

Introduction

Desmond Ball and Sheryn Lee

Paul Dobb has enjoyed an unusual career. He has earned and maintained an international scholarly reputation of the highest order, while at the same time he has done much distinguished public service. He was a pioneer in moving back and forth between posts in government departments, notably the Department of Defence, and academia. He has published more than a dozen books and monographs, about 100 chapters and articles in scholarly books and journals, and produced six official reports for government. He has happily engaged in vigorous public debate about important and controversial strategic and defence issues. Since 2006 he has written more than 40 op-ed articles for the *Australian*, each involving rigorous and succinct analyses of current issues than usually appears on those pages.

In January 1989, having just been appointed Deputy Secretary (Strategy and Intelligence) in the Department of Defence, he was awarded a Member of the Order of Australia (AM) in ‘recognition of service to the Public Service’. Much of this service involved matters of the highest secrecy, but his public activities included the role from November 1986 to December 1988 of director of the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO), where he had previously spent 11 years. From 1974 to 2004, he was one of the handful of Defence officials fully cleared for entry into the US–Australian ‘joint facilities’, including Pine Gap, the CIA’s most important technical intelligence collection station in the world. He also worked for the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO) on counterintelligence operations from 1964 to 1991. Over 1985–86, he produced the *Review of Australia’s Defence Capabilities*, which became known as the Dobb Review, for Minister

for Defence Kim Beazley.¹ There are few others in this country who are as comfortable with robust public debate while maintaining such professional intimacy with core elements of the intelligence community as Dibb.

This collection of essays, by more than a dozen of his friends and colleagues, is intended to review Dibb's work, including his public service and his academic publications. The unusual combination of governmental experience and keeper of secrets on the one hand, and prolific academic and public commentator on the other hand, is a particularly interesting aspect of Dibb's career. His academic writings are tempered by geostrategic and political realities, while his strategic analyses and policy advice are informed by academic discourse.

Two of Paul's closest friends, Allan Hawke and Admiral (Retired) Chris Barrie, both of whom worked with him in Defence, have contributed personal perspectives on him. In Chapter 1, Hawke describes Paul's upbringing in the coalmining villages in West Yorkshire, and his determination to avoid coalmining as a career. He graduated from Nottingham University in 1960 with a Bachelor of Arts in economics and geography with honours, but that was not good enough for entry into Britain's Civil Service. He was from the wrong class. However, as Hawke notes, 'Britain's loss was to turn out to be Australia's gain'. He joined the Australian Public Service in Canberra in January 1962, starting in the Department of Trade and later moving to the then Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE). Having studied Russian at Nottingham, the BAE wanted him to work on Soviet agricultural economics, which prompted his long-term professional interest in the Soviet Union/Russia.

Chris Barrie, in Chapter 2, relates that he first met Paul in 1985, when Paul was working on the Dibb Review and Chris was 'a relatively junior Navy officer', but their friendship only blossomed after 2003, when Chris joined the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre (SDSC) at The Australian National University (ANU), having retired as Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) the previous year. He describes working

1 Paul Dibb, *Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities*, report to the Minister for Defence (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1986).

with Paul as ‘an enriching experience’. He also highlights Paul’s ‘deep commitment to ... nurturing, encouraging and mentoring [younger people] in the strategic studies field’.

Desmond Ball, who has known and worked closely with Dibb since the mid-1980s, provides further personal reflections in Chapter 3. He describes the major milestones in Dibb’s career, but also tries to shed light on the personality of a man who has earned international academic prominence, been honoured for his government service, and negotiated the interstices between these very different realms before anyone else attempted anything similar. Ball describes Dibb as being highly motivated and with the courage to seek out new pastures — characteristics that might also explain his penchant for driving fast cars. He was able to attract the support of superb mentors, such as Bob Furlonger and Bob Mathams in the JIO; Sir Arthur Tange, Secretary of the Department of Defence; Kim Beazley; and professors Harry Rigby and J.D.B. Miller at ANU. He has always focused on the critical issues of the time, but also ones selected for their enduring and consequential implications, such as the central role of the ‘joint facilities’ in the US–Australian alliance, the impact of deficiencies in Soviet human geography that brought into question its status as a superpower in the 1980s, the determinate role of geography in shaping Australia’s defence strategy and capabilities, the balance of power in East Asia, and the strategic competition between China and the United States. As Robert Ayson depicts him in Chapter 6, drawing on Isaiah Berlin’s typology, Dibb is ‘more of a hedgehog (a thinker who focuses on one big idea) and less of a fox (who knows many)’.²

Dibb’s work on Soviet agricultural economics led him to visit the Soviet embassy in Canberra and thence to his acquaintance with Don Marshall, a young member of ASIO’s counterespionage branch, who Dibb has called ‘the person who changed my life’. In 1964, Marshall persuaded him to cultivate several officials in the embassy (most particularly Nikolai Poseliagin, Igor Saprykin and Yuri Pavlov) to get their views on issues concerning the central strategic nuclear balance and to discern their real interests and priorities and, possibly, persuade one or other of them to defect. He failed to ‘turn’ any of them; he says that ‘they were either too smart or they had a mole deep

2 Isaiah Berlin, *The Hedgehog and the Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History*, 2nd edn (Princeton University Press, 2013), p. 1.

inside ASIO'. The first detailed account of this side of Dibb's life was published by Geoffrey Barker in January 2007.³ That article forms the basis for Chapter 4, in which Barker situates Dibb's counterintelligence work for ASIO and his personal and professional relationship with Marshall in the broader context of the unabashed 'realism' of his understanding of international relations and his appreciation of the magnitude of the threat posed to Western interests and, indeed, Western survival by the Soviet Union.

Marshall was instrumental in Paul becoming an Australian citizen in February 1970. Paul was in the Department of Human Geography at ANU at that time, but was anticipating a position in JIO. Marshall said 'if you're going to join the Australian intelligence community, you should be a citizen, mate', and produced a form for Paul to fill in. A week later, without any further formalities, Marshall gave him his citizenship certificate.

Dibb left Nottingham University not only with a deep and abiding interest in the Soviet Union/Russia but also, and even more fundamentally, he had been intellectually framed in its very good Geography Department. In 1964–65, he had an Australian Public Service scholarship to study part-time in the Department of Geography in the School of General Studies at ANU where, as Peter J. Rimmer and R. Gerard Ward note in Chapter 5, he 'would have inculcated in Dibb the need for the greater use of statistics and model-building in geographical analysis'. In 1969–70, he spent a year in the Department of Human Geography in the Research School of Pacific Studies (RSPacS) at ANU, where he was further exposed to 'the development of a scientific approach to geographical problems'. As Rimmer and Ward show, Dibb's geographical training is the foundation on which his views about power, strategy, and Australian defence planning rest. He is a solid member of 'the pantheon of geostrategists who have long recognised geography as a decisive factor in the fortunes of nation states'; his studies of the Soviet Union/Russia and China are underpinned by geographical analysis; his 'arc of instability' is inherently a geographic construct; and geography has infused his approach to Australian defence policy and planning, with his concepts of the 'area of direct military interest' (ADMI) and surrounding 'area of primary strategic

3 Geoffrey Barker, 'The Person Who Changed My Life', *Weekend Australian Financial Review*, 25–28 Jan. 2007, pp. 27–29.

interest' (APSI), and his appreciation of the sea–air gap as the key to Defence of Australia (DOA), and hence his prioritising of maritime and air forces in terms of capabilities. For Rimmer and Ward, Dibb exemplifies 'the power of geography in public policy and discourse'.

In Chapter 6, Robert Ayson traverses some of the same terrain as Rimmer and Ward in the previous chapter but, with the eye of a strategist, he concentrates mainly on the period since the 1980s, or just the latter half of the Rimmer–Ward excursion. Ayson says that 'it is difficult to exaggerate the importance of geographical considerations in Dibb's approach to strategy and defence policy decision-making, especially, but not only, in the case of Australia'. Geography shapes our abiding (and truly vital) national interests, and it should be a primary determinant of Australia's strategic policy and defence capabilities. Ayson notes that 'there is more than a hint of material determinism' in some of Dibb's writings about Australian defence. Further, however, he argues that some of the principal geographic themes that Dibb articulated with respect to Australia's defence in 1986 were derived from his Soviet studies. There, Dibb found that Soviet priorities could be depicted in terms of 'an area of primary strategic interest defined by one's immediate geography'; that geography contained both assets and liabilities, which successful planning required be adroitly leveraged; and that the Kremlin's anxieties about the distant, vast, sparsely populated and resource-rich Siberia had implicit resonance with concerns in Canberra about Australia's northern stretches and approaches.

The mid- and late 1980s was the 'golden age' of Australian national security policymaking, defence planning and force-structure development. The Dibb Review in 1986 and the government's 1987 White Paper, *The Defence of Australia*, produced for the first time a clear and coherent basis for Australian defence planning and capability development. New strategic concepts were developed for contingency planning and warning-time analysis. Clear and coherent guidance was articulated that provided the Australian Defence Force (ADF) with the capability to control the sea–air gap, that ocean moat to our north, and thus effect the defence of Australia on a self-reliant basis. This conceptual transformation in Australian defence policy was directed by Beazley, at that time Minister for Defence, but Dibb was largely responsible for developing the strategic concepts and defining the criteria for capability planning and force-structure development,

as well as integrating it into the strategic guidance. Beazley observes in Chapter 7 that the ‘remorseless’ and ‘systematic’ logic of Dibb’s constructs ‘has never been bettered’.

Three chapters of this book are devoted to examining Dibb’s work on Australian defence policy and planning. In Chapter 7, Beazley describes Dibb as ‘the creative spirit behind the 1980s Labor Government’s defence strategy, which prioritised the defence of Australia’. He believes that understanding the ‘essence of our strategic geography’ was fundamental to Dibb’s contribution. The strength of his logic derived from the ‘disciplined linkages that he forged between national strategy, military strategy, geography and force structure’. Geography dictates that defence of the air and maritime approaches should be the most important determinant of the ADF’s force structure.

Maps, which are now invariably integrated with high-resolution digital imagery, are essential tools in geography. Sir Arthur Tange told the CDF conference at Canungra, Queensland, in August 1986 that ‘a map of one’s own country is the most fundamental of all defence documentation’.⁴ The maps that accompanied the Dibb Review in 1986 and the 1987 *Defence of Australia* White Paper, and which were novel as well as controversial in their geostrategic implications, are reproduced prior to this Introduction (Maps 1 and 2).

Richard Brabin-Smith, in Chapter 8, provides a first-hand account of the development of the concepts that comprised Dibb’s logic for the defence of Australia. He was a member of the five-person Department of Defence Review Team, which was organised to support Dibb with respect to the preparation and production of the review. As a specialist in force-structure analysis, Dibb had already been exploring some of these concepts. The Dibb Review was a feast for defence academics, policymakers, force planners and the media, being replete with ideas and a cascade of concepts publicly explicated for the first time: ‘enhanced self-reliance’ as a national strategy; ‘denial’ through defence of the ‘sea–air gap’ as a military strategy; concepts pertaining to different levels of contingency (‘low level’, ‘escalated low level’ and

4 Arthur Tange, ‘The Reorganization of the Defence Group of Departments: Reflections Ten Years On’, address to CDF [Chief of Defence Force] Conference, Canungra, Queensland, 26 Aug. 1986, in Arthur Tange, *Defence Policy Administration and Organization: Selected Lectures, 1971–1986* (Canberra: University College of New South Wales, 1986), p. 90.

'higher level') and associated warning times (and henceforth expansion times); ADMI and APSI; and a host of 'operational concepts' that were largely derived from geographical considerations.

Brabin-Smith also provides an insightful critique of the impact of the conceptual framework and the specific capability recommendations of the Dibb Review on the subsequent service force structure developments. Resistance to some elements of the logic was widespread, not only involving the Army. The Navy has never accepted the argument in the review that greater priority should be accorded to the anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities of the surface fleet. Having served as Deputy Secretary (Strategy) in 2000–02, and then having had more than a decade of academic rumination, Brabin-Smith still strongly believes that 'the imperatives of Australia's strategic geography need to remain the foundation upon which Australian defence planning continues to build'.

Peter Jennings, in Chapter 9, addresses 'the politics and practicalities of designing Australia's force structure'. He focuses on the interaction of defence policymaking and politics, at the intersection of the political decision-making process, involving the cabinet room and ministerial suites in Parliament House, and the force-development process at Russell Hill. He argues that the Dibb Review 'set the model' that has been followed to greater or lesser extents by successive governments in the development of Defence white papers ever since and, after reviewing the 1976, 1987, 1994, 2000, 2009, 2013 and 2016 publications, concludes that the 'Dibb model' is likely to remain the 'favoured way of making defence policy'.

'Politics and practicalities' also mean, however, that the demands of the political parties for 'product differentiation' are just as compelling as changes in the strategic environment with respect to shaping the policy guidance. Both factors figured in the policy of 'DOA plus' articulated by Defence Minister Ian McLachlan in 1996–98 in the first conservative Coalition Government under John Howard, who said that 'Australia's defence does not begin at the coast-line' but could involve operations further forward of the island archipelago (or sea–air gap), including 'proactive operations' against 'military assets and installations which could be used to attack Australia' and the ability to defeat an enemy 'on land' at substantial distances from Australia.

Jennings, who was involved in the development of the 'DOA plus' policy, notes in Chapter 9 that it involved 'extension of the DOA concept further into the region', while retaining the geographically based DOA as its core. He notes that '[the policies of] DOA and "forward defence" meet at some point in the archipelago of islands to Australia's north and further into South-East Asia', whereat another geographical space is in effect added to the DOAs ADMI and APSI. The new space extended from around 2,500 to around 3,500 kilometres north-west and north-east of Darwin, and potentially as far as 5,000–6,000 kilometres north into north-east Asia. Parts of this large area are a long way from Australia's shores. As Jennings also notes, 'the requirements for an effective "DOA plus" policy are practically identical to what is needed to sustain an expeditionary force'. Indeed, 'DOA plus' effectively opened the door for the Services, and particularly the Army, to justify new capabilities not required by narrower definitions of DOA. In the late 1990s the Army dropped its focus on the defence of northern Australia and adopted a strategic concept which 'reflects Australia's experience in the south-west Pacific campaign of World War II'.⁵ In practice, 'DOA plus' involved much more than a simple geographic extension of DOA; it was the first fracture in a succession of increasingly fraught policy statements, beginning with the 2000 White Paper but more haphazard in the 2009, 2013 and 2016 exercises.

The US alliance is inevitably a central consideration in Australian defence planning and, as Benjamin Schreer states in Chapter 10, it 'has been of singular importance to Paul Dibb's professional life'. In Chapter 7, Kim Beazley says that the alliance is 'a verity to which Dibb always paid obeisance'. Indeed, Dibb has consistently argued, both as a senior official and an academic, that the alliance is 'irreplaceable' and that its benefits are 'priceless'. A 'self-reliant' defence posture is not possible without access to US technology, intelligence and logistics support. As Schreer describes, the US–Australian 'joint facilities', originally comprised of the naval communications station at North West Cape, the early warning satellite ground station at Nurrungar and the ground control station for the CIA's geostationary signals intelligence (SIGINT) satellites

5 Australian Army, *Fundamentals of Land Warfare* (Canberra, Dec. 1998), at www.army.gov.au/Our-future/Publications/Key-Publications/Land-Warfare-Doctrine-1. See also Robert Garran, 'Army has Foreign Shores in its Sights', *Australian*, 4 Mar. 1999, p. 2; and 'Australia: Army Casts Eye at Offshore Ops', *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 7 Apr. 1999, pp. 30–33.

at Pine Gap, with only the latter in operation from 1999, constitute the strategic essence of the alliance. For Dibb, Pine Gap has not only provided Australia with extraordinary intelligence, it is also the essence of US extended deterrence guarantees. Moreover, hosting Pine Gap manifests Australia's interest in committing the United States to the Asia-Pacific region and encouraging the United States to act as a 'balancer' in the region and 'to check against hegemonic ambitions of a hostile major power'. Schreer observes that Dibb is 'a "classical realist" when it comes to alliance politics: he stresses the importance of values and traditions that tie the two allies together'.

As Schreer carefully recounts, however, Dibb has also expressed grave concerns about some aspects of the alliance. He has noted that the threat perceptions of the two allies are not always aligned, that 'the United States is a global power with a variety of interests, none of them centred on Australia', that 'there are potential situations where we would not expect the United States to commit combat forces on our behalf', and that America, as a unilateral power, had become dismissive of the norms of international behaviour. He was critical of George Bush's decision to invade Iraq in 2003, and of the Howard Government's willingness to support it. He accepts that there are costs and risks associated with the joint facilities (including the assessment that they likely ranked as Soviet nuclear targets during the Cold War).

Importantly, Dibb is a vigorous contestant of the view that US power is in decline and that Australia should be more 'accommodating' to the rising China. As he argued in 2011:

We should not be in the business of accommodating China on key issues of our own security just because of some narrow mercantile views of the relationship. Neither should we eschew opportunities to enhance our longstanding alliance with the US because of premature notions of that great nation's decline.⁶

For Dibb, a rising China increases the need for Australia to tighten and strengthen its relationship with Washington.

Dibb began his career as a student of Soviet economic geography and the Soviet Union, and Russia since 1991, has remained a perennial interest. His first publication on the region, on the economics of

6 Paul Dibb, 'US Build-up No Threat to Peace', *Australian*, 15 Nov. 2011.

the Soviet wheat industry, was in 1966, now just on 50 years ago.⁷ His widely acclaimed book on the Soviet Union as ‘the incomplete superpower’ was published 30 years ago in 1986.⁸ He included Russia as a party to the emerging balance of power in Asia in his monograph published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London in 1995, a time when other analysts (including Hugh White) thought that it could be omitted from relevant calculus.⁹ In 2006, in an influential article published in Washington, he argued that ‘the Bear is back’; that is, that Russia was making ‘a comeback’ as a major power, that it was already exhibiting the ‘contemporary will to re-establish and reassert great power status’, that Vladimir Putin had reversed its post-Soviet military decline, and that a resurgent Russia would be strong, assertive, unafraid of clashing with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and insistent on obtaining ‘Russian dominance in its neighbourhood, especially in Ukraine, the Baltics and eastern Europe’.¹⁰ He thought that Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008 and its invasion of Ukraine and annexation of Crimea in March 2014 signified the return to ‘a world where the sanctity of internationally recognised borders is ignored, the use of force is back in command and where a nuclear-armed major power acts with impunity in its own neighbourhood’.¹¹ He said in July 2014 that Putin acted from ‘the traditional perspective of a former KGB colonel’, and that his policies are imbued with ‘a classical KGB colonel’s deception, disguising (*maskirovka*) his true intent’.¹²

Hugh White, in Chapter 11, uses *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower* as a case study to elucidate Dibb’s approach to ‘unravelling the enigma of Soviet power’ — a country at once ‘weak and mighty’, and its policies cloaked in deception. For Dibb, the fundamental methodological premise for understanding both Soviet motivations and capability developments was to see events as they would be

7 Paul Dibb, *The Economics of the Soviet Wheat Industry* (Canberra: Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1966).

8 Paul Dibb, *The Soviet Union: The Incomplete Superpower* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies and Macmillan, 1986).

9 Paul Dibb, *Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia*, Adelphi Paper No. 295 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995).

10 Paul Dibb ‘The Bear is Back’, *The American Interest*, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1 Nov. 2006, pp. 78–85, www.the-american-interest.com/2006/11/01/the-bear-is-back/.

11 Paul Dibb, *The Geopolitical Implications of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine*, Centre of Gravity Paper, No. 16, Jun. (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, 2014).

12 Paul Dibb, ‘Putin’s Hand is All Over the MH17 Catastrophe’, *Australian*, 21 July 2014.

perceived in Moscow — perceptions that ‘are derived from unique cultural and historical traditions’. Central to these is a sense of its own weakness and vulnerability. Dobb’s exploration of the ‘weak’ side of the equation identified the pressures that were so quickly to bring about the collapse of the Soviet Union. White concludes that assessment of a resurgent Russia must be based on appreciation of the ‘resolve and determination, borne of the deep historical, cultural and geographical factors’ that Dobb explained in *The Incomplete Superpower*.

As an avowed realist, Dobb regards power as the ultimate determinant of conflicts between nation-states involving their respective vital interests. Geographical considerations, involving the domains of both human geography (including economic parameters, demographic factors and political structures) and physical geography (borders and approaches, distances and major terrain features), are among the most important ingredients of national power. As Brendan Taylor says in Chapter 12, Dobb is a ‘classical realist’ in that he appreciates the importance of domestic economic and political dynamics in affecting social stability and shaping inter-state power dynamics.

Taylor is concerned in Chapter 12 with Dobb’s analysis of the Asian balance of power and, most particularly, his Adelphi Paper entitled *Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia*, published by the IISS in 1995, which he regards as still being ‘the classic academic treatment of the Asian balance’. He is struck by the prevalence of Australian scholars in writings on this subject, notably Coral Bell, Hedley Bull and Hugh White as well as Dobb. He attributes this, ‘first and foremost’, to Australia’s strategic geography and, in particular, its proximity to Asia. As Bell wrote in 1968, ‘Australians are the only group of Westerners who must remain fully and inescapably vulnerable to the diplomatic stresses arising in Asia, on whose periphery they live or die’.¹³ On the other hand, Australia’s distance from the major powers in north-east Asia perhaps allows Australian scholars ‘to look at the Asian balance more objectively and systematically’ than scholars and practitioners from within that subregion. Taylor is impressed by the ‘remarkable degree of prescience’ in Dobb’s analysis ‘when seen in the context of the shifting power dynamics that are evident in Asia today’.

13 Coral Bell, *The Asian Balance of Power: A Comparison with European Precedents*, Adelphi Paper No. 44, Feb. (1968), p. 1.

He believes that Dibb's treatment of the Asian balance demonstrates the benefits of his 'crossbreeding' in government service/intelligence assessment and academic scholarship.

Dibb is unquestionably a 'passionate realist', but he is also a strong advocate of regional engagement and a dedicated participant in certain important multilateral processes. His involvement in regional diplomacy began, as Raoul Heinrichs and William T. Tow describe in Chapter 13, with bilateral intelligence exchanges and security dialogues with regional counterparts. For example, he initiated intelligence exchanges with the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) in August 1978 (see Photo 2). He initiated the bilateral security dialogue between Australia and Japan in March 1990, when together with Admiral Alan Beaumont, Vice Chief of the Defence Force (VCDF), he led an Australian party to Tokyo for official talks. Australia became the second country, after the United States, with which Japan engaged in regular bilateral security dialogues. The initial talks were hosted by Yukio Satoh, then the director-general of the Information Analysis, Research and Planning Bureau in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), and one of Japan's foremost official exponents of multilateralism. The discussion was limited on the Japanese side to MOFA and Japan Defense Agency (JDA) civilians, as the JDA was at that stage unwilling to approve direct military–military talks between Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and other defence forces (apart from the United States). This series of exchanges, referred to as the Dibb–Beaumont talks, continued until 1995, when the Japanese side agreed to the institution of annual political–military and military–military consultations. The initial exchanges mainly involved assessments concerning the strategic nuclear balance between the United States and the Soviet Union and the implications of strategic arms control negotiations.¹⁴

In the early 1990s, as regional discourse about post-Cold War security arrangements boomed, Dibb invented the concept of Track 1.5 diplomacy to refer to bilateral and multilateral security agenda-setting and participation dialogues dominated by officials — participating in their private capacities.¹⁵ In coining the term, he became an exemplar

14 Desmond Ball, 'Whither the Japan–Australia Security Relationship?', Nautilus Institute for Security and Sustainability, *APSN Net Policy Forum*, 21 Sep. 2006, nautilus.org/apsnet/0632a-ball.html/.

15 See 'Track One-and-a-Half', in David Capie & Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 211–12.

practitioner. He organised the first Australia–China bilateral Track 1.5 meeting in Beijing in 1992, at which he was accompanied by Rory Steele from Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) and Hugh White from the Office of National Assessments (ONA) (see Photo 16).

In 1994, he co-authored with Foreign Minister Gareth Evans the path-breaking *Australian Paper on Practical Proposals for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region*, which infused the concept paper adopted by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regional forum (ARF) at its second meeting in Brunei in August 1995. Since 2006, he has served as an Australian representative on the ARF Experts and Eminent Persons (EEP) group, where, Heinrichs and Tow note, ‘he has been a tireless agitator for the need to approach Asia’s multilateral security architecture in ways that lead from dialogue to practical cooperation’. In particular, ‘he has worked assiduously to gain support for a regional “incidents at sea” accord’.¹⁶ Complementing his expertise with respect to ‘hard power’, his contributions to regional diplomacy have been matched by few of his peers. His help to shape Australia’s strategic position in the region, and the region’s agenda for multilateral security cooperation, is truly an extraordinary legacy.

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16 Paul Dibb, ‘Treaty May Steer China, Japan to Safer Waters’, *Australian*, 1 Apr. 2013.

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