

Chapter 6: The sufi influences: in Pursuit of an Islamised Indonesia

Before the formation of their political party, few observers would have predicted that the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists would turn to a pragmatic role in the politics of Indonesia. For PKS that grew out of a religious movement influenced by the Muslim Brothers of Egypt (which has had the reputation as a fundamentalist movement) such pragmatism in politics is quite surprising. Hamid Basyaib, at the website of the Liberal Islam Network (Jaringan Islam Liberal-JIL) praises the success of PKS in the 2004 general elections but emphasises a possible dilemma facing a party based on religious ideology. According to Basyaib, PKS should decide whether to follow either a pragmatic or an inflexible approach toward politics. In Basyaib's view, the structure of a party that is headed by a Consultative Board (Majelis Syura) is likely to inflexible.¹

The reality has been contrary to expectations. After PKS gained its success in the 2004 general elections, it decided to join a coalition with nationalist parties in forming government under the leadership of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. When, in 2005, the government raised oil prices, a move that drew fierce protest from the public and caused some members of PKS to demand that the party leave the coalition, PKS would not withdraw its support.² Instead of adopting a hardline stance, PKS has softened its "religious aspirations" in order to move with the political realities of Indonesia. What are the grounds for such a practical decision?

It is interesting to note that since most important decisions of the party are taken through the mechanism of the consultative board (Majelis Syura), whose members are senior activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah upholding the teachings of Hasan al-Banna, political decisions of PKS have reflected the stance of Jemaah Tarbiyah in general. I argue that, quite apart from political obstacles from the ruling regimes experienced by Islamic parties and the socio-political circumstances of Indonesia, it is the teachings of the Muslim Brothers themselves that account for this "realistic" approach.³ Learning from the experience of the past, a member of parliament for PKS stated, "If Masyumi was eager to confront any obstacle and even sacrificed itself for the sake of upholding its idealism, PKS would not; instead, we attempt to find a different way."⁴ In fact, such moderation finds its justification in the Muslim Brothers' ideas.

This chapter attempts to analyse the influence of the Sufi dimension within the Muslim Brothers that has contributed to determine the political praxis of PKS. Strictly speaking, PKS activists always insist upon the importance of upholding the two fundamental sources of Islam (the Qur'an and Hadith) and the teachings

of al-Banna. In dealing with political and social issues, they attempt to broaden their call to all of the Indonesian Muslim communities to encompass all religious orientations, particularly the traditionalist elements of Indonesian Islam.⁵ This is keeping in mind the stages in building an Islamic society and state introduced by al-Banna, which have been adopted by PKS, namely to adopt a gradualist approach in promoting their Islamic aspirations.

A. Sufi Influences

The general and “superficial picture” of PKS is that is dominated by modernist characters. In contrast, my study has discovered that there are significant numbers of activists from a traditionalist background in PKS and what is more, the pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah were children of traditionalist families. Since most of the modernist Muslim activists during the early development of the movement had previously been activists in their own organizations, while the traditionalists were merely ordinary members or maintained only cultural connections with traditionalist organisations, the face of Jemaah Tarbiyah bears the features of a modernist derived purification movement, rather than of any traditionalist stamp.

However, when studying the political praxis of PKS and the religious attitudes of its members in responding to jurisprudential issues, it becomes apparent that PKS has adopted a traditionalist approach. This pragmatic and accommodative stance of PKS in dealing with politics can be seen to derive from the teachings of Hasan al-Banna which give high priority to the unity of the Muslim community. Al-Banna himself developed these ideas from Sufi doctrines.

Since adolescence al-Banna had firmly embraced mystical practices and doctrines, so that from the beginning of his organisational career, Sufism exerted a significant impact on his thoughts.⁶ He immersed himself deeply in the practices of the order of the Hasafiyah for more than 20 years and remained involved with Sufism in a special way for most of his life.⁷ There is no evidence in his writings that it ever ceased to influence him.⁸ Thus the Sufi dimension shaped the deepest foundations of the Muslim Brothers movement, directing it to follow a natural and gradual process of social and political change.

This is one of the more neglected aspects of the history of the Muslim Brothers, overlooked both by researchers and by followers of the Brothers themselves. Studies of the movement so far place emphasis on its political activities and its role in spreading religious radicalisation. The Muslim Brothers are known more as radicals and a threat than for their moderate and gradual agenda in achieving their goals. Christina Phelps Harris, for instance, stresses the most influential experience of al-Banna’s life as his father’s fundamentalist Hanbalite orientation⁹ in which “al-Banna was steeped from his earliest childhood in the puritan teachings of Ibn Hanbal.”¹⁰

However, the direct effect of returning to al-Banna's original thought has meant that for PKS, all religious orientations must be accommodated. Intellectual and religious disputes will inevitably arise – yet the idea of purification itself opposes such inclusiveness. The question must be posed: does the need to return to the original message of the Muslim Brothers' movement require the adoption of the religious inclinations of its founder, or just its political ideas and organisational model? It seems indeed that the adoption of al-Banna's ideas is not confined to the area of politics. The earliest intellectual formation and development of Jemaah Tarbiyah started with the impulse to consider Islam as an alternative to the national ideology of the state. The totality of Islam and its comprehensive nature has since become the main discourse within Jemaah Tarbiyah circles. The influence of al-Banna on Jemaah Tarbiyah remains broad; it can be traced in the ideas, doctrines and organisational instruments of the movement.¹¹

1. Heterogeneity of Jemaah Tarbiyah

Writings on specific religious questions, such as Islamic Jurisprudence (*fiqh*) by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists are rare. This indicates wide variation among the activists in their acquisition of religious knowledge and a tolerance of differing opinions. Most of their books are devoted to awakening individual religious awareness and not to compliance with particular issues in jurisprudential precepts. For the latter, they rely on Middle Eastern scholars. The books of Yusuf Qaradawi, for example, have become the most consulted reference for Jemaah Tarbiyah members. The general principle of Jemaah Tarbiyah in dealing with doctrinal issues is to avoid disputes and to seek a common understanding among Muslims, based on a deep grounding in the Qur'an and Hadith. Accordingly, the practices of particular aspects of Islamic jurisprudence depend on the individual religious backgrounds of those concerned.

The degree of rigidity in observance among Jemaah Tarbiyah members varies from one individual to another and in my observation, religious books written by the activists carry few details on the practices or doctrines of any particular school of jurisprudence.¹² Regarding disagreements over doctrine and practice, recourse is made to the rulings of the four orthodox schools, the Hanafi (689-759), Maliki (711-796), Shafii (767-820) and Hanbali (781-856). Jemaah Tarbiyah encourages its cadres to seek reference from authoritative sources. As long as the practices have strong bases in the two fundamental legitimate sources of the Qur'an and Hadith they are tolerated, regardless of possible quibbles over detail. The movement gives free choice to its members to consider the opinions of scholars of different schools. Tolerance in these matters aims to maintain unity among Muslims and to avoid any view that might be introduced by a new sect or belong to a particular group in society.¹³ The distinctive character about this movement is its commitment above all to the totality of Islam encompassing all

aspects of human life. Religious awareness is considered more important than religious difference

To become educators on whom people rely for answers about religious questions without creating doubts and disintegration within the community. Attempting to revive the spirit of tolerance, in responding to Islamic jurisprudential disputes, is motivated by a spirit to find a common ground for the sake of uniting the *ummah*.¹⁴

A seminal book on the theme of preserving the heritage of Hasan al-Banna, entitled *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam* (the Dakwah Strategy of the Islamic Movement) was written by Hilmi Aminuddin, currently head of the Consultative Assembly (Majelis Syura) of PKS. Aminuddin is one of the figures who made initial contact with Muslim Brothers' ideas during his studies in Saudi Arabia. He states the need to "preserve the originality of *dakwah*" (*muhafazah 'ala asalah al-da'wah*) by relying on three issues - originality of faith, worship and prayer, and ideas.¹⁵ These three, however, must not promote a rigid purification or bring blame upon others for practising a "contaminated" form of religion. Although he took Islamic studies in Saudi Arabia, Hilmi Aminuddin is an heir to traditionalist inclinations, having spent many years earlier studying at the Pesantren of Tebuireng in Jombang, East Java, the renowned city of religious boarding schools of a traditionalist reputation.¹⁶

In fact, attendance at the Jemaah Tarbiyah *halaqah* or a religious meeting does not assure an advanced level of knowledge in any particular area of Islamic jurisprudence or theology. The role of the weekly meetings is only to raise religious awareness and to equip those attending in the broader concepts of Islam. The subjects taught in *halaqah* are very general and simple, far from an expert knowledge of Islam and its heritage.¹⁷ In order to fill the shortfall in Islamic knowledge for its cadres the movement set up religious institutions, called *ma'had* (Ar. *al-ma'had*). In the absence of *ma'had* in areas where there are large numbers of new Jemaah Tarbiyah recruits, members are encouraged to attend other existing reliable Islamic institutions. In Jakarta, the role of the Institute of Islamic and Arabic Studies, Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Islam dan Arab (LIPIA) affiliated with the Imam Ibn Saud University in Saudi Arabia to provide Islamic knowledge among both modernist and traditionalist students coming from a variety of *pesantren* throughout Indonesia has been very significant.

It is interesting to note that the heterogeneity within Jemaah Tarbiyah and the efforts of PKS to bridge the gap between traditionalist and modernist camps in Indonesia have drawn some suspicion from NU and Muhammadiyah. For NU activists, PKS is not only considered to represent the modernists but is also labelled the party of neo-Wahabis or Salafis.¹⁸ This accusation has its basis on the general call of PKS activists to return to the Qur'an and Hadith and the

trustworthy founding generation of scholars (*al-salaf al-salih*).¹⁹ For some Muhammadiyah members, particularly the youth, PKS is an alternative and indeed makes more common sense in terms of political ideology. However, the older generation of Muhammadiyah activists still consider PKS not only a political party but also a religious movement subscribing to an ideology different from Muhammadiyah.²⁰ At the elite level, for both NU and Muhammadiyah PKS is a rival, since it promotes different political and ideological affiliations.

Among the Salafi groups, PKS is considered to have deviated from the true teachings of *al-salaf al-salih* and has often been accused of entertaining religious innovation (*bid'ah*).²¹ This accusation is caused by the image of the “problematic figure” of Hasan al-Banna who drew his ideas from both Salafi and Sufi traditions alike. For the followers of “pure” Salafism, Hasan al-Banna was not committed to the doctrines of Salafism. Those ideas unacceptable to Salafi groups were in the main related to practices adopted from the writings of the medieval scholars; al-Ash'ari (d. 935) and al-Ghazali (d.1111).²² Most Salafi groups do not accept these scholars, whilst al-Banna was very familiar with their writings and practices.²³

In the 1990s, the once good relations between Salafi groups and Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia were broken because of disappointment among Salafi followers with the decision of PKS to enter politics – Salafis reject practical politics.²⁴ It seemed that the reason was not only internal friction in Indonesia but rather international friction in responding to the Gulf War in 1990, when the Muslim Brothers gave their support to Iraq instead of Saudi Arab as the backbone of Salafism.²⁵ In Indonesia, the financial support offered to Jemaah Tarbiyah activities by Saudi Arabia declined after the Gulf War.

2. Turning into Traditionalists

Having realised the need to include traditionalist groups, which have significant numbers of followers in Indonesia, and yet to preserve the originality of the movement, Jemaah Tarbiyah has felt the need to return to the authentic model established by the founder of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna. One of the many books written by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, mentioned above, advocates the need to go back to the original texts written by al-Banna.²⁶ It is recommended that the Arabic versions be read in order to gain a full understanding of his ideas and mission.²⁷ Whilst other prominent figures such as Sayyid Qutb are widely emulated by contemporary Islamic movements throughout the world, Jemaah Tarbiyah has limited access only to his renowned Qur'an exegesis, *Fi Dilal al-Qur'an* (In the Shade of the Qur'an). Qutb's more radical works are not promoted. Instead, the influence of al-Banna is incalculable and most books written by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists refer to him.²⁸

Efforts to preserve the originality of the movement employing the initial methods of al-Banna have led to other theological and doctrinal consequences. Al-Banna's traditionalist and Sufi orientations have greatly influenced the practices of the Muslim Brothers. Undoubtedly, members of Jemaah Tarbiyah brought up in the modernist traditions of Indonesia meet confusion in al-Banna's intellectual heritage. However, those already within Jemaah Tarbiyah and familiar with al-Banna's ideas have tolerance towards the practices of Sufism, as long as they are based in Islam. Sufism that upholds a valid Islamic morality and is derived from Islamic sources is allowable.²⁹

However, the spirit of bringing the movement into accordance with the Qur'an and Hadith remains the main agenda. All efforts towards this end are carried out in a gradual and consensual manner, not to create tensions in society. For Jemaah Tarbiyah, a long-term predication is the only and best option and Jemaah Tarbiyah programs have started to accommodate traditionalist elements since its decision to be involved in the political arena.

Activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah have been well aware that esoteric Sufi teachings have had strong roots in Indonesian Islam for many centuries. Greater political Islamism, which would undermine spirituality, would cause alienation from mainstream Islam, in particular from NU. Instead of criticising the role of Sufism in the process of the Islamisation of Indonesia, the famed nine saints (*walisongo*) from the history of Java are considered by Jemaah Tarbiyah to be local pioneers of Islamic movements.³⁰

On the other hand, the teachings of al-Banna are responsible for the "pragmatic approach" of PKS to politics. It was al-Banna who often advocated a "middle way" and was keen to avoid religious conflict in order to maintain social harmony. This "middle" inclination was also typical of al-Ash'ari and al-Ghazali, al-Banna's inspirations. PKS activists are quite aware that adopting al-Banna's ideas has led them to accommodation in politics. Ahmad Firman Yusuf, a former head of the Central Board of PK (1999-2004) says that "most Muslim activists have viewed the ideas of the Muslim Brothers as too tolerant and flexible in upholding the *shariah*. Al-Banna based his opinions on the concept of benefit in *dakwah* (*maslahah al-da'wah*). However, besides his "tolerant attitude" in *dakwah*, his opinions always have justification in the principles of *shariah*."³¹ For instance, the decision to be involved in a secular system was widely criticised by many Muslim activists since this involvement meant to acknowledge secular and infidel rule that is in violation of the message of the Qur'an.³² Within al-Banna's understanding of *maslahah*, involvement in a secular system is preferable if it prevents harm and brings benefit, even though that benefit may only be relative.³³

This attitude sets Jemaah Tarbiyah apart from other Islamic groups, who prefer to make clear cut distinctions between what is allowable (*al-halal*) and

unallowable (*al-haram*). Such tolerance of the secular system is influenced by Sufi teachings. As has been suggested by Michael Gilson, the political importance of the Sufi orders has been characterised by their inclination to serve as mediators and peacemakers in a system in which dispute has been only one element in the constant tension born out of a need for security.³⁴ The Sufi orders cut across the ties of geography, kinship and tribal affiliation, forming a framework for a broader set of social relations and political cohesion.³⁵

Hasan al-Banna was “a schoolteacher with a background of individual and family religious studies and a modern oriented education.”³⁶ He was not a typically deep thinker, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh or other reformist figures; rather he was a charismatic leader who was able to pave the way for the establishment of a viable and effective Islamic movement. What makes him distinct from scholars before and during his time, despite his success as a propagandist and leader of a movement, was that he never undertook advanced religious studies. He graduated from a secular university, Darul Ulum University in Cairo, specialising in educational training. He was more concerned with bringing people from different sects together and avoiding doctrinal disputes.³⁷ His training in mysticism (*tasawwuf*), which he received within the regime of the Hasafiyah Shadziliyyah order, moulded his entire personality. However, his inclination toward Sufism, which had made itself felt since childhood, was not purely otherworldly; it did not prevent him from being actively concerned with concrete social issues and activities.³⁸

Initially, the Muslim Brothers was a socio-religious movement which aimed at restoring the spiritual and social dimensions of Egyptian Muslims, while at the time challenging the influence of Christian missionaries in Egypt.³⁹ Overwhelmed by the political and social problems of his nation under the impact of Western civilisation, al-Banna felt that Egyptian society had departed from the goals of its faith; therefore, returning society into the guidance of Islam became the main goal of the Muslim Brothers.⁴⁰ The movement expanded its role to engage in a struggle to “liberate” Egypt and the Arab world from foreign occupation and domination. Since it offered a reform-based Islamic framework against a corrupted society and government, it gained popularity and support from the humbler rural and urban societies of Egypt. Even more, albeit not organisationally controlled, the Muslim Brothers expanded their influence and attracted large numbers of Muslims throughout the world, including the Indonesian offshoot.⁴¹

Thus Hasan al-Banna tried to accommodate a wide range of Islamic orientations, conceiving his initial movement as (1) a Salafi movement (*dakwah salafiyah*) to reject any actions contrary to the Qur’an and the *Sunnah*; (2) a Sunni path (*tariqah sunniyyah*) that inclines it to practise the Prophet’s way of life; (3) a Sufi truth (*haqiqah sufiyah*) that emphasises virtue and purity; (4) a political organization (*hay’ah siyasiyyah*) that calls for political change from within; (5) an athletic

group (*jama'ah riyadiyyah*) that stresses the significance of physical exercise; (6) a cultural and scientific body (*rabitah 'ilmiyyah thaqafiyyah*) that seeks to enhance the knowledge of its members and others about Islam; (7) an economic enterprise (*shirkah iqtisadiyyah*) that calls upon its members to gain economic power and ensure its distribution; and (8) a social ideal (*jama'ah ijtima'iyyah*) that is committed to solve the malaise of society.⁴²

It was Hasan al-Banna who laid the basic foundations of the doctrines that combined Sufism, which focuses on the spiritual and mental development of the individual, and social activism, which encourages its adherents to be involved with people.⁴³ Al-Banna himself saw no contradiction between Sufism's ethical and spiritual goals and his own social praxis.⁴⁴ In the end, he acknowledged that the final shape of the Muslim Brothers resulted from the intellectual and social evolution of his own Sufi affiliation with the Hasafiyyah order.⁴⁵ Interestingly, this order was led by his close spiritual friend, Ahmad Syukri, whom he transferred to the Muslim Brothers branch in Ismailiyah and then chose as his deputy in Cairo.⁴⁶

Through his deep involvement with the Hasafiyyah order, al-Banna also paved the way for reform in Sufi doctrines which benefited their organizations as prospective religious and social movements. The structure of his own movement is very much based on Sufi concepts and terms. Even though he did not attribute it to any particular order (*tariqah*), the usages and practices of Sufism are found in the organisational terms of the Muslim Brothers. He called his followers *al-ikhwan* (brothers) and assumed the title of *murshid* (supervisor). He used the Sufi term *bay'ah* (oath) to initiate new members and obliged them to practise his compilation of *wirid* and *wazifah* (prayers). The mutual feelings developed among members also show a profound Sufi inclination, signified by such terms as brotherhood (*ukhuwwah*) and family (*usrah*).⁴⁷

Al-ikhwan (brothers) indicates the specific type of mutual friendship among the members of a Sufi order; in its strictest sense, the term *al-ikhwan* refers to members of the same Sufi line, for instance, those of the Naqsyabandiyyah, Tijaniyyah, Qadiriyyah, and so forth. There is mutual obligation as well: a member of a *tariqah*, (*al-ikhwan*) may travel through distant regions, accepting hospitality along the way from local brothers. The *ikhwan* code guarantees the traveller will find shelter or food within the order.⁴⁸

From the beginning, the Muslim Brothers did not aim to single themselves out from broader Egyptian society. Instead of identifying his followers as a tightly knit or closed group like the *tarekat* (Ar. *tariqah*), Hasan al-Banna preferred to name his organisation *al-ikhwan al-muslimun* (Muslim Brothers).⁴⁹ He did not want to deal with religious disputes arising among members of different Sufi orders or to limit his call to a narrow element of society. His organization had to address all levels of the broader society, based on three fundamentals –

knowledge (*al-'ilm*), education (*al-tarbiyyah*) and striving (*al-jihad*). However, he provided the opportunity for those who wanted to go through the special training of the brotherhoods to do so.⁵⁰ In the long run, however, the Muslim Brothers could not escape from an exclusivist orientation; indeed it developed into a group quite set apart from community at large.

Murshid (General Guide) is the title of the supreme leader of a Sufi order and the title taken by the head of the Muslim Brothers. It literally means "the one who gives spiritual guidance to his pupils" (*murid*). Within the Sufi tradition, the *murshid*, or *sheikh* is capable of bringing his pupils into a closer relation to God. He is "an inspired man to whose eyes the mysteries of the hidden are revealed, because he sees with the light of God and knows what thoughts and confusion are in man's hearts."⁵¹ The uppermost thing in Sufi practice is to find a good guide on whom followers may rely totally. The pupils should follow the instructions of the guide without reservation.⁵²

Most importantly for al-Banna, the choice of Sufi custom and the stress on the religious bond between the leader and the led reinforced the significance of personal authority within the Muslim Brothers. Al-Banna was able to revise the requirement of absolute obedience to the teacher into more flexible relations by emphasising the need for students to maintain their own freedom of thinking. He still required the sincere observation of the obligatory prayers (*salah*), the liturgies (*dhikr*) and ethics (*akhlaq*).⁵³ He based his leadership on his charismatic authority but also confined it within the framework of a bureaucratic and hierarchical organization.⁵⁴ Furthermore, he emphasised that not all of the instructions of the *murshid* should be followed, particularly in dealing with non-religious matters. In one of his "twenty principles and guidelines for followers of the Muslim Brothers" he explained:

The opinion of the leader or his deputy regarding issues that are not clearly ruled out in the text and may attract possible interpretation but serve the public interest (*maslahah*) may be applied as long as the statement does not contradict *shariah* principles. However, it may change depending on the changing of conditions, time and local tradition. Principally, worship requires a total surrender without considering the meaning, but non-worship activities should be examined as to their meanings and goals.⁵⁵

Nevertheless, al-Banna maintained the style of *murshid* leadership in running his society of the Muslim Brothers to a certain extent. He was a charismatic leader, since none of his companions was able to challenge his leadership. As General Guide of the Brothers, he demanded the loyalty of his followers and held "the power in his own hands and personally directed the program and the policies of his organization."⁵⁶ His personal characteristics and outstanding

intellectual attainment were evident from the respect he was given. Even those who knew him personally, though had never belonged to the Muslim Brothers, acknowledged his personal qualities

Al-Banna had three outstanding qualifications for leadership. He had an extraordinary amount of personal charm and magnetism; he was a most eloquent speaker, with a degree of oratorical power that moved his audiences deeply; and he possessed an unusually good command of his native tongue. In the Arabic-speaking world, any man with the ability to express himself fluently in excellent Arabic is highly appreciated and respected.⁵⁷

However, it is because of his Sufi style of leadership that many writers on the Muslim Brothers have criticised his leadership: it was not democratic in nature. For instance, Zakariyya Sulayman Bayumi contended that the autocratic style of Hasan al-Banna and lack of democracy in the Muslim Brothers were serious defects in the organization.⁵⁸ Furthermore, a number of leftist Egyptian historians, such as Rif'at al-Said⁵⁹ and Tariq al-Bisri⁶⁰ accused the movement of representing the opponents of the democratic forces because of its alignment with the "autocratic" and "fascist" forces of the palace.⁶¹ This leadership style has also drawn criticism of Jemaah Tarbiyah in Indonesia. It is accused of being too focussed on the relationship of the *murabbi* (mentor) towards his *mutarabbi* (student) in which the student should obey whatever the mentor has instructed. The process of conveying knowledge is often seen as indoctrination. Even the case of marriage among *halaqah* members, the *murabbi* has a significant role in determining the marriage process. The relationship between *murabbi* and *mutarabbi* also depends to a large extent on the character of the *murabbi*, who may be flexible or strict.⁶²

Another term borrowed from the *tariqah* and applied by al-Banna is *bay'ah*, the oath taken by the seeker of mystical wisdom to abide by the organization's rules and guidelines. Strictly speaking, none of the Sufi orders accept new members of the *tariqah* without the swearing of this covenant. Only those to have taken the vow of allegiance to the leader of the order are allowed to begin practising the rituals. Before taking the oath, the candidate should make sincere repentance before God and renounce his or her past sins.⁶³ The new student places his hand in the hand of the *murshid* and the *murshid* administers the covenant that he or she accepts the *murshid* as his or her guide.⁶⁴ It should be noted that each Sufi order has its own particular details and ways of proceeding in performing the ceremony of covenant taking.

The first members of the Muslim Brothers swore their allegiance to the *murshid* al-Banna himself. They were six labourers working in the British Company of the Suez Canal, and were seeking a guide able to improve their spiritual and

social conditions. Even though it has not been clearly described for posterity, the event of the covenant taking by these ordinary people indicates the strong relations between leader and led.⁶⁵ It explicitly shows the Sufi code, when laymen surrendered themselves and all their possessions - blood, soul and coin, to express their adherence to an honourable spiritual Guide.⁶⁶ Since that moment, al-Banna fulfilled his dream to become a respected Guide and teacher (*murshid* and *mu'allim*) and guided his followers accordingly.⁶⁷ He also successfully reformed the absolute dependence of students upon their teacher into the concept of solidarity and brotherhood among the members, under the banner of the Muslim Brothers, in which the *murshid* was included.

In the case of PKS, cadres are expected to make allegiance to the party, just as are cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Since the Majelis Syura occupies the highest status in the party leadership, all committee members of the party should obey and exercise decisions issued by it. The Majelis Syura is also charged to elect the members of central board committees and to formulate all strategies of the party. Members of Majelis Syura are appointed through internal elections held by the central board of the party. It represents senior members of Jemaah Tarbiyah from the provincial branches, and some scholars and social leaders. Candidates of Majelis Syura must hold at least the level of *ahli* (expert) in the party. The membership of the party is divided into three levels: sympathizers or *pemula* (beginners) and *muda* (the young); core cadres of *madya* (intermediate), *dewasa* (mature) and *ahli* (expert) status, and *purna* (advanced), and *luar biasa* (extraordinary) which are based on merit. When the members of Majelis Syura are formally elected, they are obliged to swear allegiance to the party.⁶⁸

To realise commonality and the sharing of aims rather than a single-focussed loyalty, al-Banna revised the concept and practice of attachment to the *murshid* (*rabitah murshid*) to the attachment to fellow students (*rabitah muridin*). When the *rabitah murshid* is undertaken as a practice in certain other Sufi orders, students are instructed to visualise their master and sense his presence within their hearts. Al-Banna's newly devised *rabitah* however involved a process of communal visualisation among fellow students.⁶⁹ Thus the *rabitah*, understood as a special spiritual relation, was not monopolised by the master but was shared by all members. In practising *rabitah*, the Brothers were to visualise their fellow members' faces and try to feel spiritual contact with them (even those with whom they had no acquaintance). Then the following prayer was recited

O Allah, indeed you know that our hearts have gathered for the sake of your love, met for the purpose of obedience, united under your mission and promised to uphold your path. O Allah! Strengthen our relations, endure our passion, and give us your light that never reduces to a glimmer! Widen our hearts with full faith and the beauty of submission

and revive them with your knowledge. Show me the way of *jihad*. Surely, you are the best Guide and Helper.⁷⁰

Recognising the Sufi aspects of al-Banna's teachings, it is understandable that some members of PKS have begun to acknowledge the practice of Sufism within Islam. A practical example of this is the forging of close contact between the PKS branches of West and Central Java with leaders of the Sufi orders, the Tarekat Syahadatain and Tarekat Rifa'iyyah of those provinces. The leaders of both of these *tarekat* have welcomed the PKS campaigns and have readily introduced the PKS to their members in the 2004 general elections.⁷¹

Furthermore, efforts to appreciate non-modernist elements of Islam by committee members of PKS have developed, not only in certain regions, but in many others as well. In the area of Islamic knowledge and thought there has been a similar trend. The publishing of books in great numbers dealing with Sufi subjects by PKS-associated publishers indicates the movement's increasing inclination to extend its membership among Muslims of a traditionalist background. The Rabbani Press which was so well known in the mid-1980s for publishing political materials by the Muslim Brothers has moved to concern itself with issues of the "purification of the heart," a central theme in Sufi traditions. It has published many books written by al-Ghazali (1058-1111), re-edited by the Muslim Brothers scholar, Sayyid Hawwa on the classic *Ihya Ulumuddin* (The Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other Sufi subjects. However, the categorical rejection of Sufism among modernist groups in Indonesia makes some activists of PKS inclined to use the term, *tazkiyyah al-nafs* (purification of heart) than "Sufism." In dealing with the subject of the love of God, Hidayat Nurwahid, former president of PKS and currently Chairperson of the People's Consultative Assembly, Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR, 2004-2005) avoids the use of the term "*tasawwuf*": "The love of God (*al-hub Ila Allah*) is a central and fundamental topic in theology and within the purified soul."⁷²

So to summarise all of the above, in comparison with their modernist predecessors, the activists of PKS of today value the practice of Sufism. In translating the ideas of al-Banna, they are far more permissive of Sufism than the "real" proponents of purification movements, such as Muhammadiyah or Persis. A heated issue in Sufism, and one stridently rejected by modernist groups, is the subject of *tawassul* (prayer for mediation). Whilst the reformist groups emphasise prayer as direct communication with God, the traditionalists allow room for mediation between humankind and the Creator. This mediation is believed to be carried out by the four great companions of the Prophet and deceased local saints. Al-Banna himself discussed this question of mediation at some length in his book, *Majmu'a al-Rasail* (Collected Writings), first translated into Indonesian by *Media Dakwah* in 1983 and recently again by the PKS-associated Era Intermedia in 2002. However, since *Media Dakwah* has been

influenced by modernist and even puritan ideas, it interpreted the issue of *tawassul*, as addressed by Hasan al-Banna, as a denial of its validity. Era Intermedia, on the other hand, considers it to be a disputed issue that may be tolerated.⁷³

The Sufi influences bringing PKS to a pragmatic and flexible approach in promoting its objectives can be seen in the way in which members of Jemaah Tarbiyah has formulated its strategy of Islamising the state. The following steps, as given by Cahyadi Takariawan in his book *Rekayasa Masa Depan Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Islam*,⁷⁴ are an elaboration of al-Banna's emphasis on the need to initiate *dakwah* from individual, to family and to society. A society that is motivated and familiar with the teachings of Islam will automatically determine the nature of the state.⁷⁵

B. Steps to Islamise the State

Jemaah Tarbiyah was originally a purely religious movement but it has remained by no means without political motives in the long term. My study of its fundamental doctrines and principles of operation reveals that since the very beginning, Jemaah Tarbiyah has had a systematic and clear political orientation, even if it had not then been put into practice. Mahfudz Sidiq, a student activist of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the 1980s and currently the head of the PKS faction in DPR RI illustrated the political nature of the movement

When I joined Jemaah Tarbiyah in the mid 1980s, we had no aim to establish a political party. However, the main discourse was to develop a framework for Islam that included politics. In those socio-political conditions, Islam was considered as the antithesis of existing Indonesian political practice. Islam provides an alternative, but not necessarily a political party.⁷⁶

In fact, not all cadres of Jemaah Tarbiyah initially supported the establishment of the political party in 1998. A survey circulated among 6000 cadres asking whether Jemaah Tarbiyah should establish a party or a mass organization produced surprising results. About 68% of respondents supported the establishment of a party, 27% of respondents preferred to form a mass organization and the remainder wanted Jemaah Tarbiyah kept to be as an informal movement.⁷⁷ Many members of PKS committees whom I interviewed revealed that they initially did not support the setting up of the party and would have preferred a mass organization.⁷⁸ One of the reasons in favour of forming a political party was in order to not provoke confrontation with the mainstream Islamic mass organizations: NU, Muhammadiyah, and Persis.⁷⁹ However, only Muhammadiyah and Persis members in the grassroots level felt close to PKS; members of NU were then still reluctant to join.

It was the growing student interest in politics that pushed Jemaah Tarbiyah towards taking a more politically explicit role. Through their political experiences within the campuses, the members of Jemaah Tarbiyah have been able to play a significant role in responding to political events outside. They have organised protests against the government on issues that varied from religious demands, such as the issue of women's head covering, to the more politically focussed, such as demanding that President Soeharto step down.

The unique character of Jemaah Tarbiyah lies in its attitude to *dakwah* and politics. In general, the group makes no distinction between the two. As a political party, the religious agenda of PKS is much more closely intertwined with its politics rather than is the case with other parties. Through the political party, huge public gatherings (*tabligh akbar*) are organised, combining both religious and political issues. Furthermore, most of the political activities are self-funded through professional arrangements of religious charities. Members of the party are obliged to pay religious dues, *zakat*,⁸⁰ *infaq*⁸¹ and *shadaqah*⁸² regularly to the party. Other Islamic parties like PKB, PPP and PBB, for instance, also use the religious services of NU for supporting party candidates, but not in such an integrated way as PKS. PKB has not organised the regular religious gatherings (*pengajian*) or the collection of donations as extensively as PKS has done.

Since there is no separation of the religious and the political in the party, the activists of the PKS prefer to consider it merely an extension of the field of *dakwah*. They distinguish their party from others in Indonesia by calling it *Partai Dakwah* (the *Dakwah* Party). So even though it is a political organ, it carries out the holy duty of *dakwah* within the broadest context. In order to manage and organise its constituents throughout the archipelago, PKS has divided Indonesia into four *dakwah* territories, or *Wilayah Dakwah* (Wilda). These are Wilda I for Sumatra, Wilda II for DKI Jakarta, Banten, West Java and Kalimantan, Wilda III for Central Jawa, Sulawesi and Papua, and Wilda IV for the East Java, West Nusa Tenggara and East Nusa Tenggara.⁸³ Each Wilda head is expected to appear as a religious and political figure among the people of the regions.

The principle of integrating religious and political activities is not an unusual one for PKS. They believe that Islam is an integral system guiding human beings to win prosperity on earth and in the hereafter. Prosperity itself can be achieved by individual and collective efforts to develop spiritual qualities for the triumph of Islam. The party should function as a vehicle to meet the needs of the people in attaining material and spiritual prosperity.⁸⁴

In order to accomplish the mission of the *dakwah* party, *dakwah* should be managed in a professional way and follow a strategy, which is termed the *shiyasah al-da'wah* (the politics of predication). The effectiveness of the *dakwah* programme lies in its contribution to political, cultural and religious changes in

society as well as within the state. Such changes are needed to ensure that society and the state are always under the guidance of the teachings of Islam.

The writings of the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists focus mainly on the issue of the “politics of *dakwah*.” *Dakwah* must be carried out systematically, following well-prepared steps and phases that have been set by the movement. *Dakwah* cadres are not only required to convey religious messages to the wider members of society but they are also supposed to form “literate and educated groups” who clearly understand the essence of being Muslim and who will act in accordance with the goals and missions determined by the *dakwah* initiators. In general, steps to Islamise the state by the Jemaah Tarbiyah are best described in four stages. These phases are standard guidelines for all active members of the movement in order for it to achieve its long-term goal of the “Islamisation” of Indonesia.

1. Creating Strong Cadres

The first stage in creating cadres in Jemaah Tarbiyah is through special training, initially informal, with an emphasis on ideological internalisation. A strong cadre base is vital to achieve the movement’s goals. It is through individuals who have internalised the teachings of Islam that a further process of Islamisation in all its aspects is likely. The slogan that Jemaah Tarbiyah espouses is derived from a saying of a prominent leader of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Hudaibi, “uphold Islam in your heart, and it will grow strong within your society.”⁸⁵

Yet the phase of “ideology building” among new members (*mihwar tanzim*) is not an easy one.⁸⁶ This stage best describes the condition of Jemaah Tarbiyah during its initial development in Indonesia during the New Order. Most activists experienced difficulty in maintaining communications and contact with others. They could not easily liaise with their fellow members, since the government was suspicious of any movements they saw as threatening the stability of the nation. Jemaah Tarbiyah members were forced to maintain secrecy and to avoid contact with other Muslims.

The pioneers of Jemaah Tarbiyah newly returned from their studies in the Saudi universities, however, succeeded in establishing contact with fellow Muslim student activists on the Indonesian campuses. Since the mid-1980s they have been able to train many cadres, the majority from university backgrounds. The reason to target students in the secular universities as the backbone of the movement was prompted by the fact that such students were more open to new ideas that were different from traditionalist and modernist orientations. These students were not deeply rooted in the Islamic traditions of their parents, and the campus milieu loosened their attachment to any previous religious affiliations. New ideas brought back by the Saudi graduates and introduced into

Tarbiyah provided an alternative vehicle for young Muslim activists to struggle for Islam.⁸⁷

The success of Jemaah *Tarbiyah* in generating strong cadres has also provided a strong base for PKS. PKS is the only real cadre party in Indonesia. Their strength of character has been evident in some of their activities involving thousands of participants. For instance, they often prove that they can hold demonstrations and stage political campaigns of mass participation without violence or anarchic behaviour.⁸⁸ Numerically, too, the solidity of mass support for PKS is the result of a long process of *Tarbiyah* training since the 1980s. *Tarbiyah* training has created thousands of cadres with strong ideology, so that the movement has become widespread throughout the Indonesian archipelago.⁸⁹

The dynamics of *halaqah*, influenced by Sufi patron-client relations, differs from the methods of caderisation of other Islamic student groups, such as PMII,⁹⁰ HMI and PII. During the cadre phase, members are requested to make selective recruitment through the *halaqah*. A successful *halaqah* is one which continues to grow and constantly generates more groups of *halaqah*. However, the essence of *halaqah* is not a matter of the recruitment of cadres in terms of numbers alone; careful consideration must also be given to cadres' qualities and expertise.⁹¹ For instance, the religious and educational backgrounds of prospective cadres are important considerations as to whether or not to include them in the movement. Candidate cadres with a high level of education who hold vital positions in the work place or in society are more favourable than those who have only basic schooling. In addition, those who have been involved with terrorist organisations are to be excluded, since it is Jemaah *Tarbiyah*'s policy not to recruit or even make contact with them.⁹² It actively discourages its members from communicating with such groups for any purpose, including business activity and social interaction.⁹³

The chief concern is to selectively enlist potential cadres who will guarantee the movement's interests in the future. Because of the secret nature of the recruitment process in the past, when Jemaah *Tarbiyah* was under surveillance from the regime, many members segregated themselves from wider society. However, when the regime's surveillance was lifted and there was more freedom to express ideas, the model of secret recruitment changed. Now, under the banner of PKS, all recruitment is open to the public. Members of *halaqah* are allowed to invite non-members, including non-Muslims, to attend *halaqah*. These non-member guests are usually asked to share their own knowledge and expertise with the members.⁹⁴

Cadres formed in the first phase commit themselves to uphold the movement's ideals. The Jemaah *Tarbiyah* doctrine of Islam as an all encompassing system of life, as formulated by Hasan al-Banna, becomes their guideline.⁹⁵ Though they may have come from different religious backgrounds or social affiliations, they

are expected to subvert these to the movement's mission. The movement requires their adherence and observance, and in order to join Jemaah Tarbiyah the cadre needs to take an oath of allegiance (*bay'ah*).⁹⁶

According to the PK database of 1999, since the establishment of Jemaah Tarbiyah activities in the 1980s, about 30,000 cadres, mostly student and university alumni, have joined the campaign for the party in the 1999 general elections. The party gained about 1,436,565 votes. It claims that during the 2004 general elections, numbers of active members of PKS reached more than 300,000 full time workers for the party.⁹⁷ Furthermore, the increase in the numbers of cadres has had an impact on the party's performance in the general elections of 2004, even though external factors, such as campaign programmes that have allied the party with the urban grassroots, have also played a part in this success.

2. Socialising the Ideas

The members of Jemaah Tarbiyah recognise that significant changes towards a more "Islamic" society cannot be built solely on cadres; the movement must also muster mass support.⁹⁸ Needless to say, they also maintain that the process of Islamising Indonesian society and the state must be gained through gradual and non-violent ways. Creating committed cadres is simply the first step in influencing the masses.

Thus Jemaah Tarbiyah is well aware of the need for interacting with and influencing broader sections of society. Once the strong cadres have been formed, the group moves to the second phase of its strategy, preparing to socialise its ideas and aims to the people in general. This stage is called "the phase of socialization" (*mihwar sha'bi*) in which popular acceptance is sought. If the first stage emphasises building the character of cadres, this second stage moves forward to examine to what extent *Tarbiyah* ideas will be accepted or rejected. Cadres are expected to present as exemplars to all people from various backgrounds. If earlier they have considered non-members of the movement as "others," they are now required to display a common interest with all of society. It is crucial that they develop the skills of good communication.

At the same time, cadres are still required to recruit new members so far as possible. Activists introduce the movement's aims to members of the elite and to prominent figures in society. The role of such figures becomes an important consideration. For instance, in the past, Nurcholish Madjid received harsh criticism from many activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah. A sharp debate between Nurcholish Madjid and Daud Rasyid (of Jemaah Tarbiyah) in 1992 resulted in a strong rejection of the ideas of Madjid among Jemaah Tarbiyah members. Others of Jemaah Tarbiyah, such as Abu Ridha, Hidayat Nurwahid and Didin Hafiduddin also joined in the attack on Madjid. Interestingly, relations between Madjid and Jemaah Tarbiyah improved, in particular after Madjid was invited

by the Justice Party to be a keynote speaker during the opening ceremony of its National Meeting (*Musyawarah Nasional*) in 2000. Madjid himself, in order to draw the interest of Islamic parties (since he intended to stand as a presidential candidate in 2004) affirmed he did not mean by the slogan “Islam Yes, Islamic Party No!” to reject the existence of an “Islamic party” per se. On the contrary, he admitted that his earlier rejection of an “Islamic party” during the 1970s was prompted by his criticism, as a young Muslim, of the then Islamic parties that were mostly corrupt.⁹⁹ Jemaah Tarbiyah activists were able to accept Madjid’s change of attitude as normal when referred to the example of one of the founders of Islamic jurisprudence, Muhammad Ibn Idris Al-Shafi’i (d. 820) who held both *al-qawl al-qadim* (the old opinion) and *al-qawl al-jadid* (the new opinion) to make new ruling.¹⁰⁰

Social services and community assistance have become the movement’s chief instruments in attracting the masses. In this, it is supported not only by its core cadres but also by outsiders sympathetic to its objectives. It has also subsequently established a number of non-governmental organizations (NGO) that focus on social, educational and cultural activities. It has established a number of educational and religious institutions to support the process of recruitment from various levels of society, such as the educational tutoring centre of Nurul Fikri in 1984, the Islamic higher education of al-Hikmah in 1987, the Islamic missionary institute of Khairu Ummah in 1989 and the contemporary Islamic and social studies of Sidik in 1992.

The Nurul Fikri Foundation has helped high school students to enter university, training them to successfully answer the entry tests. Besides its secular subjects, the foundation also has provided students with religious instruction and encouraged them to support Islamic activities on campus once they have gained admission. Many alumni of the foundation have become student activists affiliated with PKS.

The Islamic higher education institution of al-Hikmah was set up to prepare university students in Islamic subjects. Initially it was a type of traditionalist educational centre, founded by Haji Hasan. It was Hasan’s son, Abdul Hasib, who graduated in Saudi Arabia in 1987 who developed it into a formal institution. Abdul Hasib is currently a member of the Consultative Board of PKS. Students from secular universities in Jakarta, such as UI, IKIP and Trisakti University, have attended evening classes in al-Hikmah. It has been responsible for many activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah establishing similar institutions in other regions where secular campuses also exist.¹⁰¹

The Khairu Ummah foundation is a predication institute (*lembaga dakwah*) established by some senior members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. It aims to provide preachers and Friday lecturers for campuses and community mosques in Jakarta. It also sends preachers to give lectures in Islamic training organised by Muslim

students and other Islamic gatherings in commercial offices and business centres. Activists of Khairu Ummah also often serve audiences outside Jakarta and other areas outside Java.¹⁰²

Abu Ridha, Al-Muzammil Yusuf and Habib Abu Bakar al-Habsyi established the Study and Information for Contemporary Islamic World, Studi dan Informasi Dunia Islam Kontemporer (SIDIK).¹⁰³ This centre aims to provide social and political studies for members of Jemaah Tarbiyah. Through SIDIK, news of events in the Islamic world have been passed on to students in universities and Islamic communities as well, through printed media, audiovisual material and seminars. SIDIK also contributed to political analysis in preparing for the establishment of PK in 1998.

3. Forming a Political Party

Jemaah Tarbiyah continues to enter political institutions. This is the “stage of political penetration” (*mihwar mu’assasi*) in which it introduces political education and training to its cadres, even though they have known from the beginning that the movement makes no hard and fast distinction between religion and politics. The problem was once that they did not previously know whether the movement would transform itself into a political party or a religious mass organization, such as NU and Muhammadiyah.

The application of this third stage is again a further elaboration of a concept of al-Banna to exert political influence on the existing government. Even though al-Banna did not recommend establishing a party, the concept of Islam as a universal and complete system encompassing all aspects of human life has been translated by Jemaah Tarbiyah activists as a reason to participate in the political process through a political party. Al-Banna himself said that Islam is a combination of inseparables: state and nation, rulers and people, morality and strength, love and equity, civilization and constitution, knowledge and justice, income and natural resources, effort and wealth, *jihad* and *dakwah*, and army and knowledge.¹⁰⁴

Since then many activists who had previously devoted their energies to religious training and *dakwah* activities have become keen to be involved in political issues. Jemaah Tarbiyah activists on campus in the 1990s became more familiar with day-to-day student concerns, ranging from labour issues to national political problems, alongside their previous religious interests. Of course, their involvement in political activities has not been achieved without preparation. Eep Saifullah Fatah, a former Islamic activist at the University of Indonesia, reports that in 1994 the Jemaah Tarbiyah cadres began to run political training in tandem with the regular religious programs. According to Fatah, the training aimed to raise the political awareness of the members and prepared the way for the next step of “Islamisation.” A number of prominent political scholars and

experts, such as Arbi Sanit and Deliar Noer were invited to give lectures.¹⁰⁵ Jemaah Tarbiyah activists then not only read books on Islamic subjects but began to read more widely into politics, sociology and philosophy.

The process of “Islamisation” for Jemaah Tarbiyah is not limited to the *dakwah* programs but includes a highly structured progression in expertise. When the cadres have successfully passed through the first stage, they proceed to the next. The success of their political experiments on the campuses has prompted them to find a more explicit political vehicle to achieve the movement’s goals. The activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah are expected to play a role as politicians. The politicians of PKS should be able to present themselves as professional and clean figures in the People’s Representative Assembly (DPR). They should be able to restore the bad image of some politicians and demonstrate a high standard of personal morality. In addition, the political party serves as a vehicle to further influence the policies of the government by drafting policies of a more apparent Islamic nature.¹⁰⁶

The establishment of Partai Keadilan in 1998 indicated that the stage of political penetration had begun. Nonetheless, at this stage cadres were still permitted to join other political parties of similar vision and ideology.¹⁰⁷ The reason was that *dakwah* should not be confined to any one political institution.¹⁰⁸ But some Jemaah Tarbiyah figures maintained that cadres could only possibly join social missions or professional organizations, and not another political party, as the group had already established its own.¹⁰⁹ As it turned out, few members of the Jemaah Tarbiyah actually gave their allegiance to parties other than their own. This was because Jemaah Tarbiyah considered PK as the only political party for their activists.

4. Penetrating the State

After the stage of political participation, cadres are encouraged to enter the state bureaucracy and to bring about changes in policy toward more Islamic goals. If the stage of building a political institution allows the movement to bring its cadres into the legislative body of the state, the next stage is more practically aimed of placing cadres in government organs. This is called “the era of the state” (*mihwar dawli*).¹¹⁰ The movement has no ambition to foment revolution or to take power but rather to exert influence through the active participation of its best cadres in cabinet and other governmental positions.

The commitment of the movement to abide by constitutional law is without question. It believes that the only way to bring change is through natural and constitutional means, in which the people and the state organs freely accept it. Of course, “change” here is the transformation of the state towards becoming more Islamic in nature. Does this stage entail the establishment of an Islamic state?

In general, both the ideals of Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political vehicle, PKS are on common ground about the nature of the state. The state and its leaders merely carry out their duties to God, in whom resides ultimate authority. The state should not violate the rules of God or pass laws that are in contradiction with the laws of God. In addition, the role of the leaders of the state should be solely to provide the people's necessities. The task of the state for PKS activists is

Reforming it to be a "truly Islamic state" so that it will serve the interests of the people and function as a servant of the people for their sake and welfare.¹¹¹

It appears so far that for PKS, the question of a formal Islamic state is not part of its political platform. A truly "Islamic" state need not necessarily be an Islamic state by name but should represent the Islamic virtues, such as accountability, love and care, justice, modesty and probity in spending funds.¹¹² However, this does not mean that the party rejects the idea of an Islamic state altogether. Some members of PKS still envision an Islamic state of some form or another. Some still insist that "if not an Islamic state, then what kind of state do Muslims need?"¹¹³ This issue is likely to be a major obstacle against PKS' expansion of its political influence in the future; there is real suspicion and a sense of threat that has developed among non-Muslim groups and other sections of the Indonesian people.

In order to bridge the disjunction between their Islamic ideals and political realities, some activists of PKS are prepared to compromise the idea of an Islamic state by stating that as long as the state realises universal virtues and functions to meet the needs of the people, such a state may be considered to be Islamic.¹¹⁴ The chairman of PKS, Tifatul Sembiring has insisted that the Republic of Indonesia is the final form of the state for Indonesians.¹¹⁵ The possible synthesis between small members of Jemaah Tarbiyah's insistence on a formal Islamic state and PKS's realistic approach of Islamisation needs further experiment in Indonesia's consolidated system of democracy. The contribution of all groups and communities that make up the nation must be considered.

By carefully following its steps in Islamising society and the state, Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political party have developed confidence in achieving their ideals. If the ideologues of Jemaah Tarbiyah have succeeded in solving the theological disputes over the issue of politics and Muslims' involvement in an un-Islamic system, their solutions to internal obstacles in accepting democracy should reach the same outcome. Their argument in accepting democracy is very simple.

If we define democracy as the sovereignty of the people whilst all of the *umat Islam* are hostile to democracy and politics, we, as the majority of citizens will lose the opportunity to rule our country and we will let

the country be ruled by others. We have to use democracy to reclaim our power.¹¹⁶

The political actions of PKS are based on the premise that there is no shortcut to achieving its distant objectives.¹¹⁷ These must be attained through the disciplining of cadres and a gradual transformation of society. And democracy has provided the way to achieve this goal.¹¹⁸ Similarly, the pragmatic and flexible approach of PKS in the arena of practical politics is evident in its stance towards the implementation of *shariah* law in Indonesia. This is a further issue that is subject to scrutiny and fierce debate among Indonesian Muslim scholars and politicians.

ENDNOTES

¹ See Hamid Basyaib, "Dilemma Partai Agama," *Islamlib.com*, 19 April 2004.

² An internal survey conducted by PKS in Jakarta and Yogyakarta reports that 62% of supporters were upset with the party's position and 75% of members believe that supporting the government costs the party a lot. See "Survey PKS Yogya: Citra PKS Turun Gara-Gara Dukung SBY," *Tempointeraktif.com*, 24 November 2005.

³ In this case, Oliver Roy seems to attribute it as the failure of political Islam, however in contrast I prefer to see it from a different perspective. The domestication of universal Islam represents the success of an Islamic movement in adapting itself to political realities and making its Islamic agenda more practical, for its survival. See Olivier Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994)

⁴ Interview with Muttammimul Ula, Jakarta, 16 June 2003.

⁵ Based on the author's observations during field research (February 2003- January 2004) Jemaah Tarbiyah has struggled to maintain its intellectual origins with the founder of the Muslim Brothers, Hasan al-Banna.

⁶ In his writings al-Banna repeatedly used Sufi terms. There is no evidence to support the claim that he embraced the strict practices of Hanbali Sufism; rather, he demonstrated a thorough acquaintance with the classical doctrines of al-Ghazali and other Syafi'ite scholars. For further details of the biography of al-Banna see Hasan al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan al-Banna*, trans. Salahuddin Abu Sayyid and Hawin Mustadho (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2000).

⁷ Richard Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers* (London: Oxford University Press, 1969), 3.

⁸ Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 68-69.

⁹ The Hanbalite School of Jurisprudence is known for its strict implementation of Islamic teachings.

¹⁰ Christina Phelps Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt: the Role of the Muslim Brotherhood* (The Hague: Hoover Institution Publication, 1964), 143.

¹¹ See Ali Said Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 2002), 109.

¹² The firm Pustaka Tarbiatuna has published many original writings of the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists. These deal predominantly with practical *dakwah* issues and organization rather than religious issues. There are many publishers, such as Era Intermedia of Solo in Central Java and Rabbani Press of Jakarta, that are allegedly associated with this group but they mainly publish translated books from the Middle East and the Egyptian Muslim Brothers. The work of an influential Muslim Brothers figure, Yusuf Qaradawi, on Islamic jurisprudence has become the main reference. Qaradawi tries to position himself among moderate scholars in dealing with questions of differences in Islamic jurisprudence.

¹³ Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 200), 141.

¹⁴ Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islami*, 143.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ Interview with Hilmi Aminuddin, Jakarta, 23 December 2003.

- ¹⁷ Tim Departemen Kaderisasi Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, *Manajemen Tarbiyah Anggota Pemula* (Jakarta: DPP Partai Keadilan, 2003), 57.
- ¹⁸ See Rizqon Khamami, "Kebangkitan Neo-Wahabisme," *Duta Masyarakat*, 16 August 2005.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ See "Kader Muhammadiyah Tergjur 'Rumah Yang Lain'" *Suara-Muhammadiyah.or.id*, 5 October 2005. Within Muhammadiyah, and in particular among the older activists, there have been worries about PKS members taking over Muhammadiyah branches and activities in the strongholds of Muhammadiyah, such as West Sumatra. See Abdul Munir Mulkhan, "Sendang Ayu: Pergulatan Muhammadiyah di Kaki Bukit Barisan," *Suara-Muhammadiyah.or.id*, 2 January 2006.
- ²¹ The charge was circulated by the so-called "pure" Salafis in order to preserve the original teachings of *salafus salih* and it excluded those who did not follow in the way which their predecessors had understood. For more detailed allegations, see www.salafy.or.id under the title *Membongkar Pikiran Hasan al-Banna* (Revealing Hasan al-Banna's Thought). The article was translated from the Arabic version written by Shaikh Ayyid ash-Shamary, *Turkah Hasan al-Banna wa Ahamul Warithin*, (Saudi: Maktabah as-Sabab, 2003). See also "Historical Development of Methodologies al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen and Their Effect and Influence upon Contemporary Salafee Dawah," *Salafi Publication* (March 2003).
- ²² Both Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari and Abu Hamid al-Ghazali are main references for traditionalist in terms of theology and Sufism respectively.
- ²³ See Hasan al-Banna, *Risalah Pergerakan Al-Ikhwani Muslimin 2*, tran. Anis Matta et.al. (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2001), 234-238.
- ²⁴ See "Gerakan Islam Kontemporer: Sebuah Sketsa tentang Gerakan Salafi dan Laskar Jihad di Yogyakarta," www.lkis.org/islam_kontemporer.php.
- ²⁵ See Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 121.
- ²⁶ Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, 142.
- ²⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁸ Three important books written by leading figures of the Jemaah Tarbiyah and the committee of PKS, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam* (the *Dakwah* Strategy of the Islamic Movement) by Hilmi Aminuddin, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik* (the State and Political Ideals) by Abu Ridha, and *Rekayasa Masa Depan Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Islam* (the Engineering of Future towards the Triumph of Islamic *Dakwah*) by Cahyadi Takariawan are filled with quotations from Hasan al-Banna; there is no mention of Sayyid Qutb.
- ²⁹ See Ainur Rofiq Tamhid Foreword to Syekh Abdur Rahman Abdul Khaliq, *Penyimpangan-Penyimpangan Tasawuf*, trans. Ahmad Misbach (Jakarta: Rabbani Press, 2001), vii.
- ³⁰ Hidayat Nurwahid and Untung Wahono, *Pengaruh Sekularisasi dan Globalisasi Barat Terhadap Harakah Islamiyah di Indonesia* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2001), 21.
- ³¹ Ahmad Firman Yusuf, foreword to *Pemikiran Politik Kontemporer Al-Ikhwani Al-Muslimun: Studi Analitis, Observatif, Dokumentatif*, by Taufiq Yusuf al-Wa'iy, trans. Wahid Ahmadi and Arwni Amin (Solo: Era Intermedia, 2002), 6.
- ³² In the Qur'an VI: 60 it states: "Have you not seen those who claim to have believed in what was revealed to you, [O Muhammad] and what was revealed before you? They wish to refer legislation to "taghut" (false objects of worship), while they were commanded to reject it, and Satan wishes to lead them far astray."
- ³³ Yusuf, foreword to *Pemikiran Politik Kontemporer*, 10.
- ³⁴ Michael Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt: an Essay on the Sociology of Religion*, (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1973), 4.
- ³⁵ Ibid.
- ³⁶ John Obert Voll, *Islam Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Essex: Westview Press, 1982), 175.
- ³⁷ Ishak Musa Husaini, *The Muslim Brethren* (Westport: Hyperion Press, 1986), 25.
- ³⁸ Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence*, 67.
- ³⁹ Al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan al-Banna*, 199.
- ⁴⁰ Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, 6.
- ⁴¹ Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, 143.
- ⁴² Al-Banna, *Risalah Pergerakan 2*, 227-229.

- ⁴³ Mitchell, *The Society of Muslim Brothers*, 6.
- ⁴⁴ Rabi, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence*, 67.
- ⁴⁵ Al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan al-Banna*, 42-43.
- ⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 132.
- ⁴⁷ The Sufi model of brotherhood or family is the best way of disseminating Islamic teachings. The organised Sufis, under their charismatic leader, easily expanded their influence beyond national borders. Some *tarekat* also served as clandestine organizations that aimed to challenge the authority of an unjust ruler of the day. See Abu Bakar Acheh, *Pengantar Sejarah Sufi dan Tasawuf* (Kelantan: Pustaka Amar Press, 1977), 313.
- ⁴⁸ A member of the *tarekat* may stay in the *zawiyah* (contemplation room) or the house of *al-ikhwan*. See Martin van Bruinessen, *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 15.
- ⁴⁹ Al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan Al-Banna*, 43.
- ⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 116.
- ⁵¹ Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt*, 73.
- ⁵² Martin van Bruinessen, *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung: Mizan, 1992), 83.
- ⁵³ Al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan al-Banna*, 80.
- ⁵⁴ Brynjar Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt: the Rise of an Islamic Mass Movement 1928-1942* (Readings: Ithaca Press, 1998), 115.
- ⁵⁵ Al-Banna, *Risalah Pergerakan 2*, 163.
- ⁵⁶ Harris, *Nationalism and Revolution in Egypt*, 143.
- ⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 152.
- ⁵⁸ See Zakariyya Sulayman Bayumi, *The Muslim Brothers and the Islamic Associations in the Egyptian Political Life, 1928-1948* (Cairo: Maktabah al-Wahda, 1978) as quoted by Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 9.
- ⁵⁹ He wrote a book entitled *Hasan al-Banna: Mata, Kaifa wa Li-mada?* (Cairo: Maktabah Madbuli, 1977).
- ⁶⁰ See his book *al-Harakiyah al-Siyasiyah fi Misri 1945-1952* (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi wa al-Nashr al-Islamiyah, 1972).
- ⁶¹ Lia, *The Society of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt*, 7. The stance of the Muslim Brothers vis-a-vis the palace indicates a certain Sufi tradition more accommodating to rulers, and the way in which they gave their support to combat secular and foreign forces in the country.
- ⁶² Interview, anonymous, Jakarta, 23 April 2003.
- ⁶³ Bruinessen, *Tarekat Naqsyabandiyah di Indonesia*, 87.
- ⁶⁴ Gilsenan, *Saint and Sufi in Modern Egypt*, 95.
- ⁶⁵ Mitchell, *The Society of Moslem Brothers*, 8.
- ⁶⁶ Al-Banna formulated ten prerequisites of the covenant. These include understanding (*al-fahm*), sincerity (*al-ikhlas*), action (*al-'amal*), honest striving (*al-jihad*), sacrifice (*al-tadhiyyah*), obedience (*al-ta'ah*), perseverance (*al-thabat*), authenticity (*al-tajarrud*), brotherhood (*al-ukhuwwah*) and trust (*al-thiqah*).
- ⁶⁷ In his memoir, al-Banna includes a story which describes his goals after graduating from the University of Darul Ulum. He dreamed he became a great teacher who took on a responsibility to educate people through academic training and a great supervisor to extend spiritual guidance to people through the Sufi tradition. See Al-Banna, *Memoar Hasan al-Banna*, 96-100.
- ⁶⁸ Majelis Pertimbangan Partai PK, *Panduan Organisasi Partai Keadilan* (Jakarta: DPP PK, 2001), 19.
- ⁶⁹ In the practice of the Naqsyabandiyah order, students are supposed to sense their teacher's presence as much as they can in order to strengthen their spiritual connection with him.
- ⁷⁰ Hasan al-Banna, *Al-Ma'tsurat Sughra: Doa & Dzikir Rasulullah SAW Pagi dan Petang* (Jakarta: Sholahuddin Press, 1996). Jemaah Tarbiyah activists have used this formula of prayer as part of their daily practice. Thousands of books of collections of al-Banna's prayers are widely distributed by the Prosperous Justice Party.
- ⁷¹ *Keadilan Online*, 20 May 2003
- ⁷² Hidayat Nurwahid, *Mengelola Masa Transisi Menuju Masyarakat Madani* (Jakarta: Fikri Publisng, 2004), 109.

- ⁷³ See Hasan al-Banna, *Konsep Pembaruan Masyarakat Islam* (Jakarta: Media Dakwah, 1983).
- ⁷⁴ See Cahyadi Takariawan, *Rekayasa Masa Depan Menuju Kemenangan Dakwah Islam* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2003).
- ⁷⁵ Al-Banna, *Risalah Pergerakan 1*, 175.
- ⁷⁶ Interview with Mahfudz Sidiq, Jakarta, 8 October 2003
- ⁷⁷ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan: Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia* (Bandung, Mizan, 2002), 269.
- ⁷⁸ Nurmahmudi Ismail, Hidayat Nur Wahid and Mahfudz Sidiq, for instance, were among respondents who preferred the establishment of a mass organization. However, they have become leading figures in the Prosperous Justice Party.
- ⁷⁹ Interview with Sholeh Drehem, Surabaya, 13 March 2003.
- ⁸⁰ *Zakat* is one of the five pillars of Islam. Muslims with the financial means are obliged to give a certain percentage. For instance, from a monthly salary, one is obliged to deduct about 2.5%.
- ⁸¹ *Infaq* means dispensing moneys or gifts and is more voluntary than obligatory.
- ⁸² *Shadaqah* means charity. Both *infaq* and *shadaqah* carry similar meanings but the former is a gift that can be dedicated to any specific purpose, such as building a mosque or other public facility, while *shadaqah* is mainly dispensed to the needy.
- ⁸³ Interview with Aus Hidayat, Depok, 13 March 2003.
- ⁸⁴ See DPP PK, *Kebijakan Dasar Partai Keadilan 2000-2005* (Jakarta: Pustaka Tarbiatuna, 2000), 11.
- ⁸⁵ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 111.
- ⁸⁶ Takariawan, *Rekayasa Masa Depan*, 9.
- ⁸⁷ Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
- ⁸⁸ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 269.
- ⁸⁹ Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Depok, 11 June 2003
- ⁹⁰ The Indonesian Islamic Student Movement, *Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia* (PMII) was founded in 1960 and is affiliated with NU.
- ⁹¹ Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, 48.
- ⁹² Memet Sosiawan, member of the Central Board Committee of PKS in charge of organising *dakwah* activities in East Java said that this policy aims to prevent infiltration by terrorist groups (Mojokerto - East Java, 6 December 2005).
- ⁹³ Ibid.
- ⁹⁴ Interview with Mustafa Kamal, Jakarta, 13 December 2005.
- ⁹⁵ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 117.
- ⁹⁶ Ibid.
- ⁹⁷ *PKS Online*, 1 June 2005.
- ⁹⁸ Roy, *The Failure of Political Islam*, 53.
- ⁹⁹ See *Republika*, 19 August 2003
- ¹⁰⁰ Interview with Nurmahmudi Ismail, Depok, 8 May 2003.
- ¹⁰¹ Damanik, *Fenomena Partai Keadilan*, 168
- ¹⁰² Ibid., 161
- ¹⁰³ Ibid., 169
- ¹⁰⁴ Al-Banna, *Risalah Pergerakan 2*, 162.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Tempo*, 18 January 1999.
- ¹⁰⁶ Takariawan, *Rekayasa Masa Depan*, 92.
- ¹⁰⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁸ See Mahfudz Sidiq, "Peran Serta Da'wah dalam Politik" (Paper presented at the Square House Building, University of New South Wales, 9 August 2002), 7.
- ¹⁰⁹ The organization must be neither an ideological nor a political one. See Aminuddin, *Strategi Dakwah Gerakan Islam*, 151.
- ¹¹⁰ Takariawan, *Rekayasa Masa Depan*, 117.
- ¹¹¹ Ibid.

Islamising Indonesia

¹¹² Ibid.

¹¹³ Ridha, *Negara dan Cita-Cita Politik*, 132.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., 111.

¹¹⁵ See "Tifatul Sembiring: Paranoid Syariat Islam," *Gatra*, 6 May 2006.

¹¹⁶ Interview with Ahmad Musyaffa, Jakarta, 19 April 2003.

¹¹⁷ See Martin van Bruinessen, "Post-Soeharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratization," in *Indonesia in Transition: Rethinking 'Civil Society', 'Region', and 'Crisis'* (Jakarta: Pustaka Pelajar, 2004), 58.

¹¹⁸ Ibid.