China’s growing participation in international organisations provides a source and mark of its expanding power, and a measure of its increased global commitments and responsibilities. Its effective entry into the global community occurred thirty years ago when, on 26 October 1971, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 2758 to transfer the seat of China in the United Nations from the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Following as it did a sustained period of Chinese isolationism and revolutionary paranoia, this development was universally hailed with relief, tinged with some lingering anxiety. Any initial concern within the international community about the potential problems associated with China’s entry was, however, soon dispelled by the continuing domestic turmoil of the Cultural Revolution, then by the enticing prospects of China’s market reforms and by China’s modest, self-assigned role as a learner in global affairs. Despite its sudden international prominence, China was slow to participate in most of the UN’s affiliated agencies—it did not join the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Conference on Disarmament (CD) or fully participate in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) until well after Mao’s death in September 1976.

By the mid 1990s, only twenty years later, the scene had shifted. China was emerging as a great power, economically, politically, and militarily, and one which was highly influential in international
China's participation in international organisations

organisations. In terms of its increasing impact on international and regional politics and its influence in global issue areas of security, the environment, the international political economy and human rights, it even enjoyed the ascribed role of a superpower. As the international community began to feel the impact of China's burgeoning economic growth and its increased international assertiveness, scholars and statesmen alike began worrying about its place and role in a rapidly globalising world. Increasingly, they questioned the degree to which its domestic and international policies reflected an ability to co-exist peacefully and cooperatively with the international community.³

By 2000, China had become a member of over 50 intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and 1,275 international non-governmental organisations (INGOs). This contrasted with the situation in 1966, when it was a member of only one intergovernmental organisation and 58 international non-governmental organisations.⁴ In terms of numbers of IGOs, by 2000 China ranked seventh in the Asia Pacific region behind Japan, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia and Malaysia. In terms of its membership of INGOs, China was placed sixth in the region behind Australia, Japan, India, New Zealand and South Korea.⁵

It goes without saying that, for China, membership of international organisations is critical.⁶ It is also critical for the global community, not only because of its implications for global power distribution but because, apart from their many other functions, international organisations are seen to contribute significantly to the international socialisation of participating states. International organisations and their treaty regimes not only ensure transparency, cut transaction costs, build capacity, and enhance dispute settlement, but also, through a process of ‘jawboning’, persuade parties to ‘explore, redefine and sometimes discover’ their own, and mutual, interests.⁷ In this sense, they may be understood broadly as the institutional representations of interdependence, constituting a ‘collective organising response to a multiplicity of ‘traffic’ control problems in a world of contradictory trends’.⁸ Yet, for the same reason, they represent a challenge to the state. Participation in international organisations

133
both confirms sovereignty and constrains it. Management of the problem of sovereignty is thus a highly complex matter. For each state it is a question of steering between the benefits for sovereignty that membership of international organisations and regimes entails, and the potential threat to sovereignty that it implies. The power conferred on states by international organisational participation is balanced by the increased responsibility such participation entails.

The following overview of the goals underlying China's active engagement in international organisations, and of the means by which it pursues them, sheds light on its practical understanding of power and responsibility.

China's approach to international organisations

While China's leaders appreciate that membership of international organisations enhances China's power and status and is essential to participation in globalisation and modernisation, they are also alive to the problems posed by international citizenship. President Jiang Zemin has both welcomed interdependence and warned of the threats posed by economic interdependence for North-South relations, the centrifugal and centripetal pressures that it exerts on the economy, the social and environmental ills that it entails, and the possible impact on China's economic growth rate. Yet he has also acknowledged the responsibility that interdependence places on China to broaden its understanding of the world. Indeed, the extent of China's shift in this respect was reflected in Jiang's speech at a Royal Banquet in the United Kingdom (UK) on 19 October 1999, which expressed his pride and confidence in China's status as one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and revealed China's new readiness to view the United Kingdom, historically perceived as one of its oppressors, as one of its partners in international responsibility.

However, other more defensive reactions within China stress the way in which international cooperation and interdependence protect and promote US hegemonic interests. These reactions
China's participation in international organisations

mirror the general ambivalence about globalisation (quanzhihu) which, unlike the concept of modernisation (xiandaihua), is seen to place China at serious risk of losing control over its own policies. This ambivalence explains China's insistence that interdependence and globalisation must not undermine state sovereignty. While formally recognising international organisations as subjects of international law, it has denied that they are 'supranational' or political entities in the same sense as sovereign states. On the one hand, it looks to international organisations to confer international prestige, status and domestic legitimacy and to solve the problems inherent in globalisation. On the other hand, it prefers to use bilateral mechanisms for the resolution of interstate or intrastate conflict and views international relations from a realist, or, as some would have it, cultural realist, rather than liberal, perspective.

A China difference?

Samuel Kim has characterised China's attitude to international organisations as moving from a 'system-transforming' approach during the exclusion period of 1949-70 to a 'system-reforming' approach in the 1970s, to the 'system-maintaining and system-exploiting' approach of the 1980s and 1990s. Similarly, he has argued that China's international organisational behaviour is characterised by a 'maxi-mini approach', that is, a strategy of maximising the benefits of organisational participation through 'state-enhancing' rather than 'state-diminishing' functionalism and minimising normative costs and costs such as dependency and loss of sovereignty.

Yet, is this behaviour an indication of a 'China difference'? It is important not to exaggerate the degree to which it is peculiar to China. A maxi-mini approach is adopted by most states, although most do not share the same history of attempting to transform the international system. Some scholars even appear to conclude that China has a negative attitude to interdependence simply because of its apparently self-interested motivation in acceding to treaties and joining international organisations. Yet most states ratify treaties and join international organisations for reasons of
self-interest, or, conversely, do not, as instanced by the failure of the US Congress to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in October 1999 and by US rejection of an increasing number of international treaties in 2001. Moreover, the United States in particular claims special consideration and treatment in international organisations by virtue of its superior power and status.¹⁷

Nevertheless, the PRC's relative inexperience in the world of international organisations has meant that the last thirty years have involved a steep learning curve, mediated by its own ambitions, changing perceptions and unique perspectives. Its interaction has changed over the years, from the aloof posture of an outsider looking in and sizing up the game, to active participation and a lively, astute promotion of its national interests. China's complex identity as an incipient superpower, a permanent member of the Security Council wielding a veto, a member of the exclusive P5 (Permanent Five) nuclear club, a developing state which is the chief beneficiary of World Bank loans, and a socialist state previously exploited by imperialist powers, has given rise to conflicting concerns and idiosyncratic behaviour. Its Marxist principles and political culture continue to shape its particular motivations and perceptions, as well as its responses to international organisations. In particular, the doctrine of self-reliance and a fierce defence of sovereignty, if less egregious than in the Maoist years, remain constant influences underlying policy responses. Marxism coexists in the Chinese mindset with the more recent ideology of the laissez-faire market system—it has not been replaced.¹⁸ Which particular reference point China invokes to justify its policy decisions depends very much on the context in which those decisions are made, on domestic political considerations and on the receptivity of the international community.

Tactics

Reflecting this unique character, China adopts a number of historically effective tactics in international organisations. One of them is its self-constructed identity as a 'Club of One'. As Tian Jiyun has pointed out, '[i]n international relations, China adheres to non-
China's participation in international organisations

alignment and does not engage in formation of military blocs, arms race and military expansion. China upholds an independent foreign policy of peace and a defensive national defence policy. Within this separateness, China creates a space for itself to bend, according to circumstance or need, towards either the developing or the developed world. The flexibility of its tactics mirrors the flexibility of its ideology. Separateness and ambiguity enhance China's power, despite Gerald Segal's claims to the contrary in his controversial thesis querying whether China 'matters'. For instance, as Barry O'Neill has argued, of all the permanent members of the Security Council, China is the most powerful precisely because it stands alone with a veto at an extreme policy position. Thus, 'it is constantly using its veto or, rather, the threat to veto (actually or only implicitly), and so it is constantly making a difference'. In contrast, the United States is also at an extreme point, but it is arguably less powerful than China because other Western veto members adopt similar policy positions.

China also has a tendency to free-ride where possible and to exploit its developing nation status. Thus, for instance, although a member of the permanent five, China's contribution rate to the United Nation's regular budget is below 1 per cent. This rate, which in 1979 was reduced, at China's request, from 5.5 per cent to 0.79 per cent, compares with the 25 per cent paid by the United States and the 19.9 per cent paid by Japan, a country which is not even a member of the permanent five. China, however, insists on adhering to the 'principles on contributions that we must follow'. The United States is now attempting to increase China's contribution so that its own share may be reduced.

Principles

Numerous China scholars have noted the importance of moral principles in China's international organisational behaviour. These principles, which contrast with, but also buttress, pragmatic foreign policy goals, include the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, and the rights to national self-determination and independence. Within the context of international organisations, the most important of the Five Principles is sovereignty, which China defines solely in terms of state power.
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy

China always maintains that all countries, regardless of their size, strength, and wealth, should be equal members of the international community. Peoples of various countries have the right to choose their social systems and development roads commensurate with their national conditions and should be able to decide the affairs of their own countries. All countries in the world must uphold the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, non-aggression, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.26

For this reason, China places heavier emphasis on Article 2, paragraphs 4 and 7, of the UN Charter, which emphasise state sovereignty, including in particular the requirement that 'nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state' (Article 2.7), than on Articles 56 and 55, wherein 'all Members pledge to take joint and separate action in cooperation with the Organisation' to promote, inter alia, 'universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion' (Art. 55c). The Chinese formula is therefore far from the restrictive concept of sovereignty articulated by the UN Secretary-General.

State sovereignty, in its most basic sense, is being redefined by the forces of globalisation and international cooperation. The state is now widely understood to be the servant of its people, and not vice versa. At the same time, individual sovereignty—and by this I mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms of each and every individual as enshrined in the Charter—has been enhanced by a renewed consciousness of the right of every individual to control his or her destiny.27

In contrast to its moral principles, China's pragmatic goals are basically to preserve an external environment conducive to its own internal development and to enhance its international status. Yet, the relationship between moral principles and pragmatic policies is also a symbiotic one. China's moral stance disguises its
China's participation in international organisations

pragmatic goals and blurs the degree to which it is actually prepared to negotiate its sovereignty. Moral, particularly Marxist, principles also provide a bolt hole to which to return when domestic pressures and interests require a more assertive foreign policy stance.

China's emphasis on sovereignty is in part a product of the fact that its past is never very far from its present and future. Its perception of itself as the victim of the imperialist powers, even though it was never completely colonised, means that its foreign policy is strongly oriented towards, and motivated by, past grievances in a way that few other states' policies are. Over the decades, and in spite of growing international power, its sense of historical grievance has become a vehicle of the nationalism which sporadically erupts, primarily as a response to domestic pressures.

Emphasis on sovereignty is, moreover, a reflection of the extent to which China's international interaction carries with it considerable domestic, normative costs. For liberal democracies, cooperative behaviour and acceptance of interdependence is not as costly because such behaviour normally coheres with domestically observed standards and goals. In China's case, international cooperation and interdependence often conflict with the perceived needs of domestic stability, with the authority of Party leaders and with the norms of domestic culture. This explains the extreme sensitivity of China's international policies to the exigencies of domestic political pressures, whether they be disputes among political factions or manifestations of social instability. Even the most outward-looking of China's political leaders, like Premier Zhu Rongji, are alert to any signs that foreign or trade policies might have a negative domestic impact, and will change those policies accordingly. Needless to say, such sensitivity alters existing patterns of compliance, and, in particular, is likely to present problems after China's WTO accession. While routine activities in international organisations help stabilise the nature of China's participation, international bodies of a more political character often reflect the volatility of its policy shifts.

China's attitude to the international rule of law and its behaviour within international organisations is heavily influenced by its attitude to the domestic rule of law and to its political culture. The reliance
of its domestic political culture on ethics rather than law, moral consensus rather than judicial procedure, and benevolent government rather than on checks and balances, has its resonances in China’s international behaviour. So too have domestic notions of hierarchy, power and personal relationships (guanxi). As in its domestic law, moreover, the force of precedent in its practice of international law is weak. Although China criticises other states for not following precedent, or for establishing an unacceptable precedent, in its own international organisational behaviour it often does not invoke the same standards of consistency.

Finally, while exercising increasing power and influence, and despite the gradual erosion of its Marxist convictions, China is still inclined to stress the North–South divide and to lament undue Western influence on the international system. Thus, in its participation in international organisations, it is not only motivated by a system-maintaining and system-exploiting approach, but also, paradoxically, as it has become more powerful and more confident, has effected a partial return to a system-reforming approach, which in its view redresses the imbalances and injustices of the past. It is also concerned to make a shift from the current unipolar concentration of global power to a multipolar world. International organisations have become one vehicle for this reform agenda.

The following sections of this chapter comprise an analysis of the state enhancing/protecting and global reforming aspects of China’s participation in international organisations and, as evidence of the complex mix of power and responsibility in its global behaviour, a brief discussion of the process of its accession to the WTO.

State enhancement/protection via international organisations

Protecting and extending China’s sovereignty

Membership of international organisations helps resolve issues of China’s disputed sovereignty. Despite the universally recognised principle of self-determination, China’s sovereignty over Tibet and Xinjiang is protected by the positions it takes in international
China's participation in international organisations

organisations, such as the ASEAN Regional Forum, and through its veto power in the UN Security Council, on issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention. The close connection between China's participation in international organisations and its reaffirmation of sovereignty over Taiwan has been well documented by Gerald Chan and is illustrated in Taiwan's eighth failed attempt to enter the United Nations in August 2000, and its fourth failed bid to enter the World Health Organisation in May 2000. Equally, China's pressure on the United Nations in 1999 to restate its one-China policy was part of its push for sovereignty over Taiwan, as was its call in July 2000 for the inclusion of the 'One China' concept in a key text on its entry to the WTO. UN consciousness of PRC sensitivities has permeated all aspects of foreign policy, including the critical issue of humanitarian assistance for the Taiwan earthquake in September 1999. UN relief experts were even obliged to obtain China's formal prior approval before Taiwan's request for assistance could be met. The only international organisations in which China has been prepared to adjust its stringent refusal to allow Taiwan joint membership have been Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asian Development Bank and the WTO. In the finance and trade regimes, in other words, China is not as insistent on sovereignty as it is in the human rights, environmental and security regimes.

China's sovereignty is also protected by its participation in the negotiation of treaties or decisions with which it is not in agreement. For instance, one of the reasons given for its application to join the WTO was that it would enable China to 'take a direct part in formulating trade regulations and rid itself of the disadvantageous position of passive participation'. Again, China chose to be closely involved in drafting the draft Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, rather than simply failing to accede to it once it was formally adopted. Its strict position on sovereignty remained a barrier to drafting progress, since, together with Cuba, it insisted that the work of any investigatory UN mission to prisons and prisoners should be subject to national laws. China was also closely involved in drafting the ILO's 1998 Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, despite its objections.
that the Declaration obliged members that had not ratified the relevant ILO Conventions to undertake the same obligations as those that had. After obtaining an assurance from the ILO that support for the Declaration would not mean that its standards immediately became applicable, China voted for it.34

China's preoccupation with protecting its sovereignty is also reflected in its use of international organisations to enhance the international legitimacy of domestic policies. For instance, both the World Bank and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) have publicly endorsed a number of official Chinese economic and social programs which have been both internationally and domestically controversial. Although the Bank later withdrew its proffered loan to resettle Han Chinese in traditional Tibetan lands in Qinghai province, the program was initially supported by the World Bank despite international protest, while the domestically controversial privatisation of housing was defended by Klaus Topfer, Executive Director of UNEP and acting executive director of Habitat.35

Projecting and enhancing international status

International organisations have promoted China's international status in various ways—through its chairmanship of UN conferences, and its hosting of international conferences, such as the Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing held in September 1995, and the forthcoming APEC Leaders' Forum, to be held in Shanghai in 2001. As demonstrated in the recent election of Shi Jiuyong as Vice-President of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), Chinese officials have even been appointed into senior positions of organisations whose jurisdiction they do not accept.36 China's superior status has also been reflected in its seniority and extensive voting rights in the World Bank and IMF.37 At the same time, its aspirations for senior organisational positions within leading international organisations have had a constraining effect, leading it to modify its more extreme behaviour and to exhibit compliance in the interests of maintaining or obtaining organisational status. For instance, China's ambitions for executive
status in the ILO have had a socialising impact on its participation in the ILO Governing Body Committee on Freedom of Association (CFA), increasing its readiness to accept core labour standards. 38

Maintaining China’s strategic independence

China participates fully in the main international and regional nuclear non-proliferation and arms control organisations, the Conference on Disarmament (CD), the UN First Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). In the CD, it exercises its dual role as a member of the five official Nuclear Weapons States and as supporter of the Non-Nuclear Weapons States. This enhances its ability to negotiate particular issues of concern, such as the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and, more recently, to oppose amendment of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. 39 It has also used the ASEAN Regional Forum to attack the US-proposed theatre missile defence system (TMD) for Asia and the national missile defence system (NMD) for the continental United States. 40 As evidence of its internalisation of the norms of the security regime, it has invoked the authority of international law and international treaties, particularly the ABM treaty, to critique the US proposal. 41

Through its position as one of the permanent five of the UN Security Council, China also exercises its influence on major global issues of weapons proliferation, humanitarian intervention and peacekeeping. Of the 26 resolutions on which China abstained in the Security Council between 1990–95, 17 were explicitly enforcement measures taken by the Council under the authority vested in it under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Three related to Iraq, three to the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, six concerned Bosnia-Herzegovina, two Libya, one Haiti and two Rwanda. 42 In this arena, its policies have been more self-protective than proactive. As Nigel Thalakada observes,

[t]he pattern that emerges thus far with regard to China’s abstentions on Chapter VII resolutions is one of Chinese reluctance to condone the use of the Security Council’s enforcement authority to undertake military action

143
against a member state (as in the case of Iraq), apply sanctions against a member state (as in the cases of Libya and Yugoslavia), undertake peace enforcement and peacebuilding (as in the case of Bosnia, Haiti and Rwanda) and establish an international tribunal to prosecute widespread human rights abuses (as in the case of Rwanda). 43

China's position on humanitarian intervention, which is primarily related to the protection of its own sovereignty, is of particular importance in the new era of concern about human rights in situations of domestic ethnic conflict or separatist movements. Its stance was crucial in the 1999 Security Council deliberations on East Timor. Although it finally voted in the Security Council in support of the INTERFET role in East Timor, had Indonesia refused to accept the entry of international peacekeepers into East Timor, the likelihood of China's veto of a Security Council resolution to introduce troops without Jakarta's permission may well have prevented any international assistance to the territory.

Therefore, the UN Secretary-General's path-breaking address on the challenges of humanitarian intervention to the UN General Assembly (UNGA) on 20 September 1999 represented a distinct challenge to China's concept of absolute sovereignty. 44 Reacting swiftly, China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, pointed out that the 'new interventionism of the so-called 'human rights over state sovereignty" constituted 'hegemonism in essence'. 45 His response reflected China's increasing sensitivity about the possibility, in a new age of technological warfare in which war is 'fightable and easily winnable' without excessive casualties, of Western humanitarian intervention in China, particularly in the Chinese controlled regions of Tibet and Xinjiang and in Taiwan. 46 China subsequently opposed, if unsuccessfully, the resolution to set up a UN inquiry into violations of human rights in East Timor. 47 The recommendations in the Inquiry's report that the United Nations should set up a war crimes tribunal for East Timor were not endorsed by the Secretary-General, reportedly because Russia and China would be certain to exercise their veto rights. 48 True to expectations, on 1 February 2000, Chinese Foreign Ministry
China's participation in international organisations

spokesman Zhu Bangzao announced China's opposition to the establishment of the UN tribunal.\(^{49}\) This was despite the fact that the question of China's cooperation with the United Nations on matters of humanitarian intervention was one of the main topics addressed during the Secretary-General's visit to China in September 1999.

Preserving an external environment conducive to its own internal development goals

China has long argued that a peaceful external environment is essential to the realisation of its economic modernisation. This instrumental use of international norms is also reflected in China's support for the value of 'cooperation', as opposed to 'confrontation', in international human rights organisations. The need for 'cooperation', for instance, has proved a useful rallying cry to deflect a resolution critical of China's human rights in the UN Commission on Human Rights, and has challenged the normal adversarial procedures accepted within the United Nations. Along with like-minded developing states, China also uses the concept of consensus, with its potential for stalemate, in international organisations to further its interests.\(^{50}\)

Promoting internal developmental aims through foreign investment, expanded trade, technology transfer, and developmental assistance.

The main forums meeting these needs are the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, Asian Development Bank (ADB), Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). As will be seen, the World Trade Organization (WTO) is a less reliable forum for promoting its interests, because of the perceived risks its promotion of free trade entails for China's domestic stability.

China has been the World Bank's most acclaimed and successful client. It is regarded as a responsible, cooperative member and is presented as a model for other developing countries.\(^{51}\) Since 1992,
it has been the Bank’s largest borrower of investment finance. Conversely, the Bank is China’s largest source of long-term foreign capital. Its projects have supported China’s economic reform process, targeting poverty alleviation, infrastructure development and human resources development. Cumulative lending to China by the World Bank Group between 1981 and 30 June 1999 is about US$33.2 billion, of which US$23.3 billion is from the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and US$9.9 billion is from the International Development Association (IDA). This amounts to a substantial proportion of the total of US$400 billion lent to members (currently 180) since the Bank’s establishment. The Bank has supported over 220 development projects in China, involving all major sectors of the economy and most Chinese regions. On the other hand, this amounts to only US$2.50 per person in China, representing the ‘lowest proportion of lending per capita in the entire East Asia region’. 52

China’s loss of eligibility for International Development Assistance (IDA) loans, involving a drop in lending of about 25 per cent, has slightly modified this comfortable picture.53 Reliance on IBRD loans will make it more difficult for poorer provinces to repay since the IBRD charges interest for loans, demands a shorter amortisation period, and has no policy for debt rescheduling. Despite this, the World Bank expects to lend China between US$5–7 billion in the next three years, of which at least US$1 billion will go to poor inland provinces.54 In the new century, both the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank plan to intensify their cooperation with China in the area of poverty reduction and the environment.55 The World Bank remains highly dependent on China’s success as a role model for developing countries, and as a model client.

Since 1979, when China first accepted assistance from UNDP, that body has assisted China in 840 projects at a cost of US$500 million. The UN Children’s Fund has cooperated on a total of 150 projects costing $300 million.56 Moreover, despite the fact that China is not a member of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), that organisation has described China
China's participation in international organisations

as its ‘most important cooperative partner’. The two sides have collaborated to study enterprise reform, train workers in the Chinese tax departments and analyse statistics, as well as cooperating in areas of agriculture, education, environment and investment.

China also exerts inter-organisational pressures to extend its economic power, exploiting any rivalries or functional overlap between organisations. Speaking at the United Nations General Assembly, the Chinese Foreign Minister called on the United Nations to hold a special conference on economic globalisation because ‘the developing countries have the right to equal participation in world economic decision-making and formulation of relevant rules. In the new round of negotiations that will soon begin in the World Trade Organization, the reasonable demands of developing countries should be fully reflected’. 57 The overlapping jurisdictions of the World Bank and the ADB also allow China freedom to negotiate the terms and nature of the loan projects it selects from the ADB.

Finally, China benefits from (often conflicting) advice, information, technology transfer and research provided by international organisations. For instance, UNCTAD's advice on WTO was that China should resist opening its markets to any further international competition until it had undertaken further economic reforms. 58 The ADB supported China's entry, but argued its case on the basis that China's cautious approach to liberalisation of capital controls had insulated it from the worst of the Asian financial crisis. 59 It thereby differentiated its position from that of the IMF. 60

International organisations are also sources of pressure for change. For instance, in September 1999, the IMF policy-setting interim committee asked India and China, as well as other developing nations, to accelerate 'key structural reforms' in taxation, banking and corporate sectors, establish an effective legal system, protect property rights and ensure 'greater transparency' and accountability in government activities. 61 In some cases, as its support for the WTO indicates, China has even looked to international organisations to impose the necessary external regulatory authority legitimising wholesale domestic reforms, which the Chinese leadership would be incapable of achieving through
its own efforts alone. Its readiness to import international norms and procedures and, by implication, to renegotiate the boundaries of state sovereignty, is more evident in the international political economy regime than, for instance, in the human rights regime.

The search for power can thus lead to widely varied outcomes. On the one hand, it can create obstacles to interdependence, and, on the other, it can give states a stake in the international system and create pressures for socialisation. Equally, sovereignty concerns can have an integrating effect, as well as constitute the source of non-cooperation. In China's case, however, power is not sought through conventional channels only.

**Global reform via international organisations**

Because of China's increasing orientation to the market economy, its growing military and commercial power and its concomitant tendency to link its fortunes with the developed world and other major powers, China scholars have tended in recent years to downplay its earlier revolutionary aspirations, ascribing instances of non-cooperation with the international community to nationalistic rather than ideological wellsprings. Yet there are strong reasons to argue the continuing relevance of the Maoist heritage. China's leaders still appeal to Maoist principles of international law and still invoke its traditional, if now modified, identification with the interests of the developing world.

**Impacting on international law**

China recognises the universal applicability of generally recognised international law, even if it underplays the importance of customary international law. Yet, it still upholds Maoist principles which are seen not only to complement generally recognised international law, but even to be constitutive of international law. In a clear enunciation of China's policy on international organisations as it affected international law, former Chairman of the China International Law Society, Huan Xiang, pointed out in 1983 that, since 'Third World countries' were now in the majority, 'they have an important place in shaping and developing the principles, rules
China's participation in international organisations

and regulations of international law'.\textsuperscript{64} Participation in international organisations was seen as one way of ensuring this impact.

If the resolutions of international organisations, especially those of the UN General Assembly, are regarded as sources of international law, the position of the Third World countries as participants in the international law-making process is even more prominent, because they constitute a majority in international organisations and are playing increasingly important roles in the UN General Assembly. In fact, the resolutions containing legal documents of the General Assembly have all been initiated by Third World countries and approved with their support. Their backing has obviously given such documents greater legal significance and thus promoted the development of international law. The Third World countries have become new creators of international law both in name and in reality. As L. Henkin puts it, the new states are now both the new subjects of international law and its new masters.\textsuperscript{65}

Huan saw the Third World as having impacted on international law in a number of ways. The most outstanding contribution of the Third World was seen to be the affirmation of national self-determination as a legal principle. The second contribution was the formulation of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence as 'fundamental principles of international law'.\textsuperscript{66} Moreover, the Third World had 'strengthened and developed' the principle of sovereignty, including the principle of economic sovereignty, or the principle of permanent sovereignty over natural resources. Apart from such fundamental principles, it had precipitated changes on the question of state responsibility and on the idea that the giving of economic aid is a 'legal responsibility' rather than a 'dispensation of favour'. It had emphasised the importance of 'territorial integrity' and had played a role in 'substituting a new law of the sea for the old' by developing 'the idea about the right over 200 nautical miles of sea areas'. It had opposed the unequal treaties imposed on them by colonial powers and had made contributions to the laws of war.\textsuperscript{67}
These principles continue to animate Chinese international organisational policy and its attitude to international law. The Chairman of the National People's Congress, Li Peng, has argued the importance of a mastery of international law for a developing socialist state like China. Contemporary scholars like Wan Xia and Lu Song, however, still claim not only that China adheres to, follows and applies international law, but also that it develops it. They argue that, because of the anomalies within international law and the development of new situations and problems, new 'rational' models of international law need to be established. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence are still viewed as one of China's central contributions to international law. So too is Deng Xiaoping's notion of a new politico-economic international order (NIEO), based on state sovereignty, self-reliance, anti-hegemonism, equality, cooperation and the peaceful resolution of disputes. Thus, President Jiang Zemin has insisted that the Five Principles should constitute the basis of the new international order and has reiterated support for Deng Xiaoping's goals.

Representing the Third World, redistributing international power, promoting a certain conception of international order and reorienting international norms

As a 'Club of One' in the United Nations, China is not the leader or spokesman of a group of developing states. Rather, it achieves a balance between promoting its own fundamental interests and representing those of the Third World. It does this by promoting Third World perspectives in the United Nations on issues in which it has a national interest—issues such as security, human rights, development and the environment. In the Conference on Disarmament (CD), for instance, it sees itself as supporting the NAM (Non-Aligned Movement) states through its non-first use policy, and through its identity as the only nuclear weapons state standing for the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons—a position it believes the Permanent 4 are now beginning to accept themselves. On the other hand, according to China, the
China's participation in international organisations

NAM states oppose possession of any nuclear weapons, a position China cannot accept. In addition, some NAM states fail to distinguish between the policies of the different states in the Permanent Five (P5), and propose a time-bound nuclear disarmament program which, China says, is 'not realistic'. The NAM states have also been useful to China in advocating positions with which it agrees but which it does not wish to espouse openly. In the early years of its participation in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), for instance, it resorted to free-riding, falling in behind states like India and the Soviet Union. By contrast, its more recent disarmament diplomacy has been described as 'relatively open', involving frequent interventions in CD debates.

Where China's interests do not cohere with those of the Third World, on the other hand, it remains silent. While it has vigorously supported Third World candidates for the secretary-generalship of the United Nations, for instance, it is not so outspoken about the formula for the reform of the Security Council, supporting the idea of greater Third World representation but not of an extension of access to the veto. A Chinese diplomat at the United Nations has stated that only when developed and developing states have a 'more balanced representation' in the Security Council will the candidacy of Japan and Germany be resolved.

Yet, withal their often divergent interests, the developing states represent an important power base for China in its effort to shift the current locus of global power from the United States to a more differentiated, multipolar world. For this reason, China has used its membership of multilateral financial and development institutions to attempt to redistribute international power in the interests of the developing world. For instance, Dai Xianglong, Governor of the People's Bank, has urged the IMF to take account in its reforms of the voices of developing countries. China has also been attracted to regional solutions, partly with a view to securing its own backyard. For instance, it has been willing to consider Japan's proposal to establish an East Asia Monetary Fund, and has called for greater regional cooperation in trade, financial, investment, scientific and technological areas. At China's initiative, a Dialogue of Finance and Central Bank Deputies involving ASEAN,
China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) was launched in March 1999 under the auspices of ASEAN. On 10 April 2000, China formally acceded to the Bangkok Agreement—Asia's only preferential tariff arrangement—thereby marking its debut in regional trading agreements.

China has likewise insisted on the responsibility of the developed states, as the chief agents and beneficiaries of environmental degradation, to assume the major burden of expenditure for the rehabilitation of the global environment. It has not, however, refused to contribute to the costs. Rather, it has disputed the amount and terms of its contributions, as well as arguing for the rights of developing states generally.

In international human rights organisations, China has sought to promote the values of developing states and to question the universal applicability of international human rights norms. This is particularly the case in public and political forums like the UN Human Rights Commission, which not only provide a platform for China's projection of its moral principles, but which also have the potential to publicly threaten its sovereignty. At the normative level, in the 1993 UN World Human Rights Conference in Vienna, and yearly sessions of the UN Human Rights Commission and its Sub-Commission, China has stressed the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference, and the cultural relativist idea that each state has a right to its own interpretation of human rights. It has also emphasised the rights to subsistence and to development. Although the latter rights are important, China has seen them as prior rights, which must be satisfied before the realisation of civil and political rights. This conflicts with the UN principle, entrenched in numerous international instruments, of the indivisibility, interdependence and universality of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.

For a number of reasons, China has not been successful in its efforts to establish a new priority of rights. At the procedural level, however, through resort to the no-action motion to avoid resolutions against China in the Human Rights Commission and Sub-Commission, through its attack on non-governmental organisation (NGOs) and country situation resolutions, and its
success in 1997 in bilateralising the multilateral Human Rights Commission process, China has helped undermine the principles of the non-selectivity and universality of the application of human rights norms. Its sensitivity on issues of sovereignty has also made it reluctant in this regime, as in others, to allow international bodies to monitor conditions on Chinese soil.

Interdependence?

The complexity of China’s mix of responsibility within the international community and its simultaneous concern to project its power, interests and national values, to maintain its independence, represent the interests of developing states and safeguard its domestic stability is no better exemplified than in the process of its accession to the WTO. The significance of its entry will not lie solely in its impact on the WTO and on the globalisation project generally. It represents China’s most calculated gamble in the history of its entry into international organisations and its most unqualified leap into economic interdependence. Not only has China made sweeping concessions to the international community during its multilateral and bilateral negotiations, it has taken unprecedented steps to renegotiate the terms of its own sovereignty.

Why has China sought to join the WTO? Status, trading opportunities, the pressures of globalisation and the desire to deepen restructuring within China are all motives. The WTO is seen as an ‘important carrier of globalisation’, which will allow China to ‘become a respectable member in the open international economic system’ and enable it to enjoy equal trading treatment and take part in formulating trade regulations. The WTO will have the crucial function of opening up China’s services industry. It will link China with the global economy, ‘bring about rational allocation of resources’, allow more Chinese enterprises out of the country and facilitate foreign investment in China. Moreover, since China is not a member of any regional trading bloc, it will rely on the WTO to maintain its own competitiveness. Finally, China clearly hopes accession might facilitate better relations with Taiwan.
In the interests of attaining these goals, however, China has had to, and will continue to, bear considerable costs. President Jiang Zemin has insisted, through his spokesman, that 'we absolutely will not sacrifice our national interests just for the sake of membership of the WTO'. 82 For this reason, throughout the fifteen years of accession negotiations, China has persisted in its request to receive the benefits due to a developing country in an incremental manner. Nevertheless, China's accession to WTO will subject it to the WTO Agreement, requiring it to enforce the WTO Understanding. China will become vulnerable to the WTO dispute system and to the courts. WTO membership will introduce enhanced competition within China and will further erode central control over commercial policy. It will require numerous policy changes, including significant reductions in tariffs, removal of nontariff barriers and quotas, the opening up of China's service sector, further protection of intellectual property rights and the elimination of many barriers to trade in agricultural products. 83 It will therefore create severe social strains and exacerbate the already existing unemployment problems. It will require increased legal transparency, and greater political openness and accountability. Moreover, under the bilateral agreement negotiated in November 1999 with the United States, China made asymmetrical concessions in favour of the United States. 84 In particular, the unparalleled, extensive and prolonged safeguards and anti-dumping provisions that the United States negotiated will be available to other WTO members under the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principle.

Chinese economist Gao Shangquan has identified four challenges that WTO membership poses for China. It will constitute a challenge to the competitiveness of some Chinese industries and companies on the world market, a challenge to China's administrative system, a challenge to China's industrial structure, and a challenge to the Chinese government's macroeconomic control. 85 China's accession will bring challenges not only for China, but for the whole WTO system. In the process of implementing the rules, numerous obstacles will be met. These include problems of the insufficiency of WTO regulations to accommodate a non-market economy, including the inadequacy of existing surveillance
machinery; problems of cultural mismatch between China and other WTO members, leading to differences in the interpretation of rules; the inadequacy of Chinese domestic financial and legal institutions; interference from, and non-compliance of, China's sub-national authorities; general problems of domestic implementation; and the danger that Western WTO members will initially engage in excessive dispute resolution with China. The main variable throughout will be China's domestic stability. This is now a critical source of concern, in view of Zhu Rongji's failure to create a social welfare system funded through investments in capital markets to protect the unemployed and other groups rendered vulnerable by accession. If during the process WTO members place too much pressure on China, if its economic restructuring is pushed too fast and social stability is imperilled, domestic turmoil will result. If, on the other hand, in the interests of domestic stability, China does not fully implement the reforms it has promised within the accepted timetable, it is liable to end up in constant dispute with other WTO members, and globalisation will be the loser.

Conclusion

In its participation in international organisations, China, like most states, seeks to maximise its power and interests. Again, like most states, it demonstrates some preparedness to accept the costs as well as the benefits of participation and to assume some responsibility within the international system. While its theoretical position on sovereignty may be absolute, in practice its approach to sovereignty is more flexible, except where debate concerns the right of the international community to enforce collective rights like self-determination. When national interest and the principle of absolute sovereignty are seen to coincide, China makes a theoretical statement about the absolute nature of sovereignty. But, in general its power is enhanced by its preparedness to negotiate its sovereignty, rather than to impose blanket vetos. For this reason, since 1981 it has preferred not to use its veto in the Security Council, but obtains numerous advantages from hinting it might do so.
China's need for moral stature and a good international reputation thus helps tone down the realism of its foreign policy, both in appearance and reality. In many cases, this does not mean that it has internalised international norms, but that it is prepared to be more pragmatic about its interests than its statements of principle would suggest. To that extent, it has been influenced by the rigorous process of participation in international organisations. Despite the costs it incurs, it continues to support international organisations and multilateralism and has acknowledged the inevitability of global interdependence, accepting that, just as the world needs China, China needs the world.

At the same time, China's readiness to accept the costs and responsibility of participation must be balanced against major problems it has experienced in implementing its obligations under international treaty and organisational rules. The first is its abiding concern with sovereignty, a problem permeating most of its decisions relating to organisational cooperation and causing intransigence in cases of alleged 'interference', such as proposals by international organisations to monitor Chinese conditions in situ. This is a particular problem in the human rights and security regimes. The second is its difficulty implementing in practice the domestic legislation which it introduces in compliance with its international obligations. This is a notable problem in the human rights and environmental regimes, and may well prove a problem in its relations with the WTO. Third is its tendency to free-ride where possible, using elements of its complex identity, such as its status as a developing nation, to plead special treatment.

However, the main obstacle to international cooperation, apart from an enduring preoccupation with domestic stability, lies in China's complex perception of its global responsibilities. While it is now tending to link its fortunes much more with the developed world and with other powerful states, it still recognises an obligation to act and speak on behalf of developing states. This is because identification with the interests of the developing world remains a constituent element of its own power. In other words, precisely because of considerations of power, China's sense of responsibility to the international community is double-edged.
China's participation in international organisations

While clearly committed to participation in international organisations and to being seen as a cooperative member, it still conceives a continuing responsibility to defend developing states, to forge new international norms, rules and procedures and to oversee the redistribution of power in the international system. The balance China achieves between power and responsibility is therefore unstable and dependent on time, issue area, foreign policy environment and domestic political pressures. Given the complexities of its motivations, reflecting a mix of self-interest, conformity and dissent, given the increasing dissonance between its international power and its domestic volatility, and in view of its deep-rooted political culture and the still essentially introspective focus of its foreign policy, the unpredictability that has characterised China's international organisational policies and behaviour over the last three decades is likely to persist.

Notes


2 Speaking on the history of China's 50-year diplomacy in late 1999, China's Vice-Premier Qian Qichen identified the moment China's legal rights were restored in the United Nations in 1971 as marking the resumption of his country's status in the international community. See 'Chinese Vice-Premier on China's 50-Year Diplomacy', Xinhua News Agency, 24 September 1999, Reuters China News, 24 September 1999.

3 See also the excellent and informative study of China and international regimes, Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg (eds), China Joins the World: progress and prospects (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999); David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (eds), China Rising: nationalism and interdependence (London: Routledge, 1997); John R. Faust and Judith F. Kornberg, China in World Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1995), 207–46; James V. Feinerman, 'Chinese participation in the international legal order:'

According to Union of International Associations (ed.), Yearbook of International Organisations 1999/2000, vol. 2 (Munchen: K.G. Saur, 2000), 'an organisation is intergovernmental if it is established by signature of an agreement engendering obligations between governments, whether or not that agreement is eventually published'. By contrast, according to ECOSOC Res. 288 (X), an international non-governmental organisation (INGO) is one not established by intergovernmental agreement. It must also be genuinely international in character. See Ibid., 1477.


The importance of the United Nations in particular was acknowledged in the lead up to celebrations for the fiftieth anniversary of the PRC, when China's Foreign Minister, Tang Jiaxuan, described the role of the United Nations in international affairs as 'irreplaceable' and observed that no matter how the international situation changed, the purpose and principles of the UN Charter and recognised international norms remained realistic and valid at present and in the future. See 'Chinese foreign minister meets UN Chief Annan', Xinhua News Agency, 24 September 1999, Reuters China News, 24 September 1999.

China’s participation in international organisations


9 Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, 27.


11 He stated, ‘[a]s permanent members of the UN Security Council, both China and the UK shoulder major responsibilities for world peace and development, and our two peoples should, together with other people of the world, make due contribution to the establishment of a fair and equitable new international political and economic order’. See ‘Chinese President at royal banquet on fair and equitable new world order’, Xinhua News Agency, 19 October 1999, Reuters China News, 20 October 1999.


16 See Kim, ‘China’s international organisational behaviour’, 431, 425.


In addition, Elizabeth Economy and Michel Oksenberg list some other notable tactics—avoiding enduring commitments, making compliance with China's objectives the litmus test for friendly relations, mobilising support for China's position in developing countries; and capturing the moral high ground and placing the interlocutor on the defensive. See Economy and Oksenberg (eds), *China Joins the World*, 25.


In particular, see Shih Chih-yu, *China's Just World: the morality of foreign policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); and Kim, ‘China's international organisational behaviour’.

‘Chinese parliament deputy advocates equality in international community’.


Stephanie Nebehay, ‘Foreign rescuers go to Taiwan as UN seeks okay’, *Reuters China News*, 21 September 1999.

For instance, Taiwan joined the WTO after China's accession as 'Chinese Taipei' ('Zhonghua Taibei').

Gong Wen and Zhang Xiangchen, ‘Zhongguo jiaru shimao zuzhi dashi shuping’ [Comment on general trend of China’s entry into WTO], *People's Daily*, 7 May 1999, 1.


Ibid., 138–9.

He observed that 'w[ith] the introduction of market elements into the housing issue, people are stimulated to save more money and more flats will be built, the thorny problem of housing will be
China's participation in international organisations


37 For instance, in the IMF, China's vote constitutes 2.2 per cent of the total Fund votes, compared with the vote of 2.43 per cent commanded by the entire South Asia group of Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Sri Lanka.

38 Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, 136–39.


41 For instance, Sha Zukang, Head of the Arms Control Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, reaffirmed China's support for the UN General Assembly resolution on ‘Preservation of and Compliance with the ABM Treaty’, and stated ‘The strategic significance of the treaty goes far beyond the scope of the US–Russia bilateral relationship. It has been universally recognised as playing an indispensable role in maintaining global strategic stability, promoting nuclear disarmament and enhancing international security'. See ‘China urges preservation of ABM Treaty', People's Daily, 21 February 2001.


43 Ibid., 94–5.

44 In the face of failures in Rwanda, Kosovo and (potentially) East Timor, he defined the 'core challenge to the Security Council and to the United Nations as a whole in the next century: to forge unity behind the principle that massive and systematic violations of human rights—wherever they may take place—should not be allowed to stand'. He warned 'if the collective conscience of humanity—a conscience which abhors cruelty, renounces injustice
and seeks peace for all peoples—cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune, there is a grave danger that it will seek elsewhere for peace and justice'. See United Nations, 'Secretary-General presents his annual report'.


46 You Ji, ‘China’s perceptions on the security of Northeast Asia’, Seminar, Department of International Relations, Australian National University, 23 March 2001.

47 In the 27 September vote at the Special Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights to adopt a resolution on East Timor, China was one of twelve states which voted against retention of operative paragraph 6 of the draft resolution calling on the Secretary-General to establish a Commission of Inquiry to gather and compile information on possible violations of human rights in East Timor. By a ballot of 27 in favour and 12 opposed, with 11 abstentions, the Commission voted to retain the paragraph. The final resolution (E/CN.4/S-4/L.1/Rev.1) was approved by a roll-call vote of 32 in favor and 12 opposed, including China, with 6 abstaining. China’s representative Liu Xinsheng, said that China was against the resolution, largely due to the proposal for an international inquiry. See United Nations, ‘Special session of Commission on Human Rights adopts resolution on East Timor’, UN Press Release (Washington, DC: United Nations, 27 September 1999).


50 See, for instance, Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, 164.

51 Author’s interviews with Bank officials, October–November 2000.


China’s participation in international organisations


Just at the point when China was resuming its negotiations with the United States and the European Union for membership of the WTO, Jan Kregel advised it that empirical studies had shown that for a developing country to benefit fully from globalisation, it needed to have a robust domestic economy that could effectively counterbalance any increase in imports that came from lowering trade barriers. China’s economy was seen as weak, particularly in the banking and state enterprise sector and consequently it was advised to hold back, (see Sheel Kohli, ‘UN offers recipe for reforms’, South China Morning Post, 22 September 1999, Reuters China News, 22 September 1999).


‘IMF asks China and India to speed up structural reforms’, Reuters China News, 28 September 1999.

For example, the People’s Daily pointed out that WTO membership would provide an opportunity for the Chinese economy to become a part of standard and fair international competition and would even enhance China’s economic security, (see Gong Wen and Zhang Xiangchen, ‘Comment on general trend’, 1).

See Kong Qingqiang, ‘Enforcing WTO agreements in China’.


These are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, non-interference in each other’s internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
Power and Responsibility in Chinese Foreign Policy

69 Wan Xia, ‘Huigu yu zhanwang–gaige kaifang 20 nian guojifa zai Zhongguo di fazhan’ [Looking back and ahead: the development of international law in China during twenty years of opening and reform], Waijiao xueyuan xuebao, no. 2 (1999), 63; and Lu Song, ‘Guojifa zai guoji guanxi zhong de zuoyong’ [The role of international law in international relations], Waijiao xueyuan xuebao, no. 1 (1997), 14.
71 Author’s interviews, Geneva, August 1998.
72 Author’s interview with Rebecca Johnson, Geneva, August 1998.

75 Although he acknowledged that the IMF had always occupied a key position in the international monetary system and that its role was not replaceable by any other institution, he insisted that it should allow developing countries to join in decisionmaking, and take into account their ability to sustain the strains, instead of forcing them to reform their economic structures according to the standards of developed countries. He argued that the international community should create conditions to increase the distribution and application of special drawing rights and strengthen the IMF’s function in providing international liquidity, (see ‘Governor of People’s Bank of China on IMF, financial policy’, Xinhua News Agency, 27 September 1999, Reuters China News, 29 September 1999; and ‘Developing countries call for New World Financial Order’, Xinhua News Agency, 16 June 2000, Reuters China News, 6 June 2000).
78 Kent, China, the United Nations and Human Rights, 242–43.
China's participation in international organisations

Exceptions have been the visits to China of the UN Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance, the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, and the invitation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture.

Gong Wen and Zhang Xiangchen, 'Comment on general trend', 1–2.


Vivien Pik-kwan Chan, 'Opening up markets 'a double-edged sword'', South China Morning Post, 12 September 1999; and 'China won't sacrifice national interests to join WTO', Kyodo News, 3 September 1999, Reuters China News, 3 September 1999.

For instance, under the agricultural agreement, brokered in Washington in April 1999, the United States won substantial concessions—the average tariff for agricultural products will be cut to 17 per cent from 21.2 per cent, with the average tariff for US priority products falling to 14.5 per cent. All tariffs will be phased out by 2004. Quantitative restrictions, except for those on major agricultural products such as wheat, rice, corn, cotton and table sugar, will be eliminated. See Paul Mooney, 'Post-WTO shocks for China's farmers', China Online, 17 January 2000, available online at http://www.chinaonline.com/issues/wto/NewsArchive/secure/2000/january/C00011721.asp, accessed 1 August 2001.

According to US Trade Representative Charlene Barchevsky it 'secures broad-ranging, comprehensive, one-way trade concessions on China's part, granting the United States substantially greater market access across the spectrum of industrial goods, services and agriculture' [my emphasis], see 'Barchefsky on China WTO, Congressional trade status vote', China Online, 29 February 2000, available online at http://www.chinaonline.com/commentary_analysis/wtocom/currentnews/secure/C00022920.asp, accessed 1 August 2001.


88 See Bottelier, 'The impact of WTO membership'.