Chapter 5: The Kiai and the Dynamics of Politics at the Local Level

This chapter tries to highlight the problems of the kiai leadership in the tarekat world. It examines how the kiai exercises his power. It explores other principles, in addition to the concept of baraka discussed in Chapter IV, which underlie the followers relationship with their kiai. There are general guide lines which a kiai must follow in order to legitimise his political position in the eyes of his followers and society in general. Despite the close relations with his followers, a kiai is vulnerable to their evaluation. The split of the Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah in Jombang clearly demonstrates how a great kiai with a large number of followers was shaken and his legitimacy to lead the tarekat was questioned. This case, moreover, is sociologically important in terms of the breakdown of the existing order and the introduction of another. The main actor in the split presented a new perspective on Islamic politics in Indonesia. Despite being sharply criticised by his kiai colleagues, his political standpoint was eventually followed by other kiai ten years later when NU introduced its policy of ‘back to khittah’.

In addition, the chapter also discusses local formal kiai leadership through NU. It highlights the conflict which occurred among the local elite of NU. The local conflict between kiai in Jombang has occurred in the first half of the 1960s when a kiai in NU leadership was forced to resign. As a kiai has his own followers, his conflict with other kiai in NU has sharpened the nature of organisational fragmentation of Muslim society in Jombang.

5.1 The Kiai’s Politics in the Tarekat

NU, as the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, dominated the politics of Islam until 1984. As a political party, from 1952 to 1973, the direction of its politics was clear. The same held true when NU merged with other Islamic organisations to form the Masjumi or with other Islamic political parties to form the United Development Party, PPP (both Islamic political parties). All the institutions under NU, including its members and sympathisers, followed its politics of Islam. There was a harmonious relationship among the kiai in Jombang at that time. Not only did they feel themselves to be representatives of the same organisation, NU, but they also moved in the same direction, pursuing Islamic politics.

This situation created a political ethos which not only strengthened the unity of the umma (the transnational Islamic community), but also raised the significance of the political struggle that must be carried out by a Muslim. It is this ethos that has enlivened Jombang society, though it has lately been marked
by different ideological orientations. Since the legitimacy given by the kiai in regard to politics contributes significantly to building the orientation of the umma, the various current political affiliations of the kiai tend to create divisions within the umma. I will discuss this later in Chapter VI.

The first break that disturbed the harmonious situation in Jombang Muslim society happened when Kiai Musta’in, the former head of both the Pesantren Darul Ulum and the Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah defected quietly to the government party, Golkar, preceding the 1977 general election. This defection not only marked a disaffection with, and a disturbance of the existing social structure, but also created the beginning of a split between kiai in Jombang, which was followed by hidden conflict between their followers. The conflict occurred between the NU's kiai, who maintained affiliation with the only Islamic party, PPP, and Kiai Musta’in and his close kiai colleagues. It gave rise to a situation where mutual abuse occurred between kiai with each group accusing the other of being kafir (infidel). The Muslim society of Jombang, who had been united by a single Islamic political ethos, was split. Only the most obedient followers of the tarekat led by Kiai Musta’in himself and the santri in his pesantren followed him. For these obedient followers, the kiai's defection did not raise any problem. They believed that Kiai Musta’in's teaching remained correct. They also emphasised an absolute obedience to the guru (master, the murshid) provided that he was not shirk (claiming partnership with God; or attributing God's qualities to someone other than Him). The word ‘obedient’ here needs to be emphasised, since it has significant implications in understanding the subsequent conflict.

The situation was unfavourable for the other tarekat members since Kiai Musta’in's joining Golkar marked the breakdown of their bai’a (religious following) of him. Some hesitant members did not even attend monthly istighatha conducted by Kiai Musta’in himself. They felt it better to gather at the weekly istighatha carried out by the khalifa who still persisted in their allegiance for the Islamic political party. Some kiai in Jombang tried to establish another leadership of the existing Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah, since they no longer regarded the leadership of Kiai Musta’in as legitimate. They promoted Kiai Adlan Ali as the new leader. His leadership in the new tarekat was legitimised when he was authorised (through a bai’a and ijaza irshad) by Kiai Muslih of Mranggen (Semarang). Kiai Adlan’s leadership was formally legitimised by NU when he was also chosen as a leader of the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah at its conference in Semarang in 1979.

There are two important points in regard to the formation of the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah by NU. Firstly, this event indicated a

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1 Interview with Kiai Aziz Masyhuri, 9 April 1993.
loss of legitimacy for Kiai Musta’in both as the leader of a large *tarekat* organisation, the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh* which he had managed since 1975 and the leader of the *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah*. NU no longer formally acknowledged the *tarekat* organisation headed by Kiai Musta’in as its *tarekat* although the *kiai* continued to lead his *tarekat* after he joined Golkar. Secondly, the very term *An-Nahdliyyah* (lit. means affiliated with NU) emphasised that this new organisation was NU’s *tarekat*. There have hence arisen two *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* and two large *tarekat* organisations, the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh* and the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah* managing various *tarekat aliran*. The *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* led by Kiai Musta’in was affiliated with the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh*, while the *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* headed by Kiai Adlan was affiliated with the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah*. Both Kiai Musta’in and Adlan were also the leaders of *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh* and the *Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah* respectively. Kiai Musta’in *tarekat* was centred in Rejoso, while Kiai Adlan’s *tarekat* was centred in Cukir.

The strong reaction of the *kiai* in Jombang against Kiai Musta’in was based on the fact that, at that time, NU was directing Islamic politics, which it articulated through PPP. Their reaction was followed by a sharp decrease in popular loyalty towards Kiai Musta’in. This was expressed by the withdrawal of children from Kiai Musta’in’s *pesantren*, and the hesitancy of parents throughout East Java to send their children to his *pesantren*. Moreover, a significant number of the *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* members withdrew from *istighatha* conducted by the *khalifa* of Kiai Musta’in, and some followers joined Kiai Adlan’s *tarekat*. Although it is not easy to ascertain all the underlying reasons for such an exodus, the perceived loss of legitimacy of Kiai Musta’in in the eyes of his followers at the grassroot level can be attributed largely to his joining Golkar.

Seen from the perspective of the *kiai* in Jombang, the cause of the conflict can easily be understood. As the Jombang *kiai* had become the guardians of Islamic politics, the line that demarcated Muslim politics from others was clear during the 1970s. The Islamic leaders in Indonesia, especially in NU, had made encouraging noises that sounded very religious, to support the Islamic political parties. In the 1977 general election, the Javanese *kiai* suggested that it was religiously obligatory for a Muslim to vote for the Islamic political party. Such a notion actually had been prevalent during the 1955 and the 1971 general election when Muslims in Indonesia could join one of four Islamic political parties. This notion spread widely, reaching the ears of even very young Muslims. The defection of Kiai Musta’in had great consequences for the political

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2 I still remember when I was sixteen and voted for the first time in the 1971 general election. A friend of mine who seemed to have more information suggested that I had to vote for NU to bolster the Muslim
unity of the *umma*, since his defection to Golkar was imitated by some of his followers, especially those who were *tarekat* members.

In the 1971 general election, Golkar was the main rival of NU, as it attempted to gain more popular support from Muslim population. The same held true in the 1977 general election, when NU merged with other Islamic political parties to form PPP. It is thus clear that Kiai Musta’in had broken the tradition of ‘not supporting the government party’. The Javanese *kiai* promulgated religious justification about the inappropriateness of his steps. The aspirations of Muslim society in Indonesia had been articulated through the Islamic political party, PPP. What made Kiai Musta’in's steps wrong in the eyes of his critics was a *fatwa* (religious advice) from a senior NU *kiai*, who happened to come from Jombang, suggesting that it was a religious obligation to vote for PPP. The *fatwa* was applied nationally, so that Kiai Musta’in was severely condemned and expelled from NU. The defection of Kiai Musta’in had made some followers doubtful of the necessity to vote for the Islamic political party as suggested by the *fatwa*, or to follow the *murshid* or *guru* who by now joined the government party.

In short, the defection of Kiai Musta’in was clearly against the political efforts being articulated through PPP. The *kiai* in Jombang and East Java generally felt morally obliged to support PPP and its efforts. From this perspective it is understandable that the defection of Kiai Musta’in became a source of humiliation for his fellow *kiai*. So, although most of Kiai Musta’in's followers did not fully know why they should leave him, his political actions gave them enough reason for their exodus. It was commonly believed that the *kiai* should support the Islamic political party, because almost all *kiai* in Indonesia supported the Islamic party of PPP at the time.

However, it is important to note that Kiai Musta’in's reasons for joining the government party seem to have been based on his interpretation of Islam or on position in Indonesian politics. However, the encouragement did not stop there, but was followed by a prohibition to vote for any other party, especially a non-Islamic political party. The prohibition was easily understood, even by those who, at sixteen, knew nothing about politics. In a campaign rally held by NU, a tape of a well known verse from the Qur’an was played to justify not voting for other political parties. In the *pesantren* where I was taking Islamic studies, the verse was played constantly, just to remind the *santri* and the Muslim society nearby of the political demands of their religion. The verse tells of Adam who was asked by God not to eat of the fruits from a certain tree. The result of not obeying the prohibition was very severe. Allah promised Adam and Eve would be classified as *zalim* (unjust doer). “O Adam! dwell thou and thy wife in Paradise, and eat ye whence ye will, but to this tree approach not, lest ye become of the unjust doer” (Sura 2:33). It was clear that the tree mentioned in this verse was identical (politically) to the banyan tree, the symbol of the government political party, Golkar. Islamic politicians were using this verse to remind the *umma* not to support Golkar.

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3 An informant who was very close to NU leadership at that time told me that Kiai Musta’in was fired from NU. Kiah As’ad, the current leader of the *Pesantren Darul Ullum* who joined Golkar at the same time with Kiai Musta’in told me the same information although he did not mention explicitly about Kiai Musta’in but himself. However, Muhammad Baidlowi, who was the NU chairman during this time suggested that no such action was carried out by national NU leader.
his view of what is called the ‘Islamic struggle’. The defection of Kiai Musta’in occurred because he saw another way to achieve the political ends in regard to the ‘Islamic struggle’. His wife\(^4\) told me that he judged as a failure the strategy laid down by the Indonesian ‘ulama in general. He did not wish to further divide Islamic society into a variety of groupings based on ideological orientation\(^5\).

The political interest of Muslim society at that time was represented by the established perspective of the kiai, so that those Muslims who were less devout, like the abangan, or those who happened to be outside the preferred organisation, like those who were in PDI, were not represented by the kiai’s political efforts. That was why to bekerja di ladang yang tidak dikerjakan kiai lain (to work in a field not worked by other kiai) became an important reason for Kiai Musta’in defection. A loyal follower of his told me that PPP could be regarded as representing the larger part of the political interest of Indonesian Muslim society, but it was not the only one. Not only were some Muslims affiliated with parties other than PPP, but it is also recognised that it is human to have different interests and perspectives, which can include affiliation with a variety of political organisations. In her opinion, this human trait is actually indicated in the Qur'an, which suggests that Muslims are actually grouped into various clusters, each of which is happy with the way it is. In addition, Kiai Musta’in also tried to give a rationale for his political actions, and also to legitimise it through the use of metaphor. He told his followers that he saw in his sleep that he was playing with a kite with a world globe circled by nine stars (the NU’s symbol). He also saw a big banyan tree shadowing his pesantren in Jombang\(^6\).

In spite of the fact that few other kiai in other regions of Indonesia had already joined the government party by that time, Kiai Musta’in's joining Golkar was of considerable national importance since it led not only to the fragmentation of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah, but also to a political split among the kiai in NU. The importance of such an event lay in the fact that Kiai Musta’in was the paramount leader of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah, the head of the Pesantren Darul Ulum and one of the NU leaders in Jombang. His joining Golkar impacted on the unity of the ‘Islamic struggle’ pursued by the Muslim society in Indonesia through PPP because of his huge number of followers, both in his tarekat and in his pesantren.

One can thus see the importance of Kiai Musta’in's defection on the existing socio-political grouping within the tarekat world and the NU society in general.

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\(^4\) Interview with Kiai Musta’in’s wife, 22 June 1993.

\(^5\) There was a strong view among the Indonesian ‘ulama suggesting that only devout Muslims who supported PPP. Less devout Muslims either supported Golkar or PDI. Kiai Musta’in tried to breach this view. His actions implied that all devout Muslims could have free political affiliation.

\(^6\) Interview with Sukamto, 12 August 1993.
in Jombang and East Java. The formal discursive interpretation of Islamic politics, which was represented by the NU’s affiliation with the Islamic political party, PPP, was disturbed by the emergence of another interpretation pioneered by Kiai Musta’in. The decision of Kiai Musta’in to join Golkar was the starting point of the acknowledgement of the existence of another interpretation of Islamic politics. This is not to say that his defection was the first of its kind to occur, since similar actions had been taken by few other kiai. However, the significance of Kiai Musta’in’s action was that it was supported by many of his followers. The defection of other kiai had not been. Kiai Musta’in was supported by his followers because he was a great kiai. He was the murshid of the largest tarekat in terms of number of followers in East Java. The others who had defected in a similar way were typically local kiai.

The significance of Kiai Musta’in defection thus lay in his introduction of a new interpretation concerning Islamic politics. He inculcated a new understanding, suggesting that Islamic politics need not be restricted to the politics of PPP, the only Islamic political party, but could be any politics which allowed Islamic ideals to be pursued. Kiai Musta’in was delegitimising the existing social order in regard to politics. He tried to rebuild this order through a wider perspective, seeing an Islamic political party as only one means among several in the ‘struggle for the umma’.

Another significant consequence of his defection was that tarekat followers and NU society in general, either in Jombang or East Java and other regions, became divided. This was of course a negative result of Kiai Musta’in's action. In the tarekat, those who followed the NU kiai joined the Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyyah led by Kiai Adlan and his Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyyah, while those who followed Kiai Musta’in remained in his tarekat which was affiliated with the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh. It should be emphasised that political affiliation did not have clear-cut relations with tarekat membership in the case of Kiai Musta’in's followers. Some followers who were affiliated with and supported PPP continued to support this party without altering their loyalty to Kiai Musta’in and their membership in his tarekat.

This interpretation of Kiai Musta’in's motives indicates that what he did was beyond politics. He was more concerned with the ‘struggle for Islam’ in a wider sense. He was a kiai and a murshid who was concerned more with the religiosity

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7 In any religious society there are always formal and non-formal interpretations either in regard to the doctrine or to the normative values used by the society. The formal interpretation is usually institutionalised and accepted by the members of the society as a whole, so that it becomes the legitimate order. The existing order is supported or built through such formal interpretations. What is also important to note is that a formal interpretation is typically made by a formal (authorised) leader, such as the priest in the Christian world or the ulama in the Islamic world. On the other hand, non-formal interpretations are usually made by individuals and their level of acceptance is more limited. Such interpretation could be a reaction to the more established formal interpretation and hence rather marginal in terms of acceptance by society in general.
of Indonesians than with the power structure in which they lived. This contrasts with the majority of Indonesian kiai who tried to focus their struggles through politics on changing the power structure. This situation shows that the obsession about the power of Islam, as it had been conceptualised by some Indonesian ‘ulama in the past, still affected the NU’s kiai in Jombang. Kiai Musta’in, on the other hand, sought to give more attention to inculcating or giving an understanding of Islam and its values to those Muslims who were marginal in terms of Islamic knowledge. He tried, for example, to combine the tarekat, the pesantren and the university which he managed. He introduced tarekat practice not only into pesantren life (since not all pesantren were affiliated with the tarekat organisation or practised its waid and rituals) but also into university life. He introduced his tarekat teaching to his santri in the pesantren and his students at the Universitas Darul Ulum. Kiai Musta’in hoped that he created modern-but-religious intellectuals (all those who graduated from his university must stay for two weeks in his pesantren to get to know the pesantren life. If they did not, they could not get their university certificate). He said that he wanted to create pesantren graduates yang berotak Jerman tapi berhati Masjidil Haram (lit. with German brains but with hearts attached to the Mosque Al-Haram in Mecca). He desired to establish a modern system of Islamic education that could produce brilliant intellectuals who remained emotionally steeped in Islam. Thus, following the principle of “working the land which was not worked by other kiai” Kiai Musta’in was encouraged to join the government party. In other words, he wanted to widen his field of da’wa. By being in Golkar, in his view, he could do more for Islam. Not only was the government party the largest organisation in terms of number of members and supporters but it was the party of the ruling elites. By joining that party, Kiai Musta’in intended to introduce Islam to the ruling elites. This helps explain what Kiai Musta’in hoped to gain by risking his position in Islamic society.

However, it should be acknowledged that Kiai Musta’in's defection resulted in his being used by the government for its own political ends. The government

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8 It is important to note that not all students of the Universitas Darul Ulum were santri. Also not all santri are familiar with the tarekat.

9 His reason for spreading his da’wa among the non-santri society became clear when he joined Golkar. He approached Chinese people in Jombang, who then converted to Islam. In Rif’ah’s opinion, Kiai Musta’in always adapted to the existing situation. His style of da’wa was not strict. Although he was leader of the tarekat, he did not mind not wearing his turban when he faced the Chinese whom he tried to convert to Islam. For Rif’ah, this was a proof that Kiai Musta’in was also luwes (flexible) in his politics (Interview with Nur Rif’ah, 20 June 1993).

10 It is interesting to note that a similar argument was given by Kiai As’ad Umar who joined Golkar at the same time as Kiai Musta’in. Kiai As’ad argues that joining Golkar is a necessity if one wants to struggle for Islam. He said, “saya akan membawa pondok melalui orang yang punya wewenang” (I will bring the pesantren through those in authority). He meant that Muslims should be accommodating to authority. The Prophet Muhammad, according to As’ad, was the head of a state, and Islam cannot develop without its cooperation with the power holder. As’ad quoted a saying of the ‘ulama, “al-nasu ‘ala dini mulkik lum” (people are dependent upon the religion of their King).
received an increase in support from the wider society as a result of his defection\textsuperscript{11} and its politics were legitimised. In addition, his defection contributed to the weakening of Islamic politics as pursued by the Indonesian ‘ulama in general. Kiai Musta’in was often asked by Golkar to become involved in political campaigns, a situation which created a dilemma for him. But Kiai Musta’in never deviated from his purpose to ‘work the land not worked by other kiai’. It is said that in his first campaign for Golkar in the 1977 general election in Surabaya, he stood for just two minutes on the stage. His main speech consisted of just asking the audiences to say ‘Allahu Akbar’ (Allah is the Great) together.

Many santri in his pesantren and members of his family initially could not believe what they heard in relation to Kiai Musta’in's defection. They were surprised by the way he had breached the existing social order in regard to politics. Rif’ah, a female santri who was very close to Kiai Musta’in's family wondered how a kiai in the forefront of the Islamic struggle through the Islamic party could defect to another party, a political action that might weaken the politics of Islam. Kiai Musta’in's wife, who was an important supporter of PPP, was equally surprised\textsuperscript{12}.

5.2 The Followers’ Perspective

Most people in Jombang relate the split in the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah to politics. To join the government party was seen as deviating from the politics of the umma, which at that time, from a Muslim perspective, had to be articulated through the Islamic party, PPP, since it was deemed to be the only party trying to articulate Muslim aspirations. As the perception of the necessity of Muslims to affiliate with PPP was very strong, it is easy to see how Kiai Musta’in's political steps could delegitimise his position in the eyes of the umma. The formation of the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah by NU confirmed this demotion of Kiai Musta’in and the withdrawal of NU’s recognition of his tarekat organisation.

Some people who were disappointed with Kiai Musta’in's action tried to discredit him. Various stories undermining Kiai Musta’in's position emerged. According to an informant, there was even someone within his family who tried to discredit him and encouraged tarekat followers to forsake him. Whether it was true or not, such an insult seems credible because of the conflict which emerged after his joining Golkar. The informant told me further that such actions by a family

\textsuperscript{11} My discussion in Chapter VI shows that PPP experienced a decrease in its vote share in almost all kecamatan in Jombang in the 1977 general election, while Golkar received an increase in its vote share.  
\textsuperscript{12} As his wife was an important PPP figure, Kiai Musta’in did not ask her to follow his political action. His wife remained in PPP, but she felt uncomfortable campaigning for her party. But as far as his wife is concerned, she deemed Kiai Musta’in was right in what he did after she had a car accident. She felt that the accident happened because she did not follow his example. This suggestion was denied by her husband. In his opinion, the accident was unrelated to her desicion not to follow him. The accident was merely her destiny decided by God.
member and other kiai only occurred after Kiai Musta’in joined Golkar; it had never happened before.

The failure of Kiai Musta’in to retain control of his tarekat and its members did not result from processes within the tarekat itself but rather was caused by external worldly matters. There was no fundamental problem in regard to Kiai Musta’in's tarekat in terms of its religious legitimacy. This is especially evident when we relate those events to the more recent socio-political situation in which some kiai have not only allowed their followers to support political parties other than PPP, but have encouraged them to vote for Golkar\textsuperscript{13}, leaving PPP. Of more interest, however, is how the tarekat followers, especially those in the Tarekat Cukir see the leadership of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (formerly led by Kiai Musta’in) today. The latest murshid is Kiai Dimyati Romly, who succeeded his brother, Kiai Rifai Romly, who died in a car accident in December 1994. I will focus my discussion on Kiai Rifai’s leadership since Kiai Dimyati's leadership is new and when I did my field work, this tarekat was still led by Kiai Rifai.

My fieldwork indicates mixed reactions. Despite the fact that NU formally tried to exclude the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah led by Kiai Musta’in from its umbrella\textsuperscript{14}, by establishing the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah, the legitimacy of the Kiai Musta’in's tarekat was still recognised since it was formed by NU's kiai. Some prominent tarekat figures, however, expressed concern about this tarekat. This concern not only related to the murshidship of Kiai Musta’in which was deemed defective after he joined the government party, but also to the way his murshidship was obtained or passed on from the former murshid, his father\textsuperscript{15}. A former khalifa of Kiai Musta’in, suggested that the chain of murshidship of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (Tarekat Rejoso) had been broken. The tarekat is less mu’tabarah because one person in the chain of its murshidship was missing. The chain of murshidship of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah acknowledged by the NU’s kiai is different from that introduced by Kiai Musta’in after 1977 (See Sukamto, 1992)\textsuperscript{16}.

Kiai Musta’in in an effort to develop his tarekat and at the same time strengthen his position, had published some materials in the form of calendars and others publications. The publication indicated that Kiai Musta’in was given ijaza irshad

\textsuperscript{13} In the 1987 general election a few well known kiai in Jombang encouraged Muslims to vote for Golkar. See my discussion about this matter in Chapter VI.

\textsuperscript{14} The majority of kiai in Jombang did not interpret the formation of the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Almu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah as NU’s policy to exclude the tarekat led by Kiai Musta’in, despite the fact that such formation was a political reaction of NU in conjunction with Kiai Musta’in's political action.

\textsuperscript{15} It is important to note, however, that such concern only emerged after Kiai Musta’in joined Golkar. It did not exist before.

\textsuperscript{16} See my discussion in Chapter III.
directly by his father, Kiai Romly. In the opinion of some other kiai, however, Kiai Romly never gave ijaza irshad to his son because the latter was still very young. The ijaza irshad received by Kiai Musta’in was passed on from Kiai ‘Usman who received ijaza irshad from Kiai Romly.

This kiai's opinion is not held by the followers of the Tarekat Rejoso, who see the situation from a different angle. According to a version of events suggested by one follower, the murshidship of Kiai Musta’in and his tarekat are absolutely legitimate. In his opinion, Kiai Musta’in received the bai’a three times from his father, Kiai Romly, the murshid of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah at that time. The rest of the bai’a were done by Kiai ‘Usman after the death of Kiai Romly. Kiai ‘Usman was a khalifa of Kiai Romly, whose duty was giving bai’a to the tarekat followers. In this follower's opinion, Kiai ‘Usman was not a murshid and did not have the right to hold a murshidship (even though he was the senior khalifa), since the murshidship cannot be obtained by just any follower. The murshidship, this follower explained further, is inherited (like the authority of a King is inherited by his son); and it was Kiai Musta’in who had the right to receive the transfer of murshidship from his father. This transfer of authority (ijaza irshad) occurred when the father was on the point of death. According to this follower, the father said: “..In (a diminutive for Kiai Musta’in) teruskan tarekat ini” (lit. “Musta’in, you go on with this tarekat”). It is this exchange, in this follower's opinion, which decisively legitimised the murshidship of Kiai Musta’in and his tarekat. This follower went on to suggest that conflict occurred because of the uncontrolled action of Kiai ‘Usman. Kiai ‘Usman was assumed to have wanted to be a murshid. He felt it was appropriate to achieve murshidship since he was the most senior khalifa of Kiai Romly, Kiai Musta’in's father. However, it seems that this follower did not know that the NU's kiai had accepted Kiai ‘Usman as one of the murshid of the Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah order before Kiai Musta’in joined Golkar.

This follower suggested further that the transfer of murshidship must be performed by the former murshid for his successor, the former giving authority for the latter's succession. It is not legitimate for a senior khalifa to receive directly a murshidship after the death of a former murshid. In his opinion, Kiai ‘Usman, Kiai Adlan and Kiai Makki (Makki is one of the three current murshid of the Tarekat Cukir) who at that time constituted the senior khalifa of Kiai Romly had no right to succeed to the murshidship. They did not receive the authority of Kiai Romly to lead this tarekat. Although this opinion may not be representative of all Tarekat Rejoso followers, it gives an indication of their view on both their own tarekat and the Tarekat Cukir. Such an opinion seems

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17 It is hard to find a lay follower who dares to deliver his opinion about the legitimacy of both the Tarekat Rejoso and the Tarekat Cukir. I interviewed this follower during his presence at the big rituals of his tarekat held at the Pesantren Darul Ulum.
common among Tarekat Rejoso followers. It is doubtful, however, whether they dare to say that the murshidship of the Tarekat Cukir is not legitimate. In the tarekat tradition, no overt action should be taken in regard to perceived errors in ‘grey’ areas, especially if these impinge on the murshidship domain.

Based on the evaluation of Kiai Musta’in’s tarekat, tarekat followers in Jombang cannot but hold a view on the leadership of Kiai Rifai, the successor of Kiai Musta’in. Certain questions remain unanswered concerning the succession of the leadership in this sufi order. Firstly, there was no ijaza irshad given by Kiai Musta’in to anyone to continue the leadership. The continuation or the legitimacy of a tarekat is, among other things, sustained by the transfer of authority from the existing murshid to his successor. The successor's legitimacy to the leadership is formally performed through ijaza irshad. He can then be called the murshid. In other words, Kiai Rifai, who held the leadership of the Tarekat Qadiriyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah (Rejoso version) was not promoted in the normal way. In the tarekat world the chain of murshidship is usually decisive, defining the legitimacy of the tarekat itself. Because of this, the Tarekat Rejoso, could be regarded as non-legitimate.

Nevertheless, according to a reliable source, Kiai Rifai actually received a symbolic ijaza irshad. The ijaza irshad which sustains the leadership of Kiai Rifai is said to be based on some hints made by Kiai Musta’in. For example, it is believed that Kiai Rifai was often asked by Kiai Musta’in to substitute for him in leading solat (the prayer), when Kiai Musta’in was not able to perform it. Some followers thought that Kiai Musta’in’s request was an indication that he was counting on Kiai Rifai to continue the leadership of his tarekat. However, such hints, in the opinion of Kiai Musta’in’s wife, were not very significant.

Whether the murshidship of Kiai Rifai is legitimately strong or not, his followers treat him as they should treat the murshid of the tarekat. The same holds true for his khalifa. A senior khalifa who received bai’a from Kiai Romly acknowledges that he does not have any idea whether or not Kiai Rifai received an ijaza irshad from his brother, Kiai Musta’in. For him, what is important is that he is now able to continue what was asked of him by his teacher, who was the father of Kiai Musta’in and Kiai Rifai. His teacher asked him to build umma religiously through the tarekat. In other words, this khalifa is not concerned about the

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18 According to a reliable source, there was a little dispute in the family in regard to the tarekat leadership following Kiai Musta’in's death. The dispute was between the promotion of Mudjib, the son of Kiai Musta’in, and Rifai, a brother of Kiai Musta’in and a younger kiai but older than Mudjib in the Pesantren Darul Ulum, for the leadership in the tarekat. The followers wanted Mudjib, who was ready to perform the leadership in the tarekat. However, his youth and immaturity in Islamic understanding, made the followers uncomfortable to accept him as a murshid. They chose Rifai because he was mature enough, although he actually had a lower claim on the position than Mudjib, from the tarekat perspective. Nevertheless, neither Mudjib nor Rifai were actually ready to assume such spiritual leadership of the tarekat when Kiai Musta’in died.
status of the *murshidship* of Kiai Rifai. What is important for him is to develop the *tarekat* by performing its rituals.

From this *khalifa*’s perspective we can see some variations among the attitudes of the *tarekat* followers in regard to *murshidship*. There are a number of factors which affect the attitude of Kiai Rifai’s *khalifa*. Firstly, there is a tendency among the *khalifa* to avoid any chaos or confusion on the part of the followers which could occur if they knew the details of the *murshidship* of Kiai Rifai. This viewpoint encourages some *khalifa* to support the leadership of Kiai Rifai. Secondly, *khalifa* support Kiai Rifai’s leadership as an indirect means to protect the reputation of Kiai Musta’in. In so doing they are defending the controversial (political) decisions made by Kiai Musta’in, which were so criticised by some colleagues and much of society. The support of Kiai Musta’in’s successor is an indirect justification of Kiai Musta’in’s political actions. Thirdly, Kiai Rifai did not change any ritual practices, especially the *wird*, in the *tarekat*. Despite doubts about his *murshidship*, therefore, the *khalifa* regard such practices as religiously positive. While the leadership of Kiai Rifai might not be legitimate from the *tarekat* perspective, attending the rituals held by his *tarekat* and practising its *wird* in general still incur *pahala* (rewards from Allah).

The decrease in number of *Tarekat Rejoso* followers after Kiai Musta’in joined Golkar occurred gradually, since most of them did not have sufficient information about Kiai Musta’in’s political action from the *tarekat* perspective to alter their opinion of the *tarekat*. The followers’ interpretation of Kiai Musta’in’s defection depended on their allegiance to certain *khalifa* and other *kiai*. The followers’ attitudes towards Kiai Musta’in and his *tarekat* was very much affected by the perspective of the *khalifa*. Since there were two groups of *khalifa*, those who stayed loyal to Kiai Musta’in and those who left him, the followers’ view were also of two kinds. When the conflict between Kiai Musta’in and the majority of other *kiai* occurred, some of his followers did not automatically leave him. It took some time for them to be convinced. Their decision was dependent on and supported by explanations from various sources, including the *khalifa*, the majority of whom were motivated by politics. This explains why those who left Kiai Musta’in share no single unanimous reason to justify their actions. A common reason given by them, and their *kiai* who are now the *Tarekat Cukir* followers, concerns Kiai Musta’in’s joining Golkar. Other *Tarekat Cukir* followers are even doubtful if they had a reason for leaving the *Tarekat Rejoso*. The majority even confirm that the *Tarekat Rejoso* is legitimate, without any defect. Their decision to join the *Tarekat Cukir* was just based on the fact that this was the decision of NU.

19 Interview with Kiai Arwani, 12 December 1994.
The various reasons given by different groups of *Tarekat Cukir* followers can be illumined by recourse to recent socio-political developments. When Kiai Bisri Syansuri launched a *fatwa* nationally, making it a religious obligation for Muslims to support PPP, all *kiai* in Jombang were expected to support the Islamic political party of PPP. Kiai Musta’in’s joining Golkar hence triggered some internal problems in the *kiai* world and Muslim society in Jombang and East Java. This factor must have been significant in inducing ‘the action of leaving’ of some of Kiai Musta’in’s followers. However, when this *fatwa* was cancelled by the NU’s ‘back to khittah’ decision made at its conference in 1984, allowing its members to affiliate with any political party, the political reasons undermining the legitimacy of Kiai Musta’in’s leadership were invalidated. Very few *Tarekat Cukir* followers would dare say that there is a defect in the *Tarekat Rejoso*. One follower suggested that all *tarekat* are good since they are a means to reach Allah. In general, therefore, it should be acknowledged that there is no real religious basis which delegitimises the *Tarekat Rejoso*. If its illegitimacy was due to its *murshid* joining the government party, it became legitimate again when NU launched its policy of ‘back to khittah’. If the prohibition of NU members against supporting non-Islamic parties was based on religious factors, the encouragement to support the ‘back to khittah’ policy, which allows NU’s members to affiliate with any political party, is also supported by religious factors.

Thus no follower of the *Tarekat Cukir* regards the *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* led by Kiai Rifai as not *mu’tabarah*. This perspective, however, is not shared by other *kiai*. A former *khalifa* of Kiai Musta’in who left him because of the omission of one person in the *murshidship* chain of this *tarekat*, contends that he still cannot accept the leadership of the *Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyah* (at that time led by Kiai Rifai) since it was *menyesatkan* (misleading). “Saya kasihan dengan ummat” (I feel sorry for the *ummat*). In his opinion, the legitimacy of a *tarekat* is not only sustained by the correct *wird* and other rituals performed by the followers, but also by the legitimacy of the *murshid* who leads the *tarekat*. If the *murshid* is not legitimate, the rituals conducted in his *tarekat* would not incur any *baraka*. This *kiai* quoted other *kiai* who mentioned the possible *bahala* (disaster) which could befall the *ummat* due to the illegitimacy of the *murshidship*. According to this view, the illegitimate nature of the *Tarekat Rejoso* derives from two factors, the improper action of Kiai Musta’in in omiting one link in the chain of the *murshidship* and the absence of direct *ijaza irshad* from Kiai Musta’in to Kiai Rifai. Because of this fact, this

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20 This follower was influenced by the existing culture of the *tarekat* world, which stresses the importance of the *murshid*. He used to be a follower of Kiai Musta’in and was taught by him, so that he did not dare to say that the leadership of Kiai Musta’in was not legitimate. Not only was the *wird* performed by this *tarekat* legitimate, but also the allegiance to the *murshid* was a necessity. What was done by a *murshid* could be wrong, but the *murshid* would continue to be the *murshid* as long as he did not do wrong from the Islamic perspective, such as *shirk* (ascribing partners to God).
former *khalīfa* of Kiai Musta‘in is hesitant to acknowledge the legitimacy of the *Tarekat Rejoso*.

### 5.3 NU at National Politics

In this section I would like to describe briefly the conflict among NU leaders in Jombang. This conflict has a close connection to the conflict in the succeeding years, especially following the introduction of ‘back to khittah’ in the second half of the 1980s. Familial background contributed to this conflict. What is important in regard to this description is the fact that conflict among NU leaders is common, following the political dynamic of NU itself.

Although the primary objective of the formation of NU was to develop and maintain the *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama’a*, it had for some time also been used as a means of political struggle. At the end of Dutch colonialism in Indonesia, NU’s ‘*ulama*, together with other Islamic organisations, established the Majlis Islam A’la Indonesia in 1937 (MIAI: the High Indonesian Islamic Council). In addition, during the Japanese occupation (1943), NU joined the Majlis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masjumi: the Consultative Council for Indonesian Muslims)\(^{21}\). These organisations were a confederation which represented Islamic political interests. Although these organisations were originally mainly socio-religious in orientation, the increase in political activity at the end of the Dutch colonial period in Indonesia and the Japanese occupation made their members, including NU’s *kiai*, change their orientations to be more political\(^{22}\).

NU involvement in politics seemed to be inevitable. The position of the ‘*ulama* at the forefront of Islamic society not only made them informal leaders who maintained *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama’a* but also made them political leaders, since in Indonesia the relationship between politics and Islam was quite strong. The ‘*ulama*’s effort to develop *ahl al-sunna wa'l-jama’a* were realised by the establishment of *pesantren*, centres of Islamic learning. It was natural for a great ‘*ulama*, like Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, to have a *pesantren*. On the other hand, the ‘*ulama*’s interest in politics was realised by their involvement in an Islamic political party. Soon after the government encouraged the establishment of political parties at the end of 1945, around two months after independence, NU’s ‘*ulama*, together with Islamic members of other organisations established an Islamic political party, Masjumi. In 1952, NU even announced that it was a political party after a conflict with another Islamic group in the Masjumi could

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\(^{21}\) This Masjumi was distinct from the Islamic organisation of the same name established in 1945. The latter was an Islamic political party.

\(^{22}\) At the second half of the 1930s, the threat to Indonesian Islam also came from native Indonesians. The formation of MIAI was prompted by the political atmosphere which mostly discredited Islam. In 1938, an article was written by a Western educated young lady. She attacked polygamy practised by Muslims and that practised by the Prophet Muhammad himself. The reaction from Indonesian Muslims was very strong, resulting, among other things, in the strengthening of the MIAI (see Alfian, 1989).
not be resolved. As a political party, NU took part in the 1955 and 1971 general elections.

In 1973, however, the Indonesian government tried to reduce the existing ten political organisations which took part in the 1971 general election, to three. Four Islamic political organisations, NU, Parmusi, PSII and Perti, were merged to form the United Development Party (PPP). Other political organisations with nationalist, Catholic and Christian backgrounds merged to form the Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI). In contrast, Golkar, the organisation of professionals which won the most seats in the 1971 general election, merged with no other party. Although the merging of the Islamic parties into PPP was initially opposed by NU leaders, NU was at the forefront of the new party since it constituted the biggest component of the party. This was due to the fact that of the four Islamic parties, NU received the highest proportion of votes in the 1971 general election (18.5 percent compared to Parmusi, PSII and Perti which obtained 6.3, 2.3 and 0.7 percent respectively).

Although the formation of PPP was initially opposed by some Muslim leaders, it became a ‘blessing in disguise’. Its formation seemed to unify and strengthen Islamic politics. In the first general election after its formation, that is in the 1977 general election, PPP succeeded in increasing its votes by 1.2 percent compared to that of the four Islamic parties in the 1971 general election. Although the increase was small when compared to the votes received by Islamic parties in the 1955 general election, it gave a hope for Muslims in Indonesia that the party could represent their political interests.

However, the expectation that PPP was the medium for Indonesian Muslim politics may have been too optimistic, since the merger was a government policy which was not intended to unify the politics of Indonesian Muslims - but aimed at reducing general political conflict, which had frequently destabilised the existing government during the Old Order. In addition, the difficulty of accommodating the political interests of the party’s various components made the party unable to function as was hoped. There was inevitable conflict within the party, a factor which contributed later to a weakening of the party. Any hope that Indonesian Muslims might have had to unify their politics through this party after its success in increasing its share of votes in the 1977 general election ceased after the emergence of an ongoing conflict between the NU and MI (former Parmusi) components, preceding the 1982 general election. The MI component, led first by Sudarji and later by Naro, tried to change the decision on the composition of PPP which underpinned the formation of the party in 1973. This decision had made NU dominant both in the structure of the party leadership and in the representation of PPP in parliament. This conflict was resolved by the reduction of NU personnel in the party and the transfer of some of them to unimportant positions, after Naro assumed leadership of the party in 1984. Naro
was trying to change the power composition of the party's components.²³ For NU members, the leadership of Naro was an embarrassing incident, since it marked a decrease in their position in the party. Their dissatisfaction with Naro was due to the fact that he was seen to be disadvantaging NU. The great reaction of NU exponents at both the national and provincial level aimed not only at confronting Naro, but also NU's exponents who continued to occupy positions in PPP, signalling their acceptance of Naro. Nevertheless, Naro's position was stronger than that of his NU critics, since his leadership in the party was nonetheless accepted by the government.

This change in the pattern of power among the components of PPP gave rise to a change in NU's politics. NU, a dominant component of the party and the biggest political group among Muslims in Indonesia, withdrew itself from politics. At its congress in 1984, NU announced its intention to return to being a socio-religious organisation as conceptualised in 1926 when NU was established. This meant that NU was no longer politically oriented. This decision, widely known as ‘back to khittah’, also signalled NU's dissociation from PPP. In addition, NU allowed its members to affiliate with political organisations other than PPP. Such affiliation was, however, not organisational but was an individual matter.

The change worried other components of PPP, since the main source of support for PPP derived from NU. As a result, PPP national vote attainment in the 1987 general election decreased by about 42 percent (in Jombang it fell by 36 percent) compared to that in the 1982 general election. The decrease in PPP's attainment was a general phenomenon. It was experienced by almost all branches throughout Indonesia. This was because some NU exponents, who were supported by some kiai, tried to weaken the party. This manoeuvre, however, gave rise to internal conflict within NU at the local level, since weakening PPP meant confronting their own friends. The conflict, in terms of its scope, served to fragment the movement.²⁴

### 5.4 Local Political Conflict

The presence of many pesantren in Jombang has given rise to the emergence of various local kiai leaderships. It has also socially fragmented Muslim life in Jombang. The influence of a certain kiai can be so strong for certain Muslims that they cannot give loyalty to another kiai. This close relationship between a kiai and his followers is stronger than the relationship between a kiai follower

²³ By power composition is meant the representativeness of PPP components. In the 1982 general election, some NU supporters were placed in ‘nomor tidak jadi’ (the number beyond the possible elected rank) on the list of PPP candidates for parliament. As people in Indonesia vote for the party, the list of ranked candidates was based on the results of the previous election. If in the previous election, PPP of East Java received 16 seats, for example, a candidate place in number 20 on the ‘candidate list’ would probably not be elected. This number is called ‘nomor tidak jadi’.

²⁴ I will return to this matter later in Chapter VI.
and NU. The strength of NU in Jombang depends on the support of the *kiai* in the *pesantren*.

The fragmentation of Muslim society in Jombang becomes apparent in times of conflict. A conflict results in closer affiliation with certain *kiai* and consequent distancing from others. Despite the importance of the sources of conflict, it is also necessary to note society's perception of the conflict itself. I will return to this matter later in Chapter VI. The conflict among the NU elite in Jombang actually first occurred in the early 1960s. The conflict was attributed to and influenced by the existing local NU leadership, and the extent of the conflict was dependent on the way the main NU leader handled it.

I will briefly discuss some of the conflicts which have occurred among the NU elite in Jombang, including the conflict which emerged after NU launched its ‘back to khittah’ policy. This discussion not only aims to show that conflict among Muslims in Jombang has been a common phenomenon but also to explain why such conflicts take place. The first conflict among the NU elite in Jombang occurred in 1963 when NU was under the leadership of Kiai Masduqi Zein, who assumed the leadership in 1952. The conflict, which was marked by Muslim protests against, and sharp criticism of Kiai Masduqi Zein, was resolved by his replacement by Kiai Musta’in Romly, the head of the *Pesantren Darul Ulum*. Kiai Masduqi Zein was accused of recommending to the local government that some investors be allowed to provide gambling-like game at a ‘Jombang fair’ in 1963 (Mochtar, 1989:138).

Another conflict occurred at the end of the 1960s when NU under the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi, the grandson of the NU founder, Kiai Hasyim Asy’ari, assumed local NU leadership in 1966. He was confronted by another local NU faction headed by Nawawi. Nawawi, who was supported by some members of society, challenged Muhammad Baidlowi’s legitimate leadership. This challenge, however, was not based on any identifiable reason but simply aimed to topple Muhammad Baidlowi. Nawawi’s action was merely based on his feeling that he had every right to assume NU leadership and was more appropriate than Muhammad Baidlowi25.

Muhammad Baidlowi was associated with the *Pesantren Tebuireng*, while Nawawi was from the *Pesantren Denanyar*. Both Muhammad Baidlowi and Nawawi received some support from Muslims in Jombang. Their family backgrounds encouraged this support. A *pesantren* has certain followers, and it is very likely that both received support from those Muslims affiliated with each of their *pesantren*. According to some sources, both received support from some NU leaders at the national level. The support for Muhammad Baidlowi stemmed from his being a legitimate NU leader, chosen by a local NU conference, while

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the support for Nawawi was based on familial relationship with some of the national leadership in Jakarta. Although Muhammad Baidlowi also received support from some kiai in the NU national leadership in Jakarta, his leadership was legitimate since he had been chosen through the conference. Such endorsement had not been received by Nawawi.

This dispute over the local NU leadership in Jombang also extended to PPP. As PPP leadership in Jombang was dominated by the NU component, the competing groups led by Muhammad Baidlowi on the one hand, and Nawawi on the other, felt every right to represent NU in the party. Both tried to assume the PPP leadership. The result was that PPP also had two leaderships. The PPP leadership which represented Muhammad Baidlowi's NU faction was headed by Badawi Mahbub, while that which represented the Nawawi's NU faction was led by Nawawi himself. The emergence of this ongoing conflict in the leadership of NU in Jombang was attributed to the fact that NU was very politically oriented at that time. It was common for those who occupied a certain position in NU to occupy certain positions in PPP. Accordingly, any conflict occurring at the local NU leadership would also affect the leadership of PPP.

The Nawawi leadership of NU, commonly called 'NU-Bangladesh' finally ended by itself. Not only was his leadership not legitimate, since it was not established through a conference, but also at the grassroots level, the majority of NU members and sympathisers were in favour of the legitimate leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi. Nawawi's support was limited to a few NU figures. In addition, the government did not recognise the PPP leadership of Nawawi. The NU leadership in Jombang during the 1970s was thus under Muhammad Baidlowi's control, and PPP was headed by Badawi Mahbub, Muhammad Baidlowi's man.

Although NU domination of the local leadership of PPP in Jombang continued, and the party was not disturbed by any internal conflict between its various components due to the fact that more than 95 percent of the PPP leadership derived from NU, the conflict at the national level between members of the NU and MI factions at the beginning of the 1980s, gave rise to conflict among the NU elite in Jombang. The conflict was again marked by the emergence of two NU factions. The first was led by Muhammad Baidlowi, who promoted Kiai Syamsuri Badawi as his successor, while the other was headed by Kiai Shohib Bisri, who was appointed temporarily by NU provincial office in Surabaya.

Until the first half of 1986, NU in Jombang was still under the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi. Since Muhammad Baidlowi was close to PPP, due to his being appointed as one of the national PPP leaders in 1984 (under Naro), his leadership was not supported by the NU elite in Jombang. This was due to an NU policy which suggested that an NU leader should not simultaneously occupy

26 Interview with Hafidh Ma’shum, 15 December 1994.
positions (‘rangkap jabatan’: hold dual positions) in PPP and NU. They should choose to manage either NU or PPP. Muhammad Baidlowi, who held an important position in PPP at the national level, however, continued to lead NU in Jombang. He then organised a local NU conference in June 1986, without the acknowledgement of the NU leadership at provincial level. The conference was held at Muhammad Baidlowi’s house and chose Kiai Syamsuri Badawi to be NU top leader in Jombang.

As Muhammad Baidlowi was regarded as having violated NU policy on ‘rangkap jabatan’, the NU provincial office did not recognise Muhammad Baidlowi's leadership. It then appointed Kiai Shohib Bisri to assume NU leadership temporarily, and asked him to make all necessary preparation for a conference. Kiai Shohib came from the Pesantren Denanyar. His temporary appointment was not only an indication that he would be the next leader of local NU, but also hinted that the conference organised by Muhammad Baidlowi, which had chosen Kiai Syamsuri Badawi, was not recognised by the NU provincial office. Kiai Shohib then held another conference in 1986, and was chosen as a local NU head. His nomination for the leadership was accepted by the NU leadership at the provincial level. Kiai Shohib's support derived not only from NU activists who were dissatisfied with PPP leadership under Naro, but also from former Nawawi supporters, who had opposed Muhammad Baidlowi's leadership in the early 1970s. Nawawi had been defeated by Muhammad Baidlowi in his attempt to topple Muhammad Baidlowi’s leadership of NU. These subsequent actions by Nawawi supporters indicate their continued opposition to Muhammad Baidlowi.

Like his predecessor, Kiai Syamsuri Badawi's leadership of NU continued regardless of the disapproval of the NU provincial office. It also continued the close relationship with PPP. Since PPP was more or less identical with NU, all the party's activities were centred in the NU's office. The NU office had been the office of PPP since its formation in 1973. The rivalry of Syamsuri Badawi and Shohib Bisri can be seen by their efforts to seize the NU office at Gatot Subroto street. The office was used simultaneously by Syamsuri Badawi and PPP. Shohib Bisri supporters then asked to use it. As the office was owned by NU, and the local NU leadership recognised by the provincial and national NU leadership was that headed by Shohib Bisri, the office was returned to Shohib. Before this, Shohib Bisri's leadership had been centred in the Pesantren Denanyar, his pesantren. It is important to note that it was Shohib Bisri's leadership of NU which then continued, since it was legitimised by the central office's acceptance. In contrast, Syamsuri Badawi's leadership of NU, which was not legitimised by the central office's acceptance, ceased.

27 Interview with Hafidh Ma’shum, 15 December 1994.
A further conflict was the one among members of the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah. As this tarekat was formed as a reaction against Kiai Musta’in, who joined Golkar, its formation hence reaffirmed NU’s political orientation which by that time was articulated through PPP. That meant that NU’s tarekat should affiliate with PPP. This situation made the Tarekat Qadiriyyah Wa Naqsyabandiyyah affiliated with the Jam’iyah Ahli Thoriqoh Al-Mu’tabaroh An-Nahdliyah, commonly called Tarekat Cukir, appear as though it was PPP's tarekat. This was indicated by the fact that this tarekat often used PPP's symbol in its big religious activities. However, when NU changed its politics in 1984, some members of the Tarekat Cukir in Jombang were disappointed with the tarekat’s continued close affiliation with PPP. They began to conduct separate religious activities at locations other than those used by the Tarekat Cukir. This was done to show that NU's dissociation from PPP should be followed by its tarekat’s dissociation from the party. Although only a small number of followers joined these activities, this situation indicated the beginning of a split in the tarekat, which mirrored the conflict among the NU elite in Jombang. The initiator of this splinter group was Kiai Zamroji. Since he did not receive popular support from tarekat members, however, his idea to have a group which was different from the Tarekat Cukir failed.

In present day Jombang, conflict seems to have disappeared from the stage. However, it has left a situation unfavourable for NU development. The elite of the Tarekat Cukir continue to be closely affiliated with PPP and its elites. They feel uncomfortable with other local NU leaders who, in contrast, are more comfortable to be close to Golkar. In their preparations to attend the NU national congress in West Java in 1994, for example, local NU leaders in Jombang preferred to approach Golkar's leaders rather than PPP's. They also felt more comfortable asking for travel funds from Golkar's fraction of the local parliament rather than PPP's.

In brief, conflicts among the NU elite in Jombang have been very common. These conflicts have always involved politics, in the sense that they followed any change in the field of politics. This is especially evident in the conflict which followed the application of NU’s ‘back to khittah’ policy. This conflict had wide social consequences. I will return to this matter in the next chapter. Several factors contributed to the conflict among the NU elite in Jombang following the application of the ‘back to khittah’ policy. Firstly, the conflict was triggered by the application of NU's policy of rangkap jabatan (lit. dual position), which prohibited NU members from occupying leadership positions in both NU and in PPP simultaneously. They were advised to take either a position in the party or in NU. It was very common for an NU activist also to be a PPP activist. He could hold a position in NU and in the party. The policy aimed to disengage NU

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\(^{28}\) Interview with Hafidh Ma’shum, 15 December 1994.
members from PPP and to consolidate NU. It was hoped that those who were recruited into the NU administration would give full attention to the development of NU. At the time, many NU activists were more concerned with the party's problem than NU's. However, as the disappointment with the behaviour of Naro, the national PPP leader, was great among NU activists, the policy of ‘dual position’ was exaggeratedly applied in Jombang. The activists not only condemned other NU activists who occupied positions in both NU and PPP, but also any NU member who was affiliated with the party.

The second factor contributing to conflict was the lack of acceptance of different political affiliations within NU. Such differences have traditionally led to fragmentation. Take the case of Kiai Musta‘in. The difference between his and other kiai's politics led to an organisational split. Political difference typically result in the development of an ‘in and out-group’. Disappointment with Naro, for example, led to those holding positions or active in PPP being regarded by NU activists as the out-group. A third factor was the continued hostility of Nawawi's supporters towards the leadership of Muhammad Baidlowi when NU launched its ‘back to khittah’ policy. Since Muhammad Baidlowi remained close to PPP and tried to control the NU leadership by promoting Kiai Syamsuri Badawi, Nawawi's supporters used his conflict with the NU elite to expel him.