

## Chapter 4: Patterns of controlling Institutions: from campus to state

Indeed, the victory of Islam is due to the success of the *ummah*. The success of the *ummah* rests on its youth of good character and morality - Anonymous Muslim scholar.<sup>1</sup>

The important status of university students in Indonesian society has encouraged political and religious groups to establish their influence upon them. For students, being involved in political activities has provided them with political careers in return. Realising this, the focus of Jemaah Tarbiyah, since the beginning, has been to attract students in prestigious secular campuses since they offer the greatest opportunities in terms of vertical and horizontal mobilization.<sup>2</sup> For activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah, students are their greatest assets in the duty of the Islamisation of Indonesia and for the victory of Islam.

Most activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were elected members of the Indonesian national parliament representing the Prosperous Justice Party in the 2004 general elections hail from secular campuses. During their study life, members of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the 1990s were able to control student governments and other intra campus organisations. Their role reached its peak of significance when they succeeded in mobilising huge demonstrations involving thousands of students from various campuses to topple Soeharto in 1998. How has Jemaah Tarbiyah been able to control the campuses and use campus predication to serve its interests? Does success on campus also bring the same victory for Jemaah Tarbiyah in controlling and influencing the Indonesian state?

This chapter attempts to analyse the significance of the secular universities as strongholds of Jemaah Tarbiyah in providing political cadres for its party, PKS. The presence of the campus Islam activists who have dominated the membership and leadership of PKS have had a significant influence over PKS politics. They have contributed to making its political policies pragmatic. Their experience during their involvement in student senates and other intra-campus organisations since the 1990s, in particular their interaction with different cohort groups can account for this realistic approach.

### A. The Decline of Student Organisations

The 1960s was an era of high student mobilisation. The key body was the Indonesian Student Action Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia (KAMI), established on 25 October 1965, supported by student organizations and endorsed by the Minister of Higher Education and Science, Dr. Syarif Thayeb. KAMI succeeded in uniting student elements in the struggle against the Communist

party and its sympathisers.<sup>3</sup> The good rapprochement between the military and campus organs, such as the Minister of Higher Education and Science, rectors, lectures and students, resulted in the cooptation of student activists. Inevitably, the student activists of the 1960s lost their significance as agents of change. Their spirit of struggle declined after they succeeded in overthrowing the regime of first President Sukarno. During the period of consolidation of Soeharto's New Order which followed, some students chose to return to campus whilst others continued their political careers and joined the government.<sup>4</sup> The student movement of 1966 became a core component of the New Order regime and figures of historical memory commemorated by associations of the "generation of 1966".<sup>5</sup>

The extra-campus organizations which had previously supported KAMI showed their ineffectiveness after they regrouped under the supervision of the New Order regime.<sup>6</sup> In July 1970, through an initiative of the government, most extra-campus organizations such as HMI, GPI, PMII, GMKI, Pemuda Anshor and other organisations under the auspices of the ruling party, Golkar (Golongan Karya) led by Abdul Ghafur formed a committee for the preparation of an umbrella youth organisation. In 23 July 1973 the Committee of Indonesian National Youth, Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia (KNPI) was set up to organise all extra-campus organizations with government assistance.<sup>7</sup>

However, student activists of intra campus organizations began to evaluate their role in voicing the interests of the people in general. The Student Council, Dewan Mahasiswa (Dema) began to re-activate their function of criticising the government's policies. Since the mid-1970s, Dema succeeded in replacing the role of extra-campus organizations and received firm recognition among students,<sup>8</sup> which allowed Dema to become an arena for Muslim and Leftist activists to gain influence over students.

The most influential Dema at the level of national politics were those of the Indonesia University (UI) and the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). In its meeting on 1-5 November 1973, Dema UI stressed its commitment to give voice to the people's aspirations. This led Dema UI to play an active role in criticising the government.<sup>9</sup> The case of Malari in 1974, abbreviated from *Malapetaka Lima Belas January* or the Tragedy of January Fifteenth, signalled the increasingly critical attitudes of students towards the government. The Malari incident was a reflection of the students' frustration with the regime's economic policies which had allowed extensive foreign involvement in Indonesia's economic affairs, causing an unprecedented riot that resulted in the destruction of over a thousand of Japanese vehicles and foreign-owned buildings. Immediately after the incident, the government issued a decree (SK No. 28/U/1974) through the Ministry of Education and Culture to block the influence of the Student Councils. It required all students to attain formal approval from university rectors in order to hold

gatherings on campus and to coordinate all activities outside campus through KNPI.<sup>10</sup>

Another important issue for student activists in the 1970s was the statement by a national student consortium of Student Councils in Bandung made in October 1977, which demanded the application of Indonesia's Constitution and Pancasila in a pure and consistent manner (*murni dan konsekuen*) and called for the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) to hold a Special Session (*Sidang Istimewa*) to ask President Soeharto to account for the abuse of Pancasila.<sup>11</sup> Student willingness to criticise and mobilise against Soeharto gathered momentum. In Bandung, the Bandung Institute of Technology's Student Council issued what they called as "the White Book of the 1978 Student Struggle" accusing Soeharto of abusing his power and deviating from the Constitution and Pancasila.

As widespread unrest developed among student activists, the government issued a decree, the Normalization of Campus Life, *Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus* (NKK) in April 1978 to limit students' rights of expression, assembly and association which led to another policy of the Coordinating Body for Student Affairs, *Badan Koordinasi Kampus* (BKK). The Minister of Education, Daoed Joesoef, issued a statement directing students to be involved only in activities related to student welfare (i.e. educational facilities and material and spiritual well-being), student interests (arts, sports, journalism, outdoor recreation and campus community pursuits) and student thought and reasoning (study clubs and seminars).<sup>12</sup> The policy of NKK/BKK was effective in ending student involvement in political issues. Subsequently, in 1984 the government issued the policy of "Sole Principle" (*Asas Tunggal*) that was perceived mainly by Muslim activists as aimed at breaking the ties of the Islamic extra-campus organizations and the Islamic parties with students on campuses.<sup>13</sup> Under these conditions the activities of both extra- and intra -student organisations indeed declined.<sup>14</sup>

Muslim student activists also indicated their reluctance to join Islamic parties after the government forced the only Islamic party, the Development Unity Party, Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP) to use Pancasila as its political basis in 1984. In general, the attitude of Muslim students in responding to the policies of the New Order varied. Nurmahmudi Ismail, a former activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah at the Bogor Institute of Agriculture, Institut Pertanian Bogor (IPB) and ex-president of the Justice Party, described two orientations in students' responses to the government co-optation in the mid 1980s. A first group still believed that there was a need to struggle for the sake of Islam through the political party system, even though the party was under the control of the government at the time. A second group felt deeply disillusioned with the party and could not see any good intentions whatsoever in the Muslim activists who joined the PPP. According to this second group, they were no different from

government puppets. The Jemaah Tarbiyah activists, as represented by Nurh Mahmudi Ismail, were counted among those who were doubtful the role of PPP. From 1987 they began to express their disenchantment by not voting in the general elections.<sup>15</sup> Ismail further stated

I was one of those who were disenchanting with the PPP. I decided not to vote during the general elections, and most of us chose this way.<sup>16</sup>

Throughout the Soeharto era, the regime gradually reduced the influence and political role of student organizations and pushed them to focus on academic activities. Soeharto attempted to control student activism and broke its ties with its political patrons. Instead, the regime gave an opportunity to the ruling party, Golkar, to establish its political influence in the campuses. Thus it was that during the reign of Soeharto that many students resolved to devote their time to studying and to turn away from political activities.

Nonetheless, political reasons aside, ideological and religious factors became important for students for action in student organizations. The decline of extra-campus organisations after the implementation of NKK/BKK in 1978 caused a rise in religious student activities. The emergence of the Islamic study groups was also coincidental with the emergence of Christian and Leftist student movements in campuses. The Christian organisation at UI, Persekutuan Oikumene Universitas Indonesia (POSA UI), established in 1981, was able to organise its congregations at the faculty and university level. The Leftist-oriented students also developed similar study clubs. They were in competition for the control of student governing bodies and other strategic intra-student organizations within campuses. They were often involved in clashes, collaboration and even in agreements for sharing power within student activities. This resembled Realpolitik in the broadest sense, because they had to resort to all kinds of practical politics for their own interests.<sup>17</sup> In fact, their combination of religious activities and political experiments on campus would come to be considered important preparation in developing their political careers in the future.

## **B. The Rise of Campus Predication**

In order to gain insight into Indonesian student activism with a developing interest in Islam, it is helpful to consider Azyumardi Azra's categorisation of three orientations.<sup>18</sup> The first of these are students of high religious and spiritual inquiry. They consider the Islamic circles on campus, the *halaqah* as suitable to their spiritual needs. They attend regular meetings organised by senior students and are able to develop close contacts with one another and consider themselves and their fellow Muslims as one family. There is a practice of sharing material goods and a sense of security in these newly Islamic environments. Spirituality, piety, the regular observance of Islamic duties, solidarity and togetherness are the features that draw students to join these circles.<sup>19</sup> New students coming

from remote areas or villages who have no family in the city feel that these kinds of activities help them to find friends. Since their involvement within the group is highly motivated by religious needs and security, friendships become easier to build.<sup>20</sup>

Their interactions with the group are not confined to attending to their own religious needs; they are soon also challenged to spread the ideas they have gained to their fellow Muslims on campus. They do not limit their activities to the mosque but often meet in the small prayer rooms located in the faculties and departments within the universities. They ask their friends to observe the daily prayers while on campus and invite them to join their religious circles. Topics for discussion are not only religious but are often related to students' academic needs. For instance, they feel encouraged when facing assignments and examinations since these are also considered to be tasks that will be rewarded by God.

A second group of students are those of Muslim upbringing who are more inclined towards Leftist associations. They are not necessarily from families with a Communist background; rather the majority have been raised in devout Muslim families. Like the first group, who tend to be affiliated with religious activities of a different orientation from their parents, this group has begun to distance itself from formal religious activities. It is more interested in activities such as the People's Democratic Party, Partai Rakyat Demokrat established in 1994. Both first and second type of students signify the emergence of a new trend in which the children of faithful Indonesian Muslims no longer follow their parents in their approach to religion.<sup>21</sup>

The last group of students are those who are similar to the first category but prefer to gain organisational and political experience, rather than spiritual accomplishments. They join the Islamic organizations that have established branches in their campuses, such as HMI, PMII, and PII because they also provide political opportunities for the future. Through connections with their mentors, they often find jobs more easily. This type of student wants to develop both an understanding of Islam and organisational skills. However, we might state generally that most Islamic campus organizations focus their activities on organisational and political advancements; they are unable to fulfil students' interests in spiritual dimensions.

Students who have not been satisfied with the extra-campus organisations have sought alternatives to fulfil their spiritual needs and finally join the first group. Since the existing Islamic organisations on campus have been unable to respond to all the spiritual needs of some students, the *halaqah* groups have been able to gain an advantage.

The *halaqah* groups, later on known as *Kelompok Tarbiyah* (*Tarbiyah* Group) or *Jemaah Tarbiyah*, have advanced a more organised *dakwah* to attract students. Through their campus predication, the most successful Islamisation processes on secular campuses have taken place since the 1990s. The prestigious state universities of Java, such as the Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB), University of Indonesia (UI), Gadjah Mada University (UGM), Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB), Airlangga University (Unair) and the Sepuluh November Institute of Technology (ITS) have become strongholds of *Jemaah Tarbiyah*.

Those who have sought remedies against profane activities have found that the idea of a total Islam as an all-encompassing way of life meets their spiritual demands. In so far as their campus activities and lives had alienated them from religious practice, they felt themselves distanced from the benefits of religious guidance. They have compensated for this by involving themselves in Islamic predication. Through predication activities they have developed a sense of brotherhood and solidarity that they believe they could not find in other groups. One activist of *Jemaah Tarbiyah* told of his memory during his initial contact with this group

I felt secure and at peace when I gathered together with members of *Jemaah Tarbiyah*. The feeling of brotherhood, caring and togetherness which was developed among the *ikhwan* made me feel at home.<sup>22</sup>

In addition, the political ambition of HMI, PMII and other student organisations to gain influence were perceived by Muslim activists as merely set to achieve a short-term goal. They were more interested in power and access into the bureaucracy after graduating from university rather than inspired by the spirit of *dakwah*. Many Muslim students viewed the involvement of HMI alumni within the system ineffective, since they did not bring any change to colour the system with Islamic ideas – in other words, they had been co-opted by the regime.<sup>23</sup>

Thus the dynamics within the state universities became an important reason for *Jemaah Tarbiyah* activists to introduce their Islamic ideas. Students of the prestigious institutions were seen to have more potential to bring about social and political change in Indonesia, and efforts to cultivate the seeds of activism on the campuses were believed to be the fastest ways to bring about change in the society.<sup>24</sup> In contrast, the campaign of Islamic renewal, which is more favourable to secular ideas, only draws a limited following in secular campuses. While the secular campuses have proved to be fertile soil to receive the seeds of non-liberal Islam, religious campuses, such as the State Institute of Islamic Religion (IAIN) predominantly support the ideas of the renewal associated movements led by intellectuals, such as Nurcholish Madjid.<sup>25</sup>

The explanation for the prevalence of Islamist groups in the secular campuses and their scarcity on the IAIN lies in the gap between secular and Islamic educational institutions. There have been schisms between these two tertiary sectors, in which students from the secular universities tend to underestimate the qualities of students from the IAIN. In return, students from the IAIN often consider their counterparts in the secular universities ignorant about Islam. Islamic student organisations, such as HMI, PMII and IMM, which are supposed to bridge the gap, cannot perform well since they are not able to reconcile their own differences in terms of religious and political orientations. Many Muslim students are critical of the division between traditionalists and modernists, for example.

The Jemaah Tarbiyah is one of the few groups which have been able to channel students' interests in religious activities, and in fact their *dakwah* has helped create this Islamic intensity. Its focus on *dakwah* has enabled Jemaah Tarbiyah to recruit new cadres who are not interested in politics. In the 1980s, after the implementation of NKK/BKK, students kept themselves at a distance from the political parties and were more interested in taking part in discussions of academic issues and the basics of Islam. The growing development of the activism of the Campus Predication, *Aktifis Dakwah Kampus* (ADK) under the Body of Islamic Campus Predication, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK) that expanded its network throughout the secular campuses in Java and the Outer Islands strengthened the role of students in *dakwah* activities.

Islamic student movements in the secular universities were also a major component of the demonstrations which brought down Soeharto. They organised themselves into a front, the Indonesian Student Action Muslim Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (KAMMI). Along with other Student Executive Bodies from secular universities in Java they poured on to the streets to launch strikes against the regime. How could KAMMI and other elements of campus predication, mainly members of Jemaah Tarbiyah, organise huge demonstrations and establish their networks throughout the secular universities in Indonesia? These actions were not merely the result of spontaneous reaction but of a long-term process of caderisation within the campuses. They had a long history before they emerged as a huge and organised power to challenge the existence of a crumbling regime.<sup>26</sup>

## 1. Introducing Islam on Campus: the Role of Imaduddin

Imaduddin Abdurahhim, a lecturer at The Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB) is an important figure who deserves our consideration. He is from a Modernist background; his father was a prominent leader of Masyumi in Sumatra who graduated from al-Azhar University, Cairo. Imaduddin founded the Institute for the Struggler of *Dakwah*, Lembaga Mujahid Dakwah (LMD) in 1973, and through the LMD many students from non-religious universities attended his

“mental training sessions” and finally developed *dakwah* programs of their own on their campuses.<sup>27</sup> Indeed, the alumni of LMD became key activists in many universities.

Imaduddin had been a Muslim activist while still a student at ITB, when he was involved with the Islamic Students Association (HMI). It was he who proposed the establishment of ITB’s mosque, the Salman al-Farisi, named after an important figure from the stories of the Prophet Muhammad’s companions. The first president of Indonesia, Soekarno, gave the mosque its name. Imaduddin, an engineer by training, was appointed as secretary of the committee of the project.

In 1963 Imaduddin went to the USA to pursue his studies towards a master’s degree at the University of Iowa. During his stay there he became involved with international Islamic propagation, making contact with other Muslim students from various countries.<sup>28</sup> His Islamic orientation and his vision of struggle became more international in scope.<sup>29</sup> It was also in the USA that he established his first contact with Muslim Brothers who were students in the university. Imaduddin developed this contact until he finally became a member of Muslim Students Association (MSA) of the USA and Canada.

After his return home to Indonesia in 1966 he was appointed chairman of the Central Board of Islamic Education and Propagation (PB LDMI, Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam) a campus missionary institution under HMI. Through LDMI Imaduddin became close to Nurcholish Madjid, then chairman of HMI. During the time Imaduddin was chairman of LDMI he was sent to attend an international seminar organised by the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO), which finally led him to be elected secretary-general of this organization. Now he enjoyed interaction with Muslim leaders from around the world.<sup>30</sup>

Imaduddin set up propagation training or Latihan Mujahid Dakwah (Training for Islamic Propagators) at the Salman Mosque of ITB in 1973 after a visit to Malaysia, which lasted two years. In Malaysia, besides working under the Ministry of Education to prepare the conversion of a certain polytechnic institution into a university, he helped to activate the Young Muslim Organization (ABIM) for the propagation of Islam. His presence in Malaysia influenced the dynamics of the Islamic activities of many organizations, particularly ABIM, so that even Anwar Ibrahim himself, as chairman of ABIM, considered Imaduddin as his teacher.<sup>31</sup> Imaduddin’s aim was to use mosques not just as places of worship but also as centres to educate young Muslims who might be hoped to become leaders in the future.<sup>32</sup> The training attracted many students, not only from ITB but also from other universities in Java and Sumatra. The first training even involved student activists from the cosmopolitan centres of Jakarta and Yogyakarta.<sup>33</sup> In fact, the Salman mosque of ITB subsequently became a centre for the training of Muslim activists in the secular universities.

Imaduddin's growing popularity among students and his rising criticism of the government led the New Order regime to increasingly scrutinise his activities.<sup>34</sup> He not only maintained a close relationship with DDII activists but also made outspoken attacks on the personality of Soeharto and his family. He even accused Soeharto and his family of accumulating wealth taken from the people. In his eyes, Indonesia was full of injustice and ruled by an authoritarian president.<sup>35</sup> As a result, in 1978 he was charged with propagating anti-Pancasila ideas and seeking to overthrow the regime. Finally, he was sentenced to jail for 2 years.<sup>36</sup>

Imaduddin admitted that his vision of Islam was not only influenced by the literature of the Muslim Brothers leaders in Egypt but also Abdul A'la al-Maududi of Pakistan.<sup>37</sup> While Imaduddin succeeded in establishing the LMD, he did not carry out any *usrah* activities within the formal structure of his organization. When he was sentenced to jail, his cadres ceased the struggle. Nonetheless, it is important to note that his moral training sessions and the LMD are reportedly acknowledged by Muslim activists to be the forerunners of the campus *dakwah* model, spreading from ITB to numerous other campuses in Indonesia.<sup>38</sup> His monumental training handbook, *Kuliah Tauhid* (Lectures on Religion) became a major reference and was circulated in almost all of the campuses in Java and in some in Sumatra, Kalimantan and the Eastern parts of Indonesia.<sup>39</sup> In Jakarta, many alumni of LMD returned to their campuses and established Islamic study groups. In UI they introduced various programs in each faculty under different names, such as the Integrated Study of Islam, Integratif Studi Tentang Islam (ISTI) in the faculty of economics, the Integrated Islamic Study, Studi Islam Terpadu (SIT) in the Faculty of Letters and the Forum of Study of Fundamental Islam, Forum Studi Dasar Islam (Fondasi) in the Faculty of Science.<sup>40</sup>

In 1979, not long after his detention, the Studi Islam Intensif (SII) was established and *halaqah* were formed as alternative activities replacing the LMD.<sup>41</sup> At the same time, the involvement of the large student associations such HMI, PII and many others on the campuses were restricted by the government after through the policy of NKK/BKK. Since the 1980s, initial efforts by SII at ITB coincided with the creation of other Islamic circles and study clubs, including the Muslim Brothers-influenced Jemaah Tarbiyah. Better-structured materials of the Muslim Brothers were introduced to students, emphasising the need to develop individual morality and piety.<sup>42</sup>

Many alumni of LMD who had already established their Islamic activities in some secular universities embraced Jemaah Tarbiyah and implemented more structured teachings from Hasan al-Banna.<sup>43</sup> They learned these systematic teachings of the Muslim Brothers under guidance of Middle East graduates. Some pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah who had graduated from Saudi Arabia, such as Hilmi Aminuddin and Abu Ridha helped to introduce the ideas of Hasan al-Banna in ITB, UI and IPB. They focussed on Islamic predication by maximising

the use of prayer rooms and organised other activities for students and staff. They were known among students as *aktifis mushallah*, or prayer room activists.

## 2. Prayer Room Activists: Typical Jemaah Tarbiyah Cadres

It is something of a paradox that the government's restraining of political *dakwah* activities in Indonesian society at large inadvertently inflated *dakwah* activities on the campuses. Since any political *dakwah* conducted through the Friday prayers and public sermons was monitored and restricted by the Soeharto regime, many Muslim activists found that *dakwah* on campus was the safest way to preserve their struggle for Islam.<sup>44</sup> In most cases, all social and religious activities, private or public, had to be endorsed by stamped letters from authorised agents of the regime.<sup>45</sup> These authorised parties, including the rector, dean and members of a special committee for Islamic activities in the university consistently monitored students' activities. For instance, the authorised party on campus required that students submit the names of preachers before permission was given for guest lectures or sermons. The rector of the university was indirectly responsible for endorsing or rejecting any preachers from outside campuses and preachers of radical or hardline orientation would not be permitted to deliver sermons in the university-based mosques or at any religious gatherings held by students. As a result of the state's monitoring of public prayers and sermons (*pengajian*), Muslim students preferred to use their own prayer rooms to attract students to perform the daily regular prayers.

Since the public space for propagating Islam was restricted, students read printed materials and circulated them to their fellow students in secret. In fact, from the 1970s onwards, the circulation of translated books written by Muslim Brothers activists has been remarkable: hundreds of Muslim Brothers books were translated to Indonesian. In the early emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the mid 1980s the works of Sayyid Qutb and Sayyid Hawwa became alternative books for cadres because they were seen as providing a new spirit of Islamic activism.

The implementation of the government policy of "normalisation" of campus life, *Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus* (NKK) in 1979 and the ensuing tight surveillance of student activities by the rector and deans of faculties weakened the political activism of students. In addition, the policy of the "Sole Principle" of Pancasila in 1984 imposed by the government had an impact on the ability of extra-campus organizations to build connections with students. Having realised that any resistance towards the regime was futile and easily contained, Muslim students in the 1980s focussed their activities on Islamic predication, putting aside political and social issues for the moment. For that reason, study clubs, rather than demonstrations and public orations (*mimbar bebas*) attracted students, and small circles were preferable to large gatherings. Thus the *tarbiyah* model of the Muslim

Brothers became an alternative for students in conducting *dakwah* as well as preserving idealism within the campuses.<sup>46</sup>

In order to survive in these circumstances, the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists carried out their *dakwah* by establishing *halaqah* that focussed on practical issues. They were not alone in choosing this course of action, fearing government scrutiny at a time when the regime did not hesitate to crush political resistance, particularly from Islamic organizations. Many Muslim student activists who did not agree with the government's imposition of the *Asas Tunggal* set up massive networks of Islamic circles on the campuses that limited their programs of study of basic and practical Islam.

Having been exiled from public space, and in order to develop their ability to resist the government, activists carried out religious training secretly in small and private spaces. They did not use the campus mosques, choosing rather the modest prayer rooms located at the level of faculty or department<sup>47</sup> or conducting their activities in university rented accommodation around the campuses.

Aware of the lack of appropriate preachers for handling the increase in the Islamic circles, Muslim student activists started to build programs aimed at creating more cadres to serve as trainers. Even though these were not supported by professional preachers, the *Tarbiyah* model of self-sustaining cadres helped to accelerate a massive Islamic predication within the campuses.<sup>48</sup> Students were awakened to their responsibilities and started to search for long-term solutions for the prosperity of Islam.

Through independent training that did not rely on preachers from outside campus, Jemaah Tarbiyah has been able to provide more cadres, better acquainted with religious terms and doctrines, to assume more initiative in religious activities. They have been able to produce their own qualified preachers who are not only able to lead the religious circles but who are also confident in delivering sermons in public gatherings, including the Friday prayers. Equipped with their non-religious expertise as well, they are well received by those who take pride in the status of the secular universities. At the Arif Rahman Hakim Mosque of the University of Indonesia, for instance, from the 1970s until the mid-1980s, most of the Friday sermons were delivered by DDII preachers, but since the early-1990s, many Jemaah Tarbiyah's activists have been able to replace them.

It has become evident that these *Mushallah* activists not only target the penetration of religious institutions by controlling the religious education section (*Kerohanian Islam*, Rohis) at the university and faculty level and by establishing the Forum for Islamic Studies, Forum Studi Islam (FSI) within the faculties, but they have also started to gain influence over politically oriented campus organizations. They won control of Student Senates, Senat Mahasiswa (SM) and

established the intra-campus student movement, KAMMI. Such organs within student politics have contributed to strengthening the political role of Jemaah Tarbiyah in student affairs and in national politics.

### a) Forum Studi Islam (FSI)

If Imaduddin placed explicit emphasis on the rejection of Pancasila as an un-Islamic ideology, the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists avoided talking about such issues. In the Bogor Institute of Agriculture (IPB) during the 1980s, for example, Jemaah Tarbiyah established the religious section, *Kerohanian Islam* (Rohis) that trained Muslim students in an understanding of the most fundamental Islamic teachings and practices. Activists of Rohis on campus also played a significant role in assisting certain lecturers with courses on Islam. Through these tutorials on religion they were further able to set up their networks of Islamic circles.<sup>49</sup>

The non-political nature of the Jemaah Tarbiyah training and meeting circles has attracted wide attention among students. However, its apolitical attitude at that time by no means passed without criticism. Many other Muslim student activists severely criticised the government repression of students and Muslim activists, while accusing members of Jemaah Tarbiyah of lacking the courage to stand up for the truth before the tyrants.<sup>50</sup>

As has been suggested by van Bruinessen, Jemaah Tarbiyah, despite its important role in building individual good character, also manifested an inner rejection of the Pancasila state and of un-Islamic practices in modern Indonesia.<sup>51</sup> However, Jemaah Tarbiyah did not reject the state existence of Pancasila but carried this spirit of rejection against the imposition of it as the “Sole Principle” upon all political parties and mass organizations as well.<sup>52</sup> It must also be said here that Jemaah Tarbiyah’s disagreement with government policy was not merely the rejection of Pancasila. What Jemaah Tarbiyah really disagreed with was the policy of the government of disregarding other ideologies that were perceived to be in contradiction with Pancasila. Of course, the regime had its own interpretation of Pancasila, which it sought to enforce. The Soeharto regime never ceased to try to impose its self legitimising understanding of Pancasila onto the broader context of Indonesian society at large.<sup>53</sup>

Since the 1990s the members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have expanded their influence by penetrating and controlling formal Muslim student activities within the campuses. They have been able to make good their existence through the establishment of autonomous activities under the supervision of the deans of faculty. In turn, they were authorised by faculty and to carry out Islamic activities. For instance, they organised celebrations of the Prophet Muhammad’s birth, collected funds for charities and set up new Islamic circles as well. In the Faculties of Humanities and Medical Science at the University of Indonesia they established the Forum for Islamic Studies and Practices, Forum Amal dan Studi

Islam (Formasi) and the Forum for Islamic Studies, Forum Studi Islam (FSI) respectively. In almost all faculties of state universities they founded similar forums under the generic name of the Forum of Islamic Studies. Since then, religious activities have developed and won wide influence among students.<sup>54</sup>

The existence of these faculty based organizations within the universities has attracted new students to join their programs in numbers. Beginning at the freshman year, the members of the FIS successfully provided alternative Islamic training sessions. These take a form similar to that of the traditional Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), while they may differ in terms of length of study and the way in which course contents are presented. Although most training sessions are held during the weekends and campus holidays, they are always sited in interesting venues, such in the villas of the mountain resort of Puncak, West Java. Such training appeals to new students who are happy to spend their holidays in recreation and enhancing their religious knowledge and practice.

The expansion of FIS in the faculties has necessitated the establishment of a broader organization to manage all Islamic organisations under the umbrella of one body at university level, the Campus Predication Institute, Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (LDK), particularly to respond to the need for broader activities, aimed to build contacts with various bodies of student predication on other campuses. At UI, Nuansa Islam Campus (Salam) was founded in 1997. At IPB and ITB, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were involved in the Forum for Islamic Studies coordinated their activities through the organisation called the Council for Mosque Cultivation, Dewan Kemakmuran Masjid (DKM) al-Hurriyah, established in 1997 and the Family of Islamic Students, Keluarga Mahasiswa Islam (Gamais) ITB, established in 1991 respectively. At UGM the Shalahuddin Congregation (*Jamaah Shalahuddin*) has become a significant organisation affiliated with Jemaah Tarbiyah. Thus, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah who organised themselves in LDK have begun to participate in a broader network of inter-campus predication, the Forum for Coordination of Campus Predication, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK).

FSLDK held its first national conference 1986, which aimed to coordinate and unify Islamic campus predication at various universities in Indonesia.<sup>55</sup> As an umbrella of campus predication throughout the universities, FSLDK became an important organ through which Muslim activists could disseminate their ideas.<sup>56</sup> For instance, after the Eighth Conference of FSLD in Makassar, South Sulawesi in 1993 the book written by a scholar of Hizbut Tahrir, Taqiyuddin an-Nabhani (1909-1977) entitled *Kitab Mafahim*, became a standard text read by activists of LDK in many universities.<sup>57</sup> However, since the book was introduced through an elite top-down process, it could not last for long. In its Tenth Conference in Malang in 1998, Jemaah Tarbiyah activists were able to take control the leadership of FSLDK.<sup>58</sup>

Since the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah do not dominate all Islamic campus activities, a number of conflicts with different movements have often arisen. We need to examine how splits and competition among new Islamic movements operate in the process of recruitment of new members. The conflict involves three main groups, the Jemaah Tarbiyah, the Salafi group and Hizbut Tahrir. As stated by Ismail Yusanto, a spokesperson of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) Islamic movements in Gadjah Mada University (UGM), for instance, have maintained a long rivalry for the control of the intra-campus organisations. When a particular movement has gained control over students in an institution, they would not invite in preachers other than their own. For instance, since the early 1990s, Yusanto has been given no opportunity to lecture to student gatherings. But more recently, after Jemaah Tarbiyah established its political party in 1998, he was often called on to give Islamic lectures in UGM because pragmatic members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have created the opportunity for Hizbut Tahrir in UGM to consolidate with them.<sup>59</sup>

In Surabaya, where three state secular universities operate, before the establishment of PK, most Islamic activities had been organised by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. However, after the involvement of their members in politics, Salafi groups and Hizbut Tahrir have started to put down roots and have managed to lessen the role of Jemaah Tarbiyah in campus predication.<sup>60</sup> As before, many of the younger generation of Muslim students criticised HMI for its political inclinations and its competition to win political careers, now many students in campuses also have begun to criticise the obvious political inclinations of Jemaah Tarbiyah. *Halaqah* have been fuelled with a rhetoric that aims to defend the political decisions of PKS.<sup>61</sup>

However, for those students who are politically minded, memberships of Jemaah Tarbiyah brings opportunities to follow a political path that might lead them to occupy positions of leadership in PKS, or even to be elected members of parliament. In fact, many former student activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have now been elected members at the district and national levels.

## **b) Senat Mahasiswa (SM)**

Besides the Forum for Islamic Study, another set of important campus organizations currently under the control of Jemaah Tarbiyah is the Student Senate, *Senat Mahasiswa* (SM) of the secular state universities, which has become the Student Executive Body, *Badan Eksekutif Mahasiswa* (BEM). This body comprises the central leadership of students, organising and managing activities at the campus level that may involve student executive bodies at the faculty level in turn.

The Student Executive Body is very much influenced by the dynamics of national politics, in so far as it leads students to be directly involved in political action.

Its leadership is very important for certain students with aspirations of further political progress. It influences national politics, and the activists themselves, in the political games of the Indonesian leadership configurations. For this reason, there is competition to take over the leadership of this body, not only by the students, but the government also tries to exert its influence upon it. In fact, the elections of this body always entail political consequences at the level of campus and of the state.

The control exerted by the regime over campus life has succeeded in diminishing students' political and social activism and has led them to focus on academic activities and special interest study groups. Demonstrations against the development of the Kedung Ombo reservoir in 1989, for instance, was initiated by a study group that organised themselves under a committee of *Kelompok Solidaritas Korban Pembangunan Waduk Kedung Ombo* (Group in Solidarity with the Victims of the Kedung Ombo Reservoir Development).<sup>62</sup>

In 1990 the Minister of Education proposed a new form of student government called The Student Senate, *Senat Mahasiswa* (SM) under the control of the university rector. However, most student activists perceived this body as part of the regime's intervention on student activism. The rector's intrusive role within the activities of SM led students to organise their protests through ad hoc action committees, rather than using the formal organisation of the student senate.

Even though it no longer had a significant influence on national issues, the student senate was still an important organ of impact on internal student issues. Rivalry among activists of Islamist, Leftist, Nationalist and Christian fronts often occurred over recruitment and to secure their positions in SM. In the Faculty of Letters of the University of Indonesia (now the Humanities) during the 1990s, for example, activists of *Jemaah Tarbiyah* were prevented by the head of the student senate of the Faculty from forming an intra-campus organisation. This was because the committees of the senate were predominantly Leftists.<sup>63</sup> In fact, the Faculty of Humanities, UI, was a Leftist stronghold.<sup>64</sup> In order to be able to establish an Islamic organisation there, *Jemaah Tarbiyah* activists turned to working with other nationalists to run for the annual student senate elections.

When their candidate was elected by a decent majority, the activists of *Jemaah Tarbiyah* were allowed to establish an organisation on campus. In 1990 the Forum for Islamic Implementation and Study (*Formasi*) was formally established in the Faculty of Humanities of UI. In 1993, activists of *Jemaah Tarbiyah*, through *Formasi*, participated in the student elections and succeeded in placing their cadre as head of the student senate. Mustafa Kamal was elected as the head of SM and became the first *Jemaah Tarbiyah* cadre to hold such a position and in other faculties, a number of activists of *Jemaah Tarbiyah* were also elected as heads of the student senates. In 1994 a cadre of *Jemaah Tarbiyah*,

Zulkieflimansyah, was elected as the head of the student senate of UI, securing the highest position of the student senate at the university level.<sup>65</sup> Subsequently, most student senates of prestigious secular state universities such as ITB, IPB, UGM and many others have come under the control of Jemaah Tarbiyah.

The success of Jemaah Tarbiyah in securing positions in the student senates at the levels of faculty and university in certain prestigious universities forced nationalist and Leftist students to become marginalised. In 1996 the Forum for Communication of Student Senates in Jakarta, Forum Komunikasi Senat Mahasiswa Jakarta (FKSMJ) was established as a counter against the domination of Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. The aim of this organisation is to oppose formal organisations within campuses which prevent students from involvement in grassroots issues. This forum chiefly represents the student senates of the private universities, because of Jemaah Tarbiyah domination of the state universities.<sup>66</sup>

During the demonstrations in 1998 to topple Soeharto, when most of heads of student senates from state universities such as UI, IAIN Syahid, UGM, Unila,<sup>67</sup> Unair,<sup>68</sup> Unibraw,<sup>69</sup> IPB and ITB joined KAMMI to launch a huge demonstration in the Al-Azhar Mosque of Jakarta on 10 April 1998, members of FKSMJ were absent.<sup>70</sup>

### c) Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI)

Through intensive communication among campus predication activists in 1998, the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah were able to establish an intercampus organization that played a significant role in the demonstrations calling for the resignation of President Soeharto. The Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) was established in 29 March 1998 after activists of student Islamic predication held a tenth intercampus meeting under the Forum for the Coordination of Campus Predication Institution, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK) in Malang, East Java.

The decision to establish an intercampus organization was not formally endorsed at the FSLDK national conference in Malang, but certain members proposed it after the meeting closed. The coordinator of the centre for communication, region I, of FSLDK (Sumatra, West Java and DKI Jakarta), Mohammad Basyumi, issued a press release stating that KAMMI was not representative of FSLDK but an individual initiative.<sup>71</sup> The founding of KAMMI was announced by the head of LDK of the Muhammadiyah Malang University (UMM), not by the coordinator of national FSLDK. It seems that the rejection by some members of FSLDK was triggered by the fact that activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah had led the way to the establishment of KAMMI. Even though FSLDK has been dominated by Jemaah Tarbiyah, activists of FSLDK have represented various streams of Islamic groups, but in small numbers.<sup>72</sup> In fact, *mushallah* activists affiliated with Jemaah Tarbiyah have dominated the memberships of FSLDK.

At the level of student organisation, KAMMI has offered an alternative Islamic student networking that bridges the gap between the religious and secular campuses in Indonesia. Before the establishment of KAMMI in 1998, the absence of Islamic extra-campus organizations within the secular campuses led Muslim student activists to organise their activities independently. They developed contacts with some secular universities and did not attempt to engage with activists from Islamic higher education institutions. This fact that Islamist groups have developed on secular campuses but have few roots in the IAIN is the result of the absence of extra-campus organizations. KAMMI has represented a new Islamic student organization that was expected to take the initiative in developing closer relations with the Muslim activists of Islamic institutions. The former chairman of KAMMI, Fahri Hamzah, explained the three important tasks of KAMMI

First, it would conduct networking in campus mosques throughout Indonesia. Second, the group would elicit support from Indonesian students who were studying outside of the country, in order to rally international support. Large Indonesian student populations in Germany and Japan in particular produced quite active KAMMI branches. Third, it would attempt to forge connections with other groups, including the students of rural Islamic boarding schools – traditionally an extremely important source of political power in Indonesia.<sup>73</sup>

In general, KAMMI has tended towards a centrist stance on issues related to student and Muslim affairs. For instance, when the Reformation movement in Indonesia had just begun in May 1998, many student movements openly demanded the resignation of Soeharto. KAMMI, through its chairman, Fahri Hamzah took a softer line. Hamzah asserted that “if Soeharto changes and comes to the forefront of reform, it is not impossible that we would support him.”<sup>74</sup> For KAMMI, the critical dimension of reform was not merely change of regime but rather moral, political and legal reform of the total system.<sup>75</sup> However, when the huge wave of students and national leaders, including Amien Rais, demanding Soeharto’s resignation gained momentum, KAMMI supported the majority stance.

The following example also demonstrates KAMMI’s middle position in responding to issues of political and religious controversy and of how KAMMI tried to place itself as a moral guard between radical action and moderation. On March 1999, when many Islamic groups, including PK, PBB, PPP and other Islamic organisations in Yogyakarta marched in the streets to condemn the tragedy of Ambon, which had caused the death of many Muslims, and to call for *jihād* to protect their fellow Muslims, KAMMI as an organization was absent.<sup>76</sup> Even though most of its members joined the march, the organization did not come to an agreement to show its formal support for any *jihād* that involved military

action. Instead, KAMMI initiated a rehabilitation team to support the Muslim refugees by providing essential supplies.<sup>77</sup>

Since most KAMMI activists are also members of Jemaah Tarbiyah, their relations with PKS are obvious. In many cases, even though it claims to be an independent organisation,<sup>78</sup> KAMMI serves as the student wing of PKS. It also provides opportunities for its activists to pursue political careers. Most former chairmen of KAMMI hold important positions of leadership in PKS and some have even been elected members of the national parliament. Fahri Hamzah, the first chairman of KAMMI and Andi Rahmad, his successor, have been PKS representatives in the national parliament (2004–2009) whilst Haryo Setyoko, a general secretary became a deputy general secretary of the Central Board of PKS (2000–2005).

Nonetheless, KAMMI does not always try to follow the policy of PKS. In responding to the issue of the government's hike in oil prices in 2004, KAMMI displayed a different opinion. In the beginning, PKS through its representative in the national parliament opposed government policy, considering that the negative impacts on the little people were bigger than the benefits.<sup>79</sup> During the *Rapat Paripurna* (general meeting) between DPR and the government on 14 March 2004, PKS withdrew its previous decision to oppose the government's proposal.<sup>80</sup> One of the members of PKS, Nursanita Nasution even blatantly stated that PKS would have never accept a policy to raise the oil prices for the people.<sup>81</sup>

However PKS then changed its stance. After a long and heavy discussion in parliament, PKS dropped its decision and supported the proposal of the government, with some notes that the government was required to ensure that compensation funds for petro-fuels (*Bahan Bakar Minyak*, BBM) should be directed towards reducing the economic burdens of the people. In addition, PKS demanded that the government take strict measures to solve big corruption cases.<sup>82</sup> In contrast, KAMMI took a different direction and continued to pressure the government through demonstrations. KAMMI expressed its disappointment towards PKS for its ambiguity in supporting the people's interests. KAMMI complained to PKS during the DPR meeting discussing the issue of oil prices and carried in a free-range chicken as a symbolic gift, in the hope that PKS would not act "chicken" (*ayam sayur*).<sup>83</sup>

Jemaah Tarbiyah activists had drawn public attention to the condition of the Indonesian people after the resignation of Soeharto in 1998. Cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah who were the heads of university student senates and Islamic intra-campus organisations, together with the activists in KAMMI, had launched demonstrations to topple Soeharto. They also collaborated with other student groups in guarding the agenda of the political reformation of Indonesia. However, the cooperation between Islamist groups and other student groups did not last long after most members of KAMMI and its affiliates showed their support of

B.J Habibie to replace Soeharto, whereas nationalist and Leftist student groups rejected him.

In the event, the end of the Soeharto regime changed the orientation of student activism. Students have started to re-establish their connections with political parties and have opened up their political opportunities, while many parties make intensive approaches to student activists. The secular campuses have become more dynamic in terms of competition and rivalry among various religious and political interests, in order to secure important positions within the student governing bodies. The success of the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah in securing central leaderships of student senates has strengthened the role of the secular campuses as a source of political caderisation. Rama Pratama, a former head of the Student Executive Body of UI and Fahri Hamzah, a former chairman of the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union (KAMMI) were among the leaders of a huge demonstration against Soeharto in 1998, and have subsequently been elected members of the legislature of the Prosperous Justice Party.

### **C. Campus Islam as a Source of Political Recruitment**

The popularity of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the state universities is the result of its intensive and massive *dakwah* predication. In contrast to Martin van Bruinessen's suggestion that most of its activists are enrolled in the faculties of science and technology, the core activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah are dominated by students from the Humanities and Social Sciences, as well as from Islamic studies.<sup>84</sup> The first triumph of Jemaah Tarbiyah on campus was its success in winning the general student elections in the Faculty of Humanites, the University of Indonesia in 1993 when Mustafa Kamal, now the Member of Parliament for PKS (2004-2009) was elected head of the student senate. The following year, Zulkieflimansyah, an economics student, was elected head of the student senate at the university level in UI. Zulkieflimansyah's successors were Kamaruddin, Selamat Nurdin and Rama Pratama. Both Kamaruddin and Nurdin were students in the Faculty of Political Science whilst Pratama was from the Faculty of Economics. As a general principle, in order to secure the position of student senate at level of faculty and university, the candidate must win thousands of student votes. It is a mark of the success of Islamic predication by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists in the Faculties of Humanities and Political Science in recruiting members that enabled them to win the elections.

In addition, pioneers of Islamic predication in UI who have also gone on to occupy important positions on the PKS national committees, some of them being elected as members of legislatures, also graduated from the Faculties of Social Science and the Humanities. Among them are Yusuf Supendi, Al-Muzammil Yusuf and Mahfudz Sidiq. They have become influential figures in the current PKS leadership (2005-2010). Sidiq is the chairman of the PKS faction in the national parliament and former head of department of caderisation. Caderisation

is the most important department in the committee of PKS because of its vital role in ensuring the recruitment process within both Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS. Yusuf was the first president of PKS (2003). Both vice chairmen of the PKS faction in the national parliament of DPR RI, Fahri Hamzah and Zulkielfimansyah, graduated from the Faculty of Economics.

The general trend within the Islamic parties and parties of Muslim constituents shows that most cadres of DPR RI (2004-2009) come from the secular universities rather than Islamic institutions. The percentages are as follows. PPP - among 58 members, 34 persons (59%) graduated from secular universities and 21 persons (36%) graduated from Islamic institutions. PKB - among 52 members, 28 persons (54%) graduated from secular universities and 22 persons (42%) graduated from Islamic institutions. PKS has the same figures - among 45 members, 23 persons (51%) are from secular universities and 18 persons (40%) are from Islamic institutions. For PAN, PBB and PBR, the percentage of secular university graduates is even more significant. Secular university graduates for PAN, PBR and PBB are 43 persons (83%), 11 persons (85%) and 9 persons (75%) respectively, while Islamic university graduates are 6 (11%), 0 (0%) and 3 (25%). The role of the secular universities as sources of political candidates is still unshakeable. Overall, the percentages of members of the national parliament for the above six parties who graduated from secular universities and Islamic higher education institutions are 64% (148 persons) and 30% (70 persons) respectively, while the remaining 6% (14 persons) are high school graduates.

**Table 4: Educational Background of Members of DRR RI (2004-2009)**

Education	PPP		PKB		PAN		PKS		PBR		PBB	
PTU <sup>85</sup>	34	59%	28	54%	43	83%	23	51%	11	85%	9	75%
PTA <sup>86</sup>	21	36%	22	42%	6	11%	18	40%	0	0%	3	25%
High School	3	5%	2	4%	3	6%	4	9%	2	15%	0	0%
Total	58	100%	52	100%	52	100%	45	100%	13	100%	12	100%

The transformation of Jemaah Tarbiyah from an informal religious movement into the open political party, PKS, brought significant changes in the composition of its membership, its strategy and style of leadership. While the first Jemaah Tarbiyah activists were represented by the PK, further development manifested itself in PKS. In addition, activists coming from secular campuses and representing FSI, KAMMI and SM have contributed to the political directions of PKS. In order to broaden its appeal, PKS has transformed its Islamic aspirations into a more realistic agenda. The rich experience of its activists from campus milieus has helped PKS to negotiate with the political realities of Indonesia. The distinctively different modes of performance between PK and PKS are proof evidence of the way in which activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have prepared themselves to be involved within the grey areas of politics that are totally removed from religious ideals. As a result the split has often occurred within activists of PKS rather than PK. Many cases in some regions in Indonesia have

proved this trend. For instance, in Depok, West Java, a member of legislative from PKS, Saleh Martapermana, allied himself with the party rival, Badrul Kamal during the district election in 2005 and PKS already chose Nurmahmudi Ismail as its own candidate.<sup>87</sup> He was sacked as a member of the District Parliament (DPRD II) in June 2006.<sup>88</sup>

In general, the activists of campus Islam within the formation of the PKS leadership have demonstrated moderate views in responding to the position of Islam vis-à-vis the state and the struggle for Islamic ideals. Their experience within student politics and government in the past has helped them to position themselves in responding to national issues of pluralism and diversity. Based on their experience on campus they are divided into three streams: the generations of the Forum Studi Islam, of student senate and of KAMMI respectively. My observations on the distinctive performances of PK and PKS indicate the significance of these activists of campus Islam.

The character of the militant cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah may be seen in PK profiles. Most activists of PK directly experienced the political constraint and hostility of the Soeharto regime during the 1980s. Observing PK's seven representatives in DPR between 1999-2004, it appears that most of its cadres were of the first stratum of Jemaah Tarbiyah, mainly former activists of the Forum for Islamic Studies on campus, such as Irwan Prayitno, Yusuf Supendi and Zirlyrosa Jamil, and of the modernist student organizations (PII) such as Mashadi and Mutammimul Ula. There were also cadres from a traditionalist background, such as Nurmahmudi Ismail and Roqib Abdul Kadir.

In contrast, the configuration of the elite of PKS is represented by more moderate figures, the generation of the 1990s, who have not encountered political repression. They began their political activities during an era of political openness, since the 1990s. Their attitudes towards national issues and pluralism are more open. They are not only able to maintain good communication with other groups, including non-Islamic organizations, but they are also more pragmatic in their approach towards politics and *dakwah*. More former activists of intra-campus organizations are remarkably accommodated in DPR. Figures such as Mahfudz Sidiq, Al Muzammil Yusuf, Untung Wahono, Nursanita Nasution, RB Suryama, Chairul Anwar, Agus Purnomo, Andi Salahuddin and Idris Lutfi were leading activists of Forum Studi Islam in the 1980s, whilst other new comers are mainly former activists of Student Executive Bodies and KAMMI in the 1990s, such as Zulkieflimansyah, Mustafa Kamal, Rama Pratama, Fahri Hamzah and Andi Rahmat.

The composition of the general membership is another issue. PK owed its main support to its core cadres and their families. There was little influence over non-*santri* families in society. Their main strongholds were the regions where Islamic parties of the past, particularly Masyumi, had gained support and enjoyed

its triumphs. These are West Java, DKI Jakarta and certain parts of Sumatra. At the level of leadership, the main players were ideologists and the intelligentsia. Yet in the mean time, PKS has broadened its appeal to garner popular support. Another grouping, not core cadres, but mainly of the pious middle class and urban poor have given tremendous support. PKS now reflects different kinds of social affiliations. While the pious middle class can also be accepted within differently constituted elite circles, the urban poor have become the main constituents of PKS. This is because many former campus activists have begun to “colour” the political directions of PKS. Their participation in student politics has served to enrich PKS’s strategies in promoting the party to the Indonesian public in general.

A lack of financial and facility support was once the common picture of PK. It used Islamic institutions and mosques to which its cadres were affiliated to run the party. It also used cadres’ houses as party offices in many areas. The public who attended its political campaigns in the 1999 general elections were in the main ideologically in tune with the ideas of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Female participants wore the headscarf and rarely came from lay, or non-observant, households. On the other hand, the campaigns of PKS were far more attractive. They rented convention halls in hotels and avoided using the mosques. In terms of financial support, PKS is far more prosperous than PK. Many of the elite, public figures and other high-placed members of society have attended its campaigns. Even more surprising, people with no interest in religion, including certain actresses, have lent their support. In Surabaya, women prostitutes from surrounding localities in the city attended the PKS campaigns.<sup>89</sup>

In keeping with its policy of Islamisation, Jemaah Tarbiyah made strict Islamic demands through PK, so that its interests as an Islamic party were heard loudly in the 1999 elections. Although PK was ready to join with a non-religious party, the National Mandate Party, Partai Amanah Nasional (PAN), its motivation for this was more for the fact that the chairman of PAN, Amien Rais was so well known as a Muslim leader and activist. In contrast, PKS tends to show its non-religious orientation by favouring professional organizations and in its demands for economic, political and social reform. Its Islamic values are presented as much as possible within activities that are closer to the day-to-day lives of the people. For PKS, the implementation of *shariah* laws need not necessarily be proposed through its campaigns or by a call for the upholding of the *shariah* by the government. It is more important to make an effort to urge people in general about the importance of the *shariah* and for them to implement it in their daily lives with full understanding and consciousness. (A further discussion of this issue will be given in Chapter VII.)

Since the secular campuses in Indonesia are still considered as to be backbones of PKS caderisation, it seems they will continue to play a significant role in the

future. Their ability to control almost all strategic positions of the student bodies is certainly an inspiration of the possibility of reaching their goal to Islamise government. However, the external challenges of the social, cultural and political realities of Indonesia compel them to play in accommodative ways to promote their ideas of Islamisation. They have often demonstrated a readiness to negotiate to secure their position on a structural level in order to exert an influence on the state. Interestingly, all of these accommodative approaches within religious and political activities find their justification in the teachings and ideas of Hasan al-Bana, the founder of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt. Thus, the relation of Jemaah Tarbiyah of Indonesia and the Muslim Brothers of Egypt will be elaborated in our next chapter.

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> Quoted from Mahfudz Sidiq, *Risalah Dakwah Tulabiyah: Kajian Komprehensif Manhaj Dakwah Tarbiyah di Kalangan Pelajar dan Mahasiswa* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2002), 13.

<sup>2</sup> Sidiq, *Risalah Dakwah Tulabiyah*, 3.

<sup>3</sup> The extra-campus organizations that comprised KAMMI were HMI, GMNI, SEMMI, SOMAL, PELMASI, and MAPANTJAS. See Arbi Sanit, "Gerakan Mahasiswa 1970-1973: Pecahnya Bulan Madu Politik," in *Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru Gerakan Mahasiswa '98* (Pustaka Sinar Harapan: Jakarta, 1999), 45.

<sup>4</sup> See Abdul Mun'im DZ, "Gerakan Mahasiswa 1966 di Tengah Pertarungan Politik Elit," in *Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru*, 41.

<sup>5</sup> Edward Aspinall, "Political Opposition and the Transition from the Authoritarian Rule: the Case of Indonesia" (Ph.D., diss., the Australian National University, 2000), 160.

<sup>6</sup> Generally student organisations are divided into intra- and extra- campus organisations. Intra-campus refers to student organisations established in campuses with no organisational links with other organisations off campus, while the extra-campus groups have their own offices outside campus but also establish branches on campus.

<sup>7</sup> See Arbi Sanit, "Gerakan Mahasiswa 1970-1973", 48.

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 52-53.

<sup>10</sup> See Richard Gordon Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Student Activists in Divergent Movements for Reform during Indonesia's Transition from Authoritarian Rule, 1998-2001" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio University: 2003), 89.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 91

<sup>12</sup> Ibid., 96.

<sup>13</sup> Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003. See also Harold Crouch, "Islam and Politics in Indonesia," in *Politics, Diplomacy and Islam: Four Case Studies* (Canberra: the Australian National University, 1986), 21.

<sup>14</sup> Irene H. Gayatri, "Arah Baru Perlawanan Gerakan Mahasiswa 1989-1993," in *Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru*, 65.

<sup>15</sup> Ibid.

<sup>16</sup> Ibid.

<sup>17</sup> Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 23 December 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Azyumardi Azra, "Kelompok Sempalan di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTU: Anatomi Sosio Historis" in *Dinamika Pemikiran Islam di Perguruan Tinggi: Wacana tentang Pendidikan Agama Islam* (Jakarta: Logos, 1999), 224.

<sup>19</sup> Interview with Muhammad Irwan, Surabaya, 12 March 2003.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

<sup>21</sup> See "Comparing Islamic Leftist and Rightist," *The Jakarta Post*, 21 September 2002.

<sup>22</sup> Interview with Muhammad Arif, Padang, 19 June 2003.

- <sup>23</sup> Mahfudz Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi: Kiprah Politik Aktifis Dakwah Kampus dalam Perjuangan Demokratisasi di Tengah Gelombang Krisis Nasional Multidimensi* (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2003), 72
- <sup>24</sup> Jemaah Tarbiyah activists believe that in order to be successful in carrying on the *dakwah*, the support of qualified cadres is crucial. See Ahmad Satori Ismail, *Tarbiyah dan Perubahan Sosial* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003), 9.
- <sup>25</sup> Azra, "Kelompok Sempalan di Kalangan Mahasiswa PTU," 224.
- <sup>26</sup> See Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 113.
- <sup>27</sup> Interview with Marfendi, Padang, 23 June 2003.
- <sup>28</sup> *Ulumul Qur'an* 2 no. V (1994), 86-94. For further details also see *Gatra*, 7 October 1995.
- <sup>29</sup> V.S. Naipaul, *Among the Believers: an Islamic Journey* (New York: Vintage Book, 1982), 373.
- <sup>30</sup> Nurhayati, Djamas "Gerakan Kaum Muda Islam Masjid Salman" in *Gerakan Islam Kontemporer di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Ikapi, 1996), 265. Djamas suspected that Imaduddin's first interaction with MB ideas was during the time that he was actively involved in the International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations (IIFSO). However, long before he held a high position in the IIFSO, Imaduddin was active in Islamic propagation during his first departure in 1963 to the US where he made contact with the Muslim Student Association (MSA), the Muslim Brothers-influenced student movement in the USA. See *Muslim Executive and Expatriate Newsletter* 3 no. 1 (2000). See [www.islamic-path.org](http://www.islamic-path.org).
- <sup>31</sup> *Ulumul Qur'an* 2 no. V (1994), 86-94.
- <sup>32</sup> *Muslim Executive and Expatriate Newsletter* 3 no. 1 (2000).
- <sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>34</sup> Naipaul, *Among the Believers*, 363.
- <sup>35</sup> *Ibid.* 377.
- <sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 364.
- <sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 374.
- <sup>38</sup> ITB was considered as centre for Islamic revival and accused by the government of being a source of Islamic radicalism during the 1970s and 1980s.
- <sup>39</sup> Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Depok, 11 June 2003.
- <sup>40</sup> Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 71.
- <sup>41</sup> Djamas "Gerakan Kaum Muda Islam Masjid Salman," 265
- <sup>42</sup> Interview with Abu Ridha, Jakarta, 11 October 2003.
- <sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*
- <sup>44</sup> Although the bans on lectures and radio programs against the aims of the state were repealed in 1978 and there was a change towards the "normalisation" of the people and religion in that year, this regulation was used as a new stage in the surveillance of the activities of *dakwah Islam*. However, as long as religious activities did not turn into political criticism or agitation against the regime, they were allowed to be held.
- <sup>45</sup> Merlyna Lim, "Cyber-Civic Space in Indonesia: From Panopticon to Pandemonium?" *IDPR* 24 no. 4 (2002), 367.
- <sup>46</sup> See Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 113.
- <sup>47</sup> The moving of the University of Indonesia (UI) in 1987 from Jakarta to Depok near Bogor, for instance, represented the government's aim to prevent students from engaging in dissident political activities by weakening the role of the Dewan Mahasiswa as centres. Instead, the activities were rolled back into the faculties because of the distance of one faculty from another.
- <sup>48</sup> Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 113.
- <sup>49</sup> Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003.
- <sup>50</sup> Interview, anonymous, Depok, 9 May 2003.
- <sup>51</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia", *South East Asia Research* 10 no. 2 (2002), 133.
- <sup>52</sup> Hidayat Nurwahid, the former President of PKS and the Chairperson of MPR RI emphasized that in the 1980s he did not reject Pancasila but he opposed the imposition of the Sole of Principle. See *Tempo*, 19-25 June 2006.

- <sup>53</sup> See Ramage Douglas, *Politics in Indonesia: Democracy, Islam and the Ideology of Tolerance* (New York, Routledge, 1995), 24-31.
- <sup>54</sup> See Abdul Aziz, "Meraih Kesempatan dalam Situasi Mengambang: Studi Kasus Kelompok Keagamaan Mahasiswa Universitas Indonesia," *Penamas* no. 20 (1995), 3.
- <sup>55</sup> See Rifki Rosyad, "A Quest for True Islam: A Study of the Islamic Resurgence Movements among the Youth in Bandung, Indonesia" (Master thesis, the Australian National University, 1995), 56.
- <sup>56</sup> See Ismail Yusanto, "LDK: Antara Visi, Misi dan Realitas Sejarah Perkembangannya," *www.fsldk.20m.com*.
- <sup>57</sup> See "Banyak Jalan Menuju Kehidupan Islami," *Suara Hidayatullah*, August 2000.
- <sup>58</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>59</sup> Interview with Ismail Yusanto, Canberra, August 2004.
- <sup>60</sup> Interview, anonymous, Surabaya, 24 May 2005.
- <sup>61</sup> Interview, anonymous, Surabaya, 12 March 2003.
- <sup>62</sup> Edward Aspinall, "Students and the Military: Regime Friction and Civilian Dissent in the Late Suharto Period," *Indonesia* 59 (April 1995), 32.
- <sup>63</sup> Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
- <sup>64</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>65</sup> Ibid.
- <sup>66</sup> See *Kontan Online*, 16 November 1998.
- <sup>67</sup> University of Lampung, Sumatra.
- <sup>68</sup> University of Airlangga, Surabaya, East Java.
- <sup>69</sup> University of Brawijaya, Malang, East Java
- <sup>70</sup> Muridan S. Widjojo and Moch. Nurhasim, "Organisasi Gerakan Mahasiswa 1998: Upaya Rekonstruksi," in *Penakluk Rezim Orde Baru*, 366.
- <sup>71</sup> Sidiq, *KAMMI dan Pergulatan Reformasi*, 104-105.
- <sup>72</sup> Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 23 May 2003.
- <sup>73</sup> See Kraince, "The Role of Islamic Student Activists," 169-170.
- <sup>74</sup> Ibid., 183
- <sup>75</sup> Ibid., 184
- <sup>76</sup> Ibid., 238
- <sup>77</sup> Ibid., 240
- <sup>78</sup> See "Profile Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia," *Kammi.or.id*.
- <sup>79</sup> See a press release issued by FPKS, 4 Maret 2004
- <sup>80</sup> See a press release issued by FPKS, 15 Maret 2004.
- <sup>81</sup> *Keadilan Online*, 18 Maret 2005.
- <sup>82</sup> See press release of PKS, 21 Maret 2005
- <sup>83</sup> See "Tertunda, Pencarian Dana Kompensasi BBM," *Kompas*, 8 March 2005.
- <sup>84</sup> Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratisation," in *Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking 'Civil Society', 'Religion', and 'Crisis'* (Yogyakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 52.
- <sup>85</sup> Perguruan Tinggi Umum or Secular University
- <sup>86</sup> Perguruan Tinggi Agama or Islamic Higher Education
- <sup>87</sup> See "PKS Ancam Recall Anggotanya," *Jawa Pos*, 17 April 2005.
- <sup>88</sup> See "Anggota DPRD Depok dari PKS Dipecat," *Kompas*, 6 June 2006.
- <sup>89</sup> See "Belasan PSK Hadiri Kampanye PKS," *Jawa Pos*, 18 March 2004.