New attention to the old problem of corruption has several characteristics. First it is international. Previously corruption was mainly the concern of domestic agencies, like the police or auditors. Now it appears on the agenda of international organisations, like the World Bank or the OECD. The internationalisation of controlling corruption has been led by a non-government organisation, Transparency International (TI), which has campaigned to outlaw the bribery of foreign officials. Transparency International devised a controversial 'Corruption Perceptions Index', which ranked countries according to how corrupt they were perceived to be. It followed this up with a Bribe Payers Index, which ranked countries according to their propensity to offer bribes (Transparency International 2000:13–14).

Second, it is economic. Previously, corruption was largely the concern of lawyers and criminologists. Now the lead is being taken by economists. They look at the costs of corruption, and its effect on economic development (Rose-Ackerman 1999). They also apply the methods of economic analysis to the problem of corruption—the assumption that people are rational and calculating, and will respond to incentives and disincentives. This approach is well summarised in Robert Klitgaard's (1988) formula

\[
\text{Monopoly} + \text{Discretion} - \text{Accountability} = \text{Corruption}
\]

Third, the new interest in corruption is less patient with cultural explanations. Previously corruption in developing countries might be explained by traditions of gift giving, or the obligations of kinship. Now many people in these countries are less tolerant of such excuses. A draft bill to establish an anti-corruption commission in Papua New Guinea, for example prescribes bluntly ‘custom [is] not to be a defence’ (Papua New Guinea 1998, s.40). A
brisk distinction between gifts and bribes has been given by the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, who said that

...the gift is usually a token. It is not demanded. The value is usually in the spirit rather than the material worth. It is usually done in the open, and never in secret. Where it is excessive, it becomes an embarrassment and it is returned. If anything corruption has perverted and destroyed this aspect of our culture (quoted in Pope 1997:5)

Fourth, it is suspicious of state action. Previously, a corruption scandal might lead to a government sponsored crackdown or inquiry. An 'independent' commission might be established, but it would report directly to the Prime Minister or the President. Now there is more suspicion that those at the top may also be involved. The Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in New South Wales, for example, reports to a bipartisan committee of the legislature, rather than to the government which established it. It went on to investigate the State Premier, leading to his resignation (though the Supreme Court later found the ICAC Act did not apply to the Premier in the circumstances).

Suspicion of state action has led to greater emphasis on the role of civil society, and the private sector in preventing corruption. Transparency International has supplemented its international action against business corruption by franchising national chapters, constituted like other domestic non-government organisations, each campaigning in a different way—monitoring the privatisation program in Panama, for example, or establishing advice centres in Bangladesh. Transparency International has also attracted financial support from (among others) large international companies who are tired of paying bribes. Where the private sector used to be regarded as one of the causes of corruption, it now casts itself as a victim.

Fifth, it is as much concerned with education and prevention as with investigation and prosecution. Corruption is difficult to investigate. It typically takes place in secret, without witnesses, between willing partners. Prosecutions are hard to bring, and there is sometimes suspicion that governments are selectively targeting their political enemies. Like other crime, more corruption probably takes place than is ever investigated or prosecuted. Additional resources might therefore be better spent ‘upstream’, in reforming administrative systems to reduce opportunities for corruption, and in educating citizens against accepting it. Transparency International’s mandate specifically precludes it from taking up individual cases.

These five characteristics of the new interest in corruption are linked to broader tendencies. The rapid rise of Transparency International is part of a process of globalisation. The involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the private sector is characteristic of modern forms of governance,
in which order is seen as the result of the interaction between hierarchies, markets and communities. The economic analysis of corruption is part of a wider intellectual movement to apply the assumptions of rational choice to social and political institutions. There are links between the characteristics, but also tensions between them. Neoliberal economists and NGO activists, for example, may share a suspicion of state action, but differ over the value of moralistic appeals. Disciplined secretive organisations like the police force may be uncomfortable with the new emphasis on management reform and civil society.

This book reflects these new approaches to corruption, but it is also critical of them. It deals with the international dimensions of corruption, as a human rights issue (Pearson), in the recovery of assets that corrupt leaders have hidden abroad (Chaikin), and in the links between corruption and transnational crime (McFarlane). It includes an original piece of economic analysis (Menezes). It is designed to be read by people without formal training in economics, and provides a guide to further reading. Other chapters draw on different intellectual and professional traditions, particularly criminology (Grabosky). Angela Gorta's research for the ICAC draws on broader social science methodology. Hindess' initial chapter is critical of the narrowness of current economic approaches to understanding corruption, while Warburton's final chapter on corrupt networks draws on politics, sociology and social psychology.

The title of the book comes from a four-week short course, designed and taught jointly by academics at the Australian National University and public servants at the New South Wales Independent Commission Against Corruption. Its creation was stimulated by Transparency International, on behalf of Indonesian NGOs looking for anti-corruption training before the fall of Soeharto. It has been taught annually since 1998 as part of a Masters in Development Administration degree, taken by students from audit offices, public service commissions, anti-corruption commissions and NGOs from a range of countries in East Asia, Africa and the South Pacific.1 Versions have been taught in shorter training courses in Jakarta, Phnom Penh, and Manila. These workshops were sponsored by the Centre for Democratic Institutions at the Australian National University, which also commissioned Zoe Pearson's chapter on corruption and human rights.

Most of the authors have taught in the course, and the chapters are based on lectures and workshops they designed for it. Peter Grabosky's involvement led to the publication of this volume jointly with the Australian Institute of Criminology. The three case studies—of Calcutta, the Philippines and Thailand—were originally presented at a seminar organised by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and moderated by one of the editors. We are grateful for the permission of the ADB and the authors for their inclusion.
Definitions, explanations and remedies

There are several kinds of definitions of corruption. Some turn on the idea of the ‘public interest’, and deviations from it. Others turn on popular understandings, noticing cultural and other differences in what people regard as corrupt. Corruption is often, but not always, against the law in many countries, even if the law is hard to enforce. Different explanations for corruption suggest different remedies, just as different diagnoses of a disease suggest different cures. Klitgaard’s formula, quoted above, for example, suggests the break up of government monopolies, reduced official discretion, and more accountability.

Some of these explanations are quite traditional, but the cures they suggest remain plausible. Barry Hindess’ chapter goes back to the classical foundations of Western political theory. Corruption has also been a concern of non-Western theory. Syed Alatas’ pioneering sociology of corruption described the philosophy of Wang An Shih (AD 1021–1086) who argued that corruption was caused by a combination of bad systems and bad men. Ibn Khaldun (AD 1332–1406) argued that it was caused by luxurious living within the élite (Alatas 1990). The recent scandals surrounding the Olympic games show how reliance on the virtue of ‘good people’, such as former athletes, is insufficient unless good systems are also in place. ‘Luxurious living’ suggests close attention to the office car park, bank accounts, and the lifestyles of leaders and their families.

Transparency International influentially defines corruption in terms of the use of public office for private gain (Pope 1997:1). The distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ matters is often associated with the rise of the modern bureaucratic state. Corruption is seen as the result of the failure to distinguish private matters from public ones—appointing relatives, rather than on merit; or diverting public money to private purposes. Municipal reformers in the United States also saw corruption arising from politicisation of properly bureaucratic activities. The remedy was professional administration, at arms length from politicians, even-handedly applying legislation. Typical public administration remedies include independent commissions.

As Hindess’ chapter shows, corruption has long been seen as abuse of power. Revelations about corruption are often associated with a change of government, or the transition from authoritarian to democratic rule (which, of course, has its own kinds of corruption). Governments and oppositions regularly accuse each other of corruption, and promise cleaner government. If corruption is diagnosed as the result of abuse of power, then the remedies include democratisation, parliamentary oversight of the executive, and campaign finance legislation.

Corruption is often, but not always a crime. Angela Gorta, research manager at the Independent Commission Against Corruption in New South Wales,
and author of the chapter on research, decided to look for explanations in criminology (Gorta 1998). She found that

- crime depends on situation, not the fixed personality of the offender. There is no 'corrupt personality', and anyone, even those at the top of an organisation, may be tempted.
- people choose to commit crimes. They make calculations, including about their chances of being caught.
- there are different types of crime. Remedies for one kind may have no impact on others.
- offenders try to justify, rationalise and neutralise what they do. People will say, for example, 'everybody does it' or 'I did it for my family'.
- organisational factors affect whether crime takes place. These include the informal culture of an organisation, as well as formal rules and regulations.

These theories of crime in turn suggest their own remedies for corruption, which are described in Gorta's chapter.

**Corruption control in practice**

Different schools of thought have been reflected in the development of thinking about corruption prevention, which is reflected in the curriculum of the ANU/ICAC course on Corruption and Anti-Corruption. We will call these 'interventionism', 'managerialism' and 'organisational integrity', the last of which is described in more detail in the chapter by Catherine Boardman and Vicki Klum.

**Interventionism**

Most western methods of policing wait for a crime to be committed and then intervene in the conduct of the offender. 'Catching crooks' is how most law enforcement agencies still see themselves. This approach prevails in the so-called law and order auctions when political parties compete to show they are 'tough on crime' at election times. It is easy to measure in the statistics of conviction and crime clear-up rates.

It is assumed that society is protected by preventing the offender from continuing or repeating the offence. Intervention kicks off processes such as compensation, retribution, rehabilitation or quarantine. There is an assumed measure of deterrence for the offender as recidivist, and also for others contemplating similar conduct.

There are, however, many weaknesses in this approach, particularly when applied in isolation. First, harm done cannot be undone. Second, most crime
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goest unreported. Its particular conspiratorial characteristics mean an even smaller percentage of crimes of corruption are likely to come to notice. The ‘happy giver–happy receiver’ situation and the absence of a victim at the scene of the crime mean most corruption is invisible. Effective intervention is therefore the exception rather than the rule.

Third, its demands on resources are unlimited. As with taxation, full compliance might only be possible if every person is engaged in the supervision of everyone else. The abject failure of interventionism to deal with the trafficking of narcotics is a widely recognised example of the limits of resources. If the resources will never be available to match the scale of the problem, there must be selectivity in applying what resources are to hand. Thus we confront the issues of biased target selection, and uncertainty of detection.

Fourth, the interventionist may not notice the offence, or not treat it seriously. If attending to street violence is an electoral priority, then white-collar, environmental or industrial crimes may go unchallenged, despite their potential for causing a greater harm to society. For example, the law enforcement sector has been slow to realise the damage done by e-crime. Selective enforcement may also apply along socioeconomic, racial, ethnic, gender, age or political lines, sometimes unwittingly but also deliberately and corruptly. Individuals affected can include a government’s political opponents.

Fifth, if most crime and even more corruption goes undetected, unreported and hence unrestored, what measure of deterrence can exist? Interventionism assumes that a potential offender exercises rational judgment about behaviour and consequences. She supposedly compares the gain to be had from an illegal or corrupt act with the probability of detection and the severity of punishment, if detected, and then acts on the result of that notional equation. The slim possibility of detection means that corruption is almost risk free. Hence confidence in the deterrent effect of intervention might be misplaced.

Rational choice is often assumed as an explanation. However, many crimes, like murder, are not well understood as rational choices. Similarly, the association between corruption and gambling has led to a contrary view about rationality. The conventional construction is that a gambler might turn to corruption in order to service debts. However, it may be that the propensity to engage in risk-taking behaviour is what attracts certain types of people to gambling. It may also attract them to corruption. If engaging in corruption is merely another form of risk-taking, or a gamble on the consequences versus the rewards, then it is likely that gambling and corruption are behavioural neighbours rather than a causal couple.

Deterrence has an intuitive appeal to those who are close to the processes of law enforcement. They see the unhappy results of detection, prosecution and imprisonment. They would not want themselves to be caught up in the
harshness of the system. However, experience and criminological research suggests deterrence is a more elusive phenomenon in the minds of offenders. To rely on this as a sole means of controlling crime or corruption is problematic.

Managerialism

The managerialist model of corruption control assumes that those who seek to misbehave can be discouraged or prevented from doing so by the erection of appropriate systems, procedures and protocols. It also assumes that preventing the harm from occurring in the first place is more desirable than chasing the consequences of the harm after the fact. Prevention is often said to be better than cure.

Managerialism sees the world as made up of opportunities and exploiters of opportunity. Reduce or eliminate opportunity and misconduct will be reduced or disappear. For example, cash boxes are locked away, every purchase order is double-checked, audit trails are kept and reviewed, and so on. A key advantage of the approach over interventionism is that it can realistically hope to capture a larger proportion of misconduct. It can defeat outright some attempted abuses. It may enhance deterrence by presenting a greater chance of detection.

The limitation of this approach is its failure to recognise and deal with the interactivity of systems and human nature. It sees humans operating a machine which will only permit correct operation but not permit incorrect operation, rather like an electrical socket which can only work one way. However, people are an integral part of any system and organisations are much more complex than electrical sockets.

For example, requiring all cars to be fitted with seat belts is a typical 'managerialist' solution to the problem of road accidents. A reckless driver wearing a seatbelt should be prevented by the system from being injured in the inevitable accident. Ensuring that people use seat belts is another story. Managerialist solutions also tend to deal with idealised or standardised workplace situations. To call again on the car safety analogy, the seat belt solution is inappropriate for a heavily pregnant woman or for an infant but the system, because it is designed for the widest possible application, fails to be effective when it most needs to be—for those users who are most vulnerable. Similarly, a crime or corruption control system needs to be most effective in opposing the most serious instances of abuse. A system which only catches the insignificant abuse but which fails to deal with infrequent but critically damaging incidents is not serving the organisation.

The failings of managerial approaches turn our attention to the character of the people operating the systems. Most people who work in organisations can be seen to fit into three broad categories. In Category 1 there are those
who want to do the right thing and need varying degrees of guidance about what the right thing is to do. Category 2 people are those who are too timid to take the risk of operating outside the rules. Paradoxically, they limit any deviance to technical, sometimes clever compliance with rules. Finally, in Category 3, there are those who simply are crooks and will operate outside the rules entirely.

Let us look at a commonly used system which is assumed (often incorrectly) to prevent bribery by limiting the amount of money an official can receive in the form of a gift. People in Category 1 already know not to accept gifts, and a corrupt official in Category 3 is not going to declare the receipt of a ‘gift’ whatever its value. So having a system of controlling gifts merely creates a means by which Category 2 officials can legitimise corrupt rewards. How? If the rule says one can accept a gift up to $50, in order to receive a $100 bribe, you just register them as two separate gifts of $50. If the rule is consequently amended to stipulate that only up to $50 can be accepted on the same day from the one person, the corrupt official merely has to wait two days or take the bribe in two lots from two different people acting in concert. Or over three days from three people, and so on.

If the prohibition is then applied to cash gifts in any amount, the giver simply spends the cash on a good or service before delivering it to the official. And so on. The point is that whatever regime of rules is established, it can be subverted. By engaging in a futile battle of rule-setting, response and then rule-hardening, the runaway growth in the number and complexity of rules can eventually lead to the stifling of all legitimate business activity.

A burgeoning base of rules, characteristic of excessively managerialist systems, seems to lead to several effects. The first is to breed a culture of 'approval through omission'. Where impermissible conduct is carefully and comprehensively described, people tend to adopt a 'what’s not proscribed is permissible' attitude.

The second effect is that where clearly impermissible conduct can be made to fit the rules, it can 'launder' the misconduct. For example, if a travelling allowance rule requires a journey of no less than 50kms to trigger entitlement, the system merely encourages people to work harder for their misconduct, if they are so minded, perhaps by driving 50kms around in circles.

Managerialist corruption control approaches also tend to ignore market forces. Say for argument’s sake a group of public officials is corruptly selling confidential information. Each piece of information leaked earns the corrupt official 100 illicit dollars. If managerialist corruption prevention controls are applied with alacrity, the leaking of such information becomes more difficult and more risky. Some of the corrupt officials, unwilling to take the risk, drop out of the market. However, basic economic theory contends that if the supply of a commodity falls but demand remains unchanged, the price per item goes
up. The control measure has not dampened the corruption but merely created a more vigorous market because the remaining suppliers who are willing to take the risk can now command a higher price.

Other similar effects can be seen in wider crime prevention practice. Banks which 'target harden' against armed robbery by the use of bullet proof screens, armed guards, dye bombs, etc do not reduce crime, but merely displace it into other areas. Petrol stations, post offices and convenience stores have become the new targets of armed robberies until target hardening in those locations acts again to shift the crime elsewhere. Similarly, sophisticated anti-theft measures in motor cars create sophisticated car thieves. It enables them to steal a commodity for which there is high demand but limited supply because of effective anti-theft measures. They can command an even higher price for their crime because they no longer have to compete with the unsophisticated thieves.

The same economic theory also contends that an increase in price will cause more suppliers to enter a market which will again achieve an equilibrium, but at higher price levels and with fewer suppliers. So, at best, the managerialist prevention measure distorts a market which simply responds in a recognisable way. At worst, the risk takers become more sophisticated in their methodology to avoid detection and the consequences. Paradoxically, the prevention measure can have the effect of professionalising or increasing the sophistication of the corruption hence making it more difficult to detect and control. By ignoring the interactivity of systems, the managerialist approach tends to change the nature and location of corruption rather than prevent it.

Excessive reliance on systems can also engender complacency. Those who are convinced that a system is foolproof tend to look away, falsely believing they have successfully prevented corruption. A rule based, managerialist approach to controlling corruption may also generate responses in which strict compliance becomes an end in itself, displacing the outcome intended by the rules. A good example can be found in the way most conflicts of interest are handled. Many organisations require the disclosure of actual or potential conflicts of interest as a rule. The outcome intended is that officials sense the organisation's interests, not their own personal interests. Because many conflict of interest rules focus on declaration, there is a common attitude that the declaration itself purges the conflict. Having declared the conflict, the official then goes on to serve their private interest and defends any subsequent accusations of corruption by pointing to the declaration. Even worse, is that many people accept the defence because there was compliance with the rules.

Another example is in procurement. Procurement rules often require the seeking of multiple quotations directly or by public tender in order to ensure best value for money is obtained and to lessen the chance of a corrupt
arrangement emerging between an official and a particular provider of goods or services. When auditing records against procurement rules, often a check is made to see if, say, three quotes have been obtained where it is necessary to do so. There are many cases where such audits have missed corruption because the three quotes have been present on the files but, unknown to the auditor, two of them were forged. Here the rules and their application, extending even into the audit methodology, have helped to hide corruption. How? The three quote rule when abused through prima facie compliance means that a corruptly favoured contractor enjoys the cover of having been the ‘best’ bidder each time bids were called. Cosy relationships, without the obfuscating documentation required by managerialist methods, might be questioned sooner.

Many organisations deal with corruption risks by relying on some interventionist activities coupled with some measure of managerialist controls. Responsibility for implementation tends to lie with a specialised subsection of the corporate affairs portfolio, or be an additional responsibility of the internal audit function. Thus corruption control is marginalised. That is not to say that interventionist and managerialist measures have no place. The choice of measures and their strategic applications, however, form part of the organisational integrity approach outlined briefly below, and explained in greater detail in the chapter by Catherine Boardman and Vicki Klum.

**Beyond managerialism—organisational integrity**

Organisational integrity is a term used to label an approach to minimising corruption. It refers to the integration of an organisation’s operational systems, corruption control strategies and ethical standards. In other words, it is about establishing a social norm in an organisation which accurately defines and resists corruption. That norm, in the case of a public agency, must be one which serves the public interest. The use of the word ‘integrity’ is similar to its use when describing a building or a bridge as having structural integrity, which is to say a robust stability founded in an informed use of physical laws.

One of the conceptual underpinnings for the approach can be found in John Braithwaite’s theory of reintegrative shaming (1989). Braithwaite contends that the incidence of deviance is largely governed by the dynamics of shame in the community. Hence, if criminal behaviour is nourished by not subjecting it to shame, it tends to be encouraged as a group norm. A similar relationship is thought to exist between crime in the community and corruption in an organisation.

A key assumption in the organisational integrity approach is that deviance stems largely from the nature of the organisation rather than the nature of the individual.
The ability to behave ethically in the workplace may be related more to aspects of the organisation than to attributes of the individual (Zipparo 1998:10).

It is the inverse of the ‘rotten apple theory’, which blames corruption on the attributes of individuals. If Zipparo is correct, then measures which target the individual are less likely to be effective than those which address the organisational context in which individuals operate. Corruption must be seen in the context of a social organism. The organisational integrity approach seeks to achieve high corruption resistance in the way an organisation functions according to a clearly defined schema of ethical values.

Business and government have been learning that failure to manage an organisation along ethical lines can have a negative impact on the organisation’s objectives. For example, if treating employees with care and dignity leads to greater levels of customer service, this in turn can lead to a more profitable business that enhances shareholder value. For a public company, the root ethic might be one of service to shareholders. For a public sector organisation, the root ethic must be one of serving the public interest. A group of second order ethical values can then be identified such as customer service, sustainable development, workplace safety and so on, but they must permeate universally the organisation’s practices before an observable culture of ethical management, based on that particular ethical schema, can emerge. For an organisation to operate without corruption, careful selection and promotion of appropriate ethical values must be made.

In the public sector, serving the public interest should be the defining ethic, which can be expressed in terms of public duty values. A government agency which operates on the Organisational Integrity model will have public duty values built in at every level, no matter where and how deeply one drills down. For example, for procurement to serve the public interest it must be conducted free of the personal interest of those administering the process. Procurement policies and procedures must, among other things provide the framework and guidance for officials to do their work in such a way that they cannot exploit the process for personal gain. The key is to deal with the corruption risks integrally with the procurement process.

In contrast, the interventionist and managerialist approaches see the corruption problem as somehow separate and to be dealt with outside the procurement process. The difference is between having a fraud control policy and ensuring fraud control measures are built in to all policies, procedures and plans. Fraud and corruption control is not something to bolt on to a procurement system, it needs to be part of the procurement system. Organisations which make that leap in thinking across all areas of business appear to have the best chance of minimising corruption.
The choice of anti-corruption approaches seems to depend partly on the
size of an organisation, and can be thought of (following Klitgaard 1988) in
principal–agent terms. In a very small organisation, say a sole proprietor with
one or two employees all located together, it is possible and cost effective for
the owner to ensure her interests are being served by adopting an interventionist
approach. She can conceivably monitor most or all of her employees’ behaviour
and when an instance of wrongdoing occurs, she can take any necessary action
to minimise loss.

Where the organisation is larger and perhaps distributed over more than
one location, it is not possible for the owner or owners to maintain total
surveillance and control over all employees’ behaviour. However, a managerialist
approach can be adopted to minimise the range of behaviour which requires
surveillance and possible intervention.

A cost–benefit analysis must be applied in the sense that much in the way
of resources could be spent dealing with threats which in a medium-sized
organisation might never occur. Falling back on interventionist methods in
the event of a threat becoming a reality is probably a better use of resources.
Hence, a suitable combination of these two anti-corruption methods is likely
to serve best an organisation of medium size and complexity.

For example, the organisation may be small enough to reserve all purchasing
decisions for the owners rather than vesting them with employees. This
managerialist control might prevent gross oversupply frauds, but is less likely
to be able to stop an employee corruptly leaking valuable information to a
tenderer. An interventionist approach is the only practical and cost effective
alternative.

In a very large and highly distributed organisation a managerialist solution
will not be able to deal with all situations requiring control. A key advantage
in the organisational integrity approach is that without a clear procedure for
completing a task correctly, the right decision can be made by the application
of a previously established global ethical framework. The interventionist model
caters only for what has happened. The managerialist model caters for what
might happen but is limited by the imagination and prescience of the system's
designers. The inherently heuristic nature of organisational integrity, however,
means the right decision can be inferred even if the problem was never
anticipated or previously encountered.

The serving of ethical values needs to merge invisibly into every business
system from Human Resources to waste management. Organisations which
exhibit high levels of corruption resistance tend not to be obsessed with the
rhetoric of fraud and controlling corruption and tend not to approach the
problem by establishing discrete functional work groups (like anti-fraud
sections). Instead, the corruption resistance emerges from the fact that dealing
with corruption problems is a seamless part of the core business of the organisation. It is but one component, along with others like strong customer service values which in turn underpin higher order outcomes and, ultimately, stakeholder interests, public or private. Whichever business process one examines, at any level of complexity, public duty values must be factored in, both explicitly and implicitly, to ensure high corruption resistance in the public sector. Organisational integrity means being able to drill down into any part of an organisation, to any depth, and see evidence of the guiding ethics, whatever they might be.

A useful comparison is with fractal objects, which have an inherent property of self-similarity. Computer generated fractal art became popular in the 1990s because, no matter how closely one zooms in on a fractal image, the shape of the overall object is reflected in any component part. In a public sector agency, when the guiding ethical values of public duty can be observed to be operating at any level of inspection, the term organisational integrity can be applied. That it can better resist corruption is almost axiomatic. Of course, public sector organisations are invariably very complex social organisms. Unpacking and describing the precise factors which contribute to high corruption resistance is a difficult task and one which varies from organisation to organisation. The strength of a building can be described by reference to engineering principles based on the laws of physics. In the world of organisational strengthening, cause and effect are harder to define.

Note

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