

Appendix A: Socio-Economic Developments in Kolojonggo before 1965

A.1. Economic History of Yogyakarta in the 19th century

At the peak of its power, the territory of Mataram was divided into three: the core areas surrounding the capital called *nagaraagung*¹, the neighbouring areas of *nagaraagung* stretching into the central and eastern parts of Java called *mancanagara* and the territories in the northern coastal areas called *pasisir* (Moertono, 1974:101). In the 17th and 18th century, the *pasisir* was gradually incorporated into direct Dutch rule while, following the British interregnum and after the Java War, the *mancanagara* was annexed by the Dutch Colonial government (Selosoemardjan, 1962:27). Therefore, after 1830, Mataram incorporated parts of its previous *nagaraagung*, the Yogyakarta and Surakarta regions, under its sovereignty. This state of affairs continued until the retreat of the Dutch from Java in 1942. Throughout this period, the shrunken *nagaraagung* remained enclaves ruled by two partitioned kingdoms of Mataram under the supervision of the Dutch Residents.

Land in the *nagaraagung*, which was also called *Vorstenlanden* in Dutch, was liable to appanage (*lungguh*). Appanage referred to 'an assigned region where one has the right to gain from the land and the inhabitants a profit ... but which gives no rights on the land itself.'² The right to grant appanage was reserved for the ruler who was thought to have the sole proprietary right to the produce of the soil (Raffles, 1965:137). Those entitled to receive appanage were royal families, court officials and favourites of the ruler.³

The appanage holders (*patih* or *patuh*) living in the city employed intermediaries (*bekel*) to manage their appanage (*kebekelan*). The main roles of the *bekel* who was selected from among the residents in a certain *kebekelan* were to extract products and labour from villagers and to transfer these to the *patih*. Apart from these, the *bekel* was also in charge of 'guarding order and tranquillity' (*njaga tata tenterem*) in his *kebekelan*. In so far as he could fulfil these duties, the *bekel*

¹ Due to the policy of the ruler of keeping his officials close to himself by providing them with appanages within the core areas and as a result of increase in the number of officials to support court life, the size of *nagaraagung* was gradually enlarged until, towards the end of the 18th century, it included the Yogyakarta-Surakarta areas and the Bagelen-Kedu areas (Moertono, 1974:102).

² Van Vollenhoven, *Javaansch Adatrecht* (Leiden, 1923), cited in Moertono (1974:117).

³ The size of appanage varied in accordance with administrative rank in the case of court officials and with the closeness to the ruler in the case of royal families (Suhartono, 1991:35). The number of *cacah* (landholding family) living in the appanage was a criterion to differentiate one appanage holder from others. In Mataram, each holder was called in accordance with the number of *cacah* such as *panewu* (thousand), *panatus* (hundred), *peneket* (fifty) and *panalawe* (twenty five) (ibid.:36).

was given the freedom to manage his *kebekelan*, a privilege which allowed him to be called 'a small ruler' (*raja kecil*) (Suhartono,1991:55).⁴ He could expel peasants from his *kebekelan* (Selosoemardjan,1962:218) and could allocate *sawah* from one villager to another (Raffles,1965:145). This position gave the *bekel* room to use his power for his own benefit rather than for the *patih*'s. Mobilising the manpower of his subordinates, the *bekel*, for example, could convert uninhabited areas into *sawah*. As the individually developed land was akin to private property and was not liable to tax, this provided the *bekel* with a chance to accumulate wealth without being noticed by the *patih* (Carey,1981:xxxviii-xxxix).

Living in the *kebekelan* under the control of the *bekel* were peasant villagers. In terms of their access to land, they were classified into four: those who were given a right to cultivate *sawah* and access to a yard (*pekarangan*) to erect a house (*kuli kenceng* or *kuli sikep*); those who were given a yard but were on the waiting list for the allotment of *sawah* (*kuli kendo* or *kuli setengah kenceng*); those who had a house in someone's *pekarangan* (*tumpang*); and those who were not entitled to *sawah* nor a house, and boarded with another family (*tumpang tlosor*) (Moertono,1974:138). This stratification system was not a closed one where change of one's status from one to the *kuli kenceng* was blocked, but an open one where those who were ready to bear duties imposed on the *kuli kenceng* could be promoted as the *kuli kenceng*. The degree of openness in this system might be dependent on the size of available land and the population in each area. However, given that population density in the first half of the 19th century was far lower than in the early 20th century⁵, the *kuli kenceng* had to satisfy various duties which were not imposed on villagers of the other categories⁶ and the *bekel* could acquire more labour force as the number of the *kuli kenceng* increased, it is likely that the promotion to the *kuli kenceng* might have not been difficult, if someone was determined to bear the duties of the *kuli kenceng*.⁷

⁴ The freedom given to the *bekel* to manage his own *kebekelan* was comparable with the principles for organising state apparatus in Mataram: self-sufficiency and non-interference. The ruler granted the *patih* the right to govern their appanages autonomously and self-sufficiently and did not interfere in the matters happening there as long as order and tranquillity were maintained (Moertono,1974:88-92).

⁵ In the first half of the 19th century, the population in Yogyakarta was less than 350,000 (*Koloniale Verslagen*, cited in Houben,1994:319). Later in the early 20th century, the population rose to more than a million (*Statistisch Jaaroverzicht Voor Nederlandsch-Indie*,1922-23).

⁶ The duties of the *kuli kenceng* were as follows: first, they should pay half of the product from *sawah* to the *patih*; second, they should make occasional tributes in the forms of chickens, oil, wood and so on when the *patih* held a private feast and when two important Islamic Days (celebration of the birth of the Prophet Muhammad and of the end of the fasting month) came; and third, they had to supply corvée labour. They cultivated *sawah* allocated to the *bekel*, usually one-fifth of the total area available in a certain *kebekelan*, without compensation, participated in community works such as improvement of roads, ditches and bridges and were mobilised for other private and public works initiated by the *bekel*, the *patih* and the ruler (Suhartono,1991:39-43). Suhartono estimated that the total amount of corvée labour of the *kuli kenceng* reached 74 days a year (ibid.:41-2).

⁷ According to village elders in Kolojonggo, *tumpang* (villagers holding neither *sawah* nor *pekarangan*), in the early 20th century, designated mainly the newly married groom who moved into his wife's *kebekelan* and lived with her family, and temporary migrant workers rather than the landless as the term implies. As the marriage of the newly wedded couple became stable and when the migrant workers

Although the position of the *bekel* was not based on heredity but on a contract between the *patih* and the *bekel*⁸ and everyone was in principle eligible for the *bekel*-ship, the chance for ordinary villagers to be installed as the *bekel* was not high. They could not easily obtain one of the keys to be promoted as the *bekel*, namely, wealth to make an advance payment (Moertono, 1973:132). Unlike the *patih* who did not maintain a close watch over the *bekel*, the *bekel* was in a position to scrutinise every villager in his *kebekelan*. Unless someone had a special relation with the *bekel*, the latter would never allow the former to gain as much wealth as he had (Selosoemardjan, 1962:221). The difficulty for ordinary villagers to be promoted to the *bekel* implies that the rural populace was differentiated into two groups in the first half of the 19th century: the ruling class of the *bekel*, and their subordinates; peasant villagers. Although not based on a hereditary principle, this system encouraged the formation of a rigid boundary between the *bekel* and other villagers by giving the former room to use his power for his own benefits.

The second half of the 19th century saw a gradual erosion of the *bekel*'s previous position as a '*raja kecil*' and his transformation into a simple functionary to extract labour and tax from villagers. This change was brought about by factors both within and outside the appanage system. One of the challenges that the *bekel* faced from within was the segmentation of the *kebekelan*. The *patih*, who wanted to obtain extra revenues, adopted a strategy of increasing the number of *bekel* by dividing the appanage. The new *bekel*-ships thus created were put up for auction and given to the highest bidders.⁹ The numbers of the *kebekelan* increased to such an extent that in 1883, there were *bekel* who had five households under their jurisdiction in Yogyakarta, while it was reported in Surakarta that one *bekel* supervised only a single household (Mulherin, 1970-71:24).¹⁰ The decreasing number of households under his control and the severe competition for *bekel*-ship meant that the *bekel* had less room to accumulate wealth and used more to retain his position (Takashi, 1990:14).

The second factor contributing to the changes in the position of the *bekel* and to the socio-economic structure of rural villages in general was the massive influx of foreigners into the Principalities, who acquired leases from the *patih*. The system of leasing the appanage to foreigners began in the 18th century by the

decided to settle down, which was symbolised by their marriages with the local women, the *pekarangan* to build a house and a plot of *sawah* were allocated to them. This comment implies that the number of the landless was, if any, only a few among the total villagers until the early 20th century.

⁸ The contract between the *patih* and the *bekel* was recorded in a *piagam*, in which the duties of the *bekel* were minutely noted. For an example of a '*piagam*', see Moertono (1974:130-133).

⁹ Van Kol, *Reisbrieven*, pp. 13-14. Cited in Takashi (1990:14-15).

¹⁰ In 1910, there were 5750 *bekel* in Yogyakarta and the land under their control was 7200 *jung* (Takashi, 1990:15). This indicates that the average size of the *kebekelan* was around 0.8 *jung* (3.2 *bau* or 2.24 hectares). In the case of Kolojonggo, the size of the *kebekelan* was much larger than the average. Around 17 hectares of *sawah* in Kolojonggo was under the control of three *bekel* before the 1920s, signifying that one *kebekelan* incorporated about 5.5 hectares of *sawah*.

patih who faced a shortage of money (Raffles, 1965:273). When land and products at the disposal of foreign plantation owners expanded in the late 18th and in the early 19th century, the Dutch government, seeing its monopoly of coffee being threatened, restricted land leases in the government territories in 1808 and prohibited them in 1818 (Klaberen, 1953:98). As the Principalities were excluded from this law, the Yogyakarta and Surakarta regions became the most attractive places for foreign planters, resulting in a dramatic increase in the areas of land leased to them.¹¹ In 1839, the area rented to foreign planters was 5210 *bau* (1 *bau* = 7096 m²) (Houben, 1994:267), while this increased to 45,616 *bau* in 1862 (*ibid.*) and 93,000 *bau* in 1890 (Takashi, 1990:11).


When renting *sawah* from the *patih*, foreign planters did not have any intention of transforming the basic logic of the appanage system, namely, 'the land belonged to the ruler, the rights to the land belonged to the *patih*, the power over the land belonged to the *bekel* and the peasant simply belonged to the land' (O'Malley, 1977:168). Instead, they adapted themselves to this system by positioning themselves between the *patih* and the *bekel*. They carried out the same duties as the *bekel* had borne for the *patih* and received the same rights that the *patih* had over the *bekel*, namely, the rights to use the land and to acquire free labour from the peasants.¹² As the area of the land they rented increased and their interest shifted gradually from indigo to sugar cultivation in the latter half of the 19th century, however, their presence became a major force in transforming the socio-economic structure of Yogyanese villages and the position of the *bekel*.

Under foreign sugarcane planters, the *sawah* was physically divided into two parts: one was called red (*abang*) and the other, blue (*biru*). This system, called *glebagan*, was instituted in accordance with the condition of land leases: the planter used half of the *sawah* for market crops while the peasants used the other half for food crops. The divided *sawah* was rotated each year, so that rice and sugarcane were alternately planted in a certain plot of the *sawah*. The *glebagan* system, however, could not be run as it was expected. First of all, it took more than a year for the sugarcane to be harvested, making it impossible for the planters to return the *sawah* to the peasants in a fixed time of the year. The result of this was that the actual period in which the peasants could cultivate the *sawah* for their own food crops was far less than a year, as Figure A-1 shows:

¹¹ Whether the prohibition of land lease to foreign planters ought to be applied to the Principalities or not had been a hot issue among the colonial administrators, and ceaseless changes in policy continued until 1883 when more freedom to do business in the Principalities was given to them (Houben, 1989:189-93).

¹² In addition to paying land rent to the *patih*, foreign planters were asked to bring things such as glass, glasses, tools, clothes, lamps, rifles, furniture, horses and so on (Suhartono, 1991:40-41). The role played by foreign planters made it possible for them to be called *bekel putih* (white *bekel*) or, in the case of the Chinese, *bekel cina* (Chinese *bekel*) (*ibid.*: 41).

Figure A-1: Use of *Sawah* under Foreign Planters



Source: Modified from Anderson (1972:131).

Figure A-1 shows that the peasants could use the *sawah* only for half a year (see column for rice and restoration of *sawah*) within a period of two years. Excluding one and a half months to restore the *sawah* for rice cultivation, the actual period for cultivating food crops was around four and half months, which was shorter than the time needed to grow rice. For fear of being late and being punished by having their unripe crops removed by the planters, the peasants were frequently forced to resort to quick-ripening crops, which were of less value than rice or other principal food products (Selosoemardjan, 1962:280).

The shortened period of using *sawah* was not the only hardship which the planters brought to the Yogyaneese peasants. Different topological requirements and working processes in cultivating sugarcane escalated the amount of corvée labour that they should bear. It took around four to five months in a period of two years to convert the *sawah* which was used for sugarcane cultivation into the *sawah* for food crops and vice versa (see columns for land preparation and restoration of *sawah* in Figure A-1).¹³ Harvest of sugarcane required more labour than that of food crops since each stalk of sugarcane had to be cut individually, tied and then delivered to the sugar factory. Selosoemardjan estimates that the peasants spent approximately 150 days on corvée labour and an additional five nights a week for night duties (1962:274-75), which was more than twice the amount of corvée labour estimated by Suhartono before the coming of the planters (1991:41-2)

The shortened period of using *sawah* and the increase in corvée labour shifted the value of holding the *sawah*. The *sawah* allocated to each peasant was called *sanggan*, literally 'a burden', a term unknown outside the Principalities (Selosoemardjan, 1962:218). Some *kuli kenceng* opted to move into other areas where no sugar estates operated or even outside the Principalities

¹³ For more about the process of converting the *sawah* for rice cultivation, see Anderson (1972)

(Soedjito,1957:11). Others chose to be daily labourers, discarding their status as *kuli kenceng* (van Mook,1958:315). However, not all of them could do so. The majority continued to hold their *sawah* because, except for working in the *sawah*, there were only a few ways of earning a living (Selosoemardjan,1962:218). Amongst the peasants who stayed in the village, a certain strategy had been developed to cope with the increasing labour demands: namely, to share the burden. This might be done in two ways. First, they could modify the traditional custom by requiring not only *kuli kenceng* but every villager liable for corvée labour. Second, they could allocate *sawah* to more villagers, which would increase the number of *kuli kenceng* eligible for corvée labour. The option which was chosen by the peasants in the Principalities was the second one, so an increase in the allocation of *sawah* to the landless was reported in the late 19th and in the early 20th century (Suhartono,1991:104).

The coming of the foreign planters weakened the position of the *bekel* in several ways. First, increasing labour demands from sugar plantation made it more difficult for the *bekel* to fulfil his duty as a supplier of corvée labour. When the *bekel* could not meet his duty, he had to face severe penalties. He was locked up in the jail (Selosoemardjan,1962:272-77) or was dismissed by the planters (Takashi,1990:17). On the other hand, increasing labour demands from the sugar plantation deprived him of opportunities to mobilise villagers for his own benefits, impairing his ability to accumulate wealth. Second, with the foreign planter came a new superior to the *bekel* called the *mandor*, an overseer of the supply of land and labour employed by the sugar plantation. In administrative terms, the *mandor* was not a superior of the *bekel*. However, his role and his easy access to the foreign planter gave him a power to treat the *bekel* arbitrarily. If a *bekel* had had the misfortune of displeasing his *mandor*, the latter could make a report to the foreign planter, which meant a severe penalty for him (Mulherin,1970-71:23-4). Third, in the process of being used as a medium to secure stable supply of labour and land for the foreign planter, the *bekel* could not use his traditional source of legitimacy: people's homage to the ruler. Instead, what he could use was physical force supported by the police. This allowed the relation of exploitation to be expressed more clearly, weakening the traditional authority of the *bekel*.

In brief, the changes in the second half of the 19th century made the position of the *bekel* less advantageous than before. His riches were siphoned off to renew his position as a *bekel*, his opportunities to accumulate wealth declined as the *kebekelan* were segmented and the peasants were mobilised for sugarcane cultivation, the traditional authority provided by his relation with the ruler was eroded and increasing labour demands from the sugar plantation made it difficult for him to fulfil his duty. With these changes, the independent power of the *bekel* was gradually impaired. He was no longer a *raja kecil* in his *kebekelan* but was identified more as a functionary employed by the planter. The deteriorating

position of the *bekel*, however, did not mean an improvement of the peasants' position. They had to work longer for the foreign planter and could use their *sawah* for only a short period of time. In these circumstances, one of the ways adopted by the *bekel* and *kuli kenceng* to lessen their economic hardship was to share the burden by apportioning *sawah* to more villagers, thus increasing the number of people eligible for corvée labour.

A.2. Reorganisation in the Principalities

The economic system of the Principalities in the late 19th century was different from that in other parts of Java under direct Dutch rule. This system permitted free extraction of corvée labour, did not recognise individual right to the land and was based on the patron-client relation between the *patih* and the *bekel*, all of which had been gradually abolished outside the Principalities. As Dutch merchant capitalism was replaced by an industrial one based in the drive toward standardisation, centralisation, rationalisation and expansion in the late 19th century (Takashi,1990:18), a series of proposals were made to change the out-of-date system in the Principalities. The shift of colonial policy from the liberal *laissez-faire* to an 'ethical' one, combined with mass protests from peasants which had had no precedents in Yogyakarta, intensified the pressure for reform (van Mook,1958:310; Suhartono,1991:94-95). Finally in the 1910s, the reorganisation of the Principalities began.

In the matter of land, the reorganisation reaffirmed the principle that the land in the Principalities belonged to the ruler. However, it changed the way this principle was applied. While previously, the court officials and nobles had been given the right to use the land as compensation for their services, the reorganisation concentrated this right on the ruler (Suhartono,1991:95). As a replacement of the appanage, the ruler awarded an indemnity equivalent to the computed net income that the *patih* received from their appanage (van Mook,1958:321), while he levied taxes in the form of money to meet the cost to operate the administrative apparatus.

Second, the reorganisation abolished the system of *kebekelan* and instituted *desa* as the lowest administrative unit. Several former *kebekelan* were amalgamated into a *desa*¹⁴ which was designed to accommodate functionally differentiated officials (ibid.:324). Each *desa* was supposed to be financially self-sufficient, so that parts of *desa* land were allocated as salary lands (*bengkok*) for the officials.

Third, the reorganisation redistributed the land to villagers and granted them rights to use, dispose and inherit the land. In principle, all adult male villagers who were capable of performing obligations to the village community and to

¹⁴ The *desa* created after the reorganisation did not have the same population. The population in each *desa* reached 1500 to 2000 on the average, but it was not rare to see a *desa* with 3000 residents (van Mook,1958:323).

the state were eligible for an equal amount of *sawah* (Suhartono,1991:100; Takashi,1990:20).¹⁵ The size of the land for distribution was not fixed but left to the situation in each *desa*. In the case of Kolojonggo, it was about 4000 m² of *sawah* divided into two, one located in the *biru* (blue) and the other in the *abang* (red) section, and about 2000 m² of *pekarangan*.¹⁶ It is not certain whether the distribution of *sawah* instituted an equalisation of landholdings among villagers or not. As the distribution was implemented in already unequal power relations, however, it is plausible to assume that the former *bekel* had room to use his power to obtain more land than others. One of the ways employed by them to receive more land than the average was to register their children as recipients of the land (Suhartono,1991:102). In this respect, the reorganisation was unlikely to mean an equalisation of landholdings, although it surely helped for the land to be distributed evenly to villagers. The other benefit that the reorganisation gave villagers was the right to use their labour for their own benefits. Most corvée labour that they had borne for the *bekel*, the sugar planter and the *patih* was abolished¹⁷ and the capitalistic labour relation was installed as a way to mobilise labour.

The last package of the reorganisation was to institute a tax system. Land tax was imposed on each landholder, the amount of which was dependent on the quality of land, and a fixed sum as household tax (*pajeg somah*) was levied (O'Malley,1977:179). In some areas of the Principalities, a fixed sum as water tax was also collected (Soemardjo,1959:18). The direct purpose of levying tax was to collect the revenue to pay the bureaucrats deprived of the appanage, but the tax system also played an important role for the survival of the foreign planters to whom the reorganisation gave the right to rent *sawah*¹⁸ but no means to mobilise villagers' labour. As villagers had no way of earning money for paying taxes other than working in sugar plantations, the imposition of taxes worked as a mechanism to safeguard a stable supply of labour from the peasants without any compulsory measures.

With the installation of the reorganisation, the nature of land was transformed from non-commodity into commodity. Before the reorganisation, villagers could

¹⁵ Those who qualified for land distribution were stipulated to be 'male villagers who were adult and strong' (*tiang jaler ingkang dewasa lan kiyat*) (Suhartono,1991:100).

¹⁶ Takashi reports that around 3500m² (half a *bau*) was distributed to each villager (1990:21), while van Mook estimated each villager obtained approximately a fourth of a *bau* (about 1750 m²) (1958:327). The estimation of Seloemardjan is much larger than that of Takashi and van Mook. He suggests that it was around 3/4 hectare of *sawah* in the lowlands while around 3 hectares of *tegal* (dry land) in the rugged areas (1962:223).

¹⁷ The exception was the duty to work for the maintenance of dams and irrigation canals once a week (Seloemardjan,1962:276).

¹⁸ The reorganisation gave the foreign planters the right to rent *sawah* for fifty years without consent from the peasants (Seloemardjan,1962:276). This indicates that the abolition of non-economic compulsion, one of the major purposes of the reorganisation, could not be fully accomplished from the beginning due to the vested interests of the foreign planters.

use land in so far as they met their duties as landholders, and when they could not fulfil these duties, it was transferred to others who were ready to do so. The same was true of the *bekel* who could secure his access to land as long as he held the position as a *bekel*. If he happened to lose this position or could not leave it to his heir, the *bekel* had to give up his right over land. In this sense, land was a source of riches but was not wealth itself and the investment of one's wealth in the form of land was inconceivable. After the reorganisation, the situation changed. An inheritable right was granted to landholders, limited transactions of land were permitted¹⁹, and land could be converted into other forms of wealth. This implies that the barriers which prevented the investment of wealth in land were lifted and anyone who had riches large enough to buy land could do so in so far as they paid land tax. The transformation of the value of land, then, solidified the ground on which villagers could be polarised in terms of their landholdings. Whether this potential was actualised in the period after the reorganisation or not might be dependent on two factors: whether the amount of *sawah* distributed to each peasant was large enough to secure their economic reproduction and whether economic opportunities were distributed unevenly among villagers, so that one could accumulate riches much faster than others or not.

In Kolojonggo, each household was given about 4000 m² of *sawah*. As the *glebagan* system was at work, the size of *sawah* that landholders could use each year was just half of what they owned, while they could not get any income from the other half. Differing from the period before the reorganisation, the sugar plantation was stipulated to provide recompense for the late return of *sawah* at the rate of f 1 per month per 2000 m² (Soemarjo, 1959:16) or f 6 for a half year.²⁰ Apart from the compensation, the sugar plantation bore the cost of restoring *sawah* for rice cultivation. For this work, the peasants holding 2000 m² of *sawah* could earn about f 1.9 every year.²¹ After *sawah* was cleared up, the peasants planted rice. If the production was 29.8 *pikul* (1 *pikul* = 61.8 kg.) of unhusked dry rice per hectare (Scheltema, 1986:181)²² and the production cost reached 38

¹⁹ In principle, the reorganisation prohibited landholders from selling *sawah* (to people living in a different village), renting out *sawah* for a share, selling products for a down payment and exchanging *sawah* (Suhartono, 1991:110). For this purpose, a village council was formed to monitor transactions and the inheritance of land (Seloemardjan, 1962:220). In actuality, however, land was transacted freely between landholders living in the same village since the village council was controlled by those who were in a position to purchase *sawah* (Suhartono, 1991:110).

²⁰ Seloemardjan reports that the compensation for the late return of *sawah* was f 15 per hectare per month, a figure three times higher than that cited in Soemarjo. Given that land rent for one *bau* (0.7 hectare) of the second class *sawah* ranged between f 22.5 and f 7 per annum (Suhartono, 1991:205), his estimate seems to be too high. Therefore the figure cited in Soemarjo is used in the text.

²¹ According to my calculation from the sugarcane plantation in Kolojonggo in 1993, about 250 ditches were dug up in 2000 m² of *sawah*. As the sugar plantation paid 3/4 cent per ditch (Seloemardjan, 1962:279), the total payment for 2000 m² was estimated to be f 1.9.

²² 29.8 *pikul* was the average production of rice between 1922-27 in the District of Bantul (Scheltema, 1986:181).

percent of the yields (Gelpke,1986:61)²³, they could obtain 3.7 *pikul* of unhusked rice per 2000m². In sum, a household holding 4000 m² of *sawah* could earn f 7.9 and 3.7 *pikul* of unhusked rice per annum. After land tax for *sawah* f 2.4, that for *pekarangan* f 1.3²⁴, household tax f 2, and water tax f 1 were subtracted, what was left to this household was f 1.2 (approximately 6 kg. of husked rice)²⁵ and 3.7 *pikul* of unhusked rice or 2 *pikul* (about 120 kg.) of husked rice.²⁶ This implies that 4000 m² of *sawah* could provide its holders with less than 0.5 kg. of rice per day. The second source of income was to work for the sugar plantation or as agricultural labour. By selling their labour, the peasants could earn about 1 kg. of rice per day (Soemarjo,1959:14-22; SeloSoemardjan,1962:277). Whether the income from the *sawah* and wage labour could meet the daily consuming needs of a household or not might be dependent on such factors as the population composition of each household and the availability of work opportunities. However, the income that they could earn was far less than what Yogyanese villagers regarded as sufficient (*cukup*), namely, an income of 1200 kg. of milled rice equivalent for five family members (Penny and Singarimum,1973:3-4).

In examining the economic viability of peasant households, the amount of income was not the sole factor to be considered. The stability of income also played a pivotal role in determining economic viability. By decreasing the level of consumption, peasant households could balance their budget to a certain degree without relying on more radical measures of selling their land or migration, as Soedjito describes: 'for one month after the harvest, small landholders ate rice three times a day, which was reduced to twice after that period and which finally became once when the paddy was ripening' (1957:131). Seen from this framework, economic conditions after the reorganisation were unfavourable for the Yogyanese peasants. First, the income that they could earn was not stable but fluctuated seasonally. Within the year, money was abundant from May to November. Rice

²³ 38 percent of production cost consisted of 20 percent for harvest, 6.3 percent for seeds and agricultural tools and 11.4 percent for *slametan* (ritual). Labour cost is supposed to have been met by family labour (Gelpke,1986:61).

²⁴ Below is the amount of land tax per hectare, cited in Soemarjo (1959:17):

	Class					
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
<i>Sawah</i>	14.30	11.80	9.30	6.30	5.10	3.00
<i>Pekarangan</i>	11.60	7.70	5.10	3.40	1.70	0.80

As most *sawah* in Kolojonggo were classified as second class and most *pekarangan* as third class, the figures in the text were the land tax applied to second class *sawah* and third class *pekarangan*.

²⁵ From 1922 to 1930, the price of one *pikul* of husked rice in Javanese markets oscillated between f 11 and f 12.7 (*Statistisch Jaavoverzicht van Nederlandsch-Indie*, 1930).

²⁶ The conversion rate from unhusked rice to husked rice used in the text is 1:0.56, based on Iso (1986:288).

was harvested in April. From May, the sugar plantations paid compensation for the late return of *sawah*. From May to October or November, there were many opportunities to work as ditch diggers and harvesters of sugarcane. This bright phase ended after peasant households planted rice in December. The sugar plantation no longer needed a large amount of labour to manage sugarcane growth and work opportunities in the agricultural sector also decreased, whereas the rice, having been harvested in April, was already used up. At the worst point of their situation, therefore, peasant households had to survive with no money and little food while their rice was growing in the field (Selosoemardjan, 1962:280). Second, the economic stability of peasant households was hampered by the lump sum of tax that they had to pay. Throughout the 1920s when the flow of money from the sugar plantations was smooth, the payment of tax could be met by them. However, when the Depression came in the 1930s and the sugar plantations curtailed the land reserved for sugar cultivation and lowered the wage cost (O'Malley, 1977:187-190), land tax could not be easily met by the peasants.²⁷ They could borrow money or pawn valuables but these actions could not be taken endlessly. The last resort left to them was to sell land. By selling land, they could maintain their livelihood and be freed from the burden of land tax, an option which might not be totally a bad choice for them.

To summarise, the periodical fluctuation of money supply and land tax worked to hamper the capability of peasant households to overcome economic hardship by adopting the strategy of minimising consumption. In these circumstances, even a subtle change from within the household economy such as crop failure or sickness of a family member and from outside such as sudden shrinkage of work opportunities in the sugar plantation could easily disrupt any economic equilibrium that they maintained. Once disrupted, the equilibrium could not be restored with ease unless other economic opportunities were newly available.²⁸

The villagers who could get real benefits from the establishment of private ownership of land were those working outside the peasant economy such as

²⁷ In the first half of the 1930s when the world depression hit the sugar industry in Yogyakarta, the foreign planters returned the land to the peasants, giving them a chance to cultivate *sawah* all year round. However, this change did not improve the economic condition of peasant households. They had to pay, in addition to the taxes they had paid before, the land tax that the sugar plantation had borne before the depression, while the price of rice dropped remarkably. The rice prices in 1933-40 were less than half of those in 1926-29 (*Indisch Verslag*, 1941). The dramatic decrease in monetary income and the burden of paying tax after the depression seem to have been the origin of an expression that a few village elders in Kolojonggo still use: 'to buy money' (*tuku duit*). Similar expressions are used when they differentiate the period before and after the depression. They call the period before it *jaman murah duit* (the period when money was cheap) and, after it, *jaman larang duit* (the period when money was expensive).

²⁸ The *glebagan* system was another factor exacerbating the economic conditions of the landholders who sold their *sawah* since it was almost impossible for them to sell their *sawah* in both sections equally. When a peasant sold all *sawah* in one section, he had no *sawah* to cultivate once in two years, although he still owned half of his previous holdings.

village officials, large traders and regular employers in sugar factories, schools and offices run by the Dutch. The income that they could obtain varied in accordance with the kind of jobs and ranks²⁹ but their income made it easier for them to deal with the fluctuation of money supply and the need to pay a lump sum of tax. The economic condition of village officials is a good example of how advantageous their positions were. After the reorganisation, village officials received more than one hectare of the most fertile *sawah* as their salary land which was exempt from land tax (Takashi, 1990:20).³⁰ As the land tax for first class *sawah* was f.14.30 per hectare (Soemarjo, 1957:17) or more than one *pikul* of husked rice, tax exemption was a great benefit to them, apart from the products that they obtained from it. With this income, village officials and some of those who worked in non-agricultural sectors were in a position to take advantage of the opportunity that the reorganisation had provided, namely, to purchase land.

According to village elders in Kolojonggo, the pattern of land transactions after the reorganisation was not the same as it is now. It took place in a relatively longer period of time and the price of land was not fixed but dependent on the merits of each case. The first stage of a transaction usually started when a villager had nothing left to eat and had to borrow food from his or her wealthy neighbours. This borrowed food was supposed to be returned after the harvest with interest which was, according to some villagers, twenty percent of what the debtor had originally borrowed. When the debtor could not pay his or her debt back and if this went on for a while, he or she sold *sawah* to the creditor. At first, the selling was done only for one season (*tuku musiman*). The debtor transferred the right to use land for one season to the creditor while he or she cultivated it either as a sharecropper or as a wage labourer. If the debtor was fortunate enough to pay the debt back, land was returned after one season. If not, the period of selling land changed from one season to one year or a few years (*tuku tahunan*) until the ownership of land was shifted to the creditor. One of the factors which made it almost impossible for the debtor to pay the debt back was that, while land was sold by one season or by a year, the duty to pay land tax was not transferred from the debtor to the creditor. This debt bond made between villagers opened a way for land transactions to take place gradually and easily. The well-to-do villagers did not need to prepare a lump sum of money to purchase land but just kept lending small amounts of rice or money, which later could turn into land.

²⁹ According to two village elders who worked respectively as a primary school teacher and as a clerk in the office run by the Dutch, their monthly income in the 1930s was more than one quintal of rice.

³⁰ The salary land was apportioned to each official with the ratio of 4 (village head), 2 (deputy chief), 1.5 (secretary) and 1 (other officials) (van Mook, 1958:324). In Sumber, the *lurah* received about 3.5 hectares of *sawah*.

A few features discussed above show a high possibility of land transactions in the post-reorganisation period, but the lack of written data makes it difficult to confirm this. The first data available for this purpose are the land registration records documented in 1943 under the Japanese colonial government. Although this register was not written in the late Dutch colonial period and does not contain any data concerning temporary transfers of *sawah*, the absence of other written materials necessitates its use as a base line to understand the structure of land tenure and the intensity of land transactions in the late colonial period. A modified version³¹ of the land registration record in 1943 is presented in table A-1:

Table A-1: Landholdings in Kolojonggo in 1943

Size (ha)	No. of households	<i>Sawah</i> owned (percent)	Ratio of Blue/Red (Red = 100) ^a
0	16	0	-
< 0.3	11	10.5	31.7
< 0.5	13	31.5	73.4
< 0.7	4	14.2	59.8
< 1	3	15.1	54.6
> 1	2	28.7	52.3
Total	49	100	-

Source: Records kept in the *kelurahan* office

^a Ratio of Blue/Red refers to the ratio of the size of *sawah* that a land owner had in the blue section to that in the red section (Red section = 100). For example, if a villager had 500 m² of *sawah* in the blue section and 1000 m² in the red section, the ratio becomes 50. For the convenience of discussion, the bigger part of *sawah* that a villager owned, whether it was actually in the red or in the blue section, is supposed to have been in the red section, while the smaller part, in the blue section.

The forty-nine households in table A-1 can be classified into three groups: those who owned less than 0.3 hectare of *sawah*, those who owned between 0.3 and 0.5 hectare; and those who owned more than 0.5 hectare. The first group was the greater in number but controlled only 10.5 percent of the total 17 hectares of *sawah* in Kolojonggo. Thirteen households in the second group held 31.5 percent. The average holding of this group was 4103 m², almost the same size of *sawah* said to have been distributed at the time of the reorganisation. However, it was not this group but nine households in the third group which controlled the majority of *sawah* in Kolojonggo. The third group owned 9.3 hectares or 58 percent of the total *sawah*. Of the nine households in this group, three were the heirs of the former *bekel*, and one, who owned 3.5 hectares of *sawah*, was the *mandor* (overseer) in the sugar plantation. Two of the remaining five were related

³¹ Compared with the original data extracted from the village land registration, Table A-1 has two differences. First, it excludes the cases of inheritance which took place after the reorganisation, so that the land which was registered under the names of different heirs but which had been controlled by one household before the inheritance is considered to be undivided. This revision is made in order to differentiate the original households which had received the land at the time of the reorganisation from the households which inherited the land from their parents who were the original recipients of the land. By differentiating these two categories, it is expected to obtain more accurate data on land transactions. Second, table A-1 does not include the salary and pension land granted to those who had positions in the *desa* administration. The original data is presented in table A-2.

to the largest landowner as his son-in-law and his brother while the other three were ordinary peasants.

The extremely polarised landholding in table A-1 can not be explained except by referring to the accumulation of *sawah* by a few villagers through land transactions in the 1920s and 1930s. Although no written materials are available to show these transactions, the opinion of village elders supported this view. They remembered that a few landholders had been actively involved in buying land, while some of the land sellers of that time could still remember the land that they had sold to large landholders. Given the polarised land tenure in 1943 and the memory of village elders, it can be assumed, though oversimplified, that the first group in table A-1 consisted mainly of the households which had sold part of their holdings after the reorganisation, the second, which had retained their holdings, and the third, which had purchased *sawah*.

One of the features showing that landholders of less than 0.3 hectare of *sawah* constituted the main group that sold land is the ratio of the smaller part of *sawah* that they owned to the bigger one (see column for Ratio of Blue/Red in Table A-1). The *sawah* distributed at the time of the reorganisation was divided into two parts, one in the blue section and the other in the red section, and the size of each part was, although not the same, supposed to be balanced. Therefore, the more one was involved in land transactions, the ratio of the smaller part of *sawah* (which is supposed to have been located in the blue section in table A-1) to the bigger one (which is supposed to have been located in the red section) should be lower.³² Table A-1 shows that the ratio is the lowest in the group of less than 0.3 hectare of *sawah*. Moreover, six of the eleven landholding households in this group had *sawah* only in one section, either blue or red. In the case of the second group, the ratio was 73.4. Of the thirteen households in this group, seven had a ratio higher than 80, three of which were higher than 90, and no household owned less than 1000 m² in either section of the *sawah*. The third group has a lower ratio than the second group, while no households in the third group had less than 2000 m² of *sawah* in either section of the *sawah*.

Another feature showing that the first group constituted the main group selling the *sawah* is the similarity in the size of *pekarangan* (yard) that nineteen households in the first group³³ and thirteen households in the second group owned. The average size of *pekarangan* owned by the nineteen households in the first group was 2438 m² while that owned by the second group was 2873 m².

³² This proposition is based on an assumption that a villager could not sell (or buy) *sawah* in the blue and red section equally. For example, when a villager owning 2000 m² of *sawah*, half of which was located in the red section and the other half in the blue section, wanted to sell 500 m², it is unlikely, though not impossible, that he or she sold 250 m² from the red section and 250 m² from the blue section. In this respect, the more one was involved in land transactions either as buyers or sellers, the ratio of the smaller part to the bigger one (the bigger part = 100) would be lower.

³³ Of the twenty-seven households in the first group, eight households did not own *pekarangan*.

As *pekarangan* was distributed at the time of the reorganisation and the principle used in distribution might be the same as that for *sawah*, the similarity in the size of *pekarangan* can be regarded as an indication that the size of *sawah* received by the nineteen households in the first group and the thirteen households in the second group at the initial stage of the reorganisation might not have been as different as in 1943.

To summarise, table A-1 points out that a rapid process of polarisation in terms of landholdings took place in Kolojonggo over two decades after the reorganisation.³⁴ At one pole were a few villagers who had accumulated a large amount of *sawah* while at the other, a substantial number of villagers who sold their *sawah*, owning less than 0.3 hectare of *sawah* or changing their position from landholders to the landless.³⁵ The unfavourable economic circumstances in the 1920s and 1930s, amongst which were the seasonal fluctuation of income, heavy monetary taxes, and short period to use *sawah*, provided conditions in which peasant households could not fully use their adaptability and those who lost their economic equilibrium sold *sawah* for survival. In this respect, one of the aims of the reorganisation - namely to establish a strong tie between land and the peasants by giving the latter an inheritable right to the former (Selosoemardjan, 1962:221) - could not be achieved in the long run. Instead, what the reorganisation installed was a capitalistic development in landownership which accelerated the alienation of the peasants from their land.

As long as the economic system which produced the polarised structure of landholdings continued, the gap between large and small landholders continued to widen. Large landholders could accumulate more *sawah* with the profit that they gained from the newly purchased land whereas small landholders or the landless had fewer resources to regain their land. These favourable conditions

³⁴ Comparable data showing the polarisation of landholdings are available in a village called Tumut placed around 10 kilometres westwards from Kolojonggo. Below is the structure of land tenure in Tumut in 1943 as is cited in Sato (1994:99). The figures in the table below show the size of land controlled by villagers and includes the salary land of village officials:

	Size Group						Total
	0	< 0.2	< 0.4	< 0.6	< 1.2	< 6.2	
Households	131	72	69	38	19	16	345
Area (%)	0	10.8	20.4	20.6	16.5	31.7	100

The above table shows that the polarisation of landholdings was also a prominent feature in Tumut, although exact comparison of the data between Kolojonggo and Tumut is impossible due to the lack of data on the land ownership in Tumut.

³⁵ Not all villagers who were classified as landless in table A-1 might be those who sold their whole *sawah*. Some of them were the migrants who entered Kolojonggo after the reorganisation and had had no chance to receive a portion of *sawah* nor *pekarangan*. In this respect, it is probable that those who owned neither *sawah* nor *pekarangan* (8 of 16 *sawah*-less households) might be the migrants, while those who owned more than 0.1 hectare of *pekarangan* but did not have any *sawah* (8 of 16 *sawah*-less households) might be the initial recipients of *sawah* who later lost it.

for the further differentiation of the peasants in terms of their landholdings changed in 1942 when the Japanese came to Java as a new colonial power. As the peasants were mobilised by the Japanese and later by the provisional Indonesian government for their war efforts, the pre-existing economic system could not work, slowing down the process of differentiation. When the rural countryside once again regained its peace, the economic system which had dominated the late Dutch colonial period was replaced by a new one.

A.3. Rural Economy in the Old Order Period

One of the first acts of the newly installed regional government of Yogyakarta was to abolish the economic system which had been at the heart of the peasants' hardship. Household tax was abolished in 1946, followed by land tax in 1951. Instead of land tax, the regional government instated income tax to which villagers who had paid more than Rp 6.00 of land tax (equivalent to approximately 0.4 hectare of the second class *sawah*) were liable (Selosoemardjan,1962:225). The *glebagan* system was annulled in 1948 (Soemarjo,1959:21). These measures helped to remove the negative value on land. Land was no longer a burden but the most reliable source of income and precious capital (Soedjito,1957:146).

In the 1950s, 0.2 hectare of *sawah* could produce about 500 kg. of unhusked dry rice per cropping.³⁶ When a household cultivated this amount of *sawah* with its own family labour, the production cost would amount 70-80 kg. of unhusked rice³⁷, leaving 420-430 kg. as net yield. If unhusked rice was converted to husked one at the rate of 1:0.65 (Fox,1991:80) and pounding was done by family labour, the household could secure about 275 kg. of rice. As double cropping was possible, this amount of rice could be harvested once every six months. This shows that 2000 m² of *sawah* could give its holders about 1.5 kg. of rice per day, an amount which was large enough to meet daily rice consumption of a family of five members³⁸, although not enough for other needs.

The benefits of this new economic system in the 1950s were distributed evenly to all landholders. Decreasing land tax and a longer period to use *sawah* provided large landholders with a chance to become wealthier, middle landowners with a better opportunity to secure their livelihood solely from the cultivation of *sawah* and small landholders with a better opportunity to survive without selling

³⁶ The yields (unhusked dry rice) per hectare in the 1950s ranged between 27.6 and 22.4 quintals (1 quintal=100 kg.), the average of which was 25.05 quintals (KSY,1957 and 1963).

³⁷ This consisted of 5 kg. of unhusked rice for seeds and 14 percent of the total yields for harvest (Soedjito,1957:135). Other labour processes such as ploughing, planting, weeding and fertilising are supposed to have been satisfied by family and *gotong-royong* labour, while the cost to celebrate ritual is not included, due to lack of data on it.

³⁸ According to Pandam, the daily consumption of rice in wealthy and middle-level families reached around 200 grams per person while that in poor families, 100 to 150 grams (1958:42).

their land. The affluence which middle landowners could enjoy in the 1950s was reflected in the influx of bicycles into rural villages, which had once been possessed only by government officials, the well-to-do village officials and a few merchants in the colonial period (Selosoemardjan, 1962:256). About half of the total households in a Yogyanese rural hamlet is reported to have owned one or more bicycles, which cost 100 kg. of rice in the mid-1950s (Soedjito, 1957:157). This changed the prestige symbol of wealthy villagers from bicycles to motorbikes (Soemarjo, 1959:24), a situation which also applied in Kolojonggo.

Rising profitability of *sawah* cultivation in the 1950s brought a negative impact on the differentiation of peasants in terms of their landholdings. The abolition of land tax and of the *glebagan* system strengthened the economic position of small landholders while the changing value of land from that of burden to the most precious resource encouraged them to retain land, whatever size it might be. In the case of large landholders, a few constraints emerged which had a potential to block their economic capability to further the process of accumulating land. Before these will be discussed, the structure of land tenure in 1960 will be described:

Table A-2: Landholdings in Kolojonggo in 1960

Size (ha)	No. of Households		Sawah owned (percent)	
	1943 ^a	1960 ^b	1943	1960
0	16	21	0	0
< 0.1	6	12	2.7	4.5
< 0.2	6	14	5.0	10.7
< 0.3	10	15	13.6	19.7
< 0.4	6	5	12.1	9.2
< 0.5	6	3	15.4	7.2
< 0.6	2	2	6.7	6.2
< 0.7	2	3	7.0	10.3
< 0.8	0	0	0	0
< 0.9	2	0	10.0	0
< 1	0	0	0	0
> 1	2	3	27.5	32.2
Total	58	78	100	100

Source: Records kept in the *kelurahan* office

^aThe statistics for 1943 include the cases of inheritance and salary land, so that it is different from the data presented in table A-1.

^bAs was the case in 1943, temporary transactions of *sawah* by way of *tuku tahunan* and *tuku musiman* were not included in the statistics for 1960. Accordingly, the actual size of *sawah* that each household cultivated at that time may not coincide with the size of *sawah* presented in this table.

One of the most remarkable features in table A-2 is the increase in the number of households owning less than 0.3 hectare of *sawah*. Nineteen households were newly added to this group in 1960 and the size of *sawah* owned by this group rose from 21.3 percent to 34.9 percent. The increase in the number of small holders had also been a process characterising the colonial period. Compared with this, however, the process in the 1950s was different in that the increase

in small landholders was not accompanied by the concentration of *sawah* among large landholders. On the contrary, the total area of *sawah* that landholders of more than 0.5 hectare owned declined from 51.2 percent in 1943 to 48.7 percent in 1960. The most important factor behind this change was inheritance. According to the Javanese custom, all children have the right to their parents' estates and valuables while no rules are systemised to give preferential right to the eldest child or the male (Koentjaraningrat, 1960:105-6). When applied to the inheritance of the *sawah*, this rule implies that, upon parents' death or even before it, the parents' *sawah* is inherited by each child rather than being kept by one of them. As a result, the inheritance of land in the family of large landholders meant the creation of several smaller landholders. In the 1940s and 1950s, thirteen cases of inheritance, of which nine involved the division of the *sawah*³⁹, were reported in Kolojonggo and 7.5 hectares of *sawah* previously owned by nine villagers were distributed to 26 villagers, 19 living in Kolojonggo and 7 living in neighbouring hamlets.

The second factor which changed the structure of landholdings was the commercial sale of *sawah*. However, the size of *sawah* which was transacted in the 1950s was far less than that in the colonial time. Two villagers sold 2190 m² of *sawah* while four bought 5535 m².⁴⁰ With these transactions, the ownership of 4.6 percent of *sawah* was shifted from one to the other. To understand better the impact of land transactions on the structure of land tenure, the same data were collected in five other hamlets in Sumber, which cover 70.1155 hectares of *sawah* and 41.9750 hectares of *pekarangan*. The result is as follows:

Table A-3: Land transactions in five hamlets in Sumber (1950-1964)

Year	Cases			Size	
	<i>Sawah</i>	<i>Pekarangan</i>	S + P	<i>Sawah</i>	<i>Pekarangan</i>
1950-54	4	3	0	0.2530	0.2040
1955-59	21	14	0	1.5670	0.5250
1960-64	12	8	2	0.8310	0.4710
Unknown	1	0	0	0.0915	0
Total	38	25	2	2.7425	1.2000

Source: Records kept in the *kelurahan* office.

Table A-3 indicates that 42 cases of land sales in the 1950s covered about 1.8 hectares of *sawah* and around 0.7 hectare of *pekarangan* or 2.6 percent of the total *sawah* and 1.7 percent of the total *pekarangan* in the five hamlets. These figures imply that accumulation of *sawah* by large landholders by way of land purchase did not take place on a mass scale. The size of landholdings of land

³⁹ The other four cases consisted of one case in which the family did not have *sawah* and of three cases in which the size of *sawah* was too small to be divided (less than 1000 m²). In the latter cases, the *sawah* was inherited by one heir while the *pekarangan* was divided among all heirs.

⁴⁰ The data related to land transactions were obtained from the records on land transactions kept in the *kelurahan* office. As these data only cover the cases of land transaction in which the title to land was legally transferred, these do not show a complete picture of land transactions in that period.

purchasers, as is shown in table A-4 below, also suggests that large landholders were not the major group to buy land. Of the 58 known cases of transaction, only two cases were carried out by landholders with more than 0.5 hectare. In this respect, the polarisation of landholdings by way of land sales which had dominated the colonial period was largely halted in the 1950s.

Table A-4: Size of *Sawah* owned by Land Buyers Before They Bought Land between 1950 and 1964

	Size of <i>Sawah</i> owned by Land Buyers				
	0	< 0.3	< 0.5	> 0.5	Unknown
<i>Sawah</i> buyers	10	19	3	1	5
<i>Pekarangan</i> buyers	15	4	4	1	1
<i>Sawah</i> & <i>Pekarangan</i> buyers	1	0	0	0	1
Total Cases	26	23	7	2	7

Source: Records kept in the *kelurahan* office.

The change in the structure of land tenure raises the question as to why the process of concentration of land in the late colonial period was largely stopped in the 1950s, although the economic condition of large landholders had not worsened. The first constraint to hinder the process of concentration of *sawah* was inheritance. In many cases, those who accumulated a large amount of land were middle aged in the colonial period, and the process of inheritance in their households started in the 1940s and 1950s. When large landholders had many children, inheritance meant a creation of several middle or, in some cases, small landholders. Although each heir was fortunate enough to receive more than one hectare of *sawah*, which was large enough to yield profits to purchase more land, however, inheritance worked in a negative way. On the one hand, the inexperience of the heirs in managing *sawah* might make it difficult for them to be directly involved in the expansion of their landholdings after inheritance. On the other hand, the higher education that many large landholders' children had received helped them to find jobs in non-agricultural sectors which were valued higher than those in the agricultural sector (Soedjito, 1957:138). Irrespective of whether they stayed in the village or not, employment in non-agricultural sectors decreased their interest in agriculture and land accumulation.

The second factor was the improving economic condition of small and middle landholders. The abolition of land tax removed the expensive cost of holding land in the colonial period while the abolition of the *glebagan* system provided them with the right to cultivate *sawah* all year round, resulting in a rapid increase in the yields from the same size of *sawah*. These measures, then, made the holdings of *sawah* more advantageous than before and helped small landholders to maintain a certain degree of economic equilibrium in managing their household economy without resorting to selling their land.

In brief, the segmentation of land in large landholders' families, increase in the size of *sawah* that landholders could utilise, and the removal of outside pressure on landholders were some of the factors which hindered the process of polarisation of peasants in the 1950s. As a result, the previously differentiated structure of land tenure was largely maintained throughout this period or, considering inheritance in the families of large landholders, the gap between large landholders and smaller ones was narrowed.

The politico-economic developments in the first half of the 1960s had no major impact on the structure of land tenure. The high inflation rate in this period, although deprived the peasants of the sense of economic stability, played a role in reinforcing the importance of holding *sawah* as a safeguard against price fluctuation. On the other hand, the acceleration of the communist activities in the countryside worked to discourage large landholders' involvement in land purchase.

In Kolojonggo, the major change that the communist activists tried to achieve in the first half of the 1960s was to improve the economic condition of small landholders and tenants. Their campaigns aimed to reduce the interest rates on debt, to abolish the *ijon* system⁴¹, to change the sharecropping ratio from 5:5 to 4:6 (owner:sharecropper), to return the *sawah* which were sold for a fixed term (*tuku tahunan*) to its original owners, to collectivise agricultural working practices and to establish a cooperative. These programs, although backed by mass support from villagers, did not bring any tangible results to change the economic conditions of their supporters. Substantial concessions such as the replacement of sharecropping ratio and nullification of *tuku tahunan* could not be achieved due to severe opposition from large landholders, while the most fundamental issue of land reform was not located at the center of the communist program in Kolojonggo. This was because the size of *sawah* held by large landholders in Kolojonggo was, seen from the national standard, too small to be subject to redistribution. In Kolojonggo as well as in Sumber, no one had more than 5 hectares of *sawah*, the maximum size of landholding promulgated by the land reform act (Huizer,1972:33). On the contrary, the size that the largest landholder in Kolojonggo owned was just above 2 hectares, the official guideline used in the land reform as an appropriate landholding for a family (ibid.).⁴²

⁴¹ *Ijo* means 'green'. *Ijon* refers to a system in which the peasants sold paddy before harvest. As the peasants who used this system were in need of immediate cash, their bargaining power vis-à-vis rice traders could not be strong and the price agreed between them favoured the traders. Due to the campaign of the communist activists against the *ijon* system, rice traders did not dare to make transactions within the *ijon* system publicly.

⁴² This does not imply that no action was taken by communist activists against large landowners. It is said that there were cases in which the sharecroppers delivered less than half of the products and this brought about confrontations between the group of communist activists and that of large landholders. However, these actions were not developed as a well-organised program in Kolojonggo. For more about direct actions taken by communist activists in the 1960s, see Lyon (1970:50-59).

Although the land reform was not a central issue in the communist programs in Kolojonggo, the stipulation of the national land reform law worked as a factor to discourage the involvement of large landowners in land transactions. They could not be certain whether another agrarian law would be introduced in the future to lower the limit on maximum landholding and whether the radical slogan of the communist activists, 'to return land to the peasants', would be realised forcibly to redistribute land to the tenants or not. In these circumstances, it was probably more advantageous for them to maintain the *status quo* than to purchase more *sawah*, agitating the heightened consciousness of the communist activists. Their reluctance to purchase land was reflected in the size and frequency of land transactions in 1960-64 (see table A-3). Compared with 1955-59, the size and frequency of land transactions in this period decreased.