10

Return to Nui Thi Vai

The decision to return to Nui Thi Vai was not taken automatically. When the original clearing operation had been launched we had not expected to find such extensive Viet Cong use of the area which we had cleared and so special plans had to be made to follow up the initial success. These special plans determined the whole operational programme for the Task Force for as long as we remained out of the base and so a lengthy extension of our operation required some serious consideration by Brigadier Jackson. Several intelligence reports which we had received from various sources indicated that the Viet Cong were still installed on Nui Thi Vai and that there were more bases to be discovered with possibilities of the capture of further documents, equipment and supplies. Brigadier Jackson was convinced that the operation was worth continuing and gave his approval a few days before the convoys were due to finish so that our planning could proceed.

The most fruitful area of Nui Thi Vai seemed to be the western and northern sides. A great number of tracks ran around to that part of the hill and the derelict houses on the north-western spur were the sort of shelter which the Viet Cong liked to use. Also, the western side of the hill offered the best view over Route 15 while the natural withdrawal routes from the hill lay to the north. Colonel Warr decided to move the battalion in around the northern and western sides so that two companies could advance up the western side of the hill, one could clear the ground immediately to the north of the hill and the fourth company could lie in ambush positions on the approach routes to the north of the hill, a little further out. This company could prevent Viet Cong movement both toward and away from Nui Thi Vai if the Viet Cong used the track systems which we had discovered from the captured map. This task was assigned to D Company, B Company was to be its neighbour on the north, A Company was to search the north central sector of the western slope, C Company was to search the remainder of the western slope, while Battalion Headquarters, protected by the Assault Pioneer and Anti-Tank Platoons was to advance up the track to the pagoda and install itself in an area where good radio communications with the companies could be ensured. The Sixth Battalion assisted by providing one company, D Company, to protect the gun area.

It must have been fairly obvious to the Viet Cong on Nui Thi Vai that we would return when the convoys had stopped, so we had to take a few deceptive measures. In these we were both hindered and helped by the excellent visibility enjoyed by the Viet Cong over our movements along Route 15 from their observation posts on the hill. This visibility could be exploited, for the Viet Cong might imagine that they were secure until they saw us concentrate the battalion and begin the long move back to the base of the hill.

The jungle which covered most of the plain between the hills and Route 15 afforded cover from observation. Once we had disappeared into it without attracting enemy attention, the Viet Cong would not know where we were until we emerged right in front of their positions. The main problem was how to disappear into this jungle without the Viet Cong seeing. Two of the companies, B and C, could move directly from their positions along Route 15 to their areas of search, but A and D Companies had to come up from the southern sector of the road so that they could move by reasonably short routes to Nui Thi Vai, and so that their paths would not intersect the routes of the other companies for this could have caused an accidental clash between our own forces.

D Company was moved from its position to an assembly area south of Phu My in small groups who travelled in closed down APCs, mounting and dismounting under cover. The movement was spread out over the whole of the last day of the convoys. The APC movement was quite normal for armoured patrols had been running constantly along the road ever since we had begun securing it. A Company and Battalion Headquarters were moved at dusk in closed APCs to an assembly area midway between B and C Companies so that both these sub-units could advance straight to the east to strike Nui Thi Vai near the foot of the track which led up to the pagoda. The tents and installations of the Battalion Headquarters site on the road were left erected and some of the Sixth Battalion men moved into them so that the area was not deserted. The gun position was completely unchanged and the Sixth Battalion company was introduced carefully into the area amongst the daily resupply convoys.

Fig. 16. The company movements to dislodge the Viet Cong encountered on Operation Canberra from Nui Thi Vai, Operation Queanbeyan, 17–26 October 1966.

Each of the companies was to cross Route 15 and the open ground to the east of the road in the early hours of the following morning, October 17th, so that they would be at least a mile into the jungle by first light.

These moves were completed smoothly. Battalion Headquarters had harboured a few hundred yards away from a Buddhist shrine beside which stood a white marble Buddha nearly twenty feet tall between two lotus covered pools. We moved out into the darkness at 3 am, having silently put on our equipment which had been carefully packed the evening before and left undisturbed save for the use of our mosquito nets which were an essential precaution and had to be used every time we slept.

Our progress through the jungle once we had crossed Route 15 was accompanied by the booming of gongs and the ringing of a deep noted bell. These sounds wafted through to us clearly and lent a totally unreal atmosphere to our slopping progress through the half mile of water which lay alongside the road. We had not been close enough to the shrine to have been seen by the monks so we presumed that these sounds were as innocent as they purported to be. Captain Ledan, who commanded the Battalion Headquarters party while it was on the move, led us onto a wide sandy track running through trees which protected us from view. We were glad to have a couple of hours of rest in another harbour area some way along this track.

At dawn we moved off into taller trees which arched over the straight sandy track to allow only tiny patches of sunlight to strike the ground. The track was heading in the direction we wished to follow so we kept to it, moving rapidly. At an intersection with a similar trail which crossed the one we were following at right angles, we were puzzled to find a sign, written in English, warning that danger lay ahead. My first reaction on seeing the sign was to pinch myself. To encounter a well made, printed sign in English in the middle of a Vietnamese jungle was not something we had expected that morning. The sign was not booby trapped and it had been made at least six months previously. There was no Vietnamese translation to accompany the English so it must have been intended either for an American force or for ourselves. Its purpose was hard to fathom for all it did was to make one aware that Viet Cong were active in the area and, shortly afterwards, A Company who were leading the advance found a well constructed Viet Cong camp, equipped with trenches and cover from artillery, sited with roughly one company on either side of the track. A booby trap was tripped just by this camp, but it exploded without harming anyone and we continued on, realising that this explosion must have made the Viet Cong suspicious although they may have put the noise down to a pig which had run into the trip wire.

After passing through the camp we came to the first of the houses which lay at the foot of the hill. Some of them had been well built of brick and reinforced concrete. Several bore signs of Viet Cong occupation and it was evidently going to take A Company at least a day to search them. A Company then began to spread out to secure the area and have a brief rest while the Battalion Headquarters group, which had to get up to the pagoda twelve hundred feet above before darkness, continued on up the track.

The path began to ascend steeply after leaving the houses. The sandy track became a series of rock steps which were sometimes very rough, but often had been carefully hewn and fitted by hand or set in concrete in difficult parts. We climbed to about two hundred feet and waited for the Anti-Tank Platoon, who were leading Battalion Headquarters, to clear the next stretch of high ground dominating the track. While we stood on the rocks it began to rain in swift heavy drops. It was already past midday but we did not want to pause for lunch before climbing Nui Thi Vai because of the effects of exhaustion on a full stomach. The path ascended extremely steeply and we were looking forward to being at the other end of it.

A huge rock was discovered a little further up the track. It was like a large triangular prism resting on one of its edges, leaning on and supported by some huge trees. It was some fifty feet long and thirty feet high, with a roughly horizontal top of approximately the same dimensions. There was plenty of shelter under one side of the rock so we gathered in out of the rain, sharing the cover with a few sleepy bats which had suspended themselves upside down from the rough stone ceiling.

After some twenty minutes the Anti-Tank Platoon radioed that they were approaching the crest of the north-western spur. Then three shots cracked through the air high above us. The platoon had seen one Viet Cong disappearing behind a rock to the side of the track. The enemy was pursued for a short distance but was not found.

Brian Ledan then asked Colonel Warr if he could push on up the track with the reconnaissance group of Battalion Headquarters so that he could get the headquarters laid out on the ground at the pagoda before the main body arrived. Colonel Warr assented, adding a warning about the enemy sighted further up the track. Despite his awareness of the possible dangers lying in wait for his small party, Brian made an optimistic reply and bounded off up the rocks holding his Owen gun in his right hand at full arm’s length to balance his rapid movement.

Ten minutes after Brian had departed the remainder of Battalion Headquarters moved off up the track. We were strung out over one hundred yards of the steep slope. This meant that there was a long interval between the different individuals making up the headquarters, and therefore all comunications between the groups which comprised the headquarters had to be by radio, with the double disadvantage of one-way traffic at any one time and the broadcasting of our thoughts to anyone listening in on our frequency. For a headquarters composed of several groups which were required to command and co-ordinate the numerous diverse activities of several hundred men, from tactical deployment to ammunition resupply, direction of air strikes and the helicopter evacuation of casualties, we were not in an ideal situation. However we had become accustomed to this sort of inconvenience by dint of experience and Max Carroll had even become cynical enough to hold that fate decreed enemy contacts when Battalion Headquarters were on the move, it was raining and we were hanging onto a rocky precipice by our fingernails. His cynicism seemed fully justified by events on this afternoon of October 17th.

Shortly after setting off we heard a few shots crackling around the rocks above us. They immediately aroused our apprehension because they were clearly not from one of our own weapons. A strong volley of Australian fire replied. A few minutes later, Brian Ledan’s radio operator reported that the reconnaissance party was under fire. Brian had been hit and was pinned down by the Viet Cong behind a rock so he could not get to the radio to give the details of the enemy’s location and number. The Viet Cong had evidently recognised Brian as the commander of the group and had fired at him first. Despite the fact that he had been wounded, Brian had been extremely lucky. The sniper’s bullet had hit his Owen gun on the safety slide, missing his body by a fraction of an inch. The bullet had smashed the safety slide and jammed the gun, preventing Brian from returning the fire. It had ricocheted from the Owen gun and had passed into his chest on the right side making a deep gash which took months to heal, but which caused no serious injury.

Further firing at our reconnaissance party continued. RSM Foale and CSM Hughson were both fired at when they attempted to move despite efforts to neutralise the enemy by directing a machine gun at the general area from which the fire was coming. However, the attack came from many points scattered about in the rocks which covered the slope to the right hand side of the track and all of the enemy were out of sight in caves or in hides built amongst the rocks so that they commanded the only access route to the top of the ridge. Either the Anti-Tank Platoon had crept unnoticed past the Viet Cong except for the last man or they had thought that only a small patrol was on the hillside and hence they could ignore it and remain in their positions.

By this time the Anti-Tank Platoon had reached the top of the spur. They cleared the immediate area of the pagoda, checking particularly for booby traps, and then saw that the slope which ran up to the summit of Nui Thi Vai was free of Viet Cong. They caught a glimpse of several Viet Cong in the central part of this slope, but the Viet Cong withdrew swiftly. However, it was very advantageous for the whole of the Battalion Headquarters group that the Anti-Tank Platoon had reached the top of the spur for they could manoeuvre from the high ground to make an attack on the Viet Cong who were holding up the reconnaissance party. Without the Anti-Tank Platoon in this position, the Viet Cong could have held up our advance for a long time because their positions covered all the approaches to them from the lower slopes of the hill.

The area in which the encounter had taken place was an abrupt slope strewn with boulders up to fifteen feet high. Thick bush and large trees grew amongst the rocks, limiting vision to about ten yards in many places. The narrowness of the track permitted only one man at a time to advance. Although there were boulders at frequent intervals behind which one could shelter, most of them were isolated so that once in their shelter it was impossible to move without exposing oneself to fire again. The area which the Viet Cong had selected for their position was amongst a huge rock slide —a pile of boulders extending for most of the way down the hillside, covering it to a depth of over fifty feet. Within this rock slide the Viet Cong had many shelters and tunnels so that they could move from one fire position to another without exposing themselves to view. They exploited this position with skill and it was not until we had captured their equipment that we knew whether we had faced a dozen or fifty men. The position of those who were trapped by the Viet Cong fire was rather terrifying because of their impotence to fight their way out of the area and, while they were safe from the fire which came from the right hand side of the track, they did not know if anyone was creeping up on their left side to fire on their unprotected flank.

The Anti-Tank Platoon commander, Second Lieutenant Mick Deak, was ordered by Colonel Warr to move down onto the enemy position and to flush them out. The platoon was rather weary as it had just climbed over 1,300 feet, heavily laden, so Deak ordered his men to take their packs off and leave them at the top of the spur in a central dump. Deak’s problem was to get his platoon across a sharp gully which ran between the path on which the reconnaissance group were located and the beginning of the rock slide where the Viet Cong were. Most of this gully could be swept by fire from the rock slide.

Deak ordered his Second Section under Corporal Womal to cross the gully while the First and Third Sections covered their movement by firing onto the Viet Cong positions from further up the slope. Womal’s section advanced widely dispersed into the central part of the gully, dodging from rock to rock, without receiving any Viet Cong fire. But as they were about to climb out through the rocks on the far side, a shot rang out and Corporal Womal fell, yelling that he had been hit. A bullet had passed through his neck. He had fallen onto the top of a large flat rock and continued despite his severe wound to control the fire and movement of his section. He was out of the sight of the remainder of his platoon and it took a short while for Deak to establish Womal’s location in order to commence to extract him from the danger zone and attend to his wound. Womal continued to give directions to his platoon commander and also directed the fire of his machine gun group to cover the movement of the platoon down towards where he lay.

The Anti-Tank Platoon had taken the pressure off the reconnaissance group and Brian Ledan was able to reach the radio. We were tremendously relieved to hear him speak and to hear his description of the situation, for we had known very little of the exact disposition of the Viet Cong and how Deak’s platoon was progressing. Tony White had dashed off up the track to give attention to Brian as soon as he had been hit and by this time he had almost reached him. The wound was quickly dressed and Brian began to move back down to the main body of the headquarters for he required immediate evacuation to hospital. In the meantime, directly after the contact, Max Carroll had organised the Dust Off helicopter to come forward to the gun area on Route 15, three miles away.

The officers of the Fifth Battalion in January 1967.

From left: rear—2/Lt. L. O’Dea, 2/Lt. M. Roe, Lt. D. Rowe, Capt. R. Milligan, Capt. W. Molloy, Capt. J. Taske (on exchange with Captain A. White), 2/Lt. T. Sheehan, Capt. R. Bade, Capt. R. O’Neill, Lt. R. Wainwright, 2/Lt. R. Gunning, 2/Lt. D. Lovell, 2/Lt. H. Neesham, 2/Lt. E. Pott; standing—Capt. R. Shambrook, 2/Lt. J. Carruthers, 2/Lt. M. Deak, Padre J. Williams, Mr J. Bentley (Salvation Army), Capt. R. Supple, Lt. G. Negus, 2/Lt. J. McAloney, Capt. K. Mallinson, Lt. R. Thompson, Capt. B. Ledan, 2/Lt. D. Rainer, Capt. R. Boxall; seated—Maj. P. Cole, Maj. J. Miller, Maj. A. Carroll, Maj. I. Hodgkinson, Lt. Col. J. Warr, Capt. P. Isaacs, Maj. B. McQualter, Maj. P. Greenhalgh, Maj. R. Hamlyn.

Four members of the Intelligence Section by the model of An Nhut which they prepared in early February 1967 before Operation Beaumaris (see Chapter 14). From left: Pte. Colin Ross, Pte. Noel Clare, L/Cpl. Colin Bruce, Cpl. Bob Williams.

Second Lieutenant Bob Askew, a helicopter pilot of 161 Recce Flight, who performed outstanding feats of flying in support of our operations.

Major Maizey—a historic photograph of the second-in-command.

The most pressing problem at Battalion Headquarters was to find a landing zone for the aircraft. The nearest clearing was at the foot of Nui Thi Vai, several hundred yards away over ground which would have made stretcher bearing painfully slow. At that point the top surface of the large rock which we had just left suggested itself. It was roughly horizontal, it was easy to climb onto from the uphill side and its breadth was sufficient to allow a small Sioux helicopter to sit near the centre without its rotor blades striking any trees. The chief complication was to find a line of approach for the helicopter. The machine had to come in and depart on an angle gentle enough for it to acquire sufficient forward velocity to keep lifting once it had passed over the edge of the rock. The surface of the rock was important in enabling the helicopter to lift off because the helicopter needed the support derived from the upward thrust of the direct draught of air sent downwards onto the rock by the spinning rotor blades. This support, called ground effect, was important until the helicopter had reached a speed through the air of twenty knots, when it could derive all the vertical lift needed from its forward motion. Once it had flown out across the edge of the rock, the helicopter would have lost most of its ground effect and a great deal of skill would be demanded of the pilot to keep the machine flying. Fortunately there was an appreciable air current flowing up the hillside which had the same effect as if the helicopter had been flying horizontally through still air at the speed of the air current, so hovering was made easier. But despite this current, the angle of ascent possible for the helicopter was still very gentle.

There were tall trees all around the edge of the rock. The only feasible line of approach was from the western or downhill side because of the steepness of the hill. The Assault Pioneer Platoon scrambled around to the western side of the rock and chopped down the obstructing trees. Now it was up to the skill of the pilot. It was still an extremely difficult landing zone to use for there was only one line of approach and this was just wide enough to take the main rotor blades of the aircraft, permitting the tail rotor only a few degrees of swing from side to side. To get out again, the pilot would have to fly backwards off the edge of the rock, climbing as he went until he had achieved enough height to turn the tail of the aircraft around to the east so that he could fly forwards over the falling slope of Nui Thi Vai, picking up speed as he went. It was a very severe test and there was no way of foretelling its outcome.

The Sioux which was equipped with stretcher frames on the outside could then fly the casualty out to the big clearing below us and transfer him to the Dust Off aircraft, a larger Iroquois, which could provide immediate medical attention while it was flying the wounded man back to Vung Tau.

The Sioux aircraft which was directly supporting our operations came overhead within minutes of the trees falling and began to attempt the landing. Lieutenant Bob Askew, the pilot, made a few preliminary passes over the rock to estimate the difficulties of the approach. It was an acid test of his judgement because once he was committed to the landing it was not possible to pull out at the last moment without grave risk of crashing. However, like all of the pilots of the 161st Reconnaissance Flight who had flown so much for us since we had been in Vietnam, often up to eleven hours a day, we knew that Askew’s judgement was to be relied upon.

Captain Bob Supple guided the aircraft in. An additional danger which the pilot had to face was the risk of being shot down by an enemy sniper from the group further up the slope. While on its final approach, the aircraft was virtually a sitting duck and the pilot had no protection apart from a flak jacket. The surface of the rock was saucer shaped with a high lip on the eastern side, the side from which we could climb up onto it. The rotor blades cleared this lip by about two feet so no one could approach the aircraft while its blades were still spinning, and Bob Supple had to bring the helicopter right in alongside him to avoid decapitation.

A few minutes later, Brian Ledan came walking down the track. He was wearing only trousers and boots and looked quite unruffled despite the large blood soaked shell dressing tied across his right chest. We chatted on top of the rock after Brian had climbed into the aircraft and Askew began the start up procedure. The signals course at which I had first worked with Brian in 1961 seemed strangely distant. It looked as if he was going to be all right though he must have been in considerable pain. We kept our fingers crossed that he was not bleeding internally. The helicopter lifted a few inches off the rock and began to reverse outwards, taking great care not to back the tail rotor into one of the trees which were close behind. This feat was delicately accomplished, the pilot swung the machine clockwise to the west and sped off down to the clearing and the waiting Dust Off aircraft.

Some minutes after Brian Ledan’s departure came notification by radio of Corporal Womal’s wound. The Sioux was recalled to take Womal out and the landing procedure was repeated. However the extraction of Womal to a safe area was presenting some problems to his platoon on the spur above. The snipers knew where Womal lay and could shoot anyone moving to his assistance. Although the Anti-Tank Platoon could neutralise the Viet Cong by covering fire for a short time it was doubtful if they could keep the fire up for long enough to extract Womal.

Despite Deak’s orders to the contrary, the platoon stretcher bearer, Private Fraser, began to crawl forward to Womal, under fire. He reached Womal and proceeded to dress his wound, placing his own body between Womal and the enemy in order to shield Womal from further fire. The snipers opened up again, missing Fraser by inches. In the meantime, the stretcher party which Lieutenant Deak had organised was moving forward under the direction of Sergeant Calvert and protected by the covering fire of the remainder of the platoon. By this time, the enemy had learned to recognise the voice of Deak as that of the leader. Each time he shouted orders bullets flew over his head from the snipers.

The boulders were imposing severe difficulties on the stretcher party. In places they had to lift the stretcher head-high to get through the rocks and they were exposing themselves continually to fire. Each time they had to expose themselves like this, Sergeant Calvert called down covering fire and they managed to cross the killing ground in both directions without being hit, although the volume of enemy fire made movement extremely slow. However, the extraction was successful and the stretcher party struggled back to the cover of rocks behind the positions occupied by the remainder of the platoon.

Tony White had taken the risk of moving forward to the platoon position and was waiting to dress Womal’s wound when the stretcher party arrived. He saw very quickly that Womal had little hope of survival for the bullet had severed several major blood vessels in his neck. A few moments later Womal died and we had lost both a very fine man and an outstanding section commander. The stretcher bearers clambered on down the wet rocks to place Womal’s body onto the helicopter. Shrouded by a groundsheet, he was placed onto the aircraft and flown out to Vung Tau, while the impact of his death settled over all those left behind on the hillside. The stretcher bearers laboured back over the rocks with tremendous weariness and dejection.

The next problem was to extract the section which was still trapped in the gully by the Viet Cong fire. It seemed unwise to attempt to dislodge the enemy by further movement of this section because of the difficulties of the ground. Also they had done such a good piece of work in providing prolonged covering fire for the extraction of Womal that they were running low in ammunition. The whole platoon was experiencing a similar shortage, although to a slightly lesser degree. Some way had to be found to neutralise, or preferably, to dislodge the Viet Cong by fire support without endangering the men who were trapped in the gully.

Major Peter Cole, commander of A Company since September, radioed from the bottom of the hill, two hundred feet below, that he could see exactly where the Viet Cong were located on the steep slope six hundred yards from him and he could smother their position with machine gun fire from his current location. Also available were the two gun ships of the American light fire team which was in support of us. It was impossible to use artillery or mortars because our men were too close to the Viet Cong for their own safety, but both A Company and the gun ships were capable of hitting the Viet Cong position without risking casualties to the Anti-Tank Platoon.

All of us on the hillside began to mark our locations with coloured smoke and soon four plumes marked the Anti-Tank Platoon, the two groups of Battalion Headquarters and the Assault Pioneer Platoon. While the gun ships were brought onto station, Colonel Warr gave the order to A Company to open fire.

Soon the air above us was filled with the peculiarly sharp cracks of bullets heading in our direction but passing over us from A Company to the Viet Cong position. In a few minutes the gun ships came overhead and circled slowly over the target area, picking out likely caves to fire into. Soon the double thumps of the firing and the explosion of their rockets reverberated around the hillside. The aircraft expended their rockets and then poured machine gun fire into the position. From their altitude, the gun ships, which were simply elevated gun platforms using mobility as their main protection, were able to fire down into the cave mouths which were unreachable from below. Many of the rockets were fired on trajectories which were almost horizontal. These rockets roared straight in through the cave mouths, blowing up inside.

This combination of strafing was effective in making the Viet Cong withdraw. They retreated to the south, moving quickly through tunnels in the rocks which gave them protection from both observation and fire as they went. After the gun ships had completed their fire missions, the Anti-Tank Platoon edged forward to examine the results. They soon found that the Viet Cong had departed, leaving blood-stained bandages strewn about behind them and taking their casualties with them. The Anti-Tank Platoon discovered a great number of holes and tunnels amongst the rocks which had enabled the Viet Cong to dash from one position to another without exposing themselves to danger. As they proceeded they found that the caves had been extensively booby trapped and it looked like being a very slow operation to clear them. It was still possible that the Viet Cong had withdrawn to lower levels of the cave systems to await the cover of darkness before re-emerging to escape or to attack us.

This action had consumed the whole afternoon and by this time it was 5 pm Battalion Headquarters could not stay where it was, in such an exposed and indefensible position. If we moved back to the foot of Nui Thi Vai we would concede the day’s gains in the advance to the enemy and would probably have to repeat the entire procedure the next day. In addition, the Viet Cong would know to set booby traps higher up the track, particularly around our goal, the pagoda at the top of the spur.

Colonel Warr decided to press home our advantage and move on up the mountain, hoping to reach the pagoda before darkness. It was going to be a close thing. Everyone trod that track rather anxiously lest the snipers should reappear. The Anti-Tank Platoon went back to where they had left their packs, hoping that the area around the pagoda had not been booby trapped already by the withdrawing Viet Cong. Soon exhaustion replaced apprehension as we climbed rapidly, but the opening expanse of view over the surrounding jungles was a pleasant distraction as we caught our breath at short halts on the way up.

Darkness was falling as we passed through the stone gateway at the edge of the pagoda garden and bats flitted through the archway and the branches of the trees overhead, or dived under the wide eaves of the pagoda. Just before we reached the gateway, we passed the mysterious cave of the hermit monk of our earlier encounter, Nguyen Van Xe. The growing gloom prevented us from seeing anything within the wide arched mouth.

The pagoda was a large low granite building, rectangular in plan, and with a red-tiled roof. Grey stone swastikas looked down on us from beneath the eaves. The front section of the pagoda, facing the west, was in ruins. It had been shelled by the Vietnamese artillery from Phu My when they discovered that the Viet Cong were based there. At the back of the building we found a large kitchen and several shelters which the Viet Cong had been using recently. At right angles to the main building, another rectangular building ran out to the north from the rear of the former. A courtyard was formed by these two buildings and some outhouses on the northern side. A swiftly flowing stream ran into the south-eastern corner of the courtyard from the hillside to the rear of the pagoda. This stream was confined between beautiful rock-lined banks and ran into a large concrete cistern which fed a piping system supplying water to the houses near the foot of the hill. A stone bridge with a covered walk linked the two buildings. Ornamental trees and shrubs combined with the stone walling of the banks of the stream and the raised stone platforms on which both buildings had been erected to give the courtyard great natural harmony. Some level ground ran out towards the north and west for twenty yards but the hillsides came down sharply to the east and south of the pagoda. Dark green jungle approached the pagoda closely on all sides and the garden in front of the main building had become overgrown.

We were very glad to find that the pagoda and its environs had not been tampered with by the Viet Cong and we settled in rapidly. Battalion Headquarters was set up in the rear of the main building where it could enjoy the unaccustomed luxury of working from a table and stools. The Administrative Section, this time commanded by Captain Ron Shambrook, went into the other main building and the two platoons spread themselves around the outside of the pagoda complex to give complete protection on all sides. We did not dare risk showing a light to any Viet Cong who may have been lurking nearby, so we established ourselves in darkness. Fortunately we heard no more of the Viet Cong that night. Each of the companies had harboured securely in their planned locations. Major Neville Gair, commander of 103 Field Battery, produced a fire plan as usual for every halt that we made so that we were well prepared for an attack by the Viet Cong. Colonel Warr spoke to each of the company commanders by radio to pass on co-ordinating instructions for the following day, and then we were very glad to get what sleep we could between shifts of command post duty or sentry duty on one of the perimeter machine guns which were all manned constantly.

On the following day, October 18th, the clearance of the caves had to be commenced, not only for our own safety as we moved around the hill, but also to render them useless to the Viet Cong for as long a period as possible. The caves were protected by numerous booby traps so the Assault Pioneer Platoon, our booby trap specialists, were assigned to the task. One important tool for cave clearing, flamethrowers, had to be flown in from Nui Dat. Once they had arrived, the platoon set off to return down the hill to the caves with two guides from the Anti-Tank Platoon and three sapper captains as observers. The whole party was under the command of Lieutenant John McAloney, commander of the Assault Pioneers.

They approached the caves warily, positioned sentries on the track, above and below the area in which the platoon was about to work, and located a machine gun in a dominant fire position overlooking the area immediately to the front of the caves in which the Viet Cong had been located on the previous afternoon. McAloney told the guides to lead him to the cave where the booby traps had been found. Taking a radio operator and a sentry with them, the small group set off, clambering over and around the great boulders which had to be negotiated for the one hundred yards between the track and the furthest caves.

The cave in question was quickly located, and sentries were posted to either flank and uphill and downhill of the mouth. McAloney then entered the cave and began to search for booby traps. The first trap did not take long to find for it was just inside the entrance, below a large rock. The trigger mechanism had attracted John’s attention. He lowered himself to inspect the workings of the trap so that he could disconnect it. Just at that moment a shot cracked across the rocks, narrowly missing the sentry below the cave mouth, Private D’Antoine. John climbed back out of the cave, told D’Antoine to crouch down and take cover and to indicate the area from which the shot had come. He ordered the machine gun and one section to move down the slope and locate the sniper. Another shot was fired, D’Antoine moaned and lay silent. John was already on his way across to D’Antoine and was able to approach to within twenty feet. D’Antoine did not answer his name when John called to him.

The machine gun group was ordered by John to fire into the area in which the sniper was hidden while he crossed to D’Antoine. He had to halt the fire however, because ricocheting bullets were passing dangerously close to him. Corporal Burge, commanding the fire support section, then fired a single shot at a Viet Cong who had peered out at McAloney from the cave entrance. The head disappeared. Burge was certain that his aim had been true. McAloney then heard a scurrying tumbling noise through a passage in the rocks beneath him. D’Antoine’s legs were hanging over the edge of the rock and it was difficult for John to pull him back into shelter. The platoon medic came to John’s assistance and despite the appearance of death on D’Antoine’s body set to work with the application of mouth to mouth resuscitation and dressed D’Antoine’s wound. The bullet had passed through his back and out through his chest. They found a faint heart beat and evacuated D’Antoine immediately on a stretcher which had been hurriedly prepared. During this interval the Dust Off helicopter had been requested and by the time that D’Antoine had been carried the three hundred yards to the nearest landing zone, the helicopter was on its way. Once again rapid evacuation was of no avail, for D’Antoine died during the flight to Vung Tau.

John McAloney returned to the cave and crawled up to the mouth to begin clearing it of any further Viet Cong who may have been inside. This procedure was particularly hazardous because our men had no idea of the numbers and whereabouts of the enemy and they were unable to clear any one cave without exposing themselves to danger from several others. Despite this, Macaloney personally led the clearance of the system into which the sniper had disappeared.

John began the clearance by throwing grenades into the mouth of the cave. No reaction from inside was observed and so a flame thrower was brought forward. Before it was used, John noticed D’Antoine’s automatic Armalite rifle lying in front of the cave. He called in covering fire and began to crawl out to retrieve the weapon. The covering fire was of necessity extremely close as it had to penetrate the mouth of the cave in front of which John was crawling, but nevertheless, he felt more comfortable with it than without it—until a bullet ricocheted from the cave mouth and struck him in the right temple, causing a good deal of bleeding but not a serious wound. He grasped the Armalite and crawled back to safety remarking laconically that it seemed a pity to waste it.

John then led the flame throwing party forward towards the mouth of the cave. First they squirted fuel from the high pressure nozzle right into the cave, saturating all exits from the first chamber, all holes, nooks and crannies. Then they made a rapid assault on the mouth of the cave by dashing forward from the cover of the rock where they had been in partial shelter. When they were standing at the centre of the cave mouth they poured fuel right down the main cavity under the cover of small arms fire from the left flank. They ignited the last burst of fuel and drew back as flame engulfed the cavities and passages into which the sniper had fled. The preliminary saturation had been so effective that the sentries higher up the slope could see flame billowing out of several rear exits to the cave system. By the time that the flaming had been completed, darkness had begun to fall and the small group withdrew to the track, regrouped and virtually ran back up the hill.

During the following several days, teams of men from A Company, the Assault Pioneer Platoon, and the First Field Squadron of the Royal Australian Engineers from Nui Dat entered the caves and searched them. A Company had moved to a position half-way up the hillside to the vicinity of the caves from where they covered the north-western side of Nui Thi Vai with patrols. When they entered the caves, the men discovered that the system of tunnels was very complex for it contained several levels. Often the passages from one level to another would be very hard to see. It was pitch dark in many of the caves and passages, so the searchers had no idea of what a cave might contain until they were standing in its entrance with a torch in their hands. The tension of the search was heightened by the danger of booby traps. A great number of these were encountered. Often they were found first by the patrols from A Company who would gingerly enter a new cave or a lower level in the darkness and begin feeling their way delicately for the threads or the moving rocks which could trigger an explosion at a touch. Once the booby traps were located, Sappers or Pioneers were called in to dismantle them. So proficient had the men become that no casualties were suffered during this nerve-racking time.

The caves had been the permanent base for up to a company of Viet Cong who maintained the observation posts on the hill and transported supplies along the track system which passed the foot of Nui Thi Vai. The caves had been well developed. Most had planking beds in them, with small stoves built out of rocks. They had a piped water supply which had been tapped off the conduit which ran down the hill from the pagoda. Water storage and filtration facilities were provided deep under the surface so that the Viet Cong could have stayed underground for long periods without showing themselves. Some of the cave entrances called for amazing agility, for their only access was through chinks in the rocks of just over one foot in diameter. Some caves were too difficult for any but slightly built Vietnamese to enter. Others had been improved by building walls of rock across openings, leaving only loopholes for firing from. As the search went on the complexity of the system revealed itself, with the discovery of the succeeding levels. Each of the caves had several escape holes. One was discovered of particular ingenuity. A counterbalanced rock was poised on the edge of a vertical shaft down which a fugitive could jump. Once at the bottom he could tug a rope which released a beam supporting the rock at the entrance. With this support removed, the rock would tumble over and mask the entrance to the shaft. The fugitive could then escape through a low level passage which led to an exit on the uphill side of the caves.

The area bore many signs of a rapid abandonment. Apart from a foul stench of considerable strength, the searchers discovered large amounts of personal equipment and papers. It appeared as if the Viet Cong had been forced to flee with their weapons only. Their bedding, clothing and packs were still by their beds and cooked food was ready for eating in several of the caves. The greatest discovery of the operation was the radio station of the deputy commander of 274 Regiment, Nguyen Nam Hung, together with some vital documents, including his diary. The radio was found carefully hidden on the third level of the caves on October 21st by A Company. It was a recent model Chinese Communist transmitter and receiver—one of the few which have ever been captured from the Viet Cong. For a piece of equipment such as this to have been abandoned indicates that the Viet Cong were in desperate straits before they fled, and we must have just missed capturing Hung and his party.

Hung’s diary was very informative for he had begun each day’s entry with his current location, so that we were able to follow his movements for the whole of the first ten months of 1966. A great number of valuable deductions were derived from this study which occupied a great part of my time for the following three months. He also left other notes which related to the future activities of 274 Regiment so that we were able to formulate a detailed picture of what we would have to guard against during the following months.¹

Amongst the equipment finds it was interesting to see that the Viet Cong were equipped with Armalite rifles and that they had left 125 lbs. of Chinese Communist explosive. Several Chinese Communist Claymore mines were captured whose diameter exceeded that of any others we had previously encountered by twenty per cent. The quantity of equipment which came out of those caves was such that it took eight pages of closely typed foolscap to list everything.

While A Company spent seven days in searching the caves, C Company had been patrolling through the south-western part of Nui Thi Vai where they had found further Viet Cong bases and huts, and a sow with litter, all of whom had been carefully camouflaged. The huts and other installations were blown up and the company moved on over the southern ridge of Nui Thi Vai and onto Nui Toc Tien. Despite intensive patrolling over this hill, nothing more than dense jungle was discovered.

B Company examined a number of buildings which the Viet Cong had been using on the northern side of Nui Thi Vai before moving out into the jungle to take over the ambush role from D Company on tracks further to the east. After a few days of intense alertness to the extent of lying motionless for the greater part of every day, ready to fire with accuracy at a split second’s notice, eating silently without heating food and forgoing smoking, B Company began a sweep around to the north of Nui Toc Tien, to emerge on October 26th on the main track which ran to the north in the gap between Nui Toc Tien and the Dinh hills. This sweep discovered a small group of Viet Cong and more was learned of their movement patterns in the area.

After three days of fruitless ambushing, D Company was ordered to ascend to the summit of Nui Thi Vai to search the upper slopes and the eastern side of the hill. On October 21st Lieutenant Dennis Rainer’s platoon crept down into the pass between Nui Thi Vai and Nui Toc Tien. Some alert observation by Lieutenant Barry Campbell, the forward observation officer from 103 Field Battery who was accompanying this patrol in case it ran into trouble and needed artillery support, discovered some huts on the western slope of the pass. These huts had been very carefully camouflaged and were in extremely thick bush. Further investigation showed not only that they were surrounded by a belt of mines and booby traps but also that they were occupied by a group of Viet Cong who were inside one of the huts. During a complete reconnaissance around the huts, the entrance path was found. By the path was a notice written in Vietnamese, displaying a scarlet skull and cross bones. The notice warned that the reader was passing through a minefield and requested that he ring the bell which was close by. Rainer’s men did not stop to observe this formality and crept up into the immediate vicinity of the huts. After stealthy movement and careful deliberation, Rainer launched his platoon into a surprise attack. Out of the eleven Viet Cong in the camp, ten were killed and one escaped for the loss of no casualties to our men.

In the camp the platoon found all the weapons of the former occupants, together with their ammunition and equipment. The survivor fled through the jungle for several days and gave himself up at the Duc Thanh district compound. He had been convinced that the day of the Viet Cong had passed in Phuoc Tuy since he had been finally tracked down in a hiding place deep in the jungle, even though his unit, the Chau Duc District Company, had not been engaging in offensive operations for some months. He verified that Rainer’s attack had completely wiped out that particular post of the company.

As the days went by it became apparent that we were reaching the end of what was to be found on Nui Thi Vai and we prepared for departure on October 26th. However, we were certain that the Viet Cong would send replacement garrisons back to the hills once we had left, so we did what we could to deny the use of the area to the Viet Cong for some months. By spreading tear gas crystals in the caves and tunnels it was possible to create fumes which would linger for up to six months and so the last days on the hillside were spent in treating the caves. We were able to blow up all of the surface installations and huts but nothing could have demolished that great mass of fallen rock which contained the caves.

This operation had proved unexpectedly successful in view of the captured radio and diary and it had also been extremely difficult. These two factors combined to give the battalion a great feeling of mutual confidence amongst its members. Although it had not been as significant in terms of the long-term aim of our presence in Phuoc Tuy as the cordon of Binh Ba, it had the strongest impact on the spirit of the battalion and Nui Thi Vai became one of the most vital sections of the battalion’s tradition. For bravery and leadership in this operation, Military Crosses were awarded to Lieutenants Deak, Macaloney and Rainer, the Military Medal was won by Private Fraser, and Corporal Womal was posthumously mentioned in despatches.

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