Chapter 2

Australian Force Projection 1885–1985

Australia was dependent on allies for the first 100 years of its military history. From 1885 until the end of participation in the Vietnam War in 1972, they underwrote Australian involvement in regional and international military emergencies and campaigns. The Australian armed forces found it difficult to project force when allies were not in a position to help. This difficulty increased risk at tactical tipping points in 1942 on the Kokoda Track during the New Guinea Campaign and in 1966 at the battle of Long Tan in Vietnam soon after Australia deployed an independent task force. On both occasions, Australian troops prevailed against the odds, thereby obviating major political and strategic embarrassment. From 1972 until 1985, Australia did not project significant military force regionally or internationally except for some Cold War maritime and air surveillance activities. By 1985, the nation aspired to self-reliant joint force projection in defence of Australia and its interests.

The dispatch of a New South Wales contingent to Sudan in 1885 set the first benchmark for rapid deployment. There were more to follow. Australia was able to recruit, prepare and dispatch first contingents in about four weeks. Rapid deployment was not required during the Second World War. There was time for contingents to begin preparation in Australia, and then complete training and equipping after arrival and before the test of combat. During the Cold War, Australian Governments allowed less time for preparation in home bases. There was little or no preparation after arrival before employment. For Korea and Vietnam, the time to prepare for deployment returned to about four weeks. Circumstances also forced land force elements to reinforce and reorganise hastily before departure.

This chapter is a short introductory history of Australian military force projection. Australia may indeed have projected military force successfully for 100 years with the assistance of allies, but it needed good luck when taking military action alone. Over time, Governments and circumstances allowed an average of four to six weeks preparation time from official warning to the departure of initial contingents.

Projections to the Sudan, South Africa and China

The first official projection of Australian military force occurred in March 1885. In ‘an example of colonial military efficiency of a high order’, 750 men and 200 horses embarked in Sydney for the port of Suakin in the Red Sea to participate in the British Sudan War. Impetus had come on 11 February from
Major General Sir Edward Strickland, a retired British officer living in Sydney. He proposed in a letter to the editor of the *Sydney Morning Herald* that 'Australia'—though yet to be a nation—should respond militarily to the death of Major General Charles Gordon at Khartoum on 26 January 1885. Australia’s first battalion group to deploy overseas arrived in the Sudan less than one month after official warning—a rapid deployment, by both historical and contemporary standards.

A call to arms for another British military campaign in Africa prompted the next projection. On 3 July 1899, Joseph Chamberlain, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, sent secret cables to colonial governments in Australia asking them to consider sending contingents ‘in the event of a military demonstration against the Transvaal’. The British were not compromising during negotiations about the political rights of a burgeoning population of British immigrants who had settled in the South African Republic of the Transvaal after the discovery of gold. The Republic declared war on 11 October 1899. In a repeat of the circumstances of the Sudan expedition, Australian men from the bush and the cities volunteered for service and quick deployment. Cooperation between colonial governments, citizen committees and military authorities facilitated efficient preparation. Australian contingents arrived in South Africa in November and December 1899, fully equipped and horsed, about six weeks after enlistment. Further contingents followed at regular intervals over the next two years.

In June 1900, the Australian colonies responded to another overseas military emergency. British forces, accompanied by French and Russian troops, landed in northern China and advanced on Peking in order to protect members of diplomatic legations and their families who were being besieged by anti-Western members of the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists—nicknamed ‘Boxers’. Further Western incursions started a short war with China.

With forces committed to the Boer War, New South Wales and Victoria sent small contingents of sailors and marines from their permanent and volunteer naval forces to assist in China. After official warning in early June 1900, the Victorian Naval Contingent embarked in Melbourne on 31 July 1900. A 260-strong New South Wales contingent joined the Victorians on the same troop ship in Sydney, embarking on 8 August 1900, and arriving in China 38 days later. After the British had employed the Australians for six months on garrison duties, they returned to Australia in March 1901.

**Observations**

Projections to the Sudan, South Africa and China between 1885 and 1902 were patriotic responses to military emergencies of the British Empire. The British fostered Australian contingents in the absence of Australian capacity, capability or desire to do so. Small sizes and dispersion among British formations, as well
as the predominantly mounted infantry composition of Australian force elements in South Africa, also made creating separate sustainment arrangements unnecessary.

Typically, governments disbanded contingents after redeployment. International force projection was not the first priority. Since the early days of the colonial period, generic force preparation had focused on defence of the homeland from predatory European powers. The army depended on the dedication and patriotism of part-time volunteers to mobilise with their untrained compatriots to face threats to Australia’s territorial sovereignty. In a manner similar to dispatching sporting teams for international competition, Australian governments, companies, institutions and citizens responded fervently with both public and private funds for projections in the service of the British Empire. In return, Australians were confident that the Empire would do the same.

**Projection to Europe and the Middle East: 1914–18**

On 30 July 1914, the Imperial bugle sounded again. The British Government advised secretly that war in Europe was imminent. Though Australia, like the other British dominions, would be at war with Germany if Britain declared war, their contributions would be self-determined. There was bipartisan support in Australia for a continental defence posture, with an implicit requirement for national projection from the eastern and southern coastal heartlands to the western and northern hinterland. However, there were differing views about the defence of the British Empire. As Jeffrey Grey has observed: 'In 1914, despite all the preparations for national defence of the previous few years, the Commonwealth was ill-prepared to meet the demands of war.' Years of secret warnings from the British Government and military planning by higher command staff in the army, followed by months of warnings in the press, had not equated to preparation time for force projection.

After Britain declared war, the Australian Government placed the Australian Navy under the control of the British Admiralty. The government directed Brigadier General W.T. Bridges, Inspector General of the Commonwealth Military Forces, to prepare and dispatch ‘an expeditionary force of 20,000 men of any suggested composition’. This force, called the first Australian Imperial Force (1st AIF), would be put ‘at the complete disposal of the Home Government’. Bridges raised 1st AIF in a manner that repeated the recruitment processes for Australia’s participation in the Sudan, Boxer and Boer wars.

The British Government prompted Australia’s first regional force projection on 6 August 1914 by requesting the seizure of ‘German possessions and wireless stations’ in the southwest Pacific region. The new Chief of the General Staff, Colonel J.G. Legge, set about raising ‘His Majesty’s Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force’ (AN and MEF) immediately. Unlike the six weeks for
recruitment, preparation and dispatch of the 20 000-strong 1st AIF contingent, this expeditionary force was ‘to be promptly organised and despatched with the least possible delay. It was an affair of days.’ \(^{19}\) Legge produced his concept of operations, organisation and orders for AN and MEF in 72 hours, specifying that it would total about 1500 personnel. \(^{20}\) Twice the number of men needed for 1st Battalion, AN and MEF, were already assembling at Victoria Barracks in Sydney for enlistment with only a promise of ‘service abroad’. \(^{21}\) After being selected, attested, clothed, armed and equipped in a week, the 1000-strong infantry component embarked with the naval contingent and other elements on 18 August 1914. This was another rapid deployment comparable to the projection to the Sudan. The AN and MEF deployed 12 days after the official warning and ‘seven days after the first infantryman had been enrolled’. \(^{22}\) Six days after that, the auxiliary cruiser *Berrima*, carrying 1st Battalion, assembled with several Australian navy vessels off Palm Island north of Townsville, inside the Great Barrier Reef. \(^{23}\)

The AN and MEF then sailed for a final rendezvous with the flagship *Australia*, and the light cruiser *Melbourne*, at Rossel Island, located near the southeastern tip of New Guinea. In what may have been Australia’s first high-level joint command conference on active service, Rear Admiral Sir George E. Patey, RN, Captain J.C.T. Glossop, RAN, Captain J.B. Stevenson, RAN, and Colonel W. Holmes, the land force commander, discussed final plans. Patey issued an operation order for the capture of Rabaul and the hinterland soon afterwards. As commander of the AN and MEF, Holmes would exercise ‘a free hand in relation to all operations ashore’. \(^{24}\) Holmes landed small Royal Australian Navy Reserve (RANR) patrols to search for German military forces and reinforced them when they made contact. Indigenous auxiliaries under the command of German officers quickly succumbed. \(^{25}\) Medical staff on the hospital ship *Grantola* treated the few wounded Australians. \(^{26}\) On 13 September 1914, the Australians hoisted the British flag at Rabaul. Thus, after the British request on 6 August, Australia had recruited a 1500-strong light infantry force, prepared and embarked it on a navy task group that then deployed several thousand kilometres into the northern archipelago. The AN and MEF had accomplished its mission for the Australian Government mission in just five weeks.

While AN and MEF projection was progressing, the Quartermaster-General’s branch of the Defence Department had been working day and night to equip 1st Division, 1st AIF. Branch staff contracted Australian industry to produce a wide range of items and stripped the militia of stocks. \(^{27}\) They drew on ‘large quantities of army stores [that had been stockpiled] against the chance of sudden mobilisation’. \(^{28}\) The 1st Division embarked after four weeks of specific force preparation. C.E.W. Bean assessed that ‘no troops ever went to the front more generously equipped than the first Australian contingent’, drawing attention
to high quality webbing, clothing and boots.  Jeffrey Grey qualifies this assessment by observing that the Australians arrived in Egypt without tents and were short of ‘howitzers for the artillery’ and ammunition.  After arrival, the British army trained and sustained the 1st Division and following contingents until the 1st AIF was ready for battle in 1915.

Australia prepared and dispatched more than 330,000 troops over the next four years.  John Robertson assessed that ‘Australia’s experience in the 1914–18 war may be characterised as a great deal of slaughter with little military art’. The Australian people received mostly patriotic propaganda about the conduct of the war and the activities of their men on the frontline. Only the names of the dead published in the press communicated the paucity of military art and the cost to a generation. Though journalists were present and published stories of Australian operations, there were no significant political or strategic consequences from any particular setbacks at the tactical level.

Observations

The projection of the AN and MEF into the southwest Pacific in 1914 was Australia’s first regional joint force projection. The navy provided the means for deployment, force protection, sustainment, command and control support, and landing parties. The army benefited from a surfeit of fit and capable men rallying for service overseas. There was also sufficient experience within the army to make efficient arrangements for specific force preparation. These arrangements at Victoria Barracks in Sydney enabled a 1500-strong battalion group to be mobilised at very short notice. Though under-trained for conventional war, junior leaders and small teams were capable of the minor tactics required to engage and defeat lightly-armed indigenous troops commanded by German officers. After the war, Australia administered German New Guinea—a spoil of war. Australia had one less inimical European colonial power in the near region.

Generic force preparation, in the form of cooperation between government, citizens and industry, contributed to Australia’s proficiency in getting sizeable forces away to fight in Europe and the Middle East on time and in good order. Though the British fostered Australia’s participation and the nation paid a high price in lives and national treasure, the experience enhanced the nation’s military capabilities and capacities. All three Services practised force projection. A generation of Australian officers now had experience in higher-level command and staff appointments. From their ranks would come the generals and senior commanders for the Second World War. Many of them would train the next generation for combat at sea, on land and in the air. However, this was the zenith of Australia’s military power for the time being. The nation was sick of war and forces were demobilised as quickly as possible.
The Second World War: 1939–45

The Second World War in general (and the year 1942 in particular) proved to be an important period for the development of Australia’s strategic thinking and proficiency in force projection. Initially, Australians underwrote alliance and trade relationships, as well as racial and cultural loyalties, by projecting force to international theatres to assist Britain. After warning of a Japanese southern thrust, the Australian Government decided to pre-position forces in the national hinterland as well as in the northern archipelago. After the Japanese defeated forces that had been pre-positioned in Malaya and islands in the northern archipelago, the Australian Government decided to defend sea, air and land approaches to the homeland around New Guinea. For the first time, Australia projected force nationally to Darwin and regionally to New Guinea without substantial allied assistance. These experiences during the Second World War confirmed that Australians expected their armed forces to be proficient in national, regional and international force projection.

Australia reached a significant tactical tipping point in August and September 1942 on the Kokoda Track that ran north from Port Moresby in Papua. Good luck, rather than prompt, strong and smart force projection, helped Australian forces to prevail. Fortuitously, the USS Lexington raid on Japanese forces arriving in northern New Guinea, Allied maritime victories in the Coral Sea and around Midway Atoll, and a US Marine landing at Guadalcanal in the southern Solomons, as well as the Japanese deciding to conduct three major operations in the southwest Pacific simultaneously in mid-1942, took the pressure off Australian forces. These circumstances allowed Australia to reinforce Port Moresby in time to counter a Japanese advance along the Kokoda Track and a lodgment at Milne Bay west of Port Moresby.

Over-stretched Japanese lines of supply and difficult tropical climate and terrain assisted Australian forces further. However, lack of proficiency in the functions of force projection put unnecessary pressure on the tactical level of command and increased risk. The Australian Government ended up depending on fortuity and junior leaders and small teams displaying courage and tenacity at the right places, and at the right time, under the leadership of several exceptional unit and sub-unit commanders, to spare the nation from further strategic embarrassment.34

The Post-Second World War Period: 1946–64

There were improvements in Australian proficiency in land force projection, especially force rotation, in the 1950s and early 1960s. The Australian Government responded to a threat from Chinese-inspired communism by projecting small regular forces to participate in a US-led UN campaign in Korea and a British campaign in Malaya, and then Malaysia, to symbolise Australian
resolve. However, there were persistent weaknesses in specific force preparation, deployment and sustainment of the first contingents to deploy. Land forces had to improvise and depend on circumstances, such as being given time after arrival and the goodwill of allies, to make up for these deficiencies before being committed to combat operations.

Australia expected allies to be the forward line of Australian homeland defence and to supplement the functions of force projection despite the experience of having to defend New Guinea in 1942 without substantial allied assistance. Little was done to develop autonomous logistic and higher-level communications capabilities, or to exercise joint command to enable independent projections like the AN and MEF projection in 1914. The Australian Government did not appear to expect self-reliant Australian joint force operations while British and American allies maintained a strong presence in Southeast Asia.

Indeed, Australia was still projecting land forces as it had in 1885, 1900, 1914, 1940 and 1942; and light infantry battalions supported by field artillery remained at its core. The change for the Cold War was that land forces were not comprised of rallying volunteers already possessing many of the skills and attributes of soldiers. A relatively small group of officers and men, who spent years in regimental service, maintained Australia’s capability and capacity for land force projection.

The projections of the first 20 years following the Second World War confirmed that the Australian people expected their armed forces to operate in the Southeast Asian archipelago and beyond to protect Australian interests and bolster alliance relationships. However, the British were about to withdraw east of the Suez. As a result, British grand strategy, cultural and racial ties, historical obligations or mutual self-interest would not prompt Australian military action. Australia would have to depend solely on American military power in Southeast Asia. This historic parting of the ways from the mother country was symbolised by the divergence of British and Australian policies over supporting the Americans in Vietnam.

The Vietnam War: 1965–71

The initial projections of a 1000-strong 1st Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment Group (1 RAR) group in 1965 and of an independent 4500-strong task force to Vietnam in 1966 exposed problems with force projection that echoed deficiencies evident in 1942 (New Guinea), 1950 (Korea) and 1955 (Malaya). The Americans assisted the 1 RAR group in 1965. However, they were not in a position to do so for the task force in 1966. A seven-month military planning embargo (from August 1965 until March 1966) imposed by the government crippled tactical training and logistic preparations for the task force and, according to the official historian, Ian McNeill, ‘important matters were overlooked’. These matters
increased risk and put unnecessary pressure on those working at the tactical level of command.\textsuperscript{36} This accumulation of risk could have resulted in Australia losing a tactical contest at Long Tan near the Australian task force base in August 1966 that would have had significant political and strategic consequences.\textsuperscript{37}

Australian operations in Vietnam continued for another six years. Aside from a two-battalion sized operation outside Phuoc Tuy province in 1968 that also almost ended in military disaster, operations involved a slow, inconclusive attrition of Viet Cong guerrilla units in Phuoc Tuy province.\textsuperscript{38} The army became proficient in the mechanics of force rotation. Battalion groups shed their national servicemen on return from Vietnam and most regular personnel moved on to other appointments in the army. Concurrently, other battalion groups reconstituted and prepared for their next tours of duty.

**Post-Vietnam War Period: 1972–85**

Australia’s participation in the Vietnam War ended almost 100 years of involvement in British and American campaigns until participation in the Gulf War in 1991. Even before the end of the Vietnam campaign, Australia’s forward defence posture had begun a transition to ‘defence-in-depth’ of the Australian mainland. The withdrawal of the British east of Suez, the end of the volatile Sukarno era in Indonesia, the Nixon Doctrine enunciated in Guam in 1969 and a relatively benign near region after the end of the Vietnam War contributed (by the early 1970s) to a shift in Australian Government policy away from regional and international force projection.\textsuperscript{39}

The election of the Whitlam Labor Government in 1972 ended selective conscription and finalised Australia’s withdrawal from Vietnam.\textsuperscript{40} Though it did not initiate the demise of the forward defence policy, the Whitlam Government confirmed its end and began a process of ‘monumental change’.\textsuperscript{41} David Horner suggests that the Australian Government then began a ‘reorganisation [that] revolutionised the way Defence conducted its business’.\textsuperscript{42} Prime Minister Gough Whitlam appointed his Deputy, Lance Barnard, as his initial Minister for Defence. Barnard found Sir Arthur Tange, the Department’s Secretary, to be a willing and forceful organisational reformer.\textsuperscript{43} Since his appointment in 1970, Tange had not been able to persuade Coalition Governments to approve changes that he and other senior public servants, as well as some senior military officers, considered overdue.\textsuperscript{44} After consolidating both past and contemporary views, and with an eye on arrangements in Britain and the United States, Tange presented his recommended changes, *Australian Defence: Report on the Reorganisation of the Defence Group of Departments* (the Tange Report), to Barnard on 15 November 1973.\textsuperscript{45} His intentions were structural, strategic and economic.\textsuperscript{46} The structural objectives were to integrate ‘the various aspects of defence’ by abolishing the three Service departments with their
separate ministers and bureaucracies. A diarchy, comprised of a Chief of the Defence Force Staff (CDFS) and the Secretary, would lead and manage a new consolidated department simultaneously. The report also recommended fresh strategic thinking, based more firmly on Australia’s ‘new world situation’.\textsuperscript{47} 

The Labor Government accepted the Tange Report. The major weakness of these reforms, from a military perspective, was that the CDFS did not have a headquarters or staff to orchestrate the functions of force projection with the three Services.\textsuperscript{48} Moreover, a Chief of Joint Operations and Plans had insufficient authority or staff to summon the three Services for joint planning, or to synchronise Service capabilities on behalf of the CDFS. In effect, the CDFS had statutory authority, but not the means to exercise it.

The 1975 Strategic Basis Paper ‘was explicit that there was no requirement for the maintenance of Australian military forces for conflict in South-East Asia’ and that ‘there were no military threats to Australia or the prospect of major assault’.\textsuperscript{49} In 1976, a newly-elected government issued a Defence White Paper, *Australian Defence*, that explained Australia’s changed strategic circumstances and emphasised force projection into the ‘neighbourhood’ rather than ‘some distant or forward theatre’.\textsuperscript{50} The ANZUS Treaty partners began conducting the *Kangaroo* series of exercises in 1974, 1976 and 1979. David Horner described exercise scenarios during this period as ‘a window into the nature of the threat that the ADF [Australian Defence Force] was preparing to counter’.\textsuperscript{51} There were no scenarios based on offshore counterinsurgency or expeditionary operations. Initial exercises in the 1970s simulated conventional operations that in some ways replicated Korean War scenarios of offensive and defensive operations on land, with accompanying close air support. The navy simulated battles like those fought in the Coral Sea in 1942 and the air force fought off notional encroachments of Australian airspace by hostile military aircraft and provided air cover for the navy. By the early 1980s, land force elements exercised to defend small incursions by hostile forces intent on sabotaging Australia’s mining infrastructure in the northwest (*Kangaroo 83*) and the navy and the air force exercised in the northern sea and air approaches to the continent.

Small contingents left Australia in support of UN overseas operations. None were urgent, large scale or particularly dangerous. Similarly, force elements from each service operated offshore as tokens of support and demonstrations of resolve as part of Cold War surveillance operations.\textsuperscript{52} Several hundred ADF personnel, mostly from the army, served in support of the PNG Defence Force (PNGDF) after independence in 1975. The Government had wound this effort back by 1985.

The ADF was not ‘a truly joint force’ by 1985. It lacked joint doctrine and clearly enunciated and practised joint command arrangements.\textsuperscript{53} However, this situation was about to change. The CDFS, General Phillip Bennett, had begun
to strengthen ADF joint command and control arrangements. Bennett formed Headquarters Australian Defence Force (HQ ADF) in September 1984 to give the military–strategic level of command capacity to direct the three Services for joint and single Service operations. The parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence tabled a supportive report, *The Australian Defence Force: its Structure and Capabilities*, in October 1984. A year later, Bennett dropped the word ‘Staff’ from his title, leaving him with a more commanding designation of Chief of the Defence Force (CDF). He established a two-star position for strategic-level joint operations and plans, and another for military strategic policy and military inputs into force development. Later, he added a three-star position of Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), who was to act as a chief of staff at HQ ADF with responsibilities for both policy development, and operations and planning functions. He also included a Joint Logistics Section at HQ ADF, in order to link both departmental and Service logistic organisations.

Bennett initiated staff processes for the establishment of environmental commands. In effect, he gave the three senior Service combat commanders environmental titles (Maritime, Land and Air) and placed them under his command for ADF operations. Simultaneously, these officers reported to their Service chiefs for raising, training and maintaining their combat forces. From 1984, the CDF, through his nominated joint force commanders, would command ADF operations. Bennett’s initiatives, like those of Sir Arthur Tange in 1972, were the beginnings of a new era of Defence reform that would either enhance or detract from national, regional and international force projection.

**ENDNOTES**

3 The contingent received two weeks specific force preparation (13 February–3 March 1885) after official warning, arriving in the Sudan 27 days later.
6 The most comprehensive account of Australian participation in the Boer War is Craig Wilcox, *Australia’s Boer War*, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2002.
13 See Mordike, An Army for a Nation, A history of Australian military developments 1880–1914, for a description of a debate between ‘imperialists’ and ‘Australianists’.
15 For information on these warnings, see Grey, The Australian Army, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, pp. 34 and 39.
17 Bean, The Story of ANZAC, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–1918, p. 34.
23 The light cruiser Sydney, the supply ship Aorangi, the submarine tenders Protector and Upola, and two submarines, the AE 1 and AE 2.
26 The capture of Rabaul cost the Australians six killed and four wounded: two of those killed were officers in command, apparently victims of German instructions to their indigenous subordinates to shoot officers first.
27 Australia had ‘factories which had been set up after 1910 to manufacture military equipment’. Grey, The Australian Army, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, p. 39.
36 Australian Army, Contingency Planning paper ‘Lessons Learnt from Operation Hardihood: The Deployment of the First Australian Task Force to South Vietnam in 1966’, Annex B, undated, p. 4. This paper appears to be an annex to a parent document that focused on logistics aspects of the deployment of 1 ATF. Probably written in 1971 for a CGS Exercise as part of a presentation by Major General G.F.T. Richardson CBE, Quartermaster General, ‘Logistics Aspects of Operation Hardihood’, AWM 101, item [10]. Copy held by author.
The previous Gorton and McMahon Governments had begun withdrawing Australian troops in 1971. By November 1972, remaining troops numbered 128 and Defence planners had no role for them beyond November 1972.

One of the most farsighted senior military officers to recognise the need for a unified, joint ADF was General Sir John Wilton. His role in beginning the reform process in the 1960s is described in a biography, David Horner, Strategic Command: General Sir John Wilton and Australia’s Asian Wars, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2005, chapters 17 and 20. Also Andrews, The Department of Defence, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, pp. 183–96.


Operation Gateway (1980–89) was Australia’s contribution to Western surveillance during the last decade of Cold War. Long range P-3C Orion aircraft and navy vessels maintained surveillance operations in the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca. Australian submarines conducted patrols as part of US Cold War deterrence and surveillance operations against Soviet submarines. The army maintained an infantry company group at Butterworth airbase in Malaysia to protect allied aircraft.

The terms ‘one-star’, ‘two-star’, ‘three-star’ and ‘four-star’ corresponded to joint positions that could be filled by equivalent ranks in the three Services. For example, the term ‘one-star’ equated to the ranks of Commodore (navy), Brigadier (army) and Air Commodore (air force), and ‘two-star’ equated to Vice Admiral (navy), Major General (army) and Air Vice Marshal (air force).