The Power of Geography
Peter J. Rimmer and R. Gerard Ward

Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;
Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island;
Who rules the World-Island commands the World.
— Sir Halford John Mackinder

Paul Dibb follows a long line of geographers who have contributed to the evolution of contemporary geopolitics. Sir Halford J. Mackinder, because of his seminal paper ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’, which was delivered at London’s Royal Geographical Society in 1904, and his famous dictum, cited above, is considered to be one of the key progenitors of modern strategic geography. Within Australia Thomas

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1 The authors would like to thank the staff of ANU Archives, Dr Brendan Whyte of the National Library of Australia Maps collection, and Dr Marion Ward and Dr Sue Rimmer for their comments on the text.
Griffith Taylor,5 after the First World War, and Oskar Spate,6 after the Second World War, drew attention to the country’s isolated global position by centring their maps upon Canberra (see Fig. 1).7 Since then, a legion of geographers in Australia and in other parts of the world have refined political geography’s focus during the Cold War and post-Cold War eras, provided fresh concepts and contemplated how the future geopolitical map may be moulded.

This raises the issue of how Dibb’s life work fits into the pantheon of geostrategists who have long recognised geography as a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states? More specifically, how has his geographical training shaped his studies of the Soviet Union and his subsequent influence on reshaping Australia’s defence policy? How have his contemporaries viewed his input into this arena, which recognises, like Mackinder, that the rise and fall of states, and prospects for war or peace have been heavily influenced by the balance of power between continental and maritime states? These are crucial issues, given the Australian Government has produced a new Defence white paper to guide the country’s defence planning to 2035.

Before evaluating Dibb’s role as a geographer in fashioning defence policy in Australia, it is pertinent to examine his early training at the Nottingham University that triggered his abiding interest in the geography of the Soviet Union and, after 1991, Russia, and more recently China. Then we are in a position to consider how his proposition that geography is a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states has infused Australia’s defence planning, adverse reactions to Dibb’s views, and his vigorous counter response that reinforces the critical importance of possessing a geographical imagination in both regional and global affairs.

Figure 1A: The great ocean’s isolation of Australia, with a radius of 4,000 miles from Canberra shown to pinpoint stepping stones through the Dutch East Indies for flights to England via Calcutta.

Figure 1B: The hemisphere around Australia centred on Canberra — all points on the map are at a proportionately correct distance from the centre point.


Soviet Geography

How did Dibb’s enduring concern with Soviet geography from an Australian perspective arise? As this may seem to be an uncommon focus for a Yorkshireman born Paul Leonard Dibb at the beginning of the Second World War in the coalmining settlement of Pontefract, which was dominated by the Prince of Wales Colliery, it is important to trace key stages in this process. Dibb’s stepfather was a miner and he inherited his mother’s ambition, which was nurtured further as a scholarship boy at the Kings School, Pontefract, where teachers interested him in the world of ideas.10 Between 1957 and 1960 these ideas and their applications were refined at the Nottingham University when he was a student in the Department of Geography led by Professor K.C. Edwards who, coincidentally, had many connections with geographers in the Antipodes during the 1950s and early 1960s.11 Although majoring in geography, Dibb also undertook a subsidiary in economics under Professor Brian Tew (formerly of the University of Adelaide) and was offered the opportunity of pursuing an honours degree in the subject. He decided that sticking to a geography degree, without neglecting his interest in economics, would better suit his future career.

His curiosity about the USSR stemmed from John Cole, his Sydney-born lecturer at Nottingham University, who was prominent among a bevy of postwar, British-based geographers studying the Soviet Union at the height of the Cold War.12 After being force-fed during the immediate postwar era on G.D.B. Gray’s Soviet Land: The Country, Its People and Their Work,13 undergraduates, like Dibb, must have been captivated by Cole’s fresh insights into the geography of the USSR from the 1950s.14 These insights stemmed from Cole’s training as a Russian linguist during his national service in 1951 at the British armed forces’ Joint Services School for Linguists, where he had access

to the equivalent of an unpublished ‘admiralty handbook’ on the USSR. Paradoxically, Cole undertook fieldwork not in the USSR, where he was wary of being enveloped in Soviet intrigue, but in Latin America, and first visited Russia on an Intourist guided tour in 1976; his major work after visiting the Soviet Union did not appear until the 1980s. By then, Dibb had migrated to Australia and had made several visits to the USSR.

After a spell as a trainee manager in the British car industry and part-time lecturer in economics at the Northampton Technical College, Dibb arrived in Australia in December 1961 to take up a position in Canberra on the staff of the then Minister of Trade Sir John McEwen. During his stint in the Department of Overseas Trade he was engaged initially in investigating the country’s trade agreement with the United Kingdom in the light of the latter’s proposed entry into the Common Market, before taking charge of Australia’s trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. By 1963 he was also busy preparing reports on the country’s secondary industries for the Committee of Economic Enquiry, which produced the Vernon Report. While in the public service, Dibb was also conscious of the need to keep abreast of developments in geography, which was in the process of shifting from a qualitative perspective to a quantitative approach.

In 1964 Dibb was awarded a part-time public service scholarship to study in the Department of Geography, School of General Studies at The Australian National University (ANU) under Professor Andrew Learmonth. While there he was mentored by the political geographer Alfred James ‘Jim’ Rose, who had investigated the danger to Australia’s security lying in its northern approaches, noting that ‘the importance of New Guinea and Indonesia to Australia arises from their role as buffers or shields between us and the greater powers to the north … India, China and Japan’. Before Rose left for a Chair at Macquarie
University he would have inculcated in Dibb the need for the greater use of statistics and model-building in geographical analysis within Dibb’s study of the locational aspects of Australia’s pulp, paper and paperboard industry.

In 1965 this additional geographical training came to the fore when Dibb was transferred from the Department of Overseas Trade to the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE) under the direction of Stuart J. Harris.\(^{22}\) Immediately he brought his new-found skills to bear on the postwar economics of the Soviet wheat industry, which had significant implications for Australia’s trade policy.\(^{23}\) By the end of 1966 Dibb had moved to the Department of Territories to work as a personal project officer for the Secretary on the economic, political and social development of Nauru and New Guinea. Although this interest in Pacific Island states persisted throughout his career, it was his study of the Soviet wheat industry’s structure, trends and problems that attracted the interest of academia.

By 1968 this academic attention led to Dibb being recruited to a one-year appointment as a research fellow in the Department of Political Science within the then Research School of Social Sciences (RSSS) at ANU. Although its head, Professor Robert Parker, recognised that Dibb was an economic geographer, the accommodation was made to provide him with the opportunity for closer interaction with T.H. ‘Harry’ Rigby, the acknowledged doyen of Soviet (and later post-Soviet) studies in Australia.\(^{24}\) While in the department he was able to undertake fieldwork in Britain, Japan and the USSR supported by the Ford Foundation, endorsed by the Australian Department of Trade and Industry, and facilitated by academic contacts from Parker and Spate, then head of Geography in the Research School of Pacific Studies (RSPacS). The project’s purpose was to gauge economic development in Siberia and prospects for bilateral trade with Australia and Japan, including identifying commodities and assessing the quality of shipping services. Not only was Dibb able to have conversations with Soviet officials and academics in Moscow, Akademgorodok, Irkutsk, Bratsk

\(^{22}\) ANUA, ‘19/Box 278 8103855P ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.


\(^{24}\) ANUA, ‘19/Box 278 8103855P ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
and Khabarovsk, but also in Tokyo with businessmen from key Japanese trading companies and a struggling Australian firm, whose difficulties in trading through the Nakhodka port were taken up with a less than cooperative trade representative in the Soviet embassy (See Table 1).

Table 1: Paul Dibb’s Soviet Union itinerary, 1968

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Travel and stopovers</th>
<th>Mode</th>
<th>Stopover</th>
<th>Days</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>24/8</td>
<td>Canberra – Perth</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Perth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26/8</td>
<td>Perth – London</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>London</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Foreign Office Central Asian Research Association Royal Institute for International Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11/9</td>
<td>London – Harwich – Hook of Holland – Moscow</td>
<td>Sea/rail (via East Germany and Poland)</td>
<td>Moscow</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Institute of the Peoples of Asia (18/9) State Planning Committee (Gosplan) officials responsible for central economic planning (19/9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Moscow – Nakhodka</td>
<td>Trans-Siberian Railway</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stopping over en route at Novosibirsk (for Akademgorodok), Irkutsk and Khabarovsk</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24/9</td>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Novosibirsk</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Economic Institute at Akademgorodok (academy town)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27–28/9</td>
<td>Bratsk</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Dam and Power Station Wood-burning kombinat (permission not granted to visit aluminium kombinat)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29/9</td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td></td>
<td>Irkutsk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Irkutsk Oblast Gosplan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30/9 1/10</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Khabarovsk</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Laboratory of Import–Export Specialization, Khabarovsk Research Institute, Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2–3/10</td>
<td>Nakhodka – Yokohama – Tokyo</td>
<td>Sea (SS Khaborovsk)</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Meetings with Japanese businessmen on voyage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7–9/10</td>
<td>Tokyo</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Meetings with Japanese trading companies (7–8/10) Soviet trade representative (9/10)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Of particular benefit from Dibb’s initial visit to the USSR was the connection made in Khabarovsk with Professor Leon Vstovsky, Director of the Laboratory of Import–Export Specialization, Khabarovsk Research Institute, Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences. Not only did he provide Dibb with books from regional publishing houses to deepen his knowledge of Siberia, but their interaction also led to a proposal for an exchange of publications between Australia and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, this visit made Dibb aware of how conversations were partly standard interchanges of information between fellow academics and, on the Soviet side, partly deliberate propaganda statements along Communist Party political lines (including expressions of antipathy towards Australia’s involvement in the Vietnam War). This awareness was important in his subsequent ability to interpret Soviet source materials and information from meetings.

In 1969 an opportunity arose for Dibb to extend his stay at ANU to analyse the material collected in the Soviet Union beyond the agreed one year plus short extension in the Department of Politics when the Department of Geography in the RSPacS was subdivided into the Department of Biogeography and Geomorphology, and the Department of Human Geography. The latter, undermanned department wanted to extend its involvement beyond the Pacific and South-East Asia and recruited him as an economic geographer on a three-year appointment as a senior research fellow to provide a deeper Australian perspective on the USSR’s geography; this appointment satisfied the long-standing interest of Spate, the school’s new Director, in the Soviet Union’s geographical theory and practice.26

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Dibb’s one-year stay in the Department of Human Geography at ANU advanced the skills that stood him in good stead for the rest of his career. At the time, the visit to ANU by US geographer David Harvey, who elaborated the development of a scientific approach to geographical problems (i.e. the role of theory in scientific explanation), took the so-called quantitative revolution in geography beyond mere quantification. The value of this experience in gaining an understanding through scientific explanation is apparent in Dibb’s later explorations of the connections between international trade, the export base, and the location and health of Australia’s rural industries — a shift from the preoccupation of economists with countries to the geographer’s concern with the variable impact of policies on specific regions within countries.

The main outcome of Dibb’s time at ANU was the broad-gauge regional study of the East Asian half of the Soviet Union. At the time a focus on the economic development of Siberia, stretching from the Urals to the Pacific, was a relative rarity among geographers working on the USSR. Drawing upon the well-honed skills developed by regional geographers, Dibb’s study of ‘Pacific Siberia’ focused on the area from the Pacific seaboard inland to the Yenisey (Yenisei) River (See Fig. 2). With a perceptive foreword by Rigby, this investigation evaluated what the Russians had accomplished, contemplated and projected within Siberia and their likely geopolitical reverberations on powerful neighbours, notably China and Japan, and more generally around the wider Pacific rim. The volume demonstrated his detailed understanding of the little-studied region, its particular geographical characteristics relating to permafrost, isolation, distance and transport costs on the Trans-Siberian Railway, and their consequences for human settlement and economic activities.

27 ANUA, ‘19/Box 278 8103855P ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
28 See David Harvey, Explanation in Geography (London: Edward Arnold, 1969).
Figure 2: Soviet Union map showing the Trans-Siberian Railway c. 1990

By the time Dibb’s book on Siberia was published in 1972, he had returned to the public service as an intelligence analyst in the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) in the Department of Defence. This move did not diminish his continuing interest in the USSR’s geography. During this period he also extended his purview to cover China’s strategic interests and defence priorities in the 1980s.33 His contribution showed that he had not lost touch with his geographical roots with his devising two maps showing: (a) a view of the world centred on Beijing with radiating circles at 5,000-kilometre intervals; and (b) the location of China’s military regions and field armies, each with an estimated 43,000 men (See figs 3A and 3B). These maps, reflecting the importance of both distance and terrain, underlined ‘the important contribution of geography … to China’s strategy of protracted defence’.34

Dibb’s twin focus on the USSR and China persisted when he returned from Defence to ANU in 1981, first to the Department of International Relations and then, two years later, to the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC). In particular, he sought to continue this interest in examining: (a) the potential for global conflict over economic issues, notably oil; (b) the external relations of Pacific Island states; and (c) long-term threat assessments within Australia’s strategic neighbourhood.35 More specifically, the SDSC’s Director, Bob O’Neill, encouraged him to produce a major book that sought to diminish the yawning void in accurate information on the USSR’s military strength, economic capabilities and international relations; this topic provided a perfect foil to Desmond Ball’s work on the United States. Although Dibb extended his reach beyond Siberia in *The Soviet Union: An Incomplete Superpower* to include the country’s international relations with both Europe and the Middle East, he maintained a firm focus on the Pacific Ocean to provide a more integrated assessment of the USSR’s strengths and weaknesses as a nation-state.36 As this assessment, containing a critique of Mackinder’s heartland theory, downplayed the threat

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35 ANUA, ‘19/Box 277 8103855C ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
to Australia of the USSR’s air power, the Australian’s reviewer Peter Samuel claimed that Dibb had dangerous illusions about Soviet realpolitik. Nevertheless, the study’s quality and originality shone through and resulted in the award of a doctorate by ANU in 1987 based on published work on the Soviet Union.

Subsequently, Dibb remained focused upon the Soviet Union’s international relations. In April 1991 he was present in Moscow with one of the authors of this chapter, R. Gerard Ward, at a meeting on Pacific regional affairs between representatives of The Australian National University’s RSPacS and the Soviet Academy’s Institute of International Relations and Economic Affairs. At a side gathering, a Soviet apparatchik sought to change the nature of the discussion from academic to intelligence matters — a move that Dibb immediately recognised from past experience and closed off! This suggested business as usual but, by the end of 1991, the Soviet Union had dissolved into independent republics, which also signalled the end of the Cold War. On reflection, Dibb thought that it was not possible to have foreseen the Soviet Union’s impending dissolution because of the wide knowledge gap that existed on its economic, social and ideological base. Indeed, the Soviet Union’s subsequent breakup impressed upon him the need to employ an interdisciplinary team to provide the broadest possible perspective in a continuing watching brief on both Russia’s and China’s prospects. Inevitably, in his view, given Australia’s geopolitical situation, such a team would of necessity include a political geographer.

38 ANUA, ‘19/Box 278 8103855P ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
5. THE POWER OF GEOGRAPHY

Figure 3A: A view of the world centred on Beijing
Figure 3B: Map of China’s military regions and field armies, c. 1979

Australia’s Strategic Geography

After returning to ANU in 1981 as a senior research fellow in arms control, disarmament and peace research, Dibb saw the need, following a review of Australia’s external relations in the decade after the defeat of the United States in the Vietnam War,40 to instil in Australians the belief that they could defend themselves.41 He realised that this shift from a dependent to a self-reliant military strategy required the injection of a missing geographical perspective into Australia’s defence policy to meet the request from the United States that its ally carry a greater burden of the security task.42 In 1985 he was given the opportunity to elaborate his thesis that the fundamentals of Australia’s geographical location should be key factors shaping military posture and force structure when was he was commissioned as a ministerial consultant to provide the first postwar review of the country’s defence capabilities by the Minister for Defence Kim Beazley.43 The resultant Dibb Review provided the springboard for Dibb again leaving ANU to become Director of the JIO (1986 to 1988) and then Deputy Secretary of Defence (1988 to 1991); he was also the primary author of the 1987 Defence White Paper.44 In 1991 Dibb returned once again to ANU with a special appointment as professor and head of SDSC (1991–2003) to focus on the future balance of power in Asia.45 Our interest, however, is not on his career movements between the intelligence community and academia, but on the way in which he has used his geographical skills to mutually benefit both spheres of activity. This double act is evident in Dibb’s model for Australia’s strategic geography that became known as the ‘Defence of Australia’ (DOA) paradigm.

42  ANUA, ‘19/Box 277 8103855C ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
45  ANUA, ‘19/Box 278 8103855P ANU Staff Files: Paul Dibb’.
Defence of Australia

Dibb’s conceptual base for the DOA paradigm, prioritising air and naval forces to defend the sea–air gap north of Australia, took its cue from Sir Arthur Tange’s astute observation that ‘a map of one’s own country is the most fundamental of all defence documentation’.46 Given Australia was a ‘middle ranking power’ with modest defence resources, Dibb proposed a layered geographical construct to guide defence planning (See Fig. 4):

1. An area of direct military interest, accounting for 10 per cent of the globe, where attention should be concentrated upon securing the country from attack by another state by having a military technological advantage to defend the country’s northern air and sea approaches through island or archipelagic states, and the inner arc of countries from or through which a threat could be mounted.

2. A broader area of primary strategic interest, covering 25 per cent of the globe from the mid-Indian Ocean in the west to the mid-Pacific in the east and from South-East Asia and the China Sea in the north to Antarctica in the south.

3. The rest of the world that afforded opportunities for coalitions but was not a primary determinant of force structure.

This concentric-ring model was designed to provide Australia’s defence strategists with an ironclad discipline to shape strategy and force structure; it also provided a construct to distinguish between ‘wars-of-necessity’ and ‘wars-of-choice’ (i.e. the difference between interventions in the Solomon Islands and East Timor versus Somalia, Iraq and Afghanistan).

Figure 4: First and second regions (I and II) of Australian strategic interest established in the Defence White Paper, 1987. Additional information has been added: (1) Cooperative Security Front, (2) Aid Front, (3) Environmental Security Front, and (4) Trade Front.

After returning to ANU in 1991, Dibb was able to maintain the DOA credo. He criticised severely the Australian role in peacekeeping in Africa because it was deflecting the defence force from its primary task of defending Australia, but he also advised Defence on its 1994 White Paper, which flagged a deeper concern with security interests and perceptions of Indian Ocean countries. Fostering the security of the

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neighbourhood within Australia’s immediate ‘arc of instability’ also led to him having direct involvement in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum (ARF) and in determining the role and structure of Papua New Guinea’s defence force.\(^{50}\) Beyond Australia’s region of prime military interest he argued that, given the cost of expeditionary forces, involvement supporting the United States should necessarily be limited to niche contributions. At the same time, soft diplomacy should be used to accommodate radical changes in Asian geopolitics following the economic crisis of 1997–98, which further exposed Japan’s underlying economic weakness and catapulted China into the role of a leading East Asia power.\(^{51}\)

The DOA paradigm prioritising ‘proximity’ held sway until after the United Nation’s intervention in East Timor in 1999 and the 2000 Defence White Paper, which accommodated geopolitical changes with an additional concentric ring separating maritime South-East Asia from the rest of the Asia-Pacific region.\(^{52}\) Although non-state actors, including international criminal elements and illegal immigrants, had been injected into the new millennium’s post-Cold War strategic equation, Dibb cautioned at the time against restructuring Australia’s military forces for constabulary actions.\(^{53}\) As his position did not address the American challenge for Australia to play a greater role in the alliance, Paul Monk, a former Defence analyst, posed a dozen questions to Dibb.\(^{54}\) Before these could be addressed, however, overseas events precipitated more fundamental criticisms of the DOA paradigm’s underpinnings in strategic geography.


Adverse Reactions

The destruction of the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001 (9/11) and the Bali bombings of 2002 prompted a statement from the Minister of Defence, Senator Robert Hill, that ‘it probably never made sense to conceptualise our security interests as a series of diminishing circles around our coastline, but certainly does not do so now’ given the globalised nature of security concerns.55 This view was reinforced by Alan Dupont’s argument that the international security landscape had been transformed and a new strategy was required more in keeping with the ‘post-modern era of Osama bin Laden’ than ‘the pre-modern world of Halford Mackinder’ due to technological advances in airpower and the power of ideology.56 Besides giving insufficient weight to transnational threats and recognition that modern defence forces had to win both the peace and the war, Dupont contended that the traditional emphasis on geostrategic imperatives not only ignored the globalised nature of modern conflict but also shaped the Australian Defence Force (ADF) for the wrong wars. Above all, ‘in an age of globalisation and transnational threats’, Dupont claimed that ‘geography matters far less that it once did due to the compressions of space and time’.57 This rejection of geopolitical considerations gained traction in updates of Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper, which gave greater support to expeditionary forces to operate in subordinate roles to support its US ally in distant theatres.

Dibb opposed ‘tinkering’ with the DOA policy, which was based firmly on the country’s strategic geography; he also suggested a set of precepts to balance Australia’s involvement with the United States after 9/11 that were weighted towards the specific defence needs of our region.58 These precepts, prioritising the country’s continental defence, prompted the winner of the Chief of Army Essay Competition, Major R.J. Worswick, to detail the mismatch between the defence of continental geography

and operational realities with overseas deployments in the Persian Gulf and the ‘coalition of the willing’ in Iraq. This was followed by a contribution from the Chief of Army, Peter Leahy, which questioned ‘how could the strategic reality of [offshore] operational commitments in support of interests be reconciled with a rigid strategic doctrine that upheld defence of geography?’ This counterview against the ‘concentric circles theology’ did not, as anticipated by Monk, result in a strategic changing of the guard.

Instead the intervention of the ADF’s Land Warfare Group led, as described by Major Stephanie Hodson, to the casting of Australia’s strategic options in terms of ‘regionalism versus globalisation’. Not wanting to become entrapped in this dichotomy, Dupont nevertheless returned to the fray contending that ‘geographical determinism is no substitute for sensible strategy’. According to him, the ADF ‘can no longer be configured solely for state on state conflicts or in the defence of the continent and immediate neighbourhood because of the compression of time and space that is the defining characteristic of a globalised world’. It follows that ‘our military forces must be versatile, smart, deployable over long distances and capable of protecting and sustaining themselves against all enemies, including the shadowy foes who will inhabit the urban battlefields of tomorrow’.

Counter Response

In response, Dibb was forced to reiterate the importance of strategic geography to Australia’s defence policy to avoid being continually tarred with the geographical determinist brush that was so generously

applied to Mackinder’s ideas in the past. While adhering to his overriding premise that geography is still a decisive factor in the fortunes of states, he has been careful to elaborate that a country’s geographical environment does not absolutely dictate a state’s defence policy. Rather than imposing a geographical straitjacket on defence planners, he sees the use of geography as an ‘independent variable’ that can provide an important guide to the prudent structuring of Australia’s air, naval and land force numbers.

Also, Dibb rebutted the argument that geography is less relevant in a globalised and spatially compressed world conjured up in such phrases that declare ‘distance is dead’ and the ‘world is flat’, which together presage the ‘end of geography’. Even in a flattening and shrinking world, geographical location is of prime importance, and distance remains to be modified, conquered and subjugated as Australia’s isolation still accounted for two-fifths of its 20 per cent gap in productivity as compared with the United States. Indeed Dibb’s riposte was that geography is still relevant so long as Papua New Guinea is of more strategic importance to Australia than Guinea-Bissau in Africa! This stinging remark may have had some influence on defence

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67 This sentiment echoes Nicholas Spykman’s view that ‘although the entire policy of a state does not derive from its geography, it cannot escape its geography’. See Nicholas J. Spykman, ‘Geography and Foreign Policy, II’, The American Political Sciences Review, Vol. 32, No. 2 (1938), p. 236.


69 Bryn Batterby, ‘Does Distance Matter? The Effect of Geographic Isolation on Productivity Levels’, Treasury Working Paper 2006–03 (Canberra: The Treasury, Australian Government, Apr. 2006). Note Gerard Kelly and Gianni La Cava find evidence that Australia’s average distance to final demand has increased, mainly during the 1990s. In 2011 Australia’s trade costs were 17 per cent higher than the world average due to Australia’s isolation, with goods and services being traded over longer distances, and resources being more costly to trade than manufactured goods. See Gerard Kelly & Gianni La Cava, ‘International Trade Costs, Global Supply Chains and Value-added Trade in Australia’, Research Discussion Paper, RDP–07 (Sydney: Economic Group, Reserve Bank of Australia, 2007).
planners shaping the 2009 Defence White Paper, *Force 2030*, which sought to reconcile the strategic geography and maritime approaches of Australia’s inner arc, comprising Indonesia, the south-west Pacific, Timor-Leste and New Zealand, with an emphasis on terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and humanitarian and disaster responses, albeit in which Defence has a supportive rather than a leading role.\(^{70}\) In the process, according to Hugh White, the concentric-rings model inherited from the 1987 and 2000 Defence white papers had, by 2009, become muddled with the removal of the ring separating maritime South-East Asia from the rest of the Asia.\(^{71}\) Although the DOA rhetoric was maintained, Michael Arnold\(^ {72}\) has suggested that there has been a discernible shift towards a broader national security agenda espoused by Dupont and Paul Reckmeyer;\(^ {73}\) this prompted Dibb\(^ {74}\) to once again repeat the importance of the inner arc in Australian defence policy and planning. Even in a global virtual world, as noted by John Quelch and Katharine Jocz, place still matters!\(^ {75}\) And given that troops on the ground must deal at first-hand with, and understand, the realities of local places (as in Afghanistan), local geography is of great importance at an operational level.

### Looking Ahead to 2035

By the 2013 Defence White Paper, there was a shift in strategy to reconceptualise a more expansive ‘single strategic arc’ by amalgamating Dibb’s ‘area of direct military interest’ and his ‘area of primary concern’. The resultant arc covers Indo-Pacific Asia, stretching from

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the mid-Indian Ocean to the mid-Pacific Ocean. Without reference to the influence of either Dibb or Dupont, Rory Medcalf casts this maritime super-region as ‘Australia’s new strategic map’, encompassing the strategic interests of China, India, Japan, Indonesia and the United States. However, Chengxin Pan and Yang Yi and Zhao Qinghai suggest that the intent of this new political space is to contain China rather than embrace it (See Fig. 5).

The sheer extent of this maritime environment centred upon South-East Asia, as highlighted by Dibb and Richard Brabin-Smith, raises the issue of the Australian Government’s ability to provide and operationalise the necessary force structure and budget to defend the country’s lines of communication and contribute to military contingencies. Given this dilemma, it is hoped that a new generation of geographers will be brought into interdisciplinary teams of analysts and thinkers to evaluate the validity of this meta-geographical concept. Such an intergenerational change, foreshadowed by Alex Burns and Ben Eltham, would bring about Dibb’s plea to return geography to its proper place in defence planning in the post-Afghanistan era so as to focus on the country’s northern and north-

western approaches, its immediate neighbours and South-East Asia. Indeed the time may be ripe for a new-style Dibb Review offering a long-term vision that defines strategic risks, approach and the role of Australia’s armed forces to 2035.

Figure 5: The new Indo-Pacific strategic arc construct connects the Indian and Pacific oceans through South-East Asia. Not only does the construct cover East Asia and the west Pacific regions but also includes the hitherto neglected regions of south and west Asia. As illustrated by the inset showing the Indo-Pacific region centred on India, the definition of the Indo-Pacific concept varies according to the particular country concerned.

Conclusions

Fellow geographers are keenly aware that Dibb’s influence on Australia’s defence policy in the aftermath of the Vietnam War reprises that exercised by the geographers Griffith Taylor and Spate after the

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First and Second World Wars. Indeed his direct impact as a strategic planner on defence policy has outstripped even these luminaries. His signal contribution has been in highlighting geographical location as a key factor in reshaping the country’s defence policy. Incorporating this factor into a set of principles to guide policy has enabled him to make his mark in the wider community almost in the same league as that exerted in another era by the leading American geographer Isaiah Bowman,87 who accompanied US President Woodrow Wilson to the Paris Peace Conference held after the First World War in Versailles.88 An added bonus has been his watching brief as Australia’s leading academic specialist on Russian geography in which he has presciently noted the ‘bear is back’ and its willingness to contemplate disruption in order to expand its strategic space. This style of analysis has also been extended to commentary on China’s economic, political and military affairs.89

All political geographers from Mackinder to Dibb have emphasised the important role of ‘the map’ (though often one is not provided!). Neglect of the map’s value has led Robert Kaplan to refer to the ‘revenge of geography’ from ignoring what the map tells us about coming conflicts and battles.90 Contemporary political geographers, represented by Gerard Toal, want to go beyond this style of analysis by arguing that the resultant geographies ‘cannot be considered without, at the same time, examining how economies are organized, states are governed, technological systems deployed and power distributed across the earth’.91 This observation coincides with Dibb’s plea for having political geographers as members of interdisciplinary teams

to reflect upon the strategic implications of Australia’s cul-de-sac position in relation to the ‘Main Street’ connection linking Europe, Asia and North America.92

Geography, and geopolitics in particular, have sought to reinvent themselves in the years since Dibb was a member of the Department of Human Geography in RSPacS at ANU in 1969.93 In the process, geography’s disciplinary clout has been lost in some Australian academic centres due to amalgamations of departments with cognate disciplines and the suffusion of its identity in omnibus titles. This experience is contrary to that of their thriving counterparts, with multiple professors of geography in other centres within Australia, Hong Kong, Singapore, the United Kingdom and the United States, many of whom are well versed in geopolitics. These vibrant departments have been buoyed by the use of geographical information systems, the need to address the logistical and local implications of climate change, and explorations of such contemporary topics as terror and territory.94 Not only their output but also Dibb’s life work as a political geographer in Australia should remind both governments and university decision-makers of the power of geography in public policy and discourse, and the need to ensure that it is front and centre in both teaching and research programs.
