5. West Kalimantan and Central Kalimantan

Crowds do make history, as the West Kalimantan case demonstrates. No-one was absolutely in control of the Kalimantan conflicts, as in the other ‘small town wars’ (van Klinken 2007) of Indonesia to varying degrees. Some of the West Kalimantan scripts and strategies for using violence to achieve objectives were emulated in Central Kalimantan and across Indonesia. While no-one quite planned the ethnic cleansing that occurred in Kalimantan, many harnessed it. Reintegration and reconciliation were thin with these conflicts. Perhaps this was because so many were content to harness the violence, including a wide base of the lower middle class who took over business niches occupied by the cleansed Madurese, organised crime interests and political aspirants who enrolled ethnic NGOs to their political aspirations. Folk devils can be particularly useful when it is crowds who are making history and when it is the shadow state (Reno 1995) more than the state that is seized by opportunists who mobilise the mob.

Background to the conflicts

Gold discoveries in West and South Kalimantan contributed to a limited integration of Kalimantan into the Majapahit (Hindu–Buddhist) Empire and the Malaccan trading system from the thirteenth to the fifteenth centuries. Possibly fuelled by the flight of Malays from Malacca with the conquest of Malacca by Portugal, from the early sixteenth century, Malay trading sultanates spread Islam. The coastal non-Dayak subjects of these sultanates came to be known as Malay even though they included Arabs, Bugis and other ethnicities. Malays imported Chinese goldminers from the 1740s.¹ The Chinese established self-governing kongsis (associations of the miners’ union and associated farmers and traders) and paid taxes to their local sultan.

In the early nineteenth century, the British and the Dutch developed an interest in Kalimantan that had nothing to do with controlling or settling the huge island. Kalimantan sat between the sailing routes from India to China. The regional imperial powers were worried about hostile forces harassing their shipping from the coast. The British (in fact, the Brookes family business) particularly established posts on the northern coastal areas that are today part of Malaysia. The Dutch interest was in controlling the south and west coast that flanked the Java Sea. Pirates and anti-Dutch Chinese were specific worries.

¹ Leaders of the Chinese community insist there is archaeological evidence of Chinese presence in West Kalimantan from the thirteenth century.
The dominant west coast sultanates of Pontianak and Sambas acknowledged Dutch sovereignty in 1818. Coalmines in this area heightened Dutch interest in the mid-nineteenth century, even as goldmining declined (Ricklefs 1993:138). The indigenous societies, swidden cultivation (slash and burn) economies and non-agricultural economies that relied on mobile exploitation of wild sago, forest animals, birds, wild fruit and vegetables of the huge island were little touched by these tiny coastal settlements until the past century or two. In the twentieth century, Chinese traders provided a link between a dual economy of modest coastal enclaves of foreign-dominated plantations and resource extraction and indigenous subsistence economies upriver. Kalimantan is one-third of the landmass of Indonesia, but even after all the transmigration and logging exploitation since 1970, it still has less than 6 per cent of the Indonesian population.

Of the 11 million inhabitants of Kalimantan in 2000, four million lived in the province of West Kalimantan. The ethnic composition of West Kalimantan in 2000 was Dayak 34 per cent, Malay 34 per cent, Chinese 10 per cent, Javanese 9 per cent, Madurese 6 per cent and others 7 per cent (Achwan et al. 2005:4). Central Kalimantan, with a population in 2000 of 1.9 million, was at least 41 per cent Dayak, 24 per cent Banjarese, 18 per cent Javanese and 6–7 per cent Madurese (van Klinken 2007:131). Central Kalimantan under both Dutch and Indonesian rule was carved out as a Dayak province with the idea that it would be run by and for Dayaks. "It represented the triumph of “Dayak nationalism” against the domination of Islam, and one of the major unifying elements in the Dayak resistance was their pagan religion: Kaharingan’ (King 1993:163). Before the arrival of the first Malays, Kalimantan was a patchwork of different ethnic groups. Centuries of colonisation and anthropological labelling consolidated a shared identity of these indigenous groups as Dayaks, even though this omnibus identity was an invention of Europeans that Dayaks ultimately came to find useful for political mobilisation (King 1993:Ch. 2).

The coastal sultanates offered protection to upriver Dayaks from competing Dayak societies. Intermarriage occurred, so there was from early on some amiable symbiosis between Dayaks and Malays. We will see, however, that there was also exploitation. The sultanates competed with one another for trade with the rest of the world and regularly used piracy against the ships of their competitors to capture slaves as well as tradable goods. Dayak subjects were cast into debt slavery when they failed to pay taxes to the sultanates (King 1993:129). The sultanates also used allied upriver Dayaks in joint raids against their enemies to capture slaves. While the Malay settlers exploited Dayaks, they were able

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2 The nomadic and agricultural Dayaks tend not to be separate societies but interdependent parts of the same societies with strong trading relationships.

3 Which de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006:459) found to be suspiciously equal proportions.
to divide and rule effectively, becoming too dominant an ethnic group for the Dayaks to ever think of subordinating through violence. There is irony, then, that finally in 1996, after centuries of subservience to Malay settlers, Dayaks rose up against Madurese, who had never forced them to be their vassals or slaves, and that the Malays should join them in ethnically cleansing Madurese. Perhaps it is less irony than vindication of Petersen's (2002:25) hypothesis that ‘the predicted ethnic target will be the group perceived as farthest up the ethnic status hierarchy that can be most surely subordinated through violence’. As we will show, perhaps it is also a result of a particular history of cycles of resentment and revenge.

In 2007 and 2008, ethnic resentment remained very evident between Dayaks and Malays (Khalik 2008) in West Kalimantan, especially after Malay disappointment with the 2008 election of a Dayak as governor and a Chinese as deputy governor of West Kalimantan. This adds more mystery to why the war that did occur from 1996 was with Madurese.

Like the British in the north, the Dutch ‘ultimately secured respect for their rule, and instituted law and order, particularly through the institution of inter-tribal peacemaking’ (King 1993:152). The ‘main effect’ (Rousseau 1990:35) of colonial rule was ‘the disappearance of headhunting and warfare by 1910–25’. A decisive moment in that process was the Tumbang Anoi meeting of 800–1000 upriver Dayak elders in 1894. The meeting was called and funded by Dutch officials. According to van Klinken (2004:3), over two months the delegates ‘discussed and resolved hundreds of intra-Dayak vendettas’.

A difference between the conflict in West Kalimantan and those in Poso and the Moluccas is that its onset cannot be explained in terms of institutional uncertainty with the collapse of Suharto’s New Order. Violence against ethnic Madurese (Madura is an island off the north-east coast of Java) broke out between December 1996 and February 1997, during which estimates of deaths (overwhelmingly Madurese) ranged between 300 and 3000 (Achwan et al. 2005:2; Davidson 2008a:102). The HRW (1997) estimate of 500 seems the most credibly conservative. Further post-New Order outbreaks in January 1999 and in 2001 took another approximately 1000 lives. Varshney et al. (2004:30) found reports of 1515 deaths from collective violence in West Kalimantan between 1990 and 2003. Violence also exploded in Central Kalimantan in 2001, probably costing fewer lives than in the west, though at least 500 (Achwan et al. 2005:2), with Varshney et al.'s (2004:30) database recording 1284. In both provinces, indigenous Dayaks’ longstanding resentment of migrants from Madura motivated violence.

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4 Perhaps one should not get too carried away with the import of this. Overall in Indonesia, on one estimate, there were more than 16 times as many deaths from political violence in the four years after the fall of the New Order than in the four years before (Farid and Simarmatra 2004:88). These data in fact seem to underestimate the difference in the numbers collected in the Peacebuilding Compared project.
A major difference between the conflict in the adjacent provinces, however, was that ethnic Malays executed the second phase of the West Kalimantan conflict to accomplish complete ethnic cleansing in the district of Sambas (apart from some Madurese women married to Malays). In Central Kalimantan, Malays did not attack Madurese and ethnic cleansing was not permanent. While the first violence in 1997 was more in the nature of Dayak rioting that got out of control, the 1999 Sambas violence was organised more centrally by Malays as a planned imitation of the 1997 Dayak violence.

All this grew out of longstanding Dayak alienation that had been manifest in a 1994 violent protest against the rejection of the favoured Dayak candidate for district chief in Sintang District. In 1977, there was Dayak–Madurese fighting that killed five and destroyed 72 houses and, in 1979, there was a flare-up in which 20 were killed and 92 houses destroyed (de Jonge and Nootenboom 2006:463). In 1983, there was a Dayak attack on Madurese migrants, leaving at least one dozen dead. Indeed there had been at least six other significant Dayak–Madurese clashes since the late 1960s, and perhaps more than a dozen previous clashes (Davidson 2002:218–25, 2008b:87–90; van Klinken 2007:56; Tomagola 2003:1). Incidents of rape were also important in many of the local accounts of resentment told to us, particularly rapes in the period immediately before the 1996–2001 outbreaks of violence.

In 1967, Dayaks had expelled Chinese from the interior of West Kalimantan. In this Chinese ethnic cleansing, Dayaks were coopted by the military who wanted to remove those Chinese from the interior who they believed were supporting communists. The most certain way to accomplish this was to drive all Chinese out of the interior of West Kalimantan. Perhaps 2000–5000 people were massacred (Davidson 2002:158) and probably a greater number died from the conditions in overcrowded refugee camps, including 1500 Chinese children aged between one and eight who died of starvation in Pontianak camps (p. 173). The Chinese retreated permanently to the major towns where they could conduct businesses without posing a threat to Dayak land rights. They were not attacked in any of the violence that began from 1996. As in all the first wave of Peacebuilding Compared cases with a history of Chinese coming under attack, the Chinese in West Kalimantan rarely resisted (though they had in nineteenth-century conflict with the Dutch, and in 1914). Instead, they fled.

One old Chinese man who fled to Pontianak in 1967 said that the Chinese did not even consider or discuss striking back at Dayaks as an option. This was because they were imbued with a philosophy of being a guest on other people's

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5 Some of the provocations of the Dayaks that we presumed to be the work of the military were crude. For example, stories circulated in Bengkayang of a Dayak traditional leader being killed in September 1967 and having his genitals sewn to a pole with a note in Chinese characters (Davidson 2002:150). In another case dubiously attributed to Chinese, a dead Dayak man's severed genitals were stuffed in his mouth.
land to become a great trading diaspora. It was a philosophy of becoming powerful economically but not militarily. This was precisely why Suharto found Chinese economic power so useful; however great it grew, it would never pose a political threat to him, and his Chinese cronies would always be dependent on him for protection. The Chinese we met were generous in their attitude to Dayaks. We would ask if they had thought of getting their stolen houses back or compensation from those who occupied them. ‘No, those people are not as wealthy as me. They did me a favour in a way’ because he could become a much more successful businessman in Pontianak than he ever could have become in the interior. This man went on to say that while he was angry at first in 1967, he was not now and did not know any Chinese of his generation who was! Possibly it was because of this resilience and non-violence that many Dayaks felt sorry that they had been tricked into attacking the Chinese and they never attacked them again. As another Chinese businessman put it, Dayaks also learnt that successor ethnic groups such as the Madurese who replaced the Chinese were more aggressive in their dealings with the Dayaks.

In late 1967 and 1968, there were clashes between Dayaks and Madurese competing to seize land and other property abandoned by fleeing Chinese (Davidson 2002:214). Revenge killing was an important part of the cultural repertoire of Dayaks and Madurese (Smith 2005). Cycles of revenge that started in 1967, on Jamie Davidson's (2002) account, were never satisfactorily reconciled. When the cycle hit a major upswing in 1979, the military finally paid attention, but it did so by

forcing both sides to sign an ineffectual peace accord and by erecting a gaudy, thirty-foot monument...In fact the statue's ominous presence exacerbated the situation by monumentalising the conflict and by announcing to all that a 'problem' does indeed exist. (Davidson 2002:218)

Law enforcement officials became inured to Dayak–Madurese riots and gang fights and ignored them as long as they did not threaten elite interests, excusing enforcement neglect with stereotypes of either Madurese or Dayaks, or both, as inherently prone to violent cycles of vengefulnessthat could never be prevented. There was some truth in this aspect of the stereotypes. Dayaks and Madurese were more prone to resolve conflicts through violence than other ethnic groups in Kalimantan (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:462). One source of tension was that they were vengeful in culturally different ways. Madurese traditionally resort to carok—revenge killing with a sickle—in response to a serious incident

6 Indonesian stereotypes of Madurese as vengeful because of their traditions of carok are compounded by a perception of them as intemperate, rude, arrogant, short-tempered, uncivilised, avaricious and insensitive. Stereotypes of the Dayak are of a kindly and tolerant people, who incline to extremes of running amok and headhunting only when extreme provocation throws them into a trance that renders them oblivious to violence.
of theft, insult or adultery. This can induce inter-family vendettas that last
generations. Dayaks are also quick to resort to violence if insulted; however,
it is important that the violence is transacted with bare fists, then reconciled,
forgiven and forgotten. If a Dayak is killed by violence with weapons, ‘the
whole clan will join in and violence can easily become communal’ (de Jonge and
Nooteboom 2006:462). Madurese young men who thought they were engaging
in interpersonal or inter-gang violence to settle scores did not understand this
about Dayak culture. Madurese young men in this conflict never thought of
themselves as engaging in inter-communal warfare and failed to understand that
inter-communal warfare was precisely what Dayak warriors saw themselves as
engaged with in response. When Madurese–Dayak violence erupted in 1997,
it did so in the pre-1967 Chinese districts where these successor groups had
competed to control land abandoned by Chinese (Somers Heidhues 2001:141).

Migration

Kalimantan was one of the top destinations for government-sponsored
transmigrants and spontaneous migrants. The first transmigration started
under the Dutch, but between 1986 and 2002 West Kalimantan received 407
047 transmigrants (Achwan et al. 2005:119). Madurese were overwhelmingly
voluntary migrants rather than transmigrants (Nooteboom and White 2009) and
they behaved differently than migrants from Java. They frequently eschewed
transmigration settlements to work in the very plantation and logging industries
that at the same time destroyed the forest on which Dayak livelihoods depended
and that provided the limited employment opportunities open to Dayaks. There
was also competition between Madurese and Malays over control of illegal
businesses, the transport sector and town markets. Urban Madurese sought to
monopolise sectors in which they worked, and pretty much did that with urban
transport and markets in West Kalimantan and parts of Central Kalimantan. In
West Kalimantan, most Madurese were better off than most Malays and Dayaks,
though the gap was not huge. In such monopoly projects, they were aggressive
and sometimes not reluctant to use violence to protect a monopoly. Dayaks
believed that Madurese bribed the police so that they enjoyed impunity for
such violence against Dayaks. Madurese were far from the largest ethnic group
competing with Dayaks (and Malays), but migration made them by far the
fastest-growing ethnic group (Bertrand 2004:55).
Part I: West Kalimantan

Describing the conflict

Major fighting begins

On 30 December 1996, at a music concert in Sanggau Ledo, a group of Madurese youth injured two Dayaks in a fight that revisited a previous altercation over a girl. Rumours spread that the two injured youths had died, which they had not. Dayaks marched on the town, burning hundreds of Madurese homes, markets and other property. Over the next two weeks, 1000 Madurese homes were destroyed and 20 people were killed (Achwan et al. 2005:16). Madurese in the provincial capital retaliated by assaulting Dayak women, burning Dayak homes and a school and other premises of a prominent Dayak NGO (Pancur Kasih Social Foundation). Roadblocks were set up and passing Dayaks were pulled from their cars, stabbed, shot or dismembered. The unfortunate thing for future escalation was that some of the Dayaks pulled from their cars happened to be revered elders from other parts of the province. These areas were then joined into the conflict in ritual escalation on 2 February 1997 as the ‘red bowl’ (of chicken blood) was passed from village to village to invite them to join a war on Madurese or face demonic wrath. By 5 February, ‘rituals to initiate the killing trance, menyaru’ tariu, signalled the mobilization of Dayak war parties to completely extinguish or expel the Madurese’ (Harwell 2000:202). In the killing trance, bodies were ‘occupied by the ancestral warrior spirits who controlled their actions’. Slaughter of women and children was not seen as something the warriors really chose to do because the spirits had occupied them with the mission of completely expelling all Madurese. ‘If you called the spirits to help then you have to surrender to what they want’ (Dayak interview; Harwell 2000:212). Harwell (2000:200) observes that ‘by using “traditional” methods of warfare, participants were not only fighting over culture, but fighting with culture’. Historically, the ritual unit in Kalimantan was the longhouse that managed a particular territory. The constitution of a ritual community of all Dayaks that mobilised trance and spirits for righteous severing of heads and eating of livers was a twentieth-century reconfiguration (Harwell 2000:210–11). Conflict raged until April 1997, by which time perhaps 500, mostly Madurese, had perished. Many Dayaks were armed with factory-standard rifles, some purchased across the border in Malaysia. Dayak children as young as twelve were involved (Linder 1997:2).

In 1998, Dayak elites turned the violence into a political opportunity. This seems to be a case of turning chaos to political advantage rather than creating chaos in order to secure advantage (which better describes the subsequent orchestration of violence by Malay elites). Faced with the possible consequence
of more violence, two district assemblies were successfully pressured in 1998 into selecting Dayak district chiefs. This worried the traditional Malay political elites in West Kalimantan, but they learnt from it, mimicking it in their own ethnic cleansing of Madurese in 1999 (Davidson 2002). Indeed, in various parts of Indonesia, ethnic elites picked up the Dayak strategy of seeking to bully their way to power through ethnic or religious violence once the New Order collapsed. This was encouraged by sensational coverage across Indonesia of the severing of heads and cooking and eating of livers of slain Madurese. It was unfortunate for Indonesia that this first of a sequence of cases across the country of mobilising ethnic or religious violence delivered local political power to a group of Dayak and Malay instigators of violence. It was unfortunate for those who subsequently mimicked the strategy in other parts of Indonesia, including Central Kalimantan, that it rarely delivered positions of local political power to them as militia leaders. More often it led to them being discredited, killed or occasionally imprisoned. One explanation for the escalation of armed conflict in Indonesia between 1997 and 2001 was that successful use of violence by Dayak and Malay militia leaders was emulated. An explanation for the sharp decline in violence after 2001 could be that the modelling of violence ceased after it repeatedly failed to deliver militia leaders to local political power in the cases that followed in the wake of West Kalimantan. So we might interpret the violence in West Kalimantan more as a contributor to the breakdown of the Indonesian normative order than as a result of anomie.

Malay modelling in the Sambas phase

The second round of fighting began in January 1999 in Sambas District in the north of West Kalimantan. It started between Malays and Madurese, with Dayaks joining on the side of the Malays. Some Malays beat a youth who had allegedly stolen a motorbike. The next day, a Madurese preman (semi-organised criminal) leader and the mother of the victim led an assault on a Malay village in which three Malays were killed and many wounded. Malays were dismayed that the police did not come to protect them. A group of adult Malay gangsters and business leaders with whom they were networked seized the opportunity to form a Communication Forum for Malay Youth. It took central control of the conflict on the Malay side and established neighbourhood militias who procured weapons, sharpened bamboo spears and produced homemade shotguns (Davidson 2008a). The forum helped Malays to speak with one voice on what they projected as the Madurese threat. When we asked senior local journalists if this was a case of gangsters using politicians or politicians using gangsters, we were told it was both. Late in February, there was another incident that triggered the violence the forum had been preparing for. In Sambas, a Madurese stabbed a Malay bus conductor. The violence escalated when a Dayak was killed.
in March, causing Dayak attacks on Madurese as well. Dayaks joining the fray against the Madurese greatly accelerated the confidence and tenacity of Malay violence.

Davidson (2008b:140) doubted that ethnic cleansing was initially the Malay plan but it evolved into a plan as the momentum of expulsions fed on itself. This fits Michael Mann's (2005:7) thesis that cleansing and slaughter are rarely the initial intent of fighters. Madurese were completely driven out of the Sambas District, 200–500 were killed and the rest fled to refugee camps in the provincial capital, Pontianak, to Madura or Java. One senior Madurese leader asserted that all levels of government had an interest in talking down the numbers killed. He said he was sure, and had case-by-case records to prove, that 3000 Madurese had perished in the old Sambas district alone. Malay Muslims destroyed dozens of Madurese mosques as well as homes. Rape, mutilation and beheading were included in the repertoire of violence to encourage flight (Davidson 2003:80).

Davidson (2008b:120) interprets the Malay mobilisation as an attempt to match the Dayak ethno-political resurgence that had been enabled by Dayak violence. The hope was that Malay violence would also work to support Malay ethno-political resurgence. ‘[A]s the Dayak example had shown, mass violence against a scapegoat can galvanize a movement, fortify ethnic identities, and deliver institutional power’ (Davidson 2008b:120). In all this, Dayaks were in fact the deeper competitors of Malays than were the Madurese. By emulating Dayak violence, ‘“Malay” could rightfully challenge “Dayak” for the attendant patronage and largess associated with the decentralized state’ (Davidson 2008b:120).

In Sambas, Madurese enjoyed considerable control over several sectors of the economy including the transport sector and most illegal vice and organised crime, including gambling, extortion and prostitution (Davidson 2002, 2003), and perhaps illegal timber (van Klinken 2006a) and smuggling consumer goods into Indonesia from Malaysia (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:462). It must be pointed out that Malays and Dayaks also had long had a presence in many of these illicit markets and their less successful organised criminals coveted the domains of Madurese control. The Madurese were more wealthy generally compared with other ethnic groups in Sambas than was the case elsewhere in Kalimantan, where Madurese were not particularly well off. One Madurese leader claimed that in spite of their lower numbers, Madurese owned more land in Sambas than Malays. Madurese did not pose a threat to Malay control of senior political offices, but ‘as long as Madurese thugs roamed and operated in Sambas, Malay elite domination would be tenuous at best’ (Davidson 2003:85).

West Kalimantan is a major centre of human trafficking because of its porous border with Malaysia. Women and children are gathered up from all over
Indonesia and exported through Pontianak. Pontianak could also be a transit node for shipping sex workers sourced across the country to other destinations in Indonesia. Most of the trade is in female domestic workers destined for Malaysia, Singapore, Hong Kong and Saudi Arabia, but there is also a trade in women destined for sex work, mail-order brides, pregnant women trafficked to sell their babies for adoption, bonded plantation and factory labour. Migrant workers of all types suffer restrictions on their freedom of movement. Malaysian agents often give their passport to their employer or keep it themselves so the migrant worker cannot return home without their permission. Accumulation of debt, resulting in debt bondage, often leads women to become migrant domestic workers. Sexual harassment, abuse, exploitation and violence can follow. In West Kalimantan, there is a corrupt market for falsification of passports for underage girls (Misra and Inggas 2003:187). Refugees with little hope of return to their homes and jobs have created a large supply of families desperate enough to submit to the human traffickers. The trafficking trade is not mainly about local refugees, however, and it affects all ethnic groups in West Kalimantan (see Box 5.1). Human trafficking is integrated into Dayak stereotypes of Madurese as violent. Dayak parents are reported by Giring (2004:52) to scare their children with the admonition: ‘Beware, there is a Madurese. He will kidnap you. Don’t play in [a] far place.’

**Box 5.1 Human trafficking: one story**

Su Phin, a young ethnic Chinese girl from a small village near Singkawang, Kalimantan, was fifteen years old when an agent arranged for her to marry a Taiwanese businessman three times her age. The agent promised her parents R25 000 000 (approximately US$2500) for the contract marriage.

Her first few months in Taipei were fine. Su Phin and her husband spoke different dialects, but his parents taught her their language. They treated her well. It was only after the large wedding celebrations in Taipei that things started to change.

Her husband had lied about being from Taipei. The house that they had been living in for the past three months was rented. The family in fact lived in a small village in the countryside. He also lied about his employment. He was not a businessman but rather a minimum-wage factory worker. They all moved to his parents’ house in the village. Su Phin was told to clean the house every day and then work in the rice fields until the evening. She didn’t mind the work. She was determined to be a good wife and daughter-in-law.
Half a year later, Su Phin’s husband claimed he had been fired. He told her that he ‘sold her’ so he could continue to feed the family. Every night, he would take her to the brothel to which he had sold her. In a local nightclub, Su Phin was forced to sexually entertain men. If she did not entertain enough customers her husband would beat her.


The takeover of organised crime in Sambas from Madurese gangsters by leaders of the Malay militias of the Communication Forum for Malay Youth (Forum Komunikasi Pemuda Melayu, FKPM) has had some negative economic consequences. Davidson (2002:328) reports some stories of Malay preman becoming so overzealous in their collection of extortion payments that significant numbers of Chinese businesses have left town. He also reports a problem of armed Malay youth who regard themselves as war heroes becoming a disorganised crime problem to match the organised crime problem of their older commanders.

In each of the next years (2000 and 2001), there were violent incidents in Pontianak, to where 70,000 refugees had fled from Sambas. The first riot was triggered by a traffic accident involving a Malay and Madurese. There was Malay community resentment about plans to settle the refugees permanently in Pontianak. In the worst riot in 2001, Malay and Dayak youth associations issued ultimatums to the refugees to leave within five days, which the Madurese refused to do. One effect of the riots was to drive Madurese out of businesses they had dominated in the capital. Their market stalls were burnt and their places in the market occupied by Malay traders. Malays also took control of their intra-city transportation business after the Madurese were driven out and Chinese took over the intercity transport. The private security sector was another area Madurese were driven from by the 2001 riots. Jamie Davidson (2002:344) attributes the October 2000 riots to the machinations of Governor Aswin, ‘a prototypical New Order general-cum-governor-cum millionaire unaccountable to the province’s populace’. Students, legislators and ethnic leaders were calling for his ouster and for reform. According to Davidson (2002:344), he responded by ‘calling upon figures of the city’s underworld to orchestrate the riot…vanquish[ing] his challengers, thereby rescuing his lucrative patronage network’. In effect, Aswin deflected those seeking to unseat him by playing the Madurese folk-devil card again and promising to be the defender of social order in the face of it. A Dayak crowd also attacked the provincial parliament building in protest over the candidates chosen to represent West Kalimantan in Jakarta
Anomie and Violence

at the People’s Consultative Assembly (Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat, MPR). The Dayak mob was confronted by groups of *preman* recruited by politicians (Achwan et al. 2005:24).

In this period there were also various political confrontations between Dayaks and Malays over control of the province. Some informants argued that the real political contest was over Dayak versus Malay control of provincial and district governments as *reformasi* in 1999 effected decentralisation away from Jakarta. Dayaks and Malays realised the other was too strong to subordinate them in West Kalimantan politics through violence. All the large ethnic groups—the Malays, the Dayaks and the Chinese—gained by seizing opportunities to take over Madurese businesses, to loot their stock, take their land or assume control of organised crime the Madurese had controlled. The Madurese were stereotyped as exclusive because most Madurese lived in exclusively Madurese communities and prayed at Madurese mosques. Because they were also stereotyped as disrespectful and thuggish in Jakarta as well as across all sections of Kalimantan society, they were the easiest target to subordinate through violence. Dayaks became a political force in a way that they had not been since the 1950s in West Kalimantan. While this was a threat to Malay political domination of the province, Malay gangsters connected with the political elite gained enormously from taking over organised crime previously monopolised by Madurese—from illegal gambling to people trafficking across the border into Malaysia—and the Malay independent trader class was the main beneficiary in taking over Madurese businesses. Hard-working, respectable Malay society and the Malay underworld that connected crime to politics were well satisfied with their spoils. Because there was in a sense a planned takeover of Madurese business rather than chaos and destruction, the economic cost of the conflict was less than in any of the first 11 cases of Peacebuilding Compared, except perhaps for the quick cleansing of Madurese from Central Kalimantan. The West Kalimantan economy grew 0.5 per cent even in the worst year of the conflict and in the wake of the Asian economic crisis in 1999 (Achwan et al. 2005:33). The violence also, however, had a negative impact on the economy of Madura, a region with high unemployment, which could not absorb the more than 100 000 refugees who arrived there.

Democracy was a loser in West Kalimantan. Thugs intimidating rivals and opponents of the candidates who paid them and thugs organising demonstrations brooding with violent threat became features of elections in West Kalimantan—more so than of politics before the violence and of politics in other parts of Indonesia. Thugs organising mobs to threaten the police when one of their comrades was arrested became more characteristic of West (and Central) Kalimantan than of Indonesia as a whole. Just as the business and criminal classes had divided the spoils of Madurese ethnic cleansing, Malay and
Dayak political elites delivered peace to the province through a power-sharing deal that in effect excluded all other groups from political office. In essence, the deal was that in areas where Dayaks and Malays were in equal numbers, one group would get the bupati (district head) and the other the deputy bupati positions. Where one ethnicity dominated, it would get both positions (Achwan et al. 2005:41). So in Sambas (after Bengkayan and Singkawang were carved out of Sambas as separate districts), the payoff for the Malay political elite from the conflict was essentially that only Malays could serve as bupati and deputy bupati. Indeed the only bupati they could possibly have after the conflict was the FKPM-backed candidate, the premans’ candidate. While Dayaks secured only four of the 12 bupati positions, this was better than before the violence, and Dayaks held seven deputy bupati positions by 2004. 7 After 2005, when regional direct elections for bupatis and other chief executives came into force across Indonesia, the influence of ethnic power-sharing pacts eroded in West Kalimantan (Davidson 2008b:208).

Throughout the New Order, Dayaks, like Papuans, were regarded as ‘primitive’, unfit to govern and, unlike today, were never appointed as provincial governor of West Kalimantan (Bertrand 2004:54). They had also been excluded from top positions in the military and in government in Jakarta. This had not been the case under Sukarno and under the Dutch, when Dayaks were substantially trusted through indirect rule of their own land and held many senior positions throughout Kalimantan. While it was to Malays that Dayaks had lost most power in West Kalimantan, and the Dayak–Malay political tussle remains today the greatest long-term risk of serious future violence in the province, the largest waves of Madurese migrants arrived precisely when the New Order chose to demean and disempower Dayaks. This temporal association is one possible interpretation for the puzzling selection of the Madurese as scapegoats for Dayak grievances rather than the Malays (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:466).

Another part of the power-sharing settlement was to partition some districts into two—one to be controlled by Dayaks, the other by Malay FKPM cronies. The winning elites shared considerable spoils of political corruption, including from illegal logging, and divided up the remaining logging concessions to complete the rape of the forests. It seems a perverse kind of progress that through violence a Dayak elite received a share of the last profits from destroying the sustainability of the future of their brothers and sisters.

Van Klinken (2008:35) interpreted the violent cleansing of Madurese by Dayaks as a ‘theatrical manoeuvre’ designed to intimidate not only Madurese, but any non-Dayaks who stood in the way of a Dayak assumption of power in certain district

7 Though not as good as the four out of the then seven bupati positions that Dayaks held in 1999 (Davidson 2002:271).
governments. Mobs initially inflamed by a sense of grievance, dispossession and revenge against Madurese were, on van Klinken’s (2008) account, quickly hijacked by Dayak militants who had long been close to the state. These Dayak district elites—‘second-rung government officials and aspiring officials’ (van Klinken 2007:125)—shared the ethnicity of the aggrieved mob, ‘but not their misery’. They harnessed the violence and followed its wake into power in districts that were still rich in timber. Then, on van Klinken’s (2008) account, they further increased their wealth in the black economy associated with the illegal timber trade, much of it controlled by Malaysian Chinese businessmen (Wadley 2005). For van Klinken, this first phase of the West Kalimantan conflict is therefore better explained by a ‘resource curse’ of lootable tropical timber than by grievance. On his account, forest resources were not a proximate factor in the conflict in the sense of fostering resentment among ordinary Dayaks, as advanced by Dayak activists such as John Bamba. Rather the lure of logs ‘weakened the state such that internal factionalism along ethnic lines led to violent conflict at a moment of political transition’ (van Klinken 2006b:193). The Malay versus Madurese part of the conflict was then about Malay elites close to the state imitating what they saw as a successful Dayak politics of violence. Malay violence also worked at first for these Malay political game players. It worked not so much in getting control of districts that still had lots of lootable timber, but in securing control of districts that had other illicit markets of greater magnitude than those of the rural districts grabbed by Dayaks.

Not only were electoral politics and the politics of the civil service captured by ethnic power sharing, so was NGO politics to a considerable extent. This NGO controlled by Dayaks received public funding as a response to their grievances, then that Malay NGO received government funding in response to theirs. Exclusivist NGOs connected with the circuits of exclusivist political power and provided platforms to launch Dayak and Malay political careers.

An element of complexity we must bring into the analysis at this stage is that neither the Malay nor the Dayak communities were monolithic in how they responded to the escalation of violence. A great number in both communities deplored it and many Malays and Dayaks acted on this belief by offering protection to Madurese neighbours, hiding them, tipping them off about impending attacks, helping them to get away and watching over their abandoned property.

The role of the security forces

The police came in for much criticism from Dayaks and Malays for protecting Madurese gangsters. Part of the justification of the conflict was about the need to take the law into your own hands when the authorities could not protect you against thugs. Madurese were also critical of Kalimantan-born police and
military for failing to protect them when ethnic cleansing began. In fact, some military posts did allow truckloads of Dayak warriors to pass on their way to purging Madurese communities in 1997, while others (particularly imported Javanese troops) stood in their way and on some occasions opened fire on Dayak raiders, killing an unknown number, but probably dozens. Similarly in Sambas District in 1999, there were incidents of the military (especially those who arrived from Java) firing to stop and kill advancing Malay militias, but ‘most of the time officials and local security personnel cooperated with the FKPM programme to expel all Madurese from Sambas’ (van Klinken 2007:61). Sambas district police and military chiefs and the bupati even attended the first FKPM (Communication Forum for Malay Youth) meeting. When the local security forces safeguarded Madurese property after assisting with evacuating them, it was often so they could sell it. As the Madurese were great cow-herders, these security force sales extended to thousands of Madurese-owned cows (Davidson 2002:312).

There was limited documentation of how many arrests there were after each phase of violence, but it seemed some but not most who were alleged to be ringleaders were prosecuted and that after the 1997 fighting 184 people were formally charged—eight with murder (HRW 1997). It was also clear that there was not the widespread sense of injustice about who was and was not imprisoned over attacks on villages that there was in Poso (Chapter 4). There was Dayak resentment, however, over what they saw as a long history of failing to prosecute Madurese criminals, indeed police protection of them, often as a result of bribes. One senior West Kalimantan political leader said that in 1997 the military decided not to put themselves at risk by getting between angry mobs any more than they had to be seen to. ‘Their attitude was: let the Dayaks and the Madurese, especially their criminal classes, give each other a bad experience, kill off many of their worst elements, and they will learn from the bad experience’ (Pontianak interview). When the conflict escalated to a point where it threatened the perception of their competence, the military became more concerned, especially when the chaos was used by those who wanted an Islamic state. At this point, the military counselled Dayak leaders about how catastrophic things could become if they burnt mosques; the Dayaks were quick to be sensitive to this. So one might say the military played a role in ensuring that an ethnic conflict did not morph into a religious conflict in the way that subsequently occurred in North Maluku (Chapter 3).

In 2002, after police attempted to shut down a gambling operation protected by the military, fighting broke out between the police and the military (HRW 2006:66).

A number of informants said that police intelligence about impending violence was more on the ball today than a decade ago. A senior police commander says
that a network of Dayak police who live in Dayak areas and Madurese police who live in Madurese areas is a critical part of an early warning system to defuse violence before it starts. Moreover, the police are quicker to mobilise to smother suspected sparks of conflict. In 2007, for example, there was an escalating Dayak–Madurese incident over a shopkeeper’s allegation that a customer had not paid. The customer returned with a mob from his community to sort out the shopkeeper. The police arrived quickly to stand between the two sides in the confrontation and convened a meeting of leaders from the two communities to calm everything down. There was no need to prosecute anyone because violence was prevented.

At election time, the police commander of the province calls all candidates into his office. He asks them all to sign a promise that they will not use ethnic division, violence or rioting to achieve their political ends. If they fail to keep this promise, which happens, he calls them in to remind them of the promise. Sometimes when politicians are playing the ethnic violence card, he calls political candidates to a meeting together with the media. He tells them in front of the selected journalists that he has intelligence that this is going on and that it had better stop, because if it does not, there will be prosecutions for the violence. The police believe these warnings work. Candidates worry that even the launch of a formal investigation by the police targeting a particular candidate will derail the election campaign of that candidate. In such meetings, foreboding expressions are used such as ‘political leaders are not immune from the law’. We asked in other parts of Indonesia whether police commanders adopted similar strategies and were told, ‘no’, this would be police going too far with involvement in politics. It is an interesting question whether this should be seen as overstepping the separation of powers in a democracy. Or should it be seen as applying principles of community policing to prevent violence with as much vigour against the political elite as against other segments of society? Adérito Soares, an ANU colleague and former Timor-Leste legislator, suggests it is a good thing to do, but it would be better for the election commission to do it, as has been his experience in Timor-Leste. The office of police commander is vulnerable enough to influence from political parties as it is.

Refugee resettlement

The UNDP has assessed the initial mobilisation to the violence by government agencies as quite responsive (Achwan et al. 2005:47). While the security forces only sporadically attempted to prevent assaults, they did manage the evacuation of refugees to camps away from the conflict zones safely and quickly. The provincial government initiated dialogues at district and subdistrict levels to manage the humanitarian disaster. The national government allocated R67 billion for relocation, temporary housing and basic needs of refugees. Each refugee family was allocated R5 million to assist with rebuilding. NGOs delivered
survival needs to refugees and some trauma counselling. Unfortunately, however, after the initial responsiveness of the state’s mobilisation, the medium and longer-term process of refugee reintegration bogged down badly, in the assessment of the UNDP. The R67 billion became an embezzlement honey pot. One on-the-ground research effort suggested that a maximum of one-quarter of the money allocated to building houses for refugees was so used (Davidson 2002:380). At least one prominent Madurese leader was centrally involved in siphoning off funds intended for desperate Madurese refugees (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:244; Davidson 2008a). Leaders of state agencies and NGOs with humanitarian responsibilities seemed more concerned with extracting their share of the loot than with collaborating effectively to make the best use of it. ‘Each agency followed its own agenda, which was often in direct contradiction to that of other agencies’ (Achwan et al. 2005:47). Because refugees were excluded from decision making, they could not demand the needed coordination. Médecins sans Frontières showed great leadership, but was actively obstructed when it attempted to push through the blockages to provide better sanitation in the refugee camps. Refugees International and the UN-OCHA wrote negative reports on refugee conditions and resettlement in 2003 and 2004 (Achwan et al. 2005:48). Various international humanitarian agencies including Catholic Relief Services, the International Organization for Migration, World Vision International, UNICEF and Save the Children helped with programs to provide basic needs and reintegrate refugees into livelihoods.

The fundamental problem remains, however, that most of the conflict areas have been unwilling to accept refugees back 12 years after the initial violence. In particular, there has been no return of refugees whatsoever to the district of Sambas. In interviews with Malay elites, the line was that Madurese would probably never be allowed to return to Sambas District, but their property would not be taken; it had nearly all been purchased from them at a fair price. A Madurese community leader, in contrast, claimed only 40 per cent of Madurese land in Sambas had been paid for by 2007, with most of the rest being used by others who had not paid for it. When one Madurese refugee returned to Sambas to negotiate the sale of his land, he was murdered and his body was not returned to his relatives. Since then no refugee has returned to sell their land. This weak bargaining context makes it a buyer’s market. Overwhelmingly now refugees fear returning to Sambas, but do sell their property for whatever they can get.

So the real failure of Indonesian governments at all levels has been to allow dialogue over post-conflict reconstruction and reconciliation to not only

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8 In an email communication, Dr Timo Kivimaki of the National Institute of Asian Studies in Denmark said in 2007 that the Sambas district government had told him that 80 per cent of the Madurese land in Sambas had been sold.

9 This incident was mentioned in interviews. Jamie Davidson, in commenting on the draft, said there was more than one such incident.
exclude the voices of the Madurese refugees, but to suppress their interests by allowing the victors to do deals to share the spoils of Madurese suffering and exclusion. It was a dangerous precedent of unconstitutional ethnic cleansing for the new democracy. These victors were Malay and Dayak political opportunists, criminals and business interests (as opposed to the mass of ordinary Malay and Dayak citizens who quickly became deeply cynical of their winning elites). The Malay and Dayak elites at the resettlement and reconciliation negotiation tables mostly had the agenda of resettling refugees anywhere but in their own district and of frustrating efforts to mediate return and rebuilding of their homes. They had no interest in sitting down with Madurese for reconciliation meetings. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was so far off the agenda that it was an unfamiliar concept even to highly educated commentators. While non-truth and reconciliation characterised post-conflict dialogue in Maluku, North Maluku and Poso (Chapters 3 and 4), non-truth and non-reconciliation were mostly, though not exclusively, what happened in West Kalimantan.

Reconciliation

There were areas of West Kalimantan that had conflict without violence. Ketapang was one where it was claimed that the Dayak Customary Council effectively mediated disputes as they arose, using *adat* law, before they escalated into violence (Achwan et al. 2005:70). A comparative survey of satisfaction with ‘informal justice systems’ in the former conflict provinces of West Kalimantan, Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi found Ketapang District was equal highest in satisfaction (UNDP 2007b:70). Davidson (2002:235) concurs that in many areas at many times since the late 1960s, ‘peace ceremonies kept minor incidents minor’, fostering a sense of finality after which Dayaks and Madurese can associate in limited but civil ways. Dayak culture has traditions of war-making and headhunting (which are quite separate phenomena), but also has rich traditions of peacemaking (Bamba 2004; Flavia et al. 2004).

After the initial riot dissipated in Tujuhbelas subdistrict in January 1997, local government officials together with Dayak and Madurese leaders and the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas-Ham) convened a traditional peace ceremony and signed a peace accord. This unravelled after Madurese attacks on Dayaks in Pontianak later in the month (Davidson 2002:228). In February, the government, the military and police organised another round of traditional peace ceremonies with Dayak and Madurese elites from each subdistrict affected by violence. HRW (1997) described them as formulaic, using almost identical wording in pledges to uphold the unity of Indonesia sworn in each subdistrict. They were said to fail to engage Muslim religious leaders on the Madurese side and were elite oriented in a way that did not engage with

10 Jamie Davidson, in commenting on the draft, doubted that it had anything to do with the council.
pacification of the masses who were angry on the streets. Davidson (2002:232–3) was critical of them for appropriating only Dayak traditions of peacemaking, reinforcing Madurese exclusion as the resented and intruding other who lacked any traditions of peacemaking worth incorporating into rituals. Some limited survey evidence suggested that most Madurese disagreed and few agreed that Dayak 'customary law should be applied to non-Dayaks' (Davidson 2002:243). Ceremonies also brought to the peace table the Dayak and Madurese elites most coopted by the state, not those with the greatest legitimacy (or the greatest pain). The result was peace pacts that made things worse. Not taken seriously, they were soon broken, resulting in mutual recriminations and allegations of bad faith (Davidson 2002:233–4).

The first post-conflict peace meetings between Dayaks and Madurese were conducted more than four years after the first wave of serious violence in March 2001 in Jakarta and Palangkaraya. By then, peace for Central Kalimantan was also on the agenda. Sponsored by the central government, the talks agreed on maintaining peace, strengthening law enforcement to correct the limp enforcement against violence in the past, investment in development opportunities and poverty reduction for Dayaks, revitalisation of *adat* and more regulation of migration to Kalimantan. This was a start at least and gave community leaders the confidence to test the water with reconciliation in civil society. Some Dayak leaders, mainly from Central Kalimantan, travelled to Madura for dialogue with refugees and invited their return. These, however, were mainly Dayak leaders from rural areas who wanted Madurese to return because development had suffered once Madurese businesses withdrew from their area. The government conducted set-piece, New Order-style reconciliation meetings, pleading for all ethnic groups to maintain the spirit of national unity. Participants in the meetings were senior government officials down to the subdistrict level, military and police commanders and Dayak and Madurese elites. They did not touch the hearts of ordinary people who often questioned the legitimacy of those who signed peace accords on their behalf. The ceremonies were not constructed on a foundation of reconciliation dialogue. Malay elites refused to sign any peace accord with the Madurese. At an April 2001 reconciliation conference in Pontianak among all ethnic groups, the Malay delegation even insisted that the word ‘peace’ be excised from the proposed title of the gathering, ‘A Deliberation for Peace’ (Davidson 2002:390).

Madurese *ulamas* have shown leadership in attempting to foster reconciliation dialogue. They have visited the Sambas District government offices and apologised for past violence and insensitivity of Madurese. The Foundation for the Sambas Riot Victims convened a dialogue among the conflicting ethnic groups in Sambas (Farid and Simarmatra 2004:79). As one Sambas NGO leader said: ‘It can be dangerous to speak out in favour of reconciliation, even for
the king [sultan], because the gangsters don’t like it, so people don’t do it.’ In Sambas, reconciliation failure has been the general picture; the UNDP organised one reconciliation meeting in Sambas to which only the Madurese, who had paid R175 million for their security, turned up.

The leadership of Christian churches for reconciliation seems to have been muted and devoid of energy. The Indonesian Congress of Women ran a campaign to show solidarity with Madurese refugees and provided humanitarian assistance for them. Other women’s NGOs that have attempted to show a path to reconciliation through community education and discussion have been the Peace Forum for Reconciliation and the Institute for the Empowerment of Women and Children (Achwan et al. 2005). The international NGO Search for Common Ground in Indonesia has assisted refugee children with coping with trauma while teaching alternatives to revenge. They also established a peace journalism centre and facilitated reconciliation meetings of Madurese and Dayaks in Java. The Dayakology Institute works with 12 community radio stations to promote peace journalism. The Pontianak Historical Assessment Center opened perpetrator–victim dialogues in Singkawang and Pontianak in 2000 and 2001. There is a view among human rights activists that most of these programs have had very limited impacts on reconciliation, with many members of all the protagonist groups clinging tenaciously to stereotypical views of their adversaries (Farid and Simarmatra 2004:79).

From 2001, Madurese schoolchildren started to learn Dayak studies as part of their curriculum. Dutch Government funding also supported a program that targeted homogenously Malay schools to study Dayak and Madurese cultures and homogenously Dayak schools to study Madurese and Malay cultures. Appreciation of the culture of the other began to emerge. Interviews in the Dayak community revealed appreciation of gestures from the Madurese community such as producing a big banner in 2004 that read: ‘Madurese community congratulates Dayak people for their celebration of the first harvest festival.’

Credit unions started as institutions of Dayak empowerment. The Pancur Kasih Credit Union was established in 1988 to support Dayaks with micro-finance and to foster Dayak investment in institutions owned by Dayaks. It had 270,000 members and a capital base of R137 billion by 1999 (Davidson 2002:255). Its success was modelled by other Dayak credit unions. Post-conflict, some of these institutions of empowerment became institutions of reconciliation. Today the Dayakology Institute has shifted the philosophy of the micro-finance movement from Dayak empowerment to multi-ethnicity and financial interdependence as a path to peace. The credit union movement is seen at the village level as helping Dayaks and Madurese to borrow from and loan to one another through shared membership and joint management of credit unions, though probably more so in Central than in West Kalimantan.
Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

In the late 1960s in West Kalimantan and the late 1970s in Central Kalimantan, a process of decimating the forests on which Dayak livelihoods depended began as the central government started to issue 300 logging concessions across Kalimantan to Jakarta-based logging and plantation companies. Suharto crony and ‘timber king’ Bob Hasan came to be the leading figure in forest exploitation during the New Order. Smaller illegal logging operations, many owned by Madurese or Dayaks and protected by the security forces, also spread. Perhaps 2.5 million Dayaks were displaced from their traditional lands (Ricklefs 2001:394). Logging was not the only cause; there was also clearing for firewood and agriculture to support arriving migrants. This resulted in the worst fire in recorded human history in 1981, which burned for two years and destroyed 3.6 million hectares of forest (Ricklefs 2001:394).

Dutch indirect rule had interpreted all forest episodically used for slash-and-burn cultivation or for other purposes as ‘native’ land regulated by customary law (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:464). A series of law reforms, seen by the Indonesian state as modernising, laid the foundation for the destruction of the way of life of the Dayaks who depended on forests. The Basic Agrarian Law No. 5 of 1960 recognises customary law ‘as long as adat law does not conflict with national interests, as they are defined by the state’. The Basic Forestry Law No. 5 of 1967 decrees that a state forest is any area of forest on land that is not privately owned. Together these laws allowed the Suharto regime to ride roughshod over traditional Dayak communal land ownership, while recognising individual land ownership. The modernising and assimilationist policies of the central government towards the Dayaks were aggressive. They implored Dayak people to move from their longhouses in remote rainforests into modern Indonesian-style villages. Partly this was about the developmental objective of rendering the delivery of services such as electricity cost effectively. Partly it was about concentrating them where the eyes of the state could more readily maintain surveillance and control over them (Scott 1998). That ‘villagisation’ was partly a project of cultural imperialism was manifest in the fact that villages were given Javanese names rather than the ‘original’ names of these groups and places in indigenous language (Giring 2004:52). The juridical foundation of this was the 1979 Village Government Law No. 5 that laid down uniform rules for the governance of all Indonesian villages. The law made Dayak village heads accountable to the head of the subdistrict rather than to the members of the village. The state alienated these leaders from *adat*. The people became alienated from leaders who were seen as captured by the dark forces destroying their way of life. Part of the fallout was that traditional Dayak courts ceased to function,
replaced by Indonesian courts that people were afraid to use and resented using. This undermined indigenous conflict-resolution competence, something that was needed to steer the forest mismanagement that was a structural cause of the conflict and to transact peacemaking and reconciliation once conflict had broken out.

West Kalimantan scored highest of all provinces in Indonesia on the Human Poverty Index at the beginning of this decade, though on the broader Human Development Index it was not a long way below the national average (Achwan et al. 2005:4). It was a province in which natural resource development created opportunities for many of the settlers who arrived in Kalimantan from elsewhere, but bypassed Dayaks. Hence, migration, the seizure of legitimate opportunities for development by migrants and the blockage of non-violent legitimate opportunities for Dayaks were structural drivers of this conflict.

Van Klinken (2007:40–2) made the interesting point that the most unstable places after the collapse of the New Order were places where de-agrarianisation had come latest and most rapidly. West and Central Kalimantan were the two Indonesian provinces with the fastest rate of de-agrarianisation in his data set between 1979 and 1990 (and also in the three decades from 1971). Remember, de-agrarianisation is the rate of increase in the proportion of the working population that is not in agriculture. It is not completely about urbanisation. It is also partly about the penetration of town life into the countryside—workers who live in the countryside but work in non-agricultural jobs. Van Klinken’s incipient idea is that there could be a parallel with transition to democracy being structurally conducive to armed conflict rather than being a democracy. So it could be that transition to non-agricultural economic institutions might be more conducive to violence than being a non-agricultural economy. Just as conflict is more likely when the rules of the game for control of the national polity are in flux and undefined, conflict is also more likely when control of town economies is up for grabs and poorly institutionalised. Violence is one of the possibilities for laying down new rules for local monopoly, local extortion and local patronage. Small-town economies can become criminalised and cliental at times of rapidly expanding illicit opportunities when the rules of the game for capturing the local state are open for contest, or at times of setback after the expansion of illicit opportunities.

The Kalimantan conflicts were certainly about who would control non-agricultural jobs; their effect was to ban an ethnic group from certain employment sectors in towns that it had previously monopolised. The high levels of migration from Madura, Java and elsewhere in recent decades could be part of what built up the non-agricultural economy; indeed this was part of the intent of transmigration as a modernisation policy. Rapid non-assimilation of large tranches of migrants could have been a factor in the conflict. Several
informants said those Madurese who had been in Kalimantan for a long time had become respectful of Dayak custom; it was recent arrivals who showed open contempt for Dayak ways and did not make an effort to be polite, in their view. Van Klinken (2007:42) wondered whether recent rapid de-agriculturalisation might explain why West and Central Kalimantan had ethnic conflict while an equally ethnically diverse province such as East Kalimantan did not (though East Kalimantan did experience high levels of tension that almost led to violence in late 2001 and November 2005 and caused 10–15 per cent of the Madurese population to flee in anticipation) (de Jonge and Nooteboom 2006:469). East Kalimantan had the third-lowest de-agriculturalisation in van Klinken’s data set because it had de-agriculturalised earlier. While van Klinken interprets this as an effect that is about competition for non-agricultural jobs, de Jonge and Nooteboom (2006:471) reverse this lens to point out that competition from Madurese for Dayak traditional lands for agriculture had been a major source of tension in West but not East Kalimantan. Peacebuilding Compared interprets both as ‘contested but credible’ interpretations.

Following the scholarship of Harriss-White (2003) on the unorthodox idea that in small-town development ‘an economy might become dominated not by the rich but by the much more numerous lower middle class’, van Klinken (2007:46) sees these intermediate classes as well organised—often ethnically organised—to dominate the apparatus of the state at a local level. The lower middle classes fix the prices of intra-town and inter-town transport, regulate the town economy to create artificial scarcities, drive competitors out of markets in vice and corrupt state officials. They corrupt officials in order to perpetuate their domination of those markets and of government contracts and jobs for their families in government. The increase in illegal logging since the fall of Suharto illustrates this possibility well (Casson and Obidzinski 2007). During the New Order, the military patrolled logging to ensure only cronies favoured by Suharto benefited. After the New Order, the security sector became available to be paid by local businessmen to allow exploitation of forests. Decentralised regulatory control over forests also meant local businessmen could bribe and lobby local politicians to look the other way as they destroyed the remaining forests of Kalimantan (Casson and Obidzinski 2007).

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

As argued above, a resource curse, particularly with illegal logging (though not as much as in Central Kalimantan), opened up a violent struggle over access to illegitimate opportunities. Illegitimate opportunities to control organised crime were also proximate factors in the conflict. Organisation was mobilised to seize a variety of illicit opportunities. Grasping them became more thinkable for the criminal classes, the lower middle (trader) classes and local political elites when the collapse of the New Order left all the rules of social and political ordering
unsettled. Decentralisation opened up new kinds of opportunities from 1999 for Malay and Dayak elites to control district shadow governments that managed markets, government contracts, transport and vice. NGO politics becoming ethnically organised was not an insignificant factor in the conflict.

Weak and inconsistent law enforcement after inter-ethnic fighting, arson and rioting were proximate grievances on both sides, but especially on the Dayak side. Corruption of law enforcement officials was part of this problem.

When major violence erupted, fearful and incompetent deployment of security personnel to get between rampaging mobs and their victims, and intelligence failures to alert the state to impending mobilisation of mobs, were proximate factors.

What were the key triggering incidents?

Fights that broke out between young men—for example, over a girl, a stolen motorbike, alleged non-payment for goods in a shop—that did not necessarily have an ethnic meaning of salience were the recurrent triggers. In one crucial instance, a motor vehicle accident dispute was a trigger.

Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?

Gerry van Klinken, whose work is extensively cited above, might say the key war-making actors here are district shadow governments-in-waiting (see Reno 1995). We have characterised them as coalitions of aspiring political leaders, gangsters and businessmen. Some individuals were all three of these simultaneously. These local elites saw an opportunity that initially probably arose spontaneously (though not in the case of the second Malay round of attacks) to acquire power through ethnic power sharing. They mobilised through Malay and Dayak ethnic NGOs such as the FKPM. So the mob mattered, the crowd did make history here—history from which aspiring shadow governments in many other parts of Indonesia learned and tried (much less successfully) to apply. The mob was motivated by ethnic hatred, on the Dayak side by feelings of being disrespected and humiliated, with Madurese standing for all the deeper forces that were disintegrating their traditional way of life. Loot was a very secondary motivation for them. Much of the handiwork of the Dayak and the Malay mobs was more expressive than instrumental. It was, however, at the same time an instrumental struggle for ethnic recognition pursued by elites and an expressive plea for recognition from poor perpetrators in the mob.

Between the mob motivated by grievance and the shadow government-in-waiting motivated by greed, there was the lower middle class. They were not key instigators of the slaughter, but they have been the longest-term beneficiaries of it. So they became crucial in resisting reconciliation, especially in Sambas.
Harriss-White’s (2003) idea is that small-town economies can be dominated more by a very numerous lower middle class than by the rich. In West Kalimantan, van Klinken is surely right that this is an interesting idea, as the lower middle class has been well organised—and ethnically organised—to dominate by fixing prices of transport and other services.

Inspiring reconciliation leaders are harder to find in the West Kalimantan case than in any of the first 11 cases that will make up the first four volumes of the Peacebuilding Compared project. There have not been major provincial or national religious leaders, political leaders or military leaders who have taken large steps towards peace and reconciliation. There are, however, many local religious leaders, NGO leaders and village leaders who have helped reconcile Madurese, Dayaks and Malays back to harmoniously living and trading together in particular localities. Dayak leaders in some areas reconciled using customary peacemaking before escalation to killing occurred. The best we can say about the military is that some military officers deployed their troops to prevent violence from being worse than it might have been in some localities.

Peace journalism has been given some impetus in West Kalimantan by the establishment of the Betang Media Centre to educate about peacebuilding initiatives and prevent distorted information from dominating the local media. The centre has representatives of all ethnic groups including Madurese.

Motivational postures of key actors

For the elites and perhaps for the lower middle classes of West Kalimantan, this conflict was more about greed (and game playing) than grievance (and resistance). For the youthful mob, it was more about grievance, with some elements of motivation by excitement and loot. One-in-all-in cultural norms reinforced by rituals such as passing the red bowl that engendered the motivational posture of commitment to adat authority on a wide front were also important to understanding the psychology of the youthful warriors. The masses were also motivated by resistance to incumbent local governments and their security apparatus because of their part in humiliating Dayaks and disrespectfully dismissing their grievances. This mass resistance was in the cause of asserting the dignity of Dayak (and later Malay) ethnic identity.

The military showed weak commitment to the Indonesian constitution, in effect collaborating in the permanent ethnic cleansing of Sambas. There was a great deal of unprofessional disengagement on their part. Game playing was also an important part of their repertoire, when they seized opportunities to pretend to protect Madurese property so they could sell it and when they extorted payments to escort terrified Madurese citizens to safety.
Malay lower middle classes were also game players in the way they seized opportunities to take over control of markets, transport monopolies and land, as were Chinese businesspeople in taking over inter-town transport, Malay gangsters in taking over organised crime and Malay and Dayak politicians in taking over district government offices and proceeds from illegal logging and other rackets.

Early in the conflict, Madurese youth and gangsters overestimated their power in the localities where they attacked Dayaks. They did not have the imagination to see that their local, mostly non-ethnic, fighting could be seen in a wider frame of ethnic politics that would lead to their certain defeat. Suddenly, when they saw this wider interpretation of ethnic war, the entire Madurese community capitulated and fled. Later, West Kalimantan society as a whole capitulated to the powerbrokers of ethnic politics who carved up political offices between those anointed by the violent men in control of Malay and Dayak militias. The most structurally remarkable capitulation to the bicultural power sharing was of the Chinese. They were the third-most numerous ethnic group in the province, more numerous than in any province of Indonesia, by far the most economically powerful ethnic group and by far the group with the most influential political connections to the decisive levers of power in Jakarta. Those levers were never pulled in Jakarta, where elites were preoccupied with their own problems. More remarkably, the Chinese never even tried to call in a more interventionist Jakarta or to question locally the power-sharing deal in which all ethnic groups other than Malays and Dayaks were excluded from the highest offices. We might say that the most remarkable facts about West Kalimantan were the capitulation of the commanding heights of national political and economic power to local ethnic political authority. Perhaps emerging political parties in Jakarta hoped to recruit the new shadow governments of West Kalimantan districts into their fold, figuring it was better to harness them than to resist them, though we collected no relevant evidence in this project. To capitulate to permanent ethnic cleansing of an ethnic group from one large district of the republic was a major constitutional capitulation by Jakarta.

Beyond the trampling of human rights in this terrible crime against humanity, the other tragedy of West Kalimantan was the legacy of a provincial polity of utter citizen disengagement. Most non-Madurese were terrified by the events happening around them, petrified that they might be mistaken as Madurese (when such judgments were being made based on how people smelled) and just relieved that their families were not being beheaded. So they capitulated to and disengaged from a post-conflict corruption of democracy in which only the favoured candidates of the two armed ethnic groups could assume power. As a result, the children of West Kalimantan inherited corrupt, extortionate
government that supported a shadow government of gangsterism, fixed prices, fixed contracts and contrived shortages to keep inflated prices flowing from the pockets of ordinary folk to the custodians of the shadow government.

Poor Dayaks therefore remained more disengaged than ever from their government when they were betrayed by their own game playing elites who cashed in on illegal logging at the cost of survival of traditional Dayak ways of life and forest culture. At the same time, the flexing of their muscles continued a revival of commitment to a Dayak identity. While pride in the Indonesian polity was hardly restored among Dayaks by these events, pride in Dayak identity and rituals was promoted and a more assertive spirit of indigenous rights emerged.

**Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses**

Apart from tiny pockets of valiant work by NGOs, peace journalists and ethnic and religious leaders at a very local level, there is little peacebuilding strength to identify from this case. International, national, provincial and NGO engagement with peacebuilding was thinly resourced and energised in this case compared with others in the first set of 11 Peacebuilding Compared cases. Dayak and Malay remorse over the slaughter is not widespread—a sharp contrast with widespread remorse in Central Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku. Rather, the common feeling is that what happened in Kalimantan was unfortunate but necessary. Dayaks mostly are now very willing to allow Madurese to return as long as they understand they will be ethnically cleansed again if they return to criminal victimisation of Dayaks and disrespect for their culture. Malays mostly feel they cannot face even the possibility of having to cleanse the Madurese again, so they think permanent cleansing is unfortunate, but just and right. Malay fighters possibly might have just as permanently driven Madurese from Pontianak as they had from Sambas had the military not resisted this in Pontianak. This final dispensation is a huge defeat for reconciliation and for building a human rights culture in Indonesia. It is also a demonstration that reconciliation is unlikely to work unless the conflicting sides can muster respect for the culture of the other and find a dignified space for that culture in reconciliation processes and rituals.

More than in other parts of Indonesia that suffered ethnic conflict, in West and Central Kalimantan, violence worked in advancing the political and business interests of many who promoted it. The legacy of poor leadership that has fallen out of this grab for power and the persistence of thuggery in politics are continuing vulnerability to conflict. The comparatively powerful position of organised crime in the province is part of this problem, which requires law enforcement attention. The law enforcement corruption that is the status quo also remains a conflict vulnerability.
Embezzlement meant that refugees got a terrible deal in terms of humanitarian assistance. Those who returned to Madura experienced great poverty because of the overcrowding and absence of economic opportunity there. Many sold daughters as exported domestic workers. Little trauma counselling was funded.

**Contests of principles**

An animating principle of this conflict was Dayak indigenous identity. The mass of Dayak fighters on the street saw themselves as asserting Dayak empowerment, Dayak rights to decide who would and would not be guests on their land and to demand respect for Dayak custom (Davidson 2008a). Identification with historically more important and longstanding identities associated with Dayak language groups or Dayak longhouses was not important. Very important in the early stages of this conflict were Dayak NGO entrepreneurs of Dayak identity formation. This was not a contest of believers in Dayak identity and devotees of Madurese identity. Madurese attacks were not mounted in the name of defending Madurese identity in any important sense. There was, however, a contest between Dayak and Malay identity. Moral entrepreneurs of Malay indigeneity emerged when they saw the political claim that Dayak indigeneity was effectively staking (Davidson 2008b). The real contest for political power here was between Dayaks and Malays. Each was too strong to be attacked by the other. Each energised their own sense of in-group identity by attacking the same out-group, and both staked their claim for political representation by violent proclamation that they were indigenous sons of West Kalimantan’s soil. Colonially concocted though the identities ‘Malay’ and ‘Dayak’ were, they did come to have such deep meaning to ordinary people that they could see killing as just when it defended indigenous rights so defined.

**Table 5.1 Summary of some codes, West Kalimantan: 650 other variables are coded**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racism towards Dayaks under Dutch and Indonesian governance</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inequality that disadvantages Dayaks in their own land</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of Dayak customary law</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging and agriculture that destroy traditional Dayak economy</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Villagisation’ from traditional longhouse villages to large Indonesian-style villages</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid de-agrarianisation in recent history (van Klinken 2007)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Proximate factors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to ethnic competition (Bertrand 2004)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lure of the illegitimate opportunity of taking over Madurese organised crime and taking over Madurese legitimate businesses and land</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource curse—lure of lootable logs (legitimate and illegitimate opportunity constitution)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of Dayak trust that executive, legislature and courts will hear their grievances</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO politics becomes increasingly ethnically organised among Dayaks and Malays, thereby providing an organisational base to mobilise ethnic violence</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese constituted as folk devils by racist exaggeration, false rumours, self-fulfilling prophecies and other dynamics of moral panic (Cohen 1972)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicious circle of revenge escalating revenge</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived weakness, corruption and inconsistency in law enforcement against murderers; law enforcement becomes inured to the repeated Dayak–Madurese gang fights and rioting</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Key triggering incidents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth fighting over a girl, a stolen motorbike, alleged non-payment in a shop, traffic accident</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Key war-making actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Young Madurese toughs seeking local dominance and excitement through retribution, with no thought that they are initiating a war of ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leaders, businessmen and gangsters playing the ethnic card to capture district governments and shadow governments</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young men and boys who organise themselves into Dayak and Malay militias to seize the historical moment on behalf of their ethnic group</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malay and Dayak ethnic NGOs such as the Communication Forum for Malay Youth (FKPM) provide an organisational foundation for mobilisation of violence</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Key peacemaking actors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Local community Dayak and Madurese leaders, including adat and religious leaders, who prevent conflicts from escalating to ethnic cleansing</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some local multi-ethnic NGOs with a reconciliation agenda and a humanitarian agenda of assisting IDPs</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalists</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Peacebuilding strengths

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Consensus/Contested</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pockets of local dialogue and reconciliation using local adat</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Heightened recognition post-conflict of Dayak marginalisation as a social problem | Contested but credible
---|---
Peace journalism | Consensus
Credit unions shifting from ethnically exclusive membership to a conscious post-conflict policy of ethnically plural membership with the intent of creating ethnic interdependence through micro-finance | Consensus

**Peacebuilding weaknesses**

Security force indecisiveness and extortion | Contested but credible
Weak and inconsistent pre-conflict law enforcement against violence and post-conflict impunity for elite players | Contested but credible
Ethnic cleansing allowed to become permanent in Sambas; slow and partial return of refugees elsewhere | Consensus
Corruption and embezzlement in government (including aid for refugees and law enforcement) | Consensus
Central government and international disengagement from conflict prevention and reconciliation | Consensus
Only limited integration of respect for Madurese culture into peacebuilding rituals | Consensus
Weak NGO sector in terms of NGOs that are not ethnic NGOs | Consensus
Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants | Consensus
Non-truth and non-reconciliation apart from pockets of local reconciliatory leadership | Contested but credible
Poverty and immiserisation for refugees stuck in Madura | Consensus
Peacebuilding not multi-stranded and multidimensional in the way it was, for example, in Maluku | Contested but credible

**Key contested principles of peacebuilding**

Dignity of indigenous Dayak and Malay identities | Consensus
Freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution | Consensus
Part II: Central Kalimantan

Describing the conflict

Major fighting begins

Four Madurese men were killed by a group of Dayaks near Sampit, Central Kalimantan, on 17 February 2001 and some Madurese bars and houses were destroyed. The attackers were relatives of a man who had been killed allegedly by the four dead men in a gambling dispute months earlier. The next day, a Madurese mob burned a dozen houses associated with the Dayaks who had killed the four Madurese. They also killed 14 Dayaks. By 19 February, Dayak informants said, Madurese gangs were in control of Sampit, where Madurese formed a majority and controlled much of the timber industry and other business. Madurese accounts dispute this (Bóuvier and Smith 2008). On many Dayak accounts, Madurese youth rampaged through the city with banners that said things such as ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ (a reference to a town in Madura) and shouting slogans about Dayaks being cowards—all of which was interpreted by Dayaks as great provocation. Some Madurese accounts contest the existence of the ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ banner, or say it was put up by Dayaks to incite resentment (ICG 2001:4–5).

Boatloads of perhaps more than 1000 Dayak warriors arrived in the city from rural areas upstream on 20 February 2001. Many seem to have been recruited from goldmining and logging gangs that enjoyed corrupt relationships with certain military officers and that in some cases had been in competition with Madurese. HRW (2001a) and the police alleged that two senior district officials who believed they were going to lose their jobs in a restructure of district government paid R20 million to two ‘coordinators’ to start the violence in Sampit (Bubandt 2004a:14–15). The warriors began to slay Madurese with traditional Dayak swords in Sampit and surrounding rural areas and smaller towns, beheading many in a conscious campaign intended to effect fear and flight. Some Dayak villagers who were trying to protect Madurese were also killed (Smith 2005:5). The next week the violence spread to the provincial capital of Palangkaraya and by March almost all Madurese in the region of these two cities had fled. In April, it spread to Pangkalanbun, by which time there were 100 000 Madurese IDPs (Achwan et al. 2005:23). Bóuvier and Smith (2008:231) put the total number of Madurese forced out of Central Kalimantan in 2001 at more than 150 000. Thousands of Dayak men were involved in the ethnic cleansing. Months before the February 2001 incident that escalated into this provincial conflagration, there had been other incidents of serious violence, such as a deadly December 2000 Dayak–Madurese brawl in the karaoke bar of a brothel, followed by hundreds of Dayaks destroying at least four Madurese-
owned karaoke bars (ICG 2001:3) and predictions that more organised violence by Dayaks would occur if key alleged Madurese perpetrators of previous incidents were not arrested, which they were not.

The ICG (2001) reports 469 deaths from the Central Kalimantan conflict of 2001—456 of them Madurese. Interviewees in the province consistently thought this was too low, feeling official figures kept the numbers artificially low and generally believing more than 1000 and often several thousand had been killed (Achwan et al. 2005:33; Smith 2005:17). Van Klinken (2007:124) sees the credible estimates as ranging from 500 to nearly 1300. Much of the reporting in the Indonesian media seized on the large number of Madurese who were beheaded, fitting this to a script of headhunting resurgence by primitive Dayaks. While we will never know quite how bloody the Central Kalimantan conflict was, it was over in two months. And it was a rare case in which the economic impacts of the conflict were not large. Of course, they were large for more than 100 000 Madurese refugees. Whether because the conflict redistributed some assets and opportunities from them to the poor Dayak majority, or for some other reason, Central Kalimantan experienced a slight increase in its position on the Human Development Index between 1999 and 2002, moving up one place in the ranking of Indonesian provinces (Achwan et al. 2005:35).

Sampit police reported to Claire Smith (2005:17) that property crime fell 30 per cent after the flight of the Madurese. Violent crime, however, increased 20 per cent, which was attributed to immediate post-conflict unemployment, post-conflict trauma, alcohol abuse and Dayak young men carrying weapons in a way they had not done before 2001.

Refugee return and reconciliation

Anti-migrant laws were passed in Central Kalimantan in the aftermath of the conflict. In the first few post-conflict years, returns of Madurese refugees were modest, as central government financial aid for return began to flow only in 2004. Returning families received R3 million (US$310) plus R500 000 per family member to assist travel and rebuilding. Payments to intermediaries were, however, required for refugees to get hold of this money. A number of returned refugees interviewed said they had received nothing. Corruption in various programs designed to assist refugees was on a formidable scale. In some areas, it was common for returning refugees to make hefty payments to squatters to get their property back (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:246), and some returned to Madura because they could not afford these.

By June 2005, about 80 per cent had returned (Achwan et al. 2005:29). About 80 per cent was still the most commonly mentioned figure in our 2007 interviews, though no-one was certain. This was a much better outcome than
for West Kalimantan. One difference was that the Central Kalimantan provincial government established a policy that, in general, refugees had a right to return—something the West Kalimantan government never did. This put pressure from the centre on districts that were not allowing Madurese back to retreat from this policy. In some of these resistant districts, the returns were, however, very modest. Returnees found they had to take the lead in assuring Dayak neighbours that they would meet their conditions for return after several years of the government failing to take leadership in reconciliation (Smith and Bóuvier 2006:217). From 2004, the provincial government began to take more initiative to accelerate the community-by-community reconciliation that was already happening. Many, perhaps most, elite Madurese opted not to return (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:247). This meant that many elite Dayaks were economic winners from the conflict after they permanently took over Madurese factories, shops and other businesses. Even poorer Dayaks who occupied Madurese plantations benefited nicely from the sale of three or four harvests before their owners returned and then demanded a payment to quit the land.

Peacemaking attempts occurred in Jakarta and at a congress in Palangkaraya at first. This led to an agreement on 21 March 2001 brokered by the central government. On 22 August 2001, a meeting was held in Sampang, Madura, on refugee return to Central Kalimantan. Subsequent meetings were held in Batu Malang (February 2002), Semarang and Jakarta, some facilitated by Search for Common Ground in Indonesia. There was opposition to Madurese return from a number of constituencies in Dayak society who had benefited from taking over Madurese assets. Some of these were criminal, others not. The Batu Malang meeting set conditions for return: only ‘good’ Madurese could return and then only gradually. At a congress in Palangkaraya from 4 to 7 June 2002 mediated by the central government, to these conditions was added the requirement that returnees apologise to Dayaks for causing the conflict and for killing Dayaks and ‘pay a fine according to Dayak tradition’ (ICG 2001:13). Some district governments enacted regulations that were more prescriptive. Perda No. 2 2003 of the government of Kotawaringin Timur required migrant arrivals to register with the local government within 14 days of arrival. The only Madurese to be accepted were: 1) those with a local ID registered before February 2001; 2) those with a Dayak spouse; 3) those not involved in the conflict; 4) those with a good record with the local police; 5) those adaptive to local culture. Some districts required signed declarations that IDPs would not form Madurese organisations that were politically active, such as PK-4, which was banned in some districts. The provincial government in 2002 decided only four types of Madurese would be allowed to return—Madurese with: local government positions, other permanent jobs, a Dayak spouse and with ‘good character’ (Smith 2005:18).
The United Nations Development Program has expressed concern that in addition to being prevented from returning to some communities where they once lived, some Madurese returnees were ‘forced to pay compensation to squatters on their property, denied access to certain economic zones or types of employment, subject to intimidation or provocation, or in a word, being treated as second-class citizens’ (Achwan et al. 2005:73).

The Bupati of Sampit facilitated an inter-religious meeting to foster reconciliation—something that happened in some other districts as well (Smith 2005:19). Mosques and churches also conducted reconciliation activities within the bounds of their own flock (Smith 2005:19). This was obviously a desirable thing, particularly in supporting reintegration and healing of Dayak combatants. Because such a large proportion of Madurese had belonged to Madurese community mosques, however, victims were rarely significantly represented in these intra-congregation reconciliations. Smith (2005:21) found the same problem with sub-village and village mediation mechanisms: they were useful for intra-community conflicts, but not for inter-ethnic conflicts. Traditional adat leaders at the village and hamlet levels were respected in the Dayak community but could be biased against Madurese. At the other end of the spectrum, provincial reconciliation mechanisms did not reach down to participation by community-level leaders. Smith (2005:21) saw hope between those poles in district and subdistrict reconciliations for inter-ethnic conflict, though not if mediated by the police, who were not trusted. At the time of her research, it was still to be seen if that hope would be realised for Madurese–Dayak reconciliation. Smith (2005:23) found the government-run, World Bank-funded local development project forums of the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) were also successful in bridging inter-ethnic problems, though at the time of her research Madurese in Central Kalimantan were still not willing to come out into their open public meetings. Just as none of the levels of governance that might have reconciled post-conflict Dayak–Madurese angst was working at the time of Claire Smith’s fieldwork, all of those levels of governance had also failed pre-conflict to prevent the violence in the places where it broke out. Not everywhere, however, because there were many rural spaces where Madurese and Dayaks lived and worked happily together and where, as a result, Dayak neighbours sought to protect, hide and facilitate the escape of Madurese.

In Surabaya in 2005, a Peace Through History conference included reconciliation between the two politically prominent ethnic NGOs in the conflict: LMMDT-KT on the Dayak side and PK-4, the Madurese. It included an exchange of gifts and a collaboration dance specially designed for the conference with elements of Madurese and Dayak music and culture.

Bóuvier and Smith (2008:246) concluded that peacemaking generally followed a ‘no-fault’ trajectory, ruling out of order more complex aspects of the causation.
of the conflict such as the failure of outnumbered security forces to stop the violence before it escalated. The mandated script of reconciliation processes was that ‘cultural incompatibility was responsible for the conflict’ (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:246). Madurese understood this was code for an interpretation accepted across Indonesia that they, the predominant victims, were to blame because of their belligerence and cultural propensity for insensitivity to other cultures. As in other cases in this book, this was a script of non-truth and reconciliation. Some Madurese NGOs even bought into the victim-blaming script, participating in a program to send IDP children to Islamic boarding schools in Java where they would ‘abandon their Madurese culture and Madurese language and all the negative aspects of it’ (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:247).

At least one Central Kalimantan journalist travelled overseas on a peace journalism program. Local peace journalism training also occurred with the support of the British Council and Search for Common Ground in Indonesia. Journalists interviewed in Sampit said they wanted to ‘keep everything calmed down’ and to be careful not to blow things out of proportion. The six journalists we met repeatedly referred to the violence of February 2001 as an ‘accident’, presumably in this spirit. The analysis of this chapter is that in fact these events were politically planful. This might reveal a tension between peace journalism and investigative journalism. Kivimäki (2004:83) grasps the tension in pointing out that an important role of the media when conflict breaks out is to prick overconfidence of combatants in their interpretation of their strength based in their analysis of what the conflict is about. So in the case of the first in this cycle of Dayak–Madurese conflict in Sanggau Ledo, Kivimäki concludes that the adolescent criminals did not particularly think of themselves as Madurese in their confidence of their gang’s local strength in its ability to defeat their ‘local enemies’. ‘Their miscalculation was to ignore the possibility of their own group being seen by Dayaks [ultimately across wide sections of West and Central Kalimantan] as a representative group of the Madurese’ (Kivimäki 2004:83). Of course, they could not see that. They were young and uneducated. They had a limited understanding of the history of their own land. They could not imagine that ambitious politicians might seek to harness the chaos for political ends beyond their comprehension. As Kivimäki points out, however, the media can play a role in educating them, or elders might counsel them, that they are playing with fire, that their overconfidence in their capacity to prevail through violence is misplaced. Kivimäki’s contribution in conceiving of peace journalism as challenging overconfidence simply by discussing how different groups might interpret the identity politics in play in different ways is important. His most basic prescription is that ‘in order to avoid playing up the overconfidence of fighters, the media should be exceptionally careful and not repeat uncritically the logic and concepts of the warring parties as truths’ (Kivimäki 2004:85).
Investment in trauma counselling was thin. In the Madurese community, where counselling was most needed, untrained religious leaders shouldered most of this challenge. On the Christian side as well, churches provided most of the counselling support for those suffering trauma.

The role of the security services

By the time military and police reinforcements began to arrive on 26 February 2001, the conflict had already escalated past its peak (Achwan et al. 2005:49). The conflict was not solved by the security forces preventing further attacks, but by the flight or hiding of more or less the entire Madurese population. This must be qualified, however, by pointing out that there was a near-run avoidance of a major bloodbath in the city of Pankalanbuun, home to the second-largest concentration of Madurese in the province, when the military blocked Dayak warriors from marching on it. While some killing did occur there in April, in May, it was the only centre where Madurese remained in large numbers, assisted by Dayak peace rituals to ‘ward off disaster’ in which Madurese participated (ICG 2001:13). Everywhere else Dayak peace rituals were conducted without Madurese.

In early 2001, many dozens of people, including the ‘apparent killers and paymasters [were] apprehended but released due to Dayak outcry’ (Achwan et al. 2005:29; ICG 2001:8). Later that year, however, 233 Dayaks were arrested and 98 sent to the Attorney-General’s office for prosecution (ICG 2001:9). In the context of such mass violence, it was hard to prove murder; most were charged with carrying weapons. The near-universal Dayak impunity for murder during the conflict compounded the failure of the police before the conflict to enforce the law against perpetrators of ethnic violence.

A specific problem was that Dayaks believed Madurese repeatedly made corrupt payments to the police to prevent prosecution for crimes they had committed. A number of informants referred to a previous wave of conflict over Dayak concern that Madurese were committing crime and escaping arrest by the police. This led to the Kasongan Agreement signed in 1985 in the town of Kasongan. Leaders of the two communities are said to have agreed that if Madurese migrants did not desist from crime and violence against Dayaks, ‘the entire Madurese community would have to leave the province’ (Smith 2005:13). To many Dayaks, this justified the expulsion of 2001. Madurese leaders, in contrast, knew little of the agreement. It was said only four senior Madurese leaders had signed in 1985. Perhaps they were not sufficiently representative of Madurese. What was most important in this was that Dayaks felt it was not an option to go to Madurese leaders again and ask them to restrain the violence of their people in compliance with the agreement. This was part of the scaffolding of legitimate means for regulating violence that had collapsed.
Military officers said their orders were to stay in the barracks during the escalation of the violence, leaving control of the armed mobs to the police. Their orders then became to assist only with the evacuation of Madurese. There were incidents of the police and military shooting at each other and of extortion by the police and military for safe evacuation (Smith 2005:15). One of the worst single failures of the police was on 25 February 2001 when 118 Madurese were massacred in Parenggean after their police escort fled when faced with a large Dayak mob (ICG 2001:5).

Interpreting the conflict

What structural factors were at the root of this conflict?

The structural factors at the root of the conflict were much the same as in West Kalimantan, only more acute because this Dayak marginalisation occurred in the province conceived and created as a Dayak province in 1957 (van Klinken 2006a). Therefore Dayak ethno-nationalism in response to problems such as legal and illegal logging and mining was perhaps more intense. The percentage of Central Kalimantan covered by forest declined from 84 per cent in 1970 to about 56 per cent in 1999 (Bertrand 2004:57). De-agrarianisation was a structural factor in both conflicts, raising the stakes of small-town politics in places such as Sampit (van Klinken 2007). A specific focus of resentment was Madurese control of markets in many urban areas and thuggish behaviour associated with sustaining Madurese monopoly of critical commercial spaces in markets. It was interesting to contemplate that in Central Kalimantan most of the slaughter was of urban Madurese by upriver rural Dayaks. In Halmahera, North Maluku, as well, a great deal of the killing of urban Muslims was by highland Christians as opposed to fellow urban Christians. Likewise in Poso, much of the killing was by highland Christian villagers sweeping down on small-town Muslims.

Dayaks knew they were perceived as primitive by much of mainstream Indonesian society, as they had been by the Dutch. For this reason, it was important to them that migrants showed them respect as people and respected certain customs that were important to Dayaks. Most Dayaks believed that Javanese migrants generally showed respect to Dayak society. It was also a common view that the Madurese who had been in Kalimantan for decades had shown respect to Dayaks, maintaining cordial relations with all ethnic groups including Dayaks and often intermarrying. That was not the view, however, about many Madurese immigrants who had surged in recent decades into segregated Madurese enclaves in towns such as Sampit. Madurese men marrying Dayak women without asking the permission of their families was an especially widespread concern. Another was Dayaks being generous in lending land to Madurese for certain purposes and over time Madurese asserting ownership. In most rural
areas of Central Kalimantan, in contrast, there were not enough Madurese to live a segregated existence in their own residential communities and mosques, so they assimilated respectfully with Dayak society. So we might say that racism and marginalisation of Dayaks across Indonesian society were root causes of the conflict, with Madurese suffering the consequences because they were seen as the group who granted Dayak people the least dignity and Dayak culture the least respect. Since the large-scale IDP returns of 2005, informants from many sectors of Dayak society perceived Madurese returnees as behaving much more respectfully towards Dayak culture than before the conflict. Many thought the seeds of a more respectful relationship were planted when Madurese elders made the first visits back to their old neighbourhoods to negotiate who would and would not be allowed to return, and on what conditions.

During interviews at the Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation (LMMDD-KT), the Dayak NGO many believed organised the violence, we were told that the Sampang peace agreement of August 2001 included ‘deconstructing Madurese culture’. There was no postmodern intent here; this meant transforming Madurese culture so Madurese were not rude, not disrespectful of the culture of others and rejected ‘their culture’ of violent revenge. Hence, as we conclude that racism and disrespect of Dayak culture were root causes of the 2001 conflict, we must also worry that post-conflict disrespect of Madurese culture has been allowed through one-sided reconciliation to become a risk factor for future conflict.

What have been the proximate factors in the conflict?

A ‘resource curse’ was a proximate factor in the conflict. Dayak patrons and clients competed with Madurese patrons and clients for control of illegal logging and illegal goldmining. It was clear that Dayak logging interests played many leadership roles in the ethnic cleansing. The availability of illegitimate opportunities that could be expanded by ethnic cleansing could have been a reason why Dayak elites seized on mass resentment and vengefulness towards Madurese.

Our narrative makes it clear that revenge for each previous step in the conflict has been a factor in escalation to the next widening of the conflict. Many Dayaks in 2001 came to believe that Madurese aspired to control the province of Central Kalimantan. Almost all Dayaks believed they had lost political control of their own province. That is why allegations of Madurese shouting ‘Sampit is the second Sampang’ are important in their narrative. It also makes sense of why the conflict broke out in full ferocity in Sampit, a town where only relatively recent history had seen Madurese become a majority. Implementation of regional autonomy from 1999 created local political uncertainty that morphed into Dayak political despair when no Dayaks received political appointments in
district reorganisation. It was perhaps not a coincidence that Dayak warriors killed a Madurese family of five in their sleep in Baamang-Sampit on the eve of the installation of the new district officials (Achwan et al. 2005:28). On Bertrand’s (2004) analysis, the violence occurred at a critical juncture when a new political configuration was up for grabs.

Claire Smith (2005) sees multiple institutional malfunctions as responsible for failing to prevent the conflict. One of these was failure of the security forces to enforce the law either before or during the conflict, as discussed above. The second was a complete breakdown of trust in all levels of government officialdom by Dayak society. District and subdistrict officials did plead with Dayak warriors not to go on the rampage, but they were pushed aside. Dayaks had come to see government officials as people who listened to Madurese and other ethnic groups, but not to them. Lacking legitimate means for regulating crime and violence against them, Dayaks resorted to illegitimate means. Third, the authority of damang—traditional Dayak leaders—to regulate conflict had been undermined by the New Order reforms to village governance referred to in Part I of this chapter. In sum, the social control capabilities of the institutions of tradition, of trust in government and the institutions of force had collapsed in Central Kalimantan by 2001, as they had in West Kalimantan by 1996.

Another proximate factor was modelling the violence in West Kalimantan, which many Dayaks in Central Kalimantan saw as a success in dealing with the Madurese problem and advancing Dayak political representation.

**What were the key triggering incidents?**

The killing of a Dayak man over a gambling dispute was the trigger of a series of escalated cycles of revenge.

**Who were the key war-making and peacebuilding actors?**

As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, small groups of reckless young Madurese men who organised themselves to perpetrate violence and large mobs of Dayak young men who joined them were instigators of violence and actors who gave it momentum to escalate.

Van Klinken sees the Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation (LMMDD-KT) as an organising node for the ethnic cleansing. It was an organisation that since 1993 had lobbied for greater Dayak presence in key positions, particularly as Governor of Central Kalimantan, and for ‘Dayaks to become masters in their own country’ (van Klinken 2007:128–9). Van Klinken saw the LMMDD-KT as a de facto local political party with a nativist ideology and populist mobilisation as a method. When other methods of acquiring power failed, it adopted into its repertoire from the 1997 experience in West
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Kalimantan a racist campaign of vilification of Madurese as scapegoats for Dayak woes. The Chairman of LMMDD-KT, Professor K. M. A. Usop, who had lost the gubernatorial election in 2000, was arrested over his alleged involvement in instigating the violence. When he was subsequently allowed to return to Palangkaraya under city arrest, he ‘received a hero’s welcome’ (ICG 2001:6). Quite unlike the outcome in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, little changed in the configuration of power-holding governance as a result of the violence. The leading figures of the LMMDD-KT did not realise their personal political ambitions (van Klinken 2007:135–6).

LMMDD-KT leaders had (mostly illegal) business interests in logging and small-scale goldmining. Similarly, van Klinken (2002:74) suspected that organised Madurese fighters who put up stiff resistance in February 2001 probably also belonged to Madurese associations of loggers and miners that, rather crucially, supplied radio-telephone communications to coordinate attacks across the province. This is a question that has not, however, been well researched. In January 1997, there was formidable violence between illegal miners and the legal miners of a joint Indonesian–Australian goldmine (ICG 2001:3). The ethnic politics of this have also not been researched. As in some other conflicts in Indonesia, in Central Kalimantan, a tangle of ethnic politics (or political ambition playing an ethnic card), business politics and the politics of semi-organised crime could have been involved. For van Klinken, the fighting might be not so much about control of the formal state as about control of a shadow state (Reno 1995)—the informal authority to run rackets and secure contracts for clients that goes with incumbency in formal positions. Wealth and power are made more in the intersection between the shadow state and the black economy than in the intersection between the formal state and the legal economy. The main political competitors of the LMMDD-KT leaders were not Madurese, who always had minimal representation in government offices. It was other Dayaks in competing alliances with Javanese, with national party politics and the local subaltern business politics of illicit markets. LMMDD-KT was a subaltern elite who, after electoral politics did not deliver power to them, sought to compete for mass Dayak support by playing to Dayak ethnic resentments. This play must have been well attuned to mass sentiment because ‘not a single Dayak political figure condemned the ethnic cleansing against Madurese’ (van Klinken 2002:80).

As in West Kalimantan, here national political figures and international actors were not major players in peacebuilding. Likewise, the military did not play a major role, nor did the police, who were widely distrusted on all sides. The provincial government played more of a leadership role than in West Kalimantan, pushing districts that were resisting return of refugees to allow them back. The greater leadership, however, was by Madurese elders returning to the Central Kalimantan communities where they negotiated a modus vivendi for the return
of their people. And there was leadership by community-level Dayak leaders who responded constructively to those overtures, engaging their indigenous traditions of reconciliation to the task. These practical local reconciliations in most places seem to have worked very well, with returned refugees now having lived in peaceful, respectful relationships for a number of years since their return.

Motivational postures of key actors

The Madurese men who were initiators of violence were game players of sorts—players of the crime game, enforcers of gambling debts and managers of brothels. Their action did not spring from a commitment to a Madurese identity. The actions of the Dayak fighters very much did. They were mostly young men and boys with a high degree of commitment to their village leaders who had passed the red bowl to them. The Madurese and Dayak young fighters had very little commitment to the rule of law of the Indonesian state. They distrusted and resisted it. They did, however, capitulate to it within a short few weeks after they started fighting. After their brief interlude of resistance then capitulation, rural Dayak youth returned to their longstanding posture of disengagement from a state that seemed to them irrelevant to solving most of their problems, though relevant to making some of their problems worse.

While grievance over the humiliation of Dayaks motivated the violence of the young fighters, greed could have played more of a role among those with illegal logging and illegal goldmining interests who started the red bowl moving from village to village to recruit fighters. These could have been game players who saw business opportunities from ethnic cleansing of business competitors from their patch and political opportunities for increased Dayak representation in positions of power.

The security forces were also game players much of the time, even to the point of the police and military shooting at each other in contests over who should guarantee transport to safety because they had collected payments from IDPs.

Peacebuilding strengths and weaknesses

As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, some peace journalism grew from the ashes of the conflict, especially in the radio and television sectors. While the truth part of truth and reconciliation was no stronger in Central than in West Kalimantan, the reconciliation part had more vitality. This vitality did not come from the reconciliation processes organised by central and provincial governments, but from local leadership for practical reconciliation. Dayak traditions of peacemaking were helpful in consolidating and consecrating the practical agreements.
The limited roles in peacebuilding that national and international leaders and organisations, NGOs (local and international), trauma counselling professionals and religious leaders played in this case meant that peacebuilding lacked the multidimensionality that could be seen in a case such as Maluku (Chapter 3).

Justice has not prevailed any better than truth in this case. Corrupt justice was a factor in the sense of grievance of the fighters and post-conflict justice cast aside in compliance with the wishes of the mob was a weakness of the peacebuilding. Certainly, some murderers went to prison for short sentences and large numbers were arrested in an attempt to apply justice, but the highly politised releases of those arrested meant that no-one could feel any sense of a principled process that sought the truth and imposed justice on the most extremely culpable. The untruthful narrative that persisted post-conflict was one that imposed blame entirely on the victims. Victims unsurprisingly saw the requirement that they apologise before they could return to their homes as profoundly unjust. There was some recognition of Madurese culture in peace ceremonies, but in general the Madurese were required to feign cultural surrender, to create the appearance that they agreed that their culture needed reform as a condition of their capitulation to violence.

On the positive side, one truth that has been made more visible in the aftermath of the violence is that Indonesian institutions have allowed Dayaks to become marginalised in their own land.

**Contests of principles**

As in West Kalimantan, in Central Kalimantan, a key principle in this conflict was the assertion of the dignity of an indigenous Dayak identity. When it came to the time for refugee return, the countervailing principle asserted much more effectively in Central than in West Kalimantan was the freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution.

**Table 5.2 Summary of some codes, Central Kalimantan: 650 other variables are coded**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structural factors at root of conflict</th>
<th>Is this a ‘consensus’ factor among analysts or ‘contested but credible’ as a possible factor?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Racism towards Dayaks under Dutch and Indonesian governance</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural inequality that disadvantages Dayaks in their own land</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marginalisation of Dayak customary law</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Logging that destroys traditional Dayak economy</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘Villagisation’ from traditional longhouse villages to large Indonesian-style villages</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transmigration/immigration</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapid de-agrarianisation in recent history (van Klinken 2007)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Proximate factors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rapid de-agrarianisation in recent history (van Klinken 2007)</th>
<th>Contested but credible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Collapse of New Order opens power allocations and the rules of the game to ethnic competition (Bertrand 2004)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political decentralisation increases ethnically based patronage and resource exploitation opportunities (legitimate and illegitimate), further increasing politico-ethnic competition</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource curse—lure of lootable logs and gold (legitimate and illegitimate opportunity constitution)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Breakdown of Dayak trust that executive, legislature and courts will hear their grievances</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Modelling Dayak and Madurese mobilisation for ethnic cleansing from West Kalimantan</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madurese constituted as folk devils by racist exaggeration, false rumours, self-fulfilling prophecies and other dynamics of moral panic (Cohen 1972)</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vicious circle of revenge escalating revenge</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indecisiveness in deployment of security forces to protect civilians</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Perceived weakness and inconsistency in law enforcement against murderers</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key triggering incidents**

| Murder over a gambling dispute | Consensus |

**Key war-making actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Young Madurese toughs seeking local dominance and excitement through retribution, with no thought that they are initiating a war of ethnic cleansing</th>
<th>Contested but credible</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>District and provincial political and business leaders playing the Dayak card to capture local formal and shadow governments</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Young men and boys who organise themselves into violent mobs inspired by a Dayak warrior ethos</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Dayak NGO (Central Kalimantan Institute for Dayak and Regional Social Consultation) that provides an organisational foundation for a subaltern elite</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Networks of Dayak loggers that provide organisational resources, in particular radio phones</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Key peacemaking actors**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Local community Madurese and Dayak elders, including adat and religious leaders</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provincial government leaders insisting on change of policy from laggard districts that refuse to accept return of refugees</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalists</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Peacebuilding strengths**

| Pockets of local dialogue and reconciliation using local adat | Consensus |
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Peacebuilding weaknesses</th>
<th>Consensus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Heightened recognition post-conflict of Dayak marginalisation as a social problem</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace journalism</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit unions shifting from ethnically exclusive membership to a conscious post-conflict policy of ethnically plural membership with the intent of creating ethnic interdependence through micro-finance</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding weaknesses</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security force indecisiveness and extortion; police and military fighting each other</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak and inconsistent pre-conflict law enforcement against violence and post-conflict impunity for elite players</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slow and often selective return of refugees</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption and embezzlement in government</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central government and international disengagement from conflict prevention and reconciliation</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Only limited integration of respect for Madurese culture into peacebuilding rituals</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak NGO sector in terms of NGOs that are not ethnic NGOs</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limited access to trauma counselling for victims and combatants</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-truth and muted reconciliation apart from pockets of local reconciliatory leadership</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual IDPs of the most victimised ethnic group required to apologise on behalf of the group as a condition of return</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacebuilding not multi-stranded and multidimensional in the way it was, for example, in Maluku</td>
<td>Contested but credible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poverty and immiserisation for IDPs stuck in Madura</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Key contested principles of peacebuilding</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dignity of an indigenous Dayak identity</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedom of movement of Indonesian citizens as guaranteed in the Indonesian Constitution</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Part III: Preliminary conclusions—West and Central Kalimantan

The Dayak people had already stamped all government institutions as bad before the conflict. The Dayak community could not find a good person who they could ask for help for their problems. The governor, the bupati (district head), the camat (subdistrict head), the lurah (village head), the police, the army; they were all unfair and dishonest figures for the community. (Interview by Claire Smith [2005:15] with Sampit Dayak elder)

In this chapter, we have attempted to explain how the social control capabilities of the institutions of tradition, of trust in government and the institutions of force collapsed in West and Central Kalimantan. The structural context revealed in the above quote seems important to understanding this conflict at a number of different levels. One level is the use of illegitimate means to pursue goals (Merton 1949) by the poor, the middle class and elites. Another level is moral panics that create folk devils (Cohen 1972) as a response to disempowerment and insecurity.

Dayak people in West and Central Kalimantan felt that legitimate means for getting help with their problems and improving their circumstances were blocked. So they became attracted to illegitimate means. Perhaps if they resorted to violence, people in authority would take notice of them and their grievances? In a way, this really happened in West Kalimantan. Post-conflict, there were many more Dayak bupatis, deputy bupatis and Dayak governors of both provinces. The tragedy was that so many of those who came to power did so because they were game players who recognised that they could harness Dayak violence to projects of personal enrichment. The will to empowerment through violence of poor Dayaks was captured by wealthier Dayaks with a will to empower themselves and their cronies, to the neglect of poor Dayaks. These wealthier Dayaks had long been players in local shadow governments; they were palace insiders who wanted to sit on or beside the throne. In West Kalimantan, Dayak and Malay insiders successfully harnessed the mob to their projects of personal aggrandisement.

As happened in other parts of Indonesia, Central Kalimantan Dayak aspirants to the pinnacles of provincial power sought to imitate the West Kalimantan strategy in 2001. In this case, however, the individuals who escalated violence to ethnic cleansing did not acquire power themselves. There also was no profoundly different political dispensation of ethnic power sharing as a result.
of the violence, as there had been in West Kalimantan. And the ethnic cleansing itself was almost completely reversed in Central Kalimantan—something that did not happen in the West.

We have seen that at different layers of the Kalimantan class structure, illegitimate means push aside legitimate means for achieving valued goals in different ways. For an aspirant to become a Dayak governor of Central Kalimantan, the hope was that violent ethnic politics might pave a path to the governor’s mansion more effectively than political party electoral politics. At the level of the poor young men of the Dayak mob, it was not all grievance to the exclusion of greed. There was looting, though this really was motivationally secondary. The lower middle class in both provinces rode into town in the wake of the violence to take over the marketplaces, the transport monopolies, the gambling, the prostitution and the human trafficking that Madurese had dominated to different degrees in different places. When they were not actors in the violence, they were political supporters of the vilification of the Madurese. Above them, the Chinese economic elite was not active in violence against Madurese, but benefited from it in taking over some inter-town transportation and logging niches previously occupied by Madurese. They were also pleased that scapegoating of the Madurese reduced the risk that they would be scapegoated, as the Chinese were elsewhere in Indonesia as the Asian economic crisis descended. The Chinese therefore did not speak up to defend the human rights of the Madurese; at best they sat on their hands, at worst they colluded in Madurese racial vilification. In some cases in Central Kalimantan, Chinese businessmen might have bankrolled Dayak mobilisation against the Madurese—perhaps reluctantly and fearfully, in response to Dayak demands for support (Bóuvier and Smith 2008:243).

The structural reality of political and economic domination in West Kalimantan, historically and in the present, was that Malays and Chinese had done much more to subordinate Dayaks than the Madurese. It was unthinkable in 1997, however, for Dayaks to use violence to subordinate either of these groups; they were just too powerful for that. Besides, many Dayaks still felt bad about the way the military had manipulated them to slaughter Chinese in 1967.

So why the Madurese? Why not Javanese when it was Javanese policies that dismantled Dayak village institutions? One might as well ask why Jews in Germany? The feeling that struggling people have in times of economic and political uncertainty is, as we have said, that legitimate opportunities are closed to them. One kind of response is a rational pursuit of illegitimate opportunities. Racist scapegoating is, however, a more common response to anomie. It can make people feel better about themselves to think that the reason why they are not on top, why they are beset by crisis or why they are not being listened to by leaders is that a certain category of person is doing them in. They are then in the market for stereotyped information about that category of person. The
phenomenon is more general than racism. Youth cults such as mods and rockers in Britain (Cohen 1972) and bodgies and widgies in Australia (Braithwaite and Barker 1978) can become folk devils for older people who resent the freedom from constraint these liberated young people seem to enjoy while older folk feel so tethered. They are therefore in the market for a moral panic about these folk devils that will make them feel better about themselves by exaggerating the awfulness of the other, particularly in times of insecurity.

What this literature teaches us is that folk devils—be they of a particular religion, ethnicity or mode of dress—do not have to do much to annoy us. Perhaps they wear tight clothes that reveal something of their young bodies we would not expose of our old bodies. Perhaps their ethnic group manages many of the banks that will not give us a loan in a post-depression environment. Stigmatisation is an expressive plea from alienated masses that they are being denied cultural or economic recognition by attacking a target they think gets more recognition than they deserve (and flaunts it). Folk devils do not need to do much flaunting because the literature in the folk-devil tradition pioneered by Stanley Cohen (1972) shows how many social processes there are that can build on a small number of annoying characteristics to exaggerate and multiply them. When our friends and family realise that it makes us feel better about ourselves to rail about how insufferable Jews are, they share an anti-Semitic joke that attributes a character to Jews that in fact they do not normally have. Shakespeare, in his effort to sell more tickets to his new play The Merchant of Venice, appeals to an anti-Semitic stereotype of Jewish financiers. A leader with a new political brand arrives to tell us that Jewish bankers were responsible not only for the Depression, but for Germany losing World War I and for the threat of communism. The media finds it can sell newspapers by appealing to the stereotype, and so on. The moral panic phenomenon of stereotyping, exaggeration, politicisation and commercialisation of folk devils is such a sociologically general one that we do not need to labour it. In times of anomie, the folk devil epitomises for the mob everything that is deviant and dangerous when an old and valued normative order is seen to be crumbling.

In a sense, the ‘why Madurese’ question therefore does not need an answer. Madurese certainly had some annoying cultural predispositions. Many cultures are as relentless as the Madurese at settling scores against their family by attacking someone from the other family—though finding it acceptable to jump a member of the other family with a knife from behind while they innocently walk down the street is an annoying way of doing it, as people from many other cultures (including Dayaks) look at it. In the case of the Madurese, the starting annoyances from the perspective of the Dayaks seem clear and understandable

11 One thing some Dayak informants ridiculed Madurese for was the way they excessively flaunted jewellery and expensive cars in shallow efforts to signify their superiority.
enough, but we are deeply suspicious of the opinion of many Dayaks who have said to us that the behaviour of Madurese has improved greatly since the conflict. We are suspicious of it for the same reason we were suspicious of our parents’ generation in Australia when they said how polite they found so many of the ex-bodgies and ex-widgies had become in the 1960s after that moral panic passed—with the change in fashions that had marked bodgies and widgies as deviant. Our suspicion is that the bodgies and widgies really were pretty much the same people in the late 1950s as they were in the early 1960s. What had changed was that they were no longer caught up in a moral panic that exaggerated their vices and suppressed their virtues. Likewise, our hypothesis is that the annoying characteristics of Madurese were never as bad as they were painted when certain Dayak and Malay leaders found it convenient to whip up a moral panic that stereotyped them as folk devils. And our hypothesis is that the perceived post-conflict respectfulness and politeness of the Madurese do not reflect a fundamental change in them, but in stereotyping of them.

We were told stories of proactive efforts by responsible citizens to unwind the stereotyping. One Dayak adat leader told a story of a Madurese door-to-door fruiterer who said something to Dayak women that they interpreted as extremely rude. When he heard the women speak of this, the Dayak elder went to the Madurese fruiterer to explain that the women had interpreted what he said as rude. The fruiterer was shocked, said he had not meant to be rude at all, visited the women to apologise and explained that he had not meant to offend. When a moral panic subsides, when a society moves from anomie to a more secure confidence of citizens that the normative order is not disintegrating, communications such as this that break down stereotypes can resume.

The importance of peace journalism is something that has come out of several of the Peacebuilding Compared cases. Questioning stereotypes is one of the things peace journalism can do. A particularly important part of this is questioning predictive rumours grounded in stereotypes: ‘because Madurese believe in revenge killings, they are planning attacks in such and such a place.’ Kivimäki (2004:83) puts his finger on the need for the media to prick the overconfidence of combatants in their interpretation of their violence. Madurese young men would have been surprised to learn that behaviour they saw as simply settling a local score, and did not interpret as Madurese collective violence, might play into a stereotype of Madurese domination of a space that could lead to violent mobilisation against Madurese across a province. A conflict-prevention role of journalism, political and civil society leadership alike can be to diagnose, deconstruct and critique the stereotypes, exaggerations, predictions, rumours, generalisations and degradations involved in moral panics. It can be to seize
opportunities to behave as the Dayak leader did in giving feedback to the fruiterer. At a more macro-level, this is one of the things a truth and reconciliation commission can do.

One thing that is quite different about West and Central Kalimantan compared with Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi is that Dayak and Malay leaders so often have no regret about the slaughter, even in the face of so much killing of defenceless children, their mothers and elderly grandparents. A more truthful engagement with responsibility for the horror, such as a truth and reconciliation commission might deliver, is one possible remedy. When so much of the violence has been so planful, it will not do to dismiss it as: 1) a justified reaction of oppressed people to Madurese who are victimising them and getting away with it by bribing the police; and 2) the actions of uncontrollable warriors who are not their normal selves, in a trance of righteous slaughter after drinking from the red bowl. These interpretations cut perpetrators off from the experience of empathy for the innocents they slaughter. Just as it is shocking that the Indonesian state has allowed ethnic cleansing to stand in Sambas, it is also shocking that it has allowed this remorseless interpretation to stand. In Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, at least a kind of non-truth and reconciliation was achieved that was infused with remorse, empathy and compassion for victims. This is a more robust foundation for long-term peace than the non-truth and non-reconciliation we see in much of West and Central Kalimantan. Post-conflict processes of inquiry have not addressed either the structural injustice that Dayaks have suffered under Indonesian and Dutch institutions or the unjust way they have scapegoated Madurese for their insecurity. In the end, a historical process that has treated Dayak and Madurese cultures with contempt has been allowed to stand without honest and painful examination within the society. Perhaps one reason why this conflict was forgotten so much more quickly than some of the others in Indonesia was that its economic development impacts (at least for non-Madurese) were minimal compared with the normally large deleterious effects of massive violence.

Before finishing, some qualification of this picture of non-truth, non-reconciliation and non-remediation of Dayak structural injustice is needed. In West and Central Kalimantan, there were pockets of peace achieved through reconciliation—often through Dayak peace rituals and sometimes through Dayak peacemaking that respectfully incorporated Madurese culture through dance, music or just plain listening. If violence does recur in future decades in a Kalimantan that has never properly healed, the hope is that these places where deeper respect has been re-established through truthful, respectful dialogue will be the islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) from which a new peace following that new war might spread.
A final hypothesis that had become clear by the time these two cases were written was that there was a recurrent age structure of war-making and peacemaking so far in our cases. This is that very young toughs often trigger conflicts by fighting over turf, over girls or simply over being disrespected. These local brawls sometimes become local riots, but are utterly unlikely to escalate to armed conflict that kills hundreds without cooptation by older political schemers who harness or contrive violence to their projects of seizing political or economic opportunities. These older men (there is a gender hypothesis here too) then harness organisations of varied types to recruit much larger numbers of young men and boys to do the fighting. When the time for peacemaking comes, the age dynamic is reversed. Younger men in command of fighters who have had enough of killing pass the baton to peacemaking elders who are usually very different, less ambitious people than those who enrolled the fighters. In Kalimantan, these older men happened to be local elders, adat leaders and religious leaders from the same communities where Madurese and Dayaks had lived together. In addition, there were Dayak adat leaders who deployed Dayak peacemaking traditions to prevent conflict in their communities from escalating to ethnic cleansing and who then consolidated their communities as islands of civility (Kaldor 1999) from which peace could spread when the time for a wider peace arrived. In other conflicts, such as Bougainville, there is also a gender dynamic to this succession: women as the new peacemakers who supplant some of the male war-makers as leaders of political change. We have not seen evidence of this gender succession in West and Central Kalimantan, though it is quite possible that more thorough research at the relevant local sites might uncover it.

In Maluku, North Maluku and Central Sulawesi, there was also a succession from young men leading urban rioting in the early phases of conflict to older men (and significant numbers of women) fighting to defend and attack villages when their villages saw themselves as in a kill-or-be-killed security dilemma. Again, we have seen little evidence of a security dilemma dynamic as an explanation of fighting in Kalimantan. Once the sudden wave of Dayak violence descended on Madurese communities, the imbalance of power was so great that there was no question of Madurese warriors planning counterattacks before further attacks occurred. They all simply fled.
### Appendix 5.1

**Table A5.1 Numbers and types of people interviewed, West and Central Kalimantan cases**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Elected official, legislator/MPR/bupati</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political leader of oppositional group</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combatant</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adat/indigenous/village leader</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious leader</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s NGO</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Environmental NGO</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Development NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights/peacebuilding NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other NGO</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Journalist</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Business leader</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student/youth leader</td>
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<tr>
<td>Foreign government (ambassador, foreign minister of another country, USAID, etc.)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>International organisations</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Researcher/university academic</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Victim/refugeen</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>Total interviews</td>
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<tr>
<td>Total people interviewed</td>
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