1. The ‘principal priority’ of the campaign: The trade union movement

On 11 September 1973 Mike Gatehouse slept through his alarm.

The twenty-seven-year-old was meant to be at work at a computer centre at the Forestry Institute in Santiago, Chile. Instead he dozed in his small flat on Ezaguirre Street. When he woke he went to the balcony at the front of the flat and looked down the street. From there he could see that the military putsch had finally come.

The Chilean Communist Party had previously issued a general instruction to its supporters to proceed to their place of work at the first sign of the imminent civil war. So Gatehouse set off. Crossing the city to the Forestry Institute in La Reina took much longer than usual as he avoided main roads. He couldn’t see any fighting, but he could hear gunshots.

He arrived at the institute to find that the reality of the first hours of the perceived civil war were actually ‘domestic and mundane’.1 Those who had children and families left the institute to retrieve them from school or to check on their safety. Hours passed. A military curfew was put in place and Gatehouse found himself stuck in the institute. Later still, he recalled his escape: cleaners smuggled him out of the institute and took him to a home in a nearby shantytown.2 Meanwhile helicopters hovered above the town, sweeping the area with random bursts of machine-gun fire.3

Slowly all radio stations were taken over and it became obvious that the coup had been successful. Shock descended on Santiago.4 ‘I will never forget’, recalled Gatehouse, ‘the press, radio and television images of the new dictatorship:

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1 Interview with Mike Gatehouse (Chile activist, UK), 3 August 2007 [hereinafter Gatehouse Interview, 2007], copy in possession of author. For ease of reading, disfluencies such as ‘um’ have been removed from all oral history quotations.
2 The director of the institute, Federico Quilodrán, and other colleagues did not escape in time. They were arrested and taken to the National Stadium. The National Stadium is a sporting complex in Santiago. It was used as a detention centre in the first years of the dictatorship and has since been renamed the Victor Jara Stadium in honour of one of the most famous victims of the regime.
4 It had previously been theorised that a coup would not be successful. It was thought that internal divisions in the military would allow trade unions and the people to rise up and oppose the coup.
the harsh robotic voice and the blank face masked by dark glasses of General Pinochet, who represents for me everything that is cruel, destructive, bigoted and philistine’.5

Pamphlets had been dropped all over Santiago instructing the denunciation of foreigners, and Gatehouse was at risk because of his involvement in a progressive food-allocation program set up by the Unidad Popular Government.6 Despite warnings from friends, Gatehouse returned to his flat. He found it had been ransacked. He was there for only a short time, but long enough for a neighbour to alert the police. On his way down the stairs, he was confronted by armed police and it was claimed there had been an arsenal of weapons in the flat.

He was now a prisoner of the military government of Chile.

At the nearest police station, Gatehouse was accused of being a Cuban, despite his blonde hair, blue eyes and English accent.7 Hours passed. Then, as part of a small group of prisoners, he was ‘taken out at gunpoint and forced to lie face-down on the floor of a bus, police with sub-machine guns standing astride’ the group.8 The fear was paralysing. They moved him to the National Stadium where he became one of thousands of prisoners in the large sporting complex.9 Armed soldiers guarded the prisoners. More soldiers with machine guns were stationed behind sandbag shelters around the stadium. The violence ‘wove into a pattern of brutality, part casual and part systematic’, wrote Dick Barbour-Might, another Briton interned in the stadium.10 Gatehouse remembered that ‘the “cells” into which we were herded were the team changing rooms. There were 130 prisoners in ours, and at night we were so tightly packed that we could sleep only by lining up in rows and lying down “by numbers”, dovetailing heads and feet.’11

He recalled the food they were given. Previously, the UP Government had set up a pilot program of restaurants in one of the main parks in Santiago. There, workers could take their families and enjoy high-quality, subsidised restaurant meals. With thousands of prisoners in the stadium, the military rounded up the chefs and forced them to cook for the prisoners. The incarcerated knew the food was from the little pilot UP village in the park, and occasionally someone would

5 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
6 Ibid.; Chile Solidarity Campaign CSC, El Arte para el Pueblo (London: Chile Solidarity Campaign, 1974).
7 Carabineros are the police force of Chile. They are regarded as the fourth armed force and their leader was included in the original junta that took power from Allende.
8 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
9 Gatehouse to Basnett, December 30 1976 Re: Scottish Football Team to play Chile, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.
11 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
come across a hunk of meat that a sympathetic chef had risked putting into the food for the prisoners. The origin of the sustenance gave them hope and buoyed their spirits, though the amount of food was pitiful.12

Most of Gatehouse’s memories of the stadium are of a much more traumatic nature:

The man next to me in my cell was … a Brazilian engineer, named Sergio Moraes, he had worked in a factory called Madeco …

When he returned [from interrogation] he could hardly hear or speak: he had been hooded and beaten about the head and ears with a flat wooden bat. He told us that among his interrogators were Brazilian intelligence officers.

I never knew what happened to him, but an Amnesty International researcher who went to Santiago some weeks later was told by a military official: ‘I hope to god we killed him’.13

The British Embassy finally discovered Gatehouse’s location in the National Stadium and negotiated with the military for his freedom. He would be released on the condition he leave the country. He had been interned for seven days.14

The coup in Chile changed Mike Gatehouse. He left the country reluctantly, having established a life and invested ideological and emotional energy in the UP project. The destruction of his Chilean life, his imprisonment and the death of his friends disoriented him. It was a dramatic and traumatic return to Britain. He arrived on 2 October 1973 full of pain and anger and eager to share the story of his last moments in Chile. He threw himself into the work of Chile solidarity, speaking, typing and duplicating. It was the beginning of an activist’s lifestyle from which he has never fully emerged.

Writing about nineteenth-century radicals in Britain, historian David Hamer described the attributes of those he called ‘faddists’: ‘faddists were people who were possessed of a vision and also filled with indignation and the fundamental wrongness, indeed the evil, of the existing state of affairs.’15

Hamer goes on to suggest that for many faddists their cause became an obsession—‘the object to which their lives were consecrated’.16 Hamer’s tense is important: he clearly believes faddism was a thing of the past. In fact, he insists that ‘faddism is most emphatically not a twentieth century subject’ and that it

13 Gatehouse, ‘Testimony’.
14 Gatehouse to Basnett, December 30 1976 Re: Scottish Football Team to play Chile.
16 Ibid., 1.
had disappeared from political discourse by 1900.\(^{17}\) He was wrong. Though the word itself had accumulated other connotations, the research in these pages is constructed from the historical record left by twentieth-century faddists (in the original sense). Discard the negative connotations of modern popular culture, and this word describes the people upon whose dedication the Chile cause and the Chile campaigns were built and sustained.

One of them was Mike Gatehouse. Despite his self-effacing and low-key manner, Gatehouse had a major impact on the campaign. He would become one of the most important and dedicated figures in the Chile solidarity movement in Britain.

Gatehouse’s role was based firmly in the political arm of the solidarity movement embodied by the Chile Solidarity Campaign (CSC). This chapter outlines the formation and function of that organisation, arguing that CSC operation, despite its formal hierarchy and institutionalised labelling, remained the product of the idiosyncrasies of those involved.\(^{18}\) The CSC is placed in the context of the British labour movement, and the interaction of political parties and trade unions with the campaign is discussed in detail. The peculiarities of British trade union politics and the interstices in the structure of the labour movement made it possible for individuals to have disproportionate influence in the left. These individuals would become the most important tactical acquisitions of single-issue campaigns such as the CSC.

Strategic individuals—only some of them modern faddists—formed webs of contacts that John Baxter termed an ‘interlocking directorate’.\(^{19}\) Select individuals could be more important strategically due to their bundled affiliations and acquaintances, and they might be called an interconnected node. As the political left expanded in the 1960s and 1970s to include solidarity and liberation movements, these new causes came to rely on the individuals with accumulated connections for success.

Individuals could also bring moral capital to the campaign. ‘Moral capital’, writes John Kane, ‘is credited to political agents on the basis of the perceived merits of the values and ends they serve and of their practical fidelity in pursuing them’.\(^{20}\)

\(^{17}\) Ibid., 2.
\(^{18}\) Other groups encompassed by the Chile solidarity movement which will be dealt with in footnotes are: CSC Cultural Committee and Chile Lucha, the Chile Committee for Human Rights (CCHR), Academics for Chile, World University Service (WUS) and the Joint Working Group (JWG) for Refugees from Chile. The arrival of more substantial numbers of immigrants caused the Centro Unica de Trabajadores (CUT, the trade unions congress of pre-coup Chile) to nominate representatives and take an office in London. The group of individuals ‘Chile Lucha’ was in charge of the magazine Chile Lucha (literally, ‘Chile Fights’). In this publication, the group will be referred to as Chile Lucha and the publication as Chile Fights.
The need for moral capital in an organisation such as a solidarity campaign stems from the fact that rationality alone cannot be relied upon to mobilise.\textsuperscript{21} Moral capital has a ‘crucial supportive role’ in public and political life that is not apparent until that capital disappears, as it legitimises persons, positions, offices and campaigns.\textsuperscript{22} While it was imperative for solidarity organisations to attract moral capital through individuals and affiliations, the campaigns themselves could also bestow capital on participants, as will be demonstrated in the pages that follow.

This detailed description of the Chile solidarity movement provides an opportunity for preliminary assessment of the critical reasons for and against trade union political action. Ian Schmutte has argued that ‘[u]nions make purposive decisions about the deployment of scarce resources to achieve their goals’.\textsuperscript{23} This is called rational choice—that is, maximum benefit for minimal loss—in internationalist actions. The unions in these pages could be called ‘rational maximisers’. Regardless of ideology, the likelihood of union action for an external cause was inversely related to its potential impact on the membership.

Trade unions formed part of a web of organisations in the Chile solidarity movement, and mapping the web is no easy task: the network of organisations and individuals is daunting. Prior to the coup there had already been solidarity organisations and, naturally, these were the first to express disapproval of the coup. Mike Gatehouse arrived from Chile to find a flurry of activity as the CSC was emerging from pre-existing organisations such as the Association for British–Chilean Friendship (ABCF) and Liberation. The association was formed during the Allende administration, and in February 1973 the group boasted 168 members including artists, academics and intellectuals such as Dick Barbour-Might, Betty Tate, Celia Bower, George Hutchinson and Pat Stocker. As a group, they professed solidarity with the UP administration and published a bulletin called \textit{New Chile}. The group had strong rhetoric against multinational companies and published booklets on the International Telephone and Telegraph Company and information on Kennecott and their dealings in Chile.

Despite their strong international focus, they were aware of the importance of attracting the support of British trade unions. Even before the coup, at the annual general meeting in 1973, it was resolved ‘[t]hat the A.B.C.F. should, during the coming year, develop political support for Chile, particularly amongst British trade unionists, in order to expose the machinations of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} ‘Reliance on moral persuasion declines in proportion as political order succeeds in accruing power and has, consequently, more and different means available for consolidating itself.’ Ibid., 16.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 11.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 3.
\end{itemize}
multinational corporations’. Immediately before the coup, as the situation in Chile deteriorated, they issued a leaflet that stated in upper case: ‘WE IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MOVEMENT URGENTLY CALL UPON BRITISH WORKERS TO EXPRESS THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH CHILEAN WORKERS IN THEIR STRUGGLE TO ESTABLISH DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM.’

The focus on trade unions would be inherited by the Chile Solidarity Campaign, as the main post-coup solidarity group became known, but the political emphasis would shift. The Chile campaign was a broad alliance of left groups, centralised in a small office in London. It was, as with any broad front, subject to tension within its organisation, and furthermore, the CSC was often victim of the external tensions between its affiliates, whose relationships extended beyond solidarity into the industrial sphere. There were also substantial committees in both Liverpool and Scotland and the latter ran almost completely separately from the London-based committee.

The first meetings of the CSC were held at the House of Commons, but soon the meetings moved to the ‘wonderfully chaotic’ office of Liberation in Caledonian Road, London. The first letters sent from the Chile Solidarity Campaign Committee were on the Liberation letterhead. Steve Hart, secretary of Liberation

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24 The leaflet was signed by the following labour movement leaders and organisations: Bill Simpson; Ron Hayward; Judith Hart; Ian Mikardo; Alec Kitson; Jack Jones; Hugh Scanlon; George Smith; Alf Allen; Richard Briginshaw; Dan Mcgarvey; Terry Parry; Cyril Plant; Joe Crawfors; Leslie Buck; Lawrence Daly; Alan Fisher; George Doughty; Charles Grieve; Alan Sapper; John Slater; Roy Grantham; Harry Urwin; BLP; TGWU; AUEW; Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT); Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW); National Society of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media Personnel; Amalgamated Society of Boilmakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths and Structural Workers; Inland Revenue Staff Federation; National Association of Colliery Overmen, Deputies and Shotfirers; National Union of Sheet Metal Workers, Coppersmiths, Heating and Domestic Engineers; National Union of Miners; AUEW TASS; Tobacco Workers’ Union; Association of Cinematograph Television and Allied Technicians; Merchant Navy and Air Line Officers Association; Association of Professional, Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff; National Union of Public Employees. This is a prime example of an interlocking directorate. When the coup occurred, they mobilised support for the Chilean Embassy, the ambassador, Alvaro Bunster, in particular, and more generally supported the formation of a representative national solidarity committee to be formed. Association for British Chilean Friendship, 1975, CSC, CSC/28/2, LHASC, Manchester; Association for British–Chilean Friendship: AGM Feb 16th. Secretary’s Report, 1973, Etheridge Papers: Longbridge Shop Stewards, MSS.202/S/3/2/184, MRC [hereinafter Modern Records Centre], UW [hereinafter University of Warwick], Coventry;

25 Interview with Barry Fitzpatrick (journalist, National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants representative to the CSC), 28 July 2007 [hereinafter Fitzpatrick Interview, 2007], copy in possession of author.

26 The Merseyside committee was extremely active and boasted a very high level of union involvement. Due to restriction of length rather than interest or importance, the focus of this chapter is the London committee. For a short history of the Merseyside CSC, please refer to: Angie Thew et al., Commemorative Programme for the Premiere Screening of Cruel Separation (Liverpool: Merseyside Chile Solidarity Committee, 2008). Some Scottish history is included in Chapter Four.

27 Liberation was a small organisation that was started in the 1940s as the Movement for Colonial Freedom. At the time of the coup in 1973, it boasted prominent BLP member Stan Newens and Robert Hughes MP as its joint chairmen. Liberation served as a springboard for more specific single-issue campaigns such as the CSC. Mike Gatehouse, in Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’; Gatehouse Interview, 2007; CSC Executive Committee: Minutes of the meeting held at Liberation on February 5, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
and its only full-time staff member, worked with the CSC for the first year. Hart had been a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) at Cambridge University in the early 1970s, after which he moved to work for Liberation. Hart was the youngest son of Dame Judith Hart MP, who was at the time regarded as the foremost expert on Latin America within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP).

Soon after he arrived back from Chile, Gatehouse put his distress and culture shock aside, and contacted Amnesty International, impatient to give his testimony on the occurrences in the National Stadium. He also connected with the CPGB and spoke to their branches. He remembered that in December he started to attend campaign committee meetings: ‘and I suppose people starting to get to know me and I was wanting to, by what ever means, to work on Chile with the whole of my consciousness. And so, in some way or another it was suggested that I become Joint Secretary’ of the CSC.

Working at first from the Liberation offices and soon after moving into the London Co-operative Society (LCS) building on Seven Sisters Road, Gatehouse and the twenty-two-year-old Steve Hart were joint secretaries of the CSC for the first year of its existence.

Waterman has defined solidarity committees as ‘voluntary organizations set up with the purpose of providing publicity, political support and financial

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28 He later went on to work at a Ford factory and become an officer in the Transport and General Workers’ Union. Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
29 She was a keen supporter of the Chile campaign and a member of BLP and labour movement delegations to Chile both before and after the coup. Judith Hart, ‘Chile: Not the End of the Road for Socialism’, Tribune [UK], 14 September 1973; Chile Now: Initial Report of the Labour Movement Delegation (London: Chile Solidarity Committee, 1984); Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby’.
30 Amnesty International went on to work closely with the ‘non-political’ Chile Committee for Human Rights (CCHR). The CCHR aimed to relieve substandard human rights within Chile. It remained as non-political as possible to enable alliance with church and other groups such as Amnesty International. It employed the energy and fame of people such as Joan Jara and Sheila Cassidy as well as testimony of refugees in order to garner support. Joan Jara was the English wife of the famous Chilean new song artist Victor Jara, who was brutally killed by the Chilean military in the first days after the coup. Sheila Cassidy was a British medical doctor detained and tortured by the military in Chile. After her release, the revelations of her treatment caused the British ambassador to be withdrawn from Chile. Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby’.
31 Gatehouse was, while in Chile, very close to the Chilean Communist Party. He joined the CPGB on his return. In 1974, the CPGB had just less than 30 000 members; it was a sizeable and powerful organisation. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 219.
33 The ‘committee’ was only tacked onto the name for the first period of the dictatorship, but was soon dropped in common conversation to simply become CSC. The LCS Education Committee let the small front office to the CSC for a minimal price. The LCS Political Committee worked with the campaign quite often and at its helm was Alf Lomas, who would go on to represent the United Kingdom in the European Parliament. The CSC office at Seven Sisters Road was happily situated close to a pub called ‘The Rainbow’, where the secretaries used to eat a counter meal with a pint in the evenings before returning to work in the office. Tony Gilbert, Only One Died (London: Kay Beauchamp, 1974), 49; Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
assistance to foreign peoples, organizations and even states’. Waterman believes the groups were closer to social movements than to semi-state bodies. They were not a part of the institutionalised labour movement and had flexibility and freedom to innovate because of that. Yet their position outside the traditional hierarchy necessitated the energies of various leading personalities of the left to pull together the substantial resources and ideological impetus needed to establish a broad left campaign. It could not have been achieved by the two joint secretaries alone, despite Hart’s family connections. International secretary of the CPGB, Jack Woddis, was strongly in favour of the campaign remaining a broad left conglomerate. ‘And that was very important’, said Gatehouse, ‘because elsewhere, right across Europe, solidarity campaigns differentiated and split quite early on, because the various Trotskyist groups took the general view that Chile was the prime example of the failure of communism’.

The International Marxist Group (IMG) and Socialist Workers’ Party (SWP) were the two main Trotskyite groupings in Britain at the time of the coup. Ensuring the CSC was an inclusive, broad front would appease some of their criticism of both it and the UP Government with the aim of keeping the focus on solidarity. The CPGB’s support for the broad front sustains the notion put forward by Shipley that the CPGB acted as a progenitor of other left enterprises, although he prefixes that with ‘reluctant’, which does not match Woddis’s attitude towards the CSC. Though the party was not known as a new left organisation, by actively encouraging a broad front, the CPGB utilised one of the new left’s defining strategies. It then had a relationship with others through the united front, like Raul Sol, an expatriate Chilean journalist who was well known in British left circles. The British left had learnt important lessons from a disastrous split in

34 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 132.
35 Ibid., 139.
36 They were, however, a ‘traditional part of the democratic and socialist movement’ from the early nineteenth century. Ibid., 132, 35.
37 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
38 Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 24.
39 Raul Sol ‘was, in some senses, [a] charismatic, highly intelligent very intellectual person’, who held the respect of many of the Chilean and British left. Sol had established himself by taking an offer to go to the Falklands to get the ‘scoop’ on the invasion. According to Gatehouse, Sol ‘clearly formulated the idea that we should be a unified Campaign and however much there might be disagreement among the segments within the Campaign, that there was much more to be gained for everyone by hanging together than by hanging separately’. This idea was supported by a move towards a broad left front within the National Union of Students in the 1970s. Gatehouse Interview, 2007; Interview with Mike Gatehouse (Chile activist, UK), 13 August 2008 [hereinafter Gatehouse Interview, 2008], copy in possession of author; Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 46.
the Vietnam solidarity movement, as well as from watching the splits within the French Chile solidarity movement. There was thus a predisposition to keep the movement united.40

Consequently, the CSC functioned as a broad left representative organisation that gathered members through an affiliation and local committee system. Trade unions were encouraged to affiliate at different levels, from national to branch, as were other groups such as political parties, student movement organisations and trades councils. Individuals were able to join too. Affiliations were sought through circulars, direct letters and speeches at demonstrations, fringe meetings and conferences.41 For their fees, affiliates received copies of the CSC magazine, *Chile Fights*, and the bulletin *Chile Monitor*. These were both important assets of the movement, as it has been noted that communication is the nervous system of international solidarity movements.42 Only affiliation by unions at the regional committee or national level resulted in a representative on the CSC Executive Committee.43

Affiliation brought both inertia and stability to the CSC. The bureaucratised nature of the relationship meant that once a union affiliated it was very likely they would remain so in the future and continue to pay affiliation fees.44 The future was almost certain for the committee, at least in terms of funding.45 Trade unionist Brian Nicholson said at a conference in 1982 that the CSC’s strength came ‘from the hundreds of party branches, trade union district committees and branches, trades councils and individual Labour Movement activists who are affiliated to the Campaign. It is they who ensure that there is real solidarity action with the Chilean People’46 (my emphasis).

40 Having said that, it was not without its problems, especially in the early years. See, for example: *Minutes of the National Action Conference on Chile, 1974*, CSC, CSC/11/1, LHASC, Manchester; *Cal to Put, Wednesday 10 April, 1974*, CSC, CSC/14/2, LHASC, Manchester.
42 Waterman, Globalization, Social Movements and the New Internationalisms, 257.
43 *Affiliation to the CSC, 1974*, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
44 Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby’, 81. Gatehouse used the same words in my interviews with him: an inertia effect of trade union affiliation. Gatehouse Interview, 2007. I found only one case where this did not occur. The Sheffield Trades Council de-affiliated in 1978, then re-affiliated within six months after a visit from Gatehouse. This was the home branch of Martin Flannery (BLP MP). *Thornes (Sheffield District Trades Council) to TUC, 21st. April, 1978*, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/8, MRC, UW, Coventry; *Report of Meeting held on 23rd May 1978 in the House of Commons, 1978*, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/6, MRC, UW, Coventry; *CSC EC 1.8.78 Minutes*, CSC, CSC/1/5, LHASC, Manchester.
45 Other activities the CSP undertook to raise money included merchandising, ‘benefit bops’, sponsored bike rides and parachute jumps. Trade unionist Barry Fitzpatrick remembered that ‘it was a very enjoyable campaign, apart from the topic’. Fitzpatrick Interview, 2007.
‘Real solidarity’ came through the implied consensus of affiliation and the funds the affiliation provided. By 1976, 19 unions were affiliated to the CSC at the national level, which, estimated Gatehouse in his report to the annual general meeting, equalled a total membership of approximately 5.8 million. And the campaign continued to grow. By the end of 1977 there were 30 national unions, 85 Constituency Labour Party branches, 54 trades councils, 56 student unions, 46 associations of scientific, technical and managerial staff branches, 18 Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) branches and district committees, 18 branches of the Transport and General Workers’ Union (TGWU), 21 National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) branches, eight National Graphical Association branches, 50 branches of other unions, 24 other political parties and 59 individual affiliates. This created a substantial mailing list and a reasonable annual income.

The large list of affiliates yielded a 55-member CSC Executive Committee in 1977. There were 22 unions represented along with seven political groups, three other groups and office holders. Average attendance was 20 across the monthly CSC Executive Committee meetings of that year. Though this represents less than half of those entitled to attend, it was still a large committee taking in most sections of the labour movement and it gave authority to the CSC as a representative front.

The CSC and unions had a symbiotic relationship. By affiliating, unions could fulfil international portfolios, give substance to their solidarity and embody the rhetoric of international brotherhood with a minimum of fuss. That is,

47 In 1975 the CSC’s affiliation rates ranged from £5.50 for individuals to £25 for national bodies. *CSC Affiliation Form, 1975*, STUC, STUCA 507/3, Glasgow Caledonian University Archives [hereinafter GCUA], Glasgow. Administrative leniency was employed, however, on various occasions to ensure that all groups who so desired could affiliate regardless of their financial status. See, for example: *Edmunds (Yeovil & District Trades Council) to CSC 1974*, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.


49 *CSC Annual Report, 1977*, CSC, CSC/1/13, LHASC, Manchester.

50 Ibid. The MPs were Andrew Bennet, Martin Flannery, John Ivenden, Jo Richardson, Judith Hart, Neil Kinnock, Eddy Loyden and Stan Newens. The political groupings were: BLP, CPGB, Youth Communist League (YCL), Liberation, IMG, SWP, Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS). Other groups were: National Organisation of Labour Students (NOLS), London Co-operative Society Political Committee (LCS-PC), University of London Students (ULS). Trade unions: Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT), Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF), AUEW, AUEW TASS, Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA), Furniture, Timber and Allied Trades (FTAT), NALGO, National Association of Teachers in Further and Higher Education (NATFHE), National Society of Operative Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA), National Graphical Association (NGA), NUM, NUPE, National Union of Railwaymen (NUR), National Union of Sheet Metal Workers (NUSMW), National Union of Seamen (NUS), National Union of Gold, Silver and Allied Trades (NUGSAT), National Union of Tailors and Garment Workers (NUTGW), SLADE, Society of Graphical and Allied Trades (SOGAT), TGWU, USDAW. Chile Solidarity Campaign officers and convenors and representatives of the seven CSC local committee regions also sat on the Executive Committee.

they rationally maximised their gain for use of resources.\textsuperscript{52} As the incentive for solidarity with Chile was remote (apart from bragging rights and fulfilment of identity), action for Chile needed almost no impediment for it to occur.

The ability of the campaign to be flexible and innovative due to its lack of institutional base was attractive to some unions. Ken Coates and Tony Topham have written that contrary to what opponents believe, unions are ‘ill-adapted organs for the refinement of detailed political strategies, [thus] they tend to find themselves reacting to the initiatives of others, rather than assuming any overall innovative tone’.\textsuperscript{53} Unions were both reactive to and exploitative of the campaign: they were opportunists when it came to internationalism.

The establishment of local committees of the CSC was not as vigorously pursued as trade union links. The local committees formed in a largely organic and haphazard manner, dependent on the efforts of local activists to set up and maintain them.\textsuperscript{54} They were encouraged to integrate into the national campaign (which occurred to varying degrees) as well as to coordinate trade unionists at the local level and elicit the cooperation of trades councils. The functioning of local committees varied: some had complex structures complete with their own cultural committees while others were more ad hoc or seasonal.\textsuperscript{55}

Local committees and trade union affiliations provided the main routes through which information flowed to and from the regions of the United Kingdom and Ireland.\textsuperscript{56} There was an early attempt to divide the local committees into seven regions, each with one representative on the Executive Committee;\textsuperscript{57} however, this model did not function well due to the differing nature of the local committees, extended travel time, lack of funding and the deficiency of resources for coordination at the national office.\textsuperscript{58}

\textsuperscript{52} Schmutte, ‘International Union Activity’, 61.
\textsuperscript{54} The only case of the central CSC trying to stimulate the formation of a local committee that was found in the archives is a letter prompting Lyn Murray to organise a committee in Manchester in 1974. \textit{Gatehouse to Murray, November 19 1974}, CSC, CSC/13/5, LHASC, Manchester.
\textsuperscript{56} Affiliates and local committees received separate communications from the CSC with different tones, but largely similar information.
\textsuperscript{57} The regions were Scotland, North-East, North-West, South-West, East-Central, South-East and London. \textit{CSC: Regional Structure, 1974}, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester; \textit{List of Local Chile Solidarity Committees, By Regions, As of May 15 1974}, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
\textsuperscript{58} National meetings of local committees were held in an attempt to reflect the democratic nature of the CSC’s structure.
did its best to keep up with regional matters, but the CSC was at best a loose federation and at worst an anarchistic and individualist alliance. That’s not to say that all were happy with the status quo. As early as the 1974 annual general meeting, joint secretary Gatehouse warned that the ‘over-emphasis on the administrative efficiency of the Campaign, advance distribution of documents, etc, would lead to a diminution of the real solidarity work, unless substantial funding could be found for expanding the Campaign office’.60

From the outset the issue of internal democracy bedevilled the campaign and, by 1977, a Chile Solidarity Campaign Commission was formed to investigate the democratic processes of the CSC with a focus on the relationship between the executive and the local committees. The importance of trade union participation for the CSC (which impacted on funding and legitimacy) was evident in the commission’s report. It recommended that the vexed question of the timing of the executive meetings (midweek to suit MPs and trade unionists; weekends to suit local committees) should be settled in favour of the trade union affiliates.61 This decision was ironic, because local committees were almost always more ideologically sympathetic to the UP and Chilean politics than the trade unions, and the CSC had positioned itself as the political arm of the solidarity movement. Nevertheless, trade union and labour movement support was more valuable than the ideologically pure, but numerically few, local committees.

Harnessing the power of the labour movement was the most important strategic goal of the CSC.62 Trade unionists were elected to public positions in the campaign (explained further below) and a concerted effort was made to include the actions of all trade unionists at all levels of the movement under the CSC banner. The national office reminded CSC local committees in 1976 that trade union councils and branches were imperative to action, especially direct action.63 The campaign instructed its local committees to make an effort to fit in with the ‘procedural’ nature of trade unions. Trade union liaison had rapidly absorbed the majority of time in the CSC, though the campaign noted that ‘boycotts have usually been [at] the initiative of the workers concerned, and in few, if any, cases has the Campaign had any direct influence’.64

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59 A system of minute collection from the regions was not employed. Instead the national office relied on a more ad-hoc system of word of mouth and sporadic correspondence. Correspondence with Brian Anglo of the Manchester local committee can be found at: Gatehouse to Anglo, December 13, 1975, CSC, CSC/2/2, LHASC, Manchester.


61 CSC Commission Final Report, 1977, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.

62 This has been identified as an aspect of the archetypical ‘new left movement’. Burgmann, Power, Profit and Protest, 22.

63 Suggestions for Local Committees re: Trade Union Work, 1976, CSC, CSC/16/2, LHASC, Manchester.

64 CSC. Executive Committee: Analysis of Campaign Performance to Date. Discussion Document. 23/10/74, CSC, CSC/1/4, LHASC, Manchester.
In the office itself, Mike Gatehouse and Steve Hart assiduously worked the long days of a modern faddist for a lean wage.

Sacrifice did not bring reward for Hart.

At the first annual general meeting of the CSC, Hart was pushed out of the position by groups of the ‘ultra-left’ who were uncomfortable with two communists in the powerful organising positions in the CSC. ‘But it wasn’t a bad thing’, said Gatehouse in 2007, ‘I think Steve was pissed off at the time, but I think he was ready to move on anyway’.

The departure of Hart from the campaign weakened its ties to Liberation and helped the CSC stand on its own. This was the first major administrative change but it was by no means the last. The influential position of general secretary of the campaign moved through various activists’ hands over the 17 years of the CSC’s existence. Each of these professional activists brought to the CSC their own political ideas and their own organising style, not to mention their own set of contacts.

The work of the CSC organiser was hugely varied. They were expected to be the ‘renaissance’ activist: able to speak at meetings, write letters, make telephone calls, write apologies, incite emotion, paint pictures, design posters, look after public figures, cope with the secret service, counsel Chileans, organise tours, photostat, type with a minimum of mistakes (paper was especially scarce in the first years of the campaign) and, above all, raise their own salary.

The role evolved slightly over the years. As the CSC became more and more organised and entrenched in its functions and hierarchies, as well as more stable financially, the work of the secretary became less a jack-of-all-trades and more a master of the social movement. Artists could be employed to design and complete posters and companies could be enlisted to distribute them. Over the years of the campaign, the title used for this position varied—general secretary, organiser, joint secretary—but essentially the role stayed the same: these dedicated people were the organising workhorses of the CSC. They were the faddists, whose commitment to the cause superseded almost any other factor.

65 The vote for the unpaid post was between Steve Hart and Colin Henfrey. Henfrey won 57 votes to 29. Colin Henfrey was a Liverpool academic and a CPGB member. *CSC Annual General Meeting, December 14 1974*.

66 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Hart returned to Liberation, where he had continued to perform duties in conjunction with his involvement in the CSC.

67 Mike Gatehouse (joint secretary), 1973–79; Steve Hart (joint secretary), 1973–75; Ken Hulme (trade union organiser), 1975–79; Colin Henfrey (joint secretary), 1977; Jerry Hughes (national organiser), 1979–81; Bill McClellan (CSC officer/national organiser), 1979–85; Quentin Given (national organiser), 1982–89; Helen Garner (CSC organiser), 1986; Carole Billinghurst (CSC organiser), 1987–89. Others who occasionally took on organising roles include Jane McKay (Glasgow), Sue Carstairs (1975). Anne Brown, Carl Blackburn (Secretary, 1991), Angela Thew (Liverpool, late 1980s), Graham Jones (1975), Gordon Hutchinson (local committees organisation). Duncan MacIntosh (distribution), Imogen Mark (publications) and Celia Bower (finance). Dates in this table are estimated from the appearance of their names in the CSC archive and other sources.
In the CSC office, during the early period, Gatehouse divided his time among three types of activities. The first was collecting and publicising information from grassroots groups and trade unions on solidarity actions occurring around the country. The second was organising and implementing endorsable (by trade unions, political parties or key individuals) actions such as tours, demonstrations or the national consumer boycott campaign. Third, the central office maintained the structure of the movement by preparing newsletters, organising meetings, writing letters and other administrative tasks. Gatehouse remembered that his hours in the office were ‘frantic’. The nature of a very small office with a very large number of affiliates meant that many hours a week were spent stuffing envelopes, leaving little time for other tasks. As in other organisations of the labour movement, however, the secretaries were generally more powerful than their title suggests, as every communication passed through their hands.

After Hart’s departure in 1974, Gatehouse first worked beside Graham Jones. ‘But’, said Gatehouse, ‘he couldn’t cope with the ultra-left and they gradually put the squeeze on him to get him out’. So, in March 1975, the CSC created a new position specifically to channel trade union support. The man who got the job of trade union organiser was Ken Hulme.

Hulme was a young man of twenty-five years when he entered the CSC office. He had graduated from Warwick University where he had been active in the Trotskyite International Socialists (IS). After finishing university, he went to work on a shop floor in the motor industry in Coventry. ‘I was a bit of a student revolutionary’, he remembered. He had been secretary of the Coventry Trades Council, a member of the district committee of the TGWU and had helped to establish the CSC local committee in that city.

In early 1975 Hulme departed Coventry and the ultra-left for some time off before beginning a masters degree at the London School of Economics. Peter Binns, one of the leaders of the IS, called Hulme to ask him to apply for the organising position on the CSC. Hulme recalled that there was an ongoing ‘battle’ in the broad-front CSC executive between political factions. The IS was looking for a capable organiser to contest the CPGB candidate. Hulme continued: ‘I don’t think they expected me to get appointed, and they tried to get me to take a tape recorder into my interview so everything could be taped.’

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68. This sort of ‘mechanical’ lobbying (pamphlets, newsletters and effective administration) led to many of the political ultra-left considering that the CSC was overly bureaucratised. Gatehouse insists that this criticism was mainly because they were not controlling the committee themselves. Gatehouse Interview, 2007.

69. Ibid.

70. Both Gatehouse and Hulme were paid £23 a week plus £4 travel expenses. Annual General Meeting London, February 7 1976. Secretary’s Report.

71. Interview with Ken Hulme (Chile activist, UK), 1 September 2007 [hereinafter Hulme Interview, 2007], notes in possession of author.

72. Ibid. The panel at the interview was Brian Nicholson, George Anthony (at the time called Trade Union Convenor), Gatehouse and Colin Henfrey (Merseyside CSC). They would make a recommendation to the executive, who would ultimately decide. CSC: Annual General Meeting, December 14 1974.
Hulme was successful because of his trade union experience, which the CPGB candidate could not equal;\textsuperscript{73} but as Gatehouse explained in 2007, the tactics of the IS backfired because ‘unbeknownst to them [Hulme] was already in conversation with the Communist Party to become a Communist Party member, which he did very shortly after joining the Campaign, which really pissed [the IS] off big time’.\textsuperscript{74}

When asked about the amount of pressure that was put on Hulme by his defection from the IS to the Communist Party, Gatehouse remembered that Hulme was a ‘very hale hearty strong character … [who] enjoyed provoking and taunting the ultra left’.\textsuperscript{75} Hulme admits he had uneasy relations with the ultra-left, remembering with clarity the underlying tension between himself and co-activist Gordon Hutchinson.\textsuperscript{76} Hulme devoted himself to organising, and his presence in the CSC ironically appeared to calm the storm of factional politics on the executive for a short time. His ‘defection’ also meant the CPGB had members in almost all positions in the CSC at the national level.\textsuperscript{77} With his youth and zeal, Hulme brought organisational skills and experience. Gatehouse thought Hulme was ‘splendid’, a ‘wonderful organiser’ who ‘easily spoke the trade unionists’ language and was easily accepted by them’.\textsuperscript{78}

In spite of this, the title of trade union organiser was perhaps misleading. Hulme was young, Gatehouse was considered an ‘intellectual sort’, and as both were relatively inexperienced neither was in a position to tell weathered trade unionists where and when to act.\textsuperscript{79} Rather, the office tried to support actions that were occurring at all levels of complicated trade union organisation.\textsuperscript{80} They publicised and encouraged activities and held campaigns that created an atmosphere of moral authority in which trade unionists could be confident to act.\textsuperscript{81} They also pulled trade unionists into the CSC hierarchy.

\textsuperscript{73} The CPGB candidate was Graham Jones.
\textsuperscript{74} Gatehouse Interview, 2007. Hulme left the CSC in 1979 for a position as district organiser for South Essex CPGB. Affiliates’ Newsletter No. 32, January 6 1978, CSC, CSC/1/23, LHASC, Manchester.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Local committees and refugees portfolios within the CSC. Hutchinson worked in the JWG and became very close with and involved in Chilean factional politics through the refugees. Hulme Interview, 2007. O’Brien to Hutchinson (JWG), 30 April, 1976, Sandy Hobbs Papers, Box untitled, GCUA, Glasgow.
\textsuperscript{77} The CPGB’s influence in some trade unions, its pre-existing network of sympathisers across the United Kingdom and ability to represent the more radical sections of the BLP were positive attributes for the CSC. Non-CPGB members consistently raised concerns about CPGB domination in the campaign.
\textsuperscript{78} Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
\textsuperscript{79} Hulme Interview, 2007.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
No Truck with the Chilean Junta!

Figure 1.1 Ken Hulme, third from left, and Mike Gatehouse, at right, in 1976.

Source: From right: YCL National Treasurer, Nina Temple, and YCL International Secretary, Norman Lucas, Ken Hulme and Mike Gatehouse. Ms Temple made the banner to present to the CSC on behalf of the YCL. ‘A Special Gift from the Young Communist League…’, Morning Star, 6 September 1976, 5, courtesy of the Marx Memorial Library.
The unionists at the helm of the CSC national organisation were Alex Kitson, Brian Nicholson and George Anthony. Their names dominated letterheads, their public personas were called on at rallies and they were the voice of the cause in the press. Nevertheless, the responsibility of the everyday liaison between the campaign and the labour movement fell back on campaign workers and it required an intricate web of interactions both official and personal. Many union actions were decentralised, but the records of the period were—frustratingly for a historian—created by the centre. Therefore despite trade union figurehead involvement, despite grassroots action, the story of British solidarity is funnelled through a small, underfunded office at the centre. The centre and periphery of the movement were further confused by the split structure of the British trade union movement, which was divided into two separate streams: the unions themselves and trades councils.

While all unions had different sets of rules, each union generally had district and national-level representation and one national-level office. The executive committee of a union did not generally possess policymaking power. Policy was decided by a national committee or at a national conference attended by working trade unionists as well as officials. This structure enabled delegates from all regions to resolve and vote on policies. At the national level unions could affiliate to the Trades Union Congress (TUC). National unions could also affiliate to international bodies such as the International Steel Trades Confederation.82 The many layers of hierarchy led to an administrative distance between the rank and file and the national offices, creating internal interstices in the structure and numerous idiosyncratic relationships. This is an inherent problem in the industrial national structure of unions. Further complication ensues when parallel to union structure at the shop-floor level, (joint) shop stewards’ committees existed. They comprised elected individuals who were members of distinct unions.83 Furthermore, towns or small regions also had trades councils.

No two unions had an identical structure or ideology in the trade union movement and the confusion this creates is actually the point: the official hierarchy of parallel and different systems allowed for the politically strategic placement of individuals. For example, one local-level union member could sit on its regional and national councils at the same time as being a shop steward leader and on the local trades council (not to mention involvement in other labour movement organisations such as political parties or single-issue campaigns). By the same token, a unionist higher in the hierarchy could be a member of a TUC committee,

82 See, for example: AUEW: Structure and Function of the Union, 1976, Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers [hereinafter AUEW], MSS.259/AEUW/6/AC/11/13, Modern Records Centre [hereinafter MRC], University of Warwick [hereinafter UW], Coventry.

83 For more information on shop stewards, refer to: Chris Wrigley, British Trade Unions Since 1933 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 37.
his own union’s executive council, as well as having political party affiliation. The people who had sufficient individual experience to have varied connections through organisations and knowledge of each organisation’s idiosyncrasies and complexities gained disproportionate influence in the political left. By courting strategic individuals, the CSC could effectively punch above its weight in political arenas.

An example of this was Alexander H. Kitson, whose strategic importance to the CSC was perhaps unparalleled. Kitson was the treasurer of the campaign from its inception. Born and raised in Edinburgh, he was president of the Scottish Commercial Motormen’s Union at the time of its amalgamation into the TGWU. In the 1970s Kitson was both an executive officer of the TGWU and a member of the British Labour Party (BLP) National Executive Committee and thus had a substantial amount of influence in the most powerful groups in the labour movement in Britain.

As an executive officer of the TGWU, Kitson had a close working relationship with general secretary, Jack Jones. If the CSC organisers had to meet Kitson at Transport House, he almost always organised a visit with Jones as well. As well as being leader of the TGWU, Jones was president of the TUC International Committee, a fortunate link for the Chile campaign, as it was the third most powerful TUC committee behind the general and finance committees. Jones’s own heavy involvement in the BLP led to the understanding that Kitson had freedom in his TGWU position to participate in activities of the Socialist International, which were largely concerned with BLP activities rather than TGWU business.

Kitson in fact chaired the Socialist International’s Chile Committee. It was also widely rumoured he was linked romantically to Jenny Little of the BLP International Department and was active in the BLP’s Latin American

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85 Both Kitson and Jones were high-profile trade unionists in the Trade Union Section of the BLP National Executive Committee. Their closeness as political allies ebbed and flowed. Kitson’s subordinate role to Jones in the TGWU meant that he gave Jones ‘blind loyalty’ in 1975, according to Barbara Castle. By 1976, however, Moss Evans (national organiser, TGWU) and Kitson were united against Jones over the election of Joan Maynard or Margaret Jackson to the BLP National Executive Committee. Barbara Castle, *The Castle Diaries 1974–1976* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1980), 412; Tony Benn, *Tony Benn: Against the Tide* (London: Arrow Books, 1989), 615.

86 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.

87 Coates and Topham, *Trade Unions in Britain*, 134.


89 Trades Union Congress (TUC), ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House, Great Russell Street London, on Thursday, 24th April, 1975’ (England: TUC, 1975).
Subcommittees. More specifically, he attended the short-lived BLP International Department’s Chile Coordinating Committee, which was set up in May 1974 to ensure BLP action on Chile was coherent and coordinated. In his capacity as a member of the BLP International Committee, Kitson was expected to liaise directly with the CSC in lieu of an official BLP representation on its executive. Furthermore, he chaired the BLP Executive’s Latin America Study Group from its inception in 1975 until 1978 and sat on the Liaison Committee of the Central Unica de Trabajadores (CUT, the trades union congress of Chile) and the BLP. This confusing array of involvements serves to demonstrate both Kitson’s commitment to the Chile cause and his use of the Chile issue to establish moral authority and dominate the party and union discussion around the topic.

Ken Hulme, trade union organiser for the CSC, confirmed that ‘Alex more than anybody was our “in” into the more senior positions in the labour movement’. Liverpool unionists Jimmy Nolan and Antony Burke concurred that Kitson was a ‘lifeline’ into the upper hierarchy of the labour movement. Kitson’s name on the top of the CSC letterhead, his public profile and personal endorsement (almost always with the qualification ‘Executive Officer TGWU’ after his name) gave the CSC political credibility and the respect of the labour movement. Moreover, with such a high-profile treasurer (he was also treasurer of the Scottish Trades Union Council, STUC), the CSC was above being accused of financial mismanagement.

90 Gatehouse Interview, 2007; Hulme Interview, 2007. Alan Angell, a leading Latin Americanist scholar, was also active on occasion in these committees. At the time of the coup he was at St Antony’s College Oxford and he spent much of the next two years working for Academics for Chile. Academics for Chile was an organisation that helped academics in Chile gain contracts in Britain so they could escape persecution. The immense amount of work involved in organising such activities led Angell to go to the World University Service to ask for organising aid. That organisation then took over most of the running of Academics for Chile. Academics for Chile, 1975, Papers of Barry Carr, Melbourne; Angell (St Antony’s College Oxford) to Hart, 16 October 1973, CSC, CSC/13/3, LHASC, Manchester; Academics for Chile, 1975, CSC, CSC/41/1, LHASC, Manchester; Interview with Alan Angell (Chile activist, academic, UK), 30 August 2007 [hereinafter Angell Interview, 2007], notes and recording in possession of author.

91 Having an official representative on the CSC committee would imply the BLP’s unequivocal support of the CSC’s actions. This way the BLP had pre-warning of the CSC’s activities in exchange for the CSC’s use of Kitson’s reputation. Report to meeting of Chile Co-Ordinating Committee—May 1974, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/2, MRC, UW, Coventry.

92 Minutes of Meeting of the Latin America Study Group (27/1/75), TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/3, MRC, UW, Coventry; NEC Latin American Sub Committee: Minutes of the Last Meeting held on July 25th 1978 in the House of Commons, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/6, MRC, UW, Coventry; Programme of Work, 1976, TUC [BLP International Department], MSS.292D/936.1/3, MRC, UW, Coventry; Coates and Topham, Trade Unions in Britain, 118.

93 Kitson had in fact met Allende in Chile before the coup. TUC, ‘Notes of Proceedings at a Conference on Chile held at Congress House’, 15.

94 Hulme Interview, 2007.


96 Solidarity with the People of Chile—A trade union conference organised by the CSC, 1975, CSC, CSC/11/2, LHASC, Manchester.

97 This was not a new strategy. See: Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 47–8.
The advantages of his connections came, however, with a certain mystery. According to Mike Gatehouse, ‘there was more than met the eye’ to Alex Kitson. He continued:

I went there once or twice to meet him with Chilean Trade Unionists … and he could be very probing, prying, intrusive and sometimes on the verge of being downright rude. And you didn’t [pause] it came out of the blue. You didn’t understand where it was coming from, or exactly what it related to.98

Kitson was definitely a strong character, who pushed repeatedly for Chile resolutions and support at the BLP National Executive Committee and conferences.99 For some, politics was thirsty work and, according to Gatehouse, Kitson ‘had a big drink problem, but didn’t they all?100 He did share this trait with many trade unionists at the time, and when Bill McClellan was in Chile preparing for the arrival of the labour movement delegation of 1984 he sent a pamphlet of the hotel where the delegation was to stay with an arrow to the mini bar and the statement ‘this is for Brian [Nicholson] and Alex [Kitson]’.101

Nevertheless, Kitson undoubtedly felt strongly about the cause and consistently delivered good speeches and relentlessly fought for Chile. At the 1975 Trade Union Conference on Chile, he said: ‘We in Britain can be proud of our role in this international solidarity movement … We are involved in this because we know that the forces of fascism in Chile are the same ones that threaten us.’102

By involving strategic figures such as Kitson who could use their knowledge of labour movement quirks, the CSC had a direct liaison with some of the more powerful committees in the labour movement. The deliberate and considered choice of Kitson as treasurer illustrates a canny political selection by the CSC on two levels. First, the campaign gained respectability and true trade union connections from the outset. Second, his involvement in organisations across the left strengthened the image of the CSC as a united left campaign. His was a moderating presence in what could have been perceived as a CPGB-dominated organisation.

Alex Kitson was one among many trade unionists who figured heavily in the structure of the CSC. Labour Party MPs Ian Mikardo, Neil Kinnock, Judith Hart and Jo Richardson were all strong supporters of the Chile campaign, but despite their high public profiles, none of them was chosen as the chair. In a distinctive

98 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
99 Castle, The Castle Diaries, 506.
100 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
101 Hotel Santa Lucia, 1984, CSC, CSC/5/3, LHASC, Manchester.
and unique move, the CSC placed two rank-and-file trade unionists in the positions of joint chairs: Brian Nicholson of the TGWU and George Anthony of the AUEW. These were the two largest unions in Britain, and as a consequence had the biggest vote in the BLP. They were also two of the best placed in terms of possible blacking or boycotting of Chilean goods.

Both men had mottled reputations; it was said you were not a fully fledged member of the CPGB until you had punched George Anthony at least once. According to Gatehouse, they were both ‘notoriously and scandalously rough as chairmen and had no compunction in telling people to sod off or whatever. They were quite macho and … it gave a very distinctive flavour to the Campaign.’103 ‘George and Brian’, continued Gatehouse:

[T]he ‘terrible twins’ we used to call them, they were quite good at puncturing any … complacency and so on, though they were not without it themselves, but they punctured ours. And Executive Committee meetings were very ‘boom boom’: functional, decisive, not a lot of waffling went on, and certainly very little ideological discussion.104

Brian Nicholson was a member of TGWU Region One, which took in North London and the docks. He was a CPGB member who sat on the National Executive Committee of the TGWU, which was ‘bankrolling’ the Chile campaign.105 This was a kind of guarantee for Nicholson’s actions, and he ran campaign meetings as if they were trade union meetings. Nicholson took a slightly more prominent role in the CSC than George Anthony.106 He visited the small CSC office regularly, according to Gatehouse, and chaired meetings and conferences for many years; but, despite his commitment of time to the collective movement, Nicholson was a ‘supreme individualist’: ‘Brian did what Brian wanted.’107

Nicholson brought some extracurricular activities to the campaign office, such as coopting Gatehouse to type the Cherry Blossom. Cherry Blossom was a famous brand of boot polish, predominantly black in colour: the Cherry Blossom was a blacking list for the unofficial pickets of the docks. After Gatehouse typed and photocopied the list, Nicholson would take it down to the docks and the lorry firms listed would not be allowed through the lines on that day.108

103 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
104 Ibid. Evidence of Anthony and Nicholson attempting to stifle an ideological discussion on the lessons of the Chilean coup for the National Action Conference can be seen at: Minutes of the Meeting of the CSC Executive Committee—held at Cooperative centre, Sunday March 2, 11am, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
105 Referring to the support of Jack Jones and Alex Kitson. Interview with George Anthony (activist, unionist, UK), 22 August 2007 [hereinafter Anthony Interview, 2007], notes in possession of author.
106 The record shows that Anthony attended more Executive Committee meetings between 21 December 1973 and 16 October 1975.
108 Ibid.
Many solidarity activists believed that both Nicholson and Anthony were involved in the CSC to further their political careers. On the other hand, they may have been ‘gifted’ representation on the CSC by their unions to keep them busy and away from more politically important or local issues. Yet, Gatehouse remembered that their time commitment alone would seem to refute these accusations. They were ‘very key to the Campaign’, according to Gatehouse: ‘they were neither Labour Party officials and although they officially represented their unions, they were not high up in the union, they were not full time trade union officials. They were working trade unionists.’

Accompanying Nicholson as joint chair was George Anthony, who worked in ship repairs at the Royal Albert Dock in London. He joined the Amalgamated Engineers’ Union (later the AUEW) at seventeen and rejoined after his national service at twenty-one years of age. He was president of the North London District of the AUEW in 1974. A member of the CPGB, Anthony was a part of the London Trades Council in 1973 from which Dr Amicia Young nominated Anthony as the delegate to the CSC. Gatehouse remarked that Anthony was a ‘a complex character. I mean, very difficult and he quarrelled in a big way with some of the … younger women in the Campaign’. Anthony in fact blames ‘the women’ for eventually forcing him out of the campaign.

His confidence came through from the first. Even though Anthony was not the elected representative of the AUEW he took the liberty of representing them. ‘Well, because Brian Nicholson was from the TGWU’, he remembered in 2007, ‘I felt it was only right, really, that the [AUEW] should have an equal status’. Because of Anthony’s persistent attendance, he was gradually considered to be a representative of the AUEW and managed to manoeuvre himself into a high-profile position in the solidarity movement.

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109 Ibid. Anthony originally represented North London Trades Council at the CSC.
110 Gatehouse to Colleagues, July 10 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
111 Young, of the Association of Scientific Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS), did this perhaps to lighten her own load—she attended the first CSC meetings along with Anthony. Her political persuasion is unclear though most probably towards the CPGB. Her husband was a commander in the Royal Navy; she was a medical doctor. The exact political reasons for Anthony’s nomination for the London Trades Council are unclear. When asked about it, Anthony’s response was: ‘Oh yeah, well, she liked me.’ Chile Solidarity Committee: Minutes of the meeting held at the House of Commons on 17.12.73, CSC, CSC/1/1, LHASC, Manchester; Anthony Interview, 2007. Anthony is also listed as being CSC Trade Union Convenor for a short time. CSC Executive Committee, 1974, CSC, CSC/1/3, LHASC, Manchester.
113 Anthony Interview, 2007.
114 Anthony Interview, 2007.
Figure 1.2 George Anthony (centre).


Although the nuances of such stories are hard to corroborate through archival sources, it is certain that Anthony and Nicholson took advantage of a niche, or an interstice, that appeared in this portion of the labour movement structure. Here they could entrench themselves in positions to further exploit the gaps and disjunctures that the broad left front threw up. The joint chairs of such a broad-front organisation raised their profile and power base to a level much higher than their actual union positions. Archival evidence suggests they quite often spoke for the largely silent masses of trade unionists affiliated to the CSC, and because there was little vocal trade union opposition, they took the liberty that they were in fact correct and justified in doing so.

Other evidence suggests Anthony was detached from the workers’ understanding of the Chilean situation or their ability or desire to act. Anthony believes the presence of Nicholson and himself at meetings was enough to reassure the trade union movement that things were in good hands.¹¹⁵ Considering that almost all union organised action was initiated at the periphery and not in the central CSC

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¹¹⁵ ‘I mean, they didn’t come because they didn’t want to … I suppose they felt in a way well, Brian and George are handling it, you know, there will be nothing to worry about.’ Ibid.
office or national-level union offices (as demonstrated in later chapters), this seems like quite a presumption. Anthony even admitted that ‘workers never complained’ about him calling a boycott, ‘but they never took action on’ the call.116

Even so, Gatehouse reflected that ‘both George and Brian did really [a] huge amount … in their own style. And often that style would be rather prepotente as they would say in Chile, and macho and sometimes difficult and sometimes quite undemocratic.’117

The leadership style of Anthony and Nicholson was a form of democratic centralism, but despite the potential for negative reflections of the two, Gatehouse judged that ‘on the whole they were enormously important. And I don’t think the Campaign would have got where it did or hung together or been what it was without them.’118

Kitson, Nicholson and Anthony’s presence as trade unionists in the campaign, however, was not enough to entice the TUC to affiliate. In fact, the CSC and the TUC had a tense relationship.119 The Chile campaign was not ‘official enough’ to be important to the council, whose political agendas ran far over the heads of the Chile activists.120 Gatehouse thinks that

there is a political level in the TUC international work that has absolutely bugger all to do with the individual trade unions. Many of the unions, particularly unions like the Miners were deeply critical of it, absolutely loathed the TUC international committee and regarded them as a bunch of spooks.121

The TUC organisation was big enough to run not only its International Committee, but also an International Department. The New Statesman described the TUC International Committee ‘like most other parts of the TUC structure, [as] oligarchic rather than democratic, and has generally been a preserve of the Right’.122

116 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 This caused the CSC to describe its membership in sneaky ways: ‘Over half total membership of TUC affiliated through their unions to CSC.’ Chile Solidarity Campaign, Chile and the British Labour Movement, 8.
120 Hulme Interview, 2007; Gatehouse Interview, 2007. This did not stop the CSC using every scrap of acknowledgment for its own means. In his introduction to the annual general meeting in 1976, Gatehouse said ‘the CSC’s presence in the movement was demonstrated by its presence in the TUC for its AGM, and by the affiliation through their unions of more than 7 million British workers’. CSC-AGM 19.02.77 Minutes, CSC, CSC/1/12, LHASC, Manchester.
121 Gatehouse Interview, 2007. The TUC nevertheless was a very important avenue for small lobby groups to get their ideas to government. Wilkinson, ‘The Influence of the Solidarity Lobby on British Government Policy towards Latin America’. 14.
1. The ‘principal priority’ of the campaign: The trade union movement

Figure 1.3 Brian Nicholson and Mike Gatehouse at a Chile demonstration, 1974.

Source: Untitled. Photo box 3. People’s History Museum. LHASC, Manchester. The Deal Girl Pipers can be seen in the background of the 1974 demonstration photos.
The TUC established its own Chile Fund in October 1973. They used public occasions, such as the speech of Luis Figueroa at the Trade Union Conference for Chile in May 1975, to donate large sums to this fund and urge other unionists to encourage their own executive committees to donate also. The TUC also donated £1000 to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) Fund for Chilean Relief when it began in 1974. By widely circulating news of this generous donation, the TUC encouraged affiliated organisations to donate to the ICFTU fund (and away from the CSC). Between December 1973 and May 1974, £3928.90 was donated to ‘Chile’ through the TUC from 31 unions. Donations varied from £10 from the Rossendale Union of Boot, Shoe and Slipper Operatives to the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) and the TGWU, which each donated £1000. By undertaking this financial administration, the TUC could not be accused of ignoring the notion of solidarity. It kept a parallel morality with the CSC with little effort and without forgoing control of their own affairs, just as the BLP had by declining affiliation to the CSC but associating with it through key individuals.

Some unions were careful with their choice of fund. For example, the Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers (SLADE) instructed the General Secretary of the TUC to direct their money only to the TUC Chile Fund. They perceived the fund to be in a better position to connect directly with Chilean trade unionists than the unwieldy organisation of the ICFTU. Not all were so trusting and some members of the trade union...
movement were still dubious about how the money was being spent. These fears may have been justified, as the ICFTU and TUC started collecting funds for Chile without any clear plan or method to get the money from their European offices to trade unionists in need in junta-controlled Chile.

The ICFTU only acknowledged the first £1000 sent to them from the TUC. This, along with a pattern of donations from the TUC to the CSC for events and the CUT for office equipment, suggests the bulk of the almost £4000 sent to the TUC intended for Chile in the early years of the regime stayed in the kitty at the TUC and was subsequently used almost exclusively within Britain for British involvement in Chile solidarity. The amount of money is not surprising. The easiest way of expressing solidarity is by donating money. Unions do this in a regular, bureaucratised and structured manner.

In terms of policy, an emergency resolution at the TUC Blackpool Congress in September 1973 congratulated the trade unions in Chile on supporting the UP Government and resisting fascist takeover. At subsequent TUC conferences the Chile section of the international report spanned several pages. It detailed visits by Cyril Plant and Jack Jones to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, delegations received and international (United Nations, International Labour Office, ICFTU) Chile resolutions, indicating the high profile of the Chile issue. Every year until 1989 there was at least one page of the report dedicated to Chile, although it was sometimes in conjunction with other Latin American countries. On top of this, resolutions of condemnation of the dictatorship were passed, accompanied by long soliloquies by the speakers listing the regime’s oppressions and British trade unions’ solidarity efforts.

The high profile of the Chile issue at congress is not necessarily reflected in the general international policy (and certainly many actions of the International Department) of the TUC. In fact, many unions did not support the TUC’s international activity. The TUC often followed the policy of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (subsequently referred to as the Foreign Office) rather than representing the interests of trade unions within Britain. There was an

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130 At the Trade Union Conference on Chile in 1975, Len Willet said: ‘I am a little unhappy in a sense, about the support that we have been asked to give to the TUC fund, not unhappy about the support but I am unhappy about the progress or lack of it to see where the money is going. To see whether it is being spent wisely, and in the proper direction.’ Len Willett, Post Office Engineering Union National Executive Council, 1976, CSC, CSC/11/4, LHASC, Manchester.
131 Jenkins to Hargreaves, January 4, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
132 Ibid.
133 TUC to Stanley (POEU), December 22, 1975, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/5, MRC, UW, Coventry; Ryder to Walsh, November 29, 1982, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/11, MRC, UW, Coventry.
134 Emergency Motion, TUC Blackpool, 1973, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/1, MRC, UW, Coventry.
135 See, for example: George Anthony, TUC Annual Conference Report, 1975 (held at LHASC, Manchester), 498–9.
established practice of personnel exchange between the TUC International Department, the BLP International Department and the Foreign Office. The *New Statesmen* reported:

The TUC … has stood at the centre of the official structure of international unionism ever since the forties. But the official structure—still deeply penetrated by the CIA, and by the anti-ideology of the British Foreign Office—no longer represents, if it ever did, the aspiration of workers’ organisations to escape from national constraints.136

Since 1961 the International Department of the TUC had employed Alan Hargreaves.137 Hargreaves was disliked in the trade union movement and was, according to Patrick Wintour, ‘one of the least-forthcoming and least-known officials in British unionism’.138 He did not carry any sense of being a ‘trade unionist’, remembered Gatehouse, who continued: ‘he was extremely hostile, difficult to deal with’, and he was on occasion ‘ludicrous, inappropriate, but manifestly hostile’.139 He kept the International Department of the TUC on a tight rein, instructing his staff to keep all work confidential, even from TUC officials. His internal notes to Len Murray, general secretary of the TUC, suggested a close relationship that bypassed formal committee communications.

His ‘skilful manoeuvring’ within the TUC ensured he maintained control over the correspondence of the International Department with trade unions.140 Hargreaves even went as far as discouraging trades councils from affiliating to the CSC.141 When asked about Hargreaves and his International Department, Ken Hulme simply declared: ‘they weren’t nice people.’142 A member of the BLP International Department said ‘the trouble with Hargreaves [was] that he [did] not like foreigners’.143 As noted, Hargreaves had been recruited from the

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136 *The TUC’s “foreign policy”*.  
137 The International Department of the TUC was not the same as the International Committee. The International Department was staffed by paid workers, not elected representatives of trade union affiliates. Alan Hargreaves’ initials (J. A. H.) identify his authorship of documents in the TUC archives.  
138 *The TUC’s “foreign policy”*. This article was loosely based on the articles presented in *Where Were You Brother?*, published by the War on Want. Murray, the general secretary of the TUC, said this article was ‘almost certainly libellous’; however, I found it does echo sentiments conveyed in the oral history interviews completed for this project. *I.C. 5. March 5, 1979*, TUC, MSS.292D/901/14, MRC, UW, Coventry.  
140 Ibid.  
141 Hargreaves wrote to Mrs Burgess of the Portsmouth Trades Council: ‘It is the usual practice for Trades Councils to avoid becoming involved in political activities not connected with industrial matters of more immediate interest. Such activities are best dealt with by the political wing of the Labour Movement, and it would be more appropriate for co-operation with the CSC to be carried out through the local BLP branch.’ *Hargreaves (TUC) to Burgess (Portsmouth Trades Council) July 16, 1974*, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.  
142 Hulme Interview, 2007.  
143 *The TUC’s “foreign policy”*. 

Foreign Office, and he maintained relations with the office well into his term at the TUC. For example, Hargreaves learned of the 1974 delegation of Australian unionists to Chile from an unsolicited letter from the Foreign Office. This named the full delegation, their union affiliations and activities in Chile well before communications arrived from unions in Australia. Mike Gatehouse’s feelings on Hargreaves were clear: ‘this Hargreaves character at the TUC … I felt sick to have met this bloke.’

If only the attitudes of the TUC International Department were taken into account, it would seem that the Chile campaign did not have labour movement support. Fortunately for the committee, close to the top of the trade union movement in Britain was an individual who was strongly sympathetic to the cause: Jack Jones. He sat at the head of the TUC International Committee. Jones was a widely known and powerful trade unionist whose international credentials stemmed from his participation in the Spanish Civil War. Together with Hugh Scanlon of the AUEW, he was known as one of the ‘Tsars of the trade union movement’ in Britain. Gatehouse said that Jones ‘was a very upright man I think, in many ways, I think probably one of the least corrupt … he was the most puritanical of the trade unionists’.

Although Gatehouse recalled that Jones did not have a ‘feeling of real warmth. I think he cared a lot, but he didn’t sort of display it.’

Generally respected as a man of integrity, Jones was also on the BLP National Executive Committee, the Management Committee of the International Transport Workers’ Federation (ITF) and was the general secretary of the TGWU. A poll commissioned by the BBC in 1977 revealed that the public believed Jack Jones wielded more power than the prime minister.

Apart from Jones, the CSC had few friends in the TUC International Department. The relationship between Hargreaves and Jack Jones was imperfect. It was said that Jones ‘had particular antipathy towards Hargreaves’, but never managed to dislodge him from his position at the TUC.

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144 Hurst (Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to Hargreaves, 25 April 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
146 Jones, Jack Jones.
147 Gatehouse Interview, 2007.
148 Ibid.
149 Sterne, ‘Chile and the TUC’.
151 Hargreaves was technically below Jones in hierarchy, but as a full-time employee, he spent much more time at the TUC offices. He wielded much more power than his title suggests.
152 ‘The TUC’s “foreign policy”’.
Despite the power struggle between Hargreaves and Jones and the TUC’s general hostility towards the CSC, trade union support for the CSC was actually widespread. The attitude of Hargreaves and consequently the International Department of the TUC shows the ideological and organisational split between sections of the trade union movement that occurred within the industrial national model. The disjuncture between union levels allowed Hargreaves to establish himself and wield greater power than his position might otherwise allow. His actions did keep some TUC and other labour movement support from the CSC. It could be argued, however, that his attempts to block official TUC action created the space for the committee to expand its official network through the affiliation of unions dissatisfied with the representation of the TUC and who subsequently sought a more social movement-oriented internationalism.

A test of strength and organisational obedience occurred when the CSC decided to organise a demonstration for 15 September 1974. It would take advantage of the visit of Salvador Allende’s widow, Madame Hortensia Allende. Mme Allende was invited to Britain as a guest of the BLP, the London Cooperative Society Political Committee, the STUC and the Scottish Chile Solidarity Committee. Gatehouse accompanied and translated for her. He also organised her tour, even typing out in Spanish descriptions of people with whom Mme Allende was to meet in order to make her feel more comfortable. Trade union empathy for and generosity towards Allende’s widow was embodied in many acts of kindness—for example, Clive Jenkins of the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) loaned his car for her exclusive use. Mme Allende returned to Britain various times during her exile, including a more extended tour in 1975. Mike Gatehouse almost always accompanied her.

The Chile campaign invited the BLP, as host of Mme Allende’s 1974 trip, to sponsor the demonstration. The Labour Party, in turn, invited the TUC to co-sponsor the event. At the BLP International Committee in June it was informally reported that Jack Jones (strategically placed in the BLP, TUC and TGWU, as already described) had said that the TUC International Committee would co-sponsor if asked. As simply as that, Jack Jones committed the

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153 In February 1974, a national demonstration was held in Liverpool—a separate action to the one described here. The demonstration in Liverpool was organised by the London office to recognise the grassroots leadership from the docks that was occurring there. Programme of Activity for the Campaign for 1974–5, CSC, CSC/2/1, LHASC, Manchester. Nolan Jimmy et al., discussion with Ann Jones.

154 Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 28 August, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.

155 Gira en Gran Bretana. Septiembre 1974, CSC, CSC/20/1, LHASC, Manchester.

156 ‘Mike Gatehouse se alojara en el hotel para asegurar el bienestar de las visitas’ ['Mike Gatehouse will stay in the hotel to ensure the wellbeing of the visitors']. Ibid.

157 Ibid.

158 Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 4th July, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.

159 Hargreaves to Murray, July 5, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
resources of the national trade union body of Britain. Such were the advantages of having a sympathetic person in such a strategic position in the interlocking directorate of the labour movement.

Figure 1.4 ‘Mrs Hortensia Allende [centre] met in London yesterday by Labour Party International Department Secretary Jenny Little and (right) Mike Gatehouse of the Chile Solidarity Campaign.’

Source: ‘Junta is Terrorising the People—Chile Bishops’, *Morning Star*, 11 September 1975, 1, courtesy of the Marx Memorial Library.

According to Jenny Little of the BLP International Department, only the BLP and the TUC would be listed as sponsors, despite contributions in money and effort towards organising the event from the AUEW, TGWU and other organisations.160

160 *Chile: Demonstration, 1974*, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry. See, for example, the AUEW Executive Council resolving to assist organisation of the 1974 demonstration: *Minutes. Meeting of Executive Council, held in General Office, on the 4th June, 1974 at 2.45 p.m.*, Amalgamated Engineering Union, MSS.259/AEU/1/1/215, MRC, UW, Coventry.
The speakers were to be Mme Allende, Neil Kinnock, Ken Gill (AUEW Technical and Administrative Staffs Section: AUEW TASS), John Gollan (secretary, CPGB), Tariq Ali (IMG) and Jack Jones.\textsuperscript{161}

The inclusion of an IMG speaker at the expense of an IS speaker raised protests in that section of the Trotskyite left.\textsuperscript{162} In a letter, Peter Binns (IS and also member of the CSC Executive Committee) pleaded with the CSC to change its decision.\textsuperscript{163} Gatehouse, in a conciliatory response, pointed out that trying to construct a balanced platform of speakers from the various groupings was a difficult task: time was too short to let everyone speak.\textsuperscript{164}

The inclusion of Ali had more extensive implications than offending the IS. The TUC International Department refused the BLP invitation to co-sponsor the demonstration because of the IMG speaker on the platform.\textsuperscript{165} They wrote, in a conspiratorial tone, to the BLP that they must refuse due to ‘IMG activities elsewhere in the trade union movement’.\textsuperscript{166} The BLP International Department agreed with the peak union body’s views on the IMG speaker, but as Mme Allende was a BLP guest, they could not withdraw their support for the demonstration without embarrassment.\textsuperscript{167} In spite of this, Jenny Little talked with the CSC about withdrawing Ali from the platform, and threatened to remove sponsorship if he was not.\textsuperscript{168} The BLP was to reconsider the support of the demonstration at their national executive committee meeting on Wednesday, 24 July.\textsuperscript{169} The paper trail of correspondence on this subject in the archives then stops for some months.

The BLP ultimately withdrew its official support for the demonstration, ‘because of the general election’.\textsuperscript{170} Factional politics had won over international sentiment, and in the process of maintaining its broad united front, the CSC had alienated itself (further) from the TUC and the BLP, arguably the two most important labour movement groups, certainly within the industrial national structure. In practice, however, the withdrawal of support may have been an attempt at intimidation only. Gatehouse remembered that ‘the threat was

\begin{footnotes}
\item[161] \textit{Gira en Gran Bretana}. Others included Inti Illimani and Isabel Parra.
\item[162] This decision was passed by both the CSC Committee (6 July) and the Campaign Executive (19 July) of 1974. \textit{Gatehouse to Binns (IS), July 20 1974}, CSC, CSC/45/2, LHASC, Manchester.
\item[163] Binns (IS) to CSC, July 19th 1974, CSC, CSC/45/2, LHASC, Manchester.
\item[164] Gatehouse to Binns (IS), July 20 1974.
\item[165] Hargreaves to Murray, July 5, 1974.
\item[166] TUCIC 5.8.74: Chile, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
\item[167] Hayward (BLP) to Murray (TUC), 28 August, 1974.
\item[168] Chile: Demonstration, 1974.
\item[169] Ibid.
\item[170] Beatrix Campbell, ‘Chile’s Torturers Stand Accused’, \textit{Morning Star}, 10 September 1974.
\end{footnotes}
uttered but not carried through’. Kitson and MPs such as Judith Hart and Martin Flannery would not have been able to continue their vocal support if the BLP disapproved so openly of the CSC.

Meanwhile, one level down the trade union hierarchy, the General Executive Council of the TGWU (of which Jack Jones was general secretary) wrote that it would ‘extend the Union’s fullest support and participation to all expressions of solidarity with the Chilean people being sponsored by the Labour Party, particularly the nationwide demonstrations to be held on September 15’. Jones would speak at the rally on the understanding that it would be on behalf of the TGWU only. The TUC International Committee, of which Jones was head, suggested bleakly that he refer to the TUC international policy on Chile before giving his speech. On top of this, by June 1974 the AUEW National Executive—Engineering Section, the Welsh Area National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), Scottish Area NUM, London Cooperative Society Political Committee and the National Union of Students had also pledged support for the demonstration.

The protesters would gather at 1 pm at Speakers’ Corner and march via Oxford Street, Regent Street and Haymarket to Trafalgar Square. Speeches would start there at 4.30 pm, from a platform on the steps of the fountain. The protest was to be set out for maximum effect: at the head of the march a Chilean flag would be carried, then the platform speakers and the CSC banner, pipers and 10 more Chilean flags. After this would be trades unions and trades councils, local CSC committees, constituency Labour parties, CPGB and finally the IMG, IS and others.

On the day of the demonstration, the Morning Star, a newspaper associated with the Communist Party, reported that ‘exiled Chilean folk singers, their fists clenched, pounded out revolutionary songs as nearly 12,000 rain-soaked marchers … trooped into Trafalgar Square’. The figure is more likely to have been 10,000. It was the biggest Chile demonstration ever seen, according to

171 Mike Gatehouse, email to Ann Jones, 26 July 2009.
172 Chile: Passed by the General Executive Council of the Transport and General Workers Union on June 7, 1974, CSC, CSC/4/1, LHASC, Manchester.
173 JAH re: note attached—CHILE: DEMONSTRATION, 1974, TUC, MSS.292D/980.31/4, MRC, UW, Coventry.
174 Local Committees Newsletter No. 4, June 25 1974, CSC, CSC/44/1, LHASC, Manchester.
175 Ibid.
176 The division of the march thus indicated the importance of each of these groups to the CSC. It also served to keep disputing factions away from each other. Order of March as Agreed for September 15th, 1974, CSC, CSC/20/1, LHASC, Manchester.
177 The Morning Star was not the official organ of the CPGB, but functioned as if it was. There were 50–60,000 copies circulated per day in the 1970s. Shipley, Revolutionaries in Modern Britain, 42.
178 Ibid.
179 On top of 3000 at the Glasgow demonstration the day before. The Times put the total at the Trafalgar Square rally at 10,000. Peter Strafford, ‘Two Worlds under Chile’s Junta’, The Times, 16 September 1974.
the *Seamen’s Journal*. The entire executive of the TGWU spearheaded the march, alongside Judith Hart (then Minister for Overseas Development), Martin Flannery MP (BLP), Alex Kitson (TGWU, BLP and CSC), John Gollan (CPGB) and Dai Francis and Emlyn Williams (South Wales NUM National Executive Council members, CPGB and BLP respectively).

The demonstration was an ‘outstanding success’, wrote Max Engelnick, district organiser of the CPGB. There were at least 200 union banners present. Four hundred miners travelled from Wales and 200 from Yorkshire to march. After a last-minute shuffle, the speakers included Hortensia Allende, Harald Edelstam (former Swedish ambassador to Santiago), Tariq Ali (IMG) and Jack Jones. Significantly, mass participation triumphed without the official support of the two most powerful and all-encompassing groups of the labour movement: the TUC and the BLP. The great numbers of trade unionists in the street highlighted the lack of connection between the rank and file and the upper echelons in the trade union movement. The insistence on a broad front had created space for Tariq Ali to step in and purloin more power than his position warranted.

What was more telling was that one individual could override the structure and political idiosyncrasies of the labour movement: Jack Jones, by his presence alone, gave the appearance of TUC, BLP as well as TGWU endorsement, despite the behind-the-scenes machinations.

By ensuring the participation of strategic trade unionists, the CSC had benefited from more than the power of an individual. According to Kane, morally justified actions are ‘legitimate’. In this way, a person such as Jones with accumulated moral capital was used to access opportunities that would otherwise not be available. Jones was not a faddist. He did not ‘attach an exalted significance’ to the Chile campaign, but he was a strategic individual: an access point to and voice of the trade unions of Britain. Through the industrial national framework,
The CSC had gained the support of the TGWU, AUEW and rank-and-file levels of unions. Through horizontal movements, more akin to the relationships described in social movement unionism, they had gained Jack Jones. His status as an interconnected node gave the blessing of the whole labour movement to the Chile campaign.

The CSC continued to rely on unions. In their program of activity for 1974–75, the CSC stated: ‘Our principal support has been in the trade union movement, and we must extend this much further, with an extended campaign to increase affiliations, and to provide ample stimulus for participation to our affiliates.’\(^{188}\)

The activities the campaign undertook in order to stimulate affiliate participation are focused on in the next chapter. In the meantime, trade union work would ‘remain the principal priority of the Campaign’.\(^{189}\)

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188 Programme of Activity for the Campaign for 1974–5.
189 Ibid. Trade unions remained the focus of the campaign for the 1970s and into the 1980s. For example, the campaign took the side of the National Union of Journalists (NUJ) and National Graphical Association (NGA) rather than that of its own (long-term) member Imogen Mark in 1983: ‘While the CSC is not a trade union, it is firmly rooted in the labour movement and can scarcely be expected to take a completely neutral attitude to serious breaches of elementary trade union discipline.’ Given to Mark, 12th January, 1984, CSC, CSC/28/35, LHASC, Manchester.
Figure 1.5 Mme Allende addresses the crowd in Trafalgar Square, September 1974.

Source: *Untitled*, Photo box 3, People’s History Museum, Manchester.
Figure 1.6 Judith Hart and Hortensia Allende embrace on the platform of the first anniversary march. Alf Lomas of the London Co-Operative Society Political Committee looks on.

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