Introduction

“Again, the Prosperous Justice Party [Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, PKS] held a demonstration. And again, it involved thousands of participants, and it was amazing because the demonstration was peaceful and orderly. That’s what happened yesterday - thousands of PKS cadres poured on to the streets. They launched a demonstration calling for the United Nations to acknowledge the independence of Palestine. They condemned the United States and denounced Israel.”¹

The post-Soeharto era of government in Indonesia, beginning in 1998, has witnessed the emergence of various Islamic groups and movements. The emergence of these new groups has not only displayed diversity in terms of their political and religious orientation, but they have also brought new actors and agendas to the fore. Greater space for political expression and political participation has been opened up. Interestingly, the Justice Party (PK) that did not have popular front figures, either from traditionalist or modernist camps, performed well but did not meet the electoral threshold during the 1999 general elections. However, it produced a remarkable achievement after changing its name into the Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS) in the 2004 general elections.²

PKS is an interesting phenomenon in Indonesia. Its educated cadres, drawn mainly from university campuses, lead a dedicated membership. Its low profile performance and non-violent strategies have raised it to become the sixth largest political party in Indonesia. Its peaceful orientation, yet its criticism of Western domination of the global political order have been apparent during its many demonstrations, as the excerpt from an editorial in Media Indonesia above illustrates. PKS members have not hesitated to bring their families, including their small children, to their public demonstrations. “Bringing along children to a demonstration is an obvious guarantee that it will be peaceful and safe. That is something that has been shown by the Prosperous Justice Party.”³ The emergence of such a new force of political Islam represented by PKS is on the surface a recent phenomenon; in fact it has had a long history in Indonesia, which will be elaborated.

During the sustained political repression by Soeharto’s New Order regime towards organised Islam, Muslim activists who joined a new informal religious movement called Jemaah Tarbiyah were able to revive Islamic activities on many university campuses. They focussed on cultivating religious understanding and practice among students. They set up informal religious circles, or halaqah, using small prayer rooms and other student facilities to conduct their activities. In order to consolidate their programs they founded intra-campus organisations under the umbrella of a body called the Forum for Islamic Study (FIS).
Jemaah Tarbiyah gained momentum and attracted many students during the 1990s. In this decade, many of its activists won control of student executive bodies and placed their best cadres in the position of head of student senates. In 1993, a Jemaah Tarbiyah cadre, Mustafa Kamal, won the student elections in the Faculty of Humanities of the University of Indonesia and became the first member of Jemaah Tarbiyah to gain highest position of the student government at the faculty level. The following year, Jemaah Tarbiyah activist Zulkieflimansyah secured the position of general chairman of the student senate at university level in the same institution. Since then, student governments at the university and faculty levels in other prestigious universities have come under the control of Jemaah Tarbiyah activists, pushing aside candidates from the existing Muslim student associations, such as Muslim Student Association, Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam (HMI) or Indonesia Islamic Students Movement, Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia (PMII).

Jemaah Tarbiyah has also expanded its influence in an extra-campus predication network, called the Forum for Coordinating Campus Predication, Forum Silaturahmi Lembaga Dakwah Kampus (FSLDK) throughout secular universities in Indonesia. Through this campus predication net, members of Jemaah Tarbiyah seized the advantage to establish the Indonesian Muslim Student Action Union, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) in Malang, East Java in 1998. In April 1998 KAMMI, under the leadership of Fahri Hamzah, organised a huge demonstration calling for the resignation of President Soeharto.

After the collapse of the Soeharto regime, Jemaah Tarbiyah, as an informal social movement, decided to transform itself into a formal organisation. This decision was taken when the movement had to choose whether to establish a mass organisation, or a fully political party. The majority of members agreed to form a political party, named the Justice Party, Partai Keadilan (PK) accommodating all of Jemaah Tarbiyah’s activities. PK was established on 28 July 1998 and publicly announced on 9 August 1998. Nurmahmudi Ismail, a PhD graduate from the American Texas A & M University, was elected as the party’s first president.

In 1999 PK participated in the general legislative elections and gained 1.4% (1.436.565) of the total vote. Nurmahmudi Ismail was appointed Minister of Agriculture and Forestry. On 20 May 2000, Hidayat Nurwahid, who held a doctorate in Islamic Studies from Madinah University, Saudi Arabia, replaced Ismail as president of PK. Since PK did not meet the electoral threshold of 2%, activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah then prepared a new political party, the Prosperous Justice Party, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS). On 20 April 2003, PKS, led by Al-Muzammil Yusuf, a former activist in campus predication, was formally declared a political party to take part in the 2004 general elections.
On July 2003, PK formally merged with PKS and Hidayat Nurwahid was elected president. During the general elections of 2004 PKS succeeded in gaining 7.34% (8,325,020) of the total vote and this has placed its cadres in seats in the national and local parliaments. Nurwahid was chosen as Chairperson of the People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR) and left his position as president of PKS. On May 2005, Tifatul Sembiring, another former activist in campus predication was selected as the new president of PKS.

The emergence of this new Islamic party has surprised many observers and scholars of Indonesian politics and Islam. The dramatic success of PKS participation in the 2004 general elections also continues to puzzle many. For instance, the Indonesia Survey Institute, Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) issued the results of its national survey conducted in September 2003, stating that if the general elections had been held at the time of the survey, PKS would have been predicted to gain about 2.3%. Surprisingly, in the 2004 elections it succeeded in gaining 7.34%; that is, significantly above the LSI’s predictions. Even though PKS appears to have had little support, it still succeeded in achieving a significant share of votes in 2004.

PKS has raised new issues about the ability of a political party that apparently maintains Islam as its political and ideological basis to attract votes. PKS phenomenon has puzzled not only foreign observers but Indonesian scholars as well. This is largely because PKS has no precedent in the past and it has shown itself to be unique in the Indonesian democratic system. Its campaigns for clean government and against corruption and the abuse of power, in addition to its commitment to religious aspirations have surprised observers and merit further examination.

PKS represents a younger generation of Indonesian Muslims from various backgrounds who no longer follow their parents in political participation. They have begun to create their own political party to represent the Muslim ummah (Muslim community). Thus PKS presents an alternative political vehicle for Muslim activists who have not been accommodated by their parents’ political parties, such as PKB, PAN, PPP and PBB. They are, in the main, educated outside the traditional educational system and have taken different paths to learn about Islam. They now claim to struggle for the interests of an Islam undivided by the traditionalist and modernist dichotomy. The concept of a universal and total Islam has become their religious framework and orientation. Within their image of themselves as Muslims they lean towards a global and universal Islam that brings together all different Muslim identities for the triumph of Islam.

As the backbone of PKS, Jemaah Tarbiyah has also actively implemented a proselytising mission focussed on improving Indonesian Muslims’ understanding of their faith. Inspired by a religious movement in the Middle East, the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, Jemaah Tarbiyah has played a role as the agent of religious
reform and at the same time has embarked on political activities to present itself as a united force of ummah regardless of individual religious orientations within its ranks. In carrying out its reform, Jemaah Tarbiyah has shown an accommodative strategy in order to avoid religious disputes and resistance among Indonesian Muslims in general.

Jemaah Tarbiyah’s inclusive attitude to accommodate Muslims from various backgrounds and to invite them to follow its ideas has been heavily influenced by Hasan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers. Al-Banna’s inclination towards accommodation in religious matters has influenced Jemaah Tarbiyah’s stance in dealing with politics. Rather than demonstrating any fundamentalist views, the ideas of Jemaah Tarbiyah have been channelled through PKS in “accommodative ways” that tend to downplay its ideology. Its coalition with the Prosperity and Peace Party, Partai Damai Sejahtera (PDS), a Christian Party, to run for the election of governor of the Province of Papua in 2006, indicates PKS efforts to be accepted by the broader population of Indonesia. The views of PKS on shariah, or Islamic law and its implementation in Indonesia is also a good example of its pragmatic approach and will be analysed in Chapter VII.

Jemaah Tarbiyah’s practical attitude to religious and political issues has their historical origins during the years of Soeharto’s New Order. Instead of identifying themselves as a resistance group, the activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah deliberately avoided open confrontation with the regime and kept their distance from domestic and political issues. The commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to non-violence within its mass events on the university campuses began to bear fruit when the regime introduced a policy of political openness, picking up momentum when the regime’s situation became critical and finally collapsed in 1998. Jemaah Tarbiyah was able to transform itself into a political party and to set up branches throughout the country.

In order to gain an adequate insight into PKS phenomenon, a study of its informal religious movement, Jemaah Tarbiyah that has become the voting mainstay of the party, is crucial. We need to focus on the historical record of the Jemaah Tarbiyah, as well as on its ideological and political orientations. This will be done in this thesis by analysing the intellectual and religious origins of the movement and by placing it in the context of the dynamics of Islam in Indonesia. Whilst the transmission of intellectual influences from the international arena of Islam into Indonesia is significant, the contribution of local dynamics to the process of shaping the final ideology must be understood. The social and religious affiliations of the Jemaah Tarbiyah membership are also important factors in Jemaah Tarbiyah’s response to Indonesian realities. These will be taken into consideration in our analysis of the possible moves of the party in its efforts to Islamise the state.
A. Recent Studies on Jemaah Tarbiyah and the Prosperous Justice Party

The emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political vehicle, PKS has excited the curiosity of scholars of Indonesian Islam. In general, there have been three approaches in the many studies depicting the phenomenon of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS. Unfortunately, however, each approach has been significantly misleading in its view of the reality of Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political party.

First, some writers, such as Ali Said Damanik, Abdul Aziz and Azyumardi Azra try to depict Jemaah Tarbiyah as an entirely new movement and do not attempt to relate it to the broader process of continuing Islamisation in Indonesia. It has been also described as a splinter group apart from mainstream Islam. A second group of authors, such as Aay Muhammad Furkon and Andi Rahmat claim that the movement is merely a continuation of the modernist history of Indonesian Islam. Some exaggerate this belief and go so far as to state that PKS is the direct inheritor of Masyumi, and that the history of PKS is no less than part of Masyumi’s development. A further issue regarding the phenomenon of PKS is its attitude towards democracy. Most observers, such as Martin van Bruinessen, Sadanand Dhume and Zachary Abuza still question its commitment and integrity towards an agenda of democratisation in Indonesia. They assert that that PKS, born from a religious movement as it is, has so far taken no obvious stance on democracy.

The following section will elaborate how the three approaches give an inaccurate picture of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS. I try to bridge any gaps by suggesting new approaches and perspectives in analysing this phenomenon.

1. The “Splinter Group” Approach

The main concern of this approach has been with the roots and historical origins of PKS and its alleged links with a trans-national Islamic movement in the Middle East. The mere fact that PKS rests on the support of Jemaah Tarbiyah offers little further insight. Because of a general lack of information, Jemaah Tarbiyah has been viewed as an entirely new movement, without historical connections to existing Islamic groups in Indonesia, perhaps a group set apart from Indonesian mainstream Islam. And to some extent, it has indeed aroused suspicion in the two largest established Muslim organizations, Nahdatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah about its connection with splinter groups, since its appearance in Indonesia coincided with the emergence of Islamic radicalism.

So Jemaah Tarbiyah has not only been considered to lie outside mainstream Islam but it is also regarded by some as one of the illegal Islamic sects (aliran-aliran terlarang) or splinter groups (kelompok-kelompok sempalan) - such new movements being labelled “fundamentalist” without any serious research having been given them. For instance, a preliminary study of Jemaah Tarbiyah...
by Azyumardi Azra, though not exclusively addressing it, puts Jemaah Tarbiyah in the same category as several deviant groups which stray from the general understanding of Islam in Indonesia. The significant international influences upon Jemaah Tarbiyah are the main reasons for its categorisation as an exclusive and alienated movement. The members of the group behave in ways (such as in their mode of dress and their restricted socialising) which set them apart from many other observant Indonesian Muslim groups. They display their spiritual symbols by self-consciously following the Prophet’s examples, such as keeping beards, wearing Arab style clothing, and the like. They have been labelled by mainstream Muslims as kelompok sempalan (splinter groups).

However, the term “sempalan” in Indonesian discourse about Islam is not unproblematic. As suggested by Martin van Bruinessen, it is translated into English as “splinter group”, and has been adopted by Indonesian scholars to identify various new Islamic groups or religious sects that have been considered “alien” or deviating from the mainstream. In the context of Indonesia, “mainstream” and “orthodox” refers to recognised organisations such as MUI, Muhammadiyah, NU and others. New Islamic movements that are not associated with these have been labelled kelompok sempalan. The term is also applied to groups which deliberately dissociate themselves from the mainstream, develop exclusive attitudes and are critical of established Muslim scholars. It is perhaps understandable that early studies of Jemaah Tarbiyah have tended to view it in the frame of splinter groups in Indonesia that adopt an usrah, or “family” approach in disseminating their ideas. Among these are, as mentioned by Azra, Jamaah Takfir wal Hijrah, Hizbut Tahrir, and Jemaah Tarbiyah.

Depicting the phenomenon of Jemaah Tarbiyah as lying outside mainstream Islam may lead to the assumption that the movement, politically and culturally, has raised serious problems for and challenged the government and mainstream Islam. Admittedly, the adoption of the usrah model, borrowed from the Muslim Brothers, its links with international networks and its idea of Islam as al-nizam al-islamiy (the Islamic System) might lead such a movement into exclusive and radical directions. However, the transformation of Jemaah Tarbiyah into a political party and its integration with broader Indonesian society has not only reduced its fundamentalist image but has also made possible a new model of an Islamic movement that is not necessarily a splinter or dissident group.

A book on Jemaah Tarbiyah by Ali Said Damanik, entitled Fenomena Partai Keadilan Transformasi 20 Tahun Gerakan Tarbiyah di Indonesia (The Phenomenon of the Justice Party: the Transformation of Twenty Years of the Tarbiyah Movement in Indonesia) explains something of the context behind the establishment of Partai Keadilan. Damanik does not try to link the new movement with mainstream Islam. He sees Jemaah Tarbiyah as a unique group
that has no historical association with existing Islamic groups and parties. It is an entirely new movement, born of the ideas of the Society of Muslim Brothers in Egypt. In his introduction, Damanik expresses his confusion in identifying the movement. “The author does not know how he should name this movement that has been initiated by young Muslims, and which is very active in setting up Islamic circles (halaqah) for training and preaching on the university campuses. They are like a wind, it is easy to feel their presence but their shape is still not clear.”

2. The “Modernist Heritage” Approach

Recent studies of PKS often attempt to relate it to the heritage of Islamic modernism, in particular by directing it to the Star and Crescent Family (Keluarga Bulan Bintang) or Masyumi. In these studies, PKS is regarded as a continuation of the old Masyumi of the 1950s. However, rather than acknowledging PKS as an heir of Masyumi, Keluarga Bulan Bintang, through the Board of Indonesian Islamic Predication, Dewan Dakwah Islamiyah Indonesia (DDII) prefers to formally ratify the Star and Crescent Party (PBB) as Masyumi’s successor.

Aay Muhammad Furkon, in his book *Partai Keadilan Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemperor* (The Prosperous Justice Party: Ideology and Political Praxis of Contemporary Young Indonesian Muslims) concludes that PKS has obviously historical modernist roots. Culturally, it is an organic part of DDII in carrying on the struggle of Islam bequeathed by Masyumi. According to Furkon, in its earlier stage, most of the Justice Party activists were well connected to modernist figures from DDII, even being known as young cadres of DDII.

However, the accuracy of this claim is questionable, since the establishment of PKS was the result of the contributions of Muslims of various backgrounds and affiliations. As stated by Anis Matta, an influential figure in Jemaah Tarbiyah who holds the position of Secretary General of PKS 2005-2010: “The Justice Party is like a growing tree, and modernist Muslims have contributed to its watering; but many other Muslims have played the same role. They have been watering PK with the spirit and the ‘water’ of struggle.”

Furkon is exaggerating when he makes the claim that the modernist family is the only group which deserves to acknowledge PKS as its legitimate son. He overlooks the fact that Masyumi was not only represented by modernist figures – even though after NU broke from Masyumi in 1952 it was still supported by traditionalist figures who firmly believed in the significance of politics and power in the struggle for an Islamic agenda. Some pesantren, or traditionalist Islamic boarding schools in Java, and others in the Outer Islands as well, continued to be strongholds of Masyumi supporters. Two influential traditionalist figures who owned large pesantren in Java, Abdullah Syaifii of the Pesantren
Assyafiiyah in Jakarta and Yusuf Hasyim of the Pesantren Tebuireng in East Java are still accorded a high reputation among the “family” of Bulan Bintang. On the other hand, many of the younger generation of NU which are not formally associated with NU organisations joined Jemaah Tarbiyah and have supported the Justice Party.

The weakness of Furkon’s account is that he fails to focus on the remarkable generational change in Muslims which took place towards the end of the Soeharto regime. The decades of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a process of convergence among the successors of Indonesian traditionalism and modernism. They worked together, either in developing new directions in Islamic thought or in promoting Islamic predication movements. In this era, the embryo of PKS, Jemaah Tarbiyah developed and attracted both traditionalists and modernists. Examining these trends during the New Order regime will help us to understand the possibility of linkage between traditionalist and modernist groups and PKS.

Another book, *Perlawanan dari Masjid Kampus* (Resistance from the Campus Mosque) by Andi Rahmat, an activist of the Association of Indonesian Muslim Students, Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Muslim Indonesia (KAMMI) offers a broader explanation of the involvement of the students and their opposition to the Soeharto regime. KAMMI is known for its close affiliation with PKS. Rahmat tries to connect the spirit of political opposition with the heritage of modernist groups, which dominated the student movements. This became the central point in the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah and the establishment of KAMMI. The use of the mosque as a centre of opposition was obviously an effort to connect the new movements with DDII history in which the mosques had become the venue for veterans of Masyumi to criticise the regime.

Following on in this vein, it is generally recognised that mosques were used as sites to express Muslim opposition to the state during the 1980s. In contrast to DDII, however, which made frequent use of the mosques in urban areas to criticise government policies, the case of Jemaah Tarbiyah is somewhat different. Once the New Order had wrested control of all mosques and maintained censorship of the contents of sermons, the mosques were no longer safe sites for dissident groups. In order to keep apart from the regime’s oppression, Jemaah Tarbiyah preferred to initiate their activities through Islamic study groups and training sessions, using campus facilities, such as classrooms, halls and small prayer rooms. They avoided confronting government policies and concentrated on developing Islamic morality and ethics and on upholding the performance of the daily prayers. During this era, Jemaah Tarbiyah also tried to keep its distance from DDII in order to develop a non-political predication totally different from that of their predecessors of the modernist groups. They confined their activities of Islamisation to the campuses. They only moved into campus mosques after the regime opened up political space for Muslims in the 1990s, extending...
the Islamic activities and training that before had always come under official surveillance.

In general, the modernist image that seems to characterise PKS is due to the fact that most of the earliest outspoken activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah came from modernist families, whilst figures from a traditionalist background had a low profile. Moreover, the latter had not been active members of the traditionalist organizations. It is understandable that in the early development of Jemaah Tarbiyah connection with modernist mentors was strongly established, particularly with DDII. However, contrary to this “superficial” impression about PKS, my research into the background of its activists shows a great number of figures connected to traditionalist traditions. Traditionalist figures now dominate the membership and appear as a force within PKS that will bring change in the strategy and appearance of the party in the future. PKS represents an alternative vehicle for young Indonesian Muslims of differing religious origins united by a vision to make Islam more applicable to every aspect of daily life, including politics.

3. The “Compatibility with Democracy” Approach

As was mentioned above, the shadow and influence of the Muslim Brothers movement in Egypt over Jemaah Tarbiyah has given rise to suspicions among scholars about the commitment of PKS to democratic ideals. Was this possible for a political party almost solely supported by a religious movement, which in the beginning preferred to promote Islam as an alternative to democracy? Can the two different agendas go hand in hand in Indonesia? Will it be the role of Jemaah Tarbiyah to drive the party to promote a more Islamist programme and to downplay the value of the democratic system?

Martin van Bruinessen, in his article entitled “Post-Suharto Muslim Engagements with Civil Society and Democratisation” describes the phenomenon of the usrah group (Jemaah Tarbiyah), the embryo of PKS, as an interesting case representing different aspects of certain civil society groups. Of these, he classifies the Muslim groups into three categories: first, the civil society based on the mainstream Islamic organizations, such as Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah; second, the civil society represented by non-governmental organizations, Lembaga Swadaya Masyarakat (LSM), which are mainly offshoots from NU or Muhammadiyah activism; and third, a relatively a new kind of civil society represented by the usrah group. Since the latter tends to appear in underground forms with a tightly monitored membership, it is more likely to be viewed as a threat to the government of the day, even though it ultimately serves to strengthen “civil society.”

Proceeding from this analytical framework as he does, it is understandable that van Bruinessen has no clear explanation regarding the emergence of PKS in the
national political process towards democratisation in Indonesia. As a political party grown from a once exclusively religious movement, PKS still has not positioned itself into an open commitment to democracy. Yet this uncertain position of PKS is likely to be something of a paradox, since for van Bruinessen it represents at the same time “imperfect democrats but perhaps Indonesia’s strongest force for democratisation.”

Sadanand Dhume, in his article entitled “Radical March on Indonesia’s Future” has presented a more sceptical and hostile attitude toward PKS. Since the Justice Party, according to Dhume, has been inspired by the ideology of the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, it is likely to pose a serious threat to Indonesia’s democracy. Further, Dhume states that PKS shares a radical ideology with the Jemaah Islamiyah, an underground Islamic organisation alleged to have links with the terrorist group, al-Qaeda. The difference between them stems from their approaches to achieving their goals. Jemaah Islamiyah has used revolutionary and violent ways; PKS has preferred to use evolutionary and peaceful approaches.

However, Dhume also shows a lack of insight into the dynamics of radicalisation and Islamism in Indonesia. He does not distinguish between “moderate” and “radical” in Indonesia. Since most Islamic groups have shared ideas about the need to struggle for Islam at the levels of society and the state, Dhume has conflated the groups and simplified reality. His overestimation of the fundamentalist nature of political Islam has led him to neglect the possible contribution of political Islam in the democratisation process in Indonesia. Islamic democracy, as expounded by PKS, finds no room in Dhume’s analysis.

Further misleading information about Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS is presented by Zachary Abuza in his article “Muslims, Politics and Violence in Indonesia: an Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?” This study describes the emergence of the Tarbiyah movement as the vehicle of the oldest and most established Wahabi Islam in Indonesia, one that has always reflected the interest of the Arab minority. According to Abuza, the main goal of Jemaah Tarbiyah is the establishment of an Islamic state. Therefore, he classifies Jemaah Tarbiyah and its political party as extension of Indonesian radical Islam, even though neither entity has ever clearly stated what the shariah or an Islamic state would look like in practice.

B. New Perspectives on Jemaah Tarbiyah

In this thesis I attempt to present the phenomenon of Jemaah Tarbiyah in a broader context by framing and analysing its existence within the post-independence history of Indonesia. I will introduce new perspectives that have been lacking in earlier researches. In contrast to much other recent work as mentioned above, this thesis will also present new findings on the phenomenon
of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS. Firstly, Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS are born from a process of convergence between traditionalist and modernist generations of Indonesian Islam. Secondly, the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah in the discourse of Indonesian Islam provides a new direction for study, particularly in their ability both to adopt a foreign influence (that of the Egyptian Muslim Brothers) and to accommodate local elements (earlier traditionalist and modernist movements). Thirdly, even though PKS is a transformation of a religious movement it is necessary to see it within political perspectives. In other words, the commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to its participation in the political process compels it to abide by political rules and to be willing to compromise its religious agenda with political realities. This is to be seen especially in its response to the issue of implementing Islamic law.

1. The Historical Context of Jemaah Tarbiyah

Studying the phenomenon of PKS calls for historically informed research, since only focussing on its superficial appearance reveals the fact that this political party has no historical precedent in Indonesia. It is true that its political elites and key figures are not well known among the Indonesian people. However, they are mainly of the latest generation of Indonesian Muslims from families of either a traditionalist or modernist background who have been raised in the historical situation where differences between the two religious orientations no longer exist. They have benefited from the New Order’s economic achievements, which have enabled them to pursue their studies in universities, either in Indonesia or in foreign countries (Western and Middle Eastern). In these new academic environments, they have encountered Islamic activism and milieus dominated by the slogan of universal Islam, whilst home-grown traditionalist and modernist tensions have been reduced. They remain part of the process whereby Indonesian Muslims promote Islam into broader contexts.

The decade of the 1980s was a crucial one for Jemaah Tarbiyah, particularly because it saw the emergence of new variants in Indonesian Islam, which had their roots in the 1970s. It was during this period that the demarcation between “old” and “new” santri became apparent, the latter being less interested in political activity and distancing themselves from the heritage of their predecessors. This change has prevailed not only for Muslims who shifted their agenda into cultural and intellectual movements but also for the proponents of political Islam, who channelled their activities into predication movements. The difference is that while the cultural and intellectual groups have blamed the political activities of their predecessors as the source of Muslim problems, the predication groups still hold the ideal that one day political Islam will reappear and gain momentum.

The ability of Jemaah Tarbiyah to manage predication activities and avoid practical political issues enabled it to develop during the mid 1980s without any
significant repression from the New Order. Even though the activists came under surveillance from the regime, they were able to run their Islamic circles and training sessions on the campuses. Such campus predication enabled the students to distance themselves safely from radical activities and political confrontation. According to Jemaah Tarbiyah, the only way to influence those in power was to eschew conflict; their goals could be reached by *dakwah*, or missionary activity that would have a long term impact.\(^{33}\)

The rising generation of the 1980s has contributed to initiating various kinds of Islamic activities on the Indonesian campuses, ranging from discussion programmes to outward bound ventures. Students from both modernist and traditionalist backgrounds joined these programs. The challenging dynamics of Islam faced by this “new generation of Muslims” since the 1980s has in turn borne fruit in new orientations in the intellectual and political movements of the 1990s.

The 1980s generation has not only avoided disputes in religious issues but it has also not experienced the harsh battles between the nationalist and Islamist factions of the past. In general, their ideas on Islam were not to be trapped in the “old issues” of their predecessors, such as establishing an Islamic state or even restoring the caliphate; rather, they formulate new ideas compatible with the current socio-political conditions of Indonesia. They also differ from other Muslim groups in Indonesia in so far as they are able to accommodate the two inherited orientations, as well as legal formalist and substantialist approaches to Islamic questions and politics.

This trend of convergence among the Jemaah Tarbiyah activists can indeed be observed in politics and religion. For instance, during the discussions and debates on the issue of the 1945 Constitution in the 2000 parliament meetings, PKS did not support the amendment of chapter 29 of the Constitution, which aimed to revive the Jakarta Charter. PKS proposed an alternative, called “the Medina Charter,” which, according to the party, was more suited to the Indonesian context. In order to comply with the demands of some Muslims for the implementation of *shariah*, PKS has attempted to encourage individuals to practise Islamic teachings at the personal level.

Activists of PKS believe it is insufficient merely to observe Islamic doctrines and teachings in ritual and religious ceremonies - they must be manifested and internalised within individuals and lead to a commitment to morality and a sense of social concern. The programme of *shariah* is not merely understood as an effort to impose Islamic laws; rather it must become part of the internal character and power of the cadres who campaign against corruption and promote a clean government. It also aims to bring justice and social welfare to the Indonesian people.
In this historical context, Jemaah Tarbiyah is best described by following three approaches. First, by putting Jemaah Tarbiyah within the framework of the dynamics of the *santri* of Indonesia. The activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah are of a different character from the “old” *santri*. Second, Jemaah Tarbiyah is part of a continuing process of Islamisation in Indonesia that combines the two dimensions of accommodation and purification. This will determine a political praxis that is pragmatic in nature. Third, Jemaah Tarbiyah is part of a social movement that opposed the hegemonic regime of the New Order by establishing more space for Islamic cultivation and education (*tarbiyah*). It is through this strategy that Jemaah Tarbiyah has been able to develop itself as an alternative to Islamic radicalisation that increasingly took hold during the decade of the 1980s.

2. Internationalisation and Internalisation

As a result of its decision to withdraw from national political issues and to avoid any confrontation with the New Order regime, Jemaah Tarbiyah shifted its sights towards international issues. Ideas coming in from the Middle East became more interesting, particularly international issues involving the role of the US and Israel in the Middle East.

The phenomenon of PKS itself shows clearly the influence of Middle Eastern ideas in Indonesia. PKS activists adopted the ideas of Hasan al-Banna, while accommodating the local dynamics of Indonesian Islam. At this superficial level, the role of the Middle East as the sender of ideas and Indonesia as the receiver is immediately apparent. However, since the process also necessarily involves the role of the receiver, in which the ideas from the Muslim Brothers are domesticated, a different, modified movement has resulted. The political and cultural situation of Indonesian society has tempered the process of adaptation. The main intellectual ingredients were imported from the Middle East, but were enhanced to suit an Indonesian taste. Indonesian Islam, activists of PKS believe, will set an example about the contribution of an Islamic movement to participate in the democratic system to other Muslim countries, including those of the Middle East.\(^\text{34}\)

This process of interaction between the international source and Indonesian local dynamics which produced the Jemaah Tarbiyah has had the effect of diluting the perceived fundamentalist character of the Muslim Brothers. The involvement of Jemaah Tarbiyah activists in the realm of politics has forced them to deal with the heterogenous nature of Indonesia. As a result, the political agenda of PKS in promoting Islamic aspirations (the major discourse of Jemaah Tarbiyah) has been played down; it has passed through a process of domestication in which local contexts become determinant factors in the promotion of its aspirations.
This is not to say that the international face of Jemaah Tarbiyah is not still apparent, in particular when it places the issue of “experiences of injustice” in the Islamic world, particularly the Middle East, as a high priority in its international policy. PKS is very critical of the role of the US and its ally, Israel on the plight of the Palestinian people. This strong criticism is often misunderstood as merely an anti-Western and anti-Semitic stance; it has not yet been recognised to be the feeling of disenchantment of the ummah towards the perceived injustices in the global acts of the superpower nation and its allies.

3. Reformulation of Shariah

The commitment of Jemaah Tarbiyah to participate in politics has altered its religious orientation. A new paradigm in viewing relations between Islam and the Indonesian state has evolved. Conformity between the movement’s belief and popular issues is something that cannot be avoided by its party if it is to win mass support. Inclusive and pluralistic attitudes are also promoted in order to change the exclusive and fundamentalist image of Jemaah Tarbiyah. These new directions, however, are grounded in a deep religious reasoning, and the significant achievement of PKS in the 2004 general elections is an important example of how the party has been able to apply its new paradigm.

The case of the 2004 general elections proved the ability of PKS to broaden its domain of support. This accomplishment has differentiated PKS from other Islamic parties in the past, whose supporters were concentrated in particular regions where the santri community was dominant. The support base of PKS has formed not only within the old strongholds of Islamic parties, but has extended into areas where Islamists were not popular before. However, the strongholds of PKS are still specifically in urban areas where the lower middle class and the urban poor are numerous. People from the lower middle class in Jakarta, for instance, have given their support to the party. In the Province of DKI Jakarta PKS won power and defeated other major parties such as Golongan Karya (Golkar) and The Party of Indonesia Democracy Struggle, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDIP).

The main reason for PKS’ achievement is that as long as the party makes promises for a better life, regardless of ideology, the people will give it their support. Although PKS is an Islamic party, it is able to respond to people’s interests and it also succeeds in areas where Islamic slogans and aspirations are not dominant. The people are concerned with the party’s programs and performance. Here, PKS shows its readiness to accommodate popular problems, particularly in responding to the interests of the little people of the cities.

A reformulation of Islamic shariah, by emphasising PKS’ role in improving welfare, a commitment to care and a clean government have become central issues within the discourse of PKS activism. A new understanding of the shariah,
highlighting other than its purely punitive aspects, is part of the new paradigm to implant the shariah into popular consciousness. The party is well aware that imposing the issue of shariah in the form in which it has been understood in the past and as it is promoted by other Islamic parties will not find much public favour in Indonesia.

On the other hand, incorporating the spirit of Islam into issues that are apparently secular, such as clean government and anti-corruption, and using them in political campaigns is also part of PKS’ effort to carry out a reformulation of shariah. Secular issues are being framed within the new paradigm to reveal their Islamic nature. Every attempt is made to relate Islamic teachings to worldly issues in order to bring the party closer to popular aspirations.

C. Objectives and Methodology

My thesis aims to contribute to the analysis of the current phenomena of Islamic movements and Islamic parties in Indonesia, particularly by understanding the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah movement and its transformation into the political party of PKS. The achievement of PKS during the 2004 general elections indicates that the party has attracted voters who see it as a real alternative to existing parties. However, PKS and Jemaah Tarbiyah are not merely interesting phenomena in themselves; they offer an ideology and religious experience which is making a unique contribution to Indonesian politics by testing the nature of the relationship between Islamically based politics and the secular state.

The contribution of PKS as an Islam based party will always be determined by its ability to uphold its Islamic vision and to conform with the realities of Indonesia. The new direction in Indonesian Islamism represented by PKS progresses towards justice, social care and good governance for all Indonesians. The use of Islamic symbols and slogans must also meet the expectations of the masses, so that if the party is unable to work for the people’s interests, PKS will lose its significance in Indonesian politics.

In order to understand and provide a comprehensive picture of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS, I have used a variety of approaches and methodologies from several disciplines. The chapters of the thesis draw on theories from anthropology, political science, social movement analysis, history and Islamic Studies. Relying on political science and neglecting religious and socio-cultural features is patently insufficient for an understanding of Islamic parties such as PKS. More elaboration is needed, since up to now there have been no authoritative sources to satisfy the need of readers regarding this phenomenon. Individual key figures and leaders of PKS may present different descriptions of their organizations; each has their own experience and story. My task has been to structure the oral narratives into an academic analysis.
I present the thesis in the following form: there are seven chapters, which are divided into three parts. Each part employs a particular approach to shape the analysis. Part One presents the historical context and consists of two chapters, the first of which deals with the dynamics of the *santri*, or observant Muslims in Indonesia, focussing on the emergence of new variants of *santri* (convergence, radical, and global) and aims to describe Jemaah Tarbiyah in its global context. Chapter One applies an anthropological approach as developed by Geertz and Koentjaraningrat to describe Indonesian Muslims in the 1950s, to which I add the further development of the different variants of *santri*. Chapter Two deals with the patterns and types of Islamisation of Indonesia, focussing on how the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah offers a new perspective on the process of Islamisation. In this chapter, I use mainly a sociological approach in analysing the strategy of a religious movement that aims to influence society and the state to meet its Islamic goals.

Part Two deals with development of Jemaah Tarbiyah during the repression of the New Order and comprises two chapters. Chapter Three focusses on the historical events that coincided with the emergence of Jemaah Tarbiyah and describes how Jemaah Tarbiyah managed to survive and even expand within a hostile political environment. In this chapter, social movement theory is used to examine the relationship between the regime’s repression and Jemaah Tarbiyah’s response. Chapter Four analyses the significance of “campus Islam”, in particular how Jemaah Tarbiyah established itself on secular campuses in Indonesia and made them bases for its political caderisation. This chapter takes a political approach that attempts to depict the elite recruitment of PKS and its role within student governments during the New Order period up to its collapse in 1998. In this chapter it becomes clear that the party’s origins “will affect its organisational structure, internal dynamics, functions and ideological principles.”

Part Three of the thesis also contains three chapters, both focussing on aspects of the religious and political ideology of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS. Chapter Five studies the influence of the Muslim Brothers of Egypt in Indonesia, how the process of transmission of ideas occurred and what type of relationship the central movement and its associates have built. The approach here is political, highlighting the influence of a foreign ideology on a local social movement and political party. Chapter Six deals with the Sufi influences of the Muslim Brothers upon Jemaah Tarbiyah activists and then how to use them in responding to Indonesian issues. Why do Jemaah Tarbiyah activists believe it is important to return to the ideas of the Egyptian activist and social philosopher, Hasan al-Banna? Social movement theory is used to analyse the role of ideology in driving political practice, it is the internal factor that leads PKS to play a pragmatic role in Indonesian politics. Chapter Seven is then dedicated to a critical analysis of the sensitive issue of *shariah* - how PKS addresses this issue and what
strategies are brought into play to gain broad support from society, at the same time maintaining the solidity of PKS cadres. The discipline of Islamic Studies helps to clarify the significance of shariah and its importance to Muslims. When the results of Islamic Studies analysis are combined with those of the political science analysis, it becomes clear that the demand to implement shariah in Indonesia still needs to gain popular support; it is essential for PKS to successfully bridge the gap between Islamic ideals and political realities.

The data to support my arguments in this thesis are mainly derived from field research, which I conducted from 23 January 2003 to 15 January 2004 and from 15 November 2005 to 20 January 2006 in Surabaya (East Java), Depok (West Java), Jakarta (DKI Jakarta), Padang (West Sumatra) and Makassar (South Sulawesi). The research was based on in-depth interviews and my direct observations. During the periods mentioned, I met with most PKS leaders and figures holding high positions in the party. I interviewed them regarding their religious background and education as well as their activities in the party. I asked them to tell of their experiences during the early development of the informal movement of Jemaah Tarbiyah under the Soeharto regime and how they responded to the regime’s policy of oppression. During the interviews I also tried to gather information about the views of PKS activists on the implementation of shariah in Indonesia. I was fortunate to have the chance to observe PKS political activities and some sessions of its religious training, halaqah. In addition, I collected primary source materials, such as books, articles and official documents written by activists of Jemaah Tarbiyah and PKS.

My familiarity with primary sources written by PKS activists on religion and politics has been important in helping me to understand the movement and its political praxis. Before the establishment of PKS, during my studies towards my bachelor’s degree at The University of Indonesia (UI), Jakarta in 1992-1997 I was able to interact directly with members of Jemaah Tarbiyah and other Islamic groups on campus. These valuable experiences helped me to understand the characteristics of the movement under study. My close acquaintance with a number of PKS figures helped me gain further insight into the movement and its political activities. However, I have endeavoured not to allow this closeness to interfere with the critical analysis of my subject matter. I have tried to be objective but also to develop “empathy” with the movement. In this sense, my “empathy” towards my subject lies in fully engaging with the phenomenon of PKS so as to understand all its facets, ideals and strategies. In doing so, I do not necessarily mean that “empathy” evolved into “sympathy.”

ENDNOTES

1 See “Demonstrasi itu Tertib dan Damai,” Media Indonesia, 15 September 2003.
2 In 2004 general election PKS gained 45 seats at the national parliament, 165 seats at provinces and 849 seats at districts, compared to 1999 general election when PK only attained 7 seats at national
parliament, 26 seats at provinces and 158 seats at districts. During direct elections of mayors (Bupati or Walikota) in provincial and district level PKS also won in 61 regions. See “PKS Perkirakan Raih 48 Kursi DPR,” Gatra, 21 April 2004 and “61 dari 112 Pilkada telah Direbut PKS,” Gatra, 10 June 2006.

3 Media Indonesia, 15 September 2003.


5 Al-Banna was born in Egypt in 1906. He founded his movement, al-ikhwa>n al-Muslimi>n (the Muslim Brothers) in 1928, to become a force within Egyptian social movements. On 12 February 1949 he was assassinated by the Egyptian secret police. See John L. Esposito, ed. The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World Vol. 1 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 195-198. Further details about al-Banna and the society of Muslim Brothers will be presented in Chapters V and VI.


9 Ibid.


11 Ibid., 206.


13 Ibid.


15 Ibid., x.


17 See Aay Muhammad Furkon, Partai Keada:an Sejahtera: Ideologi dan Praksis Politik Kaum Muda Muslim Indonesia Kontemporer (Bandung:Teraju, 2004).

18 Ibid., 281-282.

19 Ibid.

20 Ibid., vii.


22 The government censored the contents of sermons in response to increasingly harsh criticism of the regime by Muslim preachers. See Faishal Ismail, “Pancasila as the Sole Basis for all Political Parties and for all Mass Organizations; an Account of Muslim’s Responses,” Studia Islamika 3 no. 4 (1996), 55.


24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.


27 Ibid., 18.


29 Zachary Abuza, “Politics and Violence in Indonesia: an Emerging Jihadist-Islamist Nexus?” NBR Analysis 15 no. 3 (September 2004), 1-54.

31 Ibid., 48.
32 In this sense, Islam is understood as a country and citizenship that eliminates all differences. Islam recognises neither geographical frontiers nor racial divisions. See Esposito, ed., *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World Vol 1*, 198.
33 Interview with Rahmat Abdullah, Jakarta, 11 May 2003.
35 Ibid.