

## Chapter 7: Muslim and Christian Relations in Kolojonggo

In Kolojonggo, Wednesday evenings symbolise the co-existence of two religious communities. Both Muslim and Protestant villagers hold their weekly learning courses, the former in the *masjid*, and the latter in the house of a Protestant family. The evenings when Christians have a meeting in a house near the *masjid* give villagers an additional chance to appreciate their religious difference. A group of villagers from the same neighbourhood, walking and chatting together, arrives at the *masjid* and then separates, each group heading for a different place. On these occasions, it often happens that Muslims sitting inside the *masjid* and listening to the sermon about the Grace of Allah hear a hymn praising Jesus Christ.

The importance of one's religious identity, previously confined to the religious domain, has begun to extend into non-religious domains. This is most clearly manifested in the life of some youth whose peer group solidarity is limited to those of the same religion. They play, chat, eat, watch television and go to the market mainly with either Muslims or Christians. Another example of the increasing importance of religious identity in non-religious domains is the activities of BAZIS which collects religious alms solely from, and uses it only for, Muslims. BAZIS activities indicate that the consideration of villagers' economic welfare, conventionally thought to be the duty of community, kin group or a family, is now viewed as the responsibility of a religious community. These developments show that the previously fixed division between the religious and the non-religious is in the process of erosion.

The purpose of the present chapter, and the next chapter, is to examine the relations between Muslims and Christians in Kolojonggo at the point at which religious identity has gradually extended into non-religious domains. One thing that should be considered in this discussion is the effects of outside influences on these relations and the ways villagers perceive them. The first of these is the government's policy of suppressing any expression of open conflict, which has helped the concept of harmony (*rukun*) become an official idiom in village life. As a result, conflicting interests between Muslims and Christians have not been expressed in public but remained hidden, unseen from the outside. The second outside influence is that of Muslim intellectuals from Yogyakarta city. Their perspective on Christianity and Christianisation has flowed into rural areas through various channels, helping Muslim villagers to re-conceptualise their relations to Christians.

The first part of this chapter will look at the development of Christianity in Java and Yogyakarta after the independence of Indonesia, focusing on the statistical

expansion of the Christian population. In the second part, the development of Christianity in Kolojonggo will be discussed. This will be followed by a discussion of Muslim villagers' growing consciousness of religious difference and expansion of the religious difference in non-religious domains.


### **7.1. Development of Christianity in Java and Yogyakarta: Some Statistical Considerations**

Although indigenous Christian communities were present in several parts of Java in the 19th century <sup>1</sup> and Christian missionaries were allowed to work among the Javanese Muslims from the mid-19th century (Hefner, 1993b:99-100), the numeric expansion of Christians in Java was not so remarkable in the Dutch Colonial period. The 1930 census shows that only 0.27 percent of the total population in Java embraced either Protestantism or Catholicism (Rauws et al. 1935). The pace of Christian expansion accelerated in the Old Order Period. Between 1953 and 1964, the Roman Catholic Church doubled its followers in Java (Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembangunan Sosial, 1968:table33), while membership growth of a few Protestant Churches in Java reached more than 20 percent per annum between 1960 and 1964 (Willis, 1977:192).

The growth of Christians in Java before 1965, however, bears little comparison with that from 1965 to the early seventies. In this period, both the Protestant and Catholic Churches witnessed an extraordinary increase in new converts to Christianity. More than a million Javanese converted to Christianity between 1965 and 1971. Local level statistics show the same picture: the average increase in members among five denominations of the Protestant Church in Java reached 27.6 percent per annum in 1965-1967 and 13.7 percent in 1968-71, compared with 7.7 percent in 1960-64 (Willis, 1971:110). The growth of the Catholic Church in Java reached 18.2 percent per annum in 1965-71 (Lembaga Penelitian Dan Pembangunan Sosial, 1968). The high growth of the Christian population from 1965 to 1971 was not drastically interrupted in subsequent decades. The Christian Churches in Java gained almost two million Christians between 1971 and 1990. With this growth in the absolute number of Christians, the ratio of Christians to the total population has gradually increased as Figure VII-1 indicates:


<sup>1</sup> For the history and the characteristics of Christian communities in East Java in the 19th century, see Akkeren (1970) and Guillot (1985:9-50); For a Christian sect which spread to various parts of Central Java in the 19th century, see Guillot (1985).

**Figure VII-1: Percentage of Christians in Java and Indonesia (1930-1990)**



Source: 1930: Rauws et al. (1935); 1953 & 1967: Protestants from Cooley (1967); Catholics from Lembaga Penelitian Dan Pembangunan Sosial (1968); 1971, 1980 & 1990: Official Statistics based on national census.

**Figure VII-2: Number of Christians in Java (1930-1990)**



Source: As for Figure VII-1.

**Table VII.1: Percentage of Christians in Java (City and District / Urban and Rural)**

|              | 1971   |           |       | 1980   |           |       | 1990  |       |       |
|--------------|--------|-----------|-------|--------|-----------|-------|-------|-------|-------|
|              | Cities | Districts | Total | Cities | Districts | Total | Urban | Rural | Total |
| Jakarta      | 8.0    | -         | 8.0   | 9.3    | -         | 9.3   | 10.9  | -     | 10.9  |
| West Java    | 7.8    | 0.6       | 1.1   | 8.0    | 0.5       | 1.1   | 4.6   | 0.4   | 1.8   |
| Central Java | 12.9   | 1.4       | 2.2   | 14.0   | 1.7       | 2.6   | 8.2   | 1.4   | 3.2   |
| Yogyakarta   | 14.9   | 3.0       | 4.6   | 18.1   | 4.9       | 6.8   | 13.2  | 5.6   | 9.0   |
| East Java    | 8.9    | 0.9       | 1.7   | 9.9    | 1.1       | 2.1   | 7.1   | 0.9   | 2.6   |
| Java         | 9.9    | 1.0       | 2.1   | 10.9   | 1.2       | 2.6   | 7.5   | 1.0   | 3.3   |

Source: Census Data

The 1971 and subsequent census data on the number of religious followers show two interesting points related to the geographical deployment of Christians in Java. First, a higher ratio of Christians to the total population is found in municipalities (*kotamadya*) than in districts (*kabupaten*) where rural villages are located. As table VII-1 shows, the ratio of Christians in the municipalities reached 9.9 percent in 1971 and 10.9 percent in 1980 while that in the districts was 1.0 percent and 1.2 percent respectively. More reliable data showing the deployment of Christian populations in urban and rural areas can be obtained in the 1990 census since this census classified the urbanised parts in each district in the category of the urban.<sup>2</sup> In 1990, the ratio of Christians in urban areas was 7.5 percent while that in rural areas, 1.0 percent.


Second, the census data make clear that some districts in Java have been more open to the spread of Christianity than others. When the ratio of Christians to the total population in eighty-two districts in Java is compared, this becomes clearer, as Figure VII-3 portrays.

Figure VII-3 shows that in 1980, Central Java and Yogyakarta possessed a higher Christian ratio than East and West Java. One of the interesting features in Figure VII-3 is that four districts in Yogyakarta are ranked at the top among thirty three districts in Central Java and Yogyakarta.<sup>3</sup> To take a more precise look at this feature, a ratio of Christians in four districts of Yogyakarta and that in twenty-nine districts of Central Java is compared in table VII-2. As this table indicates, four districts in Yogyakarta had a ratio of Christians which was three times higher than districts in Central Java in 1971 and this gap widened in the 1970s, making the ratio more than four to one in 1980.

<sup>2</sup> The data on religious followers in each district were available in the 1971 and 1980 census whereas no comparable data were presented in the 1990 census, which differentiated the urban from the rural rather than the municipality from the district.

<sup>3</sup> The districts located outside of Yogyakarta with a higher Christian ratio than Gunung Kidul in Yogyakarta were Klaten and Semarang, whose ratio was 5.02 percent and 5.76 percent respectively in 1980.

**Figure VII-3: Percentage of Christians in 82 Districts in Java, 1980**



Source: 1980 Census.

Note: Percentage of Christians in Jakarta (9.3%) is not marked on this map.

**Table VII.2: Percentage of Christians in Central Java and Yogyakarta**

|                              | Year |      |      |
|------------------------------|------|------|------|
|                              | 1971 | 1980 | 1991 |
| 29 districts in Central Java | 0.9  | 1.1  | n.a. |
| 4 districts in Yogyakarta    | 3.0  | 4.9  | 5.2  |
| Sleman                       | 3.1  | 7.5  | 8.2  |
| Bantul                       | 2.8  | 3.4  | 3.3  |
| Kulon Progo                  | 5.6  | 5.7  | 5.8  |
| Gunung Kidul                 | 1.5  | 3.3  | 3.7  |

Source: 1971 and 1980 from Census Data; 1991 from Kantor Statistik Yogyakarta (1991).

One of the remarkable features in Table VII-2 is the rapid growth of the Christian population in the district of Sleman (and Gunung Kidul). The percentage of Christians in Sleman was much lower than that in Kulon Progo in 1970 but, in subsequent years, it surpassed the latter. The annual increase rate of Christians in Sleman was 11.9 percent in 1971-1980, which exceeded the increase of three other districts in Yogyakarta and of twenty-nine districts in Central Java.<sup>4</sup> Overall, the statistics show that of the eighty-two districts in Java, the highest ratio of Christians to the total population in 1980 and probably in 1990<sup>5</sup> was found in the district of Sleman where Kolojonggo is located.<sup>6</sup>

In Yogyakarta, rapid expansion of Christianity and the presence of a higher ratio of Christians have given Muslims more opportunities of witnessing the process of Christianisation and of interacting with Christians than Muslims in other parts of Java. The other factor which makes Yogyakarta peculiar is that it hosts the headquarters of Muhammadiyah and many reformist intellectuals. These then have helped to create an environment in which the issue of Christianisation is discussed more seriously and frequently by Muslim intellectuals than in any other part of Java. For example, in the Muhammadiyah Congress held in 1990, the harmonious life among followers of different religions came to the fore. One

<sup>4</sup> The annual growth rate of Christians between 1971 and 1980 was 10.3 percent in Gunung Kidul, 3.2 percent in Bantul and 0.6 percent in Kulon Progo. Christians in twenty-nine districts of Central Java increased by 3.7 percent per annum in the same period. The only district in Java which had comparable growth rate to Sleman was Semarang, which recorded 11.1 percent annual growth rate in the same period.

<sup>5</sup> The 1990 census does not provide any data to compare the ratio of Christians at district level. However, it is plausible to assume that the ratio of Christians in Sleman, which was 8.4 percent in 1992, was the highest among 82 districts in Java.

<sup>6</sup> These data coincide exactly with the information that the Muhammadiyah pamphlet, which reported a joint conference of the Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches in 1963, describes. Christians denied that such a conference ever took place (Umar Hasyim, 1991:271) while Boland, who summaries this Muhammadiyah pamphlet, also maintains that such a conference was not certainly held (Boland, 1971:227). A part of this pamphlet goes as follows:

They [Christians] chose the island of Java as a pilot project [for their scheme to Christianise the Indonesian people]; in Java they chose Central Java, in Central Java, in particular, the Special Administrative Area of Yogyakarta; and within this area of Yogyakarta they chose the district of Sleman to become the center of their activities, i.e. the area along the road to Kali Urang (Cited in Boland, 1971:227).

of the resolutions of this Congress called for the government to take strong action against the violation of the government decree prohibiting the missionary activities toward Muslims.<sup>7</sup> Reformist intellectuals' concern about Christian missions is well expressed in an article officially published by Muhammadiyah, a part of which goes as follows:

As we witness in Indonesia, Protestants and Catholics have spread their religion professionally. For two decades since the installation of the New Order Government, we have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of these two religions: the increase in the percentage of Christians [in the total population], [the foundation of] many churches and the spread of schools [established by Christians] into the rural villages. As is known, power of attraction in Christianity is not its teaching and Scripture, but [its capability to carry out] community service such as giving out foods and clothes to the poor, and assisting orphans, the decrepit, those experiencing disasters and so on (Muhammadiyah, 1991:104-105).

The concern of reformist intellectuals about Christianisation was not confined to their own circle but spread gradually to the countryside by way of the network of *pengajian*, publications, individual contact and so on. As a result, relations between Muslims and Christians in the rural areas of Yogyakarta have been constructed not only by local dynamics but by influences from Muslim intellectuals in the city. The frameworks that these intellectuals use to grasp the issue of Christianisation and Christianity constitute Muslim villagers' understanding of their relations with Christians.

## 7.2. Development of Christianity in Kolojonggo

In the late nineteenth century, a Christian sect called *Kristen Kerasulan*<sup>8</sup> founded by a Javanese, expanded its influence from its birth place, Central Java, to the western part of Yogyakarta. When one of its followers married a girl in Kolojonggo, the history of Christianity began. After moving in, he successfully persuaded his wife and parents-in-law to embrace this sect, although he did not succeed in converting other villagers. The second wave of Christianity began just after the introduction of *Kristen Kerasulan*. In the early 1920s, a villager working as a warder in the Dutch prison caught a disease which could not be

<sup>7</sup> In 1978, the Indonesian government issued a decree prohibiting the missionary activities directed toward those who already confess one of the five official religions. This decree will be discussed in Chapter VIII.

<sup>8</sup> Little is known about the historical development of *Kristen Kerasulan* and its theological position. The influence of this sect in Sumber and neighbouring villages was lost during the Dutch colonial period, so that no Christian villagers remember it clearly. Synthesising what is remembered by villagers, it seems that *Kristen Kerasulan* resorted heavily to mystical practices and indigenous esoteric knowledge (*ilmu Jawa*) to attract its followers. It is said that the name *Kerasulan* stemmed from the fact that the head of this sect called himself *Rasul* (prophet). In general, Christians have the opinion that *Kristen Kerasulan* was not a proper Christian sect, although it used *Kristen* (Christian) as a part of its name.

treated by the *dhukun*. His friendship with a Dutchman gave him a chance to be treated in the hospital run by Dutch missionaries in the city. His contact with Christian missionaries in the hospital and his eventual recovery from the disease, which was considered to be a miracle at that time, led him to Christianity and soon he converted to it. His next step was to call a missionary from the city to Kolojonggo in order to spread Christianity to his neighbours. His efforts were successful in attracting two more villagers to Christianity.

The next stage of Christian expansion in this area came from a Dutch-Javanese technician in the sugar factory located about four kilometres from Kolojonggo. Described as a highly religious man with a strong will to spread the Bible to villagers, he did not overlook the presence of a few Christians in Kolojonggo. Having contact with Christians in Kolojonggo and receiving financial assistance from the Protestant missionary society in the city, he constructed a small church in a hamlet near the sugar factory.<sup>9</sup> In 1926 this church baptised its first two members who were from Kolojonggo, an incident which signalled its massive expansion in the coming decades to embrace thousands of villagers under the name of *Gereja Kristen Jawa* (Javanese Christian Church). The first phase of this church's expansion was achieved by incorporating followers of *Kristen Kerasulan* rather than by finding new converts from the Muslim population. In doing so, however, the centre of church activities was diverted from Kolojonggo to the hamlets located to the west of the church where a substantial number of *Kristen Kerasulan* followers were present.<sup>10</sup>

The geographical shift of church activities seems to have negatively affected the expansion of Christianity in Kolojonggo. From the 1930s till 1965, no other family in Kolojonggo was incorporated into this church, while two families embraced Roman Catholicism which arrived at Kolojonggo in the early 1950s. In addition to the distance from the church, some Christians attributed the sluggish expansion of the Protestant community to villagers' general indifference to religion, an incomplete infrastructure to carry out missionary activities, the occupation of the Japanese and the war of independence. Especially under the Old Order, the political position of the existing Christian community seems to have played a significant role in hindering the expansion of Christianity. All Christian families in Kolojonggo before 1965 were the supporters of the PNI, the ruling government party. This was probably due to the fact that some Christian families worked for the government where the PNI was predominant. The *kadus* (hamlet head)

<sup>9</sup> According to Christian village elders, direct missionary activities by foreign missionaries vis-à-vis indigenous Javanese were not permitted in the Yogyakarta Sultanate throughout the colonial period. In this context, the presence of indigenous Christians seems to have been crucial for foreign missionaries to expand their activities in the rural area since, after the establishment of a church, the missionaries are said to have been tacitly permitted to visit the countryside and to carry out their missionary activities.

<sup>10</sup> The records show that conversions to Christianity before 1965 occurred mainly in the hamlets surrounding this church, signifying that its major proselytising activities were carried out in its immediate vicinity.

belonged to one of four Protestant families while the household heads of two Catholic families were respectively the *lurah* and an official in the *kelurahan* office. In the case of three other Protestant families, their close relations with the Protestant *kadus* were probably one of the reasons which made them affiliate with the PNI.<sup>11</sup> Considering that the PKI had a stronghold in Kolojonggo, it was likely that the affiliation of all Christian families to the PNI brought a negative impact on the expansion of Christianity, in that an equation of Christianity with the government made it impossible for someone to convert to Christianity without changing his or her political affiliation. Ironically, however, this very characteristic of the Christian community was one of the major incentives for some villagers to approach Christianity after 1965 when the PKI could no longer bring them safety.

When several million Javanese converted to Christianity in the post-1965 period, villagers in this area were no exception. According to the clerks in the Catholic and Protestant Churches to which Christians in Kolojonggo are affiliated, there was a flood of villagers who wanted to embrace Christianity in 1965-1968, making it impossible to keep precise records of the converts in that period.<sup>12</sup> In Kolojonggo, seven households, all of whom were involved in the PKI before 1965, converted to Protestantism.

The expansion of the Protestant community and the active involvement of the new converts in religious activities made it possible for them to construct a place of worship (*kapel*) in the mid-1970s.<sup>13</sup> Although small in scale and having no clergyman, part of the significance of this construction was that the whole process was undertaken without outside financial assistance. In this sense, it displayed the strength and solidarity of the Protestant community not only to other Christians but to Muslims who did not have their own *masjid* at that time.

For reasons that are not clear, the construction of the *kapel* did not become the catalyst for further expansion of the Protestant community. No household conversion was recorded in the 1970s while only a few individuals embraced Christianity. It was only with the coming of the 1980s that Christian expansion resumed. Seven households changed their religious affiliation from Islam to

<sup>11</sup> The Catholic and Protestant Parties which were established under the Old Order did not have branches in the *kecamatan* Gamol, so that Christian villagers had to choose among the PKI, PNI and Masyumi. As the PKI was considered to be anti-religious and the Masyumi, to be a Muslim party, it seems to have been quite natural that Christian villagers opted for the PNI.

<sup>12</sup> The records in the Protestant and Catholic Churches to which the Christian community in Kolojonggo is affiliated show that each Church baptised respectively 126 and 268 villagers between 1967 and 1968, although these data are said to have been based on an incomplete list. The average number of baptisms in these two Churches was respectively 15 and 34 per annum from 1951 to 1959 and 17 and 42 per annum from 1960 to 1965.

<sup>13</sup> Christians in Kolojonggo together with those living in several neighbouring hamlets constitute a *pepantan* (a Christian community which combines with an existing church temporarily until they can form their own church). As a result, the construction of the *kapel* in Kolojonggo was carried out not only by Christians in Kolojonggo but by those from its neighbouring hamlets.

Protestantism, joined by several members from two households. In 1993, the Protestant community in Kolojonggo included thirty households and the Catholic, seven households.<sup>14</sup> Among the thirty-seven households, eleven were mixed ones where Muslims and Christians lived together under the same roof.<sup>15</sup>

It was difficult to research what made villagers embrace Christianity. One of the reasons was that conversion to Christianity was a taboo topic.<sup>16</sup> New converts to Christianity were not willing to discuss it except for a brief comment while other Christians generally did not want to talk about who the new converts were, who, among Muslim villagers, were sympathetic to Christianity and who were participating in the Christian learning course preparing for baptism.

If they did talk about the reason for conversion, the new converts generally mentioned their feeling (*rasa*): since they had a good feeling about Christianity and found it to be compatible (*cocok*), they decided to accept it. Sociologically, one common feature is found among the new converts: a Christian family lives nearby in their immediate neighbourhood. However, the converts did not want to admit this fact. When asked about the sources by which they had come to know Christianity, they did not point out the person who had persuaded them to attend the Christian learning course, the prerequisite for conversion. Instead, they emphasised the independence of their decision. The same mode of explanation was used by those who had converted to Christianity a long time ago or had been born into Christian families when asked to explain other villagers' conversion to Christianity. They generally talked about the life style and behaviour of Christians and the solidarity of the Christian community as the primary sources through which non-Christians encountered Christianity. Below is the reply of a Christian villager, when asked why people converted to Christianity:

The central thing which guides someone to Christianity is the life style (*pola hidup*) and behaviour (*tindak laku*) of Christians. Christians are not like 'a huge empty barrel which is lousy'. Christians love others and try

<sup>14</sup> Since the first Catholic appeared in the 1950s, the Catholic community in Kolojonggo has been successful in converting only one couple. In 1993, the seven households of the Catholic community consisted of three households which were the descendants of the two original converts, three households which had embraced Catholicism outside Kolojonggo and later moved into it and one household in which the couple were newly converted to Catholicism. Among these seven households, two households were mixed ones where parents were Catholics while some of their children were Muslims.

<sup>15</sup> Seen from the economic point of view, the thirty-seven Christian households did not have any characteristics which could distinguish themselves as a group from the other ninety-six Muslim households. The economic stratification, occupational structure and educational backgrounds of Christians were almost the same as Muslims. In many cases, Muslims and Christians were related each other by kinship ties except for the two families which had first embraced Christianity. All descendants of these families, whether they lived in this hamlet or not, were Christians.

<sup>16</sup> This tendency did not apply to Muslim villagers, as will be shown in the next chapter. However, Muslims' open remarks on conversion were made only to other Muslims while they also did not talk about this issue with Christians.

to actualise this love. This impresses non-Christians and becomes the major motive for them to make efforts to know more about Christianity.

The strong solidarity of the Christian community was not denied even by Muslims. Whenever a ceremony was held in a Christian family, Christian villagers, irrespective of their geographical proximity, came to give assistance. As the preparation process for a ceremony, especially cooking, was customarily done by neighbours or close relatives, the presence of Christian women who were neither close neighbours nor relatives of the host could be easily recognised by others. When a Christian died, the solidarity of the Christian community was even more clearly expressed. From the first to the last stage of burial, all the work was monopolised by Christians. They bathed the corpse, dressed it, carried the coffin to the cemetery and performed the last service at the cemetery, all of which provided no room for Muslims to be involved, apart from their participation as guests. The same situation, however, did not apply when a Muslim died. Not only Muslims but Christians actively participated in it. Sometimes, the participation of Christians in dealing with the death of a Muslim was more evident than that of Muslims. In several cases, it was a Christian villager with the Muslim *kaum* who entered the hole where the corpse would be placed, arranged the corpse to face Mecca, calculated the number of stones to support the corpse<sup>17</sup> and closed the hole with cement plates. In this respect, the evaluation of Christians that the solidarity of the Christian community is the key in attracting non-Christians to Christianity seems to be correct.

Apart from the solidarity of the Christian community, several clergymen enumerated various other factors as reasons for conversion to Christianity: Christians' emphasis on love rather than on rules and regulations; stress on one's personal experience and feeling rather than on mere memorisation; fanaticism of Muslims; the desire to be buried in a coffin; and witness of God through dreams or other experiences. Whatever the actual reasons for conversion, the Christians' own evaluation of conversion puts high emphasis on one's inner aspects rather than outer influences: attracted to Christianity by observing the behaviour of Christians, people are eager to know more about it and increasing knowledge enables them to convert to Christianity.

Studies about relations between Muslims and Christians in Java have shown that the official view of the government, namely, that harmony dominates the relations between followers of different religions, was not incorrect. Akkeren, who did his research in the early 1960s in an East Java community where Christians were in the majority, pointed out that discrimination based on religious difference was not felt in social interactions (1970:136). The same situation applied to a Yogyanese village in the 1950s. Muslims and Christians in this village

<sup>17</sup> According to the custom of Muslim villagers, the number of stones which support the corpse in order for it to face the west should be an odd number, usually five or seven.

created an atmosphere of peace in social life, respecting each other's religion (Soemarjo,1959:99). Research done in the 1970s in Central Java also noted that mutual respect between Muslims and Christians free of incidents suggesting conflict characterised their social interactions (Mohammad,1979/1980:177). Although the shortage of comparative data makes it difficult to make a generalisation, these studies show that religious difference was not a basis of social conflict, and religious distinction between Muslims and Christians was not felt strongly in non-religious domains.

It is likely that until recently, Muslim-Christian relations in Kolojonggo were dominated by harmony, as was symbolised by the reciprocal movements of foods and visits between Muslims and Christians. It is said that Christians were included in the Muslims' exchange network of food after the fasting month and were invited to *kendhuri* held after the fasting month. The food that Christians received at that time was reciprocated at Christmas when they sent food parcels to their Muslim neighbours while some Muslim villagers attended the Christmas celebration held in the *kapel*.

The acceleration of Islamic development in the 1980s, however, has brought a change. Islamic identity is expressed more clearly in everyday life and Islam becomes more and more a factor guiding individual and collective behaviour and providing a framework on things surrounding them. As a result, today, no food is reciprocated and no more visits are made between Muslims and Christians after the fasting month and at Christmas.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>18</sup> This change has been influenced by the *fatwa* issued by the Islamic organisation, *Majelis Ulama Indonesia*, in the early 1980s. According to this *fatwa*, Muslims are not permitted to participate in Christmas celebration since its nature is religious rather than social. When celebrating Christmas in the *kapel*, Christians in Kolojonggo delivered invitations to all executive members of the government organisations in the hamlet such as the youth organisation (*Karang Taruna*), the organisation for women (PKK) and the hamlet's social activities group (KCLKMD), irrespective of their religion. This was criticised by Muslims as a violation of Decree No. 70 issued in 1978 prohibiting the spread of a certain religion to those who already confess another religion. In spite of this invitation, no invited Muslims were present at the Christmas celebration in 1993. Muslim villagers' concern about this decree was proved once again when I made a complaint half in a joke to a few Muslims that an invitation card to *pengajian* was never delivered to me for twenty months of my stay in Kolojonggo. All of them mentioned that they did not want to violate Decree No. 70 issued in 1978 (I was a Buddhist). One exception to this practice was a community ceremony, called *Syawalan* or *Halalbihalal* which was celebrated after the fasting month. Although this ceremony was an extension of Islamic activities, all villagers irrespective of their religion were invited by Muslim organisers. They legitimised this invitation by referring to the fact that *Syawalan* is the tradition of Java as well as of Kolojonggo, so that, to invite Christians to it is not a violation of Decree No. 70 in 1978. At the 1994 celebration of *Syawalan*, it happened that most of the invited Christians did not attend it, except for a few who held the position of RT and RW head. This absence seems to have been triggered by an argument between Muslims and Christians concerning the place of celebration. The rumour went around that Christians insisted *Syawalan* in 1994 should be celebrated in a house of a Christian, a proposal which could not be accepted by Muslims. It is not certain whether the attempt by Christians to change the venue of *Syawalan* was a reaction to Muslim villagers' opposition to attending Christmas celebration or not. Whatever the reasons for this dispute and subsequent absence of most Christians at the *Syawalan* might be, however, this incident shows that the space shared by both Christians and Muslims has been getting narrower and narrower.

### 7.3. Clarification of the Boundary between Muslims and Christians

All the names of Muslim villagers in Kolojonggo are written in a notebook stored in the *masjid*. This book was made after the organisation of *takmir masjid* (*masjid* council) in 1989 and, from that time on, has been constantly revised. When someone moves in or out, gives birth to a child or passes away, these changes are added to it. In this sense, this book is comparable to the registration book of residents kept in the house of the *kadus*. In one respect, however, it carries more accurate data: on the religious affiliation of villagers. Unlike the official registration book which updates its information on the religious identity of each villager once in five or ten years, the book in the *masjid* does so as soon as a certain change occurs. When a villager's rumoured conversion turns out to be true, a red mark is added to his or her name, signifying a withdrawal from the *masjid* membership. As the invitation cards to certain Islamic activities are based on this registration book, a red mark implies that no invitation will be delivered to that person. In this respect, this book is the most updated religious atlas in Kolojonggo.

This updated book, however, is not always correct. It may contain data based on the speculation of the book-keepers, the *anak masjid*. The possibility of inaccurate updating was demonstrated when the distribution of *zakat* was completed in 1994. One day after it, Bu Wiro, who lived next door to the *masjid*, passed on Bu Utomo's complaint to the youth who were in charge of it that she did not receive her portion of *zakat* distribution. According to Bu Wiro, Bu Utomo, to support her argument that she had every right to receive a portion of *zakat*, maintained that she possessed praying clothes and memorised the motions of *salat*. The reason the Muslim youth had not allocated a portion of *zakat* to Bu Utomo was simple. Her name had a red mark in the registration book. The youth had a solid reason for this red mark: her daughter and son-in-law had converted to Christianity a few years ago. As Bu Utomo was totally dependent on her daughter and had never been to the *masjid*, her name was marked when her daughter and son-in-law got the same treatment.

As the case of Bu Utomo shows, the registration book in the *masjid* has played the role of identifying villagers by their religious affiliation. Religious difference had certainly existed and had been perceived by villagers in Kolojonggo even before the registration book was made. However, at that time, the boundary of the *umat* Islam was rather vague and arbitrary. No single criterion was available to draw a clear line and each resorted to their own criterion to define the *umat* Islam. In this respect, it was similar to what Anderson (1983) calls, 'an imagined community'.

The imaginary demarcation of the *umat* Islam is reflected in the way sacrificed animals and *zakat* were distributed in the 1980s. When the first sacrifice in

Kolojonggo was made in the mid-1980s by Pak Rono, two thirds of the mutton allotted for communal distribution was not apportioned equally to all Muslim households in Kolojonggo.<sup>19</sup> Instead, it was distributed only to the Muslims near his house. This uneven distribution brought about, from the present perspective of Muslims, an absurd situation, since Pak Rono distributed some of his portion to his close Christian neighbours. In principle, he did not violate the Islamic law which permitted him to dispose of his own portion as he wanted. However, the result was rather contrary to the idea underlying the command to distribute a sacrifice. Some Christians received a part of the sacrificed animal whereas many Muslims did not.

After talking about this story, Pak Rono excused this situation by commenting that villagers' religious knowledge was not great at that time and the amount of mutton was not enough to cover all the Muslim households in Kolojonggo. If the boundary of the *umat* Islam had been clearly conceptualised at that time by Pak Rono and other Muslims, however, this way of distribution would have been hard to implement. As this boundary was vague and was not repeatedly and consciously delineated, he could distribute his portion to his Christian neighbours, giving priority to the traditional duty of distributing food to one's close neighbours.

The first movement to coordinate *zakat* collection and distribution was started by the *kaum's* family in 1983.<sup>20</sup> Twenty-one households responded to its request, donating 120 kg. of hulled rice.<sup>21</sup> It was then distributed evenly to thirty-three households, so that each received 3.5 kg. From that time on, the collection of *zakat* has increased steadily: 315 kg. of rice and Rp 20,750 (equivalent to 35 kg. of rice) were gathered in 1994. Apart from this quantitative increase in the amount of *zakat*, a remarkable change took place in its mode of distribution, amid the decade's history of *zakat* collection.

Asked how to distribute *zakat*, the Muslim youth in charge of it replied that all Muslim villagers who did not pay their *zakat* had a right to receive it. The rationale underlying this explanation, however, was not consistent. Some said that this mode aimed to incorporate all Muslims into the exchange network of *zakat*, which would help to consolidate fraternity (*ukuwah*) amongst Muslims. Others argued that this system would help to heighten the religious consciousness of villagers. Those who were capable but did not pay their *zakat* would feel

<sup>19</sup> According to the teaching of Islam as interpreted by the reformist villagers, one third of sacrificed animals should be allotted to its purchaser and two thirds to other Muslims who cannot afford to purchase one. For a different mode of distributing sacrificed animals, see Bowen (1993:276-7).

<sup>20</sup> Some Muslim villagers said that they had started to pay *zakat* in the 1970s. However, no organising body was formed at that time to take charge of *zakat* collection, so that villagers paid their *zakat* either to the *masjid* in a neighbouring hamlet or distributed their *zakat* individually to other Muslims.

<sup>21</sup> At that time, not every participating family paid the due amount of rice, namely 2.5 kg. of hulled rice per head. Only five families did so while the others paid just 2.5 kg. of rice for the whole family.

ashamed when they received a portion of rice collected from villagers who were poorer than themselves, and this feeling of shame would encourage them to participate in *zakat* payment the next year. One youth had a totally different idea. He postulated that all villagers had the intention of paying their *zakat* but economic difficulties hindered them, so that rice should be distributed to everyone who did not pay *zakat*. In spite of these differences, all of them shared the view that every Muslim should be included in the network of *zakat* either as a recipient or as a donor.

The attitude of the Muslim youth in considering *zakat* as a medium to draw all Muslim villagers into one network did not exist in the 1980s. At that time, a household's economic wealth was said to have been an important criterion for choosing the recipients of *zakat*. However, as an absolute yardstick to measure the economic situation of each villager was not available, the actual distribution was done on an arbitrary basis and many households who were poor did not receive their portions. In 1983, only thirty-three households received a portion while about forty Muslim households, including some of the poorest in Kolojonggo, were excluded from it. Islamic development in the 1980s increased the amount of *zakat* collection until 300 kg. of rice was collected in 1990, almost three times more than that in 1983. However, the expanding amount of *zakat* did not result in an increase in the absolute number of villagers who received it. Rather, each recipient got more rice than before. While 3.5 kg. of rice was given to thirty-three households in 1983, 8 kg. of rice was allocated to thirty-six households in 1990.

In 1991, a dramatic change took place in the mode of distributing *zakat* as the idea that *zakat* distribution should embrace all Muslim households replaced the previous arbitrary selection of recipients. Consequently, the number of recipients increased to sixty-one households in 1991. The expansion of the recipients was accompanied by varying the amount of rice being distributed. From 1991 onward, the rice was not allocated equally but varied between 5 kg. and 15 kg., depending on the economic situation of each recipient. With this modification, almost all Muslim households were included in the network of *zakat* in 1993 and 1994 either as donors or recipients.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup> In 1994, three households were excluded from the network of *zakat* among one hundred and seven Muslim households in Kolojonggo (including those households which have both Christians and Muslims). Two of them belonged to relatively rich households and the other was a household which objected to participating in social activities with other villagers. In this respect, the exclusion of these three households does not seem to contradict the idea that the *zakat* network embraces all Muslim households, demarcating the boundary between Muslims and Christians. In addition, the first two households regularly received an invitation from the *masjid* for the *pengajian* and a portion of sacrificed animals was distributed to them, signifying that they were considered to be the members of the *umat* Islam. In the case of the household belonging to the second category, the situation was rather different. Neither invitation to Islamic activities nor a portion of sacrificed animal was distributed to it. However, this exclusion was the result of the idiosyncratic character of that family since it severed all social relations with villagers.

As the changing mode of distributing *zakat* and sacrificed animals<sup>23</sup> illustrates, the boundary of the *umat* Islam in Kolojonggo has become more and more clearly defined and specific. The registration book of the *umat* Islam symbolises the culmination of this process, showing that no ambiguity is permissible in the religious affiliation of villagers. This change has been triggered by the acceleration of Islamic development which has helped Muslims to be more conscious of their own religious identity and that of others and has provided more religious activities reminding them of the boundary of the *umat* Islam. The presence of Christians has been another important factor. As will be shown in the next chapter, Christians are envisaged by Muslims to be obsessed with expanding their community at the expense of the *umat* Islam. By clarifying the boundary of the *umat* Islam, therefore, Muslims try to draw a line between themselves and Christians, a line which should not be transgressed.

#### **7.4. Expansion of Religious Difference in Non-Religious Domains**

In Kolojonggo, the religious demarcation which has been consolidated in the religious domain is on the point of expanding to non-religious domains. The dichotomy of Muslims and Christians, which is sometimes referred to by the terms of *kita* (we) and *wong liya* or *tiang sanes* (other persons), is used as a framework for Muslims to interpret certain events in everyday life and to guide their behaviour. The comparison of two elections in 1978 and 1993 exemplifies the increasing importance of this dichotomy and the ways it works in the domain of secular life.

The hamlet headmanship (*kadus*) is directly connected to material benefit. The successful candidate receives approximately one and a quarter hectares of *sawah*, the size of which will make him or her one of the largest landowners in Kolojonggo. Apart from this material benefit, the headmanship guarantees high status in hamlet life. The *kadus* will be invited to all private and public occasions in hamlet life, will be given a chance to speak on these occasions and will be consulted whenever a problem occurs. In this respect, the *kadus* is at the center of all hamlet affairs.

The sudden death of the *kadus* in 1978 activated villagers in Kolojonggo. Free election, which was promised at that time, attracted many male villagers into competing for the headmanship. When the application period was closed, ten male villagers had registered their names as candidates. All applicants were aged between twenty-five and thirty-five and had jobs in the agricultural or construction sectors. Considering that the position of *kadus* was one of the most

<sup>23</sup> In 1994 when a bull was slaughtered at *Idul Adha*, its meat was distributed to all Muslim households in Kolojonggo, except for one (see footnote No. 22). In cases where a household was composed of two married spouses, two portions were distributed to it. As a result, around 140 portions were distributed to Muslim villagers, exceeding the total number of Muslim households.

preferred ones among villagers and competition was keen due to the abundance of candidates, it was natural that all possible resources were mobilised for the campaign.

All ten candidates worked hard to form their faction. The kin group was the most trustworthy resource of each candidate, as was revealed by the fact that no immediate kinsmen competed for the headmanship.<sup>24</sup> Apart from this, they used other personal relations to expand their faction. In some cases, verbal contracts were made between a candidate and his supporters about the benefits that the former would give to the latter after winning the election. Some borrowed money from others and used it as a bond between themselves and the creditor. Ascetic practices were another resource to which most candidates resorted. Many performed these by themselves while some visited the *dhukun* to get advice.

One of the interesting points in the campaign was that religion did not play a major role in building a faction. In many cases, the Christian candidates associated with the Muslim villagers and vice versa. The present Christian *kadus* who won the 1978 election, for example, had Muslims as his main opinion leaders, one of whom is now the most active supporter of Islamic activities. The fact that Christians did not resort to religion to create their faction was understandable since the Christian community had five candidates. In a situation where more than three-quarters of voters were Muslims, to use the religious element as a part of their campaign strategy might lose potential support of Muslims. As a result, it was the Muslim candidates who would be advantaged if religion became one of the key issues in the election. However, this was not the case and Muslim-Christian dichotomy was not highlighted throughout the campaign period.<sup>25</sup> The result of the election also shows that the religious identity of a candidate was not an important variable in deciding the voting pattern of villagers. The winner and the runner-up received about 90 and 70 votes from the total of about 250 voters while the other eight candidates got less than 20 respectively. This meant that the Christian candidates received more than two-thirds of the total votes since both the winner and runner-up were Christians and the other Christian candidates also received some votes.

<sup>24</sup> Two kinship ties existed among the ten candidates. Two of them had the same great-grandfather, while Pak Budi and Pak Dar were related by 'incomplete' affinal tie: Pak Budi was the step-son of his step-mother's younger brother, Pak Dar.

<sup>25</sup> When asked about the strategies in this election, all former candidates enumerated their kinship and friendship as a basis of building factions and no one commented on religious ties. The absence of any organised Islamic activities was one of the major reasons which had hindered the formation of friendship amongst Muslims based on religious activities and, consequently, made it impossible for the Muslim candidates to use religious difference as a resource to build a faction. One of the Muslim candidates whom I asked a more direct question about the role of religion in that election answered that, at that time, villagers had not been concerned with the question as to whether the *kadus* should be a Muslim or not.

*Karang Taruna* is the youth organisation founded by the government. Although its presidency is not a paid position, it is in demand among the youth: it is the only official organisation encompassing the young generation; and its president is invited to all official hamlet meetings, bringing high status to its holder.<sup>26</sup> In addition, many villagers' desire to hold a position in an organisation also explains its popularity.

In 1993, the president of *Karang Taruna* expressed his intention not to run for another three years' term. From the outset, there appeared two strong candidates for the presidentship, Ferdi and Sulis, both of whom had similar personal backgrounds: they were university students; belonged to the same age group; and had a position on the executive of *Karang Taruna*, Ferdi as a treasurer and Sulis as a vice-president. They had a good reputation among adult villagers and they actively participated in religious activities. Ferdi was one of the opinion leaders of the *anak masjid* whereas Sulis was an organiser of a Bible Study Group.

Several weeks before the election day, it was decided in the general meeting of *Karang Taruna* that the president would be selected not by direct vote from among its members but by an electoral board consisting of several hamlet leaders. As the candidates running for the presidency would also be selected at the board meeting, no candidates could be made official and no public campaign was possible before that time. In this situation, the most important factor for someone to be selected as a president was one's previous relations with the board members. The religious identity of the candidates was one of the crucial elements in forging such relations since the contact between the youth and middle aged board members was made most frequently at religious meetings.

Ferdi was quite aware of the fact that religion would be crucial in the coming election process. As time went on, his evaluation proved to be true. One rumour was that Pak Adi, who was not a member of the electoral board but had an excellent ability to convince others, openly sought support for Sulis from the Christian board members. Unfortunately, Ferdi had no trickster in his side. In terms of numbers, the composition of the electoral board was not disadvantageous

<sup>26</sup> One of the factors which added religious significance to the position of the president in *Karang Taruna* was a mutual suspicion between Christian and Muslim youth that the elected president from a certain religious group would not appreciate the religious activities of the other. The Christian complaint against the outgoing Muslim president of *Karang Taruna* was that he had fixed the time for its main activity, that is, to take coconuts from the trees owned by this organisation, on Sunday morning. Although this activity usually finished before nine in the morning when Sunday service started in the *kapel*, some Christian youth argued that the fixing of the time on Sunday morning was inappropriate for the communal activity of *Karang Taruna*. They also complained that its monthly or irregular meetings sometimes coincided with those of the Christian youth, due to the Muslim president's lack of consideration for Christians. The Muslim youth also suspected that if a Christian youth were selected as a president of *Karang Taruna*, he would not consider their religious activities in selecting the meeting day. As the Muslim youth used three or four evenings in a week for their religious activities, it might be difficult for a Christian to choose the day of *Karang Taruna* meeting without making it collide with Islamic ones. The outgoing Muslim president could do this job easily since he himself participated in all Islamic activities.

to him since it would consist of five Christians and six Muslims. However, what made him worried was the fact that all five Christian members were active in the church while three of six Muslim members did not frequently visit the *masjid*.

Deciding that the situation was not favourable to him, Ferdi, in company with his close friends, began to consider alternatives to giving the presidency to a Christian. At last, they found two options: first, to make the outgoing president remain in that post for another three years and second, to nominate a third person as president. Ferdi met the outgoing president but the latter reiterated his intention to resign. This forced him to accept the second option but it was not easy for him to find a proper person. According to Ferdi, the candidate had to be a Muslim, had to have a higher qualification than Sulis and had to be able to satisfy both Muslim and Christian board members. His choice was Pak Hartono, who was a primary school teacher and retained good relations with the board members. In order to make Pak Hartono a candidate, however, Ferdi had to overcome an obstacle: Pak Hartono was not a member of *Karang Taruna* due to his marital status<sup>27</sup> and as a corollary, he could not be a candidate for its president. This problem which did not appear easy to overcome did not pose a serious challenge to Ferdi. He discovered a way to change the conventional rule for membership to *Karang Taruna*: the manual of *Karang Taruna* issued by the government stipulated that everyone under the age of forty was eligible for membership. When this rule became known to other youth, no one could oppose the nomination of Pak Hartono as a candidate. After solving the problem, Ferdi visited Pak Hartono on the day before the election and gained agreement from the latter to be a candidate. As part of his plan, he asked the outgoing president, who would be included on the electoral board, to nominate Pak Hartono as a candidate.

The general meeting for the election was convened in the house of the *kadus*. Before it started, Ferdi passed the government version of membership rules to everyone attending. Apart from this, he made a short remark just before the electoral board meeting that he had had many difficulties working with a president of the same age and expected a more mature president for the next term of *Karang Taruna*.

The electoral board met in an isolated room. As one board member was not present that night, a senior female of *Karang Taruna* substituted for him. With this replacement, the board was composed of four Christians and seven Muslims. When the chairman of the board, the *kadus*, asked for nominations from others,

<sup>27</sup> Asked the membership rule for *Karang Taruna* until a few days before the election day, all members pointed out marital status as its main criterion. This rule had been strictly observed, so that unmarried villagers in their thirties were considered as members and invitations were delivered while those in their early twenties but already married were excluded from it. The married youth were categorised as honorary members.

the Christian RW<sup>28</sup> head nominated Sulis while the Muslim RW head put forward the name of Ferdi. With the nomination of the third person, there were three nominees. Each of them, then, briefly talked about the reasons for nominating. The next session was to hear the opinions of other board members one by one. All Christian members except for the *kadus* who reserved his opinion backed Sulis, five Muslims supported Ferdi and two Muslim members, the third candidate. This result placed the *kadus* in deep trouble. Although Ferdi had more supporters, this numeric dominance was not enough for him to be selected. They needed some kind of consensus but the *kadus* knew that the Christian members would not give up their preference easily. The moment of silence which fell over the room was broken when the outgoing president of *Karang Taruna* put forward the name of Pak Hartono. He repeated Ferdi's speech before the beginning of the election that a mature person was required for the presidency and emphasised that Pak Hartono was qualified to be a member of *Karang Taruna*. The *kadus* swiftly sought the opinions of the others. No objection was heard. Finally, he asked the opinion of the two RW heads. As they showed their consent, the *kadus* made it clear that Pak Hartono was selected as a president.

After they came out of the room, the *kadus* announced the result of the board meeting, adding that everyone should accept this decision although they had different opinions. In contrast with the previous progress of the meeting which had gone as expected by Ferdi, it finished unexpectedly. When the *kadus* asked Pak Hartono to give a speech of acceptance, no one answered. He had already gone home.

The different electoral processes in the two elections illustrate the increasing significance of religious identity in non-religious domains. The election of *Karang Taruna* implies that one's religious identity is now viewed as a factor that should be considered in selecting a person for an organisation with which both Muslims and Christians are associated. Although Ferdi did not mention it publicly, the main reason why he made efforts to prevent Sulis from being elected as a president was because Sulis was a Christian.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>28</sup> RW (*Rukun Warga*) refers to an administrative unit below hamlet (*dusun*). RW is composed of several RT (*Rukun Tetangga*), the lowest administrative unit encompassing twenty to forty households. The head of RW or RT is not a paid position, although their role includes administrative works, such as issuing certificates of residence, birth, death and so on. Kolojonggo consists of two RW and five RT.

<sup>29</sup> Ferdi's opposition to Sulis may be interpreted in a different way. We may ascribe this not to Sulis' religion but to Ferdi's personal rivalry with Sulis. Ferdi and Sulis belonged to the same age group, grew up together in Kolojonggo, shared similar personal background and were regarded as informal leaders of their age group. Although the personal rivalry between Sulis and Ferdi might play a certain role, it should be noted that this rivalry was expressed and the Muslim youth who were close to Ferdi interpreted this case in religious terms. When asked why Sulis was not suitable for a president in *Karang Taruna* and why Ferdi opposed Sulis, they suggested that this was not because Ferdi opposed Sulis personally but because Sulis was a Christian. In this respect, it can be said that religious difference was at the center of the *Karang Taruna* election, irrespective of whether it was the main reason for Ferdi's opposition to Sulis or not.

Public discourse in the *umat* Islam also emphasises Muslim identity as a factor to guide one's behaviour in non-religious life. For example, Muslims are now prompted to visit their sick neighbours, to participate in funeral procedures, to help the family of the deceased and to give economic assistance to their neighbours, primarily because they are Muslims. Pak Giran expressed this idea in a *Jumatan* as follows:

When Muslim villagers are sick, we, as Muslims, have to visit them, so that we can gather again to carry out commands from Allah. I stress this duty, since there is a member (*warga*) in the *umat* Islam in Kolojonggo who is sick, namely, Bu Yogo. Her sickness is serious and, due to her family problem, that her daughter has a different religious belief, she is in a much worse condition.<sup>30</sup> ... Don't let our sisters and brothers (*sedherek kita*) [face hardships by themselves]! It is obligatory for Muslims to visit our sisters and brothers, to share their sufferings and to help them. These acts are what can be regarded as *ibadah*.

The next week, Pak Giran's ideas were re-emphasised by two speakers in the *Jumatan* and in the routine *pengajian*. One of them, Pak Tugi, pointed out the difficulty in coordinating the activities to assist Muslim villagers and proposed a more systematic plan to take care of their well-being: to select a representative from each RT who would be in charge of monitoring the conditions of Muslim villagers in each RT and of reporting it to the *masjid* council (*takmir masjid*), which would later mobilise the *umat* Islam to take certain measures.<sup>31</sup> Pak Tugi's proposal was not put into practice for the three months of my stay in Kolojonggo after his speech had been delivered. However, his ideas seemed to be sympathetically received by others and became a basis for them to mobilise a *gotong-royong* to improve a house belonging to Bu Nangun.

In a *takmir masjid* meeting where the *gotong-royong* to help Bu Nangun became an item on the agenda, a youth argued for repairing Bu Nangun's house as follows: her house was on the verge of collapse and rain leaked into her house but her cousin who owned the land where her house was erected did not pay any attention to it. He then emphasised the devotion of Bu Nangun to Islamic

<sup>30</sup> Asked why her Christian daughter made Bu Yogo's condition worse, Pak Giran replied that her daughter could help Bu Yogo only outwardly (*secara lahir*), for example, by cooking food, by house cleaning and by washing clothes, but could not help Bu Yogo spiritually (*secara batin*). The spiritual assistance was, according to Pak Giran, what Bu Yogo was urgently in need of and what she could obtain only from the *umat* Islam.

<sup>31</sup> The other villager who dealt with the same issue in the *pengajian* mentioned two reasons why Muslims should take care of other Muslims: first, one's visit to sick Muslims would strengthen fraternity among Muslim villagers and second, this would prevent followers of other religions (Christians) from making attempts to lure Muslims. 'If the followers of other religions take care of sick Muslims (although he did not mention the name of Bu Yogo, it was clear to the audience that he was talking about Bu Yogo)', he argued, 'they definitely have a hidden intention.' Then, he explained what the hidden intention was, 'They pretend to assist Muslims, but in their mind, they keep saying: We will take care of you (Muslims), but you have to follow us, namely, you have to follow our religion.'

activities and called for assistance from the *umat* Islam. In his speech, he did not identify her cousin but everyone knew who he was. There even was someone who commented, probably half in a joke, that the working party should not expect to be served snacks and drinks since Bu Nangun was too poor to buy them; the story suggested that her cousin would not prepare food for them.<sup>32</sup> Unfortunately, the bad guy in this discussion, the cousin of Bu Nangun, was not in a position to represent himself and excuse his negligence to his aunt. He was the Christian *kadus*. Therefore, the statement by the youth, by emphasising the misery of Bu Nangun and the neglect of her by her kinsman, indirectly highlighted the religious significance of the *gotong-royong*. This was not only to help a member of the *umat* Islam but to embrace a Muslim abandoned by her Christian kinsman. In other words, this was a chance to show that religious solidarity could be stronger than kinship ties.

In two subsequent *tahlilan*, funds to purchase building materials were collected<sup>33</sup> and the date of the *gotong-royong* was fixed for Friday afternoon after the *Jumatan*. Around thirty villagers gathered at the backyard of the *kadus'* house and renovated Bu Nangun's house for two days. As Bu Nangun talked of the mobilisation of *gotong-royong* to her cousin the day before its initiation, the working party was fortunate enough to be served with tea, snacks and meals. Although a few Christian families lived not far away from the *kadus'* house, the *kadus* was the only Christian who participated in the labour process throughout two day's *gotong-royong*. This signified the acknowledgment of other Christians that it was the *gotong-royong* organised by Muslims and they had no obligation to participate in it.

Every group in the hamlet, whether it be a family, a neighbourhood, an administrative unit (RT, RW or hamlet) or a voluntary association (religious groups or art groups), is entitled to make a plea for *gotong-royong*. However, two different logics are applied to it. First, the invitation to *gotong-royong* for private purposes is governed by the rule of reciprocity. When one asks assistance of others, he or she is expected to reciprocate others' requests for labour in the future, although the reciprocity is not strictly balanced. Second, where a communal body mobilises *gotong-royong* to improve roads, ditches, guard posts, *masjid* and so on, the invitation is strictly limited to those who will benefit from

<sup>32</sup> It is an unwritten rule that the host of *gotong-royong* should provide tea, snacks and meals to the participants.

<sup>33</sup> The total sum estimated to renovate Bu Nangun's house was about Rp 100,000 or equivalent to about 160 kg. of rice, which was not a small amount in the village economy. Most of the donors, who numbered about forty, contributed between Rp 1000 and Rp 2000 while a few gave between Rp 5000 and Rp 10000. It took a month for around Rp 100,000 to be collected. The swiftness of this donation process surprised even the organisers of the *gotong-royong* since the *umat* Islam in Kolojonggo had had no precedent for gathering that sum of money in a month. This success was considered by village Muslims as proof of the maturing religious piety of the *umat* Islam.

these works. In this sense, a clear division between the private and the communal has been observed in the pattern of mobilising *gotong-royong*.

Seen from this logic, to mobilise Muslims in order to improve the structure of the *masjid* is acceptable while to ask labour from Muslims for the purpose of improving a private house is not. This is because the benefit gained from this work is not shared by all participants nor will it be reciprocated in the future. Therefore, Bu Nangun's house could be improved by *gotong-royong* only when initiated by the *kadus* since she had not previously been involved in any network of *gotong-royong*. If initiated by the *kadus*, others would come with the idea that they reciprocated the labour of the *kadus* and their labour would be reciprocated by him in the future. In this context, *gotong-royong* initiated by Muslim villagers to improve Bu Nangun's house deviated from the usual logic.

However, one condition can transform this abnormality into normality. If the benefit of this labour is conceptualised as falling on Muslims as a group, the communal labour outside the boundary of the *masjid* can be reconciled with the logic of *gotong-royong*. This conceptual change was what happened in the plea to initiate *gotong-royong* to renovate Bu Nangun's house. The participants believed that the benefit of this labour would be ultimately shared by themselves as Muslims. As a hamlet can initiate *gotong-royong* for the benefit of the whole community, so can Muslims initiate it for the benefit of Muslims. In brief, this example signals that religious identity is significant not only in the religious domain and that the daily life of a Muslim, which was previously perceived to be outside the boundary of religion, is becoming a concern of Muslims as a group.

Islamic development in Kolojonggo has been accompanied by the construction of a clear line demarcating the Muslim community from its Christian counterpart. As this demarcation is consolidated, it does not remain in one's conceptual scheme but begins to be utilised as a factor to guide one's actions both in the religious and the non-religious domains of life. The fact that one belongs to the *umat* Islam can now be used as a rationale for rejecting a certain candidate in an election and for giving assistance to fellow villagers.

This situation in Kolojonggo seems to be what is expected by the motto of 'agreement in difference' (*setuju dalam perbedaan*) popularised by Muslim intellectuals in the 1970s as the right guideline for regulating relations between followers of different religions. It defines the prerequisite to bring harmonious relations between followers of different religions as a certainty (*keyakinan*) of one's religious belief, not as a relativistic approach that sees every religion based on the same essence (*hakekah*) (Badan Penelitian dan Pengembangan Agama, 1983/1984:25-6). Only when one is convinced of the rightness of one's own religion and a clear consciousness of one's religious identity, is one thought able

to proceed to the second part of this motto, that is, 'agreement' with followers of different religions.

It is not certain, however, how far this idea can be actualised in real life. The case of Kolojonggo shows that the transition from one part of the motto, 'difference', to the other part, 'agreement', is neither an easy nor an automatic process. Although no open conflicts have been found between Muslims and Christians, friction and antagonisms have built up as Islamic identity has been consolidated and Muslims become more conscious of the differences between themselves and Christians. The relations between Muslims and Christians in Kolojonggo where religious difference has become increasingly important in everyday life will be examined in the next chapter.

**Plate 13: Bu Nangun's house before reconstruction.**



**Plate 14: Gotong-royong mobilised by Muslim villagers to build Bu Nangun's House.**

