal forms of containment (including more effective negotiation, water cannon, tear gas and even rubber bullets).

three positions above are allowed a space under its umbrella, even the military. The military leadership initially condemned the idea when it was proposed by young Papuans and students as an idea for a 'zone of peace' at a meeting in Waropen District in 1999 (see Giay 2000), and was subsequently backed by the Papuan Presidium Council (PDP), the Papuan Customary Council (*Dewan Adat Papua*, DAP) and the human rights group Elsham.⁸¹ Now that the Presidium has been gutted, however, the military attends some peace commemoration events associated with the renamed campaign relaunched by religious leaders to cover the whole of Papua. Indeed in 2007, the military initiated limited informal dialogues with leading human rights NGOs on how to make 'Papua, land of peace' a reality. This seemed a slightly hopeful development. Neles Tebay (2009) has authored the most detailed proposal for a dialogue between Papua and the Government of Indonesia located within the Papua Land of Peace framework. Another important one from Jakarta has been produced by LIPI, the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (Widjojo et al. 2008). So far, however, there has been limited interest from President Yudhoyono.

The NGO Alliance for Democracy Papua (ALDP) believes the Papua Land of Peace campaign neglects dialogue with the military at the village level, where Papuans feel the most acute insecurity (cf. Widjojo et al. 2008:20–6). Terror is, after all, produced by concrete local tactics. In their efforts to broker some local dialogue, the alliance finds that the military does not realise how much little things they do can terrorise villagers—things such as visiting homes and asking questions about the whereabouts of people can petrify villagers, even when an inquiry is quite innocent. ALDP suggests instead that security force personnel approach villagers with greater sensitivity—sitting down to ask questions at a village meeting and explaining the reason for the questions. Again, paradoxically for a Melanesian society, there has been far too little of that kind of bottom-up approach to reconciliation with the military. When local village-level commanders resist dialogue, ALDP writes to their commanders. Sometimes central commanders respond with a visit to the village to be a catalyst for the needed dialogue.

As Rodd McGibbon (2004) argued, the elite special autonomy negotiations in Aceh and Papua shared a failure to engage popular elements of their provinces, thus missing the opportunity to build popular support. Systematic bargaining processes are needed in a future dialogue that embraces all the major political factions who support independence. Ted Gurr's (2000) comparative research on ethno-national movements found, when autonomy packages succeeded, rebel movements were hands-on in negotiations with the government on the terms of such arrangements. In Melanesian cultures in general, dialogue and negotiation

81 The military commanders said because Papua had never been a war zone, it could not become a peace zone.

are cyclical. Agreements are not immutable and may be contested for a variety of reasons, perhaps the most important of which is intergenerational change. Papuans today do not necessarily feel obliged by the conditions or agreements of the past, unless they see benefits. This cyclical renegotiated pragmatism is a source of hope in the very difficult impasse that is Papuan politics today. Kivimäki (2006:39) is critical of both sides in Papua for trying to build momentum for peace by consensus building essentially only on their own side. In his view, pre-negotiation is most productive when it includes early contacts with 'the enemy'.

Merdeka and Papua Land of Peace

The values of the Papua Land of Peace campaign are 'awareness and respect for plurality, justice, unity, harmony, solidarity, togetherness, sincere fraternity and welfare' (Tebay 2006:37). This list is not so far from the way MacLeod (2007) interprets the multiple meanings of the term '*merdeka*' to Papuans. In Indonesian, *merdeka* means literally freedom, but it has a much more complex genealogy (Reid 1998). At one level, it tends to mean those things for Papuans too—only it is independence from Indonesia, not the independence of Indonesia. MacLeod (2007) and Golden (2003), building on the work of Reverend Benny Giay and others (Giay and Godshalk 1993; Giay 2001b), argue *merdeka* has a deeper, more complex, more spiritual set of meanings. One is *merdeka* as liberation theology, so liberation is the better one-word translation than freedom. Or republicans might say *merdeka* is freedom as both political and personal non-domination (Pettit 1997). Giay has developed the idea of *merdeka* as '*hai*', an Amungme word meaning 'the irrepressible hope of an oppressed people for a future that is peaceful, just and prosperous' (MacLeod 2007:157). This vision for modern Papua, reasserted and reinvigorated in the post-New Order era through the spirit of *reformasi*, has clear historical antecedents.

In 1942, in a Japanese internment camp, the Reverend Izaak Samuel Kijne articulated his modernist vision for a new Papua in a children's book written for his daughter. *The Golden City (De Gouden Stad)* was a clear allegory for the prosperous and harmonious future Kijne envisaged in Netherlands New Guinea if Dutch and Papuans worked together to create a well-ordered, Christian community. A missionary teacher of long standing in Papua, Kijne was not naive about the challenges of this aspirant vision. His novel, first published in the territory in Indonesian (as *Kota Emas*) in 1953, describes a perilous journey for its two protagonists, the Dutch girl Regi and the Papuan boy Tomi. To reach the 'Golden City', Regi and Tomi must learn to cooperate, to trust and respect one another and to follow the same moral/spiritual compass (Kijne 1953; Cookson 2008:268–70). *Kota Emas*, a metaphor for the grandeur and promise of the Kingdom of Heaven on Earth, became a beloved children's story

for young Papuans in the late Dutch colonial era, but the book was banned by the new Indonesian administration in 1963. The fall of Suharto and his New Order regime in May 1998 was followed by the republication of *Kota Emas* in Papua (serialised in the weekly tabloid *Jubi*) and new expressions of hope and possibility for the peoples of Papua.

At the vanguard of the Papuan movement for moral and spiritual renewal in the *reformasi* period, Giay (2001b) published *Towards a New Papua: Principle thoughts for the emancipation of the Papuan people* to help frame discussions among Papuans at their congress in May–June 2000. Giay (2001b:vi) challenged his fellow Papuans ‘to become aware of, critique, debate, and address the themes [of his book] and come up with concrete steps by which Papuans could emancipate themselves from their collective burdens’. Giay’s book incorporated the demands of the Team 100 (the 100 Papuans who met with President Habibie on 26 February 1999) as well as the priorities established through Mubes 2000 (24–26 February 2000). These included the ‘rectification’ of history, the setting of a Papuan political agenda and the consolidation of Papuan political structures and organisations. It also surveyed a range of other issues of immediate concern to Papuans including a memory of collective suffering among Papuans (*memoria passionis*),⁸² an agenda for non-violent protest based on a moral movement for peaceful change, a program of affirmative action in Papua (*Papuanisasi*), the need to promote and protect Papuan indigenous rights in accordance with international norms and instruments and the importance of placing Papuans at the centre of their history and of all future initiatives in their homeland. Central to Giay’s vision of hope and renewal in moving *Towards a New Papua* is the place of moral rectitude and peaceful non-violent approaches to change.⁸³ His imperative for change has resonance with Clifford Shearing and Les Johnston’s (2005) ‘justice as a new future’ as it has emerged in post-apartheid South Africa.

Merdeka also means to Papuans ‘an adat led restoration and recovery of local traditions, local indigenous forms of governance, and identity’ (MacLeod 2007:158). Some commentators argue that the *merdeka* of village and clan-level *adat* is much more important to Papuans than the *merdeka* of state legal sovereignty (Howard et al. 2002). Other meanings MacLeod explores are *merdeka* as human dignity and *merdeka* as ‘*mobu*’ (material and spiritual satisfaction in which no-one suffers poverty or deprivation).

82 Giay (2001b) attributes the use of the term ‘*memoria passionis*’ in Papua to the work of Brother J. Budi Hernawan and Theo P. A. van den Broek (see Hernawan and van den Broek 1999, 2001) of the Secretariat of Justice and Peace of the Diocese of Jayapura, Papua (Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian, SKP).

83 Giay (2001b:39–46) offers three iconic struggles as examples of the ways Papuans might build such a program of change: the emancipative struggle of Martin Luther King, jr, the independence struggle of Mahatma Gandhi in India and the democratic struggle of Aung San Suu Kyi in Myanmar/Burma.

Such depth and richness of meaning for *merdeka* imply, according to Brigham Golden (2003), that ‘independence without *merdeka*’ and ‘*merdeka* without independence’ are possible (see also Indonesia Commission 2003). This is a constructive peacebuilder’s insight. It shows a need to moderate Jakarta’s fears of *merdeka* as being synonymous with political independence in a way similar to the need for Westerners to moderate their fear of jihad as blood-letting. It is hard to see sustainable peace unless Jakarta is willing to commit to a high-integrity peace process based on remorse for the low integrity of previous dialogue, and with discussions of (forms of) *merdeka* on the table.

If *merdeka* as non-domination and spiritual and cultural liberation is the ideal (the interest) and political independence is just one position then dialogue can proceed as an interest-based process (Fisher and Ury 1981). This means people can put aside their preferred positions as they feel their way. One student leader said: ‘We need independence because we are made to feel like we are animals.’ This quote encapsulates the possibility of moving from the *position* in favour of independence to the *interest* in being treated with human dignity. Trust is so low in the Papua case that MacLeod (2007) and King (2006) seem wise to suggest that open-textured trust building is the first priority, taking some small confidence-building steps initially that do little more than reach agreement on a process and some broad principles. What Papua has at the moment is ‘special autonomy without *merdeka*’. The original Papuan draft that was watered down by Jakarta could have been a basis for ‘special autonomy with *merdeka*’. Indeed, Agus Sumule (2003:358, 2001) pointed out how the early discussions of the drafting team were about not treating the issues of *merdeka* and autonomy as *merdeka* or autonomy or *merdeka* against autonomy, but as *merdeka* and autonomy (known colloquially in Papua as *motonomi*, or *merdeka* with *otonomi*). This position accorded with that of former Governor Solossa, who argued for autonomy as self-determination or a form of *merdeka* in his 2005 PhD dissertation (Solossa 2005:53–66).

There is at least one respect in which it might be easier to go back to original Papuan aspirations for special autonomy than to what has really been enacted. The idea of a truth and reconciliation commission has fallen deeply out of favour in Jakarta.⁸⁴ Ministers in Jakarta told us the elite rejected delivering on this promise to Aceh and Papua. So why not instead go back to what Papuans were originally asking for: a process to straighten history (*meluruskan sejarah*)? Because special autonomy is so discredited today, Golden (2003) is right that any attempt to rehabilitate it will require transforming it, renaming it, imbuing it with integrity and completely reframing it politically.

84 Although LIPI (Widjojo et al. 2008) has taken up the case for it.

Papua Land of Peace might be the space where this could be done, an umbrella under which all the political contestants in Papua have become comfortable. The reframing being considered here would have the leaders of that campaign respond to the regular accusations the military throws at them of being separatists by saying, 'No, Papua Land of Peace is not about separatism, but it is about *merdeka*. Now let us sit down together, not separated but together, and discuss what *merdeka* might mean.' Papua Land of Peace, partly because it is so vague, perhaps creates the space where something might emerge that is more resonant to ordinary Papuans (and to the military for that matter!) than 'let's make special autonomy work'.

In other post-conflict regions of Indonesia, there is some prospect of non-truth and reconciliation that neglect collective memory (as we discuss in Chapters 3 and 4). What Hernawan and van den Broek (1999) and Giay (2001b) call *memoria passionis* among Papuans—collective memory of suffering—makes non-truth or forgetting implausible paths to reconciliation in Papua. Events from decades past might be as real and as poignant for Papuans today as when they first happened. Absent rectification, Melanesians might cling to a memory of trauma and wrongdoing with a tenacity that survives generations. This poses profound questions for how the state apprehends this collective memory of suffering and by what means (if any) it can reconcile itself with a community that holds ahistorical perceptions of injustice and grievance (see Cookson 2008:37–40; Chapter 6). Papuans must find a Papuan way, or a syncretic Melanesian-Christian way, for dealing with their *memoria passionis*. Giay (2001b:35–8) argues that addressing *memoria passionis* first requires recognition of the 'truth of the powerless' and then dialogue (between the state and Papuans) based on mutual respect and understanding, followed by a consistent and incremental program of action.

One hope for peace is that the diplomatic community and the Indonesian President might see the opportunity created by Papua Land of Peace as a space and seize the chance to enter it with constructive proposals for a 'consistent and incremental program of action'. A confidence-building negotiated reduction in military personnel in Papua in return for concessions by OPM, or a Commission for Straightening of History, or an invitation to an international mediator⁸⁵ would be among many possible options. Or perhaps just starting small with a peace options workshop. These are some ideas for steps that might be taken. It does seem this space, which is supported by Muslim as well as Christian leaders and now by the military, could be a productive one for the president to enter with ideas and proposals. International donors might also do this. The

85 An international mediator is the option supported by the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation, specifically suggesting Finland, as used in the Aceh peace process. Most political players in Papua, including most remnants of OPM, support this.

merit of the concept is that the religious leaders have created an inclusive space that is not encumbered with the bad karma of special autonomy and that is humanitarian and rights respecting. It is also a space replete with the deliberative and administrative competence of the Church. If it seems an incredibly vague proposal that peacebuilders start by selecting a fertile conversational space that is contingently produced by the history of conflict then consider the tsunami that created a similar humanitarian space that President Yudhoyono and international friends used to build peace in Aceh (in some ways it was a better space in the case of Aceh, as we will discuss in Chapter 6).

One of the things the international community might do within such a space is persuade Papuans that while Papua might benefit in a way similar to or better than Aceh, the East Timor scenario is utterly unrealistic. East Timor had a vote for independence because the Indonesian President of the time decided East Timor was not critical to Indonesia's interest; it was not something the international community was insisting that he do. The international community is also not going to insist that Indonesia give independence to Papua—even more so looking back on the huge political cost East Timor imposed on Habibie and his successor. Another reason is Papua's status under international law: while East Timor was never formally recognised as part of Indonesia by the United Nations, the United Nations recognises Papua as part of Indonesia. And the international community will take firm steps to prevent anyone from supplying arms to OPM. There are many hotheads in the highlands who believe that if they cause enough chaos by kidnaps, fire-fights with the military and sabotage of resource projects, the United Nations is bound to send in peacekeepers eventually, as it did in East Timor. Many said to us words such as the following genuinely puzzled query from one OPM leader: 'Why won't Australia support a referendum in Papua when it supported it in East Timor?' It is easy to see the simple appeal of this perspective, but the international community is not doing much (or anything) to explain to this new generation of fighters why it is a false analogy. To the extent that it talks to OPM leaders, it talks to those on the Indonesian payroll or semi-retired, older fighters, not the angry young men who are aspirants to command a new generation of the insurgency. The German ambassador needs to go back to Papua and admit that Germany was misguided to believe that special autonomy would bring Papuans the solutions they needed. We are saying that the international community right now has no prospect of being an honest broker in Papua because it has not been honest. It was dishonest at the moment of the 'Act Free of Choice' in 1969 and it was dishonest at the moment of 'specious autonomy' in 2001.

Other countries came and said to OPM that you should accept special autonomy. Countries like Australia, who were part of this, had a

responsibility to equally pressure Indonesia to make sure they deliver on the promises of special autonomy. (Presidium panel member who spent years in prison)

To conclude this section, it is impossible to see the ‘return to armed conflict’, ‘stick with the integration status quo’ or ‘let’s make special autonomy work’ schools of thought as a basis for future peace in Papua. It is also extremely difficult to see peace being solidly built within the space of Papua Land of Peace. That would take much more national and international political will and the political imagination and engagement of adherents of the other three schools of thought than we see today.

Meetings held in Vanuatu in November 2007 and April 2008 in some ways forged new networks of opposition unity under the umbrella of the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation, but in different ways failed to unify pro-independence forces to the degree the Presidium managed in 2000. The pro-independence players are, however, on a path towards formulating a more unified negotiating position that might open up some middle path in negotiations with Jakarta that amounts to more than making special autonomy work and less than full independence now. There is hope in these developments.

Logs, fish and military politics in Papua

The false dawn of Papuan *merdeka* that began with President Wahid’s cancellation of the division of Papua into three provinces and his announcement of freedom of speech and assembly in December 1999 was decisively over in two years. One interpretation of this puzzling interlude in Indonesian politics offered by a number of people we interviewed in Jakarta and across the country was that the military (TNI) fell from being second only to President Suharto as the most important political and economic actor in Indonesia for a period of only a couple of years. We see this in the fortunes of General Wiranto, who was generally seen, including by his boss, as Suharto’s natural successor. By the end of 1999, not only had Wiranto failed to become president, his conviction as a war criminal for the post-election slaughter in East Timor seemed likely. Within a few years, however, these charges were dropped and he became a credible, though unsuccessful, presidential candidate. On the account of some who saw the political decline of the military with *reformasi* as significant but short, TNI political networks were critical to ensuring the quick demise of Presidents Habibie and Wahid for the way they applied *reformasi* to separatist conflict—particularly East Timor in the case of Habibie and Papua in the case of Wahid. The candidate TNI found acceptable in 2001, Megawati, had had her conflicts with the military as a former leading opponent of Suharto, but she was, like her father, President Sukarno, a staunch nationalist who believed in

a strong military. She had generals supporting her. In circumstances in which only a critic of the Suharto era could win, the military was getting someone who would take the hard line it wanted to see in Papua and Aceh.

'Rome is a long way away', as one European NGO leader put his view that the real government of Papua in 2007 was neither in the hands of Jakarta nor the provincial governor, but in the grip of the military command structure inside Papua. A number of journalists and others whom we interviewed felt that it was Kopassus in particular that called the shots.⁸⁶ In Papua, as in Aceh and much of Indonesia, it is hard for a candidate for regent (*bupati*) of a locality to be elected if he or she is opposed by the local military commander. Very often the regent is groomed and corrupted by the military commander; often in the past he was a former military commander. Papua is a lucrative posting for a TNI officer. The Freeport mine has been a huge source of personal wealth for senior officers. Illegal logging and illegal fishing by large Indonesian, Chinese, Thai and Malaysian vessels protected by the security forces are also hearty sources of corrupt income.⁸⁷ Perhaps as much as 70 per cent of the logs smuggled out of Indonesia (in violation of a ban on log exports applied across Indonesia from 2001) to businesses in Malaysia, Singapore, China and beyond originate in Papua (Tebay 2006:12). The Environmental Investigation Agency and Telapak (2005:9) found that syndicates moving illegal logs to China paid an average of US\$200 000 a shipment in bribes. Merbau was the type of timber that was especially valued; Papuan communities received approximately \$10 a cubic metre for chopping it down and it was sold in China for \$270 a metre for furniture and flooring. Other reports suggest villagers can receive less than 1 per cent of the sale price for their timber and this practice has been going on since the 1970s (see Sword 1991; ICG 2002a:16). Sometimes the military simply steals logs from villagers and they receive nothing (King 2004:123).

The forests of Melanesia are one of the three great areas of tropical forest surviving in the world, with the Amazon and Congo basins. Brazil is the only country that has greater forest resources than Indonesia (Schloenhardt 2008:51). Indigenous traditions of sustainable use of forests are a great resource in the struggle against climate change. Hence, the practices of Indonesian security forces in making logging safe for business cronies by riding roughshod over those traditions and violently suppressing protest must change for climate reasons as well as conflict reduction. Forestry is a major reason why Papua is at such a political impasse. Until the 2000s, the Suharto family and immediate cronies were the major shareholders in the companies exploiting the forests of Papua (ICG 2002a:14–

⁸⁶ One of our informants in Papua explained that the governor was 'protected' by Kopassus and that this meant he was also 'guided' by his military minders.

⁸⁷ Papuan fishermen report encounters with TNI soldiers on the boats who chase them away when they encroach on areas where the Asian boats wish to fish.

17). They still are significant players, but their assets have been protected by diversifying access to the Papua logging business among many generals and political leaders in Jakarta. Decentralisation has also provided opportunities for local elites—generals, colonels and senior police working with captive local politicians—to cut their slices of a very large pie. Genuine indigenous control of Papua would disrupt this money machine. Recent government initiatives to promote indigenous community cooperatives (*kopermas*) have, however, failed (see Alhamid 2004). As in so many of Indonesia's problems, the critical element needed is not a best-practice environmental regulatory agency; it is a political capability to regulate the security forces and the corrupt politicians they capture.

There is a great deal of evidence of forestry department officials in Indonesia becoming minor parts of the illegal logging business as a result of the carrots and sticks proffered to them by the military (for example, ICG 2002a:15). The Indonesian navy has responsibility for intercepting logging ships to enforce the 2001 ban on log exports, yet the Indonesian navy is the most professional smuggling organisation in the region when it gets a share of the action. One way forward might be an internationalisation of enforcement against shipping of logs as part of what nations agree in the Kyoto-Bali-Copenhagen process. The problem is not the navy's ability to intercept logging ships—it does that very successfully. The problem is that the navy releases the shipments on payment of the appropriate amount to the navy. Internationalisation of maritime logging enforcement would also assist a future peace process in Papua.

Acute security problems around logging and fishing make it possible for the security forces to demand large protection payments. In March 2001, armed anti-logging protestors killed three logging employees at Wasior, leading to Brimob riot police retaliation in the form of the arrest and torture of 140 people, the killing of two, the disappearance of seven and the burning down of churches, public buildings and 55 houses (Hernawan 2005:78–9).⁸⁸ Relying on Amnesty International and other sources, the ICG (2002a:16–17) reported six killed in an initial Brimob attack and another 12 killed and 26 missing in subsequent indiscriminate revenge attacks on nearby villages by Brimob. Sporadic armed conflict between the anti-logging protestors and Brimob persisted in the region for more than a year to mid-2002. One attack on a Brimob post killed five Brimob officers and one civilian and saw the capture of a machine gun and five rifles in June 2001 (ICG 2002a:16).

88 The Wasior case also coincided with meetings and negotiations between Indonesian police and local communities in the nearby Bintuni Bay area as part of BP Indonesia's strategy of community policing for its massive Tangguh natural gas operation. The Wasior incident was assumed by some informants to be an attempt by (elements of) the Indonesian security apparatus to destabilise the region and thereby reinsert themselves into the Tangguh project.

Villagers and human rights NGOs told us of a comparable fishing incident in the district of Kimaam on the south coast in 2001. Resentment of the security forces was high after they persuaded local villagers to catch and skin a large number of crocodiles for (illegal) export that the police would organise. The police promised to return an agreed share of the proceeds. The police collected the skins but never returned any proceeds. Then the military shot at a village boat and damaged it, after villagers came too near a large foreign fishing boat the military was protecting. These foreign boats operated by using large nets to catch only certain species of fish that had high export demand and discarded the rest. In local custom, to unnecessarily kill and waste fish makes the ancestors angry. The villagers reported all their concerns to the fishing exporters and wholesalers and to the district regulatory authorities. After these complaints were officially ignored, they attacked and sunk two large boats in 2001, killing 12 Asian fishermen on one boat and 19 on the other. The military retaliated by burning their village to the ground and killing all their animals. At a protest by villagers over this, two were killed and others injured. The large fishing boats struck back by ramming a village boat, resulting in two fishermen drowning.

A particular problem with local logging (more than fishing) as a cause of conflict is that the loggers are one-shot players in their relationship with the traditional custodians of the land. This makes it profitable to use what in other contexts might be short-sighted tactics. Loggers ply local *adat* leaders with alcohol and prostitutes, in the process collecting compromising information about them, and then make secret payments to them. In rural societies, it is difficult to hide abnormally high consumption. The companies promise that roads, churches, houses and other infrastructure will be built in return for access to the logs and bulldozers left behind to maintain them, but these promises are not kept. Often cash promised is never paid. They promise not to touch sacred parts of forests then whip the logs out before they leave under military or Brimob protection. In every way, their logging is quick and dirty, destructive, wasteful and inefficient. The result is not only indigenous anger at the loggers and the political system they own, but anger at their own traditional leaders, undermining the fabric of traditional authority and the great things it can bring to the tables of forestry management and conflict management.

‘Militias’

The Satgas Merah Putih Movement (Red-White Task Force—a reference to the colours of the Indonesian flag) was the first paramilitary organisation to be established by the Indonesian Government in Papua. Members are indigenous Papuans who are paid by the government, follow the orders of the military and on occasion have joined the security forces in attacks on suspected rebels (Tebay 2006:20). A second paramilitary civilian defence force (Pertahanan Sipil,

Hansip) was established in 1964–65 in Papua under the leadership of a military officer.⁸⁹ For this reason, and also because Hansip was provided with uniforms and sticks and trained by the military to keep order and ensure compliance with government instructions at the village level, Papuans perceived it as an extension of military rule. Kamra (meaning ‘people’s security’) was formed in 1999 with the same rationale. Kamra members were unemployed youth who were put into uniforms and trained by the military to maintain order (Giy 2001a:131).

On 8 June 2000, the leading military and intelligence groups involved in Papua met in Jakarta and produced a ‘top-secret’ document that proposed among other things covert activities and ‘black operations’ against leading separatists and the training and recruiting of pro-Indonesian militia at the village level (Chauvel 2001:23). While there has been the odd report of a killing by militias under the control of Kopassus and of weapons being delivered to them (Wing and King 2005:6–7), during our 2007 fieldwork these groups were not really militias perpetrating acts of violence. Rather they were pro-Indonesia political groups, with some paramilitary trappings, who might heckle separatists at political gatherings or report on separatists so that they might be more quietly targeted (say, for harassment by dozens of threatening text messages). ‘Militias’ might stand ready to be armed by the military if OPM launches military operations, but they do not seem to be armed at present. They were growing in 2007, just as they were during the unsettled time at the end of the Wahid presidency and the beginning of the Megawati presidency, through military-sponsored immigration of young toughs.

A more recent pro-Indonesia militia in Papua is the Red and White Defenders’ Front (Front Pembela Merah Putih). The founder of this group was Eurico Guterres, the most notorious of the East Timor militia leaders and the only person whose conviction for crimes against humanity in East Timor was at least initially upheld on appeal in Jakarta (Tebay 2006:20). He launched the Red and White Defenders’ Front in Timika in late 2003. Unlike the militias above, it recruits mostly from Indonesian migrants, but with considerable numbers of indigenous Papuans as well. Many Papuans interviewed were very concerned about this group, alleging that Guterres had been hired to set up Papuan militias on the East Timor model by General Mahidin Simbolon, who was the military commander of Papua at the time Guterres arrived, and Guterres’s former military boss in East Timor as he went about organising militias there. Guterres’s new militia activity seems to have had the support of the incoming Papuan police chief (also an East Timor veteran) (King 2004:116) and indeed of President Megawati. Senior military officers with experience in East Timor have been quite open about marketing the recruiting of pro-Indonesian paramilitaries, even saying at

89 This model of ‘civil defence’ is standard across Indonesia.

a press conference that a target of 2700 recruits has been set. Papuans reported that this kind of very public recruitment intimidated Papuans without a shot being fired or a weapon being issued. In 2007 in the capital, Jayapura, there was concern about the promotion of militias by Colonel Burhanuddin Siagian, Korem Regional Commander. He is the subject of two separate indictments for crimes against humanity in East Timor in 1999 issued by the Special Panel for Serious Crimes of the Dili District Court in Timor-Leste (Hedman 2007:10). In 2002 and 2003, there was also a campaign by ‘ninjas’, men with black masks who would threaten and attack people at night—another technique used in East Timor and elsewhere. In August 2008, Simbolon was promoted and transferred out of Papua.

There have been many exaggerated stories of boatloads of Laskar Jihad (Holy War Army) fighters arriving from more westerly parts of Indonesia to kill Christians and burn Christian villages, as they had done in Maluku and Central Sulawesi. In fact, nine jihadists arrived from Pakistan at the beginning of the 2000s. As in North Maluku, in Papua, there could have been agitators who attempted to organise violent jihad, but because of strong support from Muslim leaders for the Christian clerics of Papua in opposing this, military factions and the bankrollers of Laskar Jihad never got behind a large-scale Laskar Jihad invasion of Papua. The Indonesian Ulamas’ Council (MUI) and the two mass-membership Muslim organisations in Indonesia wrote letters to all mosques in Papua warning that Laskar Jihad could be arriving at their mosque and urged that the mosque not be coopted into violence and should consider sermons on why jihad was not about war. It could be that Islamists had been planning a violent Papuan jihad and that these plans were dropped after financial support for Laskar Jihad fighters was withdrawn in the new climate in Indonesia after the 2002 Bali terrorist bombing.

There was, however, modest Laskar Jihad infiltration. A Laskar Jihad office was established in Sorong, but was taken over by Muslims committed to non-violence after Papua’s religious leaders asked a representative of MUI to visit Sorong to sort this out. Wing and King (2005:38) interviewed one man in Sorong in 2005 who claimed to have arrived with a group of Laskar Jihad fighters from Babo Archipelago and Seram, which was revealed to be an international terrorist training and transit base, where, for example, Imam Samudera, the Bali bombing initiator, trained (Böhm 2006:381, 383). He had previously fought against Christians in Ambon. His group was involved in killing Papuans they believed to be OPM leaders, intimidating and spreading fear through rumours. There was a conviction of the leader of an Islamic boarding school in 2000 in Sorong for having a bomb and of a *salafi* businessman there in 2003 for possession of bombs, explosives and arrows with tips designed to be dipped in petrol (ICG 2008a:16). None of the bombings of churches planned in this period happened,

nor had any mosques been torched during 46 years of conflict in Papua. Tebay (2006:19) reports some Laskar Jihad infiltration in Jayapura, Sorong, Fakfak, Timika, Nabire and Manokwari, with their members asserting that they have limited themselves to propagating Islam and educational activities, though Tebay asserts they have been distributing VCDs of sectarian fighting in Maluku.

At the high-water mark of *reformasi* Papuan nationalism in 1999, a Papuan militia, Satgas Papua, was formed. Like the pro-Indonesian militias, and the militias of East Timor,⁹⁰ Satgas Papua members had little education. Unlike OPM, it did not seem to engage in any proactive violence. Rather it provided security for anti-Indonesian protests, for the congresses of 2000 and for the Presidium during its brief period of ascendancy. Satgas Papua declined with the plunge in influence of the Presidium and a campaign of police dispersal, arrests and torture of individual members after October 2000. The ICG (2002a:3) estimated that the militia had 20 000 members in mid-2000 but was 'largely moribund' by 2002. Davies (2001:34) and others argued that Satgas Papua was funded by Golkar stalwart Yorrys Raweyai, hitman and deputy chairman of the six-million strong pro-Golkar paramilitary youth group, Pemuda Pancasila, as a 'honey-pot' counterinsurgency strategy. Yorrys gave the appearance in 1998 of conversion to being a supporter of independence for Papua. This was never genuine. His intent was to personally infiltrate the separatist elite by becoming a member of the Presidium and simultaneously infiltrating its rank and file. He accomplished both objectives. Satgas Papua drew 20 000 'separatist moths to the light of intelligence scrutiny' (Davies 2001:34). King (2004:39) also plausibly conjectures that Yorrys' strategy could have been 'to stir up trouble and discredit Gus Dur [President Wahid], rather than to liberate Papua'. Informants on the Maluku conflict (see Chapter 3) argued that he played the same role in mobilising his thugs on both sides to provoke that conflict.

There have been various youth groups or gangs formed in the past decade whose formation has been sponsored by a particular *bupati* to secure his power—as happens in other parts of Indonesia. Marginalised youth are paid to join. The mixed Papuan/immigrant Timur Samus and Tim Ohan in the Marind tribal area are leading examples. They threaten troublemakers who are proposing political protests and get people out to vote for their sponsor (or threaten them if they refuse). So, for example, when a group of migrant Indonesians protested about a

90 Kilcullen (2000) identified three tiers of militias in East Timor. The top tier was mobile, armed, trained and included cadre staff from TNI. The second armed themselves or received only limited Indonesian weapons and were trained by tier-one militia leaders. Support for tier one was therefore 'train the trainers' support. Tier three was local, non-mobile, part-time militia groups, whose main functions were to provide basic duties such as guarding, reporting on local meetings and activities and recruiting for the higher militia tiers. Tier three was generally 'unemployed, socially underprivileged and members of the criminal or extremely poor elements of East Timorese society'. This allowed TNI to 'exploit resentment against the more prosperous elements of East Timorese society' with a 'provision of narcotics or alcohol' and opportunities for 'money and the chance to plunder' (Kilcullen 2000:140, discussed in Sebastian 2006:119–20).

road, a journalist suggested groups such as Timin Samus and Tim Ohan went to them and said: 'You are causing trouble and we have the ticket here to send you back' (to their place of emigration—and they do). Often they are brazen enough to say in the newspaper that so and so should be sent back to where they came from. They threaten journalists, even foreign journalists and academics. NGOs calling for accountability over some aspect of district finances are particularly likely to be physically attacked; we interviewed one man who was. The *bupati* gives them protected access to organising prostitution, gambling, drugs and illegal alcohol. 'If the police want to arrest them for a crime against the common people, like assault, they must ask for permission from the political elite first... They also get projects without having to tender' (Merauke interview). While these politicised youth groups morph into organised crime groups, they do not pose a huge daily threat to the lives of ordinary Papuans in the way that such groups make the streets of some parts of Jakarta quite unsafe. Putting aside the political and economic crimes of the security sector itself, Papua is a low-crime society even by the standards of an Indonesian society that has a low crime rate. All the Indonesian migrants we interviewed said they were safer from crime in Papua than in the cities they had left in other parts of Indonesia. On the other hand, women's NGO leaders said they were dealing with an increasing domestic violence problem and we saw some shocking incidents of domestic violence openly perpetrated in public spaces.

These 'new militias' nevertheless pose a serious risk to the future daily safety of the people of Papua. The risk is that they get totally out of hand as organised crime groups, as we have seen in Jakarta (van Dijk 2001) and Timor-Leste (see the fourth volume of *Peacebuilding Compared*). At times of elections, they are already a severe threat to daily security, according to one informant:

They threaten people during election campaigns. 'If you do not vote the right way and if your village does not, there will be trouble.' And they do torture and beat, not just threats. They go to the leader: 'You must persuade your people to vote for...' If they say no then they threaten them.

Smaller parties are also threatened in a similar way. When they do not have their own candidate running in an election, they might be threatened if they do not throw their support behind the *bupati*; when they do have a candidate running, they might be threatened to withdraw. This kind of politicised, organised youth crime would not work very well in a Western individualist democracy where leaders of communities have little practical ability to tell their followers how to vote. In collectivist societies in Melanesia and Indonesia, however, it works, especially when the military is willing to back gangs by pointing guns at leaders who defy their 'suggestions' as to who their village should vote for. This is one of a number of ways that collectivist societies can have higher

crime rates than individualist ones (Karstedt 2006). While the military perhaps does not arm them today, as one of Papua's most distinguished political leaders put it: 'When force is needed, the military will use the militias [arm them]. They will use Papuan people to do the intimidation. They will use terror if they have to.' He felt the National Intelligence Agency (BIN) also had a role in their formation. Many militia members are recruited from sons of members or retired members of the security forces. At the time of our fieldwork, recruitment drives were expanding membership rapidly. These developments are supported by President Yudhoyono and government elites generally in Jakarta, who have been persuaded by the military that they are about 'inspiring youth with the national ideal' (Jayapura journalist).

The independence movement today and prospects for war

It is hard to foresee the future of conflict in Papua beyond the likelihood that it will be big in the absence of new and visionary preventive diplomacy. At the time of our fieldwork in 2007, the analysis of some NGOs was that we might see a change in the conflict from vertical to horizontal conflicts over environmental and resource management. The violence would then reheat. One problem is that developers bribe a big-man to hand over land for housing, oil-palm development or logging. He wants the bribe so he does not consult his people, who might not agree. He then tells his henchmen not to tolerate any complaining about his decision; and if these henchmen go about their work in a vigorous way, the potential for conflict is real. To their credit, the Papuan provincial bureaucracy in recent years has sought to give land custodians and investors security from such conflict. First, the regulatory agency responsible for plantations often convenes a *para para adat* meeting⁹¹ to secure collective agreement on who are the appropriate leaders and the terms of the negotiation to win community support for the development. They then ensure that all these leaders participate in the negotiations and agree to the contract, which in most cases today requires return of the land to tribal custodians after a 20-year lease. It does not seem to be part of the process, however, to inform traditional custodians of the results of a credible environmental impact assessment.

OPM interviewees tended to get angry when we would say: 'It's hard to see any prospects of OPM victory today. But do you think it is realistic that there could be victory inside, say, 20 years?' They would say no, they must win next year, in 2009 or 2010, because if not, in 20 years, Indonesia will have won already by turning Papuans into a small minority in the province. Indeed that makes sense. On current trends, the non-Papuan population of Papua will be so dominant

91 A traditional process in which people talk and talk and talk until a solution is found.

that Papuans will be outvoted if Indonesia does grant a new referendum at that time. Partition is also part of this strategy. In the new province of West Papua, where migrant elites are more dominant and where BP has been a much more benign foreign presence than Freeport, Indonesian strategists think there could be a vote against any independence that the eastern and southern provinces of Papua voted for, creating an unsolvable political problem for the ideal of unified Papuan nationalism (see Notes 54, 68, 73). With its mostly offshore natural gas development, BP has sought to do things very differently from Freeport. They invite NGOs to London for briefings on BP's human rights policies and performance in Papua. They have succeeded in managing their security using local employees and a community security philosophy without the state and by maintaining a more arm's-length relationship with the military for which they perhaps enjoy backing at a high level.⁹²

International mediators could probably play a useful role in confronting Papuan nationalists with the realities of some of the cards Jakarta is holding, as well as confronting Jakarta with the prospect of the kind of international opprobrium it suffered over East Timor and a foreign investment drought if it does not radically change course. International mediators could bring a sense of reality to utterly unrealistic views some potential OPM fighters have—for example, that Israel might give them guns because they are fighting Muslims, that Papua in the end will be like East Timor, misreading East Timor as a case in which the United States and Australia imposed the referendum on President Habibie. International mediators could explain to the OPM that the international community will never, ever support ethnic cleansing of Indonesians from Papua. Jakarta is ruthlessly focused on preventing this conflict from being internationalised in the way it was in East Timor. While the security forces have been reasonably effective in keeping international journalists and television cameras out of Papua, this stratagem is, however, unsustainable and is challenged daily by Papuan and Indonesian activists and media reporting on developments in the province. It seems clear, however, that the military would make life very difficult for any Indonesian political leader who would seek to bring international mediators into the Papuan conflict. It would take a determined surge of combined international and domestic pressure to bring Jakarta to the table with an international mediator.

The sad reality is that many OPM strategists see themselves with nowhere else to go since the Papuan spring proved short and false. Many now favour a return to armed struggle, kidnaps and sabotage to grab international attention. Support

92 In this, BP has learnt from the adverse publicity it received in the 1990s over human rights abuses by the Colombian military allegedly funded by BP to protect its assets. (It has also benefited from observing the negative press and practices of Freeport Indonesia.) A community security rather than state security strategy has also generally been followed with considerable success by new mining developments across the border in Papua New Guinea since Rio Tinto's debacle in Bougainville (see Dinnen 2001).

for this exists outside the highlands, but is strong only in the highlands. More than two-thirds of Papuans are from the highlands, which today supplies most of the men willing to fight the Indonesian military. So a consensus for war in the highlands that is not shared on the coast could still deliver the international attention OPM seeks. OPM leaders in the highlands in 2007 were open about saying in large meetings that it was not their intent to start a war during 2008—but they would not wait beyond 2009 (or perhaps 2010). They must strike before they become a small minority like Aboriginal Australians. Of course, such threats are common from militarily weak insurgents and OPM has made them many times in the past. Their intent in 2007 was to use the focus on Indonesia for the 2009 presidential elections to destabilise the election. One option being considered that was reported in December 2007 and April 2008 interviews was a Papua-wide boycott of the 2009 election. Because most Papuans are so peace loving and war weary, Jakarta would hope that it would be hard to get support for an election boycott in the coastal cities, the only place where television cameras are likely to film boycott demonstrations. What Jakarta should have little doubt about is the capability of OPM to sabotage pipelines and electricity supplies to shut down resource projects and to kidnap foreigners. Jakarta and OPM leaders understand, however, that the current OPM military posture is defensive only, that OPM thinks it important that it has a military option that it is ready to use in the next couple of years, but that its preferred option is to make progress through international pressure that could include, for example, a legal challenge to nullify the Act of Free Choice at the International Court of Justice.⁹³

Jakarta should also have little doubt about the capacity of OPM to kill a lot of Indonesian soldiers and police in the highlands. There are tiny military posts everywhere with few troops at each. Many posts would have no chance in a surprise ambush by 100 brave Papuan fighters, even if they had little in the way of guns.⁹⁴ The ICG (2002a:6) reported OPM claims that they had 400 guns across the border in Papua New Guinea, though this was surely a high estimate. A 2005 Indonesian Government estimate was 150 (McGibbon 2006b:28). Indonesian troops in the past have been killed and hundreds have been wounded by OPM arrows. OPM could inflict enough damage to trigger massive retaliation.

93 It is worth noting that despite the obvious interest and enthusiasm among many pro-independence activists, Papuans have not yet capitalised on the growing body of scholarly literature, including recent publications by Penders (2002), Saltford (2003), Drooglever (2005) and Tarling (2008) on the injustices of the transfer of Netherlands New Guinea to Indonesia and the subsequent Act of Free Choice. Although the PDP in 2000 claimed that it had engaged international lawyers in a review of the legality of the Act of Free Choice, it appeared there had been no subsequent follow-up to this review and the legal scholar(s) engaged to conduct this review were no longer working on the issue.

94 Krisna (1995) has written of the fears of soldiers working in the 'wilds' of Papua.

Unlike in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, today OPM has the audiovisual capability to get images of its attacks—and the human rights abuses that occur in retaliation—out to the international media. One Papuan fighter said:

[C]reating a Super Santa Cruz⁹⁵ is always an integral part of our strategy. The choice of timing and location are in our hands. The question is how to entrap the TNI so that the OPM can extract the maximum political capital at home and abroad. (Singh 2008:191)

With assistance from their camps and friends in Papua New Guinea, OPM has the capability of sending boatloads of refugees fleeing these human rights abuses into Australia and of creating digital images of a ‘canoe people’ crisis for Australia, as exemplified by the 2006 Papuan asylum-seeker crisis in Australia–Indonesia relations.

While the long-held view of President Yudhoyono is obviously correct that OPM is not a credible threat to perhaps 17 000 security personnel (police and military) in Papua (ICG 2002a:6), the scenario of the previous paragraph is potentially lose-lose-lose for his presidency,⁹⁶ for the Rudd government in Australia⁹⁷ and for the people of Papua, who would suffer untold loss of life and liberty. While this is the most likely catastrophe that could befall the ‘arc of instability’ around Australia at the end of the first decade of the new century, it is a preventable one. Jakarta, Canberra and Washington should be able to see what a disaster this would be for them and the people of Papua and should be able to talk to one another about it in a preventive spirit. Equally, they should be able to see why OPM has been put in a corner where this could become the only card they have to play—unless they see a bold and genuine new dialogue from the president or an international mediator who inspires their confidence. Equally, diplomats should be able to see why a few fire-fights are not such a great worry to the Indonesian military. They know the Indonesian people will rally behind them when they are attacked; they know violence or sabotage will bring more resources to them, create new opportunities to extort increasing amounts of money from vulnerable operations such as Freeport, which fears going the way of Rio Tinto’s Bougainville copper and goldmine, from Asian illegal loggers and fishers who need protection, from prostitution and any number of rackets that flourish in conflict zones. While the Indonesian military is entitled to view the ending of the Papuan spring with its assassination of Theys Eluay as a

95 This refers to the international attention attracted by the Indonesian military shooting a large number of civilians at Santa Cruz Cemetery, East Timor, in 1991.

96 The threat being one of hardline opponents accusing him of being too weak and the international community castigating him for human rights abuses.

97 A flood of boat people would be much more of a problem for the Rudd government than for the conservative Howard government that claimed Labor was weak on deterring boat people.

successful suppression of separatism, more thoughtful Jakarta elites might see it as a longer-term disaster for foreign investment confidence in Indonesia that an opportunity for a permanent peace has been spurned.

The prospect of a renewed war in Papua that would be lose-lose-lose-lose for Jakarta, Canberra, Washington and the ordinary people of Papua is significant precisely because it is possible to imagine how the conflict could at the same time be seen as win-win by hardliners in OPM and the Indonesian military—and they are the players with the capability on the ground to light the fuse. One might go as far as to say that only visionary preventive diplomacy from Jakarta, Canberra, Washington, Brussels and the NGOs and churches of Papua can prevent it.

Here is how one highlands OPM leader put their posture of commitment and resolve:

Once the call is made to fight, everyone will follow the call of the leaders. We can take guns from the military; we have plans for how to do that. Papuans will follow the commander. We have a culture of doing that. Papuans are waiting for the command to resume the fight and next year [2008] is the last year we will wait. (December 2007 meeting with OPM highlanders)

We were struck by how ready some of the young men of the highlands were to die. A local priest reported to us that in the retribution attacks by the TNI after the 6 October 2000 flag raising incident, some Dani were reported to be saying to their wounded comrades, 'Hurry up and die for West Papua!' More than one person asked us to write down their name so that when they died we could write in 'the book' that this was what they said when alive.

In all cases of peacebuilding in developing countries where communication of quality journalism across a nation is poor, dealing with false rumours is a major challenge. An example has been the regular rumours of landings of hordes of masked Laskar Jihad fighters intent on genocidal attacks against Papuans. One sad rumour was that then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan was getting involved in diplomacy to lead Papua to independence (van den Broek et al. 2005:1). There was another that Annan had already visited Wamena and Manokwari. It might have been good had it been true, but as a false rumour it shattered people's hopes. Given this history of false rumours about Annan, and given his skills and 2008 success in Kenya as a peacemaker, he is one of many choices worth considering as a mediator within the space the religious leaders have created through Papua Land of Peace. As the most distinguished long-serving former UN official alive, his apology for how dishonestly the UN handled the Papua issue since 1963 would be especially valued by Papuans. He would also have

the credibility to persuade Papuans that even though the United Nations did not act with integrity in 1969, the fact remains that there is even less support for independence for Papua in the international community today than there was in 1969. No major nation supports it; indeed hardly any nations at all do. The United Nations will never see it in the way it saw East Timor. Even many in the international solidarity movement have given up on independence as their objective. Though the primary Indonesian interest is in persuading Papuans on these points, even though it would be good for Indonesia's international standing for the president to stand beside a Kofi Annan and make exactly the same points directly to Papuans, it is hard to imagine even this kind of indirect UN involvement as acceptable to Indonesia. A distinguished Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) diplomat might be more acceptable. On the Papuan side, there is some interest in the New Zealand Government as a mediator or the Henri Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, the Crisis Management Initiative, the ICG or the Center for Just Peace. And there is commitment to the UN Decolonisation Committee becoming involved (although it is extremely unlikely that any government in Jakarta would accept such an initiative).

Rodd McGibbon (2006b) has fired a broadside at the alleged good intentions and bad effects of the West Papua solidarity movement, particularly in Australia. He is surely right that international pressure from another country on what Indonesians regard as an internal matter engenders resentment in Indonesia and sours the bilateral relationship between that country and Indonesia. He is also surely right that settling this conflict will depend overwhelmingly on domestic drivers and peacebuilding initiatives within Indonesia. That does not, however, preclude international pressure having a role. And McGibbon (2006b) is surely wrong that international pressure will tend to reduce prospects for peacebuilding (because of the way he sees the sensitivity of Indonesia to criticism from countries such as Australia and the United States). Of course, clumsy diplomacy can have that effect, but diplomats keep doing diplomacy because it can work and NGOs keep publicising the human rights abuses of militaries and environmental abuses of multinational corporations and illegal loggers because NGO networks of international pressure can work. They work in limited ways precisely because states and corporations that abuse rights do resent the pressure and want to get it off their backs. Increasingly, they care about their international reputations for good commercial reasons given the way international trade, investment and aid work. And they care about it for its own sake; they want Indonesia to be a respected member of the international community. So it is desirable for international civil society to be more engaged with the domination and the poverty of the people of Papua. Finally, because McGibbon (2006b) is also right that it is counterproductive for international civil society to encourage Papuans in the unrealistic view that they can be the next East Timor, it is especially imperative for international civil society

to be engaged and vocal in communicating to Papuans that a renewed war of independence will lead only to more suffering. International civil society can make a positive contribution by linking arms with Papua Land of Peace and with those in both Papua and Jakarta who want *merdeka* with autonomy.

Military strategy debates in Indonesia are profoundly shaped by the fear of international exposure of human rights abuses. That is why Jakarta keeps the international media out of the province. That is why it shoots far fewer of its opponents today than it did in the 1960s, 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and at the beginning of the 2000s. That is why young men and women we interviewed said it was comparatively safe to be arrested in the city. In the bush, however, where there are no cameras or mobile phones or journalists or NGOs, that is where arrest is most likely to lead to beating, rape or death (see HRW 2007b). In turn, that is why protestors today protest rural grievances in the city. That is why in the aftermath of East Timor there was also a real contest of ideas among different TNI generals we were able to interview over whether a counterinsurgency model that hired and armed indigenous militias to do the military's dirty work was still viable in an era when every second insurgent and NGO activist carried a mobile phone with a movie camera.⁹⁸ Some generals think the counterinsurgency strategies developed so brilliantly by the military in its successful war against Darul Islam no longer work in conditions of modern communications technology and scrutiny by organisations such as Human Rights Watch (HRW 2009) networking with (and protecting) local NGOs such as Elsham and Kontras and the church human rights activists. It is precisely international civil society activism that strengthens the hand of those generals advocating a more rights-sensitive approach to counterinsurgency that puts greater emphasis on development assistance and institution building through (admittedly flawed) initiatives such as special autonomy.

International military diplomacy and training have an important role here as well. The diplomacy of the United States will be more effective by putting ever-greater emphasis on dialogue between Indonesian military leaders of the present and the future and great American generals of the present and past who are admired by TNI. In that dialogue, crusty American generals can be counted on to sympathise with their Indonesian colleagues about what bleeding hearts human rights NGOs and international solidarity movements are, but their existence means that approaches such as fence-of-legs counterinsurgency and

98 One of General Petreus's strategists of the 2007 'Iraq surge' rethinking of counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen, has made the point this way: 'Indonesia's approach to counterinsurgency, then, derives partly from its experience in suppressing Darul Islam. The tactics developed in West Java proved effective in the geographical and political circumstances of the 1950s, but have proved ineffective—indeed, positively injurious to Indonesian interests—in other circumstances. Globalisation, and particularly, the influence of world media and international public opinion, undermined the approach's effectiveness in East Timor, and this highlights the continuing impact of globalisation in contemporary counterinsurgency' (Kilcullen 2006:61).

retaliatory strafing and dropping napalm or chemical weapons on villagers must remain part of the military past. International civil society activism is crucial for underwriting those practical military peacebuilding dynamics.

Mediation, reconciliation and new tribal wars

The Papua conflict is distinguished by how little determined local or international mediation and reconciliation has occurred apart from the brief effort of President Wahid that was undermined by the military. There has been no Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Compare this with Aceh, which saw successive failed and successful attempts to mediate peace by international and national leaders and NGOs. As one foreign pastor with decades of experience in Papua put it:

Papuan ask for dialogue, but Indonesia never accept dialogues, at least not with the real leaders—they will have dialogue with the leaders that they appoint... There are cultural differences. Javanese people are not open, [they] keep their thoughts to themselves, [they] keep their emotions to themselves, whereas Papuan people say exactly what they feel.⁹⁹

Aceh has seen a joint ASEAN–EU peacekeeping operation called the Aceh Monitoring Mission (see Chapter 6). While the Indonesia–Netherlands post-colonial conflict saw a tiny group of Australians become the first UN peacekeeping operation in 1947, none operated in Papua at that time and the UN officials who came in 1962 were not agents of peace, reconciliation or mediated democracy, but of Cold War politics.

We have not become aware of any major reconciliation meeting between the Indonesian military and the people of Papua. We were told of a few minor reconciliations in the 1970s whereby, in accordance with local custom after a war, the brother or son of a man killed by the military went to live in the barracks of the military (and was trained by them to become a soldier!). When you stand back from it, it is amazing that such a major conflict can run for almost half a century in Melanesia with so little semblance of reconciliation ritual occurring at any level. Where reconciliation has occurred more widely is among Papuans caught on different sides of the conflict. One unfortunate apolitical man we interviewed was tortured and imprisoned as a spy by both Indonesia and OPM. There seemed no substance to the allegations from either side. OPM tortured him, leaving large welts on his body, cutting off some fingers

⁹⁹ We are inclined to think these cultural differences, while significant, are not insurmountable. Moreover, while we were in Papua, there were some tentative beginnings to dialogue between the military leadership in Papua and church, NGO and indigenous leaders. So no doors seem impossible to open or even fully closed. The president also regularly meets with Christian leaders and discusses the Papua conflict with them.

and an ear and pushing an arrow through his arm. He reconciled by helping the children of his torturers with education and other difficulties children suffered when their father in the bush could not support them.

We have seen that tribal warfare¹⁰⁰ in Papua for the most part disappeared during the middle decades of the twentieth century under mission and Dutch-led pacification backed by native police. It then rose again somewhat (though not to anywhere near the deadliness of tribal fighting in the PNG highlands)¹⁰¹ in recent decades, partly because it had been coopted by practitioners of Indonesia versus Papua and Freeport versus Papua politics. Traditional reconciliation continues to be used with these conflicts to positive effect. An example from near the Freeport mine in Timika was fighting in 2003 between Amungme and Dani. First, feasts were held for men involved in fighting together in the same group during the war. A second peace process feast included all family members of that conflicting group, including women and children. A third feast brought together all family members of both conflicting parties, at the end of which compensation was paid in both directions for lives lost. Sometimes, traditionally and contemporarily, there are individual as well as collective gifts; Sillitoe (1972:116) reports among the Arapesh each warrior exchanging a polished ring with any enemy he has wounded. The burning of broken arrows is also still a common feature of these rituals, as are speeches of reconciliation from both sides—little apology speeches and little forgiveness speeches at earlier stages that build up to big apology and forgiveness speeches at the finale—enemies washing together in pig fat, prayers and particular dances and songs at particular stages. Even while fighting is still occurring, leaders start the process of mediation by talking (shouting) to each other. It's a step-by-step tradition of ritualised confidence building towards peace. A mediator is often chosen to facilitate these steps who is an older man with respect from fighters on both sides, often with connections to both but with perceived independence and lack of bias (see also Meggitt 1977:116–17). When reconciliation is finalised, it is truly finalised. It is believed terrible things will befall a person who reopens

100 Most traditional highlands fighting was not intertribal, in the sense of whole tribes mobilising against one another, but intra-tribal: family versus family, clan versus clan, village versus village or groups of villages. Were Papuan tribal warfare a pure matter of kinship cleavages, it would be less useful to be harnessed to modern resource, military and political conflicts. Sillitoe (1972:402) points out, however, the relatively unimportant role of descent in New Guinean war on both sides of the border 'and the crucial role of big men and their small political factions struggling for existence'.

101 Between 1991 and 2006, Wiessner et al. (2007:4) analysed 338 tribal wars reported to Enga Province village courts alone, resulting in the loss of more than 3800 lives. 'For three decades [until independence for Papua New Guinea in 1975, the] Colonial administration had enforced the ban on tribal warfare. The people were not as fearful of the new government composed of their own elected representatives as they had been of the Europeans with their wealth and technology from another world.' Progressively the situation has also become much worse because of the erosion of the authority of customary law and the loss of power of elders over youth with guns. So we have two forms of law—colonial and customary—each of which has had its period of being able to limit most of the potential harm from tribal warfare in Papua New Guinea, but where one withdrew after reducing the legitimacy of the other.

conflict. Peacemaking practices that persist in West Papua have a great deal in common with the way Wiessner et al. (2007:9) describe pre-colonial practice in Enga (Papua New Guinea):

Essential features...were: (1) diplomatic oration, (2) the return of families to their land shortly after hostilities had ceased so that daily communication could resume, (3) the promise of future economic gain through exchange, and (4) the payment of compensation over a protracted period of two to three years to permit the healing hands of time to take effect. Once peace was established marriages were arranged between enemy clans to further strengthen ties. In short, prior to first contact with Europeans, Enga were masters of what is today called 'restorative justice'.

One *dewan adat* (traditional customary) leader said: 'Papuan use bow and arrow to solve a lot of conflicts. We just want to use dialogue traditions more instead.' Looking across to the PNG highlands shows them why—in conditions of modernity—armed mercenaries and arms dealers can complicate, protract and multiply the death caused by tribal fighting. They can also see why from their own recent history: the Indonesian military hired in effect as mercenaries by Freeport, and with divide-and-rule interests, can have the same effect. To some degree, highland people have been influenced not only by Christianity but by lowland traditions of preventive diplomacy, resolving conflict by dialogue before war and resorting to war only if dialogue fails. The highland tradition, in contrast, was 'if you kill, there has to be a war to make balance. You must do that.' A big-man must 'announce it and own the war'. He declares war and at the same time prepares for peacebuilding as soon as the fighting finishes to restore balance. There are rules of war such as against killing women and children and against killing leaders who have the wealth and skills to make peace (see Wiessner et al. 2007:10). The individual declaration of responsibility for and ownership of the war is another rule. Another is that the war must be declared to occur at a specific place at a specific time, say, '8am to 11am, then a break, then 1–3pm' in a specific place. This is war with a lunch break. These rules mean warfare is never total and they limit threats to the security of daily life. You can be trading at the market in the presence of your enemies during a war. No-one is going to jump on you as you walk alone or break into your home at night (in the way the Indonesian military does to instil fear). 'You are not a true man' if you attack outside the agreed time when the enemy is not prepared and children are kept at a safe distance.¹⁰²

102 It is worth noting that not all tribal groups observed such courteous protocols in inter and intra-tribal conflicts (cf. Marind, Asmat and Kamoro in the southern lowlands of Papua).

We were told that wars such as the one just described in Timika were not traditional wars, but some completely new kind of conflict, because women were shot at night. Some call them 'military wars'. The Indonesians also loosely call fighting in which no-one has come out and owned the war on either side 'tribal wars'. You cannot go and talk to the owner of the conflict to find out what it is about, what its limits are. The reason, indigenous leaders said, was that if the owners of the war stepped forward, they would be the military or Brimob. Militarised indigenous conflicts are also characterised by intentional rekindling of conflicts after the reconciliation process has started and before it has finished. One strategy of the military in border areas is to hire locals as 'operational assistant staff', which was something also done in Aceh and East Timor (Davies 2001:29); conflict arises as their kin and neighbours come to see them as spies. Another feature of militarised fighting is that guns are brought in on one side of the conflict, making balance harder to secure. One Amungme leader said that deaths in military conflicts of the Indonesian era among his people ran at five times the level of wars that occurred before colonial pacification. This is not, however, typical. Fighting has jumped more among the Amungme because the Freeport mine is on their land. Traditional fighting was mostly about women, pigs or land. Military fighting today is about district, provincial and national politics and commercial interests, about the political economy of Indonesian capitalism and militarism. Modernisation is about ever-widening frames of identity (hamlet, clan, district, province, nation) that mobilise conflict, with perplexed highlanders even being caught up in things such as World War II and the global war on terror, and even being so unsophisticated in their understanding of it as to think that it might provide the opportunity of Israel giving them guns.

Here is a concrete example of militarised conflict from our notes of an interview with a Catholic priest:

One cause of the conflict between these two tribes was that some military picked up unsophisticated Dani young men and said to them, 'We would like you to steal some gold and copper from Freeport.' They think they have the backing of the military to do that, so they do it. What the military gets out of it is some gold and copper, but they also open up conflict with the Amungme. The reason the military wished to open up this conflict between tribes is that the government decided to replace the military as the main source of security for Freeport, and replace them with the police. What the military are interested in proving through creating conflict is that things were much better when they were in charge, so that the business of security for Freeport should go back to them.¹⁰³

103 See Kirksey and Harsono (2008) for more on this 'co-production' of conflict in West Papua.

Papuan tribes are also coopted into conflict between the military and the police and even between different factions of the police over the control of illegal logging. The military is a master at creating conflict by spreading rumours about who is responsible for the death of a particular person. We were told of cases where church groups that had great authority in calling for peace and reconciliation were barred from entering conflict zones to do peacemaking work when the military wanted conflict to escalate.

We were told that in parts of the highlands more distant from the Freeport mine, Papuans experienced provocations from the military to divide them against other tribes, but that they had an understanding among the tribes that such provocations would always be (and always were) resisted. In this—the majority of the highlands—the dominant view is that tribal fighting stopped soon after the missionaries arrived and has not existed since.

In traditional war, fighting stops when there is negotiated agreement that a point has been reached where balance has been attained. A core meaning of balance is equal lives lost on both sides. This mostly keeps the loss of life in traditional highland warfare quite low. Perfect balance in lives lost is not necessary, as long as the side that loses fewer fighters pays much higher compensation (usually in pigs) in the traditional gift exchange feast at the end of the fighting. Another option has been to betray an unpopular, lazy or dangerous man (recidivist adulterers have been a common choice) to the enemy 'so that he can be killed in an ambush' (Sillitoe 1972:114). If one side is foolish enough to deploy a superior military capability to create an ever-widening imbalance in lives lost, it might leave an imbalance it cannot manage financially, causing perhaps the loss of large areas of traditional land where ancestors dwell.

It is also common to seal a peace through a marriage. In Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and various parts of Melanesia, there are traditions of restoring balance by allowing the aggrieved group to choose or be given a bride, as there were between clans in early modern Scotland (Braithwaite 2002:6). This is not only about balance but about building a family bridge to promote reconciliation. Sometimes men or women move in both directions between the two conflicting groups. Among the Asmat, a couple of men and a couple of women would leave both sides to be adopted into the settlements of their enemies (Sillitoe 1972:384). Abelam peace settlement was distinguished by temporary (for a few weeks) swapping of positions in villages by men of approximately equal standing (Sillitoe 1972:114). Traditionally and today in Papua, the marriage partners volunteer. In doing so, they feel they are making a contribution to peace and harmony between their two groups.

The extent to which highland beliefs about balance have been adapted by lowland and Christian influences and by contemporary realities is reflected in our research notes from a large meeting with 20 highlands independence supporters, which included some OPM members:

He spoke of the highlands belief that deaths must be repaid with deaths, with something equal so that there is a balance. That when there is a balance of deaths there could be a finish to the conflict. Special Autonomy does not seem something that provides compensation proportionate to all the deaths that Papuans have suffered. J. B. said wouldn't it be difficult or impossible to ever achieve a balance of death given the huge numbers of Papuans who had been killed. He replied, and others chimed in, that they did not have the guns to achieve balance, so they have to find some means of achieving balance by letters, newspapers and a peace process that will lead to a better future.

This is the same shift Clifford Shearing detects in South Africa: long-suffering poor people ultimately shift their justice philosophy at the end of a long conflict from justice as a balance of benefits and burdens and justice as proportionality, to justice as a better future (Shearing and Johnston 2005). That was why the philosophy of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission became one of not wanting to spend its resources on building prisons for whites, but schools for blacks.

Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

The deepest structural driver of this conflict, as argued in the introduction, was that Papua was unusual in being afflicted with two colonialisms rather than the usual one. The poverty-inducing effects of Dutch extractive colonialism were compounded by the different poverty-induction dynamics of Indonesian settler-dominated repressive-resource-exploitative colonialism that enriched settlers and pushed indigenous custodians of the land to the margins. They were also colonialisms that left the colony with weak political and economic institutions designed to sustain dependence on the coloniser (Acemoglu et al. 2004). In Mertonian opportunity theory terms, legitimate economic opportunities for Papuans were limited, while the presence of the military opened up systematic illegitimate opportunities for some. Because Indonesian internal colonialism has

been granted so little legitimacy by the people of Papua, an anomic province has been created with limited and fragmented support for the imposed normative order.

It follows that immigration actively promoted by the invading state has been another root cause. This is geopolitically impossible for Papuans to reverse, but it is possible for wise policy to cease encouraging it and to contain and better manage it. *Reformasi's* abolition of the transmigration program was a sound first step towards mitigating this structural driver of conflict.

An illegitimate opportunity structure driven by certain elements of a 'resource curse' is another structural driver. Papua is not a classic case of the resource curse in the sense of insurgents capturing resource projects to fund their insurgency. Few places on Earth are more plentifully endowed with timber, gold, copper, natural gas and fish than Papua. As countries such as Botswana that are endowed with diamonds illustrate, there is no structural inevitability that resource riches induce conflict. They create, however, an opportunity structure that attracts dividers and exploiters. In this case, resource riches (coupled with fear of communism) attracted 'economic hitmen' to Indonesia who had been recruited through the US intelligence services, such as John Perkins (2005, 2007). They paved the path of access to the president for Freeport. Freeport then became a major structural driver of conflict. Resources also attracted the military to stay to get ever-larger slices of this action. They accomplished this by fomenting conflict: conflict with OPM, conflict between tribes, conflict between local villagers and Freeport, conflict between Papuan elites in Jayapura and those in Timika and Manokwari, and elsewhere.

While it is no longer relevant today, the Cold War was a structural driver of the conflict. The Cold War was fundamental to US pressure on The Netherlands and other countries to give up their support for Papuan independence and to support the UN-supervised Act of Free Choice, which became a key proximate explanation of fighting. What is a constant is that Indonesia is geopolitically important, while Papua remains peripheral to Indonesia in the eyes of other major states.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

If the opportunities provided by the resource curse (Collier 2007:Ch. 3) are among the structural drivers of the conflict, as explained in the previous section, the invasion of the military to pacify resistance to Indonesia and to secure Freeport are the proximate factors. The great variety of things the security forces have done to exploit the resource opportunities that we have described in this chapter is a key provocation of conflict.

Illegal logging has been shown to be a particularly potent proximate factor in many of the worsening horizontal conflicts in Papua.

Military politics in Jakarta when the rules of the game were so uncertain a decade ago also contributed to the removal of President Wahid. This ended the Papuan spring. That was a critical turning point away from a version of special autonomy that might have delivered peace. Military politics also sustained President Sukarno for the invasion of Papua and President Suharto's exploitation of the province and subordination of its institutions.

The same military politics (married to the Ministry of Home Affairs and its ancillary agencies) was responsible for the proximate inducement to enduring conflict created by partition of Papua into two, and could result in further provinces in the future. As a Presidium member put it: 'Indonesian diplomats have the power of pigeons, the military the power of eagles.'

The proximate factor mentioned most commonly by interviewees was the illegitimate nature of the Act of Free Choice in 1969.

What were the key triggering incidents?

Raisings of the morning star flag have been by far the most common triggering incidents for escalation of the conflict up to the most recent burning of houses and killings of villagers by the security forces in late 2009. Other kinds of demonstrations, such as by students against Freeport, have been triggers when they are seen by Brimob and the military to involve thumbing of noses at the authority of the security forces and challenges to the legitimacy of the unitary Indonesian state. Kidnappings, attacks on Indonesian police or military and sabotage of Freeport facilities have also triggered upward spikes in violent conflict.

The murder of Theys Eluay was a decisive incident that made a workable peace process very difficult. It does not, however, fit the definition of a classic triggering incident that sparks an explosion of fighting. On the contrary, it was a kind of surgical incision by the military backed by dozens of naval vessels offshore laden with military personnel that sparked a capitulation by independence supporters. Perhaps in time it will come to be seen as an incident that triggered short-term capitulation and disengagement and long-term defiant resistance. It might have both prevented war and prevented peace.

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

Key war-making actors have clearly been the various poorly armed factions that have made up what has loosely come to be called OPM or TPN/OPM, the armed wing of the Free Papua Movement. OPM enjoys unusually high legitimacy compared with other insurgency groups, but is also unusually poorly organised in terms of communication, training, logistics and deployment capability. The Presidium leadership in 1999 and 2000 was the critical peacebuilding actor of that period and briefly enrolled most of OPM as peacebuilding actors—but only briefly. Today some OPM factions are preparing for war again.

The Indonesian security forces are the other crucial war-making actors. Until the 2000s there was no distinction between the military and the police in Papua. We have seen that during the 2000s the police mobile squad, Brimob—its most heavily armed group—has probably killed and tortured more Papuans than the military. Within the military, the most aggressive perpetrator of violence has been Kopassus, the elite special forces group. All elements of the shifting panorama of Indonesian intelligence organisations in the past half-century also seem to have been important in maintaining the momentum for conflict, as have Papua strategists at senior levels of the Home Affairs Ministry. It might be wrong to say militias are key war-making actors because they have been so rarely armed, but it would be folly not to see them as having the potential to do what their predecessors did in East Timor. The risk already being realised of them morphing into organised-crime groups is the most probable risk of a more violent future for Papua than its immediate past.

Foreign business interests—particularly Chinese and Korean with timber and American with mining—rarely intend to cause violence but have done so very often, especially when they network their security with the military and police. Paradoxically, we saw in Note 73 that this made it easier for the Papuan elites in BP's extraction zone to want to be partitioned with them away from the more troubled resource politics of other regions.

The churches have been the most important peacebuilding actors. Missionaries rather than the thin ranks of the Dutch colonial administration did most of the legwork of the pacification of the tribal warfare that was rife until the end of the 1950s. It would not have been possible, however, without the guns supplied to native police by the Dutch state to support the peacebuilding of the missionaries. Once pacified, tribal war-makers never became key war-making actors again, but simply actors who made war occasionally when coopted to that end by the very modern politics of Freeport and the Indonesian state.

The most central human rights advocate and peacebuilding actor in networking Papua Land of Peace in the past few years has been the Catholic Office for Justice and Peace (SKP). A very active local human rights advocacy partner of SKP during the first half of this decade and in the late 1990s was Elsham (the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy, based in Jayapura). Its head, John Rumbiak, was forced to flee Indonesia. Rumbiak did not advocate independence, but was an eloquent, internationally respected campaigner for human rights and peace in Papua. Tragically, he suffered a stroke in 2005 that left him incapable of continuing his work with Elsham.

In 2007, Yap-HAM was a very active and effective human rights NGO in the highlands, struggling to document instances of torture with almost no international assistance, though it networked with Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International. The Legal Aid Foundation has an important role in providing legal representation in human rights cases and the national human rights group Kontras and Komnas-Ham and its NGO networks have also been important.

Most of these NGOs are much less internationally networked than in all the other cases in the first four volumes of *Peacebuilding Compared*. UN agencies have much less presence and impact in Papua to assist in this networking than with our other cases. The churches are very well networked internationally, as are some of the human rights NGOs. Where they exist, these international linkages are crucial for mobilising international pressure. Some human rights NGOs, however, receive no international financial or networking support. Women's NGOs were particularly unusual in their limited or non-existent international networking. In other case studies, these were the most internationally networked of all NGO types. International environmental NGOs also have a surprisingly limited presence. The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) does a great job in Merauke with a 'collaborative mapping' project with customary communities. On the same map, the journeys of the ancestors and sacred sites are plotted, as are water sources, environmentally sensitive forests and habitats important for indigenous food supply. These collaborative maps define hot spots of mutual threat to indigenous and environmental values. They are overlaid on the state's planning maps, with their vast allocations to new oil-palm, logging and rice-paddy development. As exciting as this work is, neither WWF nor any other international environmental NGO has an office in the town of Timika, which is the gateway to the greatest environmental hot spot in the South Pacific: the region of the Freeport mine!¹⁰⁴

104 WWF has a program to monitor the 2 million hectare Lorentz National Park/World Heritage Site, but meagre resources to maintain or build programs in the region.

There are several hundred (government-registered) NGOs operating in Papua. Of these, 64 are networked through the NGO forum FOKER. Our experience of the NGO culture, which was fairly rich during our fieldwork, was that it was not competitive. NGOs in Papua help each other—something joyously manifest at a FOKER picnic we were able to attend and in many other contexts. The Dewan Adat Papua, or Papuan Customary Council, is also a rich networking institution, linking 250 tribal leaders in conversation. One perceptive Papuan NGO leader, however, identified the following weakness: ‘Most people have big dreams in this [peacebuilding] business, but do not have a sense of how to take small steps towards them.’

The student movement is weaker today than it was before the 16 March 2006 Abepura incident when anti-Freeport protesters, predominantly students, killed four police and one military intelligence operative after they were fired on. Brimob retaliated, torturing 24 students, with 23 of them sentenced to five–15 years in prison; 20 other students fled to Papua New Guinea. They have been brutally suppressed and are more fragmented than they were. Former students of Cenderawash University in Abepura in particular had fanned across the province to coordinate resistance networks from their villages (King 2004:44). When we organised a meeting with Christian student leaders in Abepura, after one with Muslim Student Association leaders, 70 attended. We were expecting a few to turn up for an informal discussion. The meeting ran for hours; some said they were still recovering from trauma at the meeting and some sadly did seem to be in that state.

Most members of the Jakarta and Jayapura security establishment see the Church and human rights groups as fronts for separatism.¹⁰⁵ Some old OPM players see them this way too; they say ‘we got nowhere for so many years fighting in the jungle; it’s time now to see if the churches and students can build international pressure for a referendum’. It would be silly to say this perception from hardliners on both sides of the debate is never true. What we suspect is true is that the religious leaders in Papua Land of Peace are genuinely about peace and respect for human rights; among them are people with a wide range of views on how realistic or desirable is independence. They are a coalition that believes there are deep injustices in Papua and that armed conflict is not a way to address them in a sustainable way. There are important links between the human rights coalitions and the organisations linked more to OPM. The West

105 The perception that Christian churches in Papua are pro-independence (and anti-Indonesian) is not new. As early as the mid-1950s, this perception threatened to break apart the Dutch Reformed Church, the main Protestant congregation in Netherlands New Guinea (see van de Wal 2006). Papuan churches have struggled ever since to fulfil their spiritual and moral obligations to their congregations (and thereby civil society) while abiding by the authority of the Indonesian state.

Papua National Coalition for Liberation has potential to refine these linkages to help unify a negotiating forum on terms for a peace agreement with Jakarta (see Tebay 2009).

The actor with the greatest potential to be a peacebuilder is the president. President Wahid, for a brief period, was the only Indonesian president to ever be a committed peacebuilder for Papua. The current president has been a disappointment in Papua, unwilling to stand up to the military as the actor most responsible for the conflict, in the way he has been willing to take a stand in Aceh after the tsunami. Similarly, his first Vice-President, Jusuf Kalla, who played an even more prominent role than his president in Aceh, Maluku and Central Sulawesi as a peacebuilder, has been a game player with the business politics of partition of Papua with an eye to his business interests in the west of Papua.

The media, nationally and internationally, and the international diplomatic community have also been quiescent and unimaginative actors in efforts to open up paths to peace. Even when promising peacebuilding efforts from below occur, such as Papua Land of Peace, the journalists and the diplomats, with a few exceptions, have not pushed the bandwagon forward in important ways. Australian diplomacy has been especially insipid in this regard.

The other actors with under-utilised potential as peacebuilders have been students in Papua. University students have been inspiring in their struggles for *merdeka*, for human rights and for regulation of the environmental destruction caused by the Freeport mine. So far, however, they lack a creative vision of how to make a struggle for *merdeka* with peace work. Still, there is great idealism and fortitude beating in the breasts of the students that one can sense is waiting for the bell of history to toll. The terrible fear is that the bell will toll above a river of their blood.

Motivational postures of key actors

Valerie Braithwaite (2009) defines motivational postures as sets of beliefs and attitudes that sum up how actors feel about and wish to position themselves in relation to a source of authority. We have seen that there are many authorities in contest in Papua: different levels of Indonesian-led and Papuan-led government, the authority of big-men and hereditary chiefs and elders of the clan and a military that in some ways stands above the authority of elected officials, especially Papuan ones. Then there have been times and places where the authority of OPM and the Presidium has been central.

Actors send signals to an authority (be it a government agency, a big-man or a militia) about how it is regarded and how much social distance is placed between

them and the authority. Beliefs and attitudes making up each motivational posture are based on an appraisal of what the authority stands for, what it is demanding and how it engages with the needs and aspirations of those it seeks to govern. Valerie Braithwaite's factor analytic studies of beliefs and attitudes of businesses responding to regulators and ordinary and sophisticated taxpayers towards tax authorities empirically found five motivational postures as recurrently fundamental to the human condition.

- *Commitment* means willingly embracing the mission of the authority.
- *Capitulation* means surrender to the will of an authority and to the letter of its law without fully embracing its spirit.
- *Resistance* means vocal opposition to the power the authority has and how it uses it; resistance is about grievance.
- *Disengagement* means psychological dissociation that renders an actor immune to attempts by an authority to steer their actions.
- *Game playing* is a more imaginative and bold practice for escaping constraint by redefining rules, moving goalposts or repositioning the self. It implies keen engagement with the rules of the game, analysing regulatory and governance systems with disarming acuity and clarity of purpose. Authorities are not resented; they are playing the game too, just on a different team. More often than not, game playing is about greed.

It is often difficult to say whether a war is more about greed (and *game playing*) than grievance (and *resistance*). This is less so with the Papuan conflict, where most indigenous Papuans feel a deep sense of grievance and want *merdeka*. Many undoubtedly would sacrifice themselves to join a fight if they thought the fight had a chance to succeed in redressing injustice. 'We are fighting for our dignity, our independence,' said a Paniai TPN/OPM commander. When we interviewed older and younger-generation OPM members, they said they joined up because of their sense of injustice. Some mentioned things done to their relatives by the military—a collective memory of suffering, or Papuan *memoria passionis*. Nearly all mentioned the farce that was the 1969 Act of Free Choice. Many said they gave the Zone of Peace or the Land of Peace a try early in the 2000s, but now that they had been betrayed by special autonomy and attacks on leaders such as Theys Eluay, insurgency *resistance* and international pressure were the only paths left. It is just a matter of waiting for the right opportunity, such as being able to get the guns.

By the early 1960s, there was an educated Papuan elite who saw themselves having a personal interest in promoting the idea of a Papuan identity, as opposed to clan and tribal identity, and an independent Papua of which they would

be leaders. Gaming identities to pursue greed provides an even less plausible account today of why individual Papuans would be so irrational as to resist Indonesia.

Economic self-interest is, however, very much a factor in why many OPM fighters *capitulate*. Some nationalist Papuan leaders have allowed themselves to be caught up in business relationships with the military, with Freeport, or both. William Onde was a colourful OPM leader in the Boven Digoel District on the PNG border. He was on the take from Kopassus and the Korean oil-palm plantation developer Korindo, for whom he even drew a salary as a company security guard. He overplayed his hand in his double game when, hardly within the spirit of the deal of allowing Korindo to go about its business without being harassed, he kidnapped 16 Korindo employees in 2001. Among a list of OPM-relevant demands such as withdrawal of Brimob personnel from the district was: 'Korindo payment of Rp.2.4 million tab in the Nikita bar, Merauke' (ICG 2007c:8)! Some months later, Onde and his deputy, John Tumin, were murdered, probably by Kopassus (ICG 2007c:8).

Some OPM commanders have been paid by the military to commit provocations that justify a sweep and retaliations the military wishes to execute. Provocations also help the police and military justify more posts (that generate more corruption and business revenue) and bigger budgets from Jakarta. Other OPM are paid as spies. In this business, the Indonesian security sector is acutely pragmatic; they are the consummate *game players*. Leaders are not asked to renounce separatism; more often they are paid in return for specific, strategic forms of *capitulation*. The carrot is used to steer rather than destroy. The stick is used to destroy. More than a few OPM leaders who entered business relationships in return for allowing themselves to be steered by the military were subsequently assassinated when they were no longer worth steering. It is not only leaders who *capitulate* in a self-interested grasp for carrots. A prominent local journalist explained:

The military do pursue them [fighters] into the jungle. The military and government try to persuade them to come in from the jungle. This is partly to reduce tension across the border. And they want to come back, [they] miss their kids. They ask and government sends out a negotiating team to talk to them. They are given guarantees that they will not be punished when [they] return. In fact, [their return] causes some investment in their village...The government puts in a house-building project in the village so there will be houses for the fighters when they return.

The military does some work for the contractors on the house building 'to show they are part of the community'. There are none of the concerns Western

governments have about ‘negotiating with terrorists’, or with rewarding them for their crimes against the state. There is probably not much of a moral hazard problem here for Indonesia. Privation hiding in the jungle with a significant risk that either you or your family members will be killed is a high price to pay for a humble Papuan house to be built for you. It would be stretching truth to call the ‘carrot’ of a house ‘combatant reintegration’. Such returnees are watched, perhaps used, not trusted. They *capitulate* to the might of the Indonesian military while persisting with *defiant resistance* of the idea of Indonesian rule over them. Reintegration connotes reintegration to some level of commitment to the rule of the state’s law. That is hardly being accomplished in Papua.¹⁰⁶

While the appearance of the military and the police is of organisations with fervent *commitment* to the Indonesian State—and there is a lot of reality to this appearance—it is also true that the security forces are consummate *game players* of state, provincial, local and indigenous authority structures. Papuans have little attachment to the Indonesian state, but do continue to have considerable *commitment* to their clan and other traditional authority structures and leaders. The tragedy of Papua is that Indonesia has sought to build loyalty to its state by undermining *commitment* to indigenous authority structures. During the New Order of President Suharto, the policy was to marginalise traditional local leaders by supplanting them with government officials loyal to the Indonesian State (Howard et al. 2002). Law 5 of 1979 usurped traditional leaders with an imposed Indonesian local leadership structure that was one-size-fits-all across Indonesia. The erosion of the legitimacy of indigenous leaders in conflict resolution did not end traditional dispute resolution. Without legitimacy, however, there was less *commitment* to local and national law and there was no distaste of forum shopping for the best outcome. Collapse of legitimacy supplants *commitment* with *game playing*.

Land law is a good example. Traditionally there were hardly clear land laws—rather a plurality of contested claims to overlapping land usages. The elders said, however, there were clear powers to settle land matters. What was settled was who had the legitimacy to settle. That legitimacy was unsettled by arbitrary trumping by *game players* who invoked Indonesian land law and the *Indonesian Constitution* (Article 33.3) on state ownership of land. This also made it easy for *game players* to use the military to seize coveted land on behalf of the state. Among the Sentani people, whose ancestral lands today constitute part of greater Jayapura, each clan has an *Ondoafi* and there is a big *Ondoafi* (an *Ondofolo* or tribal leader) recognised for inter-clan disputes. In land disputes, the *Ondofolo* is procedurally bound to consult thoughtfully with all groups involved in the land dispute. When a political game player gets Kopassus to

106 Similar concerns apply in the repatriation of West Papuans who have lived in exile in Papua New Guinea for decades but recently have been enticed to return to Papua.

enforce their claim without traditional consultation, however, conditions for horizontal conflict are created by a military intervention that lacks legitimacy. Where traditional authority over land is no longer working—for example, in disputes over property between two trading companies downtown—elders have no problem with state law taking over, just as they have no problem with its sway in intellectual property or international trade disputes. For disputes of modernity, they see virtue in *commitment* to state legal authority; for disputes with traditional dimensions, for example, they think the state should defer to *Ondofolo*.

We have seen that while failing to build the desired level of *commitment* to the state, the security forces have done considerable damage to *commitment* to indigenous authority by fomenting militarised tribal wars, by bribing, inebriating and tempting traditional leaders with prostitution in return for selling out their people on crucial issues such as logging. The outcome of this process is a reduced level of *commitment* to the Indonesian state and to traditional authority structures, causing widespread anomie and *disengagement*. *Disengagement* is associated with other problems worsening, such as alcohol abuse and domestic violence. The reality that the supposed paragons of loyal *commitment* to the Indonesian state are in fact *game players*, corrupting the financial integrity of the state and its rule of law also fosters *disengagement* among Papuans. At a more macro-level, we have seen how this has promoted *disengagement* of Papuan bureaucrats from the special autonomy that could have become the great accomplishment of the Papuan spring.

In this sense, Indonesian colonialism in Papua has had an effect similar to white settler colonialism on the fabric of Aboriginal Australian society. *Defiant resistance* to white Australia is the healthy and hopeful part of Aboriginal reaction. The more widespread and pathological reaction is *disengagement* and a total loss of hope, giving up on the future of their children. This *disengagement* problem is nowhere near as deep a problem with indigenous Papuans as it has become with Indigenous Australians.¹⁰⁷ That might only be because settler domination has been statistically and demographically less overwhelming in the Papuan case and has had fewer decades to do its decimation of traditional authority. What is worse even than in Aboriginal Australia, however, is access to education and health care. We know that education and good health are vital paths to empowerment. We know that educational failure is a path to *disengagement*, as is a particularly chronic affliction with the exhaustion of malaria. Malaria infection intensity has recently been found in sophisticated econometric work to be the strongest predictor of economic backwardness in

107 See Harple (2000) on the subtle cultural processes at play behind the perceived *disengagement* of Kamoro communities living in the Freeport Contract of Work area.


Africa (Bhattacharyya 2008). *Merdeka* is imbued with the meaning of *resistant defiance* of settler hegemony, in defence of dignity through *adat*. This is why *merdeka* is a path away from *disengagement*, a path of hope.

One senior government official in Papua in effect suggested that Papuans needed to shift from *disengagement* and *capitulation* to joining the game of the *game players* in the military, and to *resistance*: ‘Papuans need to learn to say no to the central government. The way forward is to be assertive with what the law says, to use your authority.’ He used the example of Papuan concerns about being flooded by Indonesian migrants: ‘We must limit immigration. We have power to do that under special autonomy.’ The director of an international NGO made a similar point: ‘No-one is courageous enough to support things like setting up a trade union for big employers. It’s very cultural.’ Despite such political and cultural impediments, however, growing numbers of Papuan students in recent years have joined indigenous student groups, and a Freeport Papuan Employees’ Union (Tongoi Papua) has emerged as a key stakeholder in the future of Freeport (see Cookson 2008:367–79).

There is a great deal of the motivational posture of *disengagement* among Papuans. We see it among teachers—mostly migrants but also Papuans—who fail to turn up to school to teach their class. We also see a lot of *commitment* among Papuans—to their clan, their church, to Papua and its independence, but little to Indonesia. Doubtless this reflected some selection bias with our interviews, but we did not interview a single Papuan who was strongly *committed* to Indonesia, not even among senior bureaucrats. We saw evidence of these civil servants feigning *commitment* to Indonesia. In reality, however, some seemed *disengaged*, others *resistant* and many *capitulated* in their posture towards the Indonesian state. The last went through the motions with their job. Some of the more *disengaged* civil servants did not even do that, using their time at work primarily for running a private business. We met one at an OPM gathering whose dominant motivational posture was *resistance*, though he was also a *game player*, using the civil service to present a different self that would win him his salary, while being a kind of fifth column within it.

The conclusion here is that *commitment* and *resistance* have been the motivational postures in decline since the end of the Papuan spring, and *disengagement*, *gameplaying* and *capitulation* the postures on the rise. This is the motivational climate of a most dangerous calm as we write. Military and police coercion crushed overt *resistance* at the end of the Papuan spring, but Indonesian military and political *game players* did not lay out paths for building *commitment* to their state among Papuans. They secured widespread *capitulation* without *commitment*. And they did that using means that left deep residues of Papuan resentment and loss of dignity.

Figure 2.1 A theory of the effect of coercion on compliance as the net result of a capitulation effect and a defiant resistance effect



Source: Based loosely on the experiments summarised by Brehm and Brehm (1981).

Coercion by the security apparatus of the state tends to simultaneously increase *capitulation* (through rational deterrence) and *defiant resistance* (through emotional reaction) (Brehm and Brehm 1981; see also Sherman's 1993 defiance theory). Compliance in Figure 2.1 is the sum of a *resistance* effect and a *capitulation* effect. At low levels of coercion, the *resistance* curve in Figure 2.1 is steeper than the *capitulation* curve. At extreme levels of coercion, however, as Brehm and Brehm (1981) have shown to be demonstrated by many psychological experiments, people give up on *resistance*. In the end, tyranny works. The *capitulation* curve becomes steeper than the *resistance* curve; beyond that tipping point people comply rather than defy. Hegre et al. (2001) find a similar pattern with data on the relationship between autocracy and civil war: rising autocracy increases conflict until it becomes quite harsh. Past that tipping point, further increases in repression reduce the odds of civil war. It must be added, however, that when 'state failure' does occur (defined by the State Failure Project as internal war and/or political collapse), this is 3.5 times more likely to degenerate further into genocide or politicide when the outgoing regime is highly autocratic (Harff 2003). Indonesia's politicide against communists at the time of the collapse of Sukarno's 'guided democracy' in 1965–66 was one of the politicides correctly classified by Harff's model. More interestingly, one of the

seven non-genocides that were false positives predicted by the variables in the model across 126 internal wars or regime collapses between 1955 and 1997 was the dissolution of Suharto's New Order in 1997.

A paradox could be, in addition, that each round of coercion builds up more *resistance* in the oppressed community. Then when the next round of coercion is required to counter that build-up of contained *resistance*, the bar is raised on the level of coercion required to secure *capitulation*. Successful insurgency does not depend on everyone being so defiant that they overcome the rational incentives to *capitulate*, only enough to execute the hit-and-run war. If the level of coercion required to secure control ultimately becomes so high as to provoke international outrage against Indonesia then Indonesia ultimately falls into a coercion trap of its own making. Again, the quantitative evidence on the dynamics of 114 civil wars analysed by De Rouen and Sobek (2004) provides some support:

These results indicate that the use of a strong army against an insurgency could exacerbate the civil war if the state cannot win an early victory. This places states in a 'catch-22', where the use of the army may win the battles but lose the war. By not using the army, however, the government may signal weakness and encourage more resistance. Indeed...[the evidence shows] chances for government victory plummet if quick victory is not achieved. [The evidence also shows]...that time is potentially the rebel's friend. (De Rouen and Sobek 2004:317)

Indonesian security strategists should therefore not take great comfort in comparing OPM military *capitulation* to them with the (partial) *capitulation* of the PNG state to the Bougainville Revolutionary Army (see Peacebuilding Compared, Working Paper 6). Yes, PNG security forces were logistically incapable of escalating their coercive power to the crossover point of Figure 2.1, whereas the Indonesian military was able to do that. On the downside, however, the Indonesian state has to go into the future with far deeper levels of hatred towards Jakarta in the hearts of young Papuans than Port Moresby has to contend with among young Bougainvilleans (at least at the time of writing). While there is no doubt militarily about the capacity of the Indonesian state to keep coercion above the crossover point in Figure 2.1—just as there was no doubt about that in East Timor—the question is whether it is able diplomatically to keep the coercion up there in the long run of history. The answer is that it is unlikely to be able to unless it comes to the table and persuades the angry young people of Papua that this time the dawn will not be false, Papua will have *merdeka* in a way that is meaningful and sustainable. A shared *commitment* by all sides to an international or national peace process is a long way off, because, as one Protestant leader put it: 'The bottom line is Papuans don't trust Jakarta

and Jakarta does not trust Papua.’ The conflict between Indonesian authority and tribal traditional authority has so undermined *commitment* to both that rebuilding trust will be a gradual and great challenge.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

Two strengths of the push for peace in Papua are very widespread commitment to peace and the belief that violence is the wrong way to try to pave a path to justice. Long-serving OPM insurgents are tired of fighting and missing their families while they are in the bush; fighting is not their preferred path to their objectives. The religious leaders—Protestant, Catholic, Muslim, Buddhist and Hindu—have consistently worked cooperatively for peace. Launching Papua Land of Peace is just one recent manifestation of this. At times of tension, killing or even conflict in other parts of Indonesia, they network by holding joint prayers for peace. Critics say while this collaboration is outstanding in the capital, in other parts of Papua it is more muted.

The Papua Land of Peace campaign and international pressure mediated through human rights and church groups seem to be the key pressures for peace. Powerful actors such as the United States and the President of Indonesia are influenced by these pressures, however, much less than by the pressures coming from the Indonesian military and Freeport. They see little threatened by conflict in Papua. Trade is not threatened in a major way, military alliances are not threatened by it and it is no longer the sort of conflict the Cold War might play into. Sophisticated thinkers might see some opportunity costs of the poor investment climate created by conflict in Papua, but while Freeport and BP continue to invest, this source of pressure for peace is also limited.

Resource riches are both an opportunity and a threat for Papua. We have seen how natural resource endowments in Papua, as in Aceh (see Chapter 6), are so much greater than the rest of Indonesia and engender separatism of and partition within Papua itself, with both sorts of game playing fuelling conflict. We know that a resource such as diamonds can be a curse for Sierra Leone and a foundation for diversified development in Botswana. Papua and Jakarta need a dialogue that helps them to see that they do have the choice in their hands to build the resource management and effective governance institutions of Botswana. Foreign resource developers have a role here too—a role, for example, where BP has shown a more collaborative, peace-sensitive approach than Freeport. Logging has been a curse, but now the Kyoto-Copenhagen climate change agenda renders it an opportunity for Papua. The opportunity is to be paid by the industrial carbon emitters to shelve some of its grandiose oil-palm plantation plans as an offset. Because Indonesia has the fastest rate of deforestation on the globe, it can be counted as the third biggest contributor

to greenhouse gas increases after the United States and China (Petersson 2007). Deforestation is the cause of nearly 20 per cent of global emissions of carbon dioxide, according to the *Stern Review* (Stern 2006).

While there is considerable fear of the Islamisation of Papua among Christian Papuans, strengths of Papuan peacebuilding are the climate of religious tolerance and commitment of religious leaders to work together. In the face of a religious divide that maps onto a racial and class divide much more sharply than anywhere else in Indonesia, New Guinea is one of the few major islands of Indonesia where churches or mosques have not been burnt or bombed. As one NGO leader put it: 'All efforts to turn this conflict into a religious conflict failed.' Chinese have also not been targeted in the violence, as has happened in most of the conflict areas of the region. Nevertheless, the ICG (2008a) warns of some specific tensions that have grown in recent years, especially in Manokwari over Christian efforts to ban construction of a large mosque and declare Manokwari a 'gospel city' through a draft district regulation.

Another strength is that for no player is outright war their preferred outcome, though containable intermittent conflict could be the preferred outcome of sections of the military leadership who benefit financially from it. There is a peace culture in Papua that is very widespread. A weakness is that the military is undermining that peace culture by covert and overt killing and torture and by forming 'militias' that put fear into the hearts of Papuans. Two informants alleged military leaders had a sophisticated strategy of causing horizontal conflict between Papuans and migrants, as opposed to vertical conflict between the state and insurgents, should another president seek to take *merdeka* for Papua in a direction they did not like.

Investment is a weakness for Papua and peacebuilding efforts are really not tackling the investment climate. Super-profits from mineral resources still attract investment in bad security climates.¹⁰⁸ One government official told us there were 55 companies engaged in foreign direct investment in Papua in the 1990s; in 2007, only five of these were still in Papua. While other parts of Indonesia recovered completely from the violence, insecurity and economic contraction of the late 1990s, Papua never recovered investment confidence. Many Papuans do not want investment: 'Investment is not the solution we Papuans are looking for' (Christian student leader) because when companies come 'there is rape', the military comes and people lose their human rights. Promises are made to employ Papuans but they are put off at the first excuse in favour of immigrants. Investment therefore 'does not make us better off'.

108 Not surprisingly, the Indonesian Employers' Association in Papua said to us the investment climate was really quite good. They bring potential investors to Papua to see what a safe investment environment it now is and when this happens they are generally surprised that it is more secure than they thought.

Women seem to be disproportionately disadvantaged by this contraction. Whereas in most developing economies, women's participation in the formal sector of the economy rises over time, Papua is an exception. Female labour force participation is moving down (Mollet Forthcoming). Women's rights is a general area of greater weakness than in the other 10 cases of the first wave of Peacebuilding Compared. Women's NGOs are less internationally networked and less internationally supported than elsewhere. Some women are being dominated by the gun into sexual liaisons with Indonesian soldiers that they do not want and are caught up in the worst AIDS epidemic in Indonesia and in infanticide. Rape has been used to intimidate women who become politically active (Coomaraswamy 1999; Brundige et al. 2004:63). Papuan women have found it difficult to show the leadership we see in other parts of Melanesia such as Bougainville and in leading campaigns against tribal fighting in Papua New Guinea (Rumsey 2000), and indeed in many places. We have seen that traditionally women are involved only in the later stages of resolution of armed conflict and reconciliation, particularly through women's dances. This has not changed greatly. When we asked women about it they said there was nothing much they could do until men had worked through towards the end of their conflict, until the men saw balance or a hurting stalemate. An exception was when men had hit a roadblock with a spoiler, women who had the spoiler's ear might then be asked to reason with him. Polygamy is perhaps not greatly less widespread in the highlands than it ever was. When women compete for the attention of a husband, it is not the easiest context for women to usurp traditional prerogatives of their men to become the peacemakers. Mollet's (Forthcoming) surveys of women's work in four districts of Papua show enormous workloads for women in the informal sector of the economy, such as in agriculture. Women work more than a 60-hour week, averaging more than 10 hours a day in the fields six days a week, and often sleeping there. Women also spend 5–6 hours a week on average on religious activities—an amount that is much higher for the women who are most active in organising church activities (Mollet Forthcoming). There is little time for women to be active in demanding their own rights.¹⁰⁹

Women were thinly represented at the 2000 congresses. The five top leaders of the Presidium were male and of the wider leadership circle of 29 only two were female. The requirement of the special autonomy law that one-third of the MRP be women was a big step forward for women that was often neglected in the debate on special autonomy—though with the MRP emasculated into little more than a consultative body, it was not the victory women might have hoped for. We have seen that migrant women in Papua have deep fears of secessionist

109 Some of the women's leaders we interviewed felt that women were given leadership roles as a result of the arrival of Christianity, in areas that included education, peacebuilding and leading services in the Church. When the Indonesians came, however, 'this prominence of women slipped back'.

violence. Weaknesses in peacebuilding are opportunities to become strengths. One is for Muslim Indonesian and Christian Papuan women to hold out their hands to support each other with the different kinds of fear they experience, thereby opening a new peacebuilding front.

If the leadership of women in general is not a strength compared with other Melanesian cases in Peacebuilding Compared such as Bougainville, the leadership of students—including some young women who are the most brilliant orators among the students we have met—is inspiring. On the other hand, the students did not seem pragmatic enough to be politically effective. Here are some of our notes after a three-hour meeting with 70 students in Abepura in November 2007:

To conclude, this was an inspiring, engaged meeting. It shows why students are the source of vitality, even students who have suffered great trauma as some of these had...In a sense it reminded me of the Vietnam War days in Australia. On the other hand, there was an orthodoxy in the radical analysis. There was not an examination in a hard-headed way of alternative pragmatic approaches...While no one was game, or perhaps even thought it was right to say that a return to arms was the way, there was a kind of exasperation that led to a feeling that this might be inevitable. Even though, like their own demonstrations that caused some of them to lose their lives and so many arrested and tortured, even though this did not achieve a lot, there was a feeling of what else could you do but stand on your dignity.....[T]here was a feeling that the rounds of applause [for those who spoke for independence] was rabble-rousing, [and] went only to those who expressed the simple solution.

We were given a video of the Abepura riot of 2006 in which these students were involved. One cannot but be struck by their courage as they attack a phalanx, a formed unit, of Brimob (heavily armed riot police) who seem to outnumber them and fire live rounds at them. Somehow, through sheer courage, they manage to break up the police formation through salvos of heavy rocks. When they break them off, they pound them to death with the rocks (killing five). They were so brave, but so brutal and it was dispiriting to see lives destroyed on both sides of the riot shields. While it seems so clear that universities are where there is the hope and the passion and the talent for the future, here in Abepura the students are not being educated in deliberative pathfinding towards a better future. We explicitly and repeatedly asked them, 'What is the best path forward now?' There would be a speech on independence and applause. 'Yes, but what is the best strategy for getting to that point?' There would be another speech on how much suffering there had been, ending with another call for *merdeka*. Papuan universities seem to us to be failing to engage with their students as responsive, powerful democratic actors, who have better weapons of the weak at

their disposal than rocks. International educational support for Papuan students in leadership and negotiation skills could be useful here, to reinvigorate and reinvent traditions of diplomacy and oratory prized by their ancestors.

Corruption is both a deterrent and an attractor of investment. The investment it attracts is often investment of a kind that would not make economic or environmental sense in the absence of the bribe. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index for 2007 ranked Indonesia 143, while the countries with the worst corruption rankings were Somalia and Myanmar, with ranks of 179. Within Indonesia, the evidence and the debate are only over whether Papua is the most corrupt or second-most corrupt province. While other parts of Indonesia have seen serious progress in the past three years in combating corruption, Papua has not been part of this progress. So there are few places on Earth with more corruption than contemporary Papua. This is one reason within Indonesia why Papua is ranked 26 places lower in the UN Human Development Index than in GDP; resource endowments are not being harnessed to provide services for people (HRW 2007b:18).

When institutions function so exceptionally badly as in Papua, it is sometimes necessary to find ways to channel monies in ways that bypass state bureaucracies—for example, supporting education through the large system of hundreds of Christian schools where teachers turn up and students learn. The Governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, says he is visiting every single village in Papua—2600 of them—delivering R100 million a year to each for five years through Project Respek (*Rencana Strategis Pembangunan Kampung*). Every village has a semi-independent facilitator of this spending—for example, a university lecturer appointed by the government at arm's length from both the village and the state. The facilitator's job is to ensure the money does not simply go into the pockets of big-men and their cronies. This is obviously no panacea; in a province with a deep culture of corruption, not all the risks of big-men taking money for their own uses will be averted. As a result, there is a worry that Project Respek is already another case of worsening anomie from raising expectations without being able to deliver on promises. One Papuan leader worried about this money being handed over in advance of a plan for how to use it, arguing for a plan then money rather than money then a plan. In a province lacking a culture of public investment, there is no guarantee that the whole community will not invest the windfall in immediate consumption as opposed to infrastructure that will benefit their grandchildren. Democracies must, however, learn a culture of public investment and learn how to budget rather than splurge through doing, through being given the kind of trust the governor's R100 million gives them. The micro-finance initiatives that might emerge from this program could also be strategic in promoting local community prosperity and peace in Papua.

In future chapters, we will describe the promise of the new local bottom-up planning process of the *Musrenbang* (*Musyawaharah Perencanaan Pembangunan*) across Indonesia in learning how to govern from below. This was only beginning in Papua at the time of our fieldwork. The idea is that there will be a local link between *Musrenbang* planning and planning to spend the R100 million. This could be one solution to the problem of the handout culture in Papuan governance. The *Musrenbang* design can dampen expectations of handouts that are not contingent on accountability for spending the last tranche on village development, and contingent on an advance plan that justifies the next tranche. A final criticism of this program is that it is inefficient for the governor and his retinue to invest in the travel costs needed to visit every village. In cost-efficient program delivery terms, yes, but there is also a quite different rationale for democratic leaders of predominantly village societies to get around the villages talking to them as well as to the folk in the capital. A final problem has been game playing the proposal by the creation of new villages. Jayawijaya District Parliament wins the game-playing award with its proposal to create 600 new villages that could each collect the R100 million (ICG 2007c:4)!

Militarisation is a weakness that drives many of the other weaknesses. Military corruption is the number-one form of corruption that drives the culture of corruption. Military provocations create the climate of insecurity and corruption that deters investment. Military abuse of women, as we have seen, is an important driver of their disempowerment.

Education and health systems that do not work for indigenous Papuans are other weaknesses. Education helps ameliorate the disadvantage that Indonesian immigration policies have created: 'Migrants take control of everything because they have more skills. Therefore education is a top priority' (Marind customary leader). This is a result of a more general weakness that we might call the failure of the Papuan bureaucracy to work. Widjojo et al. (2008) suggest there is a paradox that the considerable Papuanisation of the bureaucracy has benefited elite Papuans while leaving ordinary Papuans worse served by it. If the bureaucracy worked, when teachers did not turn up to their school, they would lose their job. Corruption and militarisation are in turn root causes of bureaucratic inertia. Because the military really runs the government when the going gets tough, bureaucrats feel they lack power; they feel they are not public servants but military servants. Corruption also ensures the most corrupt rather than the most competent rise to the top of the bureaucracy. Much of special autonomy has not been delivered because of sheer technocratic ineptitude. Jakarta takes bureaucrats to the capital for capacity building, which is laudable in principle, but how much of it is pursuant to securing capitulation to Jakarta, even to enhancing the very corruptibility that is at the root of the problem, as opposed to technocratic competence?

Most bureaucrats seemed to have been highly committed to special autonomy for a year or so after it came into existence; but once they concluded Jakarta was not committed to it, they disengaged from their job as its executors. Papuan bureaucratic disengagement further convinced Jakarta that special autonomy was not something to work at, but rather something to weasel out of. This in turn encouraged bureaucrats to become game players—getting as much out of special autonomy as they could for their own families. A vicious circle was allowed to fester by Jakarta that saw the Papuan civil service shift from commitment to disengagement to game playing. Some whom we interviewed saw President Yudhoyono as part of this vicious circle: he was initially enthusiastic about special autonomy—an enthusiasm that faded and then seemed to almost evaporate altogether. Such commentators say: ‘They want to tell the world that they have given a large amount of money to Papua’ and if the Papuans can’t manage it ‘that’s about their poor level of development ability’.

A strength that so far has had limited application is the rich tradition of reconciliation and peacemaking among the peoples of Papua. Because they had war-making traditions until the 1950s, they also developed sophisticated skills in limiting the impact of war and negotiating and consolidating peace. The biggest weakness of peace processes in Papua has been that there has been so little reconciliation of any kind between the Indonesian state and the people of Papua—at either the provincial level or the village level, but in particular so little that has drawn on indigenous cultural resources for reconciliation. Where conversations and abortive peace processes have occurred, OPM has not been included in them. No truth and reconciliation commission has been established even though the special autonomy law requires this. Trauma counselling for victims has also been very thinly provided to villages thick with traumatised people.

On the other hand, a peacebuilding strength is that when insurgents give up the fight and come in from the bush, villages and the military work together to build them a house and to secure their reintegration back into village life.

Contests of principles

The distinctive contest of ideas around principles is about the meaning of the principles of *merdeka* and autonomy and how they fit together. The thinking of Benny Giay, Agus Sumule, Jason MacLeod and Brigham Golden has shown the potential of a new dialogue to which Indonesia could find the courage to commit over what autonomy with *merdeka* might mean, how it might incorporate Papuan *adat*, liberation theology, *hai* and *mobu* and connect to the Papua Land of Peace principles of ‘awareness and respect for plurality, justice, unity, harmony, solidarity, togetherness, sincere fraternity and welfare’ (Tebay

2006:37). Clifford Shearing's 'justice as a new future' grounded in the black South African vision of freedom from white domination seems resonant with the Papuan voices in our interviews. Rectification as *memoria passionis* is a Christian principle that connects effectively to Melanesian memory of suffering that cannot be suppressed without being confronted and resolved.

A fresh dialogue might simultaneously involve some confidence-building concessions from Jakarta and a commitment from all stakeholders to put aside their irreconcilable positions on matters such as an independence referendum while they at first discuss only what these principles should be. Then, much later, more hard-edged negotiations might begin that are not position based (Fisher and Ury 1981) but that involve creative engagement with pursuit of the agreed principles.

Preliminary conclusions

Quantitative peace researchers might code the Papua case as one that crosses the threshold into civil war only for brief periods in every decade since the 1960s—wars that end and then restart years later. In fact, during the years after each 'war' the negative peace (absence of killing) was never total. Isolated small-scale fighting, bombing and kidnapping would always be erupting somewhere in Papua during the years of 'peace'. Papua also has experienced no positive peace for 47 years; it has had a *memoria passionis*. In this research, positive peace means commitment to peace and commitment to the legitimacy of the governance arrangements for guaranteeing peace and justice (a variation on the original formulation in Galtung [1969] and in the speeches of Martin Luther King, jr). Positive peace requires the motivational posture of commitment among combatants, not just capitulation. It is enabled by a whole web of institutions that support positive peace: the rule of law, respect for human rights and social justice, reconciliation and market institutions that distribute opportunities widely. Neither combatant commitment to an agreed peace (by the military or OPM) nor the web of institutions that enable positive peace is present in the Papuan case; it was approached during the Papuan spring of 1999–2000, but never attained. So it does not make sense to code this case as four short, small wars separated by years of peace. It is 47 continuous years without positive peace, punctuated by countless moments when negative peace collapses.

At one level, the Indonesian state has been hugely successful in securing not only the capitulation of the people of Papua to rule from Jakarta, but the capitulation of the international community. Even we as authors and critics write very much from within that posture of capitulation. We worry that anyone might read

our text as support for Papuan armed struggle for independence because we suspect that is a romantic quest that can cause untold suffering for Papuans and Indonesian soldiers and their families.

While most of the world has capitulated to Indonesia on the independence question, most of the world is against it on its human rights record in Papua. In the end, it is likely to be Indonesia that capitulates here. Low-level conflict that periodically flares into severe conflict for another half-century in Papua will ultimately bring international disgrace to Indonesia. Indonesia's friends must persuade it that it is better to commit to the human rights and other principles of Papua Land of Peace in a genuine way now to prevent this. That would require presidential leadership and the leadership of progressive Indonesian generals to stand beside the people of Papua against the kind of military leadership that has called the shots in Papua. It would also require concrete steps to build trust and a sense of leadership integrity. President Yudhoyono was willing to show that leadership in Aceh by standing up to the military there, as we will see in Chapter 6. He has been unwilling to push his luck by doing the same in Papua in the face of the considerable capability of the military to damage his re-election prospects by shifting its financial, coercive and organisational support behind a more pro-military candidate. With President Yudhoyono's re-election in 2009 (he cannot stand again), some hope he might now show more resolve. There is little evidence, however, of resolve as we write.

There are so many things that could be done as concrete trust-building measures. The military presence in Papua could be progressively scaled back. Savings from this could fund other needed measures such as micro-finance reform that responds to the considerable evidence we have heard of indigenous Papuans not getting support from banks to start businesses in the way migrants do. King (2006:29) advocates a Papua trust fund, akin to the East Timor Petroleum Fund, to extend the flow of special autonomy money to Papua beyond 2026, when it approximately halves. A second rationale could be for Papuans to postpone deployment of a proportion of the funds until their institutions are less corrupt and funds can be spent more strategically for the development of the province. At the moment these funds do seem to be overwhelming Papua's absorption capacity and are being channelled towards venality and waste. In anomie theory terms, funds that gush beyond absorption capacity expand illegitimate opportunities. Symbolically as well as concretely, high-level criminal convictions for corruption are needed in Papua that include puncturing the impunity of colonels and generals. Only then is there a hope that Papuans might come to believe that they can have autonomy with *merdeka*.

The Alliance for Democracy in Papua is showing that there is no need to wait for top-down reconciliation to begin the long journey from the bottom up. There is much that local military commanders can learn and are learning from

the rich Papuan traditions of peacebuilding in the highlands and the coast. *Adat*–military dialogue to stop human rights abuses in one remote village, even as human rights abuses continue in the capital, is the accomplishment that counts here and now for the people of that village. And it creates a local foundation from which some young military leaders of the future are learning from the people the benefits of being reconciliatory, dealing with local truths, the *memoria passionis* of that village.

Even the most trigger-happy of the OPM members we interviewed much preferred the idea of negotiations with Jakarta that might lead to a referendum on independence, but they were not interested in negotiations in which the referendum was ruled out. Ministers in Jakarta, by the same token, would prefer a negotiated positive peace, but are opposed to any negotiation in which a referendum is on the table. While all key Papuan factions want to internationalise the conflict with external mediation and external monitoring, Jakarta wants internal dialogue without mediation or monitoring.¹¹⁰ Our analysis is ultimately therefore that progress depends on leadership—Papuan, national and international—to break through this positional posturing.

110 We are grateful to Damien Kingsbury for this conceptualisation.

Appendix 2.1

Table A2.1 Summary of some codes, Papua: 650 other variables are coded

Structural factors at root of conflict	Is this a 'consensus' factor among analysts or 'contested but credible' as a possible factor?
Dual colonialisms of long duration stunt institutions	Contested but credible
The Cold War	Consensus
Transmigration/immigration	Consensus
Resources—Freeport (land rights)	Consensus
Proximate factors	
Act of Free Choice	Consensus
Some elements of a 'resource curse': logging, oil-palm, fishing	Contested but credible
Militarisation—expanding posts	Consensus
Military politics to sustain Sukarno and Suharto, and remove Wahid	Contested but credible
Partition creating new provinces	Consensus
Key triggering incidents	
Papua flag raisings, independence demonstrations	Consensus
OPM hostage-taking	Consensus
OPM attacks on security forces	Consensus
OPM sabotage of resource projects	Consensus
Military assassinations (for example, Theys Eluay)	Contested but credible
Key war-making actors	
Indonesian military, especially Kopassus	Consensus
Indonesian police, especially Brimob	Consensus
'Militias'	Contested but credible
OPM	Consensus
Key peacemaking actors	
Religious leaders	Consensus
Presidium in 1999–2000	Consensus
President Wahid in 1999–2000	Consensus
Human rights NGOs	Contested but credible
Student organisations	Contested but credible
International solidarity movement	Contested but credible
Peacebuilding strengths	
Community values reject violence strongly; war is no-one's preferred outcome (though contained conflict is a preference of some in the military)	Contested but credible
Older insurgents are tired of fighting	Consensus
Community values of religious tolerance	Contested but credible
Resource-based economic opportunities	Contested but credible

Papua Land of Peace campaign	Contested but credible
International pressure mediated by human rights groups, church groups, donors	Contested but credible
Desire to improve poor investment climate in Papua	Contested but credible
Indigenous reconciliation traditions	Contested but credible
Village–military collaboration in reintegrating OPM fighters who give up	Contested but credible
Peacebuilding weaknesses	
Resource curse game playing	Contested but credible
Unconstrained military and ‘militias’	Consensus
Extreme disadvantage of women and weak international networking of women	Consensus
Extreme corruption	Consensus
Power of the military	Consensus
Disengaged, dysfunctional bureaucracy	Consensus
Education and health systems failure	Consensus
Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants	Consensus
Low commitment to and implementation of truth and reconciliation	Consensus
Impunity for rights abuses	Consensus
Failure of international leadership in mediation or preventive diplomacy	Consensus
Key contested principles of peacebuilding	
Independence/autonomy versus national unity	Consensus
<i>Merdeka</i>	Consensus
Rectification as <i>memoria passionis</i>	Consensus

Table A2.2 Numbers and types of people interviewed, Papua case

Elected official legislator/MPR/bupati	6
Civil servant	5
Presidium member or panel member (political leaders of oppositional group)	5
Military	7
Police	0
OPM (self-identified as OPM officeholder, former or current fighter or an OPM member willing to fight)	23
Adat/indigenous/village leader	9
Religious leader	14
Women's NGO	11
Environmental NGO	3
Development NGO	0
Human rights/peacebuilding NGO	29
Other NGO	2
Journalist	6
Business leader	4
Student leaders (plus meeting with 70 students)	17
Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)	8
International organisations	3
Researcher/university academic	1
Victim/refugee	5
Other	3
Total interviews	99
Total people interviewed	161

This text is taken from *Anomie and Violence: Non-truth and Reconciliation in Indonesian Peacebuilding*, by John Braithwaite, Valerie Braithwaite, Michael Cookson and Leah Dunn, published 2010 by ANU E Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.