

Chapter 4: Routinisation of the Movement: Impacts of Social and Political Changes

4.1 Introduction

In Ramadan 1994, I went to Jakarta to get my visa from the Australian Embassy. When the time for afternoon prayer came, I went to the *Musholla*¹ of a private bank, located in the basement of a car park. I was struck by the scene there. The basement usually used for a car park was crowded by approximately 800 people. Men and women, most of them employees of the bank, were sitting on plastic mats waiting for the afternoon (*zhuhur*) prayer. There were rows of men at the front and women at the back. In between the men and the women was a green curtain about one meter high. (On Fridays at this *musholla*, however, women do not pray at the same time as men). After praying, a bank employee gave a fluent Arabic introduction, announcing the speaker for that day, Imaduddin Abdurrahim. After Imaduddin's sermon, all employees returned to their offices and resumed working. According to the bank employee beside me, this activity had been conducted every day since the first day of Ramadan in 1994.

This quite new activity emerged only during the 1990s, and is only one phenomenon in a new wave of religious consciousness among the Indonesian Muslim middle class, and Indonesian Muslims in general. Along with the emergence of this new wave there have been some changes in social, political and economic life. These changes, according to Indonesian and foreign observers, are the result of the relation between the government and Islam, which has become much more intimate. This new wave cannot be separated from the development of the Islamic resurgence movement among young people which emerged in the 1970s. Many ex-activists of the resurgent youth movement have moved into various sectors of life, including into bureaucratic positions.

This chapter focuses on three important themes that have emerged since the late 1980s: 1) the extent of the social, economic and political changes, and the extent to which government is paying more attention to the Muslim community; 2) the Islamic resurgence movement's responses to those changes, particularly changes to their teachings and views about Islam and to the social and political situation; 3) trends among young people in the Islamic movement in 1990s, and their future prospects.

¹ A small room or building set aside in a public place for praying.

4.2 Social and political changes

The Islamic revival movement among young people continued to develop into the 1990s, but with a much wider scope and relatively more smoothly. Since the mid-1980s, various Islamic activities, which previously had been conducted informally among Islamic student activists, have been legitimated by the universities. At some universities, such as UNPAD, IKIP and ITB, the mentoring (small Islamic discussion group) program became compulsory for all Muslim students, and for others studying Islamic religion courses.² Such developments were predictable since many Muslim student activists of the 1970s are now becoming lecturers or university staff, and some even have become lecturers on Islamic religion. They are supporters and resource persons for Islamic education on the campuses where they work, and in Islamic proselytizing generally.

In the public sphere, those activists who now hold government and bureaucratic positions continue to spread Islam wherever they work. They initiate and organise Islamic activities in their offices. They hold small gatherings or Islamic discussions, which often develop into bigger events. During the month of Ramadan, Islamic activities are especially pervasive and intense. Breaking the fast together (*buka puasa bersama*), followed by *tarawih* (Ramadan optional night prayer) and sermon has become a routine program during Ramadan. Furthermore, employees try to create an Islamic atmosphere at their office by expressing the Islamic greeting *asslamu 'alaikum*, even at formal events. Women continue to wear veils, a custom which is becoming more widespread.

The 1990s period was also marked by wide-spread and aggressive *dakwah* (Islamic proselytisation) attempts through the mass media. Besides various Islamic magazines, which grew rapidly in popularity from the early 1980s, various Islamic scholarly journals have emerged including *Ulumul Quran*, *Islamika*, *Ma'rifah* and *Kalam*. Moreover, on 3 January 1993, ICMI launched a national newspaper *Republika*, to which Muslims responded enthusiastically. In only six months, the circulation of the *Republika* increased from 45,000 to 120,000. Many Muslims, as one informant said, hope that *Republika* can compete with the dominant Catholic and Protestant newspapers, which have for a long time been regarded a presenting distorted news about Islam and Muslims.³

Islamic proselytising is now prevalent on almost all television and radio stations. In addition to the printed mass media, the frequency of Islamic programs has increased considerably. Every Thursday night, all television stations, including private stations such as RCTI, SCTV, TPI and ANTV, broadcast religious

² In some cases, as an informant said, a Muslim can choose to study Christian, Catholic, Hindu, or Buddhist religions. He said that although he is Muslim, he did not choose an Islamic course, but rather chose to study Buddhism (Interview 29 May 1994).

³ Although, there has been a newspaper, *Pelita*, which is often regarded as a Muslim newspaper, it has not attracted a majority of Muslims because of its poor quality of reporting, and managerial problems.

programs.⁴ Moreover, similar programs are presented at about 5 a.m. every morning on all private television stations. These programs include “Di Ambang Fajar”, “Hikmah Fajar”, “Kuliah Subuh” and “Mutiara Subuh” (all of them have similar meaning ie. morning sermons).⁵ The source persons or the speakers in these programs vary from *ulama* and Muslim intellectuals to government bureaucrats, including some government ministers. Also appearing as the speakers are people, such as Imaduddin, who were formerly regarded as militant anti-government preachers. This is another new phenomenon that has emerged since the early 1990s. During Ramadan the frequency of Islamic programs always increases considerably. Programs include Islamic education, sermons before breaking the fast, movies on Islamic themes, Islam in other countries, live shows from Mecca, and Qur'an recitations at the end of the daily program.

This increased intensity of Islamic proselytizing is also evident on various radio stations. Every morning between four and six am almost all radio stations broadcast *dakwah* Islam (Islamic proselytisation). Because there are so many similar *dakwah* programs when switching from one station to another, one can choose different topics or speakers. The types of program broadcast on radio, as on television, vary from sermons, discussions and interviews to live discussion between the radio announcer and the audience. This latter type of program has become one of the most popular among young Muslims, who talk on air about their personal problems, and ask for solutions based on Islamic values. During Ramadan, *dakwah* Islam on the radio becomes even more prevalent, as on television. Special programs are broadcast every day at the end of fasting (*buka puasa*) and *sahur* (the meal before daybreak).

This pervasive and progressive Islamic *dakwah* has gradually resulted in a widespread demand by the Muslim community for a more Islamic way of life. Along with the development of the *dakwah* movement which increased Muslims' understanding of Islam, many parts of the Islamic community began to realise that aspects of their lives were not in accordance with the teachings of Islam. In mid-1989, for example, one research project reported that some manufactured foods contained pork fat. The rumour spread that several products such as soap and tooth paste were *haram* (forbidden) because pork was used in them. This created a social tension, later demonstrated through a widespread boycott of those products among the Muslim community. Those who already possessed those products, threw them away or destroyed them. The ‘pork fat issue’ subsided after some senior *ulama* and cabinet members were televised nationally eating these products.

⁴ Hindu, Buddhist, Catholic and Protestant programs are also broadcasted at different times.

⁵ Such morning sermons are not presented on the government television station (TVRI, Televisi Republik Indonesia) because its program begins later than those of private television stations.

After a long and heated polemic, the draft Law on Religious Courts (Rancangan Undang-undang Peradilan Agama, RUUPA) was finally accepted on 14 December 1989 by the House of Representatives (DPR). For Westerners like the *Far Eastern Economics Review* reporter Vatikiotis, this was “a surprisingly generous concession to the Muslim community” (1994:137). According to Munawir Sjadzali, “it is the will of history” (*ini kehendak sejarah*) of a country in which 150 million of its 175 million people demanded such a law (Serial Media Dakwah 8.1989). Historically, there were laws on religious courts from 1750 when they were first introduced by Sultan Agung Hanyokrokusumo of the Mataram empire, but gradually the laws were replaced by the Dutch, until 1937 when they disappeared altogether.

Before the new law was accepted, there was strong objection from Christian groups. As reported in the Christian weekly publication, *Hidup* (No. 7), “RUUPA is an attempt to establish Islamic law [in Indonesia]. A state ruled by a religious law is a state religion... And if religious courts are only for Muslim citizens, this implies [that Indonesia] is an Islamic state” (p.28–9). The Islamic magazine *Serial Media Dakwah* (8:1989) reported that, “It is true that RUUPA will establish Islamic law, which means Islamic law will be applied to Muslims who desire it. The scope of the law is limited to civil law, marriage, grants (*hibah*), inheritance (*waris*) and other similar cases. Therefore, it is not true that religious law will control the state”. Lukman Harun, a Muhammadiyah leader, said “I was amazed by those Christians who strenuously objected to the RUUPA, which is not related to them and will not inflict any loss at all upon them” (*ibid.*: 12). The Christian resistance to the draft religious law, according to some Muslims and as reported in *Media Dakwah*, was “a continuation of the Dutch plan to demolish the Islamic community in Indonesia”.

In October 1990, there were widespread demonstrations against a tabloid magazine *Monitor*, in big cities throughout Java. The issue started when the tabloid, edited by “Christian editor, Arswendo Atmowiloto,” ran a poll to find out “the most admired figures” (*tokoh yang dikagumi*). Publication of the poll result showing that the Prophet ranked 11th, just below the editor of the tabloid, angered Muslims. They were outraged to see the Prophet compared with common people (Tempo 27.10.90:28–32). A wave of demonstrations swept almost all big cities throughout Java, especially those with higher education institutions. In Jakarta the *Monitor's* offices were stoned and destroyed by demonstrators, most of whom were students. Demonstrators demanded that Arswendo be put on trial because he humiliated Islam and disturbed inter-religious harmony (*kerukunan antar umat beragama*). In Bandung demonstrations took place continuously in almost all large university campuses. Demonstrations attended by more than four thousand at each site took place at ITB, UNPAD, IAIN (Islamic State University) and IKOPIN (Indonesian Institute of Management and Cooperation). During these demonstrations they hanged and burned an effigy of Arswendo.

Similar demonstrations also occurred in Yogyakarta, Surabaya and Ujungpandang. According to some senior journalists, the Government through Information Minister Harmoko, was forced to ban the tabloid in order to dampen the increasing Muslim outrage. The banning of this tabloid to meet the demands of the community was the first such phenomenon in the press history of Indonesia (Tempo 3.11.90: 26–30). Muslim anger gradually subsided after the banning of the tabloid, and when Arswendo was put on trial.

The banning of the tabloid and the Muslim reaction towards this phenomenon elicited a variety of responses. Arief Budiman, a sociologist at the Satya Wacana Christian University, tried to plead the case of Arswendo and the *Monitor* by saying that “Arswendo was a victim of a social process which needs a ‘scapegoat’. Islamic groups, although constituting the majority of the nation, have a marginal political role” (Tempo 10.11.90:43). A moderate response was made by Abdurrahman Wahid. He regretted the attitude of Muslim society which forced the government to ban the tabloid. According to Wahid, the *Monitor* case arose merely due to carelessness. He regretted those who used religious spirit as a justification for anger, hatred and vandalism. Yet another reaction, like that of UNISBA (Bandung Islamic University) students and Rendra, regretted the banning of the tabloid, saying “If wrong has been done, hold a trial. Do not ban the tabloid... Such banning is not appropriate in the democratisation process we are developing”. In contrast to these responses, Nurcholis Madjid maintained that the government act was appropriate because “If the government had not acted, society would have tried (*mengadili*) the case. This is more dangerous” (Tempo 3.11.90). According to Madjid and Amin Rais, the *Monitor* case ruined all attempts to develop inter-religious harmony (*kerukunan umat beragama*) (Tempo 27.10.90). Madjid further explains, “I did not see the *Monitor* case as Arswendo's act as an individual. It was a result of a mechanism, namely arrogance, conceit, indifference, and insensitivity of certain groups, and they should be punished as heavily as possible”. What Madjid was referring to was in fact the Christian group which owned Kelompok Kompas Gramedia (KKG), one of the biggest printing and publishing companies in Indonesia.⁶

The Muslim outrage can also be seen as a climax or a peak of Muslim disappointment, especially among young Muslims, not only with the *Monitor* but with all publications of Christian publishers. Among young Muslims, especially those involved in various Islamic movements, there was a belief that the aggressive Christian mission had three aims: first, to convert Muslims to

⁶ At this point I agree with Arief Budiman's statement that the *Monitor* case and Arswendo was only the scapegoat. From Nurcholis Madjid argument and generally Islamic community, it appears that behind the Muslim's outrage against this case, there has been accumulated feelings of frustration and helplessness against the dominant Christian power on publication in particular and other sectors of life in general. Various theories related to the *Monitor* case were reviewed by Jalaluddin Rakhmat in his *Islam Aktual* (Bandung: Mizan, 1994:64–5).

Christianity; second, to diminish Muslim commitment to Islam; finally, to discourage Muslim children and young people from becoming committed to Islam. These aims were believed to be applied through various facilities including newspapers, magazines, hospitals (inherited from the Dutch colonial).⁷ Here, all Christian publications were suspected of being agents of Christianisation. The *Monitor* had long been criticised for its pornographic content which was often seen as a source of moral degradation, especially among the young generation. However, those criticisms were seemingly ignored, and the *Monitor* continued to publish pornographic pictures. Because of this the *Monitor* was known as “the hottest tabloid in Jakarta” (Tempo 3.11.90), and probably in Indonesia, because it was distributed not only in Jakarta but also in other cities throughout Indonesia. Regarding the pornographic themes, Arswendo admitted that “I consciously exploited sex and crime in journalism” (*Ibid*). So demonstrations became aimed at Christian targets as well as at Arswendo. As Zainuddin MZ, one of the most famous preachers, said “arrogance and insensitivity made my Muslim brethren, because of their poverty, become a target for the development of other religions. ... This arrogance and insensitivity was shown by Allah in the figure of Arswendo Atmowiloto” (*Ibid*:28). These various anxieties resulted in widespread tension among the Muslim community, and when the tabloid published the poll result showing the Prophet as ranking 11th, it triggered an explosion of hidden Muslim annoyance.⁸

Another important phenomenon of the early 1990s was the revoking of 1982 decree which forbade female students from wearing veils at school. On 16 February 1991, the Head of School Education and the Indonesian Council of Muslim Clergy (*MUI, Majelis Ulama Indonesia*), as witnessed by the Minister of Education Fuad Hasan and the Minister of Religious Affairs Munawir Sjadzali, signed a new decree which allowed female students to wear veils at school. This ended eleven years of uncertainty, discrimination and even intimidation. Some women had hovered between being students or not; they were students but they were not allowed to attend classes. Although they were not allowed to attend classes they were not expelled from school. Others were expelled from their school, and others were intimidated through the terror and threat of interrogation. Every week they were interrogated by their teachers, like political prisoners (*Panji Masyarakat* 676.1991). Some of them appealed to the court but were unsuccessful. Wearing veils was prohibited not only among school and university students but also among teachers. A female teacher was fired because she wore a veil. The school headmaster said “If the teachers wear veils, I worry

⁷ Interview with Muchtar Adam, 23 December 1993.

⁸ Fachry Ali seemed not to agree with this statement, because in his view there must have been someone who mobilised and motivated the mass. The poll result, in his view, had nothing to do with the demonstrations, the main factor in these being the existence of a mobiliser and motivator. I agree that there must be a motivator or a mobilizer; however, how can someone mobilise a widespread demonstration without a common and deep interest among the masses?

that students will wear veils as well". In some cases, including a case at ITB, students who wore veils were not allowed to attend practical work or examinations. In 1989, female Muslims who wore veils were slandered as "food poison disseminator" (*penyebarkan racun makanan*). As a result of this slander (*fitnah*), some female students were attacked (*Panji Masyarakat* 674.1991:15), and in other cases were even stripped and attacked by a crowd (*Panji Masyarakat* 629.1989:62-3). Islamic school students, and Muslim women who wore veils, were harassed and humiliated. These episodes took place in Semarang, Jakarta, Bogor, Serang. However, the impact of this phenomenon spread widely and strongly influenced other places in Indonesia. It created fear among Muslim women, who became scared to go out wearing the veil (*Panji Masyarakat* 628.1989:18-24). This slander against Muslim women, according to some informants including Hasan Basri, the leader of MUI, was another attempt to discredit Islam by those not in favor of the Islamic resurgence in Indonesia. Outside the UNPAD mosque more than a thousand students demonstrated against the slander, their theme being "We do not acquiesce to *jilbab* (veils) being slandered, we do not acquiesce to Islam being slandered". The demonstration was followed by a *Tabligh Akbar* (big sermon), which was supported by various Islamic preaching institutions in Bandung.

The advent of the 1991 decree allowing female students to wear veils at school resulted from consultations amongst *ulama*, the mass media, community representatives, the Indonesian Intelligence Bureau (BAKIN), the State Minister for control of machinery of the state, the Attorney General and the Minister of Education (*Panji Masyarakat* 676.1991:28). The need for a new act became pressing when cases continued to emerge in a situation where there were no clear laws or solutions. Moreover waves of demonstrations and protest continued throughout the big cities, not only in Java but also in Sumatra, Sulawesi and Kalimantan. These demonstrations became much more frequent especially between 1989 and 1991. When the French government allowed female students to wear veils at public schools, Bandung Islamic youth and students demonstrated in front of the French Embassy in support of the French government allowing female Muslim students to wear veils at school. One slogan was "In France the veil is allowed, why not in Indonesia?". Finally on 16 February 1991, the 1982 decree was replaced by the 1991 decree allowing the veil to be worn at school.

In late 1991, the Muslim obsession to have a "more Islamic" banking system was realised when a new Islamic-style bank called Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) was established. This new bank was backed fully by President Soeharto. He blessed the new bank and, together with leading businessmen, contributed to the bank's starting capital. This bank works "in a manner similar to a venture capital company. Depositors are regarded as investors and are allocated a return based on how profitably the bank invests their money. In practice customers are likely to receive a return very close to what conventional banks pay on

deposits, but with significantly less protection for their funds” (Schwarz 1994:189). The problem with conventional banking, for many Muslims, derives from the practice of charging interest, which in their view is similar to usury, which is forbidden. More than a year before, in mid 1990, NU (*Nahdlatul Ulama*), under Abdurahman Wahid's leadership, set up a joint venture with Bank Summa to develop a network of rural community credit banks. This attempt was praised by Dorodjatun Kuntjorojakti, Dean of the School of Economics at the University of Indonesia, and Munawir Sjadzali, Minister of Religious Affairs, as “a magnificent idea” that “should [have been] done much earlier” (*Ibid.*: 188-9). However, it was appallingly criticised by the some parts of Muslim community, because the bank charged interest (usury), and perhaps because the Bank Summa was owned by a Chinese Christian, William Soeryadjaya. Unfortunately, Bank Summa was closed in late 1992 because of financial mismanagement. Managing financial matters in Islamic ways continued to develop, when the finance minister officially opened an Islamic style of insurance called “Asuransi Takaful Keluarga” (Perwataatmadja 1994:6).

On 25 November 1993, the government-supported gambling and lottery SDSB (*Sumbangan Dana Sosial Berhadiah*) was closed because of a strong demand from the community. Widespread demonstrations had been triggered in late July 1991 by a statement from the minister for social affairs about the continuation of the SDSB lottery in late July 1991. One week after the minister launched the statement, various Islamic youth and student organisations in Bandung demonstrated to demand that the government close the lottery. Subsequently a wave of demonstrations against the government's supported lottery swept through the big cities such as Jakarta, Bogor, Cirebon, Yogyakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Medan and Ujungpandang. In contrast to the *Monitor* case, demonstrators were not limited only to students and young people but also included members of the wider community. The demonstrations reached a peak in late 1993, occurring almost weekly in large and small cities alike. The last demonstrations were held in front of Istana Negara (the State Palace) and Bina Graha (the president's office). Such demonstrations, according to State Secretary Moerdiono were “actions which already touched state symbols”, and if they were not responded to immediately, they might be used (*ditumpang*) by other interests that would challenge national stability (Tempo 4.12.1993). Finally, after several sessions in the House of Representatives, the social minister announced that the SDSB was discontinued.

Long before the SDSB lottery, there had been similar types of gambling under different names. In 1986, the government introduced PORKAS, which Muslims viewed as a kind of gambling. In response to Muslim criticism, it was later changed into TSSB (*Tanda Sumbangan Sosial Berhadiah*). After further criticism it was given yet another name KSOB (*Kupon Sumbangan Olahraga Berhadiah*) and finally SDSB, but all of them, in the Muslims' view, remained similar,

gambling or lottery. Although demonstrations against gambling practices took place in various places, they were not potent enough to force the government to discontinue the gambling. The government only-changed the name, whenever government support of gambling was criticised. From the government point of view, such practices were not gambling. They constituted the only way to gain financial support for national sports. The anti-gambling contingency, however, did not find this to be a convincing reason, stating that there were many better ways to gain such financial support, including taxes, donations and other *halal* sources. Aside from religious concerns, anti-gambling demonstrators demanded that the government recognise the undesirable impact of gambling on society, such as the decrease of purchasing power (*daya beli*) in lower class communities, the withdrawal of local funds (*dana daerah*) and the increase in crime. Moreover, there was also the issue of mismanagement and corruption, in which an ex-government bureaucrat and a retired general were involved (Tempo, 4:12:93).

In addition to these various phenomena, since 1992 there has been a new phenomenon in the history of the New Order (*Orde Baru*), an increase in the number of Muslim figures who have become members of the House of Representatives. On 1 October 1992, about a thousand representatives were inaugurated, of which 424 were from the biggest fraction, GOLKAR (Golongan Karya), and most of them were important Muslim figures. Among them were *ulama*, such as H. Ali Yafie, KH. Yusuf Hasyim and KH. Ilyas Rukhiyat, KH. Azhar Basyir, Hasan Basri, Tuty Alawiyah, and KH. As'ad Umar; intellectuals and educators, such as Nurcholis Madjid, Watik Pratiknya, Ismail Suny, Marwah Daud Ibrahim and Mukti Ali; bureaucrats, such as Azwar Anas, Abdul Gafur and Akbar Tanjung; and youths and entrepreneurs, such as Ferry Mursyidan and Fadhel Muhammad (*Panji Masyarakat* 734:1992).⁹ These representatives came from various Islamic groups and organisations, such as NU, Muhammadiyah, and the Neo-Modernists. This phenomenon, according to many observers, was a genuine “greening” (*penghijauan*)¹⁰ process.

This process necessarily meant that the number of Christian intellectuals in both the House of Representatives and in the cabinet decreased. CSIS personalities, such as AMW. Pranarka, Djisman Simanjuntak, Hadisusastro and Yusuf Wanandi were no longer members of parliament. Previously, this group had been an influential power and became a barometer and ‘think tank’ within the parliament. Similarly in the new 1993 cabinet there were only four members who were not Muslim, while in the previous cabinet more than ten members were non-Muslim. Many influential Christian figures, such as General Benny Murdani, Radius Prawiro, Adrianus Mooy and Johannes B. Sumarlin (the last

⁹ Moreover, many of these representatives were ex members of HMI (The Islamic Students' Association).

¹⁰ Green is identified as the color of Islam, so greening means Islamisation.

three names were jointly known as RMS,¹¹ standing for Radius Mooy Sumarlin), were not named to the new 1993 Cabinet.

The above chronology shows that since late 1989, relations between the Islamic community and the government have become much more intimate. This development cannot be separated in general from the Muslim intellectual movements (see Appendix D), and in particular, from the birth and growth of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectual Association (*ICMI, Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim se-Indonesia*). ICMI, with its founders and supporters who consist of government bureaucrats, intellectuals and businessmen, has been an accelerator factor in this development. Moreover, ICMI was blessed by the government, especially by president Suharto himself. It was another new phenomenon in Indonesian Muslim history in the New Order era. The establishment of ICMI, however, as I will discuss later cannot be separated from the role of young Muslim activists. My intention here is not to include ICMI as part of the youth resurgence Islamic movement, but to see the connection between the two.

4.3 ICMI: A New Hope

University students in Brawijaya University Malang were worried that potential Muslim leaders and intellectuals were scattered, and that there was no one institution which could unite them. They sought the establishment of an institution in which Muslim intellectuals and leaders could develop friendship bonds (*silaturahmi*) and communicate with each other to effect collective creativity, which in turn could contribute positively to national development (Pelita, 4.12.1990). A group of students of the Technical Faculty, together with the Islamic Activity Unit (*Unit Aktivitas Kerohanian Islam*) at Brawijaya University planned to hold a symposium from 29 September to 1 October 1990. The theme was "Muslim Intellectuals' Contribution Toward the Take-off Era (*Era Tinggal Landas*)" (Tempo 8.12.1990). This group of students consisting of Erik Salman GD,¹² Ali Mudzakir, Muhammad Zaenuri, Awang Surya and

¹¹ 'RMS' has also another connotation which refers to the Republic of South Maluku (RMS, Republik Maluku Selatan), a Christian pro-Dutch separatist movement. Dr Soumokil proclaimed the establishment of the Republic of South Maluku in Ambon in 1950 because the new republic was dominated by Javanese, Muslims and leftists (Ricklefs, 1993:233).

¹² Erik Salman was the leader of the group, and became the head of the committee of the symposium and of the founding group of ICMI. He was born in Yogyakarta on 31 March 1967, and is an activist of the Islamic preaching institution in his campus, besides being a student activist. He is a board member of the Student Senate of the Technical Faculty at Brawijaya University. His parents are well educated, his mother having a PhD and his father being a dentist who works for the State Owned Oil Company of Indonesia (*Pertamina, Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak dan Gas Bumi Negara*). His father's job required that he often move from one place to another. Erik Salman attended primary and secondary school in Langsa, Aceh, and high school in Jakarta. During his school years his Islamic education had almost been neglected. Eventually, through campus mosque activities, he began to study Islam intensively. He says, "now I tend to be more interested in studying Islam and preaching. Sometimes, this tendency is much stronger than for the other subjects I have studied so far in the faculty" (Pelita 4 December 1990).

Muhammad Iqbal, later met the Rector of Brawijaya University to promote their symposium plan and, although he “hesitated in the face of the expense and political sensitivity”, he gave his permission.

With their rector's permission these students -at their own expense- travelled to promote their ideas and to raise funds for the symposium. In their travels they first met with two prominent Muslim intellectuals Dr. M. Imaduddin Abdulrahim and Drs. M. Dawam Rahardjo, who suggested that they also promote an association for Muslim intellectuals. Through Imaduddin's recommendation they met Emil Salim, the Minister of Environment and later the former Minister of Religion, Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara. This meeting led these students to meet Habibie, the Minister of Science and Technology who was later nominated as a candidate for the chairmanship of Muslim intellectuals association.¹³ Based on support from his colleague ministers and Muslim intellectuals Habibie met President Suharto to promote the idea and ask his permission. Without hesitation, as it was reported, the president says “This is good, you can do it” (Hefner 1993:16–19). In a later development, through the figure of Habibie, who has a close connection with President Suharto, the idea to form an association of Muslim intellectuals was realised in late 1990.¹⁴

Thus, the students’ plan to hold a simple symposium snowballed smoothly to become a national event. On 6 December 1990, a symposium on “Developing Indonesian Society in the 21st Century” (*Membangun Masyarakat Indonesia Abad XXI*) was attended by about 512 Indonesian Muslim intellectuals from various disciplines, professions and backgrounds and was opened by President Suharto. Three days later, Vice President Sudharmono closed the symposium.

From this symposium, certain conclusions were drawn. First, social development, basically, is a transformation process towards better conditions. Therefore, social transformation means improving an individual's quality of life. Second, this transformation has structural, cultural and spiritual dimensions. Therefore changes of these dimensions should take place simultaneously and harmoniously.

¹³ In the meeting between Habibie and students accompanied by Imaduddin, Dawam Raharjo and Syafii Anwar, Imaduddin stated that “Habibie should have stepped forward, because he has an international reputation, strong integrity and is devout” (Berita Buana, 4.12.1990). He is known as a Minister who always fasts on Mondays and Thursdays. The students said, “we are confused because we do not have a leader or idol. We believe that you can be the idol of young Muslims” (Tempo, 8.12.1990). According to *Kompas* (16.12.1990), there were three reasons why Habibie was promoted and later chosen as the leader of ICMI. First, “he was known because of his intellectuality, especially in aeronautical technology, not only in Indonesia but also in America, Europe and Japan”. Second, he was a Muslim intellectual, whose integrity was made exemplary for his *umat* (Muslim community) and nation. Finally, “he showed his commitment to promoting Indonesian development in science and technology, so that Indonesia could compete on the international stage.”

¹⁴ For more detail information on the establishment of ICMI see Hefner, 1993:1–35. A similar account was also given by Nurcholis in November 1993, when he spoke on the birth of ICMI at an Indonesian Student Study Group at the Australian National University, and in a discussion with the Indonesian Students Association at the ANU, Canberra. For detailed information about ICMI see *Documentasi Kliping Tentang: ICMI*, published by CSIS, January 1993 and *ICMI Dalam Sorotan Pers*, published by ICMI Jakarta, 1991.

Third, the goal of the transformation itself is to raise the status of humans to *khalifah* (representatives, successors of God) on earth. Fourth, in the next 25 years there would be structural and cultural changes as a result of development and technology. In this process, conflict between old and new values is inevitable. Structural change will be marked by changes in social behaviour which will be experienced as a clash between the old and new patterns. In such a situation a spiritual base, ie. Islam, is needed. Finally, they agreed to form ICMI, as an institution which could optimise their roles in social, economic and political development as an expression of their gratitude to God's blessings (ICMI, 1990:359–62).

Historically, the birth of ICMI was a unique event in Indonesian history. In terms of protocol, it was quite extraordinary because usually a ceremony is opened by either the President or Vice President, and then closed by a Minister. In addition, the founders of this organisation represent various sectors of Muslim power, and include even those usually critical of the government, such as Imaduddin Abdulrahim. Furthermore, the leader of this organisation is a Minister, who heads various State Companies (BUMN, Badan Usaha Milik Negara) and government agencies, and most importantly is known for his closeness to Suharto.

The birth of ICMI was responded to unfavourably not only by non Muslims but also by other Muslim intellectuals. The latter expressed similar concerns to non-Muslims, especially that ICMI would become a political organisation, which would create sectarianism and primordialism within society, and in turn would threaten the national integrity. There was also a concern that ICMI would become another political means of the government. Abdurrahman Wahid, Deliar Noer and Ridwan Saidi were among those who were not supportive of the birth of ICMI. Wahid said, "let me stay outside managing 'Muslim *kaki lima*' (sidewalk traders), so that there is an Islamic group which is nursing them". He also said that "intellectuality cannot be represented by an institution, and cannot be born in an institution." Furthermore, he said "I do not know Habibie... I only pray for the success of the organisation" (Tempo 9.12.1990). Wahid shares the worry that ICMI will trap Indonesia into sectarianism and primordialism. According to Deliar Noer, ICMI is not an independent (*mandiri*) organisation. Like Wahid, he states "I was asked to sign a letter supporting Habibie. I refused because I do not recognise him. I do not know his way of thinking, especially about Islam. He has never been involved in an Islamic organisation". Deliar Noer worried that ICMI would be used by the government, and said "I hope the establishment of this organisation has no connection with the 1992 general election". Ridwan Saidi, like Noer, also worried that ICMI would become the only mass Muslim organisation (*wadah tunggal*). "Intellectuals," he says, "are not mass" They work individually. They struggle on the basis of truth and do not need mass support" (*Ibid*). Non Muslims responded carefully, with a wait and see approach. *Kompas*, a Catholicowned newspaper (3.9.1991), jokingly describing ICMI as "itch me"

(*garuklah saya*), reported “An inter-religion positive pluralism principle clearly does not want a religious group to be facilitated by politics for political interest”. Like *Kompas*, *Suara Pembaruan* (a Protestant-owned newspaper) described its concerns in an editorial, saying:

Thus, the integralistic state ideology (*paham negara integralistik*) is very appropriate for our very complex (*majemuk*) nation, namely a state ideology which will not attach itself with the majority group, but will accommodate all groups and will respect the uniqueness (*keistimewaan*) of all groups either majority or minority. This ideology, characteristic of our Democracy Pancasila does not approve of the tyranny of the minority (*tirani minoritas*) and majority domination (7.12.1990).

The ICMI founders and supporters responded by demonstrating the irrelevance of those concerns and criticisms. Habibie, for example, said “What is wrong with this intellectual organisation? [ICMI] is not the first intellectual organisation in Indonesia”. There have been various intellectual organisations long before the establishment of ICMI. Among the Christian community there is PIKI (*Persatuan Intelegensia Kristen Indonesia*, Indonesian Christian Intellectuals Association), and ICKA (*Ikatan Cendikiawan Katolik*, Catholic Intellectual Association). There is also a Hindu intellectual association called FCHI (*Forum Cendikiawan Hindu Indonesia*, Indonesian Hindu Intellectual Forum). In the same vein, Emil Salim, without explaining his reason, said “I do not agree that the birth of ICMI can be regarded as an attempt to develop primordialism”. He also argued that ICMI was not a “test case” step to confront the Christian mission. In a meeting attended by some ICMI figures, he said that the accusation of fundamentalism or sectarianism came from Zionist agents. He further said “I do not understand why some people accuse ICMI of being sectarian. They are unaware that the ICMI program is a national program, that what is being produced by ICMI is, of course, not enjoyed only by Muslims” (Pelita 23.5.1992). In various meetings, Habibie stressed that ICMI is “an open organisation, is not exclusive and is non-political” (Pelita 26.4.1991). He also said that ICMI has no political interest (*politis kekuasaan*). Moreover, he said “ICMI was established not to win for Golkar or other political parties in the general election. ICMI was established to solve problems faced by the whole of society, especially the Indonesian Muslim community (*umat*)” (Suara Karya 3.6.1992). ICMI is a cultural organisation which is scientific (*keilmuan*), open (*terbuka*), free and independent, and formally emphasises a cultural approach process and culturalisation (*pembudayaan*) (Antara 26.10.1992).

While Habibie was promoting ICMI, he often, if not always, talked about one important theme, namely the development of the quality of the Indonesian people (*Manusia Indonesia*). In his speech on the foundation of “Nation Servant

Foundation" (Yayasan Abdi Bangsa, YAB),¹⁵ he pointed out that the development of the quality of the Muslim community is crucial because it means developing more than 85% of Indonesian society. Besides, this development is aimed at improving the quality of Indonesia as a whole (Pelita 18.8.1992). On an other occasion, he stated that Indonesian Muslims should not only participate or become followers (*ikut-ikutan*) but should become initiators, motivators and doers of development (Pelita 6.12.1991). He further said that the Islamic community, which comprises the majority of Indonesia, should not accept being directed and determined by others because in democratic life, the majority should be able to lead and direct the minority and not vice versa (Pelita 13.3.1992).

In the first ICMI national meeting (*Silaknas, Silaturrahi Kerja Nasional*), which was held on its first birthday (5–7 December in Jakarta 1991), the above theme became the main topic of the meeting. The meeting, attended by 545 participants from 32 delegations throughout Indonesia (ICMI 1992:40), focused on attempts to increase the quality of life of the people, through what was called the "economy of the people" (*ekonomi kerakyatan*). In ICMI's view the economy of the people does not have power or access to production factors, especially financial capital and management. This is because it faces economic powers which are oligopolistic and monopolistic.¹⁶ Moreover, during the meeting there emerged an awareness that the Islamic community is a major element of the nation and has significant role and responsibility to help achieve national goals. However, in reality the Islamic community had been alienated from national and state life. Historically, the Snouck Hurgronje policies facilitated Muslim performance of rituals, but suppressed Islamic political awareness (Suara Merdeka 13.12.1991). The results of these policies were deception (*pembodohan*) and pauperization (*pemiskinan*) of Islamic community, which are still experienced. Distorted information about Islam and the Islamic community has been aimed at reducing the role and pioneering (*kepeloporan*) of Islamic community in national development" (ICMI 1992:47), which in turn has made the Islamic community a peripheral majority. The opposition and non-cooperative attitudes of the Islamic community toward the colonial government, which had been internalised and perpetuated among Muslims groups, put the Islamic community "outside the system" (*di luar sistem*)¹⁷ in the whole process of development. Based on this consciousness, two major themes emerged: first, increasing the Islamic

¹⁵ This foundation was established in Jakarta on 17 August 1992. It was initiated by 45 social figures and leaders, including 10 ministers, wives of ex Vice Presidents, ex Ministers, ulamas, and the ICMI founders. The goals of this foundation are to help and support ICMI by collecting, managing and supporting funds for ICMI programs and activities (Pelita 18 August 1992).

¹⁶ Such topics which were discussed among bureaucrats and Muslims, were quite *taboo*, since they often included references to the children of President Suharto and to collusion between Chinese conglomerates and bureaucrats.

¹⁷ A similar conception can be seen in McVey's "Faith as the Outsider: Islam in Indonesian Politics", in James P. Picastori, *Islam in the Political Process*.

community's and intellectuals' awareness of their role and responsibility in structuring national and state life; second, looking for a more appropriate political format, so that the Islamic community and Muslim intellectuals' potential could have a more positive role in the development process" (*Suara Merdeka* 13.12.1991). The idea to increase the role of Muslim in national and state life continues to be an important topic in the following meetings.¹⁸

The birth of ICMI and its development to 1994 showed various important characteristics. First, Muslim student activists played a crucial role as initiators. The birth of ICMI was the result of a long struggle by various potential Islamic powers. It was a 'convergence point' (*titik temu*) of two streams of Islamic movements: the Muslim student movement, which emerged in the 1970s, and the Muslim intellectuals movement, which emerged in the late 1960s¹⁹ amid lively (*semaraknya*) and on-going *dakwah* attempts.

Second, ICMI to a degree was able to unite Muslim intellectuals from various "Islamic patterns of thought". In the view of Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, there are four of these: Islamic neo-modernism,²⁰ Islamic democratic socialism, Islamic universalism and internationalism, and Islamic modernism (Ali and Effendy, 1986). Another categorisation offered by M. Syafi'i Anwar (1994) divides Muslim intellectuals in terms of their political thought into six, namely: formalistic, substantivistic, transformatic, totalistic, idealistic and realistic (chapter IV). Previous attempts to devise such a unity had always failed. Imaduddin, among others had tried to establish such an organisation. Imaduddin recalls "I wanted to establish an organisation like ICMI. But unfortunately, at the very beginning of the process, the police [military authority] put a stop to it" (*Tempo* 8.12.1990). Similar attempts were made in the mid-1960s, when about 100 Muslim scholars agreed to establish the Muslim Scholars Association (*Persami: Persatuan Sarjana Muslim Indonesia*), but after ten years, this organisation ceased with the death of its founders (*Tempo* 8.12.1990:36).

¹⁸ A year later, 5–7 December 1992, a second meeting (Silaknas II) was held in Jakarta. About 500 participants both from Indonesia and including expatriots (Indonesian Muslim intellectuals resident in foreign countries either as students or as bureaucrats), attended this meeting (Pelita 7.12.1992). Speaking during the opening ceremony, the Minister of Internal Affairs, General Rudini, stated "ICMI should not be suspected of being connected to the extreme right-wing Islamic power". "If such suspicion exists", he further says, "this is because of suspicion toward Islam as a result of the tragedy of the Darul Islam rebellion" (*Merdeka* 7.12.1992). Similarly, Suharto's advice, presented by Habibie, reminded ICMI not to experience the same tragedy, ie. extremity and rebellion. Meanwhile, Habibie, in another speech, quoting Alamsyah Ratuperwiranegara, said "the establishment of ICMI has erased shame and fear, which have haunted the Islamic community. Today, the Islamic community is proud of its 'Islamity' (*ke-Islaman*)" (*Suara Karya* 7.12.1992).

¹⁹ See Appendix D.

²⁰ Neo-Modernism, according to Fachry Ali and Bahtiar Effendy, is a pattern of thought which combines modernism and traditionalism. It is different from modernism which opposed traditionalism. Neo-modernism accommodates both modernist and traditionalist ideas.

Third, there was a new wave of Islamic consciousness, not only among what Geertz called *santri*, but also among *abangan* and *priyayi*. There was a process of “Santri-fication” (Schwarz 1994:174), “greening” (Hefner 1993:11), of the *abangan* and the *priyayi* marked by their growing involvement in Islam. Related to this, Harry Chan Silalahi, a CSIS founder, was quoted by Hefner as saying, “What we saw fifteen or twenty years ago, described by Geertz as [*abangan*] and [*priyayi*], almost does not exist anymore. Today it's clear that the great majority of people want to be more Islamic” (Hefner 1993:31).

Fourth, since many devout Muslims occupied various important positions as government bureaucrats or private entrepreneurs, Muslims, especially those who were previously haunted by an inferiority complex, today are proud of being Muslim. At this stage, as Aswab Mahasin (1990) points out, there is a process of “priyayisation of the santri” or “embourgeoisement” of the santri generations (p.138–46). Schwarz reports “[no] longer is Islam seen as the opiate of the uneducated and economically deprived. Professionals and the middle class increasingly are seeing it as a religion which can provide for their spiritual needs in the context of contemporary society” (Schwarz 1994:174).

Fifth, ICMI became an institution in which various contemporary problems faced by Indonesian society in general and Muslims in particular, are discussed. It encourages open discussions of many topics which previously had been regarded as “taboo” politically, as being subversive. Themes like the inadequacies of contemporary economics, and the inequality of roles and responsibilities of the majority became main topics of discussion. Within ICMI, Muslim group consciousness of their being a majority was raised and the need to play a greater role in nation and state lives was emphasised. ICMI founders and members aimed to redevelop the self-esteem and dignity of the Muslim community, after a very long period of being treated as marginal. The statements of Habibie and other ICMI figures which raised the idea of Muslim marginality implied that there was a kind of inferiority syndrome among not only the ordinary Muslim community but also among Muslim intellectuals.

The above development for many young Muslim activists is a good sign for the Muslim future. They believe that their ideas are now also shared by the bureaucrats and intellectuals. Their idea to have a more Islamic Indonesia to a certain degree has come true. There has been a routinisation of ideas previously proposed by various Islamic youth movements. Ideas that were formerly uniquely characteristic of the Islamic youth resurgence movement are now becoming common ideas among Muslims in general.

4.4 Changes: The Recovered Pain

These changes have been viewed differently by various Islamic youth movements. First, there are those who view these changes positively as clear

evidence of a rise in the predominance of Islam. Many formerly critical issues, such as the marginal role of Muslims in Indonesian political, social, economic and cultural life, are no longer concerns. When many Muslim intellectuals and leaders became members of the House of Representatives and became Ministers, their numbers lessened Christian influence in the parliament and in the Cabinet. Some young Muslim activists believe that Islam in Indonesia is no longer peripheral, no longer kept in a 'corner' (*terpojok*) position. The friendly attitude of the government toward Islam is regarded as reflecting purely good intentions for which the Islamic community should be grateful.

Second, other young Muslim activists have responded carefully to the government's action and to recent Islamic developments in Indonesia. They view these as something for which they should be grateful but, at the same time, something they should be wary of. In their view, it is true that there have been some changes in the government's attitude toward Islam, but they question the motives behind those changes. They are worried that this apparent attitude represents a government strategy to gain wider support from the Muslim community. They are worried about being used by others, as previously in Indonesian Islamic history. Despite their worries, they believe that such changes and developments will benefit their movement. They hope that the decline in military suspicion of Islam will create a much wider opportunity for *dakwah* activity. Islamic youth activities, which previously were always suspected as being political activities, today are conducted freely, without the fear of being accused of subversiveness. Nowadays Islamic *dakwah* activities involve almost all strata of society, from the lower to elite classes, from children to older people.

The third view is quite extreme. Some young Muslim activists maintain that as long as an Islamic system has not been adopted across the board and as long as an Indonesian Islamic state has not been established, there has been no significant progress or development. For them, the increasing number of Muslims in the House of Representatives and in the new Cabinet are not signs of advances for Islam in Indonesia. They argue that recent developments are similar to others in the previous history of Islam in Indonesia. Many times, they believe, Muslims have been tricked into unwarranted rejoicing.

It is difficult to pin-point exactly which view belongs to which movement since among those youth movements each of these views is shared among them. Among members of the Young DI movement and ex-LP3K, for example, I found two different views, one which views the social and political changes carefully and moderately and the other which claims those changes have nothing to do with Islamic prospects. In the latter view, "there have been no changes at all as long as the existing regime remains in control." As long as the existing system is not replaced by Islam, there is no significant change.

Similar division can also be seen among other movements. It is quite different in those movements which originated outside Indonesia. Indonesian social and political changes have no significant impact on them, because they already have certain standards which have been drawn up internationally. One informant, a sympathiser (or probably a member) of *Hizb al-Tahrir*, said "it is true that there are some changes within society, but they are nothing as long as the Islamic Caliphate (*Khilafah Islam*) has not been established (in Indonesia or internationally) and as long as Muslims' thought is far from the true Islamic thought." This is an example of the extreme view.

Unlike the Young DI, LP3K and *Hizb al-Tahrir*, the *Darul Arqam* and *Jamaah Tabligh* seem to be happy (or not bothered) with those social and political changes. This is perhaps because they put more emphasis on ritual aspects and are less concerned with social and political matters. *Jamaah Tabligh* for example always tries to avoid even talking about political matters. *Darul Arqam's* view toward those changes can be found in a book written by its leader Ashaari Muhammad, *Presiden Suharto Ikut Jadwal Allah* (President Suharto Follows God's Schedule). In this book he supported President Suharto for doing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and praised him for becoming a much better Muslim. On the evidence of this view, these movements belong to the first category which view these changes positively as clear evidence of a rise in the influence of Islam.

Despite these differences of opinion, political, social and cultural changes have inevitably influenced Islamic resurgence movements among young people. During the development period, those revivalist movements encountered resistance and criticism from many parts of the community and the government. Moreover, with various changes within society, they in turn were forced to change certain aspects of their movement to suit current social and political situations. Therefore, in order to survive and to make their ideas more acceptable to a wider community, they modified their original doctrines, their methods of education, their syllabus, and their views of the current social and political situations. During this adaptation process they were often trapped into internal conflicts, which often ended in disunity (*perpecahan*) among them. Although all of the movements tried to adapt to the current situation, their degree of adaptation varied considerably.

The adaptation process resulted in new trends among the resurgent Islamic youth movements. Previously, most of them were quite radical, and they paid more attention to increasing Islamic emotional attachment. Since the late 1980s Islamic youth movements have varied in how radical they are. At least two major trends developed among young Muslim activists: namely 'activism' and 'intellectualism.' The former trend is seen among young Muslim activists who put more emphasis on Islamic activism and behaviour, that is concrete and visible application of Islam. They believe that Islam should be applied comprehensively to daily life

activities, including those of the individual or of the community. Today, in their view, Islam is not visible in Muslims' daily activities, and consequently the blessing of God and His glory have never been gained by Muslims. The intellectualism is represented by those who believe that the thinking (*pemikiran*) of the Islamic community should be enlightened, and that Muslims' understanding of Islam should be reconstructed. They argue that the main cause of various problems faced by Muslims is due to intellectual weakness and backwardness. Unlike other activists, they pay more attention to the intellectual aspects of Islam.

The activist camp is divided into five categories: ritualists, mystics, radicals, philanthropists and fun-seekers (*hura-hura*). Ritualists are those young Muslim activists who stress the 'ritual' aspect of Islam, or the concrete aspects of Islam. They wish to practise Islamic activities, exemplified, they believe, by the Prophet (*sunnah*), and they call these practices "rituals". According to them, the Islamic community has strayed from the *sunnah*. Such a tendency can be seen clearly, for example, among the *Darul Arqam* and *Jama'ah Tabligh* movements. They wear a special type of clothing, wear beards and moustaches, have special ways of eating and other behaviour, which they believe are *sunnah*.

The mystics emphasise the mystical aspects of Islam. They seem to be unsatisfied with those Islamic organisations and movements that are devoid of the mystical aspects of Islam. They began to involve themselves in various *tariqat* (Islamic mysticism) orders. In the Bandung pesantren *Bengkel Ahlak Darut Tauhid* (see Appendix E), about four thousand people, mostly students each week, attend sermons which always finish with a kind of "collective confession" during which all attending cry. An informant said that through this kind of sermon "I experienced the pleasure of crying". As in *tariqat* orders *santri* are also introduced to a package of *dzikir* (recitation).

The third category are the radicals including those who wish to change, revolutionarily and immediately, the existing system including the government into an Islamic system. According to this group, the world is divided into two sides: the Islamic (God's system) and the non-Islamic (*thaguth* or *jahiliyah*).²¹ These two sides, in their view, cannot accommodate one another. Furthermore, they view every aspect of life from this radical 'black or white' perspective. Since the present system is non-Islamic, it should be changed as soon as possible. Within this category, there are usually *imam* (leaders), who take their followers' oaths (*membraiah*). Included in this category of radicals are the Young Darul Islam movements, and Islamic youth movements which are genealogically related to the Darul Islam movement.

²¹ *Thaguth* means evil or anything worshipped that is other than God. *Jahiliyah* (state of ignorance) refers to pre-Islamic paganism and pre-Islamic times.

The philanthropists stress the social aspects of Islam. In their view, Islam should help and assist people who are poor, who have suffered and who are oppressed. For them, freeing people from their suffering means applying Islam to other people. Such a tendency derives from their dissatisfaction with other Islamic organisations which neglect the social aspects of Islam. Their activities are directed toward helping people in rural areas, or in the slums of urban areas. Their activities include teaching children who do not go to school, helping at orphanages, being readers for the blind and other social actions.

'Fun-seekers' represent a new trend among young Muslim activists. They are more interested in fun activities but their actions are still inspired by Islamic teachings. This tendency, I believe, is a response to other Islamic groups and activities, which they view as too strict and rigid to accommodate those of an elite and Westernised younger generation. This young elite Westernised group has found psychological and social difficulties in involving themselves in many existing Islamic activities. Besides ordinary religious sermons, they often hold glamorous activities, such as big artistic performances, concerts, dances and other big events. One channel of development for this category is through various radio stations. In Bandung, one of the favourite stations is the Ardan radio station, and in Jakarta Prambors Rasisonia radio station (Tempo 29:4:1994).

The intellectuals can be divided into three sub-categories: philosophers, pseudo-scientists and Islamic-experts (*tafaquh fial-din*). The first includes those who focus on Islamic philosophy in particular and philosophy in general. They try to revitalise Islamic philosophy through various study centers and Islamic higher education. The pseudo-scientists are Muslim activists who try to seek scientific explanations of Islamic teachings. They argue that Islam, and the Qur'an in particular, are scientific, and the true Islam, for them, should be scientific Islam (*Islam yang ilmiah*). The last category of Islamic experts is more interested in Islamic knowledge in general and Islamic law in particular. This tendency can be seen clearly in the emergence of various *Pesantren Mahasiswa* (University student pesantren), which like ordinary *pesantren*, teach their santri (students) Islamic knowledge. In Bandung, there are at least two *Pesantren Mahasiswa*, namely *Miftahul Khair* (Key of Goodness) and *Fi Zhilal al Quran (In the Shade of the Qur'an)*.²² Similar types of pesantren have also been established in other cities such as Bogor and Yogyakarta.

Compared to activism, intellectualism tendency seems to have a much better future. First of all -unless there are dramatic political changes- a more stable social and political climate will give a greater possibility to the development of this trend, and at the same time militate against the development of activism, especially the radical one. Activism can easily develop in a situation where

²² This name is taken from the book of Sayyid Qutb *Fi Zhilal al-Qur'an*, 30 volumes of Qutb's comment on the Qur'an.

ideological conflicts frequently occur, or in a time of political turmoil. Second, the next period of Islam, as Kuntowijoyo (1985:71–7) points out, will be a period of “ideas and science” in which the Islamic community, including young people, become more enlightened. This is a period when modern communication technology will give Muslims a wider access to information, including information about the Islamic *ummat* in other parts of the world and about the diverse views of Islam.

The emergence of these idiosyncratic categories of Islamic youth movements shows that in conjunction with the social, political and cultural changes in Indonesia, Islamic resurgence movements among young people also change. In response to resistance and criticism from the community, they modify their original teachings and doctrines by adding, emphasising, playing down and eliminating certain aspects of their own movement. Because each movement has responded differently, there is greater variation in the emphases of the movements. Some of these categories already existed before, but they developed and spread more widely in the 1990s, when they gained more followers than before. The influence and popularity of some other categories declined.

This stage, borrowing Weber's term (1947:358–373), is the routinisation of charisma, a phase in which charismatic ideals and practices are transformed –either traditionalised or rationalised, or a combination of both– into a “permanent routine structure.” In Weber's view this transformation is based on “(1) the ideal and also the material interests of the followers in the continuation and the continual reactivation of the community; (2) the still stronger ideal and also stronger material interest of the charismatic leader in continuing their relationship.” Similar to Weber, Anthony F. C. Wallace (1979:427) named this stage as the routinisation stage in which effective actions and programs of the movement in “nonritual spheres [reduced] stress-generating situations, ... [and] established as normal economic, social, and political institutions and customs.”