EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN GIIN

Where and how Matsuoka would exercise power in Japanese politics was to some extent predetermined. His career background, political connections and electoral support dictated both the policy interests that he represented and the policy activities that he pursued. These factors led him inexorably to his role as a nôrin giin, a representative of agricultural and forestry interests in the party and in the Diet.

PARTY COMMITTEE

As soon as Matsuoka entered the Diet in 1990 (see Table 4.1), he joined the LDP’s Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee (CAPIC) (Sôgô Nôsei Chôsakai), one of the investigation committees of the PARC.1 CAPIC was formed in 1968 to discuss medium and long-term policy issues for agriculture. Since that time, it had remained one of the two most important agricultural policy committees of the PARC (the other was the Agriculture and Forestry Division). CAPIC was concerned with the larger questions of agricultural policy such as the structure of agriculture, the future of Japanese agriculture and agricultural policies as well as rice production and pricing in the context of these larger, sector-wide issues. For that reason, CAPIC was generally considered to be the ‘strategy division’ of agricultural policy, whilst the Agriculture and Forestry Division was the ‘tactics division’.2 Unlike the division, whose membership was capped, LDP Diet politicians could freely register to join CAPIC, which had a very large membership as a result (around 245 in 1990).

Matsuoka joined CAPIC for several very important reasons. First, he wanted to demonstrate his credentials as a politician representing agricultural interests.
Membership was a good indicator of his intended policy direction and activities. It showed the strength of his interest in a specific policy domain. By representing his farming constituents in the party Matsuoka also helped to secure his re-election. Only by winning successive elections could he build seniority in the party, thereby fulfilling one of the most important qualifications for appointment to higher office, both in the party and in government.

Second, membership of CAPIC provided a means by which Matsuoka could take positions on particular policies in which his constituents and supporting organisations had an interest. These standpoints were vital in allowing others to grasp his ‘revealed policy preference’.

Third, because Matsuoka had spent 19 years in the MAFF, he considered himself well versed in agricultural policy, so it was natural for him to gravitate toward a committee that considered government measures for agriculture. Besides exhibiting the characteristics of a ‘status incentive politician’, Matsuoka also demonstrated the features of ‘single-issue incentive politician’. As Glosserman explains:

...members of this group focus on a single policy issue...Many were dissatisfied with their previous lifestyle; all of them took up politics out of a desire to be involved in policy on issue in which they had a long-standing interest.

Fourth, CAPIC was where Matsuoka could refine his expertise and skills in the domain of agricultural policy. Developing his agricultural policy niche would furnish additional means for career progression and thus increase his power and influence in the party. Regular membership of a committee would qualify him for an executive position in that committee, which in turn would provide a ladder to higher office including sub-cabinet posts and ultimately ministerial positions. Membership was also proof to party executives and faction leaders of his actual activities in policy domains. It allowed Matsuoka to demonstrate to party leaders that he had policy ability, which would be linked to future re-election and a successful career.

Fifth, becoming a member of CAPIC was a vital step in putting Matsuoka into a position where he could influence party policy on agriculture and forestry, and thus government policy. If an ordinary LDP backbencher such as Matsuoka wanted to shape government policy, he had to join an LDP policy committee. Materialising policy influence for LDP backbenchers took place primarily in the committees of the PARC, which was the party’s deliberative organ for...
policy decisions.\textsuperscript{10} The party policy committees performed the crucial functions of ‘advance scrutiny’ (yotô shinsa) and ‘prior approval’ (jizen shônin) of government policies and bills. Being on a committee enabled Matsuoka, individually, to exert influence on government policy. The exercise of such influence was vital in enabling him to claim credit for particular agricultural policy measures. CAPIC discussed both government bills and policies and amended them to take account of the interests of the special-interest members, such as Matsuoka. Even as a first-term legislator, Matsuoka would be free to participate in the debates in the committee and thus influence policy outcomes. He could even exercise denial rights (hitei riken) over a government-proposed policy.\textsuperscript{11} Because decisions in PARC committees were taken on the basis of a consensus, a single individual such as Matsuoka, or a handful of like-minded politicians could hold up the business of government.

Sixth, being on a PARC committee enabled Matsuoka to directly communicate with and influence bureaucrats, who monopolised key steps in the policymaking process, such as policy formulation and bill-drafting. In particular, CAPIC would be a key locus of interaction between Matsuoka and MAFF officials, who often attended committee sessions and provided input into the decisions taken by the committee.

Finally, getting a start in an agricultural policy committee of the PARC was mandatory if Matsuoka were ever to take the additional step from nôrin giin to nôrin zoku. As an agricultural and forestry zoku, Matsuoka could exercise unparalleled influence both within party circles over agricultural policies and over bureaucrats in the allocation of subsidies and public works to his constituency. This was vital if Matsuoka were to guide benefits back to his jiban and his wider electorate, as well as to provide favours to key backers as a broker.

In 1991, Matsuoka made a logical progression in his memberships of key PARC committees relating to agriculture. He gained entry into the Agriculture and Forestry Division (see Table 4.1). LDP members of the Lower House Committee on Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries (AFF), to which Matsuoka was appointed in that year, automatically became members of this division. Together with his continuing membership of CAPIC, joining the division gave him coverage of the two most important PARC committees on agriculture. The division was also concerned with forestry policy matters: an area in which Matsuoka could claim a great deal of expertise and career experience.
DIET COMMITTEES

Besides the PARC agricultural committees, Matsuoka’s ambition was to become a member of the Lower House AFF Committee. Diet committees were formal bodies without decision-making power, and a place for opposition party, rather than ruling party, policy activity. In practice, the PARC committees were a more significant locale for LDP politicians to exercise policy influence because they provided an opportunity for them to amend government bills and proposed measures. Nevertheless, being a member of the AFF Committee would reinforce Matsuoka’s policy specialism and represent an important step towards becoming a nōrin zoku.

Because of the popularity of the AFF Committee amongst LDP Lower House Diet members, Matsuoka was not able to join right away. As his former LDP colleague from Fukushima (2) explains:

> [t]here is no way a first-term Diet member can join the agricultural and forestry committee or the construction committee. The older Diet members monopolise posts where there is a possibility of links to concessions (riken) and which are advantageous for elections. New Diet members have to wait their turn.12

Such norms meant that new members and young members of the ruling party such as Matsuoka had no right of choice. The distribution of memberships across the various Diet committees reflected the will of senior Diet members who had won a number of elections.13 Membership of PARC divisions and investigation committees were much more a matter of individual choice.

When he entered the Diet, Matsuoka was first allocated to the Lower House Regional Administration Committee (see Table 4.1), which was concerned with policies relating to regional development (public works projects such as road construction and airports), as well as regional industries such as agriculture and forestry. This policy domain, along with that of the Construction Committee, was closely linked to rural areas, which had relatively higher proportions of agricultural, forestry and fisheries population.14 For Matsuoka, the Regional Administration Committee was a stepping-stone to the AFF Committee.

In 1990, Matsuoka was also appointed to the Diet’s Special Committee Relating to Land Problems etc. (see Table 4.1), which was also indirectly concerned with agriculture and forestry because these were land-based industries. Also, given his professional career experience in the National Land Agency, Matsuoka could put his expertise to good use in this special committee.
In 1991, Matsuoka achieved his ambition of AFF Committee membership (see Table 4.1). Getting on to this committee in only his second year as a Diet member was a significant coup for Matsuoka. It complemented his membership of the equivalent PARC committees, it helped to build his agriculture and forestry policy specialism further, and it was a necessary condition for his later accession to membership of the nôrin zoku.

MAFF PARLIAMENTARY VICE-MINISTER

In August 1995, in his second term, Matsuoka was appointed MAFF parliamentary vice-minister (see Table 4.1) in the reshuffled coalition cabinet of former Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi, who headed a coalition government of the LDP and former JSP until January 1996. From Matsuoka’s perspective, a parliamentary vice-ministership was another vital step on the ladder of political advancement.

Formally speaking, the position accorded Matsuoka considerable power over the MAFF. According to Clause 3, Article 17 of the State Administration Organisation Law (Kokka Gyôsei Soshikihô), the post of parliamentary vice-minister had more power and authority than a ministry’s own administrative vice-minister, which was the top position in a ministry. The relevant clause stated that the parliamentary vice-minister’s role was to assist the minister, to participate in the planning of policies and plans, to manage affairs of state, as well as to receive orders from the minister and to undertake the duties of the minister in his or her absence. The parliamentary vice-minister could stand in for the minister in undertaking ministerial duties, while the administrative vice-minister could not.15

In practice, however, the council of parliamentary vice-ministers, which was a sub-committee of the cabinet, met only one or twice a month and did not decide anything. It just listened to explanations from bureaucrats and was more of an arena to exchange opinions.16 A parliamentary vice-ministership was considered a junior learning position within a ministry, a post reserved for second or third-term Diet members. Because it was a post that normally went to relatively junior politicians, parliamentary vice-ministers could not do important business.17

Nevertheless, being appointed to such a position in his second term was a tribute to Matsuoka’s standing in agricultural and forestry policymaking circles and his demonstrated expertise on the various relevant committees. The position enabled him to hone his policy skills and to develop closer personal links with
serving MAFF officials, as well as to consolidate his ties to all the relevant interest groups operating in the sector. In this respect, for Matsuoka as for other politicians, a parliamentary vice-ministership was a crucial step in breaking into the structure of concessions (riken kikô) in his chosen policy sector. In that respect, it gave him a leg-up to becoming a zoku giin. In fact, the LDP reportedly used the parliamentary vice-minister’s post as a mechanism for cultivating zoku giin, by linking politicians with specific ministries in this way. The parliamentary vice-ministership thus served as a pointer to Matsuoka’s political career and his political ambitions in the agriculture and forestry sector.

Moreover, it was common for the parliamentary vice-minister to become a director of the corresponding Diet committee, facilitating the passage of draft bills that the ministry had submitted for party perusal, and conducting negotiations with the opposition parties. In exchange, the ministry provided various benefits for their parliamentary vice-minister’s electorate and for the industry world with which they had connections. Both of these advantages suited Matsuoka’s own ambitions and interests.

Accordingly, in 1995, Matsuoka became one of the directors of the AFF Committee to match his appointment as MAFF parliamentary vice-minister (see Table 4.1). He held this position until 1999—well beyond the end of his parliamentary vice-ministership. Formally, becoming a director was a matter of election by the members of the committee, but Matsuoka was actually nominated by the chairman according to his factional affiliation. Selection on this basis ensured a factional balance amongst the directors from the LDP. There were usually four LDP directors of the AFF Committee with the balance coming from the opposition parties. The directors were like vice-chairmen and a stepping-stone to the chairmanship. The directors played an important role in managing the conduct of committee business, meeting both before and after committee discussions in order to draft the agenda, to draw up the consensus of the meeting and to undertake crucial coordination functions.

Becoming MAFF parliamentary vice-minister in 1995 was serendipitous for Matsuoka because it was the interim period between the passage of the New Food Law (Law for Stabilisation of Supply-Demand and Price of Staple Food, or Shuyô Shokuryô no Jukyû oyobi Kakaku no Anteihô) in November 1994 and its implementation a year later in November 1995. The new law engineered the most radical change in the nation’s Food Control system governing rice pricing and distribution in the post-war period. Under the law, the Food Agency...
devolved some of its controls over rice marketing to non-government players, and so Matsuoka was parliamentary vice-minister at a crucial time. When various questions were put to Matsuoka about rice under the new regime, he dutifully became a mouthpiece for the MAFF, commenting

> [w]e have to make [rice] production adjustment a success and keep a balance between demand and supply [in order to prevent producer rice price falls in a more liberalised market]. The government and the ruling parties have decided on some assistance for production adjustment, including compensation measures. As the government, we need to secure the budget to be able to do these sorts of things, and that’s what I’ll be endeavouring to do from now on.²¹

Like the MAFF spokesman that he was, Matsuoka opposed the idea of giving government assistance to all farmers participating in the planned distribution system for rice (*keikaku ryûtsûmai*), which was the distribution route that remained under government management. In Matsuoka’s view, only those producers undertaking production adjustment should get assistance. He also pointed out that if imported rice affected the consumption of domestic rice, it would be necessary to think about developing new kinds of demand for processed rice.²²

In 2000, Matsuoka became chairman of the AFF Committee (see Table 4.1). He had to be elected to the position in the plenary session of the Diet, but his party (effectively his faction) put his name forward after an internal discussion, and he received a formal nomination by the chairman of the Diet (*gichô*). As AFF Committee chairman, it was Matsuoka’s job to report back to the plenary session on the committee’s investigations of various aspects of the legislation submitted to it by the cabinet and by individual Diet members. Each party then made its final decision on the legislation based on this report.

**LDP COMMITTEE EXECUTIVE 1995–2000**

In 1995, Matsuoka became chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee (*Nôgyô Kihon Seisaku Shôiinkai*) of CAPIC (see Table 4.1). It was his first executive position on an LDP agricultural policy committee. The subcommittee handled all matters relating to agricultural basic laws (*kihonhô*) and basic plans (*kihon keikaku*), as well as broader policy issues relating to agricultural production policy, technical development of farming, and rice policy, including rice production adjustment. Matsuoka remained chairman of the subcommittee almost without interruption until 2003, a long time in which to serve in the same executive position (see Table 4.1). Over this period, Matsuoka fashioned the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee into his own policy kingdom.
In 1998 and 1999, as chairman, Matsuoka played a leading role in the formulation of LDP policy on the new agricultural basic law to replace the existing Agricultural Basic Law (Nōgyō Kihonhō) of 1961, as well as the forerunners to the new law, the ‘Agricultural Policy Reform Outline’ (Nōsei Kaikaku Taiikō) and the ‘Policy Program’ (Seisaku Puroguramu). In interviews with Nokyo’s National Council on these issues, Matsuoka called, amongst other things, for mutual understanding amongst the LDP, MAFF and farmers, for the need to entrust prices to markets but to protect farm incomes through policy measures, to maintain rural communities and to promote concrete policies leading to the establishment of new income policies for farmers, particularly for farmers operating under disadvantageous conditions in mountainous areas.

Matsuoka assiduously attended national gatherings of Nokyo representatives focusing on these policy issues, where the views of farmers and farm households could be directly transmitted to LDP agricultural committee executives. Matsuoka directly invited farmers and agricultural organisations to make input into the new basic law.

The LDP considers this [law] to be the most important issue [in agricultural policy], and continues to discuss it in the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee. In order to realise the policy that we are aiming for, I would like to request that farmers and agricultural groups tackle it with us in order to complete the basic law outline.

Complementing Matsuoka’s rising power as a nōrin giin was his accession to the chairmanship of the Uruguay Round-Related Countermeasures Implementation Subcommittee (UR Kanren Taisaku Jisshi Shōiinkai) in 1995 (see Table 4.1). The UR committee was a subcommittee of the Nōrin Bukai. Its main task was to decide the allocation of ¥6.01 trillion on projects and other policy measures for farmers and rural dwellers under the UR countermeasures policy and to make sure that all the funds were spent.

The chairmanship of the subcommittee put Matsuoka in charge of subsidies for agricultural and rural development projects funded by the UR countermeasures expenditure. Because of public criticism of the lavish amount of government subsidies being scattered (baramaki) in rural areas, Matsuoka made a very defensive speech about the countermeasures policy in front of 30 young men from the local agricultural cooperatives in Kumamoto, saying, ‘[a]griculture is always victimised as a “rogue” and bad people say nasty things about it. City dwellers do not understand anything. I will not allow even one yen to be cut from the ¥6.01 trillion’. He claimed to have ‘defended the package 100 per cent’.
When the money was being distributed, Matsuoka and his close political associate, Suzuki Muneo (later indicted and convicted on political corruption charges), ran the show pretty much as they liked. The farmers’ organisation of the JCP (Nôminren), complained on its website that, even though Muneo and Matsuoka obtained around ¥6 trillion in subsidies to compensate farmers for the liberalisation of rice imports, Matsuoka used part of the subsidies for construction work on building spas, some of which had closed in the red, and other facilities that were using up the budget of Aso Town, his hometown. In Nôminren’s view, the UR agricultural countermeasures expenditure had been turned into engineering works.

The spas referred to by Nôminren were hot spring resorts called ‘Refresh Villages’, which were built in various places across rural areas of Japan, including Kumamoto. In Matsuoka’s hometown, a theme park called ‘Hana Aso Bi’ was constructed at a cost of ¥920 million, with ¥460 million coming from the UR countermeasures package. According to one report, the structure was excellent, but stepping inside, some people said that it looked no different from a ‘drive-in’ souvenir store on a highway. Another facility built with UR countermeasures expenditure was a ‘Tofu Museum’, which, according to some, was on a par with a junior high school laboratory. It was questionable what, if any, benefits those employed in agriculture actually gained from facilities such as these.

In addition to these projects, total expenditure on a hot spring resort called ‘Mizube Plaza Kamato’ amounted to ¥1 billion, with approximately ¥500,000 allocated from the UR countermeasures package. Another resort, or ‘general exchange terminal’, which included hot spring facilities, a direct selling market and restaurants etc., called ‘Sanfurea’ was built in Kikuyo Town, Kikuchi County. Budgeted as an ‘agricultural improvement project’, which would bring rural and city residents together, it cost ¥1.2 billion with more than ¥600 million coming from the UR countermeasures budget. The town office sang its praises as the ‘Kikuyo Hot Spring’.

Both Sanfurea and Mizube Plaza Kamato were located in Matsuoka’s electorate.

The UR countermeasures package was distributed most heavily to zoku Diet members who say what the MAFF wants. Local people involved in agriculture commented sarcastically: ‘the only people who were strengthened by the UR budget were zoku Diet members and civil engineering and construction types. We haven’t heard anything about agriculture in Kumamoto being strengthened’.
Others commented that although the UR countermeasures expenditure was officially funding for ‘agricultural’ measures, it was just a bonus to general contractors (zenekon).42

The construction works for the Kikuyo Hot Spring were successfully bid for by a zenekon with a head office in the heart of Tokyo (Toyo Construction, which was said to be on friendly terms with Matsuoka).43 According to company executives who were connected to Matsuoka’s electorate, the Matsuoka office in Kumamoto City intervened in the choice of the sub-contractors in the works, and, indeed, in the actual orders from the zenekon. Although these facts were denied by Matsuoka’s office and by the Kikuyo Town office, they were verified by Araki Katsutoshi, a construction company executive, Kumamoto prefectural assembly member, and one of Matsuoka’s most important political followers.44

Many rural prefectural assembly members like Araki ran construction companies that relied on public works orders from both the central and local governments for their business and profitability. When Araki asked Tominaga Kiyotsugu, mayor of Kikuyo Town, whether they would use local businesses as sub-contractors, the mayor replied: ‘Matsuoka’s office deals with those sorts of issues’.45 Araki then spoke to a secretary in Matsuoka’s Kumamoto City branch office about the matter. He was also advised by a Kumamoto Prefecture Agricultural Department official to go and pay his respects to Matsuoka if he wanted to participate in the project.46 As another person in the construction industry elaborated about Matsuoka and the role he played in the allocation of construction contracts.

Being a hardliner with a big voice, a considerable part of the public construction in Kumamoto Prefecture now ‘consults’ Matsuoka’s office. With respect to construction in Kumamoto (3), as in Aso Town, ‘consultation’ must be close to 100 per cent. He has become that influential.47

Matsuoka also fiercely defended the UR countermeasures expenditure against budget cuts. In February 1997, when Prime Minister Hashimoto, in answer to a question in the Lower House Budget Committee, said that not only the UR countermeasures expenditure but also agriculture, forestry and fisheries-related expenditure would not be treated as a ‘sacred area’ in the government’s fiscal reconstruction program, the LDP set up another subcommittee chaired by Matsuoka. This Uruguay Round-Related Works Implementation Promotion Subcommittee (UR Kanren Jigyó Jisshi Suishin Shóiinkai) was established by a joint council (gôdô kaigi) of CAPIC and the Nôrin Bukai (Matsuoka was also chairman of this committee at the time). The new subcommittee conferred on
the conditions for implementing the countermeasures (that is, ensuring that expenditure targets could be found) and reviewed the contents of the works funded by the UR package. It came to a number of resolutions, including that ‘the full amount of ¥6.01 trillion in expenditure should be preserved and special measures should be taken to secure the budget in the future’. The group then lobbied the government’s Fiscal Structural Reform Council (Zaisei Kôzô Kaikaku Kaigi) as well as the party’s executive to get its objectives met.

When later interviewed by the National Council about whether agriculture and forestry-related public works should be excluded from public works, Matsuoka responded as follows

> [e]ver since the Hosokawa Cabinet, fiscal reform has been discussed under the principle of ‘economy for economy’s sake’ and discussion has been led by the financial world (zaikai). This was the background against which the idea that agriculture-related public works should be excluded from public works originated. Because the role that agriculture and forestry plays is indispensable to the lives of the people, nothing is more closely related to the public benefit than agriculture and forestry. Therefore, I strongly believe that agriculture-related public works have to be included in works for public benefit. The Uruguay Round was an international treaty that Japan agreed to for the benefit of the entire nation’s trading interests, but that means we must take measures for agriculture. At the time, the Hosokawa Cabinet promised to undertake assistance measures for agriculture, and after that, I and others made similar promises now that we’re back in power. Excluding agriculture and forestry-related public works from public works is the last thing we can give in to…[Finally] the important thing is to demonstrate the position of agriculture in farm households. In other words, it is necessary to show clearly how to ensure farm household income. It is necessary at least to show that you can get this much if you produce this much.

In 1996, Matsuoka became acting chairman then chairman of the LDP’s Agriculture and Forestry Division, a position he held until 1997 (see Table 4.1). This was an appointment made by the LDP’s Executive Council, as were all the top executive appointments in the PARC, including the chairmanships of other agricultural committees, such as CAPIC, the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee (Rinsei Chôsakai), and the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee (Nôrinsuisanbutsu Bôeki Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai, or Bôtaii).

Customarily, junior and middle-ranking Diet members were appointed as division chairmen. The divisional chairs were distributed according to faction but factors such as how many times they had been elected, their contribution to the division and whether they had shown ‘presence’ (sonzaikan) were also taken into account.
When someone asked Matsuoka, ‘what are the divisions of the LDP all about?’, he answered

[as the ruling party, each division in the LDP drafts (ritsuan) numerous policies. Large numbers attend the divisional meetings and active debate takes place, especially in the agriculture and forestry-related divisional meetings. Although society might misunderstand the role of the divisions, in reality, it is quite obvious that policies are formed (seisakuka) as intense debate takes place and accumulates.51

Immediately after the 1996 Lower House election the LDP set up a new executive regime relating to agriculture and forestry, to which Matsuoka, as chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division, was appointed along with three other LDP agriculture committee chairmen, including the chairman of CAPIC. The purpose of the new executive was to push various agricultural policy issues rapidly to a conclusion. For Matsuoka, his accession to the divisional chairman’s position was a trigger for his elevation to higher status in the party’s agricultural and forestry policymaking machinery. According to one MAFF OB, ‘in 1995, at the time that Matsuoka became parliamentary vice-minister of the MAFF, he didn’t have that much power, but in the following year (1996) when he became the party’s Agriculture and Forestry Division chairman, he suddenly became powerful’.52

Electoral reform appeared to have no impact whatsoever on Matsuoka’s policy specialism. In fact, he retained and strengthened it, following the same career track that he would have without electoral reform and remaining a nôrin giin. It was at this time in 1996, when the first Lower House election was held under that new system, that Matsuoka’s seniority in a range of committees enabled him to exert wide-ranging powers over all major agricultural policies. He participated in the joint council (gôdô kaigi) of the Agriculture and Forestry Division and CAPIC, which played a vital role in the final stages of agricultural budget formulation. Participating in the joint council provided a means whereby the LDP agricultural policy executives, who were also Diet members pressured by Nokyo and its National Council, could directly influence the MAFF minister on the verge of cabinet negotiations on the final budget draft.

Matsuoka also secured membership of the LDP’s general agriculture and forestry executive (nôrin kanbu), consisting of the chairmen of all the important PARC committees on agriculture and forestry. The executive was in charge, for example, of deciding the LDP’s producer rice price in the ultimate stage of decision-making within the party on the issue. In 1996, it was active in realising
Nokyo's producer rice price demand in defiance of the government's (MAFF's) plan to lower the basic rice price amidst a severe over-supply situation. The government-LDP negotiations ground on to the very last minute, producing an additional package of ¥10 billion for ‘special countermeasures works’, which met producers’ expectations.

While serving as acting chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division in 1996, Matsuoka also became chairman of the Livestock Commodity Prices Etc. Subcommittee (Chikusanbutsu Kakakutô Shôiinkai). It was normal for nôrin giin to become chairman of an Agriculture and Forestry Division subcommittee first, and then move on to become chairman of the division itself, if they proved successful in their subcommittee post.

This subcommittee traditionally formulated party policy on the price stabilisation bands for beef, the indicative stabilisation price for dairy products and the guaranteed price for raw milk for processing. Like CAPIC’s Rice Price Committee (Beika Iinkai), the livestock price subcommittee played a key role in determining the LDP’s position on support prices for these products. Provision was made at its meetings for the submission of producer requests from Nokyo representatives.

When, in March 1996, Matsuoka was asked by the National Council what his views were on livestock prices, he commented that the beef liberalisation in 1991 and the URAA of 1994 was a ‘double punch’ as far as livestock and dairy farmers were concerned. He trotted out the usual homilies about the most important policy issues being how to promote motivated farm households, to modernise the dairy and livestock industries, and to expand production. He thought greater consideration should be given to the fact that the dramatic reduction in production costs (which were driving down the administrative prices for livestock commodities) could be attributed to the rise in the value of the yen. On the cost side for farmers, Matsuoka noted the expense of disposing of animal waste, which he thought should also be taken into account in determining the administrative prices. In calculating livestock prices for that year, Matsuoka thought that farmers’ feelings were the most important factor. He undertook to apply himself to the livestock price decision whilst giving consideration to concrete problems.53

In May 1996, when the National Council again provided a vehicle for the publication of his views on the livestock price issue, Matsuoka commented that ‘we have to put our best efforts into obtaining a price decision that doesn’t weaken the motivation of livestock farmers’.54 He added that it was necessary to find a solution for dairy beef farmers so that they could cope with the
liberalisation of beef. Fluctuations in the cost of feed also had to be taken into account in determining prices for livestock commodities. Another factor was farmers’ debt levels. These had been declining, not because management was prospering, but because farmers had stopped investing in facilities owing to the uncertain business conditions. In order to give farmers certainty in the future, Matsuoka commented that

[w]e have to make livestock price decisions that don’t weaken the motivation of livestock farmers. Because of this, I, as LDP Livestock Commodity Prices Etc. Subcommittee chairman, will decide to maintain the current prices, and will also undertake a radical review of the formula for calculating prices and the way in which production cost investigation is done, which up until now, has been extraordinarily disadvantageous to farmers.55

In 1997, Matsuoka took over as chairman of the Rice Price Committee, which was concerned with the producer rice price and production issues such as rice production diversion programs (gentan). One of his main tasks in that committee was to establish a New Rice Policy (Arata na Kome Seisaku) designed to compensate farmers for falls in rice prices. In this capacity, Matsuoka attended a ‘National Gathering of Representatives for the Establishment of a Rice Policy and the Stabilisation of Rice Crop Management’, organised by the National Council and Zenchû in October 1997. Approximately 1,200 representatives attended from local agricultural cooperatives nationwide, and they made a direct request to the participating LDP Diet politicians for a New Rice Policy that would include income compensation for rice farmers. Because of the sense of crisis in national rice policy caused by falls in prices for rice farmers, a large number of LDP Diet members took part in the meeting. Matsuoka attended as chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee and gave a speech. In it, he stated that ‘expanding production adjustment is the only way to deal with the problem of excess rice. We must collect as big a budget as possible in order to do this’.56

At a similar meeting organised in November by Nokyo groups to demand the necessary funding for a New Rice Policy, Matsuoka again emphasised the need for production adjustment.57 The National Council followed up with a direct approach to the nörin kanbu, in which council representatives sat down with LDP politicians at a roundtable conference in the LDP headquarters. Matsuoka attended as the chairman of the Rice Price Committee along with the chairmen of the other main LDP agricultural policy committees, including the CAPIC chairman, and the chairman of the Agriculture and Forestry Division, a position that Matsuoka had relinquished by November 1997.
A week later a much larger rally of Nokyo representatives was held at LDP headquarters. Matsuoka, as chairman of the Rice Price Committee, delivered some of the main greetings. He spoke about his resolve and the political judgement that it was necessary to get ¥40 billion as a countermeasures policy to compensate farmers’ income for falls in the price of rice for the current year’s crop. However, there were insufficient funds to cover this expenditure.\textsuperscript{58}

Matsuoka was interviewed by the National Council on the 25 November 1997, six days after the new policy was announced. He began by pointing out that

\textit{because of bumper harvests, the government’s rice stocks have risen to more than 3.5 million tonnes and as a result, market prices for rice have plummeted. It seems that everything goes against rice farmers, and the main reason for establishing a New Rice Policy is to how to break through this situation. In order to reduce the amount of rice in stock (where the balance between supply and demand has not recovered), only three choices are possible: a) rice should be exported overseas, b) demand and consumption should be increased in other areas, and c) production should be controlled. Because the first two options are problematic, emphasis should be placed on production control (\textit{gentan}). We asked for a large number of opinions from various fields and established a framework that guaranteed farmers’ income. I strongly demanded that the MAFF raise the necessary funds. This was done by pulling money from various sources: by getting ¥25 billion from the Ministry of Home Affairs as their contribution, by the Food Agency making efforts to cut its expenditure by 5 per cent, and by getting ¥45 billion in new sources of revenue from various places. Putting all these funds together including those from the agriculture and forestry budget produced a total of ¥610.1 billion over two years.}\textsuperscript{59}

The National Council issued a special ‘thank you’ to the three agricultural and forestry executives (\textit{nôrin sanyaku}), including Matsuoka, for their great efforts in finalising the New Rice Policy. Importantly, the UR agricultural countermeasures expenditure was left untouched.

From 1997 to 1999, Matsuoka served as acting chairman of the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee. Its task was to tackle agriculture, forestry and fisheries trade-related issues for the LDP. In August 1998, the trade committee set up a Study Team (Nôrinsuisanbutsu Bôeki Chôsakai Sutadei Chîmu) initially to analyse and investigate in detail the contents of the URAA and report back to the larger committee. It also set about constructing a strategy for the next round of agricultural trade negotiations in close consultation with the government (MAFF), LDP and Nokyo organisations. This was the World Trade
Organization (WTO) tripartite council (WTO sansha kaigi), a consultative council established by the MAFF in late 1998 to facilitate the formation of a consensus amongst agricultural bureaucrats, the LDP’s nôrin kanbu and representatives of agricultural, forestry and fisheries groups on trade-related issues. The executive leadership of the trade countermeasures special committee was put in charge of positively advancing ‘Diet members’ diplomacy’ (giin gaikô) on trade issues, by sending delegations to Asia, the European Union and other countries about the upcoming negotiations on agricultural trade under WTO auspices.

At one time in 2000 Matsuoka served in seven executive posts in LDP agriculture and forestry policy committees, as well as being AFF Committee chairman and, once again, chairman of the Rice Price Committee (see Table 4.1). In 2000 and 2001 he also became acting chairman of the Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee (Sanson Shinkô Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai) of the PARC (see Table 4.1). This committee was concerned with matters relating principally to special support for agriculture and other industries in mountainous regions as well as with the provision of public works and community facilities for farmers and rural dwellers.

In December 2000, Matsuoka became chairman of the Management Income Study Meeting (Keiei Shotoku Suradei Kaigô) (see Table 4.1), a group within the LDP’s Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee, which Matsuoka also chaired at the time. The group was set up to tackle a new policy that would provide direct income subsidies to farmers. These would be called ‘agricultural management income stabilisation countermeasures’ (nôgyô keiei shotoku antei taisaku) and they would be in line with similar systems already introduced in the United States, Canada, and the European Union. Other proposals discussed by the group called for encouraging farmers to expand the size of their land holdings and to boost per capita productivity.

At the time he took up the chairmanship of the Management Income Study Meeting, Matsuoka had just been appointed MAFF deputy minister in the second Mori Cabinet (see Table 4.1). On the very day he was appointed, he led a meeting of a newly formed group, which came up with a set of proposals to ‘raise farmers’ incomes by channelling agricultural subsidies directly to them instead of by buying produce at government-set prices’. The policy ‘targeted 400,000 farmers earning their living solely through agriculture or who had made farming their main source of income’.
EXERCISING POWER AS A NÔRIN GIIN

The development of this proposal into a formal government policy was overtaken by the advent of the Koizumi administration four months later in April 2001, and Koizumi’s commitment to structural reform. Koizumi campaigned first for the presidency of the LDP and then in the 2001 Upper House election on a platform of dismantling the old order, principally the political and bureaucratic institutions blocking economic reform. Thereafter, direct income subsidies had to be instrumental in achieving structural reform of the farm sector.

Being an executive of particular LDP agriculture and forestry committees did not prevent Matsuoka from attending the meetings of other committees in which he did not play an executive role. The most crucial issue for Matsuoka’s farm vote-gathering strategy was policy that affected farm household incomes from agriculture. He had to demonstrate a commitment to maximising incomes for farmers in order to retain high levels of voting support from farm households. This meant poking his head into the proceedings of any committee that was deliberating on matters relating to farm incomes. For example, he attended discussions of the LDP Farmers’ Pension Subcommittee (Nôgyôsha Nenkin Shôiinkai) and was vitally concerned with the prices of all agricultural commodities. For this reason, he regularly participated in all the major agricultural and forestry committees concerned with pricing issues. For example, when the Vegetable, Fruit Tree and Upland Field Crops etc Countermeasures Subcommittee (Yasai, Kaju, Hatake Sakubutsutô Taisaku Shôiinkai) met to decide prices for upland field crops, and to discuss production countermeasures for wheat, soybeans, sugar beets and sugar cane, Matsuoka was there making his contribution to the decision.

Matsuoka was also an especially prominent figure in both rice and leaf tobacco price decisions; the producer rice price because it captured the largest number of agricultural producers, and tobacco because it was especially important in Kumamoto. By 1995 the prices of farm products such as rice were being increasingly marketised. Leaf tobacco was the last fortress for the LDP to exercise decision-making authority over the price. The normal procedure was for Japan Tobacco Inc. (JT) (Nihon Tabako Sangyô Kabushiki Kaisha)—which was the monopoly buyer of domestically produced leaf tobacco—to submit its proposed purchasing price to the government’s Leaf Tobacco Advisory Council (Hatabako Shingikai), which would recommend a certain purchase price. It was customary, however, for ‘tobacco-related Diet members such as Matsuoka to decide [the
tobacco price] by *nemawashi* [preparing the groundwork] before the council. Some would say that this ‘constituted not only “prior examination” (*jizen shinsa*) as Prime Minister Koizumi described it, but also “prior decision” (*jizen ketchaku*)’. When the leaf tobacco price was lowered substantially in 1995, Matsuoka hurled an empty can of juice at a JT executive, yelling, ‘what is the salary of the president? Say it!’

Matsuoka was also opposed to an increase in the tobacco tax in 1999. He made a special visit to the Prime Minister’s Official Residence (Kantei) to talk to Aoki Mikio who was chief cabinet secretary at the time. Matsuoka suggested to Aoki that a pachinko tax should be introduced instead of a tobacco tax in order to avoid a decline in the consumption of domestically produced tobacco leaves. A Matsuoka critic lamented, ‘[w]hile this guy is around, there is no way Japan will establish an anti-smoking right or a policy to lower the smoking rate. It seems that the concession for the tobacco farmers is more important than the health of the citizens’.

MAFF DEPUTY MINISTER

In December 2000, in former Prime Minister Mori’s second cabinet, Matsuoka was appointed to the newly created position of MAFF deputy minister, taking up the position on 6 January 2001, when the restructuring of government ministries and agencies took effect. In keeping with tradition, Matsuoka was nominated to the post by his faction boss, Kamei.

Matsuoka’s accession to the deputy minister’s post was a pointer to how important he had become as one of the LDP’s leading politicians on matters relating to agriculture and forestry. As deputy minister, Matsuoka had the power to act on behalf of the MAFF minister. He could explain draft bills to the Diet from the state minister’s gallery and also in the Lower House AFF Committee. He could answer questions in the Diet on behalf of the minister, substituting for the practice of bureaucrats answering these questions in lieu of the minister (*seifuiin*). He could also attend deputy ministers’ councils in the Kantei.

As one of the two new deputy ministers in the MAFF (the other was Tanaka Naoki), Matsuoka was assisted by two parliamentary secretaries (Kaneda Hideyuki and Kunii Masayuki): all LDP Diet members. They were all expected to ‘exert political weight on the bureaucracy’ by providing additional expertise and support for the MAFF minister, thus bolstering his position against the bureaucratic weight of his own ministry.
Matsuoka, however, was very keen to exert his own power over the MAFF.\textsuperscript{72} Two days after the government reorganisation took effect, Matsuoka told Kyodo News that the new MAFF deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries would set up a council at the ministry to resolve key policy issues and problems. The council would meet on a weekly basis. There were no such fora in any ministry or agency before the reorganisation. Matsuoka’s plan was to lessen the party’s reliance on bureaucrats in policy formation and reduce their power.

Some MAFF bureaucrats called the initiative an attempt to create an extra organ, since there already was a top meeting for ministry officials.\textsuperscript{73} Matsuoka pressed on regardless. As he explained, ‘[d]epending on the agenda, the council will call for participation of directors-general from the Food, Forestry and Fisheries agencies and may include Agricultural Minister Yoshio Yatsu’.\textsuperscript{74} Matsuoka remarked at the time that politicians ‘have knowledge and ability in dealing with the ministry’s administrative affairs and are competent enough to equal bureaucrats in handling policy matters’.\textsuperscript{75}

Leading the way for the other central ministries and agencies, a meeting of MAFF deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries was held in the MAFF on 9 January 2001, three days after bureaucratic reorganisation came into effect. At the meeting

\[\text{[e]ach MAFF bureau director and directors-general of the MAFF’s agencies reported respectively on important policy issues relating to their areas of administration. On the basis of their reports, the deputy ministers and parliamentary secretaries gave the necessary directions (shijii) and executed the required coordination (chôsei)\], thus putting into practice policy planning (rittsuan) under political leadership.}\textsuperscript{76}

Matsuoka led the meeting along with Deputy Minister Tanaka, as well as the two new parliamentary secretaries. He was jubilant after the meeting, claiming ‘[w]e politicians now directly engage in the task of formulating policies...We are here to do the job of working out important policies. No policy can be decided on without being discussed at our meetings’.\textsuperscript{77}

In terms of actual policies, Matsuoka’s biggest impact as deputy minister was felt in the area of agricultural trade. He travelled with MAFF Minister Yatsu for the purpose of conducting foreign (agricultural trade) policy activities (gaikô katsudô) overseas. On his return to Tokyo, he reported back to the LDP committees concerned with agricultural trade issues (the WTO sansha kaigi, the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Investigation Committee Study Team, and the committee itself).
His greatest coup, however, was his pivotal role in the government’s decision to invoke safeguards on imports of rushes for tatami mats (*igusa*), raw *shiitake* mushrooms and leeks from China. Matsuoka exerted direct influence on the MAFF to agree to provisional safeguard measures (emergency import restriction measures) being invoked for 200 days under WTO rules against imports of these commodities from China. The decision was officially justified as a response to rapidly expanding import volumes of these products between 1997 and 1999. Matsuoka told the press, ‘I want to invoke the [safeguard] measure’.78 Even prior to his becoming deputy minister, Matsuoka had pushed this option strongly in the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee, presenting a report on the provisional invocation of safeguards.79

Matsuoka’s constituency was in Kumamoto Prefecture where 95 per cent of domestic rushes were grown. Reports suggest that he was under severe pressure from *igusa* farmers in Kumamoto Prefecture as well as the prefectural Nokyo organisation and the National Federation of Igusa Production Groups (Zenkoku Iseisan Dantai Rengōkai).80 There was even a rumour that the Kumamoto Nokyo threatened not to support him in the next election ‘unless he made significant efforts’.81 In 2000, when safeguards were becoming an issue, the LDP’s Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch (effectively a branch of Matsuoka’s *kōenkai*) received a political donation of ¥1.8 million from the prefectural *nōseiren*. Previously Matsuoka had received only ¥100,000 from the *nōseiren*, obtaining most of his donations from the construction industry.82 The Kumamoto Prefecture No. 3 Electoral District Branch also received ¥1 million from the *nōseiren* branch in Yatsushiro region, where most of the *igusa* was produced. It was the first time that Matsuoka had obtained donations from this region, which was in fact located in Kumamoto (5).83 According to a former leader of Yatsushiro Nokyo, ‘the donation was made with getting Matsuoka to make efforts for agriculture in general in mind, but there was some anticipation in regards to the safeguards. While we hadn’t made any [donations] before, we decided that this was an opportunity, and the donation was made on the decision of the league head’.84

Another Diet member commented that Matsuoka’s ‘standpoint was as if his single-handed efforts led to the invoking of the safeguards’.85 Matsuoka lobbied the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) hard, saying ‘what can you do?’ in relation to invoking the safeguards.86 At one point he was reprimanded by Minister Yatsu, who
warned, ‘you are the deputy minister so this attitude will not do. If you made any mistakes, it would be disastrous’. However, raw *shiitake* mushrooms were of primary concern to MAFF Minister Yatsu, and leeks were added to the list in order to symbolise action against the influx of Chinese vegetable imports. Also in the minister’s and deputy minister’s minds was the fact that an Upper House election was looming in July 2001.

On 23 April 2001, the Japanese government imposed emergency import restrictions for 200 days (until 8 November) on the three products. It was the first time that the Japanese government had imposed ordinary safeguards under WTO rules. The measures imposed punitive tariffs on imports above a certain volume, which was designed to bring the prices of the three products up to levels in Japan.

When the Chinese government hinted at retaliation, Matsuoka was despatched to China to explain the Japanese decision and to try and find a compromise. The Japanese government was hoping that negotiations might induce the Chinese side to voluntarily restrict exports. Matsuoka urged China’s vice minister of foreign trade and economic cooperation to restrict exports of the products. He also conferred on matters relating to tree-planting cooperation as part of a greening project in China. Matsuoka told the Chinese that the rapid increase in imports of leeks, *shiitake* mushrooms and tatami rushes into Japan had had a bad influence on Japanese farmers. He also explained that the Japanese government had conducted the requisite investigation and examination in order to increase tariffs immediately.

The Chinese government retaliated against the safeguards by imposing 100 per cent tariffs on Japanese motor vehicles, mobile phones and air-conditioners, exports of which virtually stopped. The loss to the Japanese car industry amounted to ¥51.2 billion, which, when added to the countermeasures budget for the three safeguard categories, came to ¥85.5 billion. Such considerations made it impossible for the Japanese government to institute full safeguard measures in December 2001 after the expiry of the provisional safeguard measures in November. The Koizumi government backed down in the face of the Chinese action, which was illegal under WTO rules, but, at the time, China was not a member of the WTO.

This did not stop Matsuoka doing his best to pressure his own government to institute full safeguard measures.

Matsuoka and others repeatedly demanded that the government present a firm attitude. Matsuoka argued that ‘there were no cases where full safeguards were not implemented after the invocation of provisional safeguards. It is a national disgrace. Implement the full safeguards’. 
This opinion was not necessarily shared by other leading nôrin zoku, such as Yatsu and Nakagawa Shôichi. They reasoned with Matsuoka that ‘if the regular invocation is implemented, Japan will lose at the WTO panel. If Japan loses, the three farm products can enter from China at a stroke’. 91

Matsuoka’s position as deputy minister lasted only from January 2001 to April 2001 because Koizumi became LDP president and prime minister in April 2001 and appointed a new cabinet. This meant that Matsuoka was only in the position for just over three months, which limited the extent to which he could exercise his new-found power.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE POSITIONS FROM 2001

After stepping down from his post as deputy minister, Matsuoka resumed his executive posts in LDP agricultural and forestry committees: as chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee as well as acting chairman of the Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee and chairman of the State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee (see Table 4.1).

Rice policy reform

Matsuoka continued to lead the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee through 2002 (see Table 4.1). In that role, he was right at the centre of party deliberations on rice policy reform. He was made chief of the survey group conducting investigations relevant to the reform in Hokkaido. At the local level, the survey group listened to explanations from agricultural cooperative representatives, and exchanged opinions with them. 92 Matsuoka’s Hokkaido group was one of several local survey groups reporting back to the subcommittee, which called on the government to listen to voices at the grassroots level and which also indicated the directions of the plan for rice policy reform. 93

In July 2003, Matsuoka attended the ‘National Nokyo Representatives Convention on the Rice Policy Reform Countermeasures’ along with Horinouchi Hisao, chairman of CAPIC. In the final stages of formulating rice policy reform, Matsuoka resolved to guarantee about ¥300 billion to fund the new policy, with the subcommittee leaving the final decision to the top three agricultural and forestry executives (nôrin sanyaku) 94 and the nôrin kanbu. 95

After the final decision was made on concrete policy for the so-called New Rice Policy Reform (Arata na Kome Seisaku Kaikaku), a roundtable of ‘three related parties’ was held. The three parties were Matsuoka, Horinouchi and
the chairman of Zenchû. Horinouchi and Matsuoka presented a report to the Zenchû chairman, outlining the contents of the decision. Because the ¥300 billion to fund the policy, which had been requested by Nokyo, had been secured, the chairman expressed his thanks for Matsuoka’s efforts. The next day the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee acknowledged the final decision on the policy. Horinouchi and Matsuoka then reported back to a combined meeting of CAPIC and the Agriculture and Forestry Division, which also acknowledged the new policy.

In November 2003, Matsuoka was instrumental as chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee in determining the amount of acreage to be taken out of rice production. This was a political issue because it influenced the price of rice for both producers and consumers by impacting on the amount of rice circulating in the domestic market. In 2003, the committee decided to leave the gentan acreage at the same level as in the previous year in order to maintain, as the subcommittee described it, a stable ‘consumer’ price.

Trade policy

In 2003, Matsuoka established an executive connection with the LDP’s Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Investigation Committee in the key post of secretary-general (see Table 4.1). From the time of its inception in 2001, the trade investigation committee took over as the main PARC committee dealing with Japan’s agricultural trade negotiating position at the WTO and on bilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). Both sets of international trade negotiations put pressure on Japan’s agricultural sector for market-opening concessions. In the position of secretary-general, Matsuoka became one of the group of executives (kanbukai) of the committee, and thus played a pivotal role in its proceedings. In this position, he was also assiduous in attending gatherings of Nokyo representatives on agricultural trade matters, especially those organised by Zenchû.

In 2004, when Matsuoka was still secretary-general of the committee, officials from the Ozu branch of Kumamoto Prefecture nôseiren visited him in Tokyo and he allowed them to attend one of the committee’s meetings. Afterwards, the officials commented very favourably on how Matsuoka had conducted the committee proceedings as the organiser of the debate and how Matsuoka had made the relevant ministries and agencies come up with countermeasures on the spot. One of the officials said: ‘I now understand very well how a policy
will be realised in that way. I did not know how expert Diet representative Matsuoka was in policy until I actually saw it with my own eyes’. In March 2004, the committee approved the Japan–Mexico Free Trade Agreement. This was Japan’s first free trade agreement encompassing the agricultural, forestry and fisheries sector. The judgement of the committee was that the bilateral agreement was a well-balanced settlement, which protected areas that should be protected and included some acceptable market opening in other areas. Because further liberalisation of oranges and orange juice was permitted under the agreement, the committee verified that all possible domestic countermeasures would be taken.

**Tobacco price**

In 2003, in recognition of his interest and role in LDP committee proceedings on the producer price of tobacco, Matsuoka became chairman of the Leaf Tobacco Price Investigation Subcommittee (Hatabako Kakaku Kentô Shôiinkai) (see Table 4.1). This subcommittee examined the Leaf Tobacco Advisory Council’s report on what the producer price of leaf tobacco should be. The price was decided annually each November. After receiving the report, the subcommittee held hearings at which it received submissions from organisations of tobacco farmers and Japan Tobacco about matters such as its (JT’s) buying price of tobacco and so-called production countermeasures (seisan taisaku) for farmers.

In November 2003, the committee undertook a comprehensive examination of tobacco farm management. This was considered necessary in light of the drastic fall in tobacco farmers’ income because of fire damage, the rapid change in the situation surrounding tobacco in recent years and other factors. The subcommittee decided to leave the cultivated area of tobacco and the purchase price of leaf tobacco produced in 2004 where they were. This decision was in line with the report of the Leaf Tobacco Advisory Council.

**Avian flu countermeasures**

In March 2004, Matsuoka was made secretary-general of the newly established LDP Avian Influenza Countermeasures Headquarters (Tori Infuruenza Taisaku Honbu) (see Table 4.1). It was set up to alleviate the anxiety of both consumers and producers about the outbreak of avian flu in Oita and Yamaguchi prefectures. The headquarters deliberated on matters such as
amending the 1951 Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Law (*Kachiku Densenbyô Yobôhô*). Matsuoka had earlier visited Oita Prefecture in February 2004 with a group of LDP Diet representatives and delegates from the party's Oita and Kumamoto federation of branches. Based on the results of the investigation, Matsuoka felt a strong need for a response from the whole party. The headquarters was thus created on the basis of his proposal, enabling Matsuoka to claim the credit.\(^{102}\)

After Matsuoka was appointed secretary-general of the committee, he asked questions on two occasions in the Budget Committee of the Lower House about what was going to be done to stop the spread of avian flu. His questions followed a new outbreak in Kyoto Prefecture, and there were fears that the infection could spread. Matsuoka demanded that the headquarters and the government face the problem cooperatively to the best of their ability.\(^{103}\)

The headquarters later organised emergency measures for avian influenza and, on the basis of these countermeasures, a part of the Livestock Infectious Diseases Prevention Law was revised. The amendment institutionalised subsidies to livestock farmers who cooperated with restriction orders on the movement of birds. It also increased the fines and penal restrictions on traders and others who neglected to notify the government of infected birds.\(^{104}\) However, this did not stop the spread of avian flu to Ibaraki Prefecture in 2005.

In June 2005, Matsuoka received a direct delegation from the Japan Egg Producers Association (Nihon Keiran Seisan Kyôkai). They were concerned about the impact on egg production and egg-producing farm households of the recent outbreak of avian flu in Ibaraki Prefecture, saying it would cause trouble for their management (that is, their income). They wanted government ‘countermeasures’—financial compensation of some sort. Matsuoka commented that measures for consumers were also in order to allay any concerns they might have.\(^{105}\)

**Mountain village development**

In 2004, Matsuoka became acting chairman of the Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Committee (see Table 4.1) because Uesugi, the former chairman, lost his seat in the November 2003 election. In 2005, the committee was retitled the Mountain Village Development Committee (Sanson Shinkô Iinkai). The committee dealt with matters relating to the administration of the Mountain Village Promotion Law (*Sanson Shinkôhô*),
which was originally passed in 1965 by bipartisan consent with a 10-year period of application. It had already been extended three times and was due to expire again at the end of 2004. It had been principally concerned with the provision of infrastructure (kiban seibi) in mountain areas where there were farmers. Such infrastructure included agricultural and forestry roads, as well as ‘livelihood facilities’ in rural villages in mountainous areas under the rubric of ‘the development of the rural living environment’. This referred to the provision of mobile phone access, electricity, and medical, nursing and welfare facilities for mainly old people left in these villages. The committee also concerned itself with expenditure for mountain village development in the MAFF budget.

Matsuoka, as acting chairman, engineered a visit by key members of the committee to Kumamoto at the end of January 2005. He chaired a meeting of the committee in Oguni Town, Aso County, in the electorate of Kumamoto (3) (which, along with Minami Oguni Town, were the only places in Aso County that failed to elect Matsuoka in first place in the 2003 election, as shown in Table 7.1). The idea behind holding the meeting in Oguni Town was to get a sense of what the locals wanted from their political representatives and the relevant government ministries and local public officials. The meeting was officially to hold an on-the-spot investigation and to exchange opinions. It lasted for two and a half hours in a hotel with about 90 people present, including the chairman of the Kumamoto Prefecture branch office of the National Mountain Village Promotion League (Zenkoku Sanson Shinkō Renmei), as well as Nokyo and forest association officials, and local municipal mayors. Matsuoka presided at the meeting, which was also attended by relevant officials of the MAFF, Ministry of Land, Transport and Infrastructure (MLIT), and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIAC), and the prefectural government. Uozumi attended as vice-chairman of the committee. Most of the discussion was about public works projects, including a transport centre, the Oguni Dome and other public buildings and amenities. Local representatives demanded an extension and revision of the Mountain Village Development Law and the establishment of a cellular phone communication base since there were many areas where it was not possible to use cellular phones. Women attending the meeting demanded better medical treatment, nursing, and welfare facilities. The meeting provided Matsuoka with an opportunity to engage in some surrogate election campaigning. Voters could see him as an influential LDP Diet politician who was not only committed to
his constituents and local issues but also effective in bringing subsidies and projects back to the local area.

A week after the meeting was held, an outline of amendments to the law was discussed and approved by the Mountain Village Development Committee. It was then presented to the Diet as Diet members’ legislation requiring cooperation from the opposition parties. Successful passage of the amended law extended it for another 10 years. It allotted a greater role to municipalities in the implementation of development plans for mountain villages as a hallmark of greater decentralisation. Under the amendment, the power to formulate these plans was passed from prefectures to municipalities. In addition, the amended law strengthened countermeasures against damage done by birds and animals and also extended to installation of information and communications infrastructure.

Forestry policy

In 2004, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Forestry Policy Basic Problems Subcommittee (Rinsei Kihon Mondai Shōiinkai) (see Table 4.1), a subcommittee of the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee. The subcommittee had the task of holding annual hearings on how much timber should be used each year by government bodies. In October each year the subcommittee also met with the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee in a joint council (gōdō kaigī) for purposes of discussing the contents of budget demands for the following year.

Working on this committee was advantageous for Matsuoka because it put him in direct contact with the leadership of the forest associations and its national body, the National Federation of Forestry Associations (Zenkoku Shinrin Rengōkai, or Zenshinren). Matsuoka’s position as chairman continued into 2005 when the committee reviewed the issue of reform of the forest associations. It listened to explanations from Forestry Agency officials on the issue as well as representations from the head of Zenshinren. The subcommittee also took up the issue of the development of the forest and timber industry in Japan. Matsuoka used the committee as a venue from which to push his environmental message about the value of forests in protecting the environment.

Direct income subsidies

In 2004, Matsuoka became chairman of the LDP’s Management Countermeasures Project Team (see Table 4.1), a subcommittee of CAPIC (of
which Matsuoka was also acting chairman at the time). The project team was established to deliberate on the policy proposed by the MAFF under the ‘New Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Plan’ (Arata na Shokuryô, Nôgyô, Nôson Kihon Keikaku), or New Basic Plan (Shin Kihon Keikaku). This policy would replace price-related subsidies with direct income subsidies to farmers as the main method of supporting farmers’ incomes—a so-called Japanese style direct payments system. Matsuoka was made chairman of the project team because he was one of the prime movers in the December 2000 LDP proposal to provide direct income support to farmers facing declines in agricultural prices led by the rice price.111

The project team’s job was to discuss various proposals and views advanced by the MAFF, which were presented to the committee, investigate how similar policies were implemented in other countries, particularly in the United States and in the European Union, review the implications of such a system for Japan’s food self-sufficiency and come up with its own views about what form the new policy should take and then present them to CAPIC. The MAFF wanted to restrict the payments to ‘core farms’—farms of larger size—with the idea of encouraging the amalgamation of farm plots and the structural reform of agriculture. However, many LDP farm politicians in Matsuoka’s committee saw the policy as potentially ‘destroying’ small-scale farmers.

As the new scheme represented a radical departure from the government’s past policy of assisting all agricultural producers regardless of farm size, farmers were also pressing for the widest possible eligibility for the new subsidy program. In April 2004, an explanatory meeting (setsumeikai) concerning the details of the LDP version of the New Basic Plan was presented by the agricultural and forestry executive (including Matsuoka as chairman of the project team) to representatives of agricultural, forestry and fishery groups. About 100 of these representatives attended.

The government delayed the decision about which farms would be eligible for the new form of state support while Matsuoka’s project team tried to ensure that small-scale farmers would not be left out. The team came up with a series of farm management income stabilisation countermeasures, with Matsuoka making proposals to the team. It was only prepared to consider policies that would not exclude small-scale farm households. It wanted to make sure that the new policy for direct income subsidies did not destroy this type of farming.
The project team took its proposals into the larger Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee, which also received representations from Nokyo spokesmen about how the management stabilisation countermeasures should be applied as part of the revised basic plan. The subcommittee was in charge of deciding the policy for the LDP. In July 2005, a meeting of the subcommittee was held at LDP headquarters in which there were explanations about the formulation of the New Basic Plan, which had begun in March. Matsuoka emphasised that he wanted to ‘establish a farm industry with strong legs and loins and positively promote high quality agricultural products that could be exported’.\(^{112}\)

Matsuoka was reappointed as chairman of the Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee after the 11 September 2005 election (see Table 4.1). He acknowledged that it was a post that carried heavy responsibilities, but he said that he had to listen to the opinions of many people.\(^{113}\) As chairman of the subcommittee, Matsuoka presided over the final agreement within the party on the direct payments system, and between the party and the MAFF.

The subcommittee’s immediate task (until the end of October) was to wrap up discussion on the conditions for ‘bearers’ of agriculture to receive direct income subsidies from the government. In a late September meeting, the subcommittee decided to thrash out the bearer issue.\(^{114}\) In the same month, Matsuoka also conferred directly with executives from the National Council of Nokyo Youth Organisations (Zenkoku Nôkyô Seinen Soshiki Kyôgikai) about which farmers should be the target of the new direct payments system. The board of directors of the organisation proposed that the government should consider the targets of the New Basic Plan with some flexibility so that hard-working farmers would not miss out.\(^{115}\)

The following month the subcommittee held hearings on the policy for the purpose of eliciting the opinions of key agricultural organisations on the issue. Appearing at the hearings were representatives from Zenchû, the Japan Chamber of Agriculture (Nôgyô Kaigishô), the Nokyo Youth Council (Zenseikyô) and agricultural production corporations in Niigata and Aomori, two prominent rice-producing prefectures.

In early October, the subcommittee firmed up a concrete plan for the direct payments system, while the LDP’s nôrin kanbu deliberated on the essentials of the draft.\(^{116}\) In late October the subcommittee convened a meeting to conclude the party’s final draft of the ‘Japanese edition direct payments system’ (Nihonhan chokusetsu shiharai). In the final days of deliberation on this draft, the
subcommittee met every day at 8.30am. Matsuoka noted that, as chairman of the subcommittee, it was his responsibility to decide the essentials of the draft plan after discussion in the subcommittee.

The subcommittee drafted a final report and presented it for approval to the combined council of the Agriculture and Forestry Division and CAPIC. The subcommittee then held a press conference in the Diet building about the ‘Management Income Stabilisation Countermeasures Outline’ (*Keiei Shotoku Antei Taisaku Taikō*) and explained its contents.¹¹⁷

After the government and LDP agreed on the new policy in November, Matsuoka, as head of the LDP’s subcommittee, explained that the new policy would target a 50 per cent integration of farm households in terms of cultivated land area by fiscal 2007.¹¹⁸ He was referring to those farm households that would be forced to amalgamate (either through conversion to community farms or farm corporations) in order to be eligible for direct farm subsidies under the new policy.

SECOND-STRING INTERESTS

Matsuoka’s committee memberships reveal an unerring commitment to agriculture and forestry policy, and reflect a policy specialism gained over a number of decades. His chosen policy field was the escalator that took him to the top executive positions in the relevant Diet and party committees. He used these to build his political reputation, standing and influence as a policymaker. However, like any successful politician, Matsuoka developed second-string and third-string interests that complemented his major policy focus on agriculture and forestry. Significantly, his secondary interests were in disaster and environmental policy—areas that were closely related to agriculture and forestry.

In his second year in the Diet, Matsuoka joined the Lower House Special Committee on Disaster Countermeasures (Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai), rising to be a director in 1992 and staying on the committee in this executive position until 1999 (see Table 4.1). Disaster policy was attractive to Matsuoka because it was lucrative in terms of bringing subsidies (including for public works) back to his electorate in order to rectify the damage caused by earthquakes, storms and typhoons. Typhoons, torrential downpours and earthquakes did a lot of damage to farms and forests. Nine typhoons struck Japan between June and October 2003 causing a total of ¥7.4 billion worth of damage to agricultural, forestry and fisheries, including crops, agricultural
land and agricultural, forestry and fishery facilities. In the same year, a large earthquake in Niigata caused ¥96.8 billion worth of damage to agricultural, forestry and fisheries industries, the most since the war. Under government policy, those affected in these industries had to be compensated in addition to the reconstruction involved, so disasters became an important rationale for public works and subsidy outlays.

Whenever a natural calamity hit his local electorate, Matsuoka made a point of conducting on-the-spot investigations of the damage, liaising with local government politicians and officials, and working hard to get funds from the disaster restoration budget directed to areas that had suffered damage. In July 2005, for example, Matsuoka visited Oguni Town in his electorate following a torrential downpour that did substantial damage in the town. He listened to a description of the damage at the town office, and then visited each of the wards in the town to see for himself. In September of the same year, he visited Oguni Town again to hear requests from the town assembly members about restoration of the damage done by the heavy rain, along with representatives of the MAFF, the MIAC, the Cabinet Office and MLIT.

After the meeting, he attended the ordinary general meeting of the Japan Flood Control and Riparian Works Association (Nihon Chisan Chisui Kyôkai). As he liked to preach about the importance of industries he was inclined to support for political reasons, he stated on his website that

"[f]lood control and riparian works are extremely important for creating safe land that is not damaged. The idea that looking after mountains and water is looking after the country has been around since the feudal times of the Sengoku era...It is part of the heritage that we carry on today."

Besides being formally a part of the membership and executive of the Lower House committee on disasters, Matsuoka was active in attending the relevant LDP divisions and committees of the PARC when disaster struck in his area of Japan in order to show that he was responding to the needs of his constituents suffering disaster damage. In July 2003, following torrential downpours that did terrible damage to areas in the mid-western part of Kyushu, Matsuoka attended a joint council (gôdô kaigi) of the LDP’s Special Committee on Disaster Countermeasures (Saigai Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai) and its Cabinet Division (Naikaku Bukai). The joint council received a report from the ministries concerned in the presence of the PARC Chairman Asô Tarô. The council confirmed the need to tackle countermeasures in a unified fashion with the
government after discussing matters such as the disaster prevention radio system in the disaster-stricken area and to what degree forecasts of precipitation were possible in advance.123

Matsuoka also entered the realm of environment policy by joining the Diet’s Environment Committee, rising to be a director in 1994 and chairman of the LDP’s Environment Division in the same year (see Table 4.1). A divisional chairmanship was a senior position for a second-term Diet member, but the division was not very popular because it was recognised as ‘high politics’ and not directly connected to votes.124 As a result, competition for executive positions in this policy sector was not high. The environment was also a policy set generally recognised as representative of urban interests.125

Matsuoka was interested in it, however, because it was connected, indirectly, to both the agricultural and forestry industries. Environmental policy related to agriculture because one of the main arguments used by Matsuoka and others for continued support and protection of the Japanese farming sector was that it preserved the environment. The same could be said for forests, which had well-acknowledged environmental functions. Their positive environmental value was one of the main rationales for maintaining them. Moreover, environmental arguments resonated amongst the broader public, including urban dwellers, and thus offered powerful national-interest grounds on which to defend both Japan’s agriculture and its forests. In this way, environmental policy could be used as a bridge between city and urban areas.

THIRD-STRING INTERESTS
Matsuoka acquired not only a second but also a third string to his policy bow. One area of interest from relatively early in his Diet career was communications. He became a member of the Lower House Communications Committee (Tsûshin Iinkai) and the corresponding LDP Communications Division (Tsûshin Bukai) in 1992 and became vice-chairman of the LDP’s Communications Division in 1993 (see Table 4.1). The Communications Division (prior to the amalgamation of the Ministry of Home Affairs with the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications in January 2001) handled matters relating to posts and telecommunications as well as broadcasting issues—everything under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications.126

Given his family connections to the military and his youthful ambition to join the National Defence Academy, Matsuoka also showed an interest in defence
policy in his second term by joining the National Defence Division (Kokubō Bukai). He became the vice-chairman of the division in 1994 (see Table 4.1). Defence put some balance into his policy focus by broadening his scope to encompass issues outside Japan, but given his background and family connections in this area, Matsuoka preferred defence policy to foreign affairs. He only began to attend meetings of the Foreign Affairs Division (Gaikō Bukai) later in his career in order to provide support for his main LDP backer, Suzuki Muneo.

Matsuoka also served on Diet and party policy committees on accounts and administration, ethics in public elections and others (see Table 4.1), including the Special Committee on Okinawa and the Northern Territories (Okinawa oyobi Hoppō Mondai ni kansuru Tokubetsu Iinkai). Here he could again provide backup to Suzuki, who was very influential in this area and who, at one time, served as director-general of the Hokkaido Development Agency.

In 1996, Matsuoka rose to be vice-chairman of the LDP’s Diet Policy Committee, which was concerned with advancing the parliamentary legislative process. Its task was chiefly one of coordination: with bureaucrats, who wanted to get their legislation passed, and with opposition parties, whose cooperation was needed for the smooth passage of legislation through the Diet.

In 2003, Matsuoka served as vice-chairman of the LDP’s Special Committee on Aviation Problems (Kōkū Mondai Tokubetsu Iinkai), which later set up a subcommittee called the Aviation Industry Countermeasures Subcommittee (Kōkū Jigyō Taisaku Shoinkai) in order to come up with solutions to the downturn in the aviation industry. At one of the subcommittee meetings, Matsuoka, as a market interventionist, proposed that special financing should be made available to each (aviation) company via the policy investment bank. In his view, support for the aviation industry in Japan was important ‘so that globalisation of the country would not stagnate’.

In 2004, Matsuoka became vice-chairman of the LDP’s Medical Treatment Basic Problems Investigation Committee (Iryō Kihon Mondai Chōsakai) (see Table 4.1). He claimed to have some knowledge and interest in this area, particularly as it could be applied to his local constituency. In the past, Matsuoka had held meetings on medical issues in Aso County Medical Hall so that voters could evaluate him as a political representative on medical issues. He discussed initiatives such as the introduction of an emergency helicopter, his involvement in reviewing medical laws, the entry of joint-stock companies
into medical fields (as a deregulation measure) and problems of Japan’s low birth rate and aging population.

Matsuoka laid claim to some of the success in achieving the implementation of a national paediatric emergency telephone consultation service in 2004, which he asserted had been one of his pet projects for some time. He had tackled the problem for the first time 20 years previously when he was assistant director of the National Land Agency’s Regional Development Division. During that period, he said he had ‘keenly felt the need for an emergency medical system specialising in paediatrics’. Since then, the fulfilment of an entire emergency medical system had been one of his policy objectives including the introduction of an emergency helicopter and local medical treatment in areas such as remote islands and mountain village regions. Matsuoka claimed credit for the fruits of his ‘inconspicuous but energetic and patient efforts in all directions’, which had finally started to produce results.

In another social welfare policy area, Matsuoka stepped into the lead position on an LDP panel on Minamata disease (see Table 4.1), the Minamata Problem Subcommittee (Minamata Mondai Shoinkai). Minamata disease was a form of mercury poisoning that broke out in the 1950s and Minamata Bay was located in Kumamoto Prefecture. As chairman of the subcommittee, Matsuoka claimed credit in 2005 for breaking the deadlock between the national government and Kumamoto prefectural government on the issue of who should foot the bill for medical costs for patients with Minamata disease. He instructed the Environment Ministry and other ministries and agencies concerned to work out a compromise under which the national government would bear more of the costs than local government.

Matsuoka also stepped into important positions in the Diet committee system. In November 2003, in the early days of his fifth term, Matsuoka was elected director of the Lower House Budget Committee (Yosan Iinkai) (see Table 4.1). The Budget Committee’s purview is all-encompassing. It not only deliberates on the government’s budget bill, but also on all other important policies with fiscal implications, such as the dispatch of Self-Defence Force (SDF) troops to Iraq, pension issues, the economy, postal privatisation, foreign policy and so on. The committee also serves as the main arena for question time between government and opposition party leaders. This function put Matsuoka, as vice-chairman, in the thick of government business in the Lower House. In this role, Matsuoka attended meetings of Budget Committee directors, which
were held in order to organise the committee agenda as well as to discuss items for examination undertaken after the close of the Diet session.

At the very first meeting of the Budget Committee of the special Diet in September 2005, Matsuoka was reappointed as a director of the committee (see Table 4.1). At the same time he was reappointed as chief of the LDP’s Information Research Bureau, a position he first took up in 2004 (see Table 4.1). This made him one of five LDP bureau chiefs. The bureau provided data to determine the basic policy of the party through the collection and arrangement of all sorts of information necessary for LDP activities.\textsuperscript{135}

Within the executive ranks of the ruling party, Matsuoka rose to be deputy secretary-general of the LDP in 2000 and held other leading positions in the LDP’s organisation (see Table 4.1). The highest general policy position he held was as a member of the Executive Council in 2001–03, reflecting his seniority. The council was the supreme decision-making body of the LDP and the clearing-house for all PARC policy decisions. It had 31 members, all senior members of the party appointed mainly through coordination amongst the party factions.\textsuperscript{136} Article 38 of the party rules stipulates that the role of the Executive Council is to ‘deliberate on important bills relating to party management and Diet activities and determine whether to support the bills or not.’ No policy could become party policy without the approval of the Executive Council, which gave Matsuoka the opportunity to act as a supreme veto point on policy within the party.

**ACTIVITIES IN DIET MEMBERS’ LEAGUES**

Matsuoka’s public profile as an agitator on behalf of agricultural interests was further boosted by his high-profile activities in more informal organisations known as Diet members’ leagues. From the time he entered the Diet in 1990, Matsuoka remained resolutely resistant to agricultural trade liberalisation and was not open to persuasion. He was very strongly protective of his constituents, and became the leader of a movement (within the LDP) to block the opening of the rice market during the UR negotiations. In 1992, he mobilised the Special Action Diet Members’ League to Protect Japanese Agriculture (Nihon no Nôgyô o Mamoru Tokubetsu Kôdô Giin Renmei), a group of 32 politicians who had only been elected once. The group spearheaded the anti-rice liberalisation lobby within the LDP. Matsuoka was its representative organiser (daihyô sewanin). The group went into action whenever the government showed
a softening attitude towards liberalising imports of rice. In late 1992, it
threatened to request the immediate resignation of Prime Minister Miyazawa
if the government changed its approach to the rice import issue. It also proposed
sending its own mission to Geneva to appeal to the Japanese GATT negotiators
to prevent comprehensive tariffification of agricultural import barriers.\textsuperscript{137} As
the leader of the group, Matsuoka, in his own words, ‘made a signed pact with
fellow Diet members and conducted a sit-in protest in front of the Diet’.\textsuperscript{138}
He sat down in front of the Diet building and refused to move.

Matsuoka also demonstrated a similar commitment to defending the interests
of his farm supporters in 1996. While holding the position of chairman of the
Agriculture and Forestry Division, he simultaneously participated in the LDP’s
‘action corps’, which aligned with agricultural groups to secure the agriculture
and forestry budget and which included a number of senior LDP\textsuperscript{nôrin giin}.

These are both examples of informal, but organised, policy activities
characteristic of special-interest politicians such as Matsuoka. The most transient
groups are called ‘action corps’, but the more substantial groupings in which
Matsuoka has been involved, some with an almost semi-permanent existence,
are Diet members’ leagues (\textsuperscript{giin renmei}).

The leagues engage in very public activities that enable Matsuoka to promote
particular policy causes and to lobby the party leadership, the ministries and
the government leadership. Such activities are essentially a form of public
relations. They present a good image to voters, and are designed to demonstrate
Matsuoka’s experience, knowledge, sense of duty and commitment, as well as
his policy interests and credibility. Activities in the leagues raise Matsuoka’s
public profile and visibility, particularly in his electorate, showing how
energetically he is working in \textsuperscript{giin katsu}dô on behalf of his supporters, how he
is engaging with other like-minded legislators on issues in which they are in
common agreement and how they are working for common objectives in a way
that cuts across both factional and sometimes party membership. The leagues
enable Matsuoka to operate as part of an internal pressure group within the
Diet and ruling party.

Some of the leagues in which Matsuoka has participated are related to
agriculture and forestry, directly or indirectly. Matsuoka became acting
chairman of the LDP’s Dairy Policy Association (Jimintô Rakuseikai), a group
of LDP farm politicians who represented constituencies where dairy farming
was important, and who had close links to the dairy farmers’ political leagues.
In the role of acting chairman, Matsuoka attended the permanent and central combined council of the dairy farmers’ political leagues and made his greetings to the attendees as acting chairman of the LDP group. He saw this as necessary order to demonstrate his continuing support for dairy farming.  

Matsuoka also assumed the position of acting chairman of the Forests, Forestry and Forestry Industry Activisation Promotion Diet Members’ League (Shinrin, Ringyô, Rinsangyô Kasseika Sokushin Giin Renmei), which maintained links to the Forests, Forestry and Forestry Industry Activisation Promotion Assembly Members’ League (Shinrin, Ringyô, Rinsangyô Kasseika Sokushin Giin Renmei) organised by regional prefectural and municipal assemblies. In his executive role, Matsuoka liaised between the two leagues and attended roundtable conferences of the prefectural group. These activities provided him with direct links to prefectural politicians concerned with regional forestry issues.  

In an agriculture-related role, Matsuoka became chairman of the Diet members’ league called the Association for Researching the Food Labelling Problem for Consumer Protection (Shôhisha Hogo no tame no Shokuhin Hyôji Mondai Kenkyûkai), which focused on the issue of labelling food with the regional district in which it was produced. It also dealt with the lack of precise regulations on food-producing district labelling for supermarkets and others. Meat companies were able to label imported beef as domestic beef during the domestic bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) scare in order to obtain subsidies from the government, a sham in which Matsuoka was indirectly involved. Matsuoka claimed that ‘through the enthusiastic action of the Diet members’ league the government has started to adopt strict criteria for producing district labelling and penal regulations for offenders’.  

Matsuoka also established the Diet Members’ League to Promote the Export of Farm Products Etc. (Nôsanbutsutô Yûshutsu Sokushin Giin Renmei) in December 2003, with the catchphrase ‘agricultural policy on the offensive’ (seme no nôsei). He later became leader of the LDP’s Agricultural Products Etc. Export Promotion Research Association (Nôsanbutsutô Yûshutsu Sokushin Kenkyûkai), which was formed in February 2004 with approximately 40 members from the Upper and Lower Houses of the Diet. The association was established with the objective of encouraging people in other countries to taste authentic Japanese food using genuine Japanese foodstuffs, to understand and like Japan’s culture more, and to make Japanese agriculture into an export industry. The foundation general meeting of the association expressed the view
that the amount of exported farm products should rise from the existing level of ¥270 billion to ¥1 trillion over five years in cooperation with the Japan External Trade Organisation (JETRO) and other groups.\textsuperscript{144}

Through his membership of Diet members’ leagues, Matsuoka managed to span the range of other core LDP interests as well, with small business, traditional Japanese culture, consumer and welfare interests, and health and aviation policy figuring in his membership. For example, through league activities, Matsuoka became something of a small business advocate. He became chairman of the LDP’s Small and Medium Enterprise Area Coordination Law Subcommittee (Chûshô Kigyô Bunya Chôseihô Bunkakai), which was a subcommittee of a larger Diet members’ league, the Association to Foster Small and Medium Enterprise to Revive the Japanese Economy (Nihon no Keizai o Kasseika shi Chûshô Kigyô o Sodateru Kai),\textsuperscript{145} commonly known by the sobriquet ‘Association to Reconsider Deregulation’ (Kisei Kanwa o Minaosu Kai).

Matsuoka also served as chairman of another subcommittee of this larger Diet members’ league, the Coexistence with Large-Scale Stores Problem Subcommittee (Daikibo T enpo to Kyôson Mondai Bunkakai). On these committees, Matsuoka went out of his way to speak for the owners of the old-fashioned Japanese ‘mom-and-pop’ stores, the traditional small business owners who sheltered behind a welter of regulations preserving their profits, and who formed a very important bailiwick for the LDP throughout Japan. Because the push for deregulation could affect small businesses in regional areas, Matsuoka railed against the iniquities of deregulation on his website. He cited the example of Germany where, he argued, unregulated development had not been allowed to take place in regional cities, and where a large-scale supermarket opening in a rural district was forced by regulation to deal in products other than those supplied by regional shops.

Thus agriculture and forestry have not been Matsuoka’s exclusive interest or zone of political activity. He has had other policy concerns and became a member and executive of committees that were completely unrelated to his primary specialism. In fact, on his website, he claimed ‘to be active in a wide range of areas and to be a rarely gifted person…with an extraordinary ability to execute actions’. Furthermore, as Matsuoka gained seniority in the Diet and in the party, he spread his wings further in preparation for, as he saw it, higher office. This required him to gain knowledge and expertise in a wider range of committees, and to demonstrate that he was not simply a narrowly
focused, special-interest politician. His agricultural and forestry specialism was the dominant but not the sole dimension of his policy activities. No politician in Japan could afford to be one-dimensional in his representation of agricultural and forestry interests because of the number of votes connected to primary industries was declining all the time.

However, the key difference between Matsuoka’s memberships of agriculture and forestry committees and all the rest (apart from the Lower House Special Committee on Disasters where he demonstrated rather more dedicated attachment because of its connection to public works in regional areas) was that his participation was not continuous. It was Matsuoka’s persistent attachment to agriculture and forestry committees and the variety of committees in this policy sector on which he served and directed, which pointed to his policy specialism and primary area of interest representation.

Table 4.1  Matsuoka’s Committee Memberships et cetera

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Lower House committee memberships</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Regional Administration Committee</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Committee Relating to Land Problems</td>
<td>1990</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Committee</td>
<td>1991–94</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member/Director</td>
<td>1995–96</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1997–99</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chairman</td>
<td>2000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Committee on Disasters</td>
<td>1991, 1995–97, 1999</td>
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<tr>
<td>Communications Committee</td>
<td>1992–93</td>
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<tr>
<td>Environment Committee</td>
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<tr>
<td>Member/Director</td>
<td>1994</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>1995</td>
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<tr>
<td>Land, Infrastructure and Transport Committee</td>
<td>2001–2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Committee on Okinawa and Northern Territories</td>
<td>2001</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>2002</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Committee on Ethics in Public Elections</td>
<td>2002–2003</td>
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<tr>
<td>Budget Committee</td>
<td>2003, 2005</td>
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<td>Director</td>
<td>2004–05</td>
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<tr>
<td>Accounts and Administration Committee</td>
<td>2004</td>
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<tr>
<td>Special Committee on Postal Privatisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Director</td>
<td>2005</td>
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LDP (PARC) policy committee memberships

Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee 1990–94
Agriculture and Forestry Division 1991–95
  Chairman 1996–97
Communications Division 1992
  Vice-Chairman 1993–94
Defence Division 1993
Environment Division 1993
  Chairman 1994
National Defence Division
  Vice-Chairman 1994
Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee
  Chairman 1995–2003, 2005
Uruguay Round-Related Countermeasures Implementation Subcommittee
  Chairman 1995
State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee
  Chairman 1995, 1997, 2000–01
Livestock Product Price Sub-Committee
  Chairman 1996
Diet Policy Committee
  Vice-Chairman 1996
Rice Price Committee
  Chairman 1997
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade
Countermeasures Special Committee
  Acting Chairman 1997–99
UR-Related Works Implementation Promotion Subcommittee
  Chairman 1997
Comprehensive Agricultural Policy Investigation Committee
  Acting Chairman 2004–05
Committee Concerned with the Rice Price
  Chairman 2000
Mountain Village Development Countermeasures Special Committee
  Acting Chairman 2000–01, 2004
UR-Related Countermeasures Implementation Promotion Subcommittee
  Chairman 2000
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Administrative Reform Investigation Team
  Chairman 2000
Management Income Study Meeting
  Chairman 2000
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade
Investigation Committee
   Secretary-General 2003–05
   Chairman 2006
Leaf Tobacco Price Investigation Subcommittee
   Chairman 2003
Forestry Illegal and Unlawful Logging Countermeasures
Investigation Team
   Chairman 2003
Special Committee on Aviation Problems
   Vice-Chairman 2003
LDP Avian Influenza Countermeasures Headquarters
   Secretary-General 2004
Management Countermeasures Project Team
   Chairman 2004–05
Forestry Policy Basic Problems Subcommittee
   Chairman 2004–05
Illegal Logging Countermeasures Investigation Team to
Protect the Global Environment
   Chairman 2004–05
Agriculture and Forestry Executive
   Acting Chairman 2005
Tobacco and Salt Industry Special Committee
   Chairman 2005
Forestry Management Activation Council
   Chairman 2005
Forestry Policy Investigation Committee
   Vice-Chairman 2005
Mountain Village Development Committee
   Acting Chairman 2005
Roads Investigation Committee
   Vice-Chairman 2005
Minamata Problem Subcommittee
   Chairman 2005
Social Welfare System Investigation Committee
   Vice-Chairman 2005
Special Committee on Aviation Countermeasures
   Vice-Chairman 2005
Human Rights Problem Investigation Committee
   Vice-Chairman 2005
Committee to Rapidly Promote Exports of
Japanese Agricultural Products etc.
Cabinet and sub-cabinet positions
Parliamentary Vice-Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Murayama Cabinet 1995
Deputy Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries: Second Mori Cabinet 2001
Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 2006

Party organisation/ executive posts
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Bureau
Assistant Director 1993
Communications and Information Bureau
Assistant Director 1993
Construction Bureau
Chief 1994
National Organisation Committee
Vice-Chairman 1994
Construction Bureau
Chief 1995
National Land and Construction-Related Groups Committee
Chairman 1997
Deputy Secretary-General 2000
Executive Council 2001–03, 2005
Information and Investigation Bureau
Chairman 2004
PARC Deliberation Commission 2005
Organisation Headquarters
Vice-Chairman 2005

NOTES

1. These investigation committees (chôsakai) are also called ‘research commissions’.
3. Tatebayashi generalises this point. See Giin Kôdô, p. 125.
4. ibid., p. 63.
5. Tatebayashi generalises this point. See Giin Kôdô, p. 62.
8. Tatebayashi generalises this point. See Giin Kôdô, p. 2.
9. ibid.
11. Tatebayashi generalises this point. See Giin Kôdô, p. 71.
12. Quoted in Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô, p. 68.
13. ibid., p. 69.
14. ibid., p. 132.
16. ibid., p. 35.
17. ibid., pp. 162–63.
18. Kan generalises this point. See Daijin, p. 162.
19. ibid., p. 163.
22. ibid., p. 12.
23. This was the New Food, Agriculture and Rural Areas Basic Law (Shokuryô, Nôgyô, Nôson Kihonhô) of July 1999.
26. See also the discussion in Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.
29. ibid.
30. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.
31. This is short for Nômin Undô Zenkoku Rengôkai (National Federation of Farmers’ Campaigns). It claims that it does not support any particular political party, but it is generally regarded as affiliated with the Japan Communist Party. See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/aboutus/soshiki/gaiyo.htm
32. See http://www.nouminren.ne.jp/dat/200208/2002081202.htm
33. These were ‘health resorts’ equipped with hot springs, places for doing holistic chi-kung and other places for people to stand together in large numbers. Hasegawa Hiroshi, ‘Nôsuishô o Haishi seyo’ [‘Abolish the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries’], Aera, 1 April 2002, p. 37.
36. ibid.
‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyōsōryoku Kyōka Nyōgyō Yosan Muda Tsukai no Közu’ [‘Internationalisation Strengthened Through Hot Springs—The Composition of Wasteful Spending in the Agricultural Budget’], Shiikan Daiyamondo, 20 April 2002, p. 52. The resort provides a wide range of leisure facilities in addition to a hot spring, including restaurants, shops, hotels. See http://www.mizube-plaza.co.jp/

The idea behind this terminology is to ‘promote interaction between urban and rural areas, while at the same time securing employment opportunities for farm villages.’ ‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyōsōryoku Kyōka’, p. 52.

Nakanishi and Special Reporting Group, ‘Suzuki Muneo, Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 103.


‘Onsen de Kokusai Kyōsōryoku Kyōka’, p. 52.

Nakanishi and Journal Reporter Group, ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu to Fu Giwaku Nin’, p. 183. Zenekon is an abbreviation of zeneraru kontorakutâ, (general contractor), which directly contract construction works from clients and conduct all aspects of construction work. Zenekon consist of the top construction companies in Japan such as Takenaka Corporation, Obayashi Corporation, Shimizu Corporation, Kajima Corporation and Taisei Corporation, which are sometimes called Super Zenekon. Even though the core business of these five corporations is the execution of construction works, the corporations also have design, engineering, and research and development sections and possess extensive technological resources for construction. In this respect they are different from ordinary (small-scale) construction companies (kensetsu kaisha).

Itō, ‘Heisei Jiken Fuairu: Nyōrin Jigyō Hojokin o Dokusen Suru Matsuoka Toshikatsu’, p. 67. Toyo Construction also secured the contract for a cultural exchange centre in Kikuyo Town. Originally a different general contractor involved in the planning stages was going to take the job, but the bid went to Toyo Construction.

Hasegawa, ‘Kanjūdanomi no Hazama de Shundō’, p. 23. See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.

ibid.

ibid.


This is an abridged version of Matsuoka’s response, reported in ‘Zaisei Közō Kaikaku ni kakawaru Nyōgyō Kankei Yosan Kakuho Taisaku no Torikumi ni tsuite’ [‘About Grappling with Countermeasures to Secure the Agriculture-Related Budget Endangered by Fiscal Structural Reform’], Nyōsei Undō Jyânaru, No. 14, August 1997, p. 5.

Tatebayashi, Giiin Kôdô, p. 70.


‘Jimintô Chikusanbutsu’, p. 11.


See Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nôrin Zoku’.

In 2000 Matsuoka served as chairman of the LDP’s Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Administrative Reform Investigation Team (Nôrinsuisan Gyôkaku Kentô Chîmu).

In 1995, 1997, 2000 and 2001 Matsuoka served as chairman of the State-Owned Forests Problems Subcommittee (Kokuyû Rinya Mondai Shôîinkai), which was a subcommittee of the Forestry Policy Investigation Committee. The subcommittee was, for example, concerned with the Forestry Policy Reform Outline (Rinsei Kaikaku Taikô). It was under Matsuoka’s chairmanship in 2000 when the plan for the Forestry Policy Reform Outline was advanced. ‘Nôgyô Kankei Seisaku Kettei no Ashidori’ ['The Steps of Agriculture-Related Policy Decisions'], Nôsei Undô Jyânaru, No. 35, February 2001, p. 29.

See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.

Embassy of Japan in China, ‘Nihon to Chûkoku no Kankei: Saikin no Ugoki – Matsuoka Nôrinsuisan Fukudaijin ga Hôchû, Yunyû Yasai ya Ryokuka Kyôryoku ni Tsuite Kaidan’ ['Japan-China Relations: Recent Activities – Deputy Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries Minister Matsuoka on a Visit to China,

9 Wada, ‘Kenshô: Sefugâdo wa Naze Hatsudô sareta ka?’, p. 93.


91 ibid.


93 ibid.

94 They were the chairmen of CAPIC, the Agriculture and Forestry Division, and Agricultural Basic Policy Subcommittee.


96 ibid.

97 ibid.


99 It replaced the Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Products Trade Countermeasures Special Committee.


107 See http://www.sanson.or.jp/sokuhou/no_901/901-3.html


109 For more discussion of Matsuoka’s activities on forestry-related committees, see Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’.

110 See Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’.


114 ibid.


124 *Tatebayashi, Giin Kôdô*, p. 132.

125 *ibid*.

126 Personal communication, Professor Ellis Krauss, June 2005.

127 See also Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-chô’.


129 Elsewhere this committee is listed as the Special Committee on Aviation Countermeasures (Kôkû Taisaku Tokubetsu Iinkai). See *Seikan Yôran*, 2004, Spring Edition, p. 564.


131 ‘Matsuoka Toshikatsu Shi ni Kiku (Aso Gun Ishi Renmei Shiryô no Peiji)’ [‘Ask Mr Toshikatsu Matsuoka (The Data Page of Aso County Doctors Federation)’]. Available from http://www.geocities.jp/e_osan/ishirenmei_aso03_T_Matsuoka.html


136 Under Prime Minister Koizumi, the members of the Executive Council are officially elected in the following way: 14 members are publicly elected from the LDP Lower House membership; six members are publicly elected from the LDP Upper House membership; and 11 members are designated by the LDP president. *Jiyû Minshutô Sômukai [The LDP Executive Council]*. See http://ja.wikipedia.org


Activities in other forestry leagues are examined in Chapter 7 on ‘Electoral Vicissitudes’, as are Matsuoka’s promotion of environmental causes through league activity.

See Chapter 6 on ‘The Identical Twins of Nagata-cho’.

See also Chapter 5 on ‘Exercising Power as a Nōrin Zoku’.