Jihadism and ‘The Battle of Ideas’ in Indonesia: Critiquing Australian Counterterrorism

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We are engaged in a battle of ideas [with terrorists], a struggle to the death over values.¹

[The fight against terrorism] is now one of the greatest political challenges of our generation. And I believe our most potent weapons in this struggle are our ideas.²

Alexander Downer

The Howard Government has made counterterrorism a cardinal element in its foreign policy. This is evident from the amount of resources—human and financial—which have been devoted to this purpose during the past five years. More than A$8 billion has been committed to the ‘war on terror’ since late 2001, including about A$400 million in Southeast Asia.³ Most of this regional expenditure goes to Indonesia, as it is seen as not only having the most severe terrorism problem in the region but as also the Southeast Asian country in which Australian citizens and assets are at the greatest risk of attack from groups such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and the Noordin Mohammed Top network.⁴ Counterterrorism assistance takes various forms. The most prominent has been the extensive technical cooperation and training provided by Australian police and intelligence agencies to their Southeast Asian counterparts. This includes assistance with forensic investigations and electronic surveillance, programs to improve terrorism database management, and training in terrorist psychology, ideology and operational methods. There has also been assistance for drafting counterterrorism legislation. In addition to these law enforcement, intelligence and legislative initiatives, the Australian Government has committed substantial sums of money to programs designed to combat terrorist ideas—its 2005 White Paper on regional terrorism (Australia’s National Security: A Defence Update 2005) made clear that the government regarded ‘extremist ideology’ as the main driver of terrorism.⁵ These programs are diverse and not always placed in an explicitly counterterrorism framework. They include interfaith dialogue
conferences, Muslim exchange programs between Australian and Indonesian students, youth leaders and intellectuals, educational assistance programs which are aimed at Islamic schools (such as the Learning Assistance Program for Islamic Schools), and high-level visits to Australia by senior Indonesian Muslim leaders.

These campaigns against terrorist ideology, which the government regards as part of a broader ‘battle of ideas’, are the focus of this chapter. It will explore the government’s perceptions of the ‘battle of ideas’ and critique the policies deriving from it. I will argue that this aspect of the counterterrorism effort is of questionable benefit, as it is either poorly targeted or fails to address the dynamics of jihadism and the vectors through which it is spread.

The Howard Government and the ‘Battle of Ideas’

To gain a better understanding of how the Howard Government defines the ‘battle of ideas’, it is necessary to examine the statements and publications of key ministers and departments. There are three interlinked themes in this discourse: (1) ideology is the primary driver of terrorism; (2) ideas promoted by terrorists are totalitarian and based on a malign misinterpretation of ‘true’ Islamic teachings which are tolerant and pluralistic; and (3) Western nations can only defeat terrorism with the assistance of ‘moderate Muslims’.

Australian Foreign Minister Alexander Downer has made the most frequent and detailed pronouncements about counterterrorism, and particularly the importance of ideas. In a 2006 speech entitled ‘Ideas as Weapons’, he said:

> Ordinary Australians … want to know what is fanning this violent extremism. The answer is: ideas. Even though they are couched in religious terms, the ideas that drive terrorist groups like JI and al Qaeda are political in nature. Their ideas are based on a distorted and selective interpretation of Islam.

On another occasion, he declared:

> The heart of this contest [between moderate and radical Islam] is about the totalitarian mentality of violent extremism. It is about the values on which the terrorists base their ideology. … This ideology can and will be defeated if people of good faith everywhere stand up against it.6 [emphasis in original]

Downer has been at pains to illustrate the power that ideas can have in motivating global movements. In one speech he compared contemporary terrorism to communism of the last century:

> Soviet Communism began in a back room in London in 1903 with Lenin, a handful of followers and half a dozen pistols. They took an idea and turned it into a plan for political power. That revolutionary regime and its totalitarian ideology was an ideological storm that inflicted
catastrophic results on the world. … At the beginning of the twenty-first century, terrorism and its extremist ideology is another storm bursting on the world.\textsuperscript{7}

Downer pointed to the susceptibility of sections of the Muslim community to radical messages, saying ‘as people search for meaning and spiritual fulfilment they can easily be misled by utopian ideas packaged as simple solutions to complex political problems’.\textsuperscript{8} He repeatedly asserts the centrality of moderate Muslims to the counterterrorism effort:

The most successful warriors against the Islamic extremist terrorists will be moderate Muslims.

In the Mosques, in the Islamic schools and more broadly in the Muslim community, it is moderate Muslims who can spread and give life to the great values of peace and tolerance which are at the heart of the beliefs of the overwhelming majority of Muslims.

We must support each other, as people who respect the rights of others, as people who value tolerance. We must support moderate Muslims to ensure that they successfully defeat the divisive message of hate, tyranny and intolerance propagated by the extremists.\textsuperscript{9}

Australian Prime Minister John Howard has also spoken regularly, though in more general terms, on the importance of ideology and moderate Muslims to counterterrorism. Fighting terrorism, he says, is not only the military battle, but also the battle of ideas. … We must try and engage and win the confidence of moderate Islamic people. … Justifying terrorism by a reference to Islam is the common thread of all the terrorist attacks that we’ve had. Every single one of them has involved some kind of indication or reference point in Islam. Now that is blasphemous, it is a misrepresentation of the Islamic religion. [This] puts obligations on all of us, including in particular moderate Islamic leaders. Because it is their faith that is being blasphemed [sic] and wrongly invoked.\textsuperscript{10}

Howard has been especially generous in his praise of ‘moderate Muslim leaders’ such as Pakistan’s President Pervez Musharraf and Indonesia’s President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Musharraf is, according to Howard, someone who has played a major role in the fight against terrorism and in leading his country to democracy. Yudhoyono is described even more glowingly as ‘one of the most capable moderate Islamic leaders in the world’.\textsuperscript{11} Yudhoyono’s ‘election [in 2004] was a triumph for moderate Islam over the forces of evil and extremism. The terrorists want him to fail. The good, decent moderate Islamic people want him to succeed.’\textsuperscript{12} He went on to compliment Pakistan and Indonesia as ‘two
great Islamic countries, both of whom [sic] future as pillars and exemplars of moderate Islam is so important to winning the battle of ideas against the extremist elements around the world’.  

It is worth noting, in passing, that the language and counterterrorism priorities of the Australian Government are almost identical to that of the Bush Administration, suggesting that the former borrows heavily from the latter. Senior Administration officials refer constantly to the ‘battle of ideas’ and the need to enlist moderate Muslims in the global ‘war on terror’. For example, in 2005 President Bush’s National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley declared: ‘we must win the battle of ideas’ between [the terrorists’] ‘grim totalitarian vision’ and the free world’s ‘positive vision of freedom and democracy’. He described this as ‘a struggle for the soul of Islam’ in which ‘Islamic moderates’ needed to ‘dispute the distorted vision of Islam advanced by terrorists’.  

More elaborate expositions on Australian Government counterterrorism thinking and policies are set out in a range of official documents, most particularly in DFAT’s Advancing the National Interest: Australia’s Foreign and Trade Policy White Paper (especially chapter 3), and Transnational Terrorism: The Threat to Australia (especially chapter 5), though the analyses of the nature of the ‘terrorism problem’ and the means of addressing it are, not surprisingly, consistent with the views enunciated by both Downer and Howard.

**Critiquing the ‘Battle of Ideas’**

The Australian Government’s discourse, on counterterrorism and the ‘battle of ideas’, invites several critical observations. The first is that the government’s perception of the problem is based on a simplistic, dichotomous typology of Muslims as either ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’. Rarely are definitions offered for either term, though it is often apparent from the use of related adjectives and synonyms how the government views these categories. ‘Radical’ is most commonly taken to mean ‘violent’, ‘extremist’ or ‘fundamentalist’, but is also often linked to intolerance, theocratic rather than democratic tendencies, and sectarianism; terrorism is located as an extremist sub-category within radicalism. By contrast, ‘moderate’ is associated to terms such as ‘tolerant’, ‘pluralist’ or ‘mainstream’, and Muslims of this persuasion are seen as democrats and law-abiding. Often, more loaded descriptors are used, such as referring to radical Muslims and terrorists as ‘evil’, ‘medieval’ and ‘barbarous’, or portraying moderates as ‘good’, ‘peace-loving’ and ‘modern-minded’. Such a discourse revolves around binary opposites, whereby all virtue is ascribed to the ‘moderates’, and ‘radicals’ are cast in unrelievedly negative terms. In effect, the ‘moderate Muslims’ are cast as friends in a common struggle and the ‘radical Muslims’ are the enemy or at the very least problematic.
In reality, this dichotomy is crudely inadequate to understanding the great complexity within Indonesia’s Islamic community (or indeed, any other community). Many Muslims may hold views that are, according to the Indonesian Government’s criteria, both radical and moderate. Individual Muslims may be supportive of democracy and modernisation but also favour comprehensive implementation of sharia law and have anti-Semitic or anti-Christian views. For example, one of the most prominent Muslim leaders in Indonesia, Professor Din Syamsuddin, behaves in a way which transcends the radical-moderate division. One part of his public life appears to mark him out as a ‘moderate’. He is chairman of the nation’s second-largest Islamic organisation, Muhammadiyah, and also deputy chairman of the government-sponsored Indonesian Ulama Council, or Majelis Ulama Indonesia, two positions that would seem to place him squarely in the middle of ‘mainstream’ Islam. In addition to this, he enjoys a high profile at home and abroad as an advocate of interfaith dialogue. He is co-chair of the World Conference on Religion and Peace, convenor of the World Peace Forum, chairman of the Indonesian Chapter of Religion and Peace and deputy secretary-general of the World Islamic People’s Forum. He has also defended Indonesia’s religiously neutral state ideology of Pancasila from attack by Islamists who seek to replace it with an explicitly Islamic ideology. On other occasions Din acts like a ‘radical’. He has claimed that Indonesian terrorism is a product of Central Intelligence Agency manipulation, and during the US-led bombing of Afghanistan in 2001 he called for jihad against America. He has promoted hardline Islamists to the Indonesian Majelis Ulama Indonesia and backed the Council’s controversial 2005 fatwa condemning ‘pluralism, liberalism and religious secularism’ as contrary to Islamic law. At the same time, within Muhammadiyah he has overseen the sidelining of prominent moderate intellectuals and has spoken out in favour of sharia-based local laws, even where these are staunchly resisted by religious minorities. Thus, the range of Din Syamsuddin’s thinking and actions are not easily reducible to a single characterisation. Trying to fit him into either a neat ‘radical’ or ‘moderate’ category is a Procrustean exercise.

These kinds of complexities can be found across the Indonesian Islamic community. Sometimes they are the product of genuine ambivalence; in other cases they are borne of political calculation.

There is another problem with the radical/moderate characterisation: it encourages narrow thinking on the part of government officials when implementing policies and interacting with Muslims. For example, Indonesian Muslims invited to participate in exchange programs to Australia are carefully vetted to ensure that they have not espoused ‘radical views’. Prospective participants who have been publicly critical of the ‘war on terror’ or advocated strongly Islamist positions are likely to be pushed lower down invitation lists or struck off them entirely. Moreover, some senior Australian officials have
adopted a condescending or naively approving tone when meeting Muslims. One senior embassy official in Jakarta was in the habit of visiting mainstream Muslim organisations and commending his interlocutors as ‘true Muslims’, often to the chagrin of his hosts.

So, using a radical–moderate paradigm as the starting point for counterterrorism policies is inherently flawed as it imposes false boundaries upon Muslim behaviour. A sounder option would be to avoid the use of the term ‘radical’, as this covers too broad a spectrum of thinking and action within the Muslim community, and focus instead upon those who perpetrate or endorse violence. Thus, Islamists who seek ‘sharia-isation’ through democratic means or who criticise the ‘war on terror’ would not necessarily be regarded as ‘part of the problem’; the important thing is that they do not use or condone violence.

The second difficulty with the Australian Government’s approach is that it promotes the mistaken notion that there is a single ‘correct’ form of Islam which is inherently peaceable and tolerant. This is in keeping with President Bush’s refrain that Islam is a ‘religion of peace’. Islam, like other faiths, contains a diversity of teachings, many of which are open to a variety of interpretations. The two central sources of Islamic law—the Qur’an and the example of the Prophet Muhammad (Sunnah)—contain both irenic and bellicose elements. Much depends on Muslim perceptions of their position in the world as to whether tolerant or militant sources of guidance are drawn upon. Muslims who believe themselves to be under attack can find many sections of the Qur’an and Sunnah which sanction aggressive behaviour in such circumstances. By contrast, Muslims who find themselves in a relatively stable and prosperous community are more likely to invoke the pluralistic and quietist sections of scripture.

The third criticism of Australian policies is that they fail to specify the target audience for ‘counter-radicalisation’ programs and tend to offer undifferentiated programs for both mainstream and jihadist sections of the Islamic community, as if one approach will work for all Muslims (or, indeed, all terrorists). Attempts to involve ‘moderate’ or ‘mainstream’ Muslims in counterterrorism efforts appear to assume that terrorists and prospective terrorists are either drawn from mainstream Islam or heedful of moderate ulama or Islamic leaders. Both these assumptions are dubious. The available evidence points to most terrorists coming from family, educational or social backgrounds that are already militantly Islamist; very few of the more than 300 terrorists arrested to date have come from non-jihadist or mainstream organisations such as Muhammadiyah or Indonesia’s largest Muslim organisation, Nahdlatul Ulama. Moreover, there is abundant evidence suggesting that terrorists and those whom terrorists are seeking to recruit are dismissive of moderate leaders, believing that they are part of Islam’s problem. Terrorists accuse moderates of straying from ‘true’ Islamic teachings and of weakening the faith by being too prepared for
compromise on matters that Muslims should rightly hold firm, such as unstintingly implementing sharia and rejecting secularism. The convicted Bali bomber, Imam Samudra, gave some insight into these attitudes when he wrote that mujahideen should only follow Islamic scholars who had direct experience of war:

How could those ulema who have never fought a jihad or been on the battlefield possibly understand the issues and complexities of jihad? … When the ulema are increasingly busily submerged in their collections of holy books and the echo of loudspeakers, they no longer care about the despoiling, vilifying and colonisation of Mecca and their holy lands. It was preordained by God that a group of holy war fighters would be born who were truly aware and understood what they had to do.20

Hence, the Australian Government’s policy to use moderates to influence terrorists seems doomed to failure. Indeed, there is mounting evidence to suggest that the most effective way to wage a ‘battle of ideas’ among jihadists is to use Islamic scholars who are of similar doctrinal outlook but who reject terrorism in an Indonesian context. Most Indonesian jihadists regard themselves as salafist, a puritanically conservative stream within Islam which seeks to model itself strictly on the example of the first three generations of Muslims. The great majority of salafists are non-violent and pursue their religious and social goals through educational, intellectual and preaching activity. There is, however, a small sub-stream within salafism, usually called jihadi salafism, which regards violence against Islam’s enemies as justified. Non-jihadist salafis are strongly critical of terrorism, regarding it as sinful and contrary to the teachings of Islam’s founding generations.21

A look at the discourse regarding terrorism in Indonesia shows the impact of salafist critiques of jihadi salafism. In 2004, Imam Samudra published his biography and manifesto, Aku Melawan Teroris (I Oppose Terrorists), which soon became a best-seller. By 2006, more that 15 000 copies had been sold and the book had been reprinted four times. Aku Melawan Teroris gave the first opportunity for many Indonesian Muslims to read a terrorist explaining in detail their thinking and actions, and the author repeatedly justifies his behaviour in terms of salafist principles. Samudra’s publication prompted a string of books from critics challenging his interpretations. The first was Nasir Abas’s Membongkar Jama’ah Islamiyah (Exposing Jemaah Islamiyah).22 Nasir was a former JI member and head of the organisation’s third regional command based in Sulawesi. Although not from a staunch salafist perspective, he accuses Samudra of selective quoting from the Qur’an and of twisting JI’s original doctrine. The second ‘reply’ to Samudra was written by a salafi scholar and former paramilitary leader, Luqman Ba’abduh, Mereka Adalah Teroris (They are the Terrorists).23 The cover is identical to that of Samudra’s book and the text offers a closely
argued exegetical and jurisprudential rebuttal of *Aku Melawan Teroris* from a salafist viewpoint. (Ba’abduh has also travelled widely through Indonesia, holding public meetings to discredit Samudra’s writings.) Another salafist scholar, Abu Hamzah Yusuf At-Atsary, published a shorter tome opposing Samudra entitled *Aku Melawan Teroris: Sebuah Kedustaan Atas Nama Ulama Ahlussunnah* (I Oppose Terrorists: a Fraud in the Name of Sunni Ulema), in which he declares the Bali bomber to be deceiving his co-religionists and of advancing thinking which is un-salafi. The most recent book on this subject, by Muhammadiyah intellectual Abduh Zulfidar Akaha, is critical of Ba’abduh and the attack on Samudra. Not to be outdone, Samudra has, from his cell on death row, written his response to critics, though it has yet to be published. Interestingly, much of his text is taken up with answering salafist criticisms of his original writings.

Thus, it is clear from the foregoing that much of the debate over the legitimacy of terrorism is taking place not in mainstream communities but within fundamentalist and radical Islamic groups. These are the circles from which most terrorists are recruited and if would-be jihadists are to be dissuaded from violent activity, it will be this discourse which is most likely to influence them. Western governments will find it difficult to assist this salafist challenge to terrorism, because most salafist scholars would be averse to receiving Western aid, and would object to many of the views held by salafists. For example, salafists are usually opposed to gender equality, deny Israel’s right to exist, are anti-Semitic, and are hostile to the ‘Christian West’.

A final criticism of the ‘battle of ideas’ is that it greatly exaggerates the extent of ideological ferment within the broader Islamic community. Australian politicians frequently talk about the ‘battle of ideas’ as if large sections of Indonesia’s Muslim community were at risk of radicalisation. The reality is that Islamism and jihadism are very much minority phenomena and there is little evidence to support the contention that Indonesia is becoming more radical. In political terms, Islamist parties gained just 16 per cent and 22 per cent at the 1999 and 2004 elections respectively—far below the 43 per cent of the 1955 election. While there are some localities controlled by Islamist parties and currently engaged in ‘sharia-isation’, these amount to less than 10 per cent of Indonesia’s more than 500 provinces and districts. At the national level, attempts to insert sharia clauses into the constitution have been soundly defeated. This suggests that, in terms of mainstream Islam, there is no monumental battle between pluralism and tolerance on the one hand and violent jihad and fundamentalism on the other. There is serious debate over ideological and theological issues related to jihad, but this discourse is taking place within a largely pluralist framework and there is little prospect of the terms of this debate changing dramatically within the short to medium term.
A more important task for Australian counterterrorism than the ‘battle of ideas’ is to persuade Indonesians of the nature of the terrorism problem within their country. While seemingly most Indonesians now accept that terrorist attacks have been carried out by their fellow countrymen, conspiracy theories regarding the role of foreign intelligence agencies abound and denial of JI’s existence in Indonesia remains commonplace. The Australian Government could contribute to a more informed debate in Indonesia by releasing reliable information about terrorists including, where possible, primary source materials gathered by intelligence agencies, and by assisting the Indonesian police to explain terrorist thinking and activities to the public.

Another obstacle for effective counterterrorism is to allay suspicions about Western motives in conducting the ‘war on terror’. There are two elements to this. The first is that countries such as Australia and the United States apply different standards when dealing with the Muslim world compared to their own allies and client states. The most often mentioned cases are those of the Israel–Palestine conflict and the treatment of Muslim detainees in Guantanamo Bay’s Camp Delta. An indication of the depth of feeling generated by such issues is a recent speech by K. H. Mustofa Bisri, the deputy president (rais) of Nahdlatul Ulama. Mustofa, apart from being a noted Islamic scholar, poet and columnist, has also been an eloquent champion of religious tolerance and understanding. And yet, during the Israeli attack on southern Lebanon in 2006, he railed against the role of Western countries, and the United States in particular, in supporting Israel and unleashing emotions that feed terrorism:

Hatred against Israel and condemnation of its cruelty appear to have failed to stop the US from being arrogant and taking the side of Israel. This can be understood because according to Gus Dur [former Indonesian president and Nahdlatul Ulama chairman, Abdurrahman Wahid], one-third of the leaders in the US are Israelis/Jews. God permits, even if doomsday happens within the next two days, the US will continue to protect Israel even if this means trampling on the principles it has glorified all along such as democracy, human rights et cetera. While supporting Israel, the US is not afraid of losing its face because it has 1000 faces. As the strongest country, which has no match at all levels, the US tends to be arrogant and does not listen to other sides, except those on its side.

The US behaviour—often described as being a double standard—is the cause of all ‘indiscriminate’ resistance everywhere. It has become the root of terrorism. What can the weak with high motivation do to fight the strongest one? Just like a child abused by parents, the most he/she can do is pelt stones at the roof of the house—an action that will only disadvantage oneself and those not the target of resistance.
In connection with this, we have seen groups that have passion, whose spirit for jihad are [sic] burning, and they want to go to the battle in Lebanon and Palestine. So strong are their passion and spirit that rational considerations are defeated. Even waging jihad requires logical considerations. Look at the jihad waged by Prophet Muhammad SAW [Peace be Upon Him], the great leader and role model for all the faithful!

... 

Who would possibly not be angered or outraged by Israel’s excessive inhuman actions? But Allah has warned the faithful to uphold truth consistently, justly, and rationally. Outrage and hatred often drag people to inconsistency. That is why Allah has commanded: ‘And let not enmity and hatred of others make you avoid justice. Be just, that is nearer to piety’

(Qur’an surah 5 verse 8).

Despite his anger at what he sees as the injustice of Israeli and US actions, and his sympathy for those who oppose it, Mustofa ultimately warns against violent jihad as a reaction.

The second suspicion is that Western countries are using the ‘war on terror’ as a means of pursuing their strategic, diplomatic and economic interests. One common view within Islamic political circles, for example, is that nations such as Australia have tried to lever Indonesia into supporting the current Iraq War by claiming this as a part of the ‘war on terror’.

**Conclusion**

Australia’s counterterrorism efforts have had some impressive achievements. The low-profile but highly successful cooperation between the Australian Federal Police and the Indonesian Police is the most obvious example, but there have also been the significant efforts to improve counterterrorism training and analysis. Other aspects such as assistance to the Islamic education sector are commendable, though unlikely to bring about marked changes in attitude. The ‘battle of ideas’, by contrast, is one of the more problematic aspects of Australian counterterrorism. It rests upon questionable assumptions about the nature of terrorist recruitment and has tended to be applied in a vague and unsubtle way. While it is clearly desirable to assist moderate Muslim leaders in promoting values of tolerance and pluralism within the Islamic community, there is little chance that such activity will impact on terrorists.
ENDNOTES


6 Downer, 'Terrorism: Winning the Battle of Ideas', p. 2.

7 Downer, 'Ideas as Weapons: Meeting the Ideological Challenge of Extremism', pp. 11–12.

8 Downer, 'Ideas as Weapons: Meeting the Ideological Challenge of Extremism', p. 7.


17 See *Jawa Pos*, 17 August 2006; *The Jakarta Post*, 31 August 2006; and *Republika*, 10 November 2006.


19 Publicly, at least, the Australian Government chooses to place Din Syamsuddin in the ‘moderate’ camp. He has been DFAT ‘special visitor’ to Australia and meets regularly with Foreign Minister Alexander Downer. In private, though, policymakers are mindful of his Islamist proclivities and are less trusting of Din than his predecessor in the Muhammadiyah chairmanship, Professor Syafii Maarif.


21 Sidney Jones, of the International Crisis Group, Jakarta, was the first writer to propose the use of salafi ulema to counteract the influence of jihadi salafists. See, *Indonesia Backgrounder: Why Salafism and Terrorism Mostly Don’t Mix*, Asia Report, no. 83, 13 September 2004.
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