

Chapter 2: The Foundation of the Movement

2.1 Introduction

Although they had in common, the growing attachment of Muslims to Islam, Islamic resurgences that occurred throughout the Muslim world from the 1970s, were historically and behaviorally diverse and complex phenomena (Dessouki 1982:6). In each Muslim country -even within each Muslim country- there were always different causes, different historical backgrounds and different cultural settings. In the Middle East, for example, Islamic resurgence often occurred through radical political activism, whereas in Malaysia and Indonesia it is manifested respectively through Malay ethnicity (Muzaffar 1985: 14-6) and through the Islamic cultural movement.

From a sociological point of view, it is difficult to pin-point one absolute cause of a social phenomenon. It comprises various factors which directly or indirectly affect one another. A social movement, for example, is an accumulation of various factors, including the emergence of radical ideological powers, class consciousness, group and race identity, nationality and the emergence of important (charismatic) figures, who are able to mobilise power. These factors are not sufficient for the emergence of a social movement, without a conducive social milieu and an apt social issue or event that triggers the movement. These may include leadership disintegration, social chaos, economic problems, national instability, and foreign influence and intervention (Perry and Perry 1988;280-2, cf. Tolkhah 1994:9).

Similarly, there is no single factor which caused the emergence of Islamic resurgence movement among young people in Bandung. To understand this phenomenon at least four important aspects should be considered: socio-historical backgrounds, radical ideology, foreign influence and individual personalities. In examining these I restrict myself to the history of student movements from the early period of the New Order, ie late 1965, to late 1979. This history is important because Islamic youth movements emerged, when the student movements seemed to be dead.

Secondly I analyse how the founders and their followers perceived the history of Islam in Indonesia, and how they viewed social and political situations at the time they initiated the movement. The study of perceptions of the past, as Gungwu puts it, "is an attempt to understand the contemporary values of some periods of the past ... [which] constitutes a valuable background for explaining what is happening today" (1979:6). It is important to understand these historical perceptions since they can be adjusted along with radical changes of the world around, and can deliberately be used 'for social and political purposes' (1979:2).

Islam was understood by the founders and the followers of the movements as an alternative ideology and civilisation which completely contradicts other world ideologies such as socialism and capitalism. Such a view is very different from previous Islamic movements such Muhammadiyah, PERSIS (*Persatuan Islam*, The Unity of Islam) and NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*, The Rise of Islamic Scholars) that put much more emphasis on ritual, social and political aspects.

My third interest is to examine to what extent international Islamic movements and foreign influences played a role in the emergence and development of Islamic youth resurgence movements in Indonesia.

Lastly the individual background of the founders is significant in understanding the movement. I will observe the background of only one of the founders, including his familial and educational background, and his relation to the emergence of the movement.

2.2 Student Movement and Political Suppression

Students' interest in social problems lead to their involvement in politics. Students, according to Curran and Renzetti (1990:598), "have a long history of activism in such political pressure groups". Such a position, in Lipset's view, is gained because students "are more responsive to political trends, to changes in mood, to opportunities for action, than almost any other group in the population" (Lipset and Altbach 1969:497). This shows that the role of students in society is not only as social critic, but also as a political force which can stimulate social and political change within society.

In developing countries, the role of students in society is very important because they are elite groups who are among the first introduced to modernisation. This was even clearer in the post-colonial era, between 1950s and 1970s, when very few people had access to higher education. Within a society with a small number of educated middle class, students became a source of public opinion. Moreover, their concern with modernisation and development made them important agents of social, political and cultural changes. They began to diverge from the traditional prescriptions to which the older generation was very much attached, instigating, as Feuer (1969) puts it, a "conflict of generations".

In Indonesia this conflict of generations was marked by various student demonstrations which criticised government policies and proposed radical changes and solutions to social, economical and political problems faced by Indonesia. In the 1960s students and other sections of society, including some army members (Railon 1985:7) struggled for the establishment of the Indonesian New Order. In the New Order era student movements continued to criticise government policies. In 1974 students demonstrations demanded the dissolution of the group of personal assistants of the president who had too much influence at the time, a reduction in prices and the crushing of the corruptors. This

demonstration turned into violence and destruction when demonstrators' behaviour went out of control, and about 9 students were killed and 23 others were injured (*Tomtowi Syafei* 1987). This event was known as 'Peristiwa Malari' (The Fifteenth of January Event).

This event had a long and tragic impact on student activism. In 1977, the Ministry of Education banned student involvement in politics. It was followed by the dissolution of Student Government (*Dewan Mahasiswa, Dema*) in 1978, by order of the Pangkopkamtib (*Panglima Komando Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban*, the Chief of Operations Command for the Restoration of Security and Order), Admiral Sudomo. Finally, on April 19th 1978, the Ministry of Education decided on a new policy, ie. Normalisation of Campus (*Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus, NKK*). A year later students protested against this policy in Bandung, Jakarta, Surabaya and Jogjakarta (CSIS 1980:15), but, the policy still applies in 1995.

For students, this was the death of university campuses. According to a student, the NKK policy resulted in disadvantages not only to the students but also to the government. Students became passive and were no longer interested in the social and political problems of their societies. They were alienated from their surrounding environment and frustrated. Their ideal intellectual and spiritual dimensions disappeared. They become bodies (*tubuh*) without soul (*ruh*). In MH Ainun Najib's view, students became bulls in the stall of NKK.

From 1983 Islamic student organisations such as HMI (*Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam*, Islamic Student Association), PMII (*Pergerakan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia*, Indonesian Islamic Student Movement), IMM (*Ikatan Mahasiswa Muhammadiyah*, Muhammadiyah Student Association) and PII (*Pelajar Islam Indonesia*, Islamic School-Student Association),¹ were forced to change their ideological base, ie. Islam, into Pancasila. In the 15th HMI Congress in Medan, HMI decided not to adopt Pancasila as its *azas* (foundation), even though there was strong external pressure from the government. However, in 1985 when the government began to apply the Basic Guidelines for Mass Organisations (*Rancangan Undang-Undang Keormasan*), all mass organisations, including here students' and religious organisations were required to accept Pancasila as their bases. Therefore, in the 16th congress, after a long and heated debate HMI accepted Pancasila. This attitude led to internal conflict, ie. the break-up of HMI into HMI itself and the 'Assembly to save the organisation,' (*Majelis Penyelamat Organisasi, MPO*). Muhammadiyah Student Association (IMM) and Indonesian Islamic Student Movement (PMII) automatically accepted Pancasila when their main body Muhammadiyah and NU, respectively, accepted it as the foundation of all organisations. Only one organisation, the PII, preferred to dissolve itself rather

¹ In Indonesia there are two terms which refer to the word 'student' in English. First students of High school and below are called '*pelajar*.' The other term is '*mahasiswa*,' which refers to students of higher education institution, universities and academies.

than accept Pancasila as its ideological foundation. Although it formally dissolved, it continued to hold trainings at an underground level.

This situation for Muslims and students in general was quite frustrating. To reduce their alienation they tried to find channels through which they could express their ideas. At this stage public and university mosques became a centre of student activities.

The late 1970s and early 1980s (after the banning of *Dewan Mahasiswa*), according to Denny J.A., (1990), marked a new stage in the student movement in Indonesia. Student movements changed their orientation, format, organisation and type. While the orientation of previous student movements was challenging the 'power structure' (*struktur kekuasaan*), in the 80s their orientation was to form political and social opinion among the masses.

2.3 Historical Perception: Disappointment of The Past

In concentrating on this historical perception my intention is to relate the founders' perceptions of the past to their response to contemporary situations. These past perceptions contribute "a valuable background for explaining what is happening today, why contemporary [people] respond as they do to current developments and in what ways they are likely to interpret present events in the future" (Gungwu 1979:6).

In the view of the founders and followers of various Islamic youth movements, the history of Islam in Indonesia is the history of "continuous defeat and disappointment."² For them it is ironical that throughout history Indonesian Muslims have been the majority of the Indonesian population, but have always been marginal politically. Islamic parties and organisations have been impotent. The Indonesian government has actually been dominated by other powers. Although some Muslims have been involved in the government, Muslims have seen it as un-Islamic. In their view government has been infiltrated by Christians, and government policies identified with Christian policies directly or indirectly push Islam into a 'corner' (*terpojok*).³ Since the birth of the New Order, Christian figures have occupied some very important and strategic positions in the country.

In the view of Muslim activists, the role of Muslims in the independence movement began since three centuries ago, with resistance movements against the Dutch by Muslim sultanates and leaders. Due to this continuous resistance by Muslims, Indonesia was increasingly identified with Islam, and the Dutch with Christianity, since Christianity was introduced with colonialism. The Dutch were seen as *kafir* (infidel) who not only wanted to control the country politically and economically but also to destroy Islam. This identification of the Dutch

² Interview with some of the founders of Islamic movements and many youth Muslim activists.

³ The word *terpojok* (cornered, marginalised) was a common theme among the young Muslim activists to describe the position of Islam in Indonesia.

Christian as a threat and enemy of Islam became the roots of political conflict between Christians and Muslims in the period of post-independence, when the issue of Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*)⁴ emerged (Hasan 1980:7).

Most movements and revolts were crushed by the Dutch. However, the Dutch had to pay a high price in terms of money and human life. The resistance movement of the Acehnese was successfully crushed after Dr. Snouck Hurgronje, an Islamic specialist, studied Islam in Aceh.⁵ His report on Aceh was then used to plan an effective strategy to surpass the Acehnese. He was appointed as the Dutch government specialist for Islamic affairs, and he developed an effective policy to prevent and destroy any forms of an Islamic resistance movement. His policies became more important when the Dutch realised that the biggest challenge to their domination was coming from *ulama* and Islamic leaders. One of the most important policies of Snouck Hurgronje was to encourage Islamic religious activities (ritual aspects), while preventing and proscribing any attempts to develop a powerful Islamic political base. This policy, according to Muslim activists, continued to be applied by the Sukarno and Suharto regimes (cf. Samson 1972:229–30).

Indonesian history, for Muslims especially the militant, has been an irony. In the political sphere, throughout history, Indonesian Muslims, who are the majority of the Indonesian population, were characterised as 'outsiders' (McVey 1983:199–225). Indonesian Muslims have been characterised, borrowing Wertheim's (1980) term, as a "majority with [a] minority mentality". Indeed, as Drakeley (1992) puts it, throughout the New Order (Orde Baru) period Islam in Indonesia has occupied a position as political outsider, "despite being a crucial political midwife at its birth" (p.5).

Furthermore, Muslim activists believed that the Muslim *ummat* (community), organisationally and individually, was often sold out by both Muslim and non-Muslim leaders. Islamic power was always used and exploited, but it was neglected when the glory was gained (Rosidi 1970). One informant said, "When this country was in a crisis Muslims, who were the majority of the population, were always in the front line, but when the crisis was over the Muslims were ignored." This awareness led to a belief that there must be something wrong

⁴ The Jakarta Charter (*Piagam Jakarta*) was a draft preamble of the Constitution of 1945 (*Undang-Undang Dasar 45*) which said that the state was "based on belief in God with the obligation for adherents of Islam to carry out Islamic law" ("*berdasar ketuhanan, dengan kewajiban menjalankan syariat Islam bagi pemeluk-pemeluknya*") (Boland 1985:28). According to Hasan (1980:8), this was a minimal demand from Muslims during the debate on the national state base in 1945. After heated debate between nationalist secularists, Christians and Muslims, the last seven words known as the "tujuh kata" (seven words) were finally dropped from the draft preamble because -it was believed-they would create religious conflict and in turn destroy national unity.

⁵ It was reported that he studied Islam in Mecca and disguised himself as a Muslim. One of the important concepts is his three categories of Islam: as pure religion, social aspect and political aspect. For further information of Islamic Politics of Dutch Colonial Government see Husnul Aqib Suminto in his *Politik Islam Pemerintah Hindia Belanda*, especially between pages 115 to 125.

with the ummat. Among other things, Muslims realised that Islam was remote from the ummat. In a public sermon, one *mubaligh* (preacher) even said that the Quran had been treated as a house decoration. *Hadits* (the traditions of the Prophet) had been left behind.

Muslims have always been in opposition to the government not only because of Suharto, who ignored and suppressed Muslims' aspirations, but also because of the people surrounding him. Some big mass media, publishers and social infrastructures were controlled by Christian institutions. Furthermore, Christian missions which successfully converted Muslims in many parts of Indonesia, were regarded as a big challenge for Muslims. These facts, according to Mursalin Dahlan, one of the founders of Islamic resurgence in Bandung, "showed that Islam, as in the colonial era, has been dominated and controlled by other powers that were always hostile to Islam."

2.4 Islam: The Only Alternative

Basically, the core of Islamic teachings developed by the Islamic resurgence movement is similar to other Islamic groups. Their teachings are based on similar sources, ie. Quran and *Sunnah* (tradition of the Prophet). The differences are tied to the way they approach Islam. These differences result in various religious views, such as reformist, modernist, traditionalist, and fundamentalist (Aziz 1989:236).

According to one informant, Muslims' view of Islam was deeply influenced by Snouck Hurgronje, who tried to restrict Islam to a 'the mosque religion' (*agama mesjid*) and deny its social and political life (cf. Suminto 1985:122 and Samson 1972:229–30). Islam, in the view of young Muslim activists, for a long time has been misunderstood by Muslims, and because of this misunderstanding, Islam has been mocked and humiliated by other powers. Islam, in Mohammad Abduh's⁶ term, "has been covered up by Muslims" (*al-Islamu mahjubun bi al-Muslimin*). I found there was a general dissatisfaction among important figures of the movement with the concept of Islam offered by previous ulama and mainstream Islam. Moreover, some ulama in the view of young Muslims were afraid to explain the 'true Islam'. Because of this, young activists preferred young and 'brave' preachers.

This new tendency was related to the wide distribution of Islamic translations. Almost all reference books of the movements came from the Middle East, and other Muslim countries. Some of those important books were written by Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and other members of Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanal-Muslimun*). Another important writer was Abul A'la Maududi, the

⁶ Abduh was one of the most prominent figures of Islamic reformism in Egypt. In Indonesia his ideas deeply influenced the Islamic reformist movement, Muhammadiyah.

founder and the leader of *Jama'at al-Islami* (Islamic Group) in Pakistan.⁷ Those books emphasised at least three major points. First, they attempted to re-examine Islam, and they tried to correct the view of Islam previously held by Muslims. In addition, they proposed Islam as a solution for all problems faced by Muslims. This led to their rejection of other ideologies, including socialism, nationalism and other 'isms'. Compared with other Muslim groups, they were more concerned with *aqidah* (basic faith), basic meanings of Islam, and the social and political aspects of Islam. These three aspects, in terms of approach, were quite radical and different from mainstream Islam. This was a crucial factor in the development of the movement.

Aqidah (basic faith), for young activists, is the most important aspect of Islam because it is the foundation of all activities and determines people's lives. An informant said that like a foundation of a house, it determines the strength of the building. Although the building is made from very good material, it would be ruined if its foundation was fragile. *Aqidah*, therefore, is conceived as comprehensive and basic thought about the universe, mankind and life, and it becomes a base of all activities. At this point Islam is identified as an ideology which opposes the established ideologies of Capitalism and Socialism.⁸

Based on my interviews with many Muslim activists, I found similar views that Islam is not only a belief and ritual system, but also includes law (*Syari'ah*), politics and way of life (*nizham*). Islam, according to this view, is a complete code of life which rules all aspects of life, including individual, social, economical, political and cultural life. This implies that Islam is conceived as not only a set of beliefs and a socio-political code but also a cultural code.

This new cultural view of Islam emerged as a result of dissatisfaction not only with the established social and political order, which oppressed Islamic social ideas and political aspirations, but also against the cultural order. From their historical perceptions, Muslim activists believed that Islam and Muslims often became victims of corrupt leaders and a bad system. They asserted that Western cultural infiltration through mass media, both printing and electronic, had "intoxicated" the Muslim *ummat*, especially young Muslim generations. The general trend among youngsters who often regarded everything which came

⁷ Some titles of these books are *This Religion of Islam*, *Al-Islam*, *Towards Understanding Islam*, *The Future for Islam*, *Islam the Misunderstood Religion*, *Islam and Universal Peace*, *Iman dan 20 Perkara yang Membatalkan Syahadatain* (Faith and 20 Matters which Nullify the Profession of Faith), and *Jundullah Jihad Fi Sabilillah* (The Soldier of God's War in the way of God).

⁸ Other religions such as Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism, in the view of Muslims activists, do not cover all aspects of human life. Christians, for example, believe that Christianity the religio taught by Jesus Christ is universal. However, in the Muslim activists' view, it does not have complete rules by which all dimensions of life of the Christians must be ruled by the Christian teachings. In Christianity there is a division of spiritual and temporal (wordly) life. It was known that in Christianity there is a doctrine "Render unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's and to God the things which are God's." Likewise, Buddhism also accepts the dichotomy of life, spiritual and worldly life (Rais 1985:27-48).

from the West (*Barat*, America and Europe) as good, for Muslim activists was a clear evidence of "Westoxication."⁹ This 'westoxication,' they believed, created a permissive and valueless society resulting in moral decadence. Indonesia, as Imaduddin puts it, was a place to be cleansed because it was full of injustice and un-Islamic practices (Naipaul 1981:350:2).

Another implication of the idea that Islam is a complete code of life is that Islam does not need any other ideas from other sources. It does not need assistance from other ideologies. Islam is self sufficient. This view leads to a total rejection of any other value systems, such as socialism, liberalism, communism, secularism and other 'isms'. An informant said that valuesystems or ideologies other than Islam are regarded as a source of chaos and conflict within Muslim society. The world, including Muslim countries, was dominated by those powers. Behind all of this, he further said, was the Zionist¹⁰ power, which was always hostile to Islam.

The idea that Islam is a complete code of life also implies rejection of the division between the religious and non religious. Such division was often believed as a

⁹ 'Westoxification,' 'Westoxication,' 'Westomania,' 'Occidentosis,' 'Westitis,' 'Euromania,' and 'Weststruckness' are terms translated from a book written by a modern Iranian novelist and social critic Jalal al-e Ahmad *Gharbzadegi*. According to Madjid Tehranian (1993), Westoxication is the right translation because it "connotes a richer meaning in English in that the individual so addicted, just like any intoxicated individual, enjoys the conditions of his own addiction." This book became a major source of ideological inspiration for the revolution, and because of this, the book was banned after its first publication in 1963. After the revolution it was distributed widely throughout the country, and the title of the book *Gharbzadegi* became a phrase for the malaise of modern Iranian society. The core idea of this book is that the West has never been a panacea, but rather is a terrible disease which has poisoned Iranian society. In his *Gharbzadegi* (English translation by John Green and Ahmad Alizadeh *Westruckness*, Lexington: Mazda 1982), Jalal al-E Ahmad criticised the Western developmentalist policies of the Shah's regime. He argues that Western neocolonialism often penetrated the minds and souls of the nations of the Third World through a pathology called 'Westoxication,' a total irrational fascination with everything Western at the expense of the indigenous cultural heritage. Furthermore, he discovered Western intentions to destroy Islamic unity and the involvement of the Shah in this endeavour. At the same time he also argued that 'Eastoxication' is pathological obsession among intellectuals with Marxist and communist ideologies. While they were negating religion as 'the opium of the masses,' intentionally or not these intellectuals disconnected themselves from the masses and on the contrary they served the interests of the colonial powers of the Soviet Union. Based on these negative valuations of West and East, came the slogan, which later became the slogan of the Islamic Republic of Iran, 'Neither East nor West, Islam is best' (*La sharqiyya wa la gharbiyya illa al-Islam*) (Tehranian 1993:341-73, and Rajae 1993:103-25). This term 'Westoxication' has been used as a powerful rhetoric of various Islamic movements throughout the Muslim world. The term Westoxication itself emerged and developed for the first time in Iran, but the idea that Muslims had been intoxicated by Western values and culture has been a common theme among those Islamic movements.

¹⁰ Zionism, according to Ismail R. al-Faruqi (1983), a professor of Islamic studies in Temple University, America, refers to "a movement launched by Theodore Herzl following his disillusionment by the Dreyfus Affair. It was designed to transform Palestine and its adjacent territories into a Jewish state, 'as Jewish as England is English.' Its pursuit of this objective is thoroughly Machiavellian. Its single-minded purpose is given absolute priority over all considerations, including the moral" (p.261-267). This term 'Zionist,' like 'Westoxication,' was a common rhetoric label among young Muslim activists for those who were believed as hostile to Islam.

symptom of secularism¹¹ an ideology that only thinks about and binds itself to this present life and rejects the existence of the hereafter. "Secular people seem to be good, their pragmatic actions make them forget future (hereafter) matters. At the extreme level, they will do anything to reach their goals" (Imaduddin 1980:36). Islam, according to Imaduddin (an important figure of the youth Islamic resurgence in Bandung) is a way of life which rules all of human activities, and therefore none of our lives should be profane or non-religious. He explains that Islam even prescribes what to do on going to the toilet. A Muslim for example, is supposed to say a prayer (*do'a*) and enter the toilet with the left foot. He further says, "keep our body healthy so that we can carry out God's order and obey God much better, this is *ibadah* (worship) (*Ibid*, p.47). By this he rejects the translation of the word *al-Din* in *al-Din al-Islam* as 'religion' (*agama*) because *al-din*, for Imaduddin, means a complete way of life whereas 'religion' is merely a set of beliefs and rituals (cf. Lyon 1979:37).

Finally, the notion of Islam as a complete code of life led to the idea of an Islamic state. It was commonly believed that the totality of Islam can only be comprehensively applied in a system or state which is also completely Islamic. Among the Islamic youth resurgence movement, there are at least two different groups. There are some groups who believe that the present regime is not totally un-Islamic, but changes to be more Islamic are necessary. Other groups believe that the present regime is completely un-Islamic, and should be changed by revolution to Islam. Because Islam, as Mursalin Dahlan explains, cannot be applied partially. In his view, there are only two choices accepting Islam completely or rejecting it completely. He further says "Believing or practising some parts of Islam and rejecting the others is *kafir* (infidel). Islam should be accepted completely (*kaaffah*) or rejected completely." This was the view of Islamic underground movements, such as the Young DI (Darul Islam) and LP3K (Pesantren Kilat Movement) movement, whereas the former view was held by the formal Islamic movements, such as those at public mosques and campus preaching institutions.

Their notion of a more Islamic and a completely Islamic state refers to the ideal period of Islam in the era of the Prophet and his companions. It was believed, by most Muslim activists, that the Prophet established a state which was built on the basis of God's revelations. In this state, Muslims rule themselves with Islamic law (*shariat*) which covered all aspects of life. This ideal conception of an Islamic state, among the Islamic youth resurgence movement created two

¹¹ Secularisation processes refer to "the separation of the state from the church leading in its advanced stage to the separation of politics from religion, ...[ie.] the disestablishment of religion in the domain of public policy and its relegation to the realm of private preference and judgement. ...[As a result of] the demonstrated and incontrovertible success of rationalism in various areas of life, religion would eventually lose its salience even for the individual.... Thus secularism refers to both eradication of religion as an institution in human society and erosion of man's faith in the divine and the transcendental (Haq 1986:332-3).

aims: to establish an Islamic state, and to apply Islamic law. These aims, as in other Islamic resurgence movements in the world have been the two main characteristics of contemporary Islamic movements, namely “legalist” (the comprehensive application of Islamic law, *shariat*) and “autonomist,” or “separatist” (the establishment of an Islamic state) (cf. Pipes 1980:17–39). In Pakistan, for example, the Islamic movement demanded the application of Islamic law, whereas in Sudan, in the Southern Philippines, and in Kashmir, Islamic movements demanded an Islamic state and full autonomy.

To establish an Islamic state and a more Islamic identity, Muslim activists believed they had to prepare the Muslim *ummat* so they could accept Islam as their law. Furthermore, this preparation process could only be achieved through *jihād*¹² (endeavour, holy war) and *dakwah*¹³ (proselytisation). According to an informant, the spirit of *jihād* had disappeared from the hearts of Muslims. It was not surprising then when *jihād* became an important subject among young Muslim activists.

Among some groups of Muslims I interviewed, there was an awareness that it was impossible to reach the above aims without collective efforts. They believed that there should be a cohesive group (*jama'ah*), who was expected to be the pioneer of the *dakwah* (Islamic preaching) movements. This belief, they claimed, is based on the examples of the Prophet in the early phases of development of Islam. The Prophet Muhammad, according to an informant, established a small group secretly in a companion's house. Arqam's house became a secret centre of the early Islamic movement, from which members of the groups spread to preach Islam secretly. This period was named by some groups as the Mecca period, or a period of forming cadres. Based on this view, some Muslim groups believe that they should establish a *jama'ah* which spreads Islam secretly. These groups later developed as underground movements. Interpretation of the history of early Islam of the Prophet varied among the Muslim groups, and in the later developments, this became a source of disagreement among the Islamic youth resurgence movements.

From the above description there are three important issues. First, the idea that Islam as a complete code of life which provides answers for all questions of modern life is quite different from what was previously conceived. Previously, the Islamic movement was a purification movement which attempted to purify Islamic teachings and to refute local un-Islamic traditions. In the following phase, Islamic movements had a more political character. Finally, contemporary Islamic

¹² The word *jihād* is an Arabic word meaning fight, battle and holy war against the infidels. The root of this word is *jahada* which means to endeavour and to strive, and because of this the word *jihād* often translated into Indonesian as “endeavour” (*berusaha dengan sungguh-sungguh*)

¹³ The term *dakwah* comes from the Arabic word *da'wa* which is from the root *da'a*, meaning to call or invite, ie. to call mankind to Islam. *Dakwah* also means missionary activities, ie. Islamic evangelism which promotes Islamic teachings among Muslims.

youth resurgence movements have been less concerned with Islamic purification and Islamic politics, and more concerned with the cultural aspects of Islam. Despite these differences, contemporary Islamic movements and previous Islamic movements have something in common ie. all of them try to make Islam present and felt in society and to give Islam substance and a role in society (Bahasoan 1985:131–60). At this point, the current Islamic movements seem to be a continuation of previous Islamic movements.

Second, through the translation of many books which later became a reference for various groups of Islamic movement, ideas developed by various Islamic youth resurgence movements in Bandung, and generally in Indonesia, were highly influenced by other Islamic movements throughout the world, especially in the Middle East. Among others, the thought of the *Ikhwan al-Muslimin* in Egypt, and *Jamaat-i-Islami* in Pakistan were the most influential sources for the Islamic youth resurgence movement in Bandung in its early development. This international influence was not only in terms of ideas but also in terms of motivation.

2.5 International Influences

Islamic reformist movements in Indonesia have always had connections with other Islamic movements in other parts of the world. The emergence of reformist movements, such as Muhammadiyah and PERSIS, was deeply influenced by the Islamic movements in the Middle East, such as Wahabism in Saudi Arabia, and the Islamic reform movement of Muhammad Abduh (1849–1905) and Jamaluddin al-Afghani (1839–1897) in Egypt. Like previous Islamic movements in Indonesia, contemporary Islamic youth resurgence movements in Indonesia are also influenced by international Islamic movements.

Different from their predecessors, current Islamic movements developed in an era of globalisation, in which mass communication technology has been revolutionised. Recent advances of technology have led to a situation where citizens of the planet earth are linked inextricably by satellites, receiver dishes, transmitters and cable television networks and relays. At this stage, all humans are in one community, a global community (Shupe 1990:17–26) or in McLuhan and Fiore's (1968) term a "global Village." This situation, in relation to the Islamic movement, creates a closer connection among various Islamic movements.

Previously, the influence of the international Islamic movement reached Indonesia after a period of time. Usually, the founders of the Indonesian movements met reformist ideas in the Middle East when they studied Islam or when they did pilgrimage (*haji*) in Mecca. When they returned to Indonesia they preached their reformists ideas and later established a movement. For this reason, there was a time lapse which differentiated the Islamic movement in other parts of the world and the Islamic movements in Indonesia. The agents of these movement were

individuals. In later developments, this agency of change was also through books and other printed media. Finally, the agency of the contemporary Islamic movement is not only through individuals and printed media but also through various electronic mass communication media, such as television networks and direct broadcasting systems. This advance of telecommunication technology has revolutionised the spread of ideas and information. What is on television in America can also be seen at the same time in a small village in Bandung, Indonesia. Through television, what happens in other parts of Islamic world can immediately be seen and heard by Muslims in Indonesia.

This fast current of information is very important in understanding the emergence and early development of the Islamic youth resurgence movement in Indonesia, especially in Bandung. One of the most important international events which greatly influenced the early development of the movement was the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. This event for Muslim activists had three impacts. First, it gave Muslim activists the idea of an Islamic revolutionary movement and that Islam could become a radical ideology which could challenge established ideologies. Second, Islamic revolution in Iran psychologically motivated Muslim activists and convinced them that they could also succeed like the Islamic movement led by Khomeini in Iran. Third, the Islamic revolution in Iran also influenced the way Muslim females wore clothes or at least reinforced the teaching of the veil (*kerudung, jilbab*) This was because female Muslims who supported the revolution in Iran wore the veil and black clothes.

In the late 1970s and early 1980s, these influences could be seen clearly. There was a kind of admiration toward Khomeini as the leader of the revolution. The portrait of Khomeini was hung in young Muslim activists' rooms and in offices of student and youth Muslim organisations. Another influence could be identified clearly in the way Muslim female activists wore clothes. In the late 1970s there were very few female Muslims who wore the veil, however in the early 1980s- just one or two years after the Islamic revolution in Iran- those who wore the veil increased rapidly. Furthermore, the distinct Iranian influence was that Muslim female activists wore black veil and clothes similar to those female activists in Iran.

The influence of the revolution in Iran was reinforced by the translation of books written by important revolutionary figures. The works of some Shi'ite scholars, such as Ali Shariati and Imam Khomeini were published and read by Sunni Muslim people in Indonesia. Along with other books written by Sunni scholars, such as Sayyid Qutb, Hasan al-Banna and Mawlana Maududi, these books shaped a new Muslim view on Islam.

These impacts of the Islamic revolution in Iran on the early development of Islamic youth resurgence movement are clear despite the fact that the revolution in Iran was a revolution of the Shi'ite (*Si'ah*) Muslims. It is a quite interesting

fact that regardless of differences,¹⁴ Indonesian Sunni Muslims accepted revolutionary ideas from the Shi'ite Muslims in Iran. An informant says, "we do not agree with some of the faith and teachings of the Shi'ite, but we have learnt from the revolutionary ideas of the Shi'ite." At this stage, as Khurshid Ahmad (1983) says, the contemporary Islamic movement reached a very important phase in Muslim history marked by its non- sectarian characteristic (p.223).

2.6 The Founder: An Individual Background

It is not easy for me to decide which Islamic institutions played the most important role in the emergence of the Islamic revivalism among the young people in Indonesia, especially in Bandung. As I focused my study on the Islamic revivalism among young people, including students from the mid-1970s to early 1990s, I studied the case among the university campuses. During this period Islamic activities in almost all university campuses began to take shape. Public and campus mosques were crowded by young people, most of them students. They came to pray (*sholat*), attend public sermons (*pengajian*) and take part other activities. This was followed by the 'veil (*kerudung* or *jilbab*) movement'. Female university students and later senior high school students started to wear head cover.

In Bandung, Salman Mosque at the ITB (Bandung Institute of Technology)¹⁵ was the first Islamic institution in which Islamic activities for young people were held in a proper organisation. That Salman Mosque with its Karisma organisation was the most influential Islamic institution in the Islamic youth resurgence movement in Bandung and in Indonesia, was reported by V.S. Naipaul who visited Bandung in the late 1970s. Naipaul observed that Bandung is "one of centres of the Islamic revival in Indonesia" (1981:338). Thousands of young people from Jakarta, Bogor and other cities in Indonesia came to attend a short Islamic course, which he called 'mental training', at Salman Mosque at The Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB, Institut Teknologi Bandung). The course was given by Imaduddin, an electrical engineer, a lecturer at the institute, who had also graduated from the ITB. Imaduddin is one of the most important figures involved in the establishment of the Salman Mosque, and in general in the emergence of Islamic youth resurgent movement in Bandung.

His full name was Muhammad Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Among young people, he was called Bang Imad.¹⁶ He was born in 1931 to a devout Muslim family in

¹⁴ Sunni or *Ahl al-Sunna* (People of the Sunna) refers to those Muslims who uphold customs based on the practice and authority of the Prophet and his companions, as distinct from *Shi'a* ('the party' of Ali) which comprising those Muslim who uphold the rights of 'Ali and his descendants to leadership of the Ummah.

¹⁵ ITB is one of the most, prestigious tertiary institution in Indonesia, having produced many national leaders, including Soekarno, the first president.

¹⁶ Bang is an intimate name, meaning big brother. Usually used in Jakarta and some other regions in Sumatra.

Medan, North Sumatra. His mother was from a noble family of the Riau Sultanate. Because of his mother's position, he could enter the Dutch School, HIS (Hollandsch Inlandische School) which only recruited children from noble and aristocrat families (*Ulumul Qur'an* 2:5:94). His father was a religious teacher, who graduated from Al-Azhar Islamic University, Cairo, Egypt. He was one of the teachers of a famous religious school (*madrasah*) run by the sultanate in the Dutch time. At this school, he was also one of the principals (Naipaul 1981:345). In the political sphere, Imaduddin's father was one of the leaders of Masyumi, representing his region, North Sumatra. Moreover, in the Council of the Muslim Clergy he had the highest position, as a *qadi* (Muslim judge) (Naipaul 1981:347 and *Ulumul Qur'an*, 2:5:94).

During the revolution against the Dutch, Imaduddin was involved in the Muslim Army Hizbullah.¹⁷ At the age of fifteen, in 1946, he was trained as a guerilla fighter, and he received a star and a stripe as a first sergeant. In 1953, he finished his high school with the highest mark. While he was a student in Medan, he was one of the leaders of the students in his school. After finishing high school he continued his study in ITB. His ideal of becoming an electrical engineer was deeply influenced by Dr. Hatta's speech on his visit to the largest waterfall close to Medan. In his speech Hatta, who was then the vice president, stressed the importance of electricity (Naipaul 1981:346).

In 1953 he found Bandung and especially ITB a secular place. He found it difficult to find any mosque around the institute. The closest mosque was about three kilometres away. Before 1957, when Sukarno threw the Dutch out, almost all lecturers and professors in the institute were Dutch, and most of the lectures were presented in English. On his first Friday, Imaduddin was shocked by the fact that some classes took place during prayer time. Since he was brought up in a strict Muslim family, absence from Friday prayer in the mosque was quite a mental shock for Imaduddin. He asked permission to go to the mosque. The lecturer allowed him and his three friends to go. He went to the mosque but he missed the lecture. This happened every Friday. He felt that the campus was dry of religious activities.¹⁸ He became inspired by the idea of having a mosque close to the campus (Naipaul 1981:347)

¹⁷ It means the party of Allah, a military unit for the Muslim youth, established by the Japanese at the end of 1944. Ulama and Muslim leaders also established Sabilillah (the way of Allah) which acted as the main body and protector for Hizbullah. From the Japanese point of view, it was a strategy to defeat the allies, and a realisation of Nippon's Islamic Grass roots Policy (Benda 1958:134). In addition, the Japanese realised that the ulama and the Islamic leaders were not only formal leaders but also very influential figures in the Muslim community (Ma'arif 1985:99).

¹⁸ Interview with Imaduddin. A similar feeling was also experienced by Mursalin Dahlan. According to Mursalin Dahlan, the campus environment with all its aspects made him thirsty for religious situations, which he was used to. This was because at that period, between 1950s and 1960s, one's religion was always identified as a political alliance. As a result of this, people, especially Muslims who performed prayer five times a day, were unwilling to show their ritual performances. Furthermore, in the ITB at

When he entered the ITB he became involved in HMI (Islamic Student Association). In 1954 he was appointed as a head of education and preaching (*dakwah*) of the HMI Bandung region. This position forced him to organise various training activities for members of the organisation. His experience in managing training activities later inspired him to hold similar activities in Salman Mosque.

One year after he finished his study in 1961, he became a lecturer in the Institute. Later, beside teaching his discipline, ie. electrical engineering, he also taught the Religion of Islam.¹⁹ In 1963 he was involved in the committee for the development of the Salman mosque, in which he served as deputy chairman. He also held Islamic discussions and *pengajian* (religious lecture). Gradually, his preachings attracted audiences who not only came from among the ITB students but also young people and students from surrounding areas. In the same year, ITB sent him to the United States to get his masters' degree. He studied there for three years at Iowa State University.

After finishing his study in 1965, he was asked to return to Indonesia to teach again at the ITB as some of the lecturers had been involved in 30 th September Communist movement (G30 S PKI) and were dismissed. On his return to Indonesia, HMI held a National Congress in Solo. Knowing that Imaduddin had returned, the congress nominated him as the head of Preaching Institution of Islamic Students (LDMI, *Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam*). Through this position he met Nurcholish Madjid (now a celebrated Indonesian Muslim intellectual), Abdul Latief (now the Minister of Employment) and Mar'ie Muhammad (now the Finance Minister). From that time he regularly held training activities for university students, which he called LKD (*Latihan Kader Dakwah, Preaching Cadre Training*) and later changed into LMD (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah, Preaching Management Training*).

In 1970, the Malaysian Minister of Education came to ITB Bandung and with his group joined Friday prayer. Imaduddin was, at that time, the *imam* and the *khatib*. Interested in Imaduddin' s methods of Islamic education, the minister asked him to come to Malaysia to encourage Islamic resurgence, as Imaduddin had done in Indonesia.²⁰ He happily agreed to the request, and in 1971 he went to Malaysia as a lecturer from the ITB, under the auspices of the Indonesian Ministry of Education (Imaduddin 1990:xvi–vii).

that time only very few of students and academic staffs came from *santri* (more a committed Muslim) background.

¹⁹ According to Mursalin Dahlan, religion subjects, especially Islam, had never been taught in the Institute until 1962. Nowadays, all religions are taught in all universities, and all students are free to choose any religions they want to study the establishment of University of Technology Malaysia (UTM).

²⁰ According to Naipaul, when Imaduddin was at Cornell University he met a Malaysian, through whom in 1971 he went to Malaysia to help

The first thing he did in Malaysia was to propose that Islamic subjects be included in the university curriculum, as had been done in Indonesia in 1962. While he was teaching at the University of Technology Malaysia (UTM) in Kuala Lumpur, he also conducted religious talks for selected groups of Malay students, whom he felt had leadership qualities, at different campuses in Kuala Lumpur. Students regarded him as a powerful and convincing orator who could awaken awareness in his audiences of their wrongdoing. According to Shukran Jamel Zaini, a dakwah leader, “[Imaduddin] made us realise the gravity of our wrongdoing and that we could not carry out a dichotomous life when we believe that Islam is a complete way of life” (Anwar 1987:20).

In the middle of 1972, because of student enthusiasm for his teaching, he proposed a special Islamic course, organised during the semester holidays. The course lasted about four days and five nights, and was held in a *surau*.²¹ The participants were limited to 40 students, and they had to pass an interview. Through this interview Imaduddin tried to select students who were not only clever but also had leadership talent. It was expected that after the course they would become the pioneers of the dakwah movement on university campuses. The course ended with *tahajud* (an optional midnight prayer) and *bai'ah* (oath)²² together before dawn (*subuh*). Imaduddin named this course LKD (*Latihan Kader Dakwah*, Preacher Cadre Training (Imaduddin 1990:xix–xx).

At UTM, he developed a core group of about 100 followers, many of whom later went to Britain to study and continued their dakwah activities. When they came back to Malaysia, with more committed zeal for Islam, they taught at various universities and other institutions in Malaysia (Anwar 1987:21). Their dakwah movement became much bigger and stronger, especially when they had higher positions in the places where they worked. One of the students trained by Imaduddin was Anwar Ibrahim, who now is a leader of UMNO (United Malays National Organisation) party and Deputy Prime Minister.

The link with an Indonesian Muslim activist was as an important impetus to Islamic resurgence in Malaysia. This link in fact was started when HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam Indonesia, Muslim Students' Association) helped ABIM (*Angkatan Belia Islam Malaysia*, Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia) and PKPIM (*Persatuan Kebangsaan Pelajar-Pelajar Islam Malaysia*, National Association of Muslim Students Malaysia) to organise several Islamic training trips to Jakarta and Bandung. The HMI leaders helped ABIM to formulate ideas

²¹ Surau is a prayer house, communal building suitable for any prayers except Friday prayer.

²² The meaning of *Bai'ah* here is very different from the *bai'ah* in the period of the Prophet or *bai'ah* in the Sufi Orders. In the above case, the participants only say a prayer or even only read a poem, which is led by an instructor. The word 'bai'ah' in fact has very broad meanings. It derives from *ba'a* which means to sell. *Baya'a*, to make the *bay'a*, in Arabic grammar called *musyarakah*, mutual, in which two parties are bonded together by rights and obligations. Therefore, in the above case, according to Jalaluddin Rakhmat, it is not *bai'ah*.

and arguments against the Nationalist and Socialist forces in their universities and in the government (Anwar 1987:18–19).

Imaduddin stayed in Malaysia until he was 'returned' (*dikembalikan*) to Indonesia in September 1973. In his view, the Malaysian authorities expelled him because of his critical attitude. When he first came to Malaysia, he was actually shocked by the act of a mufti (religious high judge) who kissed the hand of the Sultan. Finally, in the middle of July 1973 Imaduddin was invited to be a key note speaker at a big public sermon (*tabligh akbar*). In this sermon he criticised the hypocritical attitude of some leaders who were known as drunkards but regarded students who used drugs as criminal (Imaduddin 1990:xxiii).

His visit to Malaysia increased his interest in the international Muslim movement. He then visited Libya, England and Pakistan. Because of his wide connections and his position in the Islamic Student Association (HMI) as the head of the Islamic Student Preaching Institution (*Lembaga Dakwah Mahasiswa Islam, LDMI*) he was nominated to be a secretary of the International Islamic Federation of Student Organisations (IIFSO) (Naipaul 1981:349 and Aziz 1989:217). In the name of this organisation, he held or sponsored LMD (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah*) type of training in many Islamic organisations in Australia, Korea, Hongkong and Europe (*Ulumul Qur'an* 2:5:94). This organisation linked him more closely to the ideas of the Muslim Brotherhood (*Ikhwanul Muslimin*) movement, which was established by Hasan Al-Banna in Egypt. He also gained contact with other Islamic movements such as *Jami'at Islami* founded by Abul A'la Maududi in Pakistan. It is not surprising that his view of Islam was deeply influenced by these movements.

In 1974, a year after he returned from Malaysia, he held LMD (*Latihan Manajemen Dakwah*) training in Salman Mosque of ITB, but with a small change, ie. from *Latihan Manajemen Dakwah* into *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah* (Dakwah Warrior Training).²³ At this time he was no longer the head of Islamic Student Preaching Institution (LDMI) of the HMI, because after the 10th HMI congress in Palembang in 1971, the LDMI was removed from the HMI structure (HMI 1972), and Imaduddin no longer held a central position in the institution (Aziz 1989:218).

Latihan Mujahid Dakwah training activity was the embryo of the development of Islamic intensification groups in Salman Mosque of ITB and in the Bandung area which have continued until now. The LMD was originally aimed to create a breakthrough in the development of Islam, especially in the ITB. It formed cadres of Islamic preachers who became pioneers of the development of Islam.

²³ According to Imaduddin, his idea to hold such activities was inspired by the book *Mujahid Dakwah* (Dakwah Warrior) written by Isa Anshary, an important Masyumi and PERSIS figure in Bandung. Imaduddin further explains, his experience while he was in America, especially when he attended missionary training, was also influential (*Ulumul Qur'an* 2:5:94).

To achieve this, at least three aspects were stressed: basic knowledge of Islam, implantation of the spirit of struggle, and commitment to the group. The first aspect was related to the basic information (and some misconceptions) about Islam and its teachings. Problems faced by Muslim *Ummat* were introduced and discussed to develop participants' awareness and responsibility. Moreover, it encouraged participants to struggle for Islam. The training, which lasted one or two weeks continuously, was ended with a *bai'at*, an oath as an inauguration. With the *bai'at*, the collective determination of the participants to spread the mission was strengthened.

Since LMD was considered as training to form preacher cadres, all participants had to pass through a selection in the form of an interview. The selection was based on participants' Islamic knowledge, personality, motivation, aims and their attitude towards the program. Moreover, the intellectual potential of the participants, specifically shown by the cumulative marks of the students (*Indeks Prestasi, IP*), was considered. For the ITB students, for example, the minimal IP was 2.75. Therefore the aim of the training, i. e. to form cadres with the qualities of faith and morals, combined with scientific and intellectual abilities was clear in the first stage of training (Aziz 1989:268–9).

In 1979 the name of the training program was changed to Intensive Islamic Study (SII). On the one hand, this can be seen as a broadening of the program, in terms of target and time. On the other hand, this was the only way to keep the training going in the face of external pressure. According to Imaduddin, there were hostile feelings, especially from military authorities, with regard to the word '*mujahid*,' in *Latihan Mujahid Dakwah*.²⁴ This is because the word Interview with Imaduddin, 8 March 1994. '*mujahid*,' which means warrior, fighter and one who fights in a holy war, has a rebellious connotation (like *Komando Jihad* rebellion) and often implies the idea of an Islamic state (Darul Islam, DI). In 1978 he was accused of being anti-Pancasila, anti-Christian and not being nationalist, and because of these accusations he was detained for 14 months.²⁵ After this detention he was not allowed to teach at the ITB, and in 1980 he went to America to continue his study for a PhD degree. In 1986 he returned to Indonesia, but he could not go back to the ITB because he had been fired by his dean (*Ulumul Qur'an* 2:5:94).

In Imaduddin's view for the umpteenth time he became a victim of corrupt leaders and a bad system. Indonesia for Imaduddin was a place to be cleansed, and it was full of injustice and therefore un-Islamic. The ideal for him was an Islamic state, as it was practiced in the era of the Prophet and his four Caliphates.

²⁴ Interview with Imaduddin, 8 March 1994.

²⁵ According to Imaduddin, he was arrested only because of the BAIS (Badan Intelijen dan Strategis, Intelligence and Strategic Bureau) action which controlled by Benni Murdani and his groups. For Imaduddin, BAIS was not *Badan Intelijen dan Strategis* but '*Badan Anti Islam*' (Anti-Islam Bureau).'

However, for Imaduddin, the Indonesian constitution had some Islamic values in it. 'What we need now is the people behind the structure. They must be true Muslims'. He believed that what was needed now was a true Muslim leader, 'who lived according to the Quran, ... who could stand in for the Prophet, ... who knew the Prophet's deeds so well that he would order affairs as the Prophet himself might have ordered them' (Naipaul 1981:350–2). For this reason, Imaduddin was concerned with Islamic education for youngsters.

During his second time in America, he often met and discussed issues with Muslim intellectuals, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Amin Rais and Syafi'i Ma'arif, who also studied in America. From these discussions emerged an idea to unite Muslim intellectuals in Indonesia. On his return he tried to promote his idea through various activities but always failed. However, in 1990 his idea became a reality when a symposium of Muslim intellectuals was held in the Brawijaya University Malang, from which Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (*ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia*) was born.

From Imaduddin's individual background emerge four important issues. First, Imaduddin is an example of those who came from strong Islamic circles in rural areas and then moved to a city, in which modernisation and Western (Dutch) institutions clearly existed. Living in the Westernised and secularised milieu of the ITB (at the time when most of its lecturers were European) he missed the 'religious' environment he was used to. Second, Imaduddin's critical view of the social and political situation led him to pseudo-political opposition to a suppressive and strict political system. Through various small group forums and Islamic training among the university students, Imaduddin spread his political perceptions and at the same time his theological and Islamic ideas, which often supported one another. These discussion groups and training institutions later provided a shelter for various student movements banned in 1979. Furthermore, these institutions became a center of Muslim student activists who were not satisfied with established Islamic student organisations. Such a tendency emerged, I believe, because student movements and Islamic youth movements have something in common, namely their social and political criticism of the existing regime. Third, it is clear that Imaduddin's Islamic and political ideas were influenced by various Islamic movements throughout the world such as *Ikhwanal-Muslimin* (Muslim Brethren) in Egypt and *Jamaat-i-Islami* (Islamic society) in Pakistan. His meeting in international Islamic forums led him to know more about other Islamic movements and other political and Islamic ideas. Furthermore, Imaduddin was deeply involved in the early emergence of the Islamic youth resurgence movement in Malaysia, when he helped the foundation of ABIM (Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia). Finally, without neglecting the roles of other figures or institutions, Imaduddin was a charismatic figure, a convincing radical and a brave person (cf. Anwar 1987:19–27) who played a

significant role in the early emergence of Islamic youth resurgence movement in Bandung, and perhaps in Indonesia.

In conclusion, this analysis has focused on the factors contributing to religious resurgence especially among young people. First, there is social dissatisfaction and frustration -not only in terms of social, economic and political subordination but also in terms of spiritual or religious deprivation- experienced by some part of society. This dissatisfaction is an accumulation of a long period of unfulfilled expectation. Second, this social dissatisfaction is initially experienced only by a few individual members of society, by whom the idea of dissatisfaction is spread to the wider part of the society. Very few of these individual members are charismatic²⁶ figures who are able to convince and spread the idea to other people. Third, the nature of youth which is radical, critical and rebellious toward the *status quo* became a significant factor for the early emergence of the movement. Finally, there are some events or issues which triggered the initial emergence of the movement. These events do not occur only at local or national level but also at the international level.

²⁶ Borrowing Weber's definition of charisma, it refers to "a certain quality of an individual personality by virtue of which [one] is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities. These are such as are not accessible to the ordinary person, but are regarded as of divine origin or as exemplary, and on the basis of them the individual concerned is treated as a leader" (1947:358-9). This definition does not mean that Imaduddin or other founders had superhuman quality or had miraculous or magical ability. Instead, by charisma here I refer to a personality characteristic which is regarded as extraordinary. Those who possess it are thought and regarded by their followers to have extraordinary qualities which cannot be acquired by ordinary persons (Gerth 1969:258).