6. Governance

Centrelink represents a departure from the APS departmental model because of the scope of its design and operations, in particular its complex and unusual governance arrangements. Its emergence coincided with the growth of corporate governance in the public sector.

Of the four primary stakeholder groups nominated by Centrelink—the portfolio ministers, client departments, internal customers (board of management and agency staff) and the people using Centrelink services—this chapter is concerned with the role of the minister and the board.1 The central features of Centrelink’s governance have been, first, the formal political and executive elements involving the minister, board, departmental secretary and chief executive, and second, their interactions and operations in practice. In other words, there have been three sets of primary relationships, each involving Centrelink and either its board, its minister or the key purchasing departments.2

Three perspectives inform the approach to Centrelink’s governance. First, there is the corporate governance perspective, which looks at the formal elements of relationships and seeks to compare them and how they operate with good governance principles. The board features here as the key and most interesting element of corporate governance, particularly in consideration of what difference it makes. Second, there is the political management perspective. Here, centrality is given to the minister, who is operating in terms of one of the organisational imperatives, the political, outlined in the introductory chapter. Third, there is the perspective of the agency in its dealings with the other stakeholders. This reflects a second organisational imperative, the entrepreneurial, which requires advocacy and building and mobilising support for activities.

Given such distinctive roles and relationships, how do the actors work through these imperatives and what is the impact on other stakeholders? This chapter explores the governance operations of Centrelink, in particular, the political management of an agency that is outside the formal and normal departmental loop, and the relationship between a board dominated by businesspeople and those concerned with Centrelink’s social policy focus.

New governance arrangements

Minister Ruddock (1996:7624) made it clear that Centrelink was to be a statutory agency with full public service responsibilities as a core part of government operations. All the mainstream legislation for the operation of Commonwealth departments and agencies will apply to this agency. It will be subject to the Audit Act, finance regulations and finance directions...these scrutiny and accountability arrangements are
central to the management structures for the agency given that it will be responsible for the day-to-day administration of large sums of public moneys.

Minister Newman (1997) regarded Centrelink as significant because it would not operate solely within one department or portfolio. This feature had implications for governance.

Governance covers the overall management of the affairs of organisations and is ‘generally understood to encompass authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control’ (ANAO 1997a:1). Elements of good governance include corporate planning, business plans, audit committees, performance information and standards, client service focus and planned and professional development. The main questions of good governance concern appointments to the board and its composition, the role of the board and the relationships between the board, the minister and Centrelink and, finally, the board’s impact.

Centrelink, as a statutory agency, operated under the Financial Management and Accountability (FMA) Act 1997, which required a high level of accountability. The chairman of its board of management was regarded as the chief executive for the purpose of the FMA Act and was given specific powers in the legislation establishing Centrelink, which included direct accountability to the portfolio minister. The accountability and reporting mechanisms were quite complex. Not only did the CEO, who was appointed by the board, report to the board, the CEO reported directly to the minister (or ministers) of client departments and was responsible for the delivery of programs for which these departmental secretaries were funded and accountable. The Review of Corporate Governance (Uhrig 2003) commented that Centrelink, while under the FMA Act, unusually, is also governed by a board. Apparently, given the need to strengthen the governance power of the Centrelink board, the [FMA] Regulations 1997 establish the chairman of the board as the chief executive for FMA Act accountability purposes. However, the actual chief executive officer is the agency head for [Public Service] Act purposes. This situation creates an anomaly of having two chief executives for accountability and governance purposes.

Centrelink provides the case of an organisation that combines some formal autonomy through corporate governance arrangements (an independently appointed CEO and board) and operations (involving relationships with several departments), with informal features that facilitate conformity with government policy and preferences in politically sensitive fields.

Located within the core public service and a statutory agency, Centrelink is subject to the requirements of a department of state. How its position and relationships operate depends on its statutory basis and practice as it has evolved.
Where functions derive from a department of state and remain in the core, some features will endure. As the organisation’s functions have been separated out from those of a department, it is also expected to display non-department-like features, such as being entrepreneurial and business like.

The standard departmental model consists of a direct relationship between a minister and a departmental secretary, who, under the Public Service Act 1999, has clear responsibilities in relation to the minister. In contrast, until 2004, Centrelink reported to the minister through the board on administrative issues relating to the portfolio. The client departments are the purchasers of services detailed in negotiated agreements with the agency, which requires effective working relationships to ensure policy is implemented to the standards and quantities agreed.

**Centrelink board**

Centrelink’s complex and unusual governance derived from several features. The agency lay within the Family and Community Services portfolio and was responsible to the Minister for Community Services through an appointed board of management. It was, however, a separate entity to DFaCS and had its own accounting and reporting requirements.

The board was selected by the government and appointed by the Minister for Family and Community Services and consisted of a chairman, the CEO of Centrelink and at least four other members, of whom at least two were not to be principal officers of Commonwealth authorities. Moreover, any principal officer of a Commonwealth authority appointed to the board was not accorded voting rights. While not a requirement of the act, it was the practice until 2002 that the secretaries of the two principal purchasing agencies, DFaCS and the Department of Employment, Workplace Relations and Small Business (DEWRSB), were appointed to the board as non-voting members.

**Phases**

There have been two principal phases in the development of the board. In the formative period—with a new organisation, the CEO and board chair—considerable time was spent establishing roles and relationships. After about 12 months, the rivalry between Centrelink and its client departments and the clash of personalities between the CEO and the chair created a dysfunctional situation and eventually the chair resigned. He was replaced by John Pascoe, whose style was less confrontational and was more about persuading people to work together (in contrast with his predecessor, who tried ‘to bang heads’).

In the evolution of the relationship between a new board and a new agency, Centrelink had to ‘work out what did the new people control—what did
[Centrelink] control, and what did the board control? And it took us a while to build up a board agenda.’ It was necessary, a senior Centrelink official continued, to report somehow to the board on how we were going. And then we started to write what we had been doing, and then the board said, ‘We want to make the strategic decisions for the organisation.’ So we sent up some strategic decisions for them to make…they weren’t the sorts of decisions that would make or break the organisation.

In the Pascoe era, the board’s role ‘evolved towards supporting the management team at Centrelink…Under John’s leadership, the current board will stand their ground and support the Centrelink management’ (Board member). This period was also important in moving towards better relationships with client departments because there was a lot of tension to explode. The chairman let us run for a while, then he slapped the table hard and he said, ‘This is intolerable.’ We as an organisation can’t progress until we and our client departments have a better understanding about what we’re on about, and form an alliance.

(Senior Centrelink official)

Pascoe introduced the concept of an alliance and insisted that it become the basis of key relationships. The result was ‘unquestionably a strong partnership that has grown up between Centrelink and FaCS. As a result of the deliberate relationship between us, we have become very tightly interlinked’ (Senior Centrelink official).

**Board’s role**

The board of management set the overall objectives, gave strategic direction and set broad business rules for the organisation (CSDA 1997a).³ The board was responsible for Centrelink’s goals, practices and priorities and focused initially on balancing the need for accountability, risk management and auditing with the demands to achieve best practice in service delivery and reduced costs (Blunn 2000) in order to meet the government’s efficiency expectations and to remain competitive in what might become a more commercial environment.

The board’s conception of its roles covered a high level of strategic input across a broad canvas (IT, future directions, and so on), ensuring the right financial controls were in place, delivering on budgeted outcomes and management support. What was outstanding was the view that the board’s key role was assisting Centrelink’s management in setting strategic direction. Another role, according to a Centrelink board member, was overseeing Centrelink’s financial management and the way in which Centrelink achieves its service targets…And a lot of our time…is spent around the future, where is Centrelink going? What are the challenges
that the agency is going to face? What should we be doing, for example in the area of IT…And generally supporting the CEO, in particular, and management generally, in the carrying out of their roles.

Two equally important roles for the board were to assist the ‘day-to-day management team with their strategic view [and] to provide support for the organisation in dealing with issues with the government of the day—because the four of us are outsiders’ (Centrelink board member).

Two examples of the board’s behaviour indicated how it operated in handling financial and performance aspects. The balanced scorecard became the board’s main means of monitoring performance, the ‘primary tool used to inform the board on the organisation’s performance’ (Centrelink 2001c). Significant intervention followed a recommendation from the CEO, when the board commissioned a report by BCG because it ‘wanted a better understanding of Centrelink’s cost efficiency performance, partly in response to questions raised about Centrelink’s costs by its client agencies and other stakeholders’ (BCG 2002:9).

Mediating the relationship with client departments emerged as another role. It was felt that there was a need
to encourage almost a seamless boundary between FaCS and Centrelink so that FaCS can feel totally confident that it knows what’s happening at Centrelink, and that there is input into the way in which their services are delivered by Centrelink. But…to some extent, the responsibilities of the secretary of FaCS are tied up with what Centrelink does. So, there’s always going to be some creative tension in that relationship. (Centrelink board member)

The board’s roles of strategic direction, mediation with the minister, consensus development and legitimisation reflected smart practices in designing and operating steering processes (Bardach 1998:210).

 Committees
The board established several committees to help it do its job:

• an Audit and Risk Committee, which was required under the FMA Act to ensure that Centrelink ‘operated with appropriate financial management and internal controls and in accordance with statutory requirements’ (Centrelink 2003b: attachment 4.3)
• an Information and Technology Committee, which advised ‘the Board on current performance of the I & T environment as well as on strategic issues and future directions’ (Centrelink 2003b: attachment 4.3)
• a Quality Committee, which assisted ‘the Board with its responsibilities for ensuring that Centrelink’s functions are properly, efficiently and effectively
performed’ (Centrelink 2003b: attachment 4.3). The committee also assisted with developing the strategic alignment with customer issues.

Private sector members each chaired one of the committees. One member of the board with a very strong financial background chaired the Audit Committee (initially John Thame, then Elizabeth Montano). Another board member with a strong IT background chaired the Information and Technology Committee (Christina Gillies). A third board member (Don Fraser, who resigned in December 2004), who had spent a lifetime in retail, chaired the Quality Committee and was described by another board member as having ‘an enormous understanding for drivers around customer satisfaction’.

The board saw committees as important because of the opportunities provided for more informal contact between management and board members, and if you have the right board members, and...a very good mix of skills, the experience of the board members can be put to very good use by Centrelink management for adding value to the things we are trying to do. (Board member)

**Relations between the board chairman and Centrelink's CEO**

For the chairman, the relationship with the CEO was very important because the chairman should be there as a sounding board...that can be particularly important in government organisations, where the CEO...can benefit from being able to talk to someone who is not part of the political process...if there are complementary skills, that’s another way of adding value. (Board member)

Much of the chair’s role is ‘around promoting harmony and making sure that the board is working together all the time’ (Board member). Because the relationship between the CEO, the chairman and the board is crucial, it is ‘very important that everybody feels totally confident with one another. And that the CEO understands that he or she is supported by his or her colleagues on the board, and...everybody operates in an environment of openness, and complete honesty’ (Board member). The chair sought to encourage ‘full and open communication between the senior management of Centrelink, and the client departments’ (Board member).

**The board members**

Over the years, the board experienced a changing membership but the preference for ‘strong commercial credentials’ (Board member) was maintained. Of the seven members of the board, four were usually private industry representatives who
brought with them a wide experience of commercial business practices. For example, Pascoe (chairman and non-executive member, 2000–04) came from retailing and was CEO of George Weston Foods; Gillies (non-executive member) came from management positions in banks; Fraser’s background was in retailing, supermarkets and customer relations; and Thame came from banking. Their expertise in the retail industry gave them ‘bone deep understanding of customer service [and] customer satisfaction’ (Board member). Of the other appointments, Susan Rapley was a businesswoman and the last chair, Montano, was a lawyer and consultant with private sector and government experience. In addition, there were initially two departmental secretaries from the main client departments as non-voting members (after 2002, only one, the secretary of DFaCS) and the CEO of Centrelink, Sue Vardon.4

The core of the board’s skills and expertise, therefore, was based on business sector knowledge and experience and service delivery/network experience. Business thinking lent itself to an organisation aspiring to be entrepreneurial and cutting edge. The ‘huge challenge facing Centrelink is around information technology…Centrelink has got to be world’s best practice, in the IT area, and my feeling is that we’re already at the cutting edge’ (Board member). The connection with a private sector-oriented government also meant ‘ministers knowing that they have some private enterprise people guiding this organisation [who] will help them’ (Board member).

The support of the board was relevant to the evolution of the customer service model because it helped drive the building of a customer-centred culture. The business perspectives of private sector board members helped guide the organisation to a competitive and commercial footing. In a commercial and contestable environment, they helped refine the strategic edge needed to offer improved services at reduced costs and to beat potential competition, particularly in the call centre area.

The philosophy during Pascoe’s time as chairman illuminated how businesspeople could relate to a social policy organisation. It was hard nosed but sympathetic:

Centrelink is not just a cheque payer, it really is a place of contact for many people who are disadvantaged, or alienated, and it can play a very positive role in how those people relate to government and get on with their lives. And...the board can also play a role, working with the executives to make sure that the agency delivers cost-effective service and...makes that contribution back to government by keeping its costs down, by keeping itself at the cutting edge, and by providing a very high level of service to the people who interact with Centrelink. (Board member)
Composition of board and departmental secretaries

While not a requirement of the act, the practice until 2002 was for the secretaries of the two principal purchasing agencies, DFaCS and DEWRSB, to be appointed as non-voting members of the board. The DEWRSB secretary’s membership was discontinued in 2002 due to perceptions of a conflict of interest.

There was widespread criticism of the practice of appointing board members from the purchasing agencies. The position essentially was that you could not be on the board if you were also representing a purchasing agency requiring an independent, arm’s-length relationship. ‘At the moment the Centrelink board is not a separate commercially oriented board, it’s a public service board’ (Senior DoFA official). A senior Centrelink official appreciated the secretaries’ roles during the transition period for the new agency when there needed ‘to be an assurance in both resource management and a program deliverer and therefore a political sense that this major structural change wasn’t going to just blow up in the government’s face. So you can see an element of security…in having the secretaries represented.’

By the early 2000s, it was thought that Centrelink had reached a stage at which it was appropriate to question continuing this practice. One of the arguments was that having the secretaries as board members limited what Centrelink could say to the board because, for some purposes, there was seen to be a conflict of interest in having the purchaser on the provider’s board. At the same time, departmental secretaries were regarded as playing distinctive and valuable roles because they

bring their own insights to Centrelink; it gives us an opportunity…to resolve issues within the board structure and within a collegiate structure…it gives the departmental secretaries an opportunity to understand…in depth the issues that Centrelink faces, and for the board of Centrelink and our management, although they deal with it outside of the board, to understand the drivers for the secretaries of the departments. (Board member)

Centrelink’s major job was ‘to educate our client departments on what are the major drivers in customer satisfaction. That is, what the customers are saying, as opposed to what the other departments perceive. Now to do that without the two secretaries on the board would be that much more difficult’ (Board member).

There was also a mediation role, according to the DFaCS secretary, until 2002:

These disputes can surface as issues for the board. The secretary has used the board processes to express dissatisfaction, at a fundamental level, with Centrelink’s performance vis-à-vis financial reporting. The board shared the concern. Similarly, Centrelink has expressed dissatisfaction with FaCS’ interference with management responsibility.
Debate on the board can be helpful in resolving these disputes and therefore helping to ensure effective policy delivery. Because the board sees FaCS as a key partner, and not a predatory monopsonist, it is able to steer a middle path and to mediate between a purchaser and its own agency. (Rosalky 2002:11)

There was a dilemma in acting in Centrelink’s interests across departments compared with the special interests of DFaCS.

**Challenging the government on IT**

In one prominent case, the board’s advice challenged the government’s official position. The government had a policy of outsourcing IT services. The board members agreed that the proposed approach was a serious threat to the security of Centrelink’s operations and therefore to social security program delivery. According to a board member, ‘[T]he IT outsourcing issue is a pretty good example of where the board empathised, and agreed where Centrelink was coming from…John Pascoe in particular put in a case very strongly with the support of all of us’. ‘Eventually, and close to the denouement, the government began to listen to the voices of the external directors—the public officials were not trusted to act in other than their own interests—and the Humphry inquiry was set up’ (Rosalky 2002:4).5 ‘[W]e wouldn’t let go of [the] board for all the tea in China, because they came to the fore when, over IT outsourcing…they took a stand when the public service people couldn’t’ (Senior Centrelink official).

The Humphry report (2000) concluded that, while it was the ‘prerogative of the government to set overall direction, the introduction of the FMA and CAC [Commonwealth Authorities and Companies] Acts places responsibility for implementation of policies with chief executives and boards. Accordingly future responsibility for implementing the Initiative should be fully devolved to agency chief executives or boards.’ The government agreed (Halligan 2001). On Centrelink, the report (Humphry 2000) concluded: ‘The outsourcing process for Centrelink should not proceed until the Centrelink board is satisfied that the transition and implementation risks can be effectively managed.’ Again, the government agreed, which, in effect, was a face-saving way of allowing Centrelink to proceed by outsourcing only what its board wished to outsource.

The great value of the external representation on the board to the governance systems was most apparent during this outsourcing debate.

There is absolutely no doubt [that] Centrelink would not have been able to influence the direction of government policy to the extent that we were able to…the potential role of the board in carrying on that role in a much broader context…is an extremely potentially powerful force, something that [we need to] retain at any cost. (Senior Centrelink official)
Reciprocity in the relationship with the minister

The primary relationship for the board and Centrelink must be with the minister. The minister and the government more generally play a determining role in strategic directions in accordance with policy preferences and management objectives. Almost all governments modified and amended social welfare and employment policies during their lifetime, so a degree of policy change was anticipated—but not the radical changes that occurred soon after Centrelink’s inception. The government undertook a wholesale review of social welfare and the policy decisions taken in 2001 flowing on from that review substantially changed how Centrelink operated and significantly extended its core business.

There was a perceived problem with DFaCS when it initiated policy without discussing delivery with Centrelink (Board member). A Centrelink view was that ‘it would like a place at the policy table’. A board member advanced the view that

...we can ensure that our views are heard by working with the secretaries of our client departments, and trying to ensure that they understand completely what Centrelink’s views are, and where we are coming from. And that can be reinforced by the contact which the Centrelink board, and Centrelink management [have] with the relevant ministers. [There has] been a very good working relationship between the board of Centrelink and the management of Centrelink, and the ministers, Jocelyn Newman, Larry Anthony and Amanda Vanstone.

As chairman of the board, Pascoe had a close relationship with the government. The chair had financial responsibilities under the act. He would report to the minister on board proceedings after each meeting and periodically meet with the minister to discuss Centrelink issues. It was initially more regular and routine, but as they got to know each other, it became on the basis of need. The board, according to Rosalky (2002:8), was concerned largely with ‘navigating the course that it interprets government has ordained for it’.

It was also understood that the CEO would keep the minister well informed. ‘We’re all working together as a board in making sure that the minister is properly informed, and [are] really very happy for Sue to keep the minister up to date’ (Board member).

The CEO reported to the minister once a week about what was happening and, as a consequence, was depicted as being ‘much more intimately connected to the decisions of Centrelink’ than the board (Senior Centrelink official).

The agency is subject to the legislative requirement that it performs any function directed by the ministers in writing to the chairman of the board (with details to be provided in the annual report for the agency for that year), and providing
it has consulted with the board before issuing directions (CSDA 1997a: s. 8–9). The minister’s directions to the board can cover the ‘performance of its functions, the exercise of its powers or the conduct of its meetings, or in relation to the terms and conditions of appointment of the chief executive officer’ (CSDA 1997a: s. 13).

While ministers have the power under Centrelink’s legislation to intervene directly in Centrelink’s affairs, such occurrences have been rare. Two examples come to mind. The first was in July 2000, when the minister notified the board of the government’s policy in relation to IT outsourcing. The second was in January 2001, when there was a change in approach and the minister notified the board of their power to make decisions to outsource IT infrastructure in accordance with the government’s new policy approach (Centrelink 2001a:25).

The secretary of DFaCS for much of Centrelink’s existence provided insights into a different relationship: the relationship between the minister and the department responsible for purchasing services from Centrelink. Several types of ministerial intervention were indicated: ‘Cost-reducing management strategies...have been overruled by the minister as a potential political threat...The minister required close overseeing [sic] by the portfolio secretary of politically sensitive decisions within the prerogative of the Centrelink management’ (Rosalky 2002:10).

There is evidence from the original design and subsequent practice that ministerial accountability could continue to operate as under the former DSS. Ministers routinely accepted public responsibility for Centrelink’s activities: the agency’s performance was defended and new services announced by the minister. Ministerial correspondence in relation to Centrelink was handled as if staff were dealing with a department. Less politically attractive decisions, however, such as retrenchments, were matters for Centrelink management (Mulgan 2002:52–4). Mulgan’s (2002:54–5) overall conclusion about ministerial responsibility was that there were slight changes of emphasis but no major breaks with convention. Ministers still take responsibility for administrative decisions, particularly in Parliament. Except for issues of staffing and employment conditions, there has been no public attempt to delineate separate spheres of public responsibility and accountability for ministers and the Centrelink managers as implied by the Act.

The significance of ‘oversight mechanisms’, political and executive, in supporting large-scale change is well established (Nutt 2004). An important role of the Centrelink board was to contribute to the steering function and to act as a buffer and an intermediary between the public service agency and politicians. With the life-events case (see Chapter 5), it was about affirming the extension of a
service delivery role that had major policy implications. The secretaries of the
two main client departments were members of the board at that time and could
be expected to be supportive of life events within that arena. Securing the
support of the board was tantamount to tying in key departments as well as the
government’s business sector appointees who had access to the minister.

On the political side, there was a close symbiotic relationship between the
ministers and Centrelink and, in particular, the CEO. There was a need to be
highly responsive to new political requirements, particularly those with public
implications, and to reflect more generally government priorities. In these
respects, Centrelink was poised to respond like a department of state and this
could be problematic when it was confronting the primary department within
the same portfolio. More significant was the role in which the purchaser and
the provider were involved. The close relationship between Centrelink and the
minister did mean, in the view of a former secretary of DFaCS, that the
department at times was seemingly either marginalised or at least out
manoeuvred: ‘The minister intervened directly with Centrelink regularly in a
direct one-to-one link with the CEO, overriding the roles of the secretary and
the board’ (Rosalky 2002:10).

Given that Centrelink had responsibilities for one of the largest components of
the budget, with programs that could be highly sensitive, this forging of a direct
relationship with its minister was not unexpected. Ministers accepted
responsibility for Centrelink. There are also expectations and pressures to respond
to government agendas and public crises with regular use made of Centrelink’s
capacity to deliver assistance to people (for example, support for those affected
by drought, economic structural reforms and the Bali bombings). A difficulty
arises, however, in relation to other imperatives that also drive Centrelink. Since
Centrelink was part of the Family and Community Services portfolio, the
responsible ministers regarded it as a department of state rather than a separate
service delivery agency that was operating at arm’s length.

When the minister wants a call centre to be set up quickly to do
something, he just calls on Centrelink to do it. And they just do it, and
no one actually worries about what the charge will be, and who’s going
to negotiate the contract—that comes afterwards. (Central agency official)

Reconciling general and specific agendas was also problematic. Major cutbacks
in staff (mandated by government expectations of efficiencies) coincided with
the demands of major policy change. According to the former secretary of DFaCS,
ministerial priorities produced frequent changes in outputs that could not be
captured in the purchaser–provider relationship and ‘undermined the terms of
business agreements between the two organisations’ (Rosalky 2002:10). The
department’s attempts at oversight were frustrated by such departures.
The situation, as represented by a senior Centrelink official, was more complex:

The truth is, it was the politicians who hadn’t let go of the board, they hadn’t let go of their power for the board. And to this day it remains the biggest government issue. Because the politicians think they run Centrelink. But the board thinks they run Centrelink. The secretaries think they run Centrelink. Centrelink is not satisfactory unless they’re totally happy. And so we’ve got this very subtle power shift.

The fate of governance

The relationships between the key players—ministers, the board and Centrelink—have evolved with time. Various modes of operation were reached regarding the nexus of relationships and how to handle political dimensions.

There was much that was commendable in how these arrangements were worked through. If there were unconventional governance elements they were made to work in practice by the key participants. The practical realities of the conduct of governance, however, mattered less for steering the system. The government’s Review of Corporate Governance (Uhrig 2003:45) was insensitive to the subtleties of corporate governance practice in this case. It observed that under the FMA and Public Service Acts, the chairman of the board and the CEO had responsibilities and this created the anomaly of two chief executives for accountability and governance. The review ‘identified the need for a consistent approach to structuring agencies and establishing effective governance frameworks, including where to use boards and the application of the FMA and CAC Acts’ (Uhrig 2003:46).

Several tensions and issues in governance were apparent, including the internal contradictions in the model. These questions touched on the impact on departmental secretaries and were related to the move towards a more mature partnership with client departments. In the end, Centrelink emerged during its formative years much like a department of state, in part because of pressures to fit the core public service culture. This was simply confirmed when new corporate governance arrangements were introduced.

ENDNOTES

1 Other papers cover the relationship with client departments, customers and other stakeholders: secondary clients, the Public Service and community.
2 In addition to the portfolio minister, a junior minister could have Centrelink responsibilities.
3 The act states ‘to decide the agency’s goals, priorities, policies and strategies; and to ensure that the agency’s arrangements are properly, efficiently and effectively performed’ (CSDA 1997a: s.12).
4 Two later non-executive appointments were David de Carvalho, CEO of the National Catholic Education Commission, and David Deans, CEO of the National Seniors Association.
5 The government announced an independent review into the ‘Whole of Government IT Outsourcing Initiative’ on 7 November 2000, to be conducted by Richard Humphry (2000).