From Global Education to Campaigning

An informed public in Australia is a prime asset in the struggle for justice and social equity in world development.

— John Crawford, Vice-Chancellor ANU and President ACFOA, 1972

In the twenty-first century, global education is seen as a way of promoting aid programs and to some extent as a propaganda arm for official aid agencies. This current perception, however, is a relatively recent phenomenon. From the late 1960s until the late 1990s the main thrust of global education was quite different from that of the official aid programs, and very much focused on promoting a social justice agenda. Official aid agencies such as AusAID, which once funded this broader development agenda, now use school and adult education curricula to push the benefits of their national overseas aid programs and limit discussion of social justice issues within the global system (AusAID 2013; Weber 2013; Selby and Kagawa 2011; Biccum 2011). This chapter will look at the growth and development of global education since the 1960s, and how it has evolved into campaigns such as Make Poverty History and the global education programs of the 2000s.

The first Development Decade (1961–1970) offered much hope but in the end failed, leaving both developing countries and many international and local NGOs disillusioned (Pearson 1969; Legum 1970; Gubser 2012). The upshot was a reinforced need for greater awareness of the public in developed countries to pressure their governments to use aid to create a more just world. In Australia it was the drive from Brian Hayes, ACFID’s first executive director, with European experience of working on awareness raising (see Chapter 2). Hayes’ drive led to ACFID’s establishment of the development education (Dev Ed) program. The 1970 ACFID Council agreed to set up an education committee to develop a program to commence in 1972 (ACFOA 1970b). This was to become the main focus of ACFID’s work for the following 20 years, and the most controversial. The main activities of the nascent program were to be a resource centre; produce a bi-monthly newsletter; and organise a series of conferences to drive Australian state and federal government policy to ensure development issues were taught in schools.
This program continued in one form or another until the early 1990s, after which it was replaced by more focused, issues-based campaigning, such as Make Poverty History, and a much smaller aid and development-focused global education program. This chapter will largely focus on the first five years to 1975, as they set the scene for ACFID’s relations with its members and government in later years and led to ACFID having a credible voice in development policy, and then conclude with the shift to campaigning in the 1980s onwards.

Global education: Some background

The idea for global education had its origins in the 1930s and the nascent idea of community education, a response to community demands for greater relevance of education to their needs (Bennett 1969). The basis of community education was helping people resolve problems by understanding them, rather than being told the answer. Organisations such as the Council for Education on World Citizenship founded in 1939 (Rendall 1976; Heater 1984) had a focus on ‘education for international understanding’ (Hicks 2003, p. 266). Christian social justice teaching of the 1960s had its ‘origins in a desire to educate the public into effective concern for the Third World [with] the inherent logic that … development begins at home’ (Rendall 1976, p. 2). Biccum also traces this desire to educate the public back to nineteenth-century humanism and what she calls its ‘civilising mission’ (2011, p. 1344). While the notion of a ‘civilising mission’ is probably only partly true, it did underpin some of the tensions that arose in the 1970s between those who were driven by a social justice concerns, and those whose altruism was based on notions of welfare and charity. It was the coming together of these various strands of thinking that led to the sharp focus on global education in the 1960s and 1970s, and was also the source of the division that accompanied it.

Following the failure of the first Development Decade, building support for increases in development aid and fair and equitable development policies was seen as the way forward for the second Development Decade from 1971 (Meier 1971; Gubser 2012; Trebilcock et al. 2012; Weber 2013). By the mid-1960s economic growth was slower than population growth for many developing countries, who were struggling to feed their growing populations. The spectre of a chronic food crisis was very real, with famines having occurred in India and China in the 1950s and 1960s (Gráda 2011; Cheek 2012), and industrial output was low. Some of the blame was levelled at the protectionist trade policies of the West and, as an alternative, the idea of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) to ‘overcome developmental hurdles rooted in historically constructed patterns of dependence and inequality’ (Golub 2013, p. 1003) was gaining
traction. It was no surprise then that the political focus in developing countries was on central planning and a healthy scepticism of Western driven market processes (Meier 1971; Hilton 2012; Golub 2013).

As a result of these fundamental structural development issues many activists, and not a few policymakers in the West such as John Crawford in Australia, felt the solution was in garnering public support for a fairer world through public education on social justice and development issues. This public support would then drive the political processes for donor and developed country policy change. In the UK, after the first flourish of the very successful Freedom from Hunger fundraising campaign, the ‘zeitgeist of the 1960s which was marked by a widespread political awakening’ was picked up (Saunders 2009, p. 43). The major British agencies had agreed in 1966 to work together on global education, noting (rather idealistically) that they should not subordinate the ‘educational responsibility to any money making campaigning considerations’ (VCOAD 1966, p. 1). In both the UK and Australia in the 1960s there was a noticeable change in broader social norms, which included not only changes in social mores but also a greater public awareness of social justice issues (Chalmers 2012; Shragge 2013).

The 1960s also saw the Christian churches (both Protestant and Catholic) providing important leadership in global education, which arose from a concern at the injustices they saw emerging from decolonisation and the Cold War in the 1950s and 1960s. Liberation theology emerged in the Catholic Church in Latin America, with its radical Christian agenda (Brouwer 2010; Mackin 2012). At the same time, the WCC argued that they should be active in promoting worldwide opposition to new forms of colonialism and oppression that the West, with its capitalist political and economic system, was imposing on developing countries (Abrecht 1968; Kim 2011; Petrou 2012). The groundbreaking papal encyclical Populorum Progressio (on the development of peoples), enunciated a set of rights including wages, conditions and access to resources for all peoples (AWD 1970; Donaldson and Belanger 2012).

This move to a stronger social justice philosophy by the two leading Christian churches led to the development of a joint approach to achieve it: the program of Action for World Development (AWD 1970; Fernandes 1970). The AWD program started in the UK in 1969 as the World Development Movement (De Waal 1997; Saunders 2009), which was very influential in changing public opinion at the time (McDonald 1972). It coincided with an international youth assembly at the General Assembly of the United Nations (Hill 1970). By 1970 the role of global education was well established internationally, with both the WCC and the FAO Second World Food Congress emphasising the need for community education on issues such as self-determination, social justice, as well as trade, employment, and investment (Lissner 1977; Lemaresquier 1987).
It was only a matter of time before the Australian churches took up the call for action. In April 1969 the ACC and the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference agreed to set up a planning committee for AWD (Fernandes 1970; ACC 1972; Herbert 1973). After a year’s planning, a joint conference between the ACC and the Catholic Church was held in February 1970 with the exhortation that ‘it is necessary to instil social and economic processes with a new dynamism of human solidarity and justice’ (AWD 1970, p. 49). The conference had a strong focus on aid, and resolved that *inter alia* ‘aid and trade must be grounded in justice, and used to eliminate root causes of the disparity in wealth, which threatens the peace of the world’ (p. 18). The meeting also resolved to campaign to eliminate poverty and racial injustice, not only overseas but also in Australia.

The national campaign was started with coordinated study group meetings in homes across the country over a week in July 1971 to study an education kit prepared by the program (O’Dwyer 1972a). The campaign even gained tacit support from the federal government, reporting favourably that AWD had 20,000 groups with 200,000 supporters (AIS 1972). The AWD program provided a strong synergy and impetus for the ACFID global education program, which had started earlier that year.

### Establishment of the Development Education Unit

John Crawford, the founder of ACFID (see Chapter 2), continued his influence and support for the global education program at the ACFID Annual Council in 1971, where he made the point that education of the public is key, especially for the needs of the second Development Decade. He also said that:

> Australian Governments seem too prone to attach conditions to their acceptance of international obligations. Education of the people and the application by them of pressure on our Government to give more aid and more generously and promptly, is absolutely vital if Australia is to mount an aid effort commensurate with her increasing affluence, and worthy of her international image (Crawford 1971, p. 1).

The Dev Ed Unit was very timely as the Bangladesh civil war became the major development event through 1971 and into 1972. This war created the largest global refugee crisis since the breakup of India in 1948. The massacre of hundreds of thousands of people, and nearly 10 million people fleeing to India led to global outrage, triggering the first global fundraising event for a development crisis – The Concert for Bangladesh (Cullen 1971; O’Dwyer 1971a; Bose 2005; West 2007; Salehyan 2008; Mookherjee 2011; Wolf 2013). Australia’s poor official response
to the crisis added to the storm of protest, and the Australian government ‘received a lashing from public opinion’ (O’Dwyer 1971a). There were large demonstrations across the country, including a hunger strike by Paul Poernomo and a large rally of 5,000 in the rain outside Parliament House, at a time when Canberra was much smaller than it is in the 2010s (Canberra Times 1971; O’Dwyer 1971a). There had already been a groundswell among the Australian public about poverty and ethnic problems in Australia through 1971, and the Bangladesh crisis provided a strong catalyst for ACFID’s Dev Ed Unit (ACFOA 1972b).
After a year of planning and some funding hiccoughs, the Dev Ed Unit was launched in February 1972 with John Crawford taking a particular interest in its planning (ACFOA 1971). The focus was still Brian Hayes’ idea of a resource centre, a newsletter, and a series of regular conferences. ACFID’s role in global education from the government’s viewpoint was to be ‘encouraging an informed questioning of public opinion on the issues of world development, particularly as they effect Australian policies in trade and aid’ (News and Information Bureau 1972, p. 2).

Despite the international events and Crawford’s support, there was still reluctance among member agencies to increase fees to cover the Dev Ed Unit’s costs. Some ACFID members felt that education was not ACFID’s role and were reluctant to continue their membership if their fees were used to support it. While ACFID had received a $12,000 grant from the government in 1971 for the promotion of the second Development Decade (O’Dwyer 1971b), any government support was to be for specific activities rather than as a grant for the Dev Ed Unit. In late 1971, four agencies agreed to fund a shortfall so there was a budget to cover one staff person and associated program costs (Solomon 1971, 1972a). It was also agreed that global education be managed out of a separate unit within ACFID, with the result that the Dev Ed Unit saw itself as being semi-autonomous from the rest of the secretariat. This was not helped by it being also physically separate in another part of the building a couple of years later.

The Development News Digest

The bi-monthly Development News Digest (DND) was the flagship of the unit with a print run of 5,000 copies going into selected bookshops and Melbourne newsagents, as well as to NGOs and other subscribers (O’Dwyer 1972d). The first issue in 1972 opened with the provocative headline ‘Aid as a Political Issue’, which was to set the tone for DND and the Dev Ed Unit through its early years (O’Dwyer 1972a). The front page went on to report the events in Bangladesh and its neglect by the Australian government, the major political issue of the time. The tone was deliberately provocative and challenged existing shibboleths. It also challenged a lot of established NGO aid practice, and from the very beginning this took a toll on its support from some ACFID members (O’Dwyer 1972b). ACFID had already sought legal advice on how to avoid litigation arising from DND articles (Solomon 1972b), and even at that time considered having the Dev Ed Unit made a separate legal entity from ACFID.

John Crawford (1972), who was no doubt aware of the tensions caused by the Dev Ed Unit, made a point of congratulating DND in his keynote address at the 1972 Annual Council in which he referred to himself as a ‘sleeping partner’, noting how ACFID members:
DND in subsequent issues went on to deal with the issues of the time, such as the war in Vietnam and apartheid in South Africa, and had its stories regularly picked up by the mainstream media (ACFOA 1973b). The second issue of DND, with the provocative headline ‘Racism in Australian Schools’, was particularly important as it dealt with how development issues and the Third World were presented in education curricula (O’Dwyer 1972b). This prompted interest from the ABC and other media, but most importantly it led to discussion with state education departments on curriculum development (O’Dwyer 1972f). This was the start of a long-standing global education activity of ACFID and its member agencies working on how development issues were presented in schools. This work has continued into the 2000s, but it is less about social justice and more about supporting government aid policy, and with much less direct funding from NGOs (Bracken 2011; Kagawa 2011; Bryan 2011; Biccum 2011).

Global education conferences

The second main activity of the Dev Ed Unit was organising global education conferences to raise public awareness, particularly within the educator community. This followed the lead of the World Studies project in the UK, which from 1973 ran a series of innovative conferences attended mainly by secondary teachers and NGO educators to look at the global issues of the time (Hicks 2003). There were also similar events held by FAO and UNESCO in Sweden and VCOAD in London and Washington in 1971 (O’Dwyer 1972e). ACFID organised two such conferences in Australia: one in Canberra in 1973 and one in Hobart in 1978. The 1973 conference was funded by DFAT and held over a week from 19–24 January. The conference looked at the basic question of what is development and, emerging from discussion, how education methods and developing country studies could be included in the various curricula to get message of social justice more clearly into the formal education sector (O’Dwyer 1972c).

The conference was not only a success but it also inflamed passions. Some speakers called for aid to be ended as it was neocolonial, while others challenged the conference participants’ role in what was seen as an exploitative system, and the complacent racism of Australian society. Sekai Holland, the Zimbabwean activist, put out the challenge:
One day the feelings your society has meted to you will be restored to you when you wake up to what you are collectively involved in doing in Vietnam and Southern Africa, but particularly to the Aboriginal and Islander peoples, then perhaps we can meet as equals. At the moment it is not yet time (ACFOA 1973d).

This challenge was followed up with a resolution that Australians were guilty of oppression by association with the government’s trade policies. This was heady stuff and ‘many aid people started to radically rethink their concept of development’ (Moore and Tuckwell 1975, p. 11). There were important recommendations for the formal school education system which were taken up over time, including having Aboriginal studies, the treatment of other cultures, and other social justice issues in school curricula and, finally, that the Federal government should fund the recommendations (ACFOA 1973b; O’Dwyer 1973).

The second conference was to be ACFID’s biggest undertaking: the Tasmanian Summer School in February 1978. Held over a week in Hobart, it was more than double the size of the Canberra event, with 500 delegates from around the country and 75 leading speakers. The key development issues it covered were trade and employment, human rights, lifestyles, the international economic order, militarism, and education; and how these issues could be better incorporated into global education (Curtis 1977; Sullivan 1978; ACFOA 1978c). This conference, while a great success, lacked the fire and passion of the 1973 event. It was to be the last nationwide global education conference, with questions being asked of the usefulness of such large and expensive events. Following the Tasmanian Summer School, the focus moved to more local and agency-based initiatives, which were the hallmark of global education in the 1980s.

**Growing tensions about the Development Education Unit**

In 1973 there was a rapid growth in global education among member agencies with AFFHC and CAA both having full-time education officers, as well as a growth in specialist global education agencies.¹ The unit’s funding was by then integrated into the ACFID budget, rather than as a separate part of it, with member agencies accepting global education as a legitimate core activity of ACFID (ACFOA 1973a). In 1974 it had a more assured budget, with a very substantial $50,000 government grant from the Labor government, and so was able to increase staff numbers and broaden its role to undertake advocacy (Webb

¹ For example, Action for World Development (AWD), International Development Association (IDA), World University Service (WUS) and Australian Student Christian Movement (ASCM).
The year 1974 was to prove to be the halcyon year for global education: it was well resourced, both internally and from the federal Labor government, and there was an increased demand for new ideas and information on development issues from the public, some of which sowed the seeds for the unit’s crisis a year later.

While funding for the Dev Ed Unit was assured, the ongoing tensions within ACFID about its work began to grow, reflecting international trends on development issues (Sullivan 1974a; Smillie 2012; Weber 2013; Lissner 1977). Even though tensions were very real there was no major split, and Mick Sullivan, the executive director at the time, believes one of the reasons ACFID did not fall apart like VCOAD in the UK was because of the leadership of the Development Education Committee by two church leaders (Catholic and Protestant). Sullivan recounts that on the Sunday immediately before the education committee agenda item came up at the Annual Council, the two leaders of the committee each held a religious service. Now Sullivan believes that this made it hard for the churchgoing agency representatives hostile to the Dev Ed Unit and its work to accuse the program of being ‘communist’, the usual cry of the influential Catholic lobby group – the National Civic Council (Sullivan 2013).

The attitudes on both sides of the debate, however, were becoming more entrenched with the Dev Ed Committee report to ACFID Council in 1974 noting the split in voluntary agencies around global education with a plea for some understanding. The report also noted a similar division emerging among agencies in Europe:

one that could be roughly summed up as a gap between the basically fund raising agencies, and those concerned with global education and social change. I see a similar gap developing in Australia within the ACFOA member agencies … [It is] unfortunate … if the issue became one of radical versus conservative, as both need each other … (O’Dwyer 1974).

Lissner (1977, p. 190) identified three sets of opinions within and among agencies: the fundraisers who maintained that ‘the overriding purpose of a voluntary agency is to provide social services to the third world’; the educationalists who argued that ‘voluntary agencies have a responsibility for promoting social change there [in the home country] too’; and the middle-of-the-roaders who agreed to a concerted educational effort ‘as long as it did not jeopardise agency income’. So they shied away from direct criticism of people and policies of high-income countries. These issues came to a head in Europe

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2 In parallel, Community Aid Abroad had set up the Light, Powder, and Construction Company, and AFFHC had established The Ideas Centre, both of which undertook global education not only among their supporters but with the broader public as well.
in 1972 and led to the Frascati Consultation, which aimed to bring about some kind of understanding among the various groups of NGOs (Lissner 1977). This did not succeed, in part, because the NGOs did not see global education as a core activity, but rather as a specialist activity, and so NGO leadership did not attend these meetings.

Government funding for global education in many countries, including Canada, Germany, Denmark and Sweden, as well as Australia was readily available, but there was no appreciable change in NGO supporter values. Lissner argued that this was due to the ‘middle-of-the-road’ agencies merely wanting more education, not different education to challenge basic causes of injustice (Lissner 1977, p. 195). A solution to the conundrum of agencies not wishing to have their education work affect their fundraising evolved into ‘constituency education work by proxy’, whereby education campaigns were jointly funded, without agencies actually lending their names to it (Lissner 1977, p. 197).  

The agencies satisfy their left-of-centre supporters by backing such initiatives; at the same time the agencies are able to appease their conservative and moderate supporters by assurances that the actions and views of the proxies are not officially endorsed (p. 198).

The problem with this approach was that the global education activities of the proxy agencies were invariably underfunded; and they developed a separate identity, separate values and separate objectives. The result is that communication with the host NGOs was hampered to the point of breaking down, often resulting in alienation and animosity. The global education NGOs developed separate constituencies and fell into the trap of ‘preaching to the converted’, which defeated the purpose of the exercise, that is, raising the awareness of constituencies of the larger, more mainstream development NGOs.

These issues were at the forefront of ACFID debates at the time. On the one hand, ACFID did provide the role of a proxy for agencies, but the ACFID Dev Ed Unit itself was developing into a proxy within a proxy, creating divisions not only within the ACFID secretariat but also across the agency membership. Despite these tensions the Dev Ed Unit actually expanded through 1974: it set up the anti-apartheid campaign (including calling for boycotts of South African goods); ACFID women’s committee prepared for International Women’s Year (see Chapter 4); and it also managed a $10,000 community education grant to be made available for worthwhile global education projects in the community (ACFOA 1974c).

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3 The main proxies in the UK at the time were VCOAD, the World Development Movement, and the New Internationalist magazine, which still continues.
It was secure government funding, similar to what was happening in Europe, which tipped the balance for ACFID to maintain its lead in global education, but without solving the inherent tensions that were coming to a head.

In late 1974 Brendan O’Dwyer, the ACFID education officer, went to North Vietnam representing church groups as part of a peace delegation which also had delegates from the ACTU and the Women’s Union, both with left-leaning and communist affiliations. The visit also included travel to Viet Cong-controlled areas in South Vietnam. On his return, O’Dwyer gave a number of interviews to the press and on radio, in which he gave unqualified support for the Provisional Revolutionary Government (the Viet Cong) and called on the Australian government to recognise it as the legitimate authority in South Vietnam. Even though O’Dwyer was representing the churches, rather than ACFID, it still led to a storm of protest from ACFID members and the executive (Byrne 1974; Cullen 1974). This set in train a series of incidents the following year which brought matters regarding the Dev Ed Unit to a head.

In 1975 the ACFID report from the Dev Ed Unit, *Aid in a Changing Society: A Handbook of the Australian Aid Debate* (Moore and Tuckwell 1975), was highly critical of Australian NGOs, and when it was debated at ACFID Council in 1975 there were moves for it to be pulped. The Dev Ed Unit was challenging NGOs and their approach to aid, suggesting a need for much stronger participatory approaches and clearer support for social movements (O’Dwyer 1975a; ACFOA 1975h; O’Dwyer 1975c). If this was not enough, there was also an ongoing argument with the Returned and Services League (RSL), also an ACFID member, about the Dev Ed Unit’s South African Campaign (Keys 1975; Cullen 1975a; O’Dwyer 1975b).

These divisions, which were becoming more prominent within ACFID, sparked a sense of crisis leading to a series of emergency executive meetings on what to do about the unit (ACFOA 1975a, 1975b, 1975c, 1975g, 1975h). Ardent supporters of the unit, including Vaughan Hinton and Sir John Crawford, had resigned their positions for personal (Hinton) and conflict of interest reasons (Crawford). While General Cullen, the chair of ACFID, had been supportive of the unit, the trip to Vietnam, ongoing arguments with the RSL, plus perhaps a reading of a change in the political wind by the ACFID executive (the Whitlam Labor government was sacked in November 1975) led Cullen and the executive to support a restructure of the Dev Ed Unit.

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4 It was the fact it was government funded from the Office of Women that saved it.
5 Crawford had been appointed chair of the Aid Advisory Council in 1974.
A discussion paper by two executive members suggested having the unit as a separate entity, as some of the larger agencies could not be party to the perceived political activities of the unit (Minogue and Burns 1975). The paper went on to question whether ACFID, as a representative body of all agencies, was best placed for global education at all, given the ‘growing political activities of the Education Unit’ (p. 1). The paper recommended that an institute of development studies could take over the role with departments on aid, research, and education. This paper only served to worry the ACFID executive more as it could have led to a split, with the larger agencies leaving. John Mavor from the Uniting Church responded to the discussion paper, arguing that to separate the unit from ACFID and constitute it as a Third World Centre would be counterproductive as ACFID needed the challenge and thrust of the Dev Ed Unit, uncomfortable though this was. He went on to rather drily note that the opinions of the unit were ‘mild compared to the expressions given by Third World Delegates’ at a Christian conference he had attended the previous year (Mavor 1975, p. 2). The executive agreed that the unit should remain within ACFID and be able to present recipient views on aid issues, noting that this may upset some members, but as for the future of global education a broader discussion was required among the membership.

We cannot have aid without development, we cannot have development without development education, we cannot have development education without action and we cannot have action without being political – and ACFOA cannot avoid living with this tension (ACFOA 1975g, p. 1).

This, however, was not enough and some in the ACFID executive wanted a scalp – and it was to be O’Dwyer’s (Nation Review 1975; The National Times Editorial 1975; Juddery 1975a). The executive felt that action against him was not only necessary to ease the ongoing tensions, but there was probably nervousness about the possibility of a change of government, and some in ACFID felt they needed more politically neutral credentials (Hill 1975a). O’Dwyer was sacked with no specific reasons provided (Roberston 1975; Hill 1975a; Cullen 1975b; ACFOA 1975c). The sacking was later put down to a personality clash between O’Dwyer and the executive director, and divisions on the role and future of global education within the executive (Sullivan 2013).

The dismissal created a furore particularly at ACFID Council, which was held only two weeks after the sacking, with resolutions supporting his dismissal only being ‘noted’ and an alternative resolution to have O’Dwyer reinstated being passed. He declined the offer (ACFOA 1975d). At the same a new executive was elected, which was less divided and more supportive of the Dev Ed Unit and its work (Juddery 1975b). This story, however, created considerable press interest (The National Times Editorial 1975; Juddery 1975a; Hill 1975a; Juddery 1975b), with questions in parliament as to the possible involvement of the shadow
foreign minister Andrew Peacock in influencing the executive, particularly General Cullen who was chair and a prominent member of the opposition Liberal Party (Kerin 1975). While Peacock’s meeting with the executive actually occurred after the sacking, it did not remove the suspicion in those politically volatile times that there may have been some behind-the-scenes ‘influence’ by opposition politicians.

While the dismissal was to some extent inevitable, it did highlight that for ACFID to have a wide membership it had to accommodate the views of a broad range of agencies, lest they leave. It was also clear that the development community itself was divided between the social activists, who saw themselves seeking a different and more just social order, and the traditional aid agencies in favour of preserving the existing social order, but ameliorating its excesses (ACFOA 1975f). While this divide narrowed in the 1980s and 1990s, it was very wide in the 1970s.

Helen Hill, in summarising the era, said that global education at the time was promoting a more just world by pushing for changes within education systems and campaigning on the social justice issues of the time, such as racism, colonialism and sexism, while at the same time agencies were appealing to the public for donations – which led to natural tensions (Hill 1980). Echoing Lissner, Hill argued that it was the lack of internalising the importance of global education within ACFID and its members, which made it always vulnerable:

[D]oes the fact that they give generously mean that they will also respond to information and want to know more about why such aid is necessary … I would say that the opposite is true, that those who give the most are the least interested in finding out more about the situation and may in fact give to rid themselves of the bother of finding out. The aid agencies … have assumed the reverse to be true (1980, p. 14).

In 1978 a group of seven agencies led by Bill Armstrong, deputy chair, held a review and recommended the continuation of the Dev Ed Unit with some mechanism for more inclusion of agencies through a liaison officer, and an additional publication: Inside ACFID (ACFOA 1977a, 1978a). A broader review of ACFID a year later found the key criticisms of the Dev Ed Unit fell into four broad areas: political bias; being a separate entity within ACFID; poor response to member agency needs; and only concentrating on activities with a select few (Tiffen et al. 1979). It was inevitable that the Dev Ed Unit could not continue as such, and it would have to spend more of its resources in serving member agencies. ACFID’s global education program continued to challenge the development issues of the day, such as East Timor and South Africa; however, DND, the unit’s flagship became too expensive and was wound up with its last issue in November 1979.
Global education in the 1980s

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, global education was maintained at a relatively low profile. Despite some lobbying of the foreign minister (ACFOA 1981b), there was little support from the more conservative Coalition government for global education, and AusAID was reluctant to fund it outside of the ACFID grant or mention it at the annual consultation with ACFID (Ingram 1981). Despite the review of 1979 there were still further reviews (Hodges 1980), and questions kept being asked as to whether global education should have a separate budget or even the need for ACFID to run a separate public awareness program, and instead focus on supporting member agencies’ own work (ACFOA 1981c, 1981d).

In 1983 a new executive director, Russell Rollason, reinvigorated the global education program and moved the approach to a more focused, campaign-based strategy (Armstrong 1981; Rollason 2013). The origins of ACFID’s move to a more comprehensive campaigning strategy lie in some of the weaknesses of conventional global education, which was mainly about providing broad-based information on social justice issues: ‘publishing stuff where it sat on shelves – doing kits and sending them to your mates would not get you anywhere’ (Rollason 2013). His experience from a 1974 Right to Eat campaign, and a 1977 campaign on what was thought an obscure topic, the Common Fund, had worked well. As an approach he felt campaigning had better prospects than more general global education. While working with schools was a worthwhile long-term investment, change was also needed more immediately (Rollason 2013). While there was still a view that ACFID had ‘done its job’ – as global education had been mainstreamed into most agencies’ work with ACFID members spending $2 million on global education in 1982 (ACFOA 1983b) – ACFID still argued for a leadership role, albeit in the form of specific campaigns on global education issues.

The advent of a Labor government in early 1983 provided new opportunities. There was a renewed push for global education funding from government with submissions to the Jackson Committee on Aid for more support for community education (ACFOA 1983a). This recommendation was largely supported, as the Jackson Committee saw global education as a complementary activity to aid; this was important to maintaining a constituency for official aid (Fujikane 2003; Hicks 2003; Jackson Committee 1984). In 1985 AusAID funded resource centres in each state capital city. They were a hub for getting information not only out to the public but also to schools (Moxon 1985). There were regular liaisons with agencies such as the global education officers’ conference in 1985 (ACFOA 1985c), and ACFID also did some work on the formal curriculum in that year, giving ACFID an opportunity to work with teacher groups such as the Geography Teachers Association in much the same way the UK did in the late 1970s (Fujikane 2003; Hicks 2003). Work on curriculum grew through the
1980s and at the end of the decade culminated in a three-year project funded by AusAID to continue its support of global education in the school system (Hunt 2012).

The campaigns

In the UK, NGO-led campaigns started earlier than in Australia, with Christian Aid Week in 1959 and the ‘1 per cent’ campaign in 1965 by British NGOs’ War on Want and Christian Aid being some of the first (Hilton 2012; Saunders 2009). As noted above, ACFID’s first campaigns were the anti-apartheid campaign following the 1971 Springbok tour (Ross 1990) and the Bangladesh famine campaign of 1971–72. Later the Campaign Against Racial Exploitation emerged from another ACFID anti-apartheid campaign in 1974 (Minogue 1974; Robertson 1975), which then picked up Aboriginal issues in Australia. In the late 1970s, however, apart from aid budget campaigns, there was no coherent campaigning strategy for ACFID. Rollason pushed for a more direct campaigning approach and he slowly won the global education advocates over (Armstrong 1981).

Figure 5 ACFID stalwarts Russell Rollason and John Mavor eat pet food as part of a Right to Eat campaign in 1974.

Source: Ted Golding; Fairfax Media.

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6 This was a campaign for British ODA and Direct Foreign Investment in developing countries to be 1 per cent of GDP.
In 1982 a community awareness campaign One World or No World was proposed and advised by prominent advertising executive and ACFID supporter Philip Adams, who presented an advertising-type pitch to the Council based on pithy slogans. This was too much for the traditional educationists and the response was lukewarm, with AWD, for example, saying such an approach would put global education back 10 years (ACFOA 1982a). But the seeds of change were sown, and a few years later campaigning was to become entrenched in ACFID’s work.

The aim was for ACFID to focus on public awareness through its campaigns. Campaigning was about both focus and the use of mass media, and it was the Live Aid phenomenon in the mid-1980s that changed the mindset.

Many NGOs have often felt uncomfortable with events based primarily on mass communication techniques. Their criticism focuses on the oversimplistic presentation of issues, on the fact that most such presentations portray the Third World as helpless, and on the lack of a long-term perspective on issues. Live Aid succeeded in conveying simple messages to large numbers of people because it based its approach on the public’s perceptions and needs, rather than the causes and issues; it showed that the public needed to feel that they were part of a larger movement (Lemaresquier 1987, p. 197).

By the 1990s campaigning came into its own, with the One World campaign and later the Make Poverty History campaign the two major ones. These were large campaigns and effectively were the global education strategy for ACFID to get the message of development and social justice issues out (ACFOA 1990d; Rollason 2013). The only reason Dev Ed stayed as a name for another few years was that it was in the ACFID constitution (ACFOA 1990b). In 1998, however, ‘development education’ was formally replaced by the term ‘advocacy’ (ACFOA 1998a).

While campaigns were more tightly focused, with more direct messages, they tended to direct what the answer to a problem should be rather than enable a more open conversation – the basis of global education (Ni Chasaide 2009). Campaigns also tended to take the priorities and agenda from Southern NGOs to be ‘owned’ by Northern NGOs. For example, the trade justice agenda was being driven by what groups and campaigners in the North perceived to be the problem rather than what those in the South wanted or needed (Lloyd 2005; Murphy 2012). Southern NGOs tend to push for structural change against what they see as neocolonial economic structures, while Northern NGO advocates prefer a ‘tweaking’ of the system.
the strong justice agenda that underpinned the campaign at the start became incrementally replaced by an ‘empathy’ agenda which tended to appeal to Western politicians with relatively little consideration of the causes or nature of poverty, let alone the ways in which the British public might relate to Africans or African societies (Harrison 2010, p. 392).

Campaigns often serve as a shell into which a wide range of information could be poured. Their focus and project nature made it easier for ACFID to budget and plan while providing a mechanism to ensure a necessary profile. As Rollason said to the Campaigns Committee in 1993: ‘[ACFID was] adopting a strategy to ensure that aid would be the second or third issue on the prime minister’s agenda and acknowledge that change would need to come over a longer period was very important’ (ACFOA 1993b, p. 1).

Figure 6 Janet Hunt Launches Development Dossier on Disarmament and Development 1987.

Source: ACFID.
The key was to get aid issues on politicians’ agendas, and conventional broad-based global education was not going to do that. Added to this was the post-Cold War donor fatigue of the 1990s. This meant that the agenda had to be revitalised through campaigns like One World and Jubilee 2000 in the UK and elsewhere (Saunders 2009). The campaigns were successful and an important part of keeping aid on the agenda through the cynical 1990s and into the 2000s, when overseas aid volumes shot up to the same levels (as a percentage of GDP) as the 1970s, but without the postcolonial aid obligations of that era.

If the Dev Ed Unit was ACFID’s signature activity in the 1970s, by the 1990s and into the 2000s it was campaigning. In 1989 the One World Campaign was launched (ACFOA 1989b). The focus was on environment and development,
poverty, disarmament and human rights. Fifteen member agencies came on board, together with a $300,000 grant from AusAID (Ross 1991). The campaign opened with the global television documentary *Our Common Future*, which led to 10,000 signing up, five times more than planned for (ACFOA 1989b), and even a resolution of support in the Australian Parliament (Tickner 1989). Later in the year, ACFID put a scenario to Geoffrey Robertson, a prominent human rights lawyer, who had a very popular television program on social issues called *Hypotheticals*. The format was a panel of public figures, experts and politicians responding to a rapidly shifting hypothetical situation orchestrated by Robertson, which made for good television. ACFID persuaded AusAID to cover the production costs of the ensuing program *Beggar Thy Neighbour*, which looked at aid and human rights. It was a television success, getting development issues to a mass audience. A kit for schools followed (Hunt 2011).

The second major ACFID campaign was Make Poverty History, which was conceived by British NGOs in 2003 as a campaigning coalition that would mainly focus on the G8 summit in July 2005 to be held in the UK (Harrison 2010). Over time it outgrew those humble beginnings and became a global campaign over the next 10 years. In Australia it had its own identity separate to ACFID or individual NGOs, with ACFID being a member of the campaign coalition and offering some staff and secretarial support.

The One World Campaign represented the shift that had been underway for some time of ACFID moving out of global education as such and to an arms-length campaigning model for getting development messages out. The same change was also being seen in the agencies themselves, with the early 1990s marking a period of change, when there was a broad shift from global education to campaigning. Twenty years of ACFID’s involvement in global education was not without its controversies, but the work of the first five years and the semi-autonomous Dev Ed Unit set the scene for public and government engagement. This early work set ACFID up as a key voice in public debates, and gradually saw it take a greater coordination rather than operational role in campaigns and global education.

### Global education in the 2000s

Global education was internationally strong for about 15 years up to the mid-1980s, when it declined in part due to a conservative backlash, particularly in the UK with the Thatcher government (Fujikane 2003), which saw global education as ‘condoning indoctrination and politicisation of the educational experience’ (Bracken et al. 2011, p. 2). In the 2000s, the Blair government in the UK saw advantages in supporting global education as it was important in maintaining the strong constituency for aid, so it was well resourced with NGOs
being encouraged to put resources into it as well (Dominy et al. 2011; Weber 2013). In Australia ACFID members continued to do work on global education with AusAID providing some funding, but with more strings attached. AusAID began to approve the material being used, even for projects being funded under the usually much looser ANCP (AusAID 2013), and in 2014 even went so far as to drop public awareness raising as an accreditation criterion (DFAT 2014; Purcell 2015).

The 2000s represented a shift away from the 1970s and 1980s and critiques of contemporary development models to a narrower focus on aid more directly, and taking a more positive and less critical approach to the topic – what Bryan (2011) calls the ‘de-clawing’ of global education. This reflected a broader shift among NGOs globally, whereby they were more constrained in criticising government policy due to tighter regulatory and financial strings, and Lissner’s ‘middle-of-the road’ NGOs were less inclined to fund the more radical advocacy organisations (Ni Chasaide 2009; Bicum 2011; Lang 2012; Lissner 1977; Weber 2013). In 2015, however, following massive cuts in the official aid program and polling that showed historically low levels of public understanding of development issues, there were signs of change. The 2015–20 ACFID Strategic Plan moved ACFID to a more direct engagement with the public on the challenges of human development to try to build the development constituency, much in the same way that ACFID and AWD did in the 1970s but without the same levels of resources.

Conclusion

In the 20 years that ACFID had a global education program it had achieved a lot but also had trodden on many toes. The leadership and vision of the early years was that global education should not only bring development issues to the eyes of the public, and from a government perspective provide a constituency for aid programs, but it should also challenge the basic injustices of the global order. This latter direction of course challenged the ‘comfort zones’ of agencies, which had been built on the altruistic notion of helping those in need, to being in solidarity with and being prepared to challenge a fundamentally unjust economic order. In the end this last ‘ask’ was probably a step too far.

Balancing both the challenging of key issues of development and keeping the aid constituency on side for over 20 years was no small feat. The Dev Ed program in 1972 was built on two key events: the public revulsion to the Australian government’s inaction to what was happening in Bangladesh and the massive public response to the AWD global education program. This gave the impetus for the new Dev Ed Unit to start with a radical edge and to challenge the prevailing
views of development, developing countries and social justice. This was the heady period of social change in Australia and globally. The Dev Ed program set an agenda and had the public and governments sitting up and taking notice. This was demonstrated by the two national global education conferences in 1973 and 1978, which galvanised support especially in the education sector to put the messages out in school and the community on issues of social justice.

Of course this agenda was very challenging to both agencies and government, especially among those agencies that had the idea of development built on non-political stances and values of non-interference on matters of aid and politics. There was always an inherent tension with ACFID and its Dev Ed Unit, which was only resolved in the 1980s with a shift in direction to campaigning. In the early 1990s, the global education program had largely achieved what it had set out to do. There were strong education programs among member agencies, Dev Ed centres were flourishing in the states, and the education curriculum in schools had a much richer analysis of development and developing country issues.

The campaign model was a move away from what may be described as grassroots activism on social justice issues more generally in the mould of AWD to a more focused approach looking at specific issues more clearly directed by agencies and ACFID. The debate that occurred within ACFID and across NGOs more broadly was that while campaigning is important to focus on particular questions in the short term, something was lost in not having an ongoing program of global education with the general public to keep a higher awareness of social justice issues. The drop in public support for aid in the 2010s may be a result of this shift in focus.

In the 2000s, with governments more sensitive to public criticism, the global education and advocacy space for peak agencies such as ACFID has closed somewhat. ACFID is also very sensitive that they still have a place at the table to express a voice even if it is behind closed doors, lest they be excluded in the same way that CCIC has been in Canada (Smillie 2012). The advocacy space and campaigning is now filled, not with voices railing against injustice but rather looking to have strong and growing aid programs, and generally avoiding structural issues altogether. There are, however, signs of change as ACFID in 2015 moves to a more direct engagement with the public about broader development challenges beyond aid and levels of aid.