Chapter 11

Projection to East Timor

In August 1942 in New Guinea during the Second World War and in 1966 in Vietnam an accumulation of risks resulted in a small number of Australian troops facing several thousand well-equipped, well-trained and more experienced enemy troops. Fortunately, climate, terrain and the resilience of junior leaders and small teams, as well as effective artillery support in 1966, offset the numerical and tactical superiority of their opponents. Australian troops prevailed against the odds. If either of these two tactical tipping points had gone the other way, there would have been severe strategic embarrassment for Australia. There could have been public pressure for a change in Government and investigations into the competence of the Australian armed forces.

For 48 hours in September 1999, renegade members of the Indonesian military forces and their East Timorese auxiliaries provoked members of an Australian vanguard of the International Force—East Timor (INTERFET) in the streets of the East Timor capital, Dili. Indonesians outnumbered Australians, who carried only limited quantities of ammunition. On the night of 21 September, a 600-strong East Timorese territorial battalion confronted a 40-strong Australian vehicle checkpoint on Dili’s main road. Good luck, superior night-fighting technology, the presence of armoured vehicles and discipline under pressure resulted in another historic tactical tipping point going Australia’s way. Had there been an exchange of fire that night, there would have been heavy casualties on both sides and several hours of confused fighting between Australian, Indonesian and East Timorese territorial troops. There was also potential for Indonesian and Australian naval vessels to have clashed as Australian ships rushed to deliver ammunition to Australian troops, as well as for Australian transport aircraft and helicopters to have been attacked at Dili airport. Australian and Indonesian relations would have plummeted to an historic low, and Australia’s reputation in the region and respect as an American ally would have diminished significantly.

This chapter covers the events and an accumulation of risk that influenced Australia’s most significant post-Cold War force projection in September 1999 to East Timor. It examines them from the perspective of Australian military self-reliance and competence at the end of the twentieth century.

Command and Control

The quest for an effective way of planning and conducting operations and campaigns continued in 1998. Close to the second anniversary of Rear Admiral...
Chris Oxenbould’s submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC), Major General Jim Connolly submitted a ‘Mid Trial’ report on 1 December 1998, as his period as Commander Australian Theatre (COMAST) drew to a close, to demonstrate the efficacy of Theatre Command. He contended that Theatre Command facilitated rapid development of concepts for operations, speedy formation of joint task forces and a unity of command that was previously lacking in the Australian Defence Force (ADF) joint environment. He regretted that operational circumstances during the initial period of the trial had not provided the opportunity to test his concepts. Little did Connolly know that a strategic surprise awaited Australia in 1999 that would not only test the function of force command but also every other function of Australian military force projection.

Connolly did not overlook logistics, but left unexplained why the Service chiefs and their logistic support commanders would comply with his priorities and directives. Based on Operation Solace, Operation Lagoon and the first 10 months of Operation Bel Isi, it was unlikely that either the Maritime or Air Commander would give Connolly or a joint task force commander control over the means of resupply or a guarantee to deliver. It was also just as unlikely, based on the experience of Operation Bel Isi, that Major General Des Mueller and his headquarters in Melbourne could guarantee an efficient supply chain to a deployed force.

On 26 May 1999, the new COMAST, Air Vice Marshal Bob Treloar, submitted a progress report on theatre headquarters development with an accompanying document, ‘Concept for the Command of the Australian Theatre’. He echoed his predecessor’s assessment of the value of Theatre Command. He concluded that Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) was ‘the ADF’s only viable potential major JTFHQ [Joint Task Force Headquarters]’. It remained to be seen whether DJFHQ would work. In reality, DJFHQ was not a truly joint headquarters staffed by all three Services. There was not enough day-to-day work at DJFHQ for navy and air force staff, who were needed to support maritime and air operations at their respective environmental headquarters.

Treloar had not sought to change arrangements, except to diminish the operational role of Northern Command (NORCOM). Expectations of sequential and devolved planning and decision-making remained. Indeed, he expected General John Baker’s successor as Chief of the Defence Force (CDF), Admiral Chris Barrie, and his staff to issue ‘Military Strategic Estimates’ for anticipated contingencies, followed by warning orders and possibly execution orders for preliminary operations, before ministerial and cabinet submissions were submitted. This sequence, or one like it, had not been followed since Australia returned to projecting force beyond Australian territorial waters and air space in 1987. Indeed, the theatre planning process added another sequential layer to a cloistered strategic planning process. Treloar’s small joint staff groups would
still be left to coordinate environmental headquarters staff, who would remain responsive but not necessarily compliant.

While Treloar was comfortable with evolving arrangements, a group of consultants from PricewaterhouseCoopers were not convinced. They concluded that relations between Headquarters Australian Theatre (HQ AST) and its environmental headquarters were dysfunctional and ineffective. HQ AST was not working cohesively, efficiently or effectively and was not ready to assume leadership of joint operations. Overall, there was an emphasis on process, and not on outcomes, as well as ‘a lack of common understanding of shared purpose’. Environmental headquarters staff did not regard HQ AST as ‘value adding’.

The PricewaterhouseCoopers report was a contrary opinion. The Theatre Command trial had a further six months to go. Exercise Crocodile 99, like the Kangaroo series of exercises of the 1980s and early 1990s, was intended to test the effectiveness and efficiency of ADF joint command and control arrangements. The jury was still out on Theatre Command.

**Projection to East Timor**

On 6 February 1999, the Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer, opined that he expected the East Timorese to reject an Indonesian offer of autonomy within the state of Indonesia and that an international military force would be needed to safeguard East Timor’s subsequent journey to nationhood. In early March, he flagged a military role for Australia in East Timor after a referendum that was being negotiated by Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations. Thus, the ADF was faced with the prospect of a neighbourhood operation in East Timor. There was potential for Australian and Indonesian military forces to have to work closely together there. There was a lot at stake for the Indonesian Army (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). As the institution charged with the protection of the Indonesian nation-state, TNI would lose face if East Timor achieved independence. Since the invasion in 1975, the Indonesian Army had campaigned unsuccessfully to defeat East Timorese pro-independence forces. Like armies throughout history, the Indonesians had a deep desire to vindicate their blood sacrifice by defeating their enemies. Perhaps more importantly, Indonesian generals would have been concerned that an independent East Timor might also set a precedent and encourage secessionist movements in other provinces. In a relatively new country deeply divided by religion, ethnicity, and cultural traditions, the TNI saw itself as the only organisation capable of protecting the unity and integrity of the Indonesian state.

On 27 April 1999, the Australian Prime Minister, John Howard, met with the Indonesian President, Jusuf Habibie, in Bali to discuss the reported massacres of East Timorese civilians in regional centres and in Dili by pro-integration militia during the previous weeks. Howard’s intervention in an internal security
matter in an Indonesian province was unprecedented. Several days before this meeting, *The Australian* and the *Sydney Morning Herald* published a Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO) intelligence assessment on East Timor. It identified the role of TNI in instigating violence through militia surrogates. Notwithstanding this leak, Habibie appeared to welcome Howard’s visit and affirmed a partnership between Australia and Indonesia to facilitate a solution to East Timor’s political status. The two leaders emerged from their talks issuing assurances that the East Timorese would be given the opportunity to decide their political future in a secure environment.

On 5 May 1999, Habibie signed a tripartite agreement between Indonesia, Portugal and the United Nations for a ‘popular consultation’ in East Timor in August. If the majority of East Timorese voted ‘No’ in this ballot and the Indonesian Parliament endorsed the result, then the Indonesian Government would invite the United Nations to assist with the transition of East Timor to nationhood. Given competing interests in East Timor and its violent history since 1975, senior ADF officers, Defence officials and analysts in Canberra and Jakarta must have known that the period leading up to the ballot would be violent and that there was potential for an anarchic aftermath. East Timorese pro-integration and pro-independence factions were vying to win popular support for their causes. The pro-integration side, backed by elements of Indonesia’s security forces and military intelligence organisations, were already exerting significant coercive power.

In June and early July 1999, first-hand media reports, protests from the newly-deployed UN Assistance Mission—East Timor (UNAMET) and reports from Australian military liaison officers serving with UNAMET, identified an alarming situation. Local Indonesian Army and police units, members of East Timorese territorial battalions and militia groups were intimidating the population to vote for integration. In these circumstances, Indonesian security forces might be too busy either quelling or instigating unrest to provide security for an emergency evacuation of Australian nationals and UN staff.

In secrecy, contingency planning for an ADF-led evacuation operation in East Timor called *Spitfire* began. Following precedents set in the past, Barrie did not authorise inclusion of representatives from lower levels of command in a strategic-level planning compartment. Later, he commented that the political environment in Canberra was most sensitive due to leaks of information about what the Australian Government knew—or did not know—about the situation in East Timor: ‘We were reading about our business in the media every day.’ For their part, commanders and staff at lower levels of command in Sydney, Townsville and Darwin kept abreast of unfolding events in East Timor in the media and by following reports from Colonel Paul Symon, an ADF officer, who was a senior UN military liaison officer with UNAMET, and national commander
for Operation *Faber*, the ADF’s participation in UNAMET.\(^{30}\) Staff at Land Headquarters convened periodic meetings to discuss the situation in East Timor and intelligence staff provided weekly updates.\(^{31}\) Major General Peter Cosgrove and his staff at DJFHQ assessed that there might be a need for the ADF to evacuate Australian nationals and UN staff. This operation might also include securing protected areas for those fleeing violence. It would take the United Nations some time to assemble and deploy an international force to East Timor to restore public safety, if the Indonesian Government invited foreign troops to do so.\(^ {32}\)

Barrie, Treloar, Major General John Hartley, the Land Commander, Cosgrove and Commodore Mark Bonser at NORCOM in Darwin and their respective staffs became seized by the fate of UNAMET in East Timor. Whereas previous force projections had not benefited from reconnaissance and first hand intelligence, ADF officers participating in Operation *Faber* gave the ADF eyes and ears in East Timor.\(^ {33}\) Symon visited Darwin on 16 July and was able to brief planning staff from all levels of command in Darwin and also in Sydney and Brisbane via video-conferencing facilities. He recalled that this was a pivotal meeting because he realised how little those he spoke to understood the situation in East Timor, the conditions he was working under or the urgent need to support him with independent secure communications. He was also disappointed with the lack of detail in contingency planning. In his view, extant plans had not changed significantly since he left DJFHQ at short notice to serve with UN AMET in mid-June. He was also concerned that he and his fellow Australian observers were being targeted. All had received death threats and knew that they were under surveillance.\(^ {34}\) Hartley took his staff’s advice and arranged for Symon to have secure satellite communications.\(^ {35}\)

Logistics would be the major challenge. Mueller was not a member of the Strategic Command Group (SCG). Consequently, he was not privy to contingency planning. Unauthorised preparations had begun among a group of logisticians from each level of command.\(^ {36}\) From Canberra, Colonel Craig Boyd, Director Joint Logistic Operations and Plans, Brigadier Jeff Wilkinson’s erstwhile deputy during the first 12 months of Operation *Bel Isi*, kept Wilkinson informed and provided confidential guidance on prospects in East Timor.\(^ {37}\) For his part, Wilkinson and his two force support battalion (FSB) commanders, Lieutenant Colonels Barry McManus, 9 FSB, and Mick Kehoe, 10 FSB, had already studied options for supporting ADF and coalition operations in East Timor. Wilkinson’s Logistic Management Centre was managing a supply chain for Operation *Bel Isi*; so it would be a matter of increasing staff numbers and refining processes and procedures for East Timor. They had shared their findings with Lieutenant Colonel Don Cousins, Cosgrove’s senior logistic staff officer, who concurred that there would need to be a terminal in Darwin to receive supplies from around Australia, and possibly overseas, for onward movement to East Timor.
Logistics Unit—North (JLU—N) in Darwin, commanded by Mueller, did not have the capacity or capabilities to command terminal operations or to resupply a force deployed to East Timor. The other complicating factor was that Treloar controlled ADF joint movements in support of the force projection to East Timor, not Barrie and his headquarters, or Cosgrove and his headquarters. In addition, Bonser’s Headquarters Northern Command (HQ NORCOM) in Darwin was an obvious but unrehearsed headquarters for mounting base and terminal operations there.  

Within the context of Australian force projection, July was a paradoxical month. Foreign Minister Downer and the Defence Minister, John Moore, hinted publicly at Australia’s military intentions in East Timor. 1st Brigade in Darwin had been brought up to 28 days’ notice to move after Moore announced on 11 March 1999 that there was a need to be prepared for ‘contingencies that could arise in the region, including East Timor’. Barrie and his staff were involved in secret contingency planning at Australian Defence Headquarters (ADHQ). Elsewhere in the ADF, unauthorised planning had begun without strategic guidance. In a similar way to Operation Bel Isi, the strategic, operational and tactical levels of ADF command split into separate uncoordinated planning processes informed by the media; not by the chain of command or intelligence. The Sydney Morning Herald echoed widespread expectations that there would be a breakdown in law and order after the ballot result was announced in early September. It did not appear to be difficult for ordinary Australians to connect the new levels of ADF preparedness and the events in East Timor. Presumably this connection did not escape the Indonesian military and civil authorities who were orchestrating violent intimidation in East Timor. Consequently, Australia’s military preparedness to intervene and TNI’s intimidation to facilitate a ‘Yes’ vote were open secrets.

By early August 1999, reports by media and UNAMET representatives in East Timor warned an international audience of the strong likelihood of violence after the ballot result was announced in early September. Images and stories of violence had begun to arouse world public opinion in favour of international intervention. General Wiranto, Defence Minister and TNI Commander-in-Chief, soothed that the TNI and the Indonesian police would maintain law and order after the ballot. However, his forces on the ground allowed violence to occur unchecked in the weeks and days leading up to the ballot.

In secrecy, Brigadier Mark Evans, Commander 3rd Brigade, convened a meeting of his local commanders at his headquarters in Townsville on Sunday 22 August. He briefed them on what he knew of Operation Spitfire and discussed other scenarios. Kehoe attended, even though he worked for Brigadier Jeff Wilkinson, and was not one of Evans’ subordinate commanders. From that day on, with Wilkinson’s encouragement, he attended all of Evans’ conferences.
relating to East Timor and provided whatever assistance he could to contingency planning.

Barrie was maintaining close control of contingency planning in Canberra and forbade planning elsewhere. As was the case in 1966 for the deployment of a 4500-strong task force to Vietnam, the government was highly sensitive to leaks. Barrie was forced to tighten operational security. A high-level defence committee noted later that ‘planning at all levels had been inhibited by the compartmentalisation of information, implemented due to previous major security leaks. … At times lower headquarters felt that there was a lack of strategic guidance.’

This ‘lock down’ not only left Treloar and his staff waiting for strategic guidance and devolution of planning and decision-making from ADHQ, but also bypassed the Service chiefs. They complained later that they had not fulfilled the role of senior environmental advisors and that their input into the compartmented SCG had been ineffective. Treloar commented at the same meeting that compartmentalisation ‘introduced additional risk and costs’ and compromised operational security, as lower level commanders and staff guessed or acquired information from other sources. Interestingly, Barrie’s centralisation of both the strategic and operational planning for the projection to East Timor unintentionally emulated what the American Commander-in-Chief in the Pacific (CINCPAC) would have done from his headquarters in Hawaii if the Americans had been planning a similar operation. Barrie planned the East Timor campaign with his Head of Strategic Command Division, Major General Mick Keating, and his joint staff. He did not delegate this work to Treloar and his staff groups, who would have coordinated environmental staff effort. By early August, Cosgrove had become a member of the SCG top-secret compartment. Thus, Barrie and Cosgrove integrated the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command and became partners, in conjunction with Keating, in Australia’s most strategically significant force projection since 1942.

**Deployment**

Defence Minister John Moore ordered Barrie to pre-position forces in northern Australia for an evacuation operation (*Spitfire*) on 26 August 1999. Assigned Special Forces and other force elements had less than 12 hours’ warning to pack and move. Personnel were warned after arriving at work on the morning of 27 August and were packed, palletised and flying by mid-afternoon. A joint evacuation force assembled at Tindal airbase south of Darwin under Cosgrove’s command. It was a joint force comprised of army troops, supported by *Black Hawk* battlefield helicopters and several C-130 *Hercules* transport aircraft. Alongside in Darwin was HMAS *Jervis Bay*, the navy’s fast catamaran. From the perspective of generic and specific force preparation, Operation *Spitfire* was
mounted at extremely short notice but was an exemplar of what happens in practice when strategic stakes are high. Though there were many uncertainties ahead, the strategic level of command was engaged and ready to direct the tactical level of command. Barrie and his staff were in contact with Brigadier Jim Molan, the Australian Defence Attaché in Jakarta, who was already in Dili with a small staff group to facilitate cooperation with Indonesian security forces for an evacuation operation and to report back to Barrie on the evolving situation. Keating and Cosgrove monitored the situation closely. The ADF was ready. There was still some way to go, however, if it became necessary for a more substantial force projection to follow an evacuation operation.

By this time, Barrie had appointed Treloar as the ADF’s national commander to support operations in East Timor. On 30 August, Treloar appointed Wilkinson as his Logistic Component Commander (LOGCC). Wilkinson had already persuaded Hartley to send McManus and an advance party from 9 FSB to Darwin to receive and dispatch stocks to support a projection into East Timor. For the time being, McManus and his staff focused on supporting the burgeoning evacuation force. Wilkinson had also briefed him to plan to support a larger scale operation in the future. Wilkinson also alerted Hartley to the need to raise a Headquarters Force Logistic Support Group (HQ FLSG) to coordinate logistic support in East Timor, should the Indonesian Government invite a larger-scale international intervention. He also directed Kehoe to prepare for deployment to East Timor to set up a terminal in Dili for supplies that McManus and 9 FSB would be forwarding from Darwin, if a larger ADF force deployed into East Timor.

On 30 August 1999 the East Timorese voted. The large turnout was a strong indication that they had rejected autonomy. The withdrawal of international UN volunteers and international election observers began as soon as the ballot boxes were sealed and on their way to Dili. All but essential UN staff began to leave East Timor immediately. Only UN political staff, Military Liaison Officers and UN civilian police remained. Outbreaks of violence resulted in UNAMET staff from some areas withdrawing to Dili. Helicopters flew to outlying areas from Dili picking up staff who had witnessed the growing chaos. While the votes were being counted, East Timorese militia groups intimidated UNAMET and media representatives in Dili while they rampaged through the streets burning houses of suspected pro-independence supporters. From everywhere in East Timor came reports of Indonesian security personnel standing by while militia intimidated civilians, looted goods, and burned property. Indications of the mayhem that was about to engulf East Timor were evident as early as Thursday 2 September 1999, when widespread violence broke out in Maliana near the border with West Timor, forcing UNAMET to evacuate its staff urgently and inhabitants to flee. Militia groups and local Indonesian security forces
began to loot and burn the town. The United Nations released the ballot result on Saturday 4 September 1999. There was then a period of quiet before the storm. Many East Timorese seemed to know what would be in store. Within a few hours of the announcement, the sacking of East Timor and the terrorising and displacement of its people by marauding militia gangs and East Timorese territorial troops began in earnest.

Following historical precedent, it was the Australian Foreign Minister (Downer) and not the Defence Minister (Moore) who announced on Saturday 4 September 1999 that, in light of the growing violence, Australia would offer to lead an international military force into East Timor, if the Indonesian Government invited the United Nations to intervene. Some were surprised that this announcement triggered ‘detailed planning’ in the ADF rather than the unfolding events since May which should have signalled that Australia needed to be ready to lead any ‘coalition of the willing’ into East Timor. At about 10.00 p.m. on Sunday 5 September 1999, Cosgrove called Evans at home and requested him to convene his staff and develop a concept for operations for what by morning would be called Operation Warden. His staff at DJFHQ would then have time to review the concept on Monday 6 September before sending it to Treloar’s headquarters in Sydney. From there it would be forwarded to Canberra by 7 September for consideration by the SCG and the National Security Committee of Cabinet (NSCC). Evans called in his Brigade Major, Major Marcus Fielding, his senior logistician, Major David Stevens, and his Intelligence Officer, Major John Blaxland. They worked until 4.00 a.m. before dispatching a concept document to meet Cosgrove’s early morning deadline. On the same night and morning that Evans, Fielding, Stevens and Blaxland were developing the concept for Operation Warden, hundreds of East Timorese climbed the walls around the UNAMET compound in Dili and jumped in to save themselves or just their children from marauding militia. Many of them lacerated themselves and their children on razor wire. The UN Secretary General’s Special Representative in East Timor, Ian Martin, began to discuss an evacuation of remaining UNAMET staff.

The SCG compartment approved the Operation Warden concept on 7 September and briefed it to the NSCC. Later that same day, Habibie declared martial law in East Timor and issued an ultimatum to Wiranto to restore public safety. Barrie issued his warning order for Operation Warden the next day. Concurrency, the United States was exerting increasing pressure on Indonesia to quell violence and arson, but there was no intention of deploying US combat troops to East Timor. Australia would have to lead and support an international intervention alone. Though not specifically intended to do so, Operation Spitfire triggered preparations in 3rd Brigade, the only formation trained and capable of rapid deployment. Fortunately, Evans and his staff had been warned
informally in April about the likely scenario of having to provide either a protection force for the United Nations in East Timor, or forces to protect an evacuation. Planning for deployment to East Timor had been going on secretly for months. Unlike Operation *Morris Dance*, Operation *Solace* and Operation *Lagoon*, 3rd Brigade would have detailed maps, infrastructure information and recent intelligence estimates for a forthcoming operation.

Barrie now faced the challenge of conducting further evacuation operations in East Timor and preparing for Operation *Warden*. The evacuation force in Tindal, and at the airport and alongside at the port in Darwin, now exceeded 600 personnel from all three Services and involved ships and aircraft. Operation *Spitfire* had begun as a limited protected evacuation operation employing maritime and air force transport assets. It looked like merging into a larger-scale stabilisation operation. Molan and his staff in Dili were Barrie’s ‘eyes and ears’.

Local TNI commanders appeared to have lost control of their rank and file, who were joining East Timorese territorials and militia in looting and ransacking property, and also in terrorising the population, who had fled or were fleeing Dili. This was a volatile and dangerous environment that could lead to the strategic nightmare of an accidental clash between Australian and Indonesian troops. Barrie had warned members of the NSCC that intervention into East Timor under these risky circumstances could lead to war with Indonesia.

While Cosgrove and his headquarters staff would, by their professional inclination and experience, concentrate on projecting land forces into East Timor to stabilise the situation on the ground, there were ominous strategic developments at sea and in the air. Indonesian maritime and air force elements had begun to arrive, ostensibly to facilitate a withdrawal of TNI forces from East Timor. The New Zealand Centre for Strategic Studies reported later that the Indonesian Navy had deployed a T-209 submarine as part of a maritime task group to the waters off East Timor and that the Indonesian Air Force had deployed A-4 *Sky Hawk* and F-16 *Fighting Falcon* aircraft into West Timor.

Thus, Barrie had to deter Indonesian interference with an ADF evacuation operation and be ready for anything that might follow if interference occurred. He could do this from his headquarters through Bonser’s Headquarters Northern Command (HQ NORCOM) in Darwin to maritime and air force units deployed to northern Australia, or through his headquarters to Treloar who would direct maritime and air force elements deployed to northern Australia. David Horner later confirmed that Barrie decided to place F/A-18 fighters, F-111 strike aircraft, forward air control aircraft and aerial tankers on alert during the initial deployment. ... Similarly, warships with a high level of capability in anti-submarine warfare escorted the ships transporting the forces to East Timor. [these forces]
remained under the Commander Australian Theatre [Air Vice Marshal Treloar].

Fortunately for the ADF, probably the strongest deterrent to Indonesian interference was a blunt warning from the United States to Wiranto that law and order should be restored in East Timor as soon as possible.

Concurrently, the ADF had to execute Operation Spitfire and prepare for Operation Warden. In reality, the two operations were merging as phases of a single-force projection that Cosgrove and his staff had predicted earlier in the year. Operations would begin with a small Operation Spitfire force and be followed, given an Indonesian invitation and UN endorsement, by Evans’ 3rd Brigade and Cosgrove’s DJFHQ, augmented at short notice with ad hoc maritime and air force staff groups. For their part, the Indonesian Government, the TNI and their militia surrogates appeared to be executing a preconceived plan. The first phase appeared to be to drive out foreign witnesses to the punishment about to be meted out to the East Timorese for rejecting autonomy. The second phase appeared to be the destruction of infrastructure, looting and population displacement, disguised as an emergency evacuation plan. The final phase appeared to be to leave East Timor abruptly and invite the United Nations and the international community to take over the task. If this was the plan, no TNI opposition would be expected during an evacuation of foreign nationals, but there might be some resistance if international forces interrupted the second more destructive phase.

**Operation Spitfire**

After a close examination of political consequences and increasing pressure on beleaguered UNAMET staff at the UN compound in Dili, the United Nations sought Australian help to evacuate its remaining staff on 9 September 1999. The next day, Molan and Colonel Ken Brownrigg, the Australian Army attaché from Jakarta, met the first C-130 Hercules aircraft landing in Dili. Molan and Brownrigg found they had to work very hard to calm Indonesian air force special force troops at the airport. Australia and Indonesia had arrived at a tactical tipping point and the Indonesians cooperated. Fortunately, the ADF had the right people, at the right place and at the right time.

In the early hours of 14 September 1999, in a second evacuation, Martin and the remainder of his staff left East Timor. Soon after, Molan returned to Jakarta with his staff. Molan and Martin left liaison officers at the Australian Consulate building to maintain contact with Indonesian commanders and authorities, and to continue reporting to both Canberra and the United Nations in New York.
Meanwhile, Wiranto had appointed Major General Kiki Syahnakri, his Jakarta-based chief of operations, as the Chief of the Martial Law Authority in East Timor. His plan was to withdraw all locally posted TNI personnel, especially those of East Timorese ethnicity, and replace them with troops from Java. In the meantime, the terror campaign would continue for several days unchecked until there was a sufficient build-up of replacement units and misbehaving units had departed.85

The gathering of world leaders in Auckland on 11 September 1999 for the annual meeting of the Asia-Pacific Economic Community (APEC) became the focal point for putting international pressure on Indonesia to allow international intervention. On 12 September, Habibie announced that the Indonesian Government would accept international intervention into East Timor.86 The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 1264 on 15 September 1999 authorising what was to become INTERFET, to take all necessary actions to restore peace and security in East Timor.87 On 16 September, Indonesia cancelled its security agreement with Australia.88 The scene was set. Barrie, Keating, Treloar, Cosgrove, Evans and Wilkinson, and their respective headquarters and force elements, stood on the threshold. Barrie decided to take command himself.89

This operation will be Operation Stabilise and is to be commanded by Major General Cosgrove, under my command [author’s emphasis]. … Operation Stabilise and Warden together represent the most significant military commitment of the Australian Government, on behalf of the Australian people since World War II. Our logistic support must also be a world class performance.90

Deployment

Barrie had to synchronise forces from the three Services and their logistic capabilities for a common purpose. The first challenge would be to deploy Cosgrove’s land forces safely and efficiently. Treloar, who commanded the joint movements system through 1 JMOVGP, was responsible for the efficient execution of Cosgrove’s movement plan and any subsequent movements support he required from Australia. Bonser and his staff in Darwin had the Joint Movement Control Office—Darwin under operational control. Thus, he and Group Captain Ian Jamieson, commander of 1 JMOVGP in Sydney, were in charge of coordinating the movement of personnel and matériel staging through Darwin to East Timor, as well as from East Timor. Unlike field exercises conducted in northern Australia since the late 1980s, troops and supplies would have to deploy under operational conditions in a pre-planned tactical order of
arrival: this time logistic support would follow and not be pre-positioned for arriving troops.\textsuperscript{91}

Cosgrove envisaged a four-phase campaign in East Timor, with specific but limited military objectives. The first phase would be to negotiate with Syahnakri to establish optimum safe preconditions for lodgement. The second phase would be the rapid deployment of as many combat forces as strategic lift would permit. The third phase would be to establish a secure environment in Dili and then throughout East Timor. The final phase would be a transition of INTERFET to a UN peacekeeping operation.\textsuperscript{92}

Brownrigg, supported by his maritime and air force counterparts from the Australian Embassy in Jakarta, and Special Forces troops would constitute the first ADF elements on the ground. Brownrigg and his colleagues would reassure Syahnakri and his commanders that INTERFET was a neutral force, only intent on assisting with security while they withdrew miscreant TNI and auxiliary units from East Timor. Brownrigg facilitated a meeting between Cosgrove and Syahnakri at Dili airport on 19 September 1999. Both generals affirmed that they would take every precaution to ensure that those under their command would not be drawn into gun battles through a lack of discipline on either side or through manipulative provocation by third parties.\textsuperscript{93} Subsequently, Brownrigg and his colleagues maintained contact with senior TNI and navy and air force commanders after Cosgrove left. Phase 1 was a success.

On the night of 19 September 1999 Phase 2 was poised to begin. Cosgrove’s plan depended on the ADF movements system being able to deliver as many combat troops from 3rd Brigade as possible in the first 48 hours so as to create a deterrent effect on the ground in Dili. There would be risks. Cousins did not plan to have substantial reserves of bulky and heavy basic commodities, such as ammunition, rations and water, on hand. He took this risk in order to allow more troops and armoured vehicles to be deployed quickly. His arrangements depended on an efficient air bridge to and from Dili. There was little room for error. He specified logistic and movement arrangements by aircraft load for three weeks.

Group Captain Stewart Cameron controlled the transport aircraft that Cousins would depend on. He established 96 Combined Air Wing Group to coordinate air operations. The core of Cameron’s capacity was a force of 12 Australian C-130 \textit{Hercules} transport aircraft and 16 crews. For the air bridge, Canada, France, New Zealand, the Philippines, Britain, the United States and Thailand had provided or promised a further 16 C-130 \textit{Hercules} aircraft and 21 crews.\textsuperscript{94}

Seven C-130 \textit{Hercules} aircraft left Townsville for Dili in the early hours of 20 September. While they were inbound, a further five C-130 \textit{Hercules} aircraft flew from northern Australia carrying a vanguard of Special Forces troops and
their supplies of fuel and other necessities. They landed at Komoro Airfield ahead of the aircraft from Townsville. Brownrigg, dressed in summer dress uniform, beret and aiguillettes, met his compatriots as if they were arriving for a diplomatic visit: a ploy to ease tension. The TNI officer commanding Indonesian special force troops guarding the airport and his subordinate commanders were polite, cordial and cooperative.

The arrival of the first company from 2nd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (2 RAR), the INTERFET advanced force, was more risky because they ignored orders to leave the aircraft carrying their weapons in a non-threatening manner. The troops ran down the lowered ramp and, in the way that they had trained to do many times before, dispersed at the run, hit the ground and adopted a half moon formation with weapons pointing out—at the ready. Fortunately the benign arrival of the earlier C-130 Hercules aircraft and subsequent friendliness had diffused Indonesian suspicion at the airport. However, the environment in the remainder of Dili was hostile. TNI and East Timorese territorials, accompanied by militia sporting red and white bandannas and brandishing weapons, and driving past in trucks, harassed the 2 RAR company assigned to secure the port. The provocateurs yelled out death threats, made cut-throat gestures with their hands and occasionally fired weapons into the air. Initially this was unsettling for the Australians who instinctively readied their weapons for return fire, but they soon assessed that they were not being attacked. They were being tested by undisciplined individuals, who displayed more menacing bravado than bravery.

At sea, Indonesian Navy vessels provoked Australian Navy vessels. Smaller Indonesian craft sailed on collision courses, changing course at the last moment. Larger ships were sailing across the bows of Australian vessels to force them to slow down or to change course. Indonesian captains did not respond to radio calls from Australian commanders. These provocations continued all day and into the night. Like their compatriots in Dili, all the Australian maritime commanders could do was maintain disciplined vigilance and not be drawn into an incident that might provoke an escalation of hostilities.

Unfortunately, the air bridge from Darwin to Dili encountered difficulties after the first aircraft had discharged their loads in Dili and returned to Darwin to load more cargo for the flight back. Unbeknown to Cosgrove, Evans or Cousins and their staffs, there were competing priorities for C-130 Hercules aircraft. They assumed that no one else would use C-130 Hercules aircraft flights into Dili until 2 RAR, Cosgrove’s and Evans’ tactical headquarters, vehicles and initial supplies of ammunition, rations and water were on the ground. Risks would increase substantially if there was a time gap between the arrival of troops and their initial supplies. Cousins and his staff had planned each aircraft load meticulously and the order of arrival of tactical and logistics elements into East Timor with
3rd Brigade staff. Evans had directed that all elements would pack ‘light’ and take a ‘Spartan’ approach, in accordance with Cosgrove’s direction to put as many combat troops on the ground as soon as possible. He planned to insert a 600-strong force from 2 RAR quickly with a minimum of vehicles and supplies. They would carry their water, ammunition and rations on their backs and would wait 24 hours for resupply and more vehicles. Commercial shipping would only operate in a secure environment, so the sea bridge for lodgement would depend on securing Dili quickly and the HMAS *Jervis Bay*, HMAS *Success* and HMAS *Tobruk* shuttling to and from Darwin and Dili on schedule, with other navy vessels positioned offshore holding contingency stocks on board for emergencies.

Even with operational imperatives and 24-hour operations, Komoro Airfield could only handle a finite number of landings and take-offs. Every aircraft load was either contributing to or detracting from Cosgrove’s plan and overall force protection. Cousins’ movement schedule fell apart by early afternoon on 20 September 1999. After the first sorties that had brought the Special Forces contingent and the first two companies of 2 RAR, the remainder of 2 RAR with vehicles and supplies, including an aircraft bringing bottled water, were delayed while unplanned sorties of media contingents, air force personnel, equipment and supplies, and UNAMET personnel and vehicles were flown in. Consequently, vehicles that Cousins had instructed be brigaded in Dili to distribute water did not turn up. Medical personnel and supplies were delayed at a time when no one knew whether or not there would be casualties. Evans and Cousins at Dili airport watched in dismay as aircraft arrived and did not discharge their expected loads. There was unruly behaviour at Darwin airport as members of 3rd Brigade, who desperately wanted to join their comrades in Dili, were left waiting while they watched journalists, air force staff and supplies as well as UN personnel load and depart ahead of them. They subjected some movements staff to verbal tirades and threatening behaviour.

Confusion and frustration in Darwin increased risk, but did not endanger the initial 24 hours of the lodgement. Australian Special Forces provided force protection with specialist assets. They commandeered scores of abandoned UNAMET vehicles for transport. Thus, sufficient troops were on the ground for high priority tasks. Australian, US and other coalition vessels patrolled offshore near Dili harbour to deter interference. The unplanned use of aircraft forced Cousins to use all of his contingency stocks of water immediately, ordering bottled water to be brought ashore from HMAS *Success*. Later in the afternoon and evening, Company Quartermaster Sergeants from 2 RAR commandeered stocks of bottled water from the airport that had been flown in to build up stock holdings for the air force.
The logistic crisis eased when 3rd Battalion, the Royal Australian Regiment (3 RAR) and a squadron of Australian light armoured vehicles (ASLAVs) and Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) arrived aboard HMAS *Jervis Bay* and HMAS *Tobruk* on the morning of 21 September 1999. Once they were aware of 2 RAR’s predicament, the arriving paratroopers carried off cartons of bottled water from HMAS *Jervis Bay* and placed them on vehicles at the wharf for their comrades before continuing on to their first objectives in the city. The lodgement was working and 3rd Brigade secured the initial objectives as planned. However, the danger of an accidental clash between Australian and Indonesian forces had not passed. Evans and his two-battalion brigade of about 1500 troops, with limited supplies of water and ammunition on hand, was outnumbered by nearly 15,000 Indonesian troops in Dili, who presumably had plenty of ammunition and other supplies in their barracks.

Overnight on 20 September 1999, the Australians observed new plumes of smoke rise as arsonists lit more fires in the suburbs and in government buildings. They heard the sounds of gunfire as well as explosions of accelerants used to start new fires. Long convoys of TNI soldiers, crammed into trucks with their personal belongings and loot, rolled through the streets, heading towards West Timor. At any time, a truck load of soldiers and militia would drive past groups of INTERFET troops on sentry duty and patrol, shouting and gesturing malevolently.

By the afternoon of 21 September 1999, INTERFET had made its presence felt throughout Dili. Soldiers were patrolling and clearing houses and buildings in which militia were thought to be hiding. There were a number of incidents that could have resulted in a clash between Indonesian and Australian troops. At midday, a group of 300 TNI Marines threatened and tried to intimidate a patrol from 3 RAR. Earlier, a 3 RAR patrol had raised and aimed their weapons at a truckload of TNI personnel, who had raised and aimed their weapons at them. The discipline of Australian troops was commendable, considering that many had only received their training in the Rules of Engagement (ROE) whilst in transit to East Timor, or waiting in Darwin and Townsville for deployment:

Concerned about the mayhem the night before and mindful of the INTERFET mandate to create a secure environment, Evans decided to restrict the movement of trucks of provocateurs and arsonists on the night of 21 September by ordering 2 RAR to set up vehicle check points (VCP) along the main road through Dili. He was setting the conditions for confrontation. Lieutenant Colonel Mick Slater ordered Major Jim Bryant to set up three VCP, several hundred metres apart on the main east-west road through Dili. Slater’s intent was to prevent anyone using side streets from passing a single VCP sited on this main route. He was setting a VCP snare to entrap truckloads of arsonists moving at night. Slater ordered
Bryant to stop anyone who was armed, but not in uniform. If they did not have suitable military identification, then they were to be detained for further questioning. Slater allocated six ASLA Vs to form two-vehicle herringbone obstacles at each checkpoint that would force vehicles to slow down and zigzag between the vehicles to get through. Truck drivers would not argue with a .50 calibre machine-gun mounted atop an armoured vehicle. Slater strengthened his VCP by reinforcing Bryant’s company with his Assault Pioneer Platoon and six pairs of snipers. Bryant allocated an Assault Pioneer section and two pairs of snipers to each of his three rifle platoons.\textsuperscript{114}

At around 10.00 p.m., a 600-strong East Timorese territorial battalion, accompanied by TNI personnel, and travelling in a convoy of about 60 trucks, crammed with soldiers, family members and loot, drove into Dili from Baucau. They had murdered, burned and pillaged their way west and were heading directly for Slater’s checkpoints.\textsuperscript{115} Indonesia and Australia were now approaching another tactical tipping point that could have substantial strategic implications in general, and for the INTERFET campaign in particular. Unfortunately, Slater’s VCP operation and Syahnakri’s withdrawal operation had not been fully explained at the daily coordination conference at HQ INTERFET. Evans and his staff, and Slater and his staff, were not told of the movement of this battalion either by Syahnakri’s staff or by Australian intelligence.\textsuperscript{116} The Australians manning checkpoints were unaware that it was in everyone’s interest to let this convoy proceed. In the vanguard of this battalion were about 40 outriders on motorbikes. These men wore an assortment of bandannas, T-shirts, singlets and camouflage trousers. Each had a rifle slung over his back.\textsuperscript{117} These were the types of people Slater had directed Bryant’s men to stop and detain.

Lieutenant Steve Casey’s platoon, positioned at the eastern VCP, was the first to encounter these East Timorese outriders. Casey’s interpreter, Lieutenant Grant Chisnell, spoke with the leader of the outriders in Bahasa, asking him for his identification and informing him that the Australians had orders to detain any armed persons not in uniform and who did not have suitable TNI identification.\textsuperscript{118} While he spoke, the outriders revved their engines and looked on with menace. The leader demanded to be let through immediately. Behind the motorcyclists, trucks began to slow down and stop. Soldiers from the rear trucks began to dismount and move forward, calling out for information on why the convoy was held up. Seconds ticked by—and the tension mounted.

As the leader of the outriders and Chisnell continued to negotiate, the remainder of Casey’s platoon and the Assault Pioneers positioned themselves. They were outnumbered and out-gunned. Chisnell and the leader of the outriders raised their voices in argument. Most of the Australians wore night-vision goggles, and all were in flak jackets. They had clear vision of the area. The
territorials in the trucks overlooking the scene were in the dark and assumed they could not be seen. They raised their weapons and pointed them at Casey and Chisnell.119

The Australian infantrymen held their weapons down at their sides, but pointed their muzzles up at those in trucks who had raised their weapons. They were preparing to fire. Their laser designators formed bright green spots on the chests and heads of the unknowing territorial soldiers. In a split second, a volley of 5.56 mm rounds would follow the laser beams if they showed that they were about to take a sight picture and pull their triggers. The Australian cavalrmy men also trained their .50 calibre machine-guns on the line of trucks. Undetected, on top of a bus shelter, the snipers could also see at night through their scopes.120

Casey’s signaller described the scene over his radio to Bryant, stationed at the next checkpoint, who now had an important decision to make. Would he let the motorbikes and trucks through, or tell Casey to insist on them being pulled over and screened in the search area? Realising that the situation could escalate into a very dangerous standoff or gun battle, Bryant decided to let the convoy through to his VCP, so he could assess the situation personally.121 This would diffuse the situation at Casey’s location, but also give him time to seek guidance from Slater. While Bryant contacted Slater, the motorbikes and trucks zigzagged past the two ASLAVs and drove on.

A second confrontation quickly ensued. This time the outriders were more aggressive and those in the trucks behind them became more resentful at being stopped a second time. In the face of raised voices and raised weapons, Lieutenant Peter Halleday’s platoon, the attached Assault Pioneers and the snipers repeated what had occurred at Casey’s checkpoint. While laser beams again lit up the territorials, Bryant received word that he was to let the battalion through without further delay.122 Apparently, Slater had consulted Evans, who assessed the danger immediately, and directed that the territorials should not be delayed any further.123 Calling out abusively and brandishing their weapons, they drove out of Dili and on to West Timor—a clash with Australian troops having been narrowly avoided.

There were several more provocations from truckloads of TNI soldiers, territorials and militia overnight on 21 September 1999. The Australians maintained their discipline and vigilance. In many cases, their ROE would have permitted them to open fire when weapons were pointed at them, and to have ‘mock fired’, like in a children’s game of ‘cowboys and Indians’. It was a dangerous and potentially fatal game. The sounds of a firefight in the dark, that would have soon involved light armoured vehicles, could have escalated as TNI troops spilled out from their barracks, firing at any INTERFET personnel they encountered. Fortunately, there was no firefight and the vast majority of TNI
soldiers remained in their barracks or continued moving peaceably to the port for embarkation.

On 27 September 1999, Syahnakri handed over responsibility for the security of East Timor to Cosgrove, leaving only a token TNI presence in Dili. Syahnakri had made the transition work. He had reduced an estimated 15,000-strong security force to a Dili garrison of about 1300 troops. The militia and their controllers were gone. INTERFET had achieved most of its mission in seven days. This first week set the scene for the rest of the campaign. Dili, the political and spiritual centre of East Timor, was secure. UNAMET staff had returned. UN aid agencies, such as the World Food Program and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aid, had begun facilitating the delivery of humanitarian aid. During this time, a coalition of nations apparently liked what they saw. They confirmed promises of support and began sending contingents of troops. However, several did so in expectation of receiving ADF logistic support. Brigadier Jeff Wilkinson’s ad hoc supply chain had sustained the 3rd Brigade group during the first critical days of the campaign in Dili near a port and an airfield. Australian military logistics now had to be at force level. Thousands of coalition troops were inbound and 3rd Brigade would need to be supported on the border.

**Force Sustainment**

The lodgement of sufficient vehicles and stocks to sustain arriving INTERFET forces was delayed for several days and, in some cases, over a week, because of the collapse of movement coordination in Darwin under the weight of competing priorities. There was just not enough transport, movements staff or handling capabilities at Darwin airport or its port to push through the volume of personnel, vehicles, equipment and supplies required. However, Cousins’ priority on water, food, fuel and ammunition paid off. Cosgrove and Evans were able to prosecute the campaign in the first seven days without significant logistic limitations. A combination of stocks afloat on navy vessels in Dili harbour, the maritime shuttle of supplies and vehicles on HMAS Jervis Bay, HMAS Tobruk and HMAS Success, and the flexibility to load urgently needed items on aircraft flying around the clock from Darwin, assured supply of the basics of water, food, fuel and ammunition.\(^{124}\)

Wilkinson and his staff had foreseen the coming requirements to support a force that would climb to over 10,000 personnel, about 50 rotary-wing and fixed-wing aircraft and a fleet of over 1200 vehicles. Their challenge, since beginning planning for Operation Warden on the weekend of 8–9 September 1999, had been to mobilise a logistic system, that had been pared back over the previous decade, in just two weeks. Commercial operators had replaced many logistic functions and none would be venturing into danger until INTERFET had secured East Timor. There was also some high-level resistance among senior
ADF officers to using contractors in East Timor. Specialist services, such as movements, stevedoring, water transport, petroleum operations and postal and amenities services, had been cut or no longer existed. There was no deployable logistic force headquarters. Logisticians in Canberra, Brisbane and Sydney had been decimated as a result of the Force Structure Review, Commercial Support Program and the logistic redevelopment projects of the early 1990s. There were also deficiencies in the military logistic infrastructure in Darwin. Joint Logistic Unit—North was structured to support local military units and field exercises. There was no surge capacity to support offshore operations. There was little stock on depot shelves anywhere in Australia in many classes of supply, because ADF force sustainment was based on purchasing items commercially and distributing them to units ‘just in time’.

Planning conducted at Headquarters Logistic Support Force (HQ LSF) in Randwick in early September had marked an important logistic milestone during the transition from Operation Spitfire to Operation Warden and then to the multinational Operation Stabilise. For the first time, a formation headquarters that commanded logistic units and was used to solving practical logistic problems, was making plans, taking action and warning units for deployment. Wilkinson and his staff had simultaneous responsibilities to expedite logistic preparations for lodgement of the 3rd Brigade group, as well as to build a supply chain to sustain the main force of international units that were due to arrive in the following weeks. He found staff at short notice to enable HQ LSF and DJFHQ to meet the planning challenge and to establish an INTERFET HQ FLSG. Once word was out among serving and retired logisticians, many offered to help and volunteered to serve in East Timor.

As soon as Habibie announced on 12 September that the Indonesian Government would accept the deployment of an international force into East Timor, Wilkinson ordered a large-scale move of vehicles, equipment and stocks to northern Australia. When Barrie issued his executive order on 14 September 1999 for Operation Warden, additional stocks of basic items, such as jerry cans, rations and ammunition were already arriving in Darwin, and more convoys were on their way. Purchasing action had begun for repair parts and essential items that had long lead times. Staff at 1 JMOVGP had begun to charter shipping and to contract commercial road and air transport. For the first time since Australian troops had deployed to the Kokoda Track in 1942, Australian military logisticians were being asked to sustain a major Australian offshore operation by drawing on Australia’s military and commercial supply and transport systems.

Wilkinson built the supply chain for INTERFET using his two force support battalions and the newly-raised 60-strong HQ FLSG. The plan was for stocks to be sent to Darwin from the Defence National Supply and Distribution Centre.
(DNSDC) at Moorebank in Sydney and other regional base logistic units around Australia. McManus would then arrange for storage and subsequent movement of consignments to East Timor to meet INTERFET needs, using air and sea bridges comprised of ADF, international and Australian commercial assets. Kehoe would receive stocks in Dili at the port and Komoro Airport, and then distribute them to INTERFET units. Thus, the logistic concept was to send as much stock to Darwin as possible and then regulate its flow into East Timor from Darwin. To do otherwise would result in stocks arriving in Dili in bulk without adequate facilities or assets to transport, secure, store or distribute them—a replication of Operation Hardihood in Vietnam in 1966.

Colonel Grant Cavenagh, Commander of FLSG in Dili, wrote to Wilkinson on 21 October informing him that there were several ‘significant factors that continue to complicate logistic operations in EM [East Timor]’. The strategic level of command in general, and HQ AST in particular, had failed to sign up arriving coalition contingents to implementing agreements for logistic support and to anticipate their logistic support needs. Most contingents arrived needing assistance in unloading and immediate resupply, as well as in catering and transport support.

By late October, after six weeks of arduous operations, there were expectations in Australia and East Timor that it was time to establish more comfortable living conditions for units on the border and elsewhere. By this time, 22 kitchens were offering fresh meals, but many personnel still slept on the ground and there were insufficient tents to accommodate them. There were no laundry facilities and soldiers washed their uniforms in empty ration tins. Since early October, Cousins and his staff had been pressing for camp and accommodation stores to be pre-positioned in Darwin. Mueller’s staff was having difficulty responding to these requests amidst their competing priorities.

The ADF supply chain to East Timor was jamming up and difficult to manage. It was unable to improve simultaneously the living conditions of INTERFET troops in the field, satisfy demands for water, food, fuel, spare parts and other items, keep construction stores flowing to the engineers and build up stocks before the coming wet season. The pressure on the logistic system supporting Operation Stabilise did not go unnoticed. Hartley visited East Timor on 4 and 5 November 1999. He spoke with commanders and staff and, upon his return to Australia, distributed a highly critical assessment to Treloar and Mueller. Hartley ascertained that, despite appointing Wilkinson as logistics component commander at HQ AST, there was a need for an over-arching logistic coordination agency. What he failed to mention was that Wilkinson in Australia and Cavenagh in Dili had not been given operational control over maritime or air force logistic units and assets, or over the joint movements system. He also commented that little effort had been made to forecast major logistic and
engineering requirements. Compounding these two major weaknesses, Hartley assessed that there were signs of an imminent logistic disaster, especially with the wet season only weeks away. He pointed to the backlog of unsatisfied demands for resupply, a lack of visibility of items within the movements system, a deficit of logistic and engineer assets in East Timor, and insufficient shipping.\textsuperscript{138} His report also contained examples of commanders taking into their own hands the resupply of spare parts to keep their vehicles and equipment going and of them commandeering camp stores from depots to improve the living conditions of their troops.\textsuperscript{139}

Hartley’s report produced a number of strong reactions. Treloar sought an explanation from Wilkinson.\textsuperscript{140} Hartley had brought to the surface the gap between customer expectations and what the supply chain was delivering. This distraction from the task of solving the problem caused uproar amongst logistic commanders and staff supporting Operation \textit{Stabilise}. They felt that their efforts were being criticised at a time when they could do no more to satisfy Cosgrove’s priorities.\textsuperscript{141}

Throughout November 1999, logisticians at all levels worked long hours to reduce the backlog of supplies, to build stocks before the wet season set in and to push through camp stores and other amenities to improve the living conditions of those in the field. For example, 2 RAR received a full complement of stretchers, tents, camp stores, such as chairs and tables, and duckboards by 12 November, eight weeks after they had landed in Dili.\textsuperscript{142} The week before, backlogs in demands for spare parts and other critical items had been overcome. Mail was regular. A canteen service and showers were available every day in Balibo and Maliana, the two major Australian bases on the border.\textsuperscript{143} The Joint Amenities Unit, operating in Dili provided stock for canteens at all the major bases, a duty-free service for returning troops, an Interflora service and video hire. Local labour had been hired in most locations to launder clothes, and to clean kitchens, toilets, accommodation and working areas. All kitchens produced high-quality food and were supported by an efficient fresh-food resupply system.\textsuperscript{144} By 15 December 1999, Mueller and Support Command had taken over logistic responsibilities for Operation \textit{Stabilise} and a more conventional logistic system replaced Wilkinson’s interim arrangements. Though there were still nine weeks to go before INTERFET would be relieved by UN forces on 23 February 2000, the mission had been accomplished by mid-December. Indeed, INTERFET had been a garrison force since mid-October. Based on its outcomes, the intervention was an outstanding success. Based on its processes, there was much for the ADF to reflect on.
ENDNOTES

1. A ‘first line’ of ammunition was limited to the amount of ammunition ordered to be carried by each individual and vehicle. The amount of ammunition is limited by the capacity of individuals to carry ammunition as well as other commodities such as water. Australian armoured vehicles not only carry their own ammunition, but may also carry quantities of small arms ammunition for combat troops. A second line of ammunition is normally located with a sub-unit headquarters.


10. This process had been reviewed and made more efficient, but secrecy isolated this refined strategic planning process from lower levels of command. Commodore Jim S. O’Hara, Air Commodore Angus G. Houston and Brigadier Brian G. Stevens, ‘Report of Review of the Strategic/Operational Relationship’, 14 October 1998, HQAST 623-11-1, HQ AST, Potts Point.


16. The author has used the acronym TNI (Tentara Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian Army). This title applied after 1 April 1999. Before then, the Indonesian armed forces incorporated the policing function, and were known as ABRI (Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia or Indonesian Armed Forces).

17. Harold Crouch assessed that, ‘An overwhelming majority of army officers had served in East Timor at one time or another and some had served three or four tours of duty there. Many officers also felt a deep emotional attachment to East Timor as the place where several thousand Indonesian soldiers had died’. Harold Crouch, ‘The TNI and East-Timor Policy’, in (eds) James J. Fox and Dionisio Babo Soares, Out of the Ashes: Destruction and Reconstruction of East Timor, C. Hurst and Co., London, 2000, p. 138.


19. On 5 April 1999 there was an attack on civilians sheltering in a priest’s house in Liquica and, on the weekend 17–18 April, militia gangs killed and injured a number of civilians in Dili. See Lindsay Murdoch and Peter Coleman-Adams, ‘Freedom Slaughtered, Howard outrage as military shoot down peace process’, Sydney Morning Herald, pp. 1 and 9; Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Revealed: Our Timor role’, Sydney Morning
Struggling for Self Reliance


27 Cosgrove in interview with author, 3 January 2000.

28 Cosgrove in interview with author, 3 January 2000.

29 Admiral Chris A. Barrie in interview with author, 6 September 2005.

30 Symon, ‘OP Faber, Australian Service Contingent I Sitreps and Orders June—October 1999’.

31 The author attended these meetings and was present at weekly briefings at Land Headquarters and daily video-conferences between HQ AST and each environmental headquarters.

32 Cosgrove in interview with author, 3 January 2000.

33 Operation Faber covered ADF participation in UNAMET.

34 Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Symon in interview with author, 21 August 2000.

35 The author had personal involvement in this decision. He also had discussions with Colonel Stephen J. Dunn, Colonel (Operations) Land Headquarters and Lieutenant Colonel Mark Hoare, SO1 Intelligence, LHQ, at the time.


37 Colonel Craig W. Boyd in discussions with author at the time and subsequently. Also Colonel Craig W. Boyd, ‘OP Warden: Draft Concept of Logistic Support’, Version 3, 11 September 1999. ‘This concept has no official status. It was developed by DJLOP [Boyd] from earlier planning with input from HQAST, LHQ [Land Headquarters] and LSF.’

38 _terminal operations_: Activities related to receiving, unloading, storing, preparing and then loading and dispatching _matériel_ to an area of operations (AO). These activities can involve sea, land and air transport.

39 Robert Garran, ‘Troops on Timor alert, Military numbers doubled in readiness for urgent move’, _The Australian_, 7 July 1999, pp. 1 and 7. The front page of _The Australian_ contained a photograph of HMAS Jervis Bay, a large, fast catamaran alongside in Darwin. This vessel had been leased by Defence in April
1999 and was able to accommodate 500 personnel comfortably, a further 300, less comfortably, or a mix of personnel, vehicles and supplies (See David Horner, *The Making of the Australian Defence Force*, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume V, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 2001, pp. 11–12) The accompanying article contained information on the state of readiness of the ADF to deploy to East Timor.


41 Lindsay Murdoch, ‘Fears of after-vote bloodbath increase’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 10 July 1999, p. 4.


43 Barrie in interview with author, 6 September 2005.

44 Classified source.

45 Classified source.

46 Classified source.

47 Cosgrove in interview with author, 10 September 2000.

48 Brigadier Steve H. Ayling, Discussions with author in May 2000. Ayling was appointed Director General INTERFET in September 1999. He was privy to strategic level planning and orders for Operation *Spitfire* in August 1999.


53 Barrie in interview with author, 6 September 2005.


55 The author was privy to these arrangements at the time.


66 Brigadier Mark Evans in interview with author, 6 February 2000.


69 Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom*, p. 239.

70 ADHQ, CDF WNGO [Warning Order], 13/99 OP Warden, SIC 14X, 100830ZSEP99. Copy held by author.

71 Classified source, Defence Archives, Queanbeyan.


73 The author met with Evans and his subordinate commanders and headquarters staff in April and briefed them based on UN planning documents that he had been received from Australian staff at the United Nations in New York and his assessment of the course of events in East Timor.

74 Barrie in interview with author, 6 September 2005.

75 Brownrigg, Comments by email on draft chapter on Operation *Spitfire* in Bob Breen, *Mission Accomplished, Australian Defence Force participation in International Force East Timor*.

76 Barrie in interview with author, 6 September 2005.


81 There were reports that the Indonesian Cabinet was split between a liberal elite that had gained influence after the demise of the Suharto regime in 1998 and ‘old-guard nationalists’. The nationalists probably supported the razing of East Timor and the displacement of thousands of East Timorese population and at least condoned the actions of TNI. See Don Greenlees, ‘Rogue element’, *Weekend Australian*, 11–12 September 1999, p. 29. John Martinkus in *A Dirty Little War*, Random House, Sydney, 2001 claims to have discovered a copy of the TNI plan two months before its execution. See also Hamish McDonald, ‘Australia’s bloody East Timor secret, spy intercepts confirm Government knew of Jakarta’s hand in massacres’, *Sydney Morning Herald*, 14 March 2002. McDonald quotes from material from radio intercepts from the Defence Signals Directorate (alleged to have been leaked to him by Defence officials) that point to a TNI plan to drive East Timorese out of the territory and lay waste to its infrastructure. See also Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance: The Inside Story of East Timor’s Fight for Freedom*, chapter 11.

82 Martin, *Self Determination in East Timor, The United Nations, the Ballot and International Intervention*, p. 94.


84 Martin, *Self Determination in East Timor, The United Nations, the Ballot and International Intervention*, p. 100.

85 Brownrigg, Notes on draft. See also Greenlees and Garran, *Deliverance*, pp. 228–29.


Cosgrove in interview with author, 3 January 2000.

Brownrigg, Comments by email on draft chapter on Operation Spitfire in Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished, Australian Defence Force participation in International Force East Timor.


Major Jim L. Bryant in interview with author, 23 December 1999. Bryant commanded this company.

Bryant in interview with author, 23 December 1999.

Commander Daryl W. Bates in interview with author, 18 February 2000. Bates was Chief of Staff, Maritime Component at HQ INTERFET.

Evans in interview with author, 6 February 2000; and Lieutenant Colonel Don Cousins in interview with author, 23 February 2000.

Evans in interview with author, 6 February 2000. After the first 12 sorties had come and gone on the morning of 20 September 1999, there was only capacity for 13 more sorties that day. A total of 25 C–130 Hercules sorties flew in and out of Dili on 20 September. Details of these were in a table provided by Group Captain Stewart R. Cameron during his interview with author on 20 February 2000. Copy held by author.

Commodore B.D. Robertson in interview with author, 18 February 2000. Robertson was Maritime Component Commander HQ INTERFET from December 1999 until 23 February 2000 after Commodore J. Stapleton.

Cousins in interview with author, 23 February 2000.

Evans in interview with author, 6 February 2000; and Cousins in interview with author, 23 February 2000.

Captain Lawrence T. Sargeant in interview with author, 21 December 1999. Sargeant was a nursing officer waiting at Darwin Airport on 20 September. He recalled incidents of booing, jeering and shouting.

Captain Kate L. Saunders in interview with author, 7 February 2000. Saunders worked at Joint Movement Control Office—Darwin during the initial deployment of INTERFET and was subjected to several tirades.

Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000.

Warrant Officer Class One, Peter F. Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000. Mele was Regimental Quarter Master Sergeant, 2 RAR.

Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000.


Stockings, Paratroopers as Peacekeepers, 3rd Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, East Timor 1999–2000, p. 20. Lieutenant Colonel Nick W. Welch, notes on draft chapter of Bob Breen, Mission Accomplished, Australian Defence Force participation in International Force East Timor, May 2000. Copy held by author. Welch was Commander Officer of 3 RAR. Also Lieutenant Colonel Mick D. Slater in interview with author, 9 January 2000. Slater was Commanding Officer of 2 RAR.

Evans in interview with author, 6 February 2000.

Slater in interview with author, 9 January 2000; and Bryant in interview with author, 23 December 1999.

McDonald, Ball, Dunn, van Klinken, Bourchier, Kammen, and Tanter, Masters of Terror Indonesia’s Military and Violence in East Timor in 1999. The activities of 745th Territorial Battalion are covered in this publication. See also Cameron Barr, ‘A brutal exit’, Christian Science Monitor, 13 March 2000.


Contrary to Major General Mueller’s ‘concept of civilianising logistic support wherever possible’, ‘there are some senior Army officers who refuse to entertain any notion of allowing contractors to totally control the log support of certain items into EM [East Timor], eg fresh food. The rationale is that it is a war zone’. Lieutenant Commander R. Van Geelen, ‘Future Force Spt in Darwin—Op Warden’, Minutes of a meeting convened by Brigadier Jeff B. Wilkinson, LOGCC, 3 October 1999. Copy held by author.


Lieutenant Colonel Alan A. Murray, ‘From SCA LO—Arrangements in Darwin’, email to Commander M. McKeith, Headquarters Support Command—Australia, 26 September 1999. Murray was a liaison officer from SCA located with HQ LSF. In this e-mail, he describes his efforts to have interim logistic support arrangements continue for several more weeks because JLU (N) ‘was flat out supporting normal dependency [local Darwin-based ADF units] and that SCA was not easily able to reinforce JLU (N)’. Copy held by author.

Murray, ‘From SCA LO—Arrangements in Darwin’, email to McKeith, 26 September 1999.

Wilkinson in interview with author, 6 May 2005.

Wilkinson, ‘Brief to SCA (A) Conference’.


Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000.

Cousins in interview with author, 23 February 2000.


Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000.

Mele in interview with author, 9 January 2000.

Cousins in interview with author, 23 February 2000.