1. Entwined Endemics: HIV and ‘Law and Order’

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Papua New Guinea has two entwined endemics: a complex ‘law and order’ problem and entrenched HIV. Each has serious implications for the nation’s future. Together they pose joint challenges and joint opportunities, most fundamentally for efforts to realise ‘civic security’ that may confer some immunity to both.

This chapter surveys HIV and ‘law and order’ in PNG. It scopes broader dynamics in the governance of security, and the contributory roles of state, community, and their interface. It highlights how synergies of HIV and ‘law and order’ can create vicious spirals or virtuous circles. The potentials of a public health approach for improving the governance of security and of ‘law and order’ measures for helping prevent and manage HIV are also stressed. While in theory the state is primarily responsible for the security of its citizens, in PNG we suggest that it may be more fruitful to ask: how can this young, postcolonial state best promote or facilitate civic security? We see one possible means in models of community governance.

HIV in PNG: Epidemic, Epidemics, Endemic?

HIV contributes to Papua New Guinea’s difficult mix of challenges for health and development. In mid-2010, PNG was home to roughly 6.7 million people (SPC 2010), speaking some 800 languages and living mostly in small, dispersed communities, heavily dependent on a mix of cash-cropping and subsistence activities. About 85 percent of the population is classed as ‘rural’ (NSO 2003). On the United Nations’ human development index, PNG ranks 145 out of 177 listed countries and is the least developed of the Pacific Island states and territories (UNDP 2008). Despite PNG’s great wealth of natural resources, the gulf between ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ is wide and widening; and much of PNG’s population is poor, and growing poorer (see Bourke 2008; Haley this volume). Roads and
government services have deteriorated. About 40 percent of men and 50 percent of women are illiterate (PNG 2003, 52). Life expectancy at birth is the lowest in the Pacific: 54 years (SPC 2008).

PNG’s first notified case of AIDS was in 1987: a policeman who had been serving in Bougainville; his wife and child were subsequently found to have HIV too (Pantumari, pers. comm.). But the virus was probably in PNG before that date (CAP 2009, 22) and in the 1990s spread rapidly (UN 1996, 13). HIV nevertheless remains difficult to track or quantify because surveillance, while improving, is still weak (NACS 2008, 75–77). At the end of 2008, cumulative notifications numbered 28,294 and estimates of prevalence, as this volume goes to press, seem to range between 1.5 percent and the projected figure of roughly 3 percent for 2010 (CAP 2009, 20; UNAIDS 2009a; NACS and NDoH 2007, 25), though some informed observers ‘feel’ this range, particularly the bottom end, is too low (Reid 2009).1 Whereas injecting drug use (IDU) and sex between men are important means of HIV transmission in many south east Asian nations and in Australia and New Zealand, IDU is negligible in PNG, while sex between men seems to play a small, but perhaps underestimated role (see Luker with Monsell-Davis, this volume).2 The main mode of transmission is heterosexual, with secondary transmission from mother to child. For ages 2–29 years, cumulative notifications are higher for females than males and Papua New Guinea is experiencing the ‘feminisation’ of HIV and AIDS—with respect both to transmission and impacts (CAP 2009, 22; NACS 2008, 21; UNAIDS 2008, 168–169).

HIV is also believed to be ruralising.3 AIDS has always been most noticed in the National Capital District, other urban centres, along transport routes such as the Highlands Highway and, more recently, in the vicinity of development enclaves (see Map 1). But in 2007, for the first time, rural HIV prevalence was estimated to have surpassed urban and very high prevalence has been found in some localities—for instance, 40 percent of 15–45 year olds sampled from Tari in the Southern Highlands (NACS 2008, 19–20; Anon. 2006; WB 2007, 85, 86; see Haley this volume). This ruralisation and feminisation pose a double challenge for the response to HIV—of reaching the most disadvantaged members of what are many of the most disadvantaged communities in PNG.

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1 At the time of going to press, the results of PNG’s recent national demographic and health survey were not yet published.
2 See Jenkins 1996; NACS and NDoH 2007, 18. Molecular epidemiology has found the predominant subtype of HIV in PNG is most closely related to East African strains (CAP 2009, 22) and correlated with heterosexual transmission.
3 Studies that have deepened understanding of the cultural dimensions of rural HIV in PNG include Dundon and Wilde 2007; Butt and Eves 2008; Spingler 2009.
1. Entwined Endemics: HIV and ‘Law and Order’

Map 1: Papua New Guinea. By Karina Pelling, Coombs Cartography, College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.

Among the conditions favouring the spread of HIV is PNG’s predominantly youthful and rapidly growing population, poor and in many parts of the country deteriorating health services, and the co-presence of other sexually transmitted infections that can assist transmission. As several chapters in this collection indicate, high levels of rape and sexual abuse, domestic violence, and multiple sexual partners have contributed to HIV’s spread. The relationships between development and HIV are complex. Sizeable urban populations and uneven development, conducing to migration, social stress, widening disparities along axes of location, class and sex, and the commodification of female sexuality (HELP 2005) have shaped environments and patterns of human interaction in which the risk of infection is heightened (PNG 2006, 10).

PNG has been routinely described as experiencing a ‘generalised’ epidemic, meaning that prevalence has reached or exceeded 1 percent and HIV has spread beyond so-called high-risk groups and settings. In the wider Asia-Pacific, PNG is one of only two nations currently so classified. (The other is Thailand, but its estimated prevalence is marginally lower than PNG’s (UNAIDS 2009b, 37; UNAIDS 2009b)). Among the member states and territories of the South Pacific
Community, PNG accounts for 95 percent of the total reported cases of HIV and AIDS (see Graph 1). Among PNG’s neighbours, the Indonesian province of Papua, comprising the western half of island of New Guinea, comes closest to PNG in the scale and prevalence of HIV (see Map 2). In 2006, among a population of roughly two million, prevalence was calculated to be 2.4 percent (SI and MoH 2007, i), perhaps 15 times higher than Indonesia’s national average (UNAIDS 2009c, 38).4


But is ‘generalised epidemic’ the best description? As indicated above, while PNG’s national epidemic may be described as ‘generalised’, subnationally it has ‘concentrated’ and ‘micro’ epidemics within certain networks and locales. Some connotations of the word ‘epidemic’ can be misleading too. Consider speed and infectiousness, two qualities often implied. Epidemic HIV however, unlike for instance epidemic influenza, is not so easily passed from one person to another and is even less infectious than most common STIs. Consider transience. Unlike, say, the 1918-19 ‘flu, which swept across the globe in several rolling waves and then completely petered out, HIV is now deeply rooted in the world and in PNG, embedded in the very means by which humans reproduce. Finally, ‘epidemic’ triggers fight or flight. This reaction can be useful in the immediate response to HIV, but we also need to tackle HIV’s ‘non-epidemic’ qualities, to prevent and mitigate, in the very long term, a disease that is difficult to dislodge.

4 Sadly, few studies have considered HIV in the Indonesian province of Papua and the nation of PNG together. One is Butt et al., 2004.
Some researchers have tried to epitomise the non-epidemic characteristics of HIV in new metaphors. Barnett and Whiteside have described HIV as a ‘long wave’ and ‘multi-wave’ event (Barnett and Whiteside 2002). De Waal has pictured it as a structural and structuring component of our social and biological evolution (de Waal 2005). But a catchy formulation that counters some of the misleading connotations of ‘epidemic’ seems elusive. In this book, though the conventional parlance of ‘epidemic’ is used, as editors we prefer, following Barnett, to describe PNG as experiencing an ‘HIV endemic’ (Barnett 2008). This reminds us that HIV is here to stay, at least for the foreseeable future.

Several studies have modelled the medium- and longer-term social and economic impacts of AIDS on PNG (e.g., CIE 2002; Hauquitz 2004; HEMIS 2006). These studies depend on underlying projections of AIDS-related morbidity and mortality, in turn dependent on calculations of HIV prevalence. According to recent projections, HIV will stabilise around the year 2012 at a prevalence of 5.07 percent (Hayes 2007). While certain impacts on the formal sector—on hospital beds, gross domestic product, salaried labour force and so forth—can be relatively easily calculated, the harshest damage affects individuals, households, and the informal sector, with repercussions for possibly generations. This damage is difficult to track and quantify (Barnett and Whiteside 2002, 182–195). Indeed, some of the human costs of AIDS—such as grief, or a parent’s love that orphans may never know—are unquantifiable.
The national response to HIV has many achievements (Ballard and Malau 2009; WB 2008, 96–106). These include the formation of the National AIDS Council and a network of Provincial AIDS Committees, a series of public education campaigns, national strategic planning and policy development, workplace reforms, and the passage of the HIV/AIDS Management and Prevention Act in 2003. In recent years, the contribution of churches, non-government organisations (NGOs) and the private sector—through such bodies as the PNG Business Coalition Against HIV and AIDS (BAHA)—has strengthened (see, e.g., ADB 2008, 14–29), as has leadership at national and subnational levels of government. Since 2004, care and treatment services have also rapidly extended, and at the end of 2007, close to 35 percent of people who need antiretroviral therapy were estimated to be receiving it (NACS 2008, 11–13, 39). Great weaknesses in the response remain, some indicated by recent scandals engulfing the National AIDS Council Secretariat and in reasons for the Global Fund’s rejection, in 2009, of PNG’s application for continued financial assistance (Fox 2009). Nonetheless many recent initiatives appear to have answered to the call ‘for renewed energies and directions to contain a fast spreading epidemic’, guided by ‘the rights of all PNG citizens, as enshrined in the national constitution’ (PNG 2004, ix, 3; PNG 2006, 1, 3).

Finally, this short survey of HIV in PNG would be incomplete without some reflection on the term itself. As many readers will know, since 2006 UNAIDS has discouraged the usage ‘HIV/AIDS’ (UNAIDS 2006). Either ‘HIV’ or ‘HIV and AIDS’ are preferred. With some regret, this volume uses HIV very elastically, depending on context, to refer to: stages 1–3 of HIV disease; stages 1–4 (that is, including AIDS) (WHO 2007); the HIV endemic; the broader historical, social, cultural, and political phenomenon centred on HIV and AIDS; and finally, to imply specific issues associated with the progress of the disease through individuals and collectivities. But the retention of ‘HIV/AIDS’ is warranted in some contexts.

‘Law and Order’

At the heart of the phrase ‘law and order’ is a concept of ‘civic security’—that is, the safety and liberty of citizens in a modern nation-state. As the preamble of the PNG constitution proclaims, all citizens are entitled to ‘life, liberty, security of person and the protection of the law…’ (quoted in Brunton and Colquhoun-Kerr 1984, 24). In principle, civic security remains first and foremost a responsibility of the state and its various agencies of law and justice. The police are accorded a central role in the deterrence and detection of crimes or, as the constitution puts it, in the preservation of ‘peace and good order’.
Yet the reality for most PNG citizens is very different. Formal law and justice resources are concentrated in the urban centres and suffer from a chronic lack of capacity. For nearly everyone, and especially the rural majority, challenges of personal security are more likely to be mediated through an individual’s membership of an extended family, sub-clan or other local association rather than through citizenship in the state.

In this collection, we use the term ‘law and order’ broadly to implicate the full range of conditions and factors that affect, or are seen to affect, civic security, including: 1) criminal acts and violence (particularly sexual violence); 2) state law (as provided in written laws and judicial precedents); 3) the ‘arms of the law’—that is, the institutional enforcers and interpreters of state law, notably the police and other uniformed services, courts and prisons; 4) myriad methods of informal community-based social regulation, including customary law and community norms whose authority is not derived primarily from the state, and that prevail at local levels throughout PNG.

Papua New Guinea’s ‘law and order’ difficulties were noted before Independence in 1975 (Nelson 2000; Levantis 2000b, 134–5). Since then they have grown. Alphonse Gelu voices a number of common, current perceptions: that rising rates of crime and violence in both urban and rural settings threaten the democratic process, prey on lawful business, cause health and other services in parts of the country to shut down, subject women and girls to sickening abuse, and defy church and government countermeasures (Gelu 2003, 46). These anxieties are amply aired in the local press. Recent national surveys attest to widespread concerns about personal safety, crime, corruption and violence while a significant proportion of informants have also been victims. Women more often report and fear intimate and sexual violence, but men are prone to other forms of assault (PNG JAG, 32; see also Sims 2004; Hukula 1999, 19). At a recent symposium on ‘Culture and Violence’ in Madang, Powes Parkop, governor of the National Capital District, complained that violence ‘is like a cancer destroying our nation and retarding our social and economic progress’ (Anon. 2009a). Port Moresby is repeatedly classed as one of the world’s unsafest cities (though recent data suggest that it is not the worst in PNG (PNG JAG 2008,17)) and, like Parkop, many outside commentators identify PNG’s law and order problems as major impediments to development (see Levantis 2000a, 13; Windybank and Manning 2003; Hughes 2004: White and Wainwright 2004).

Discussing ‘violence’, ‘corruption’ and ‘lawlessness’ in PNG, whether from inside or outside, is beset by difficulties, dangers and distortion, to which the introduction and several chapters allude. But these pitfalls do not alter the fact that PNG indeed faces great challenges in the governance of security. ‘Governance’ can be taken to mean the organisations and norms, state and
non-state, that collectively regulate social life, and, if the metaphor is not taken too far, it can be helpful to think of governance in PNG by analogy with an hourglass.

The top half of the hourglass is the state. PNG’s state is less than 40 years old. It was built on the spare skeleton of a colonial administration largely—but rapidly and minimally—fashioned after World War II. Many people in PNG today are little touched by the state; they live beyond its geographic reach. Where the state does operate, dysfunction is common. While PNG has the usual panoply of state law and state agencies, many ideals and attributes associated with the Western-cum-liberal state in countries with longer traditions of statehood (by which criteria, of course, many older states also fall short), do not altogether apply. These include the state’s spatial permeation of the nation; state capacity to fulfill crucial responsibilities, such as the rule of law; impersonal bureaucratic principles; and the depersonalised exercise of power (Dinnen 1998, 11–39). (The rich literature on the concept of the Melanesian ‘big man’, though debated, attests to the vitality and operation, at every political level in PNG, of a contrasting ideal of personalised power (see May 2001)). The constitution, state laws, the bulk of law and justice agencies and the military are to be found in this half of the hourglass.

The bottom half of is ‘community’—a tricky word that in PNG as elsewhere can refer to a variety of flexible social configurations (Nelson 2009; Goudsmit 2008; James et al. 2009). For this volume, it applies to people who recognise ‘ties that bind’ through relations of reciprocity, often embodied and symbolised in common language (wantoks), kinship and cultural observations; joint interests in a physical locality; and a sense, in certain contexts, of common interests in survival. While these interests and relations can accommodate much change, diversity, ‘insider’ manipulation and fission, they can also provide prompts and platforms for people’s cooperation—for their coming together to sort things out—and, as PNG’s Social Welfare and Development Minister Dame Carol Kidu and others argue, constitute PNG’s major social resource (Kidu 2008). The vast majority of everyday disputes, within and between communities, tends to be managed informally through community-based mechanisms.

The narrow waist of the hourglass is the conduit and intermediate zone between the two. For the governance of security, two state institutions are crucial here: police and village courts. The national force of some 5,000 police can be imagined as an arm of state law that reaches down to community. The village court system, currently comprising around 14,000 courts that serve over 90 percent of PNG’s villages, was introduced by Australian colonial administration in 1973 but designed in part as an extension of community governance that could reach up and interlock with the national court system and bridge different legal and social worlds. The village court system and
police are stressed (see Goddard 2009, esp. 67–71; Dinnen 2006). Similar observations could be made for crucial state institutions at this interface in other areas, such as health (aidposts) and education (schools) (Nelson 2003).

Civil society affiliations can also serve as bridging tissue. In PNG, vertical civil society linkages, as well as those that horizontally knit people from different primary communities of place and kin—through for instance common pastimes, causes, professions, or educational experience—are increasing, but still relatively scarce. An important exception is the churches that, in the language of social capital, often have intensive and extensive, horizontal and vertical networks (Luker 2004; Hauck et al. 2005). Heterogeneous though the churches are, their presence and influence are pervasive. Secular NGOs operating in the intermediate zone include organisations that have abilities to engage with government policy and project a public profile, but many draw their greatest strength from international networks while their roots in communities at large are relatively weak.

Business can act as a state-and-community ‘go between’ too. The formal business sector in PNG, however, employs only a tiny proportion of the working population (according to 2000 census figures, 10.4 percent (NSO 2003, 56)), and tends to be dominated by very large companies. These can be admirable corporate citizens, engage in dialogue with the state, feature in national media, do important work with their employees and the communities where they operate, and sometimes they constitute ‘mini states within the state’ by providing services in education, health and security to ‘their people’. But again, the bulk of Papua New Guineans remain outside such constituencies.

This metaphor of ‘hourglass governance’ thus points to the narrowness of the conduit that both joins and separates state and community. It can also be useful to think about the pressures on this slender waist. From the top comes the requirement to observe the principles of law, the values they enshrine, assumptions of how state and citizenry should behave, and operational dictates. From below comes the imperative to meet the expectations and values of local communities, or what Michael Goddard terms ‘local sociality’ that may variously draw upon ancestral traditions, Christianity and other sources (Goddard 2009, esp. 13–21). From many angles, but probably most powerfully from the side, come the demands of a global discourse on rights, often most vigorously promoted by NGOs, international organisations, and development partners. Global rights discourse harmonises most readily with the underlying Western-cum-liberal morality of the state, but can make common ground with Christian teachings and also with elements of local socialities. Yet in many parts of the world, PNG not excepted, the promotion of rights is often heard as an exogenous Western discourse of criticism (see Macintyre and Macleod this volume; Reid this volume; cf. de Waal, 2003).
Violence is an attribute of many issues featured in this collection, and deserves reflection within this sketch, beginning with some general reflections on violence in the modern state according to Western, liberal ideals. In Weberian theory, the state has a monopoly on the exercise of legitimate violence. Theoretically, it is also ultimately responsible for dealing with illegitimate violence in its midst (though, in practice, some forms of violence, such as domestic violence, have been, and continue to be, largely left alone). Only minimal levels of state-sponsored violence necessary should, ideally, be used (though, again, instances of excessive state-sponsored violence occur and proponents of punitive state violence continue to be vigorous). And lastly, while deterrence has always been part of the state’s responsibility to ‘ensure peace and good order’—and is an ancient justification for its use and exploitation of violence—that responsibility has been subjected to more recent reassessment and reemphasis. Forms of state violence, such as public hanging, have been argued to be both immoral and demonstrably ineffective as deterrents, while conventional state responses to violence and crime are said to often reproduce the problem—for example, when a convicted young man reemerges from prison more hardened and violent than before. As a corollary to these arguments, the moral value and economic benefits of deterrence have been emphasised. Consequently, interest in the state’s promotion of nonviolent forms of prevention has grown, both in theory and practice.

For the young, postcolonial state in PNG, these broad statements are qualified somewhat by consideration of state capacity, resources, and community attitudes—attitudes that state officers may share with the wider community and which also shape their working environment. In PNG, even if opportunity avails, some forms of domestic violence and sexual assault are even less likely to be reported to or pursued by police than they are in many Western countries, as several chapters here attest. Other forms of violence, such as ‘community sanctioned’ assaults, killings, or intergroup fighting may not be investigated properly because police believe that the violence was warranted or they lack the means. Some crimes are kept from police and the formal justice system by parties who prefer to exact and pay compensation, or because benefits—such as stolen goods—are distributed. And the vast majority of violent acts that are illegitimate according to law simply occur far from the eyes, ears and arms of the state (see Haley this volume). In PNG, the arguments for the involvement of police in the prevention of violence before the fact therefore have particular force, if only because so little is or can be done after.

Police also reportedly use violence and, on occasion, exploit its spectacle. The rough treatment of suspects, raids on settlements or the torching of villages are examples (Anon 2008; HRW 2006, 2005). Such police violence may be justified as retribution, deterrence, the best option for action with limited resources, or
a fair response to the perceived failure of courts to deliver justice. Some police may also commit acts of violence primarily as a perquisite and expression of masculinity (Macintyre and MacLeod this volume). For the same reasons that many legal responses to violence and crime by police and other law and justice agencies can be criticised for reproducing the problems they are supposed to limit, policing practices such as these, while in themselves illegal, also add to the sum of violence.

In societies everywhere violence has accepted roles, and traditional cultures of PNG are no exception. For instance, warfare was a means for securing group resources (and a mechanism for the redistribution of land). The term ‘payback’ also implies an acceptably violent retaliation for a wrong. Witchcraft and sorcery have been understood as an effective means of oblique violence; and untimely death and other personal misfortunes continue to be commonly attributed to such practices. Overt violence could be used to punish wrongdoers for an offence or to remove individuals deemed to pose a threat to the group. In many (but by no means all) parts of PNG, forms of gender or intimate violence have been considered justified in certain circumstances. While much has been written about traditional precedents for man-to-woman violence and its role in structuring masculine dominance (see, e.g., Eves this volume), woman-to-man and, more often, woman-to-woman violence could also be seen as sometimes justified (cf. Macintyre and Macleod this volume).

The traditional exercise of violence may have been costly in human life, but appears to have been regulated (see, e.g., Luker with Monsell-Davis this volume). It must also be seen alongside complementary tendencies to form relationships of reciprocity between groups and individuals, and to respond to wrongs through non-violent compensation and reintegration. As Richard Sikani has written, the restorative impulse is strong in many PNG traditions (Sikani 1996, 192–194). This tends to be reinforced by indigenised Christianity and was a feature, for instance, in grassroots reconciliation in the Bougainville peace process (Howley 2002). In some cases, however, the payment of compensation and reintegation of an offender can be interpreted as violating principles of Western justice, women’s rights or the interests of the victim, and failing to repudiate the crime (see, e.g., Kewa 2007, 31). In other circumstances, cycles of retribution are difficult to stop (e.g., Ward 2000).

Various factors currently favour violence, while weakening traditional and modern checks. Laments are often heard that elders have lost authority while young men have lost their way (see Luker with Monsell-Davis). The

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5 The word ‘traditional’ is used loosely in this context to describe cultures that existed before interaction with mission, colonial and other influences; and cultures that continued to be shaped to a high degree by the practices and values from that time.
Civic Insecurity

retreat of police and other government services from some areas has left a space where traditional responses, for instance, to persons accused of witchcraft, have assumed new, more violent forms (see Haley, this volume). Links between male violence and, since the 1960s, alcohol consumption or, more recently, marijuana are keenly perceived (Iamo and Ketan 1992; Haley this volume). Guns have changed the rules of violent engagement and, with deteriorating medical services, made it more deadly. Social change has eroded many customs that regulated contact between the sexes and which, in some communities, both authorised but checked violence against women (Wardlow 2002). Crowding, due to population growth or immigration, has accentuated tensions over resources in various urban and rural locales (see, e.g., Beer 2008, 100–3). The need for money can dispose a victim’s kin to seek financial compensation rather than challenge the wrong itself (Kewa 2007, 31), while poverty can encourage crime and opportunistic sexual relations (often leading to domestic and other violence) for material gain (see Haley this volume). Trafficking in girls, guns, and marijuana has emerged, and the use of girls as currency (Alpers 2004). Indeed, certain forms of crime and conflict appear to follow (as do directions for the spread of HIV) broader development processes—hence the concentration of organised crime in expanding urban centres, armed hold-ups along arterial highways, and inter-group conflict near major resource development (see, e.g., Badi 2008; Hammar this volume; Haley this volume). Critics of PNG’s huge liquid natural gas project, at AUD$15.6 billion the Pacific’s largest ever business investment, predict it will only fuel corruption, conflict and HIV on a hitherto unprecedented scale (Callick 2009).

PNG’s law and order problems are not simply problems of violence, but these highlight the weakness of the PNG state with respect to what is theoretically its cardinal responsibility: the governance of security. Yet many communities also struggle with this same task, while cooperation between state and community is often less than it could be. Phrases such as ‘an epidemic of violence’ are commonplace, but just as the term ‘epidemic’ is in some ways misleading with respect to HIV, in PNG it can disguise the many etiologies of violence, their implication in broader processes of governance and development, and the differing moral analyses that converge on its regulation. Like endemic HIV, PNG’s law and order problems pose a long-term challenge.

Connecting HIV and ‘Law and Order’

Certain connections between HIV and ‘law and order’ figure in everyday talk, the media, and documents relating to PNG’s national response. Despite awareness campaigns and legal provisions, people living with HIV still often suffer abuse and cases similar to Joan’s (see frontispiece, this volume) continue
to be reported. The HIV-positive ‘Hagen lass’, burned alive on top of tyres at a rubbish dump in early 2009, is one recent example (NACS 2009; see Luker this volume, conclusion). She was also alleged to be a witch, further suggesting the part of HIV in the perceived surge of witch killings that has prompted the current review of PNG’s sorcery laws (Anon. 2009b; cf. Haley this volume). Other allegations of deliberate attempts to transmit HIV, and incidents of child abuse and rape that spread the virus, excite anxieties about a range of occasions for possibly reckless, willful, or violent transmission (Anon. 2003a; Kewa 2004). ‘Gays’ and ‘lesbians’ are sometimes accused (John 2003), but more often ‘prostitutes’ are described as spreading HIV while tales abound of HIV-positive girls who set out to infect men (see Fletcher this volume; Anon. 2003b). The tendency to blame women is marked (see Eves this volume; Haley this volume; MacPherson 2008; cf. Lepani 2007, 122–144). Yet women in safe houses for people living with HIV are targets for rape (Gerawa 2009). Reports of ‘street kids’ orphaned by AIDS and the selling of sex for survival loosely suggest how crime, poverty and HIV entangle (Gerawa 2004a, b). The nation’s AIDS strategy states too that ‘urban migration, squatter communities and high levels of crime’ foster favourable conditions for HIV, a diagnosis with which many ordinary people would agree (PNG 2006, 9; cf. Beer 2008, 103). The press has aired fears that AIDS could unman the military and police (Steven 2004). Meanwhile, the National AIDS Council itself stands accused of gross corruption (Nalu 2009). Against this background and reports of systemic failure in the national response to HIV, the 2009 rejection of PNG’s application to the Global Fund jeopardized the funding for antiretroviral treatment that keeps some 7,000 Papua New Guineans alive (Fox 2009; see also Aggleton et al. 2008, 29–31).

Such talk, stories and perceptions suggest a multitude of links between HIV and ‘law and order’, but our central thesis of their two-way interaction is embedded more deeply in the literature on how social, political and economic factors can determine health and, vice versa, how a population’s health influences its social and economic conditions. Thus it is widely acknowledged that medical services, though they play an extremely important part in the response to diseases, have very limited ability to remedy their social causation. As John Kemm and Jayne Parry remark, ‘Major improvements in population health are more likely to be achieved through interventions in economic, industrial, housing, transport, agriculture, education, law and order, and other ‘non-health’ areas than in policy areas with which ministries of health are involved’ (Kemm & Parry 2004, 5). Conversely development agencies invest in measures to improve health not just as a good in itself, but because this investment delivers other social and economic dividends.
A similar point about the importance of deeper determinants can be made in respect of ‘law and order’. Conventional responses to ‘law and order’ problems have tended to depend on the coercive role of law enforcement agencies. However, policing responses or indeed longer-term capacity-building in the formal law and justice sector will not address underlying and structural factors contributing to high levels of conflict, crime and violence. Such arguments have forcefully emerged from efforts to address crime and conflict in South Africa, among other countries (see, e.g., DSS 1996; Emmett and Butchart 2000). In PNG, the National Law and Justice Policy observes, ‘(t)he failure of official responses [to crime] has in part been because we have been concentrating on applying ‘band aid’ solutions in an essentially ad hoc manner. We have been focusing on the symptoms of much deeper problems that are inextricably bound up with broader processes of social, economic and political change’ (PNG 2000, 9).

Public Health Approaches to HIV and Security

As David Hemenway remarks, public health approaches ‘can be contrasted to the often reactive, individual focus of therapeutic medicine and traditional criminal justice’ (Hemenway 2004, 8–9). But public health approaches can differ widely among themselves. For instance, from the early years of the international response to HIV, a stark difference emerged between ‘classic’ public health approaches and those described as upholding human rights (Scheper-Hughes 1994). The former rely on active case-finding, contact-tracing and the isolation of infected individuals, and were widely employed in past efforts to control tuberculosis, leprosy and STIs. The latter emphasises public education, the implementation of certain universal precautions, and the capacity of individuals, once they are equipped with knowledge and means, to change. While theoretically, both approaches can be construed as pragmatic, and each ultimately appeals to the commonweal, they are often morally contrasted. The former tends to accord with retributive proclivities on the part of majorities against individuals and minorities, the latter with the celebration and assertion of individual and minority rights. In terms of limiting HIV, each approach has its success stories. Australia, for example, is one for the second; Cuba for the first (Bowtell 2005; Scheper-Hughes 1994; Arazoza et al. 2007). Yet success depends enormously on contextual factors. Cuba’s cannot be replicated in many contexts, and neither can Australia’s.

Along the spectrum of public health approaches to HIV, contributors to this volume all cluster towards the ‘rights’ end. The ‘rights’ approach broadly characterises PNG’s national strategy, the policy of most of PNG’s development partners, including Australia, and the global response promoted by UNAIDS.
Yet chapters ahead reflect many of the challenges to this kind of response in PNG. These include limited state capacity, limited community mobilisation, local values apparently at odds with those of the AIDS agenda, difficulties in translating ‘AIDS awareness’ into preventive or ameliorative action, and the sense that larger processes and structures are untoward. Of course, similar challenges are found in other countries; and those working with HIV in PNG are not alone in targeting ‘barriers’ to effective programs, and stressing the need to create ‘enabling environments’. As Jenkins and Sarkar noted, ‘Effective HIV prevention not only requires targeted interventions that foster behavior change in individuals and communities at risk, but also requires creating environments that support people in their efforts to change, rather than punishing them or driving them away’ (Jenkins and Sarkar 2004, 3).

For this volume, an article by Sevgi Aral, Scott Burris and Clifford Shearing (2002) has been particularly helpful for thinking about public health approaches that respond conjointly to HIV and ‘law and order’, but at two levels. One might be called the level of ‘barrier removal’ and ‘enablement’; the other, while also operating on that plane, goes deeper: to the progressive structuring of social and cultural environments which deliver, almost incidentally and unconsciously, benefits for HIV prevention and the amelioration of AIDS.

Aral and her coauthors use two case studies—the policing of sex work in Moscow and an example of community governance in South Africa—and employ a standard epidemiological model for the rate of an STI’s spread. Its three determinants are: 1) the rate of exposure between infected and susceptible persons; 2) the probability that infection will occur from one of these sexual encounters; and 3) the duration of infectiousness. Drawing on research relating to the policing of sex-work in Russia (where prostitution per se is not a crime) they demonstrate the effects of laws, political directives, and police practices upon these determinants.

A few examples can illustrate. Russian police reportedly use a woman’s possession of condoms as grounds for persecuting her as a prostitute. This could discourage the use of condoms, increase the likelihood of unprotected intercourse, and thus affect the second determinant. Because immigrants are not legally entitled to free medical treatment in Moscow, immigrants who sell sex are likely to delay or forego medical treatment for STIs that are co-factors of HIV transmission. This affects the second determinant. Police actions that clear sex workers from one site of work to another may disrupt existing sexual networks and promote new networks in new locations. This could affect the first determinant. The sexual services that are routinely demanded by police from these women could also affect the first determinant.
Obviously, these illustrations could have been taken from policing in many countries, including PNG, while this model can be used to think about the possible epidemiological effects of a range of state laws, enforcement practices, related conditions and events—from prison sentences, mass prison breakouts, curfews and area-specific crime control measures, the criminal status of homosexuality, retributive practices by uniformed services, conditions of service for law and order personnel, and so forth. Similarly, the model can be used to analyse the possible epidemiological consequences of non-formal methods of social regulation, such as warfare, various forms of ‘pay-back’ and punishment.

While Aral, Burris and Shearing demonstrate how certain law and order factors can promote the spread of HIV, conversely they show how, within the formal sector, the reform of specific laws, policies, and crime-control practices could reduce transmission. It would be theoretically possible, for instance, to educate Russian police not to demand sexual services from sex-workers nor persecute them for carrying condoms, and so on. Their discussion also mentions, more generally, other areas where reforms can help limit infection: in, for instance, prisons, or by diverting offenders from detention.

Similarly, a number of initiatives in PNG—in community policing, restorative justice programs, juvenile justice reform, HIV prevention and support programs within the uniformed services and prisons, the involvement of law and order personnel in educating communities about HIV, and the provisions of the HIV/AIDS Management and Prevention Act to name a few—suggest ways in which the uniformed services, courts, prisons, and state law can make a beneficial difference to the management of HIV, converting the same abilities for (unintentionally) facilitating the spread of HIV to the cause of prevention (see Patrick this volume). However, as Aral and her co-authors note, such state initiatives can be difficult to effect where state capacity or resources are limited (see Law this volume; Patrick this volume). Also, reforms mainly dealing with the formal law and justice sector do not fully exploit co-present methods, or potentials, for governing civic security that exist beyond the (often short) reach of state agencies.

So perhaps the greatest value of their article is, finally, its advocacy of a deeper preventive approach in the Zwelethemba model for community governance, from South Africa’s Community Peace Program. Cartwright, Jenneker and Shearing describe it in greater detail later in this volume. Briefly, it brings community members together in ‘peace-making’ that prevents the escalation of conflicts and in ‘peace-building’ that prevents conflicts from starting. The model makes use of the community’s resources: time and knowledge. It obliges participants to observe South Africa’s constitution. They also receive a financial incentive: participants earn a small payment, part of which goes
to each while a proportion is reserved for the community to invest in ‘peace-
building’ projects of its own devising. The process involves women and youth. It develops community skills and capacity. While the model fully recognises the limited role that the state can play, it also stimulates thinking about how best the state can play its hand. Finally, the authors argue that the higher resulting levels of social cohesion can be predicted to correlate with better health and also to facilitate effective health programs. They specifically suggest that this model could contribute to lower levels of HIV transmission and more effective community management of HIV. The Zwelethemba model, in effect, promises a new civics of security that offers HIV benefits, ‘accidentally’ through ‘deep prevention’ and deliberately by enabling self-conscious initiatives that target HIV.

As Dinnen stresses in his preface to chapter twelve, where both the Zwelethemba model and Port Moresby’s Saraga project are featured, the former’s value for this collection lies in its clearly articulated rationale and design, and in its resemblances to the Saraga and other such local initiatives (Jacka 2007, 51–52.). PNG’s National Law and Justice Policy also recognises the importance of social cohesion for improved community safety and health. This recognition in turn underlies the Policy’s emphasis on community engagement in crime prevention and dispute resolution, as reinforced in the White Paper on Law and Justice (Dinnen 2006; PNG 2007). Recent thinking on democratic engagement at the community level in PNG resonates with features of this model too (e.g., Goudsmit 2008), while the Integrated Community Development Program introduced by Dame Carol Kidu envisions ‘inside out’ community governance that inherently involves the reduction of both HIV and crime (Kidu 2008).

Entwined Endemics, Prevention and the State

Endemic HIV and ‘law and order’ entwine in PNG, and it is possible to tabulate ways in which each may exacerbate or moderate the other (Table 1). But this chapter has also argued that public health approaches to the governance of security have potential to prevent and ameliorate each and their interaction, at ‘shallow’ and ‘deep’ levels.

What then is the role of the PNG state in the governance of security? Our discussion has underlined two irresistible facts. First, PNG’s young state, though nominally responsible for civic security, does not have the reach or capacity that many older states can flex and, for the foreseeable future, will have only limited ability to discharge this responsibility. Second, for the foreseeable future, communities will continue to do most of ‘the work’ of civic security, though clearly many currently struggle.
Tendencies in thinking that polarise state and community, and stress solutions to the governance of security that focus on one to the occlusion of the other, must be resisted. The international interest, over the last decade, in improving national and international security by ‘building’ states described as failed, fragile or flailing, has contributed to fresh thought on both the potentials (for instance, through ‘a whole of government’ approach) and limitations of state-centric conceptions of governance and security (see, e.g., Wood and Dupont 2006). These debates have special point for the Island Pacific, where several nations, including PNG, have been dubbed as failed, fragile or failing states and have been targeted, notably by Australia, for urgent state-building measures (Fry and Kabutaulaka 2008; Wood 2007). Both globally and with respect to the Pacific, the escalation of these ‘state-building’ and security concerns also roughly coincided with a steep increase of interest in and funding for interventions in HIV (Schneider and Garrett 2009; CAP 2009, 61–62).

The critiques of so-called ‘state-centric’ approaches to development in PNG (see, e.g., Dinnen 2008; Patience 2008), and the renewed, creative attention that ‘community’ is now receiving (see, e.g., Jacka 2007; Kidu 2008; Goudsmit 2008; James et al. 2009; Boege et al. 2008; Macdonald 2009), at least partly as a consequence of such critiques, do not lessen the necessity, or the moral imperative, for the state to discharge its specialised tasks in the governance of security as effectively and strategically as it can. Many of these—in policing, prisons, defence, legislation—place the state in positions from which it can advantageously intervene in both the concentrated and generalised dynamics through which ‘law and order’ and HIV play out and entwine. Nor should the potential for state agencies—police, village courts, but also institutions in other areas such as health and education—to contribute to local civic evolution be underestimated. Even if, in such settings, representatives of the state are only one of many actors and have circumscribed local roles, the state can provide vital long-term, stabilising and strategic elements to local endeavours. This ‘whole-of-governance’ vision calls for less talk of a fragile, failed or failing state, and continuing effort to back an enabling one.

Postscript: While this collection was in press, new figures were released for HIV prevalence in PNG. In 2009, 0.9% of PNG’s adult population was estimated to be infected. Prevalence in the Highlands and Southern regions exceeded the national figure. UNAIDS. 2010. ‘Papua New Guinea releases new HIV prevalence figures’. 26 August 2010. http://unaids.org/en/KnowledgeCentre/Resources/
Table 1: Entwined endemics

Potentially detrimental impacts of HIV and AIDS on ‘law and order’

- A new mode of inflicting or attempting to inflict harm now exists in cases where individuals deliberately try to infect others with HIV—whether through sexual contact or via other means.
- Community responses to HIV and AIDS may involve acts (such as murder or torture) or inflame pre-existing conflicts so as to increase demands upon the resources of law and order agencies and tax community capacities to ensure the safety of members.
- HIV, through its effects on law and order personnel and consumption of resources, may further reduce the capacities of uniformed services to combat crime and safeguard order.
- Because HIV can impoverish individuals and families now and in succeeding generations, the endemic can drive more people into criminal activities for economic survival, often thereby promoting conditions or behaviours that favour the further spread of the virus.

Potentially harmful effects of ‘law and order’ factors on HIV and AIDS

- Acts of sexual violence can spread HIV and make their consequences (sometimes for the perpetrator as well as the victim) fatal.
- The criminalisation of certain sexual acts can facilitate the spread of HIV by impeding prevention efforts.
- Policing and related practices—sometimes supported or required by law, sometimes not—can promote transmission.
- Law and order personnel, and the inmates of prisons, can constitute populations with a high prevalence of HIV and may also serve as bridges of infection to other populations.
- Failings of law and order can exacerbate the suffering of people affected by HIV or accused of causing AIDS, and render them vulnerable to acts of violence.
- Violence can prevent the delivery of or access to health and other services for people affected by HIV.
- Corruption and the misappropriation of funds can undermine the work of HIV agencies.

Potentially beneficial effects of law and order factors on HIV and AIDS

- Law and order responses may help to safeguard people affected by HIV and prevent the mistreatment of persons accused of causing AIDS.
- Initiatives within law and order populations—among men and women in the uniformed services and the inmates of prisons—may reduce the levels of HIV infection within these groups and the dangers of further transmission beyond them.
- Reforms to law and policing practices can both discourage actions that transmit HIV and enable interventions to change behaviour (see Stewart this volume).
- More fundamentally innovative, community-based approaches to the governance of civic security may help create ‘safer environments’ where occasions for infection occur less frequently, while simultaneously enhancing the capacity of communities to effect preventive measures and deal with the impacts of AIDS.
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