2. Post-Cold War Intrusions into Japanese Waters

Chinese intrusions into Japan’s claimed exclusive economic zone (EEZ), hitherto sporadic, increased rapidly after 1996, when Japan expanded its claims to include the disputed Senkaku Islands (called Diaoyu in Chinese) and other islands in the East China Sea, thus overlapping similar Chinese claims, as well as Okinotorishima in the Philippine Sea, midway between Taiwan and Guam. Moreover, in addition to numerous deployments of ‘oceanographic research’ and signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection ships, the intrusions have increasingly involved warships, including submarines, sometimes acting aggressively.

Chinese marine research vessels operated actively in Japan’s EEZ 16 times in 1998, 30 times in 1999 and 24 times in 2000. For example, the Dongdiao (V 232) oceanographic research/intelligence collection vessel was observed ‘collecting electronic information off the coast of Japan’ in February 2000. In May 2000, the Yanbing (No. 723) AGI (Auxiliary General Intelligence), in an unprecedented move, passed through Japan’s two most important straits, the Tsugaru Strait between Honshu and Hokkaido and the Tsushima Strait off Kyushu. (The vessel did not violate Japanese territorial waters in passing through the straits.) In August 2000, a Chinese spy ship ‘equipped with sophisticated electronic monitoring devices’ penetrated inside Japan’s 12-nautical-mile limit during a Chinese navy war game. In January 2003 a Ming-class diesel submarine was ‘detected inside Japan’s waters’ off the southern tip of Kyushu; it was reportedly ‘collecting electronic intelligence and other oceanographic data’. Another Ming-class submarine was observed in the Osumi Strait, about 40 kilometres south of Kyushu, on 12 November 2003.

7 Bussert, ‘Oil May be Focal Point of Sino-Japanese Dispute’, at www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anmviewer.asp?a=1216
8 Iris Trang, ‘China’s Navy Floats a Warning to Taiwan’, Asia Times Online, 25 November 2003, at atimes.com/atimes/China/EK25Ad01.html
Vociferous Japanese complaints to Beijing saw the rate of Chinese intrusions slow in 2001–03. The intrusions accelerated at the beginning of 2004, however, with 25 Chinese survey ships entering Japan’s claimed EEZ during the first seven months of the year, a fourfold increase over 2003. In July 2004, for example, a Yenlai-class marine survey ship and a Yanha-class AGI operated in Japan’s EEZ. Much of the increased activity concerned the area around Okinotori Island, which accounted for 12 incursions in 2004. It was speculated that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) navy was ‘surveying the seabed to support future PLAN submarine operations and preventing the U.S. Navy from coming to the defense of Taiwan’. In December 2004, a Chinese ship was found ‘using sonar, apparently to map the sea floor for Chinese submarine activities’. In May 2005, Tokyo decided to install a surveillance radar on Okinotorishima to detect intruding vessels.

In November 2004, Japanese Maritime Self–Defense Force (JMSDF) patrol aircraft near the Sakishima Islands detected a Han-class nuclear attack submarine (No. 405) underwater and tracked it for three days, including whilst it sailed submerged between Ishigaki and Miyako islands, at the southern end of the Ryukyu island chain. In September 2005, a PLA navy five-ship surface action group, including a Sovremenny-class destroyer, two frigates, a replenishment ship, and the upgraded Dongdiao SIGINT/space event support ship (with its pennant number changed from 232 to 851), cruised near Okinotorishima. In July 2006, the Dong Fang Hong No. 2 marine research vessel was found inside

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10 Bussert, ‘Oil May be Focal Point of Sino-Japanese Dispute’, at www.afcea.org сигнал/articles/annviewer.asp?a=1216
14 ibid.
Japan’s claimed EEZ, just 24 kilometres south-west of Uotsuri, the main island in the Senkakus.\(^\text{17}\) In February 2007, the *Dong Fang Hong No. 2* returned to the Senkakus; it was detected 30 kilometres west of Uotsuri Island.\(^\text{18}\)

In September 2008, an ‘unidentified’ (but almost certainly Chinese) submarine was detected south of the entrance to the Bungo Strait between Kyushu and Shikoku Islands; it was some 60 kilometres south-west of Cape Ashizuri, Shikoku’s southernmost point, and 7 kilometres inside Japan’s territorial waters. The submarine was spotted with ‘a periscope-like object’ poking out of the water, and was evidently on a reconnaissance mission.\(^\text{19}\) And, five weeks later, four Chinese naval vessels, including a destroyer, passed through the Tsugaru Strait; they were found by P-3C surveillance aircraft on 19 October about 35 kilometres off Tappi Zaki.\(^\text{20}\)

In September 2009, a foreign submarine was detected off the Pacific coast of Kochi Prefecture on the southern side of Shikoku Island. Beijing denied that it was a Chinese submarine, but Japanese naval authorities insisted that it was.\(^\text{21}\) In April 2010, two Chinese submarines and eight destroyers were detected between Okinawa Island and Miyako-jima. The fleet conducted refuelling and engaged in helicopter operations in an area about 140 kilometres west-south-west of Okinawa. One of the helicopters flew within about 90 metres of the *Suzunami*, a Japanese destroyer that was monitoring the activities of the Chinese warships.\(^\text{22}\)

On 7 September 2010, a Chinese fishing trawler, the *Minjinyu 5179*, deliberately rammed two Japanese Coast Guard vessels near the Senkaku Islands. The 14-man crew was detained and released six days later, but the captain was detained until 24 September, in the face of vehement objections from Beijing.\(^\text{23}\) A Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said that ‘Japan’s actions have violated international law and rudimentary common sense in international matters’, and that ‘they are absurd, illegal and invalid’, and warned that ‘if Japan continues in this reckless fashion, it will taste its own bitter fruit’. China cancelled planned talks with Japan over the Okinotorishima dispute, and warned of ‘worse

\(^{17}\) Fanell, ‘China: Big Trouble on the High Seas’, at www.hoover.org/publications/digest/4635601.html


\(^{19}\) ‘Unidentified Submarine Detected Between Shikoku and Kyushu’, *Japan Times*, 15 September 2008.


\(^{22}\) ‘MSDF Tracks China Armada Off Okinawa’, *Japan Times*, 14 April 2010, at www.japantimes.co.jp/text/nn20100414a2.html

repercussions’. As of 7 September, there were 160 Chinese vessels fishing in the area, of which 30 were ‘inside what Japan claims to be its territorial waters’. On 14 October, China dispatched two fisheries patrol boats to the area to protect ‘the legal rights of Chinese fishermen’. The boats were spotted again on 24 October, after which Japan lodged an official protest with Beijing.

In June 2011, the Chinese navy conducted its largest-ever exercise in the Pacific. Eleven ships – three Sovremenny-class destroyers, one Jiangkai II-class frigate, one Jiang-wei II frigate, two Jiang-wei I frigates, a Fuqing-class oiler, a Dajiang-class auxiliary submarine rescue vessel, a Tuzhong-class fleet tug, and a Dongdiao-class electronic intelligence ship – passed through the Ryukyu island chain about 100 kilometres north-east of Myako-jima on 8–9 June, and returned through the Japanese islands on 22–23 June. The exercise was conducted about 450 kilometres south-west of Okinotorishima, and included seaborne replenishment, gunnery practice, helicopter flight training and use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV).

On 23 June the Nan Feng, a research ship belonging to the Chinese Academy of Fishery Sciences (CAFS) was found conducting surveys within Japan’s EEZ about 330 kilometres from Miyagi City in north-eastern Honshu. When questioned by Japanese Coast Guard vessels, the Nan Feng said that ‘it was collecting water at public sea for environmental and fishery studies’.

On 24 August 2011, Tokyo formally protested to Beijing after two Chinese ships briefly entered what it regards as its territorial waters near the Senkakus. The Chinese Foreign Minister responded that China’s sovereignty over the islands was ‘indisputable’, and said that the boats were in the area to ‘maintain normal order’ for fishing.

China conducted another large exercise in the western Pacific in November 2011. Six vessels, including the intelligence-gathering Beidiao 900 (a Type 814A Dadie-class surveillance ship), missile frigates and supply ships, passed through the waters between Okinawa and Miyako-jima on 22–23 November.

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on their way to the exercise. Chinese authorities said that these were ‘routine manoeuvres’ and that China’s freedom of navigation ‘shall not be subject to any form of hindrance’.

In mid-December, China’s largest and most advanced ocean surveillance vessel, the new Maritime Surveillance 50, cruised around disputed waters in the East Sea ‘to protect the rights of navigation in the waters’. In January 2012, to China’s chagrin, Japan decided to name 39 uninhabited islands, mostly located around the Senkakus, as ‘the basis for defining Japan’s EEZ’.

In early February 2012, four Chinese frigates passed through the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako-jima to conduct exercises in the western Pacific. Three vessels passed through the Osumi Strait south of Kyushu on 30 April; China’s Defence Ministry said that the passage was ‘routine and non-threatening’, and ‘not targeted at any specific country or objective’. Another three passed through the Osumi Strait on 13 June, which Beijing again said was ‘regular training not aimed at specific targets or nations’. Seven navy vessels transited the Miyako Strait to the Pacific on 4 October, returning to the East China Sea through the strait between Taiwan and Yonaguni on 17 October. Five navy ships passed through the Miyako Strait for ‘a routine training exercise’ in the western Pacific on 28 November 2012.

Tensions again flared at the Senkaku Islands in September 2012. On 14 September, six Chinese surveillance vessels entered waters near the disputed islands. China’s Foreign Ministry said that the ships were present ‘to carry out maritime surveillance’ and to perform ‘law enforcement over its [China’s] maritime rights’. On 18 September, 12 surveillance vessels were operating in the area, three of which ‘sailed into Japanese territorial waters’. All of these had left the area.

34 ‘China Says its Naval Vessels’ Transit of Osumi Strait Not Threatening’, Mainichi, 2 May 2012, at mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20120502p2g00m0dm019000c.html
by 24 September, but frequent deployments resumed in October. Four Chinese maritime patrol ships entered ‘Japanese territorial waters’ around the Senkakus on 3 October and remained in the area for more than a week, despite statements by Japan’s Foreign Ministry that their intrusions were ‘unacceptable’.39 Another four Chinese patrol vessels entered Japanese waters on 20 October; they stayed for 11 days, while the Japanese Government ‘strongly protested’ and China’s Foreign Ministry stated that China was prepared to ‘respond forcefully’ if Japan challenged its sovereignty over the islands.40

On 19 January 2013, the tensions over the Senkakus reached their highest point when Chinese navy ships directed their fire-control radars onto a Japanese helicopter and a JMSDF destroyer (the Yudachi DD-103) on 30 January. The radars were turned on for ‘a matter of minutes’. The incidents were the closest the two countries have come to exchanging fire. The Chinese Government initially denied that any fire-control radars had been used, while the Japanese Government considered releasing tape recordings of the radar emissions, but decided that would compromise its electronic intelligence (ELINT) collection capabilities. Chinese officials admitted in March that a fire-control radar had in fact been used, but said that it was ‘accidental’ and ‘the act was not planned’.41

On 4 February 2013, two Chinese Hai Jian-class maritime surveillance vessels harassed two Japanese fishing boats near Uotsurishima Island, the largest of the Senkakus and well inside Japan’s claimed territorial waters.42 On 18 February, three Hai Jian-class vessels chased another Japanese fishing boat around Uotsurishima Island.43

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On 17 February, Chinese vessels deployed a series of buoys around the islands. China’s Foreign Ministry said that their purpose was to carry out ‘maritime weather observations’, but Japanese authorities were concerned that they were intended ‘to collect intelligence about Japanese operations’, and particularly ‘to detect movement of submarines’.  

On 2 May 2013, an unidentified submerged submarine was detected close to Amami-Oshima, an island roughly halfway between Kyushu and Okinawa. On 12 May, another ‘foreign submarine’ was detected just outside Japan’s territorial waters south of Kume-jima in Okinawa Prefecture. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe said that he was ‘not going to mention the nationality of the submarine, but we have already carried out the necessary analysis, including about its nationality’, and that ‘we want the relevant country to be aware that this must never happen again’. A ‘government source’ reportedly said that ‘the sub likely belonged to the Chinese Navy’.

On 13–14 July, five Chinese navy vessels (two destroyers, two frigates and a supply ship) passed through the Soya Strait from west to east, exiting into the Pacific Ocean. This was the first time that China’s naval ships had ‘ventured into that waterway’. The warships returned to Qingdao, the headquarters of the North China Sea Fleet, through the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako-jima on 25 July. A senior officer at the PLA’s Academy of Military Science noted that ‘the Chinese navy has the capability to cut the first island chain into several pieces’, and that ‘Now the chain is fragmented’.

On 7 November, four Chinese Coast Guard vessels entered Japan’s territorial waters off one of the Senkaku Islands. They reportedly remained in the area for about 90 minutes. Tensions escalated again in November when the JMSDF conducted a large, 18-day exercise in Japan’s southern islands. The exercise, conducted from 1 to 18 November, involved 34,000 military personnel, six vessels, 360 aircraft, and six Type-88 surface-to-ship missiles. Two of the Type-88s, together with a launching system, were deployed to Miyako-jima on 6 November. Four, together with another launcher, were deployed to Naha air base in Okinawa on 7 November. The missiles effectively covered the 300

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47 ‘China Sails Through “First Island Chain”’, China Daily, 2 August 2013, at usa.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2013-08/02/content_16863855.htm
kilometres between Okinawa and Miyako-jima, used by Chinese navy vessels to transit into and out of the western Pacific. The Chinese media reported that deployment of the missiles to Miyako-jima was ‘an unprecedented move … targeted at blocking the Chinese Navy’ and ‘can pose real threats to the Chinese Navy’.49

North Korean Intrusions into Japanese Waters

North Korean penetrations into Japanese waters have been much more irregular, with major incidents involving ‘spy ships’ in 1999 and 2001. On 23 March 1999, two ‘suspicious vessels’ (bearing the false names No. 1 Taesei Maru and No. 2 Yamato Maru) were found by a JMSDF P-3C Orion off the Noto Peninsula in Honshu’s Ishikawa Prefecture, across the Sea of Japan from North Korea. On 24 March, the JMSDF was authorised to take ‘maritime security action’ to stop and inspect the boats. JMSDF destroyers and patrol aircraft fired warning shots – the first time that Japanese ships or aircraft had fired warning shots since 1953, when a patrol boat intercepted a Soviet spy ship off Cape Soya on the northern tip of Hokkaido. The two North Korean ships were pursued by the JMSDF destroyers until they crossed Japan’s Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), after which they berthed in Chongjin in the northern part of North Korea.50 On 22 December 2001, the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) (formerly the Maritime Safety Agency) sank a ‘suspicious’ North Korean boat, with the loss of its 15 crewmen, in complicated and controversial circumstances; the boat was within Japan’s EEZ, but well outside Japan’s territorial waters, west of the Japanese island of Amami-Oshima, between Kyushu and Okinawa.51

In January 2002, the JDA compiled a list of 27 ‘suspicious’ ships that had been sighted operating in waters around Japan in recent years. Some of them belonged to China and Russia, but the majority were classified as North Korean ships. The North Korean ships featured ‘multiple antennas, double doors in the stern to launch and retrieve smaller craft, and an engine mounted forward rather than aft, as is usually the case’.52

49 ibid.
51 Ball, ‘Intelligence Collection Operations and EEZs’, p. 76.
The Dispute with South Korea over Dokdo (Takeshima)

Japan also has an outstanding dispute with South Korea over ownership of Dokdo or Takeshima, a group of islands in the southern part of the Sea of Japan, about halfway between the two countries, which sometimes causes friction between them. The islands were annexed by Japan in 1905, primarily because the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) was interested in their utility for watchtowers and a telegraph station. The main island is currently occupied by South Korea, which has built lodgings, lighthouses and a ‘monitoring facility’ there.

The area is watched closely by both the JMSDF and the JCG, however, and incursions by South Korean survey vessels into the disputed waters are regularly protested. In July 2006, for example, a South Korean survey ship was intercepted by a Japanese patrol boat in the area; Japan asked South Korea to withdraw the vessel, but in the ensuing ‘war of words’ a South Korean Government spokesman said that ‘it is the basic right and prerogative of this country to conduct any scientific research within our exclusive economic zone area’. The dispute over Dokdo flared up again in July 2008 after Tokyo reaffirmed its claim on the area. South Korea stepped up its air surveillance patrols and despatched an additional patrol boat to the area.

Issues with Taiwan

Japan also has discordant issues with Taiwan, some arising from the sovereignty dispute over the Senkaku Islands, which Taiwan also claims, together with China, and some from zealous enforcement by the JCG of strict laws concerning foreign fishing in Japan’s territorial waters. On 10 June 2008, a JCG patrol vessel rammed and sank a Taiwanese sports fishing boat near the Senkakus; the crew were detained in Ishigaki for two days ‘for questioning’.

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54 ‘Japan’s Takeshima X-Files’, at dokdo-takeshima.com/dokdo-x-files2.html
2008 a Taiwanese fishing boat, the *Yungsheng No. 106*, was detained by the JCG after being chased and rammed near Miyako-jima; it was taken, together with its crew, to Hirara, the main town on Miyako-jima, ‘for an investigation’.\(^59\)

On 13 September 2009, when another Taiwanese sports fishing boat was impounded and its crew detained by the JCG after it had been found in waters near Miyako-jima, five Taiwanese National Coast Guard Administration (NCGA) vessels confronted five JCG patrol ships in what was described in the Taiwanese media as ‘the first naval encounter between Taiwan and Japan’.\(^60\) In September 2010, Japanese navy ships forced a Taiwanese vessel carrying ‘activists’ to the Senkakus to turn back and return to Taiwan.\(^61\) In September 2012, ‘about 40’ Taiwanese fishing boats, accompanied by eight NCGA vessels, entered disputed waters near the Senkakus, but were turned away after JCG and NCGA vessels engaged in a duel with water cannons.\(^62\)

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