3

The ‘specialised little world’ of parliamentary administration

Overview

The calls for reform of parliament documented in the previous chapter came largely from external actors concerned particularly with public engagement, executive–legislative relations, governance and resourcing. Not all these calls went unheeded and we have seen, over the decades, significant improvements in communications and in the facilities and resources available to members. But claims that the two parliaments have always been insular, self-serving and elitist cannot be easily dismissed. In this chapter, I establish the context within which administrative reform has occurred and bring to the account an understanding of the specialised nature of parliamentary management and the traditions, beliefs and practices of parliamentary administrators that have influenced the pace of reform. The chapter describes a culture of ‘uniqueness’ that has resisted calls for greater attention to be paid to effective management practices. It begins with insights into the specialised nature of the roles of parliamentary officials and, in the second half, provides a historical trajectory of administrative reform in the two legislatures.

The UK Parliament

Much has been written about Parliament—Parliament as a place of legislature, as court of law, as defender of the liberties of the people (and their oppressor at times) … but the great machinery of Parliament, as distinct from the machinery of government, is not kept running by politicians, nor does it run itself; it is kept in motion, cared for and continually brought up to date by men who are carefully chosen and meticulously trained to carry out this peculiarly subtle task … Seen against the background of contemporary politics, the internal organisation of Parliament … may appear complicated—to some, even chaotic—but the endless efficiency of the machine itself is undeniable. And this efficiency, which has been maintained through every crisis thrust upon it by Parliament and the nation’s affairs, is simply the product of the efforts of all those men who are part of this specialised little world. (Marsden 1979: 11)

Marsden’s idealised account of the roles of parliamentary administrators noted the ‘unique’ characteristics of officers of the parliament: they were almost religiously non-political; professionally expert with a reputation second to none; unmercenary;¹ discreet, knowledgeable, instinctive and prescient; and devoted to duty—characteristics suggestive of the archetypal Weberian bureaucrat. But it was only through living and working in ‘the very special atmosphere that [existed] uniquely within the walls of Westminster’ that they began to absorb that ‘intangible “something”’ and then to act in the way it demanded (Marsden 1979: 16). There can be no doubting Marsden’s view of the parliament and its administrators as sui generis. Rydz (1979) also gave useful insights into the early development of the clerk’s role. In describing how the clerks of the House of Commons once acted as parliamentary agents by exploiting their privileged positions to extract fees from the proponents of private bills introduced into the parliament, he demonstrated how influential they have been since the earliest days of the institution in providing procedural advice—a clerk’s principal role (see also Williams 1954).

The early parliamentary literature examined in this study focused mainly on procedural reform. Michael Ryle—a clerk in the House of Commons from 1951 to 1989, co-founder of the Study of Parliament Group in 1964 and joint author of an authoritative work on parliamentary functions, processes and procedures (Griffith and Ryle 1989)—noted the contribution of 50 years of procedural reform to the growing influence and effectiveness of parliament, and he strongly defended the institution’s relevance. But he also urged the House of Commons to ‘take itself and its practices more seriously’ (Griffith and Ryle 1989: 10) and suggested ways in which the House’s modernisation and procedure committees could achieve further legislative reform. However, Johnson (2005)—an emeritus fellow of Nuffield College, Oxford—questioned the assumption of many political and parliamentary practitioners that procedural change and adaptation had, in fact, strengthened parliament’s effectiveness. He believed the challenge was not just to change the balance of power between government and parliament by reforming procedures, but also to rethink what parliament ‘can and cannot do’ in a more complex environment where it seemed increasingly disconnected from the real citizens. He advocated ‘standing back from the preoccupations of politicians and officials who work the system as it now is’ (Johnson 2005: 19; emphasis added) to adopt practices that wider society might understand and recognise. Among the uncomfortable questions parliamentary institutions should ask themselves, Johnson listed: ‘Could not officials discharge some of the functions presently reserved for the most part to political appointees, many of whom are ill-prepared for the managerial functions to which they often lay claim?’ (2005: 20). We see here a call for greater agency for parliamentary officials and perhaps an early connection with Moore’s (1995) concept of public value and subsequent criticisms of unelected officials crossing the political divide (Shergold 1997; Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2009).

Blackburn et al. (2003: vii), in their preface to the second edition of Griffith and Ryle’s work, also acknowledged the concept of self-interest in their study of how the rules, processes and procedures affecting the work of parliament were ‘employed in practice and manipulated by the participants at Westminster in order to further their own vested interests and objectives’ (emphasis added). Readers cannot avoid inferring that traditional parliamentary practitioners, including proponents of procedural reform, sought principally to preserve the institution of parliament in their own image, rather than pursuing Crick’s ideal of reaching out to the public—a theme that is explored throughout this account.

Crewe (2015, 2017) offered a different perspective: a strong defence of the roles and culture of clerks, sweeping aside perceptions that they remain backward-looking, tradition-bound and opposed to innovation, and that they make poor managers. On the contrary, she argued, they are at risk of being pressured into following external organisational norms, becoming bureaucrats and losing the detailed knowledge of the rules that is required for flexibility and innovation (Crewe 2017: 65). Crewe likened the clerks to either Magi or mandarins—on the one hand, protecting parliamentary rules and knowledge; on the other, managing the rulers—concluding that, in fact, they are neither. To her, the mix of improvisation, innovation and interpretation that clerks have to master sets them apart from priests and, unlike the mandarins of the civil service, they are not involved in developing or implementing government policies or services. Rather, they are both custodians and reformers and their goals are to win support for the institution and serve its members. Crewe’s (2017) work on the clerks’ roles and culture was insightful but also seemingly dismissive of the strategic or managerial role they perform, appearing to offer instead a defence of process over outcome. It also contrasted with research that found that House of Commons administrators themselves saw the need for improved professional management, long-term planning, economy and efficiency—albeit within the context of parliament’s independence and a sensitivity to members’ demands—provided they could maintain their distinction from the civil service (Barrett 1999).

Blackburn et al. (2003: 203) also explained that the functions of officeholders in parliament—to exercise authority, speak on its behalf, administer its business and serve its members—are, in fact, divided among elected MPs and permanent officers and staff employed by the House, often for the whole of their career. This explanation provides an important allusion to the distinct role elected members do (and should) play in the parliament’s administration, as well as in the lawmaking, scrutiny, representational and grievance-airing roles typically associated with MPs. It links the management of the business of the House with the administrative requirements and processes that support its functioning. This link is germane to articulating a comprehensive understanding of parliamentary administration—one that includes management of both the business of parliament and the administrative support underpinning all its functions. As this book argues, the history of management reform in the two parliaments has tended to view management as a separate and subsidiary function and has failed to acknowledge the relationship between political and institutional reform and effective public management.

The business relationship also comes to mind when considering the political role of the whips, whose principal duties are to keep MPs informed about forthcoming parliamentary business, to ensure they attend important debates and vote in support of their parties and to pass on to the party leadership the opinions of backbench members (Walpole et al. 2008). The traditional hunting analogy of a whipper-in who ensures the hounds do not stray remains a preferred description of the whips’ role (Renton 2004; Crewe 2015), and their influence in managing the business of the House and its members’ responses through ‘the usual channels’ is well documented (Walpole et al. 2008; Crewe 2015; Rogers and Walters 2015). Less has been written about when the whips’ roles extend into administrative activity. One prominent example is the 2009 expenses scandal in the UK House of Commons.² Crewe (2015) recounted that, before the scandal and the subsequent transfer of responsibility for the oversight of parliamentary expenses to an external body, the whips would use their knowledge of individual members’ expenses claims and other personal affairs to offer a form of protection in return for party loyalty. She claimed they retain an ability to offer rewards to loyal members, such as a good office within the parliamentary estate (Crewe 2015: 136). However, rising independence among backbenchers and an increase in cross-party cooperation have reduced the power and authority of the whips over the management of parliamentary business and contributed to the erosion of their influence (House of Commons Reform Committee 2009; House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee 2013).³

The Speaker’s role (and the roles of other presiding officers) is central to the effectiveness of parliamentary administration, as will become apparent. But early scholars were divided about the professional standing of this high office. According to Cocks (in Laundy 1964: vii), the Speaker in the mid-twentieth century did not appear to be burdened by managerial responsibilities outside their notably antiquated and dignified position in the chamber. In contrast, Laundy (1979), in Walkland’s collection of essays on the House of Commons by the Study of Parliament Group, gave a spirited defence of the onerous duties of the office—the principal ones being to apply and interpret the rules and practice of the House and maintain order in debate. He sought to demolish the ‘fallacy’ put forward by Jennings (1961: 65) that the qualities required of a Speaker were not very high and any reasonable person could make a success of the office. The only administrative duties Laundy mentioned were those pertaining to being head of the five departments forming the House of Commons administration (in effect, the Speaker’s counsel acted as de facto head and relieved the Speaker of the day-to-day administration).⁴ He did note, however, that in 1973, the Speaker ordered a ‘thorough-going review of the structure, organisation and co-ordination of the services provided by the five departments’ (Laundy 1979: 198). This was known as the Compton review (1974); it was the start of a series of management reviews that led to the establishment of the House of Commons Commission and which have progressively modernised the House of Commons’ administration.

Responsibility for responding to members’ demands, as well as maintaining order, security and ceremony, lay with the Serjeant-at-Arms. The role’s multiple domestic oversight tasks included accommodation, cleaning, laundry, stationery, telephones and division bells, but not catering services, which were provided by professional managerial staff appointed by a select committee but who did ‘not enjoy the status of House officials’ (Marsden 1979: 239). Marsden wryly recorded that although these ‘routine tasks’ could be undertaken by staff ‘in their stride’, the Serjeant, as the contact point for users of the services, was the constant recipient of everyone’s complaints and suggestions; ‘the trouble [was], from his point of view, that he generally [had] to do something about them’ (Marsden 1979: 211; emphasis in original). The 1974 Compton review included sweeping changes to the Serjeant’s remit, but, as we will learn, the review attracted strident criticism from staff, and only led to further investigations. Today, the Serjeant’s non-ceremonial role is principally related to access to and within the parliamentary building.

The library and Hansard functions have also received some attention in parliamentary literature. Marsden (1979) noted that the House of Commons Library emerged from a small collection of records, pamphlets and assorted books stored in a warehouse in the custody of the Clerk of the Journals. It was officially established in 1818 in a 1.6-square-metre room in the Palace of Westminster and rehoused following the Great Fire of 1834 into a noble suite of rooms in the finest position in the palace. Notwithstanding that the first librarian was reported to have died from overwork, the life of successive librarians continued at a steady pace and they were able to preside with ‘leisured dignity’ from their desk in the library itself (Marsden 1979: 177). The library was the responsibility of the Speaker and was ‘governed’ by a series of standing committees until 1862, after which it was left to its own devices. In 1922, it came under the direct control of a committee appointed by the House to advise the Speaker on library affairs. With the influx of new and more demanding members in the 1945 parliament, a select committee was appointed to oversee it and it expanded rapidly thereafter (see also Menhennet and Palmer 1967). Gay (2017), a former senior library staffer and scholar, provided a contemporary account of the development of the House of Commons Library with a specific focus on House-wide corporate management and service improvement. She claimed that interdepartmental rivalries and jealousies, particularly from within the clerk’s department, inhibited change—resistance being the product of an excessive emphasis on hierarchy and departmentalism that existed until the 1990s. She did, however, praise the largely unrecognised role of the Study of Parliament Group for fostering parliamentary reform that was more broadly based than simply procedural reform, and she highlighted technology and the appointment of non-librarians as factors contributing to the library taking on outreach and public engagement roles.

The story of Hansard as the publisher of a near-verbatim report of parliamentary debates has been well documented by parliament’s officials (Weatherston 1975; Marsden 1979; Church 1991; Holland 1991; Barrett 2010; Sutherland and Farrell 2013). Although the service could be considered ‘ancient’, and has generally been highly regarded, Hansard staff have not retained the same cachet as other long-established parliamentary staff. The service and its staff are particularly vulnerable to technological innovation and efficiency initiatives, including contracting out.

I have touched briefly on the characteristics and administrative roles of officers and members of the House of Commons, influenced by the ‘special’ nature of parliamentary administration; the importance of maintaining order, security and ceremony; an increasing level of dissatisfaction from members with the services offered; and, from a scholarly perspective, questions about the nature and effectiveness of administrative reform. Central to this picture is an ethos epitomised by the need to hold the executive to account, as summed up by MP Hugh Munro-Lucas-Tooth:

It is not the mere existence of Parliament which ensures our freedom but the way in which we do our job here. If Parliament becomes inefficient or impotent, the first thing which will suffer will be our personal freedom as citizens. I will not base my argument on the view that the power of the executive is too great. On the contrary, I recognise that the power of the executive is great … [W]hether we like it or not, it will grow greater … But if it is inevitable, then that is the best reason why we should ensure that we make the machinery for the supervision of the executive by Parliament as modern and as strong as it can be. (in Menhennet and Palmer 1967)

For an outline of the history of administrative practice in the House of Lords, the research notes provided by the House of Lords Library are an excellent resource (Brown and Evennett 2015; James et al. 2017; Torrance 2017). The Select Committee on the House of Lords’ Offices (the Offices Committee) was established shortly after the Clerk of the Parliaments Act was enacted in 1824 to supervise appointments and conditions of employment in what were then the only two offices in the House of Lords: the Clerk of the Parliaments and the Black Rod. Thereafter the committee of more than 60 members presided over the House of Lords Library, refreshments, works of art, staff, finance and administration. In 1965, responsibility was formally vested in the Lord Chancellor, acting as Speaker of the House of Lords. He delegated his authority to the Offices Committee, with the Black Rod acting as its agent. Following the Constitution Reform Act 2005, the lords resolved that they should elect their own presiding officer (House of Lords Select Committee on the Speakership of the House 2005). The first Lord Speaker was elected in July 2006 but with a very different role from that of the Speaker of the House of Commons. The House of Lords is self-regulating and the Lord Speaker has no power to rule on matters of order; his or her primary role in presiding is to assist proceedings. During question time, the Leader of the House continues to advise the House (Brown and Evennett 2015).

The leaders and whips of the main political parties within the House of Lords (sometimes including the Convenor of the Crossbench Peers) are also known as the ‘usual channels’. They play a key role in decision-making about the governance and administration of the House, including facilities and services for members. In 2002, the Offices Committee was replaced with a new House Committee, which was tasked with providing leadership and strategic planning for the House of Lords’ administration, reflecting earlier widespread dissatisfaction with service delivery and the standard of accommodation (Blackburn et al. 2003). Crewe (2005: 174) noted that the ‘usual channels’ were not much interested in managing the House of Lords during the 1990s; Labour managers had enough on their plate; Conservatives did not see much wrong with it; and the Liberal Democrats, who complained about inefficiency, were ignored. The path to management reform in the House of Lords is discussed later in this chapter.

The position of Clerk of the Parliaments (the title being indicative of the tenure of the clerk through successive parliaments) was once considered a sinecure (Bond 1958), although administrative changes have since added considerably to the procedural functions of the office. Crewe’s (2005) anthropological study of rituals and politics in the House of Lords provided insights into the hierarchical nature of the various administrative offices. As a group, the clerks have been criticised for their snobbery, privileges, exclusiveness and intolerance of mistakes, including by staff within the semi-autonomous fiefdoms of the library, the parliamentary archives, Hansard and the refreshment department, who themselves have exhibited traits of exclusivity and remoteness. Rivalries between those facilitating the business of the House and those concerned with maintaining the building and looking after the peers stemmed partly from the backgrounds of staff. Overall, Crewe concluded, management has been inconsistent, tending towards conservatism; nevertheless, the changes that most public institutions in the United Kingdom have undergone have also affected the House of Lords.

From this overview of both houses, we are left with an impression of a parliament with two separate administrations, each inculcating specialised tasks and fiefdoms, the existence of self-serving social hierarchies and an environment resembling a gentlemen’s club. We are also aware of an institution facing increasing external pressures for change.

The Australian Parliament

Reid and Forrest’s (1989) single chapter on parliamentary administration is surprisingly candid, perhaps reflecting Reid’s later career as a political scientist, following his official roles in the House of Representatives. It noted a complete lack of early planning for how the new Commonwealth Parliament would operate from its inception in 1901, citing widespread confusion among parliamentarians about their administrative roles and responsibilities. Members and senators were indifferent to staffing and administration arrangements for the two houses, being content to leave those matters to the presiding officers. Then prime minister, Edmund Barton, capitalised on this confusion to great effect, appointing a new Clerk of the House of Representatives against the advice of the Speaker and maintaining control over the officers of the library and parliamentary reporting staff until arrangements were finalised under the Public Service Act in 1902. Although members were said to regard the clerks as overpaid, with what little work they had to do being of a routine and clerical nature, the powers of the clerks were significant and the two house departments became ‘insular and deferential’ and displayed ‘intense hostility’ to any measures that might have threatened their limited scope for advancement (Reid and Forrest 1989: 416–17). Jealousies, suspicion and politicking between departments stymied attempts at reform and raised questions about who should be in control of parliament’s administrative affairs. For more than 60 years, the five departments remained almost unchanged structurally, with hierarchical and slow progression of officials to senior levels.

Reid and Forrest succinctly encapsulated the effect of early administrative decisions resulting from a culture of insularity, exclusivity and hostility towards outsiders, and even one’s own colleagues, combined with a lack of support and engagement from both the presiding officers and other members:

In matters of parliamentary administration, organisation and staffing, the executive arm of government has exploited the weaknesses of the five parliamentary departments and their employees. The latter have suffered the disability of organisational fragmentation and an absence of leadership and representation within the Cabinet and the party rooms. The party affiliations of the respective presiding officers and the temporary nature of their appointments have consistently placed the parliamentary organisations they are required to administer at a considerable disadvantage. The resort to rhetoric about parliamentary independence in budgetary management has not helped; neither has the predisposition of parliamentary officials to have their organisational arrangements and salary classification tied to public service criteria and public service recommendations. The lack of a person authorised to advocate, negotiate and plan in the interests of Parliament as an institution has greatly impeded the growth of an effective parliamentary administration. (Reid and Forrest 1989: 433; emphasis added)

There are elements of self-interest within this historical account of parliamentary administration in Australia, as in earlier references to the UK Parliament (Rydz 1979; Blackburn et al. 2003; Crewe 2005; Gay 2017). Continued politicking among officials and members within the two houses has also hampered the progress of structural reforms on efficiency grounds, as discussed later in this chapter.

More recent commentary on the role of officers in the House of Representatives sheds little light on the execution of their managerial responsibilities but offers some insights into procedural roles. Wright, former clerk of the House of Representatives and editor of House of Representatives Practice, drew on Laundy’s work on the historical development of the Speaker’s role in the United Kingdom. He echoed the latter’s description of the speakership as being ‘an office of great importance not only in its significant and onerous duties but particularly for what it is held to represent’ and noted that the Speaker is not extraordinary but an ‘ordinary person of the highest calibre’ (Wright and Fowler 2012: 161–63). Wright drew also on Erskine May to highlight differences in the degree of impartiality exercised by the Speaker in the House of Commons in the UK Parliament and the Speaker of the House of Representatives in the Australian Parliament. In the latter case, the Speaker, although ostensibly impartial while in the chair, remains politically affiliated with his or her party and is not considered independent. This important difference in the way the Speaker’s role is executed is discussed further in Chapter 5. The powers and functions of the presiding officers under the Parliamentary Service Act 1999 parallel those of a government minister, but responsibility for day-to-day administrative matters is delegated to the clerks of the two houses and to the Secretary of the Department of Parliamentary Services, which provides services and facilities to both houses. The Speaker has ex officio membership of the House Committee and the House Appropriations and Administration Committee.

Like Marsden (1979), Wright emphasised the distinction between parliamentary staff and those serving the executive, highlighting their impartiality and professional expertise. He described the procedural role of the Clerk of the House in some detail, but did not elaborate on the management role, merely stating that it ‘covers the usual range of departmental functions including staffing matters, financial management and so on’ (Wright and Fowler 2012: 207). This is not a surprising observation but is illustrative of the differing emphasis placed on procedural and management roles, particularly in the Australian Parliament with its separate services department. Wright outlined the historical role of the Serjeant-at-Arms: as in the House of Commons, it is principally concerned with the ceremony of parliament and the preservation of order. In practice, duties also include serving on the parliament’s Security Management Board and providing a range of support services to members.

Laing (2013), a former senate clerk, in an address to the 44th Presiding Officers and Clerks Conference, stated that continuing to give advice, whether the advice was contested or acted on, was possibly the most important function clerks performed, both to support individual members to be effective parliamentarians and for institutional purposes by ensuring that important things (powers, practices and procedures) were not forgotten. Patmore (2017), a former member of the Tasmanian Parliament, told a workshop of parliamentary scholars and parliamentarians that the clerks are vital in supporting the concepts of the separation of powers and responsible government; he saw their role as going beyond the purely administrative and advisory. As editor of Odger’s Australian Senate Practice, Laing (2016b) provided a brief account of the management roles of the Senate’s senior offices. The president is responsible for the proper conduct of proceedings of the Senate and the interpretation and application of its rules, in addition to ‘ministerial-type functions’ (Laing 2016b: 146). The president chairs the Standing Committee on Appropriations, Staffing and Security, which determines the budget and oversees the Senate’s organisational structure, and is also concerned with seating arrangements in the chamber, room allocations and certain entitlements of senators. The incumbent has joint administrative responsibility with the Speaker for the joint department (the Department of Parliamentary Services) and joint control of the parliamentary precincts. The Clerk of the Senate, as the departmental head of the Department of the Senate, exercises the powers of a departmental secretary and is responsible for the budget, staffing and management of the department. The perennial problem of the dependence of the parliament on the executive for funding is addressed in a brief history of the establishment of the Senate Appropriations and Staffing Committee and the introduction of a separate appropriation bill for the parliament (Laing 2016b: 156).

In many ways, the administrative roles of officials and members in the Australian Parliament are similar to those of their counterparts in the UK Parliament; indeed, as the discussion above makes clear, the House of Representatives draws much of its organisation and characteristics from the House of Commons. But there are also differences. In the Senate in particular, much store is set on its independence from the executive, not just in budgetary matters, but also in organisational and structural issues. As an elected chamber, its powers are vastly greater than those of the House of Lords and, under existing electoral arrangements, its legislative independence from the executive is largely guaranteed. The presiding officers in the Australian Parliament also retain their affiliation with their party. The effects of these differences will become apparent later in this account. For now, we can look at the pattern of administrative reviews in each parliament, commencing in the 1970s, to see evidence of resentment among parliamentary officials and members towards the management function; a lack of interest by members in the administrative complexities of the services provided to them—at least until they become the subject of public criticism, usually after some type of failure; the slow pace of management reform; and continuing concerns about governance and strategy.

Chronicling administrative reforms: A historical and institutional perspective

House of Commons Service

Moroney (1997) described early attempts at reform precipitated by the inadequate accommodation available to members in the outdated Palace of Westminster. Control of the palace passed from the monarch to the two houses in 1965 but there was still no clear line of authority for the administration of the parliament, and the House of Commons Act 1812, which had established a 13-member commission, made no provision for the appropriate representation of members. The parliament had ‘little control over its own budget, an ineffective committee system and outdated staff supervisory arrangements’ (Moroney 1997: 23). Constant lobbying achieved some small concessions, such as secretarial support and office facilities, but the pressure for reform grew, including from proponents of procedural reform who were able to draw links between administrative structures, members’ services and facilities and parliamentary effectiveness (Jennings 1941; Hill and Whichelow 1964; Crick 1968). The Compton review (1974) recommended, among other things, a unified house service under a new chief officer and interchanges between the house service and the civil service, but the review was roundly condemned by members and staff and was quickly succeeded by an internal investigation headed by a House of Commons member. Bottomley (1975) reported that even though the Compton review had received little input from members, it had been criticised for its failure to avoid executive government control, its underestimation of the differences between the requirements of the House and the wider civil service, its proposed appointment of a ‘chief officer’ (likened to a ‘fifth wheel on the coach’; p. 9), its underestimation of the relative importance of procedural services and its proposals on the pay, grading and retirement of officials. Although Bottomley rejected much of Compton’s civil service approach to parliamentary administration, the groundwork was laid (Moroney 1997) and, two years later, the House of Commons (Administration) Act 1978 was passed, establishing the House of Commons Commission, with the Speaker as chair and appropriate member representation. The commission became responsible for the employment of staff in a unified service, with the clerk as accounting officer. The first annual report of the commission was presented in 1979.

Boulton (1991), a former clerk of the House, saw the passing of the House of Commons (Administration) Act as a watershed—the most significant change in the organisation of house services in modern times. Lacking radical tendencies, it nonetheless presaged the assertion by the House of Commons of its right to control its internal affairs. It did not, however, lead to a unified hierarchy: each head of department retained significant independence, and although the clerk was the senior officer of the House, they had no power to intervene in the affairs of their colleagues.⁵ No one was in charge.

An examination of the commission’s annual reports over the decade following their inception in 1979 does not bear out the initial enthusiasm for the changes brought about by the new administration. Despite repeated assurances from successive accounting officers (the Clerk of the House) that the ‘authorities of the House’ considered themselves to be under a moral obligation to scrutinise expenditure, particularly on staff numbers, as ‘thoroughly and strictly as possible’ (House of Commons Commission 1979: 6), ensuing reports revealed growing concerns about staffing costs, pay and grading, recruitment, accommodation, the introduction of technology and financial management, particularly within the refreshments department.

In 1990, Sir Robin Ibbs was invited to conduct a short but detailed review of the provision of services to members to address divided responsibilities and to ensure a coordinated decision-making structure that could respond to, and prioritise, the demands by members for services. Ibbs (House of Commons Commission 1990) pointed to continuing widespread dissatisfaction from members, particularly about accommodation and catering, which was exacerbated by the increasing gap between the House’s need for accommodation and facilities and the original design of the Palace of Westminster, and the lack of control by the House over its works program.⁶ The review drew attention to shortcomings in the management structures and the lack of effective financial control and oversight. Ibbs emphasised the need for greater clarity among members on how the House operated administratively; a survey of members conducted during the review found that although 58 per cent claimed to understand the way services were managed, the majority of them were ignorant about the role of the commission. It also found a positive correlation between knowledge of the way services were managed and the level of satisfaction expressed by members—an important observation in terms of the value of members’ engagement in administration.

The Ibbs ‘settlement’ included a more strategic role for the commission, an enhanced corporate management role for the management board, a new financial management system, the appointment of a finance director, clarity around the role of the Clerk of the House as primus inter pares in executing policy on service delivery, transferring to the House of Commons Commission responsibility for all Commons expenditure except members’ salaries, and regular examination of the House’s accounts and performance by the National Audit Office and Public Accounts Committee. The commission welcomed the recommendations and noted the House’s general support. It was enthusiastic about the review’s evolutionary nature yet reassured that ‘the main procedural, library and accountancy services were the subject of so little criticism’ (House of Commons Commission 1991: 7). The commission also commended the structural changes made by the House of Lords Offices Committee that reflected the Ibbs proposals and looked forward to ‘better decision making and accountability in the provision of services for Parliament as a whole’ (House of Commons Commission 1991: 10).

In 1998, the House of Commons Commission called for what was in effect a post-implementation review of Ibbs, albeit almost a decade later. The Braithwaite report (1999) began by noting the contextual complexity of parliamentary administration:

Resourcing a Parliament effectively is of vital constitutional importance, but extremely difficult. The business is complex, the environment reactive and unpredictable. Expectations of public bodies have increased, but the problems are no less. There must be strategic planning, effective management and financial control; but also sensitivity to the needs of the House and its Members. (Braithwaite 1999: 9)

Braithwaite was a management consultant from the private sector. He commended the Ibbs ‘settlement’ as a ‘remarkable piece of work [resulting] in an integrated plan for the planning and delivery of services, and the House’s control over its own expenditure’ (Braithwaite 1999: 9–10). However, he concluded that much remained to be done in terms of strategic planning, political governance, better financial management and control, separation of political advice and decision-making and a ‘corporate’ method of operation among the house departments. Although the rise in levels of satisfaction with accommodation was striking, satisfaction with the management of emerging information technology was low. The commission had not taken a strategic view and members were still insufficiently knowledgeable about the House’s administration and services. Braithwaite acknowledged that the clerk had assumed the role of chief executive to a greater extent over the previous few years; however, he noted a lack of formal authority over other heads of department and their performance.⁷ While Braithwaite’s willingness to acknowledge and build on earlier work was notable, he made it clear the status quo was not an option. Rush (2005: 47) recognised the achievements of Bottomley, Ibbs and Braithwaite, not just in organisational and managerial reform, with departments of the House becoming increasingly professionalised, but also as ‘a means to the end of improving the ability of MPs and the House as a whole to fulfil [their] functions by providing appropriate and adequate resources’. He noted, however, that ‘institutional professionalisation’ had yet to be achieved.

In 2006, the House of Commons Commission initiated the third in its series of major management reviews, the Tebbit review. The terms of reference included whether the benefits of the Braithwaite review had been realised, whether further actions were required to achieve strategic plans and whether ‘the organisational and staffing arrangements … are adequate to realise the objectives laid down in the Resolution of the House of 26 January 2005 relating to Connecting Parliament with the Public’ (House of Commons Commission 2007a: i). A link was thus made between the management reform agenda and the outcomes of the Modernisation Committee established in 1997 as part of the incoming Labour government’s commitment to modernisation and renewal (Kelso 2007a).⁸ Tebbit was at pains to point out that his review was not intended to contribute primarily to reforming parliamentary procedure and constitutional policy prescriptions but was concerned with

the more prosaic issue of how the services to support the institution of the House of Commons and members of parliament are governed, managed and delivered—vital in itself, given the importance of a well-functioning parliament in the affairs of the nation. (House of Commons Commission 2007a: 3)

Nonetheless, the review acknowledged a connection that cannot be dismissed between the need for effective management of both the procedural and the management functions within a highly political context.

Tebbit (House of Commons Commission 2007a: 4), like Braithwaite (1999), acknowledged the work of his predecessor and the reputation of the House of Commons for its effective service delivery (barring estates and works, which required remedial action). His review highlighted, however, the changing role of members, including their constituency work, and pointed to a need to replace the semi-autonomous federal nature of the House of Commons Service with a more corporate direction to achieve greater levels of performance and efficiency. Tebbit questioned the assertion that the House of Commons was a unique institution unsuited to the application of modern management techniques and the impossibility of quantifying outputs and performance given the all-pervasive influence of politics. He referred to several unique public institutions facing similar complexities; to him, the special character of the House of Commons did not preclude the need to build organisational capacity and promote effectiveness, accountability and value for money. A major recommendation, while not seeking to replace the Clerk of the House as its principal officer, aimed to bolster the chief executive officer aspects of the role and lend greater support from below to carry out procedural duties. Tebbit was careful in balancing the need for radical management reform with longstanding parliamentary traditions and beliefs.

There is a clear trajectory in these reviews of the House of Commons Service towards the need for greater professional managerial influence in service provision and the establishment of a management culture within the service. But this did not prevent a massive deterioration in the public’s trust in parliament following revelations in 2009 of dubious expenses claims by members (and their counterparts in the House of Lords). Nor did it resolve the longstanding tensions between the respective priorities accorded to procedural and management roles, as reflected in 2014 in the breakdown in the relationship between the House of Commons Speaker, John Bercow, and Robert Rogers, then Clerk/CEO of the House of Commons, giving rise to a further governance review, chaired by Jack Straw, a former Leader of the House (HOCGC 2014). Whether this was precipitated by a continuing deficiency in professional management skills, despite review after review through the decades, or whether it was driven by the ‘caprice’ of an independently minded and progressive Speaker anxious to leave his mark on the role he had occupied for some years is a matter of conjecture; there was much speculation at the time in media reports in both the United Kingdom and Australia.⁹ Chapter 4 provides a full account of the events surrounding the HOCGC and its implications.

House of Lords administration

The reform process in the House of Lords administration appears to have been heavily influenced by repeated House of Commons reviews, but peers shied away from adopting to the same extent the managerial practices introduced in the Commons (Torrance 2017). Following the 1990 Ibbs review, the House of Lords streamlined its administrative arrangements by reducing the number of subcommittees and delegating responsibility for decision-making. However, as these committees had no terms of reference or ability to report to the House, matters still had to be handled by the Offices Committee, resulting in an overlap of responsibilities. When the Offices Committee resolved in 2000 to engage Michael Braithwaite, who was responsible for the 1999 review of the House of Commons administration, to conduct a similar review, some peers baulked at the prospect of introducing a management consultant and instead a steering group was appointed, headed by Lord Grenfell (Crewe 2010). In 2002, a further working group, under the chairmanship of Lord Tordoff, developed proposals including replacing the Offices Committee with a much smaller house committee and appointing a principal finance officer. The review took place in a climate of uncertainty surrounding possible House of Lords reform as part of the Blair government’s modernisation agenda, but it was expected the review would lead to the House of Lords being able to better assert itself in its relations with the House of Commons regarding the provision of joint services, and most of the recommendations were agreed to (Torrance 2017).

Another review of the management arrangements in the House of Lords took place in 2007, at the same time as the Tebbit review of the House of Commons Service. The reviewers, Parker and Mahy, two senior officeholders in the energy industry, were given only five days to conduct their review and they apologised in advance for any misinterpretation of key issues. They recommended a greater focus on strategic planning and the appointment of external directors, and suggested the role of the clerk might be split to incorporate additional management capacity rather than continuing to take a business-as-usual approach. A further report, based on the Parker–Mahy review, and taking account of Tebbit’s recommendations for the House of Commons, concluded that only a tweaking of the House and domestic committees’ membership and terms of reference was required. A subsequent report by the House Committee proposing new terms of reference was agreed to by the House (House of Lords Debates 2007; Torrance 2017). In 2011, a principal clerk in the House of Lords administration, together with an external consultant, conducted a ‘light-touch’ review of the structure of the administration and the operation of its management board. Interestingly, the only one of its recommendations not adopted was the recurring proposal to appoint a professionally qualified finance director¹⁰ or head of corporate services to improve oversight of major programs and projects. Finally, in 2016, the House of Lords established its own commission, replicating the 2015 House of Commons administrative reforms (Torrance 2017).

Administrative reform in the Australian Parliament

In a research paper prepared for the then Parliamentary Service Commissioner, Andrew Podger, as part of a review of aspects of parliamentary administration, Adams (2002) documented at least 20 attempts over the previous century to change the administration of the Australian Parliament.¹¹ Podger described those attempts:

It is a history of claims and counter-claims about bicameralism and the independence of Parliament from the Executive arm of Government and about costs, efficiency and improving services to Members. In terms of responsibility for services to Parliamentarians the history also illustrates administrative structures based essentially on history and sometimes on chance, rather than a careful consideration of good management. (2002: 5)

For decades, the debate had centred on parliamentary independence: whether parliament should control its own budget and whether that budget should cover the whole parliament; whether parliament’s staff were different from those in the wider public service; and how the administration of parliament could be made more efficient without impinging on its independence. Governments and their central agencies were the main proponents for change, with the presiding officers becoming involved in the latter half of the past century. Key resistance to change had come from the presiding officers (in the first half of the past century), the clerks and senior departmental staff throughout the period, senators and individual backbenchers in the past 30 years and all those concerned about the diminishing role of parliament and a weakening of the separation of powers (Adams 2002: 7).

The resistance in some cases had centred on where the authority for staffing resided. Adams cited Robert Garran, a former solicitor-general, in asserting that primary responsibility for the parliamentary departments had always been in the hands of the presiding officers, but the role of senators had been strengthened by the Senate Standing Committee on Staffing and Appropriations, established in 1982, and a 1987 senate resolution requiring that the committee examine and report to the Senate on any proposed changes to the structure and responsibilities of the parliamentary departments. In 2011, the House of Representatives established its own Committee on Appropriations and Administration to consider, among other things, any changes to administrative arrangements. Both committees may confer with each other on appropriations for the DPS.

The principal focus of the reform proposals in the Australian Parliament was structural; they appeared to pay little attention to governance or strategy. Table 3.1 provides a chronology of key structural proposals from 1910 to 2004 (Adams 2002).

Table 3.1 Australian Parliament: Key structural proposals, 1910–2004

1910–12: Prime minister and presiding officers (in response)	Amalgamation of departments: Five into one. Amalgamation of departments: Five into two (including a separate Hansard department). No action taken.
1920–22: Presiding officer, McLachlan Royal Commission and senators	Divergence of opinion on absorption of parliamentary departments into public service; parliamentary offices included in Public Service Act 1922. Presiding officers retained control over staffing matters but were under pressure to conform to public service conditions.
1930: Executive	A further attempt to incorporate parliamentary departments into the public service failed; however, discretion afforded by rhetoric of parliamentary independence was limited.
1933: Pinner inquiry	Amalgamation of departments: Five into one. Rationalisation of common services; reclassification of positions; reorganisation of work. Report criticised for lack of understanding of parliament and rejected.
1953; 1975–76: Public Service Board	Amalgamation of departments: Five into one. Separate parliamentary service proposed. Proposals rejected.
1977: House of Representatives officials	Amalgamation of service departments: Three into one. Separate Department of Parliament proposed. Proposals rejected on grounds of autonomy of houses.
1977–79; 1980–82; 1987: Presiding officers	Separation of administrative from procedural services. Amalgamation of service departments: three into one. Interhouse rivalries prevented comprehensive examination of parliamentary administration; proposals did not proceed.
1988–96: Presiding officers and officials	Amalgamation of service departments. Various attempts did not pass the Senate.
1996–97: National Commission of Audit; presiding officers	Amalgamation of departments: Five into one. Presiding officers respond by proposing amalgamation of service departments into chamber departments. Not supported by the Senate.
1999: John Templeton, Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff Secretary; legislative change	Internal restructure of the Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff: ‘One-stop shop’ service support. Parliamentary Service Act 1999 established.
2002–04: Presiding officers	Amalgamation of service departments: Three into one. Department of Parliamentary Services established on 1 February 2004.

Adams called on the observations of Broinowski, a former senate clerk, to encapsulate the essence of the entrenched resistance to change within the parliament, recited below:

A succession of clerks, often with the connivance or tacit approval of the Presiding Officers, successfully and repeatedly used the principle of parliamentary independence to maintain autonomy from the general public service in matters in which they thought it advantageous to do so … whilst maintaining the benefits of common standards in matters such as salary scales …

The members of the five departments thus withstood all early efforts to rationalise them. They became a self-contained and insular enclave, a priesthood, in which the status quo, the established order, and the importance of apprenticeship were heavily emphasised during the steady, often glacially slow progression officials would make through the hierarchy. Promotion depended primarily on seniority, and secondarily on profound knowledge of parliamentary practice. (Broinowski 2001: 60–61)

Adams (2002) and Reid and Forrest (1989) recounted the opprobrium from parliamentary staff towards those who would threaten the status quo that followed the 1933 report by Pinner, an inspector from the Public Service Board, at a time when the government of the day was fixed on economies in the public service. Aside from recommending a single department led by a single clerk, Pinner proposed staff cuts and a reduction in salaries and suggested that officers from the two chamber departments could help with stocktaking in the library during parliamentary recesses. Pinner was reviled for his lack of understanding of parliamentary practice, just as Compton would later be in the House of Commons.

Another radical five-into-one proposal came from the Howard government’s National Commission of Audit (NCA 1996), which was established to review the operations of government. This proposal aroused significant controversy (particularly for its purported efficiency claims), yet it serves as a powerful illustration of the resistance to change within the parliament. According to a current issues brief written by a Parliamentary Library researcher:

The Commission has attempted to highlight the cost of support services to the Parliament by calculating that the cost of operations by the five parliamentary departments works out to $600,000 for each Parliamentarian. This statistic is, however, quite misleading. The operations performed by the parliamentary departments are not directed solely at Parliamentarians, but contribute to the functioning of a democratic system, benefiting all Australians, of which Parliamentarians themselves are a part. For example, the Parliamentary Committee system, whose costs are included in the above average, has played an important role in investigating and recommending action on a range of issues of economic and social importance, both within the private and public sectors.

Contrary to assertions in the Report, efforts to amalgamate parliamentary departments have been pursued in the past but failed for want of parliamentary support. Institutional changes in the Parliamentary Departments must have regard to the continued capacity of the Parliament to function independently and effectively. Were such changes to be seen as being dictated by the Executive Government, the preservation of parliamentary independence and the constitutional separation of functions performed in the two Chambers could also be an issue. (James 1996: 26)

James did concede that the existence of five separate departments of the parliament, with their own structures and hierarchies, could be anachronistic, particularly as each department was responsible on average for only 282 staff, compared with an average of 6,031 staff in executive departments, and that the amalgamation of routine corporate functions or the outsourcing of some tasks should be examined. This library researcher was not alone in expressing disquiet about the NCA proposal; it was vehemently opposed by the then Clerk of the Senate (Harry Evans) and the presiding officers, unsurprisingly, decided not to support it, although they did seek advice from a former secretary of the Department of Administrative Services, who concluded that the proposal was justifiable and did offer potential savings but may not have been politically achievable (Adams 2002). The proposal for a single parliamentary department has not resurfaced.

As we can see, the trajectory of administrative changes in the Australian Parliament was centred on attempts to increase efficiency by amalgamating departments. In the early years, there were inadequacies in the accommodation and facilities in the temporary Parliament House, but a proposed replacement was being planned as early as 1954. Indeed, as I have noted, following the 1988 move to the new Parliament House, concerns were expressed about the impersonal nature of the increased space and the distances between functional areas. The magnificent new building was a catalyst for a renewed approach to managing what was described as ‘the equivalent of running a large industrial plant containing a five-star hotel in which two hundred and twenty-four major shareholders are staying at the same time’ (JHD 1988: 6). Until the amalgamation of the three service departments, the Joint House Department had operated relatively autonomously and its annual reports reflected a private sector management approach, including adopting techniques of ‘best practice’ and ‘total quality management’. Catering services were first contracted out in 1989. The recording and televising of parliamentary proceedings were aided enormously by the new facilities available. However, failures in the delivery of Hansard services, due to perceived ineffective management and the slow uptake of technology, and serious accountability issues in the then Parliamentary Information Systems Office, led to the departure of the heads of the Parliamentary Library and the Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff, following two critical audit reports.¹² In 1990, the Speaker of the House of Representatives appointed John Templeton, an ‘outsider’ from the Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, to head the Department of the Parliamentary Reporting Staff and subsequently the Parliamentary Library, arguably adding to the reported hostilities between the parliamentary departments.

In 2002, Podger recommended the three service departments be amalgamated. His review was also focused largely on cost savings and its terms of reference offered little encouragement to set a strategic direction for a restructured parliamentary administration, unlike the more farsighted observations of Ibbs (House of Commons Commission 1990), Braithwaite (1999) and Tebbit (House of Commons Commission 2007a) in the United Kingdom. Some of my interviewees expressed reservations about the effectiveness of the Podger review and Podger conceded he could have more actively addressed the poor relationships between the heads of the parliamentary departments:

In relation to internal relationships at the top, if I had my time again I would probably be a bit more active as a Parliamentary Service Commissioner … I chaired meetings once every three months of the heads of departments, but they were a bit perfunctory … [I]f I had been clearer about agendas and what we should be getting out of them I could have teased these things out more. In hindsight, I was new to the Parliamentary Service and maybe I didn’t take the role as substantially as I should have. That might have forced a bit more dialogue. It would not have been a magic answer but if you handled the agenda and the meetings right you would ensure that different perspectives were put in the right way. And if you have papers around the agenda, you can tease the issues out very clearly, allowing discussion.¹³

The review did, however, secure the support of at least some parliamentary officials and both presiding officers, and the long sought-after amalgamation of the service departments was finally achieved, resulting in the establishment of the Department of Parliamentary Services in 2004.

The utility of this administrative reform was short-lived, at least initially, subsequent performance deficiencies were well publicised and hostilities were not resolved (SFPALC 2012a, 2012b, 2015a, 2015b; Mulgan 2014). Accounts of dysfunctional relationships or dissensus in Australia’s parliamentary departments demonstrate the influence of individual parliamentary actors on the processes of administrative change that could otherwise be masked by a ‘central analytic notion of “path dependency”’ in historical institutionalism (Peters et al. 2005).

Conclusion

This chapter has depicted the specialised and insular environment in which parliamentary actors operate, using examples of the slow pace of reform and a culture of preservation and self-interest. It is not exhaustive—further accounts are developed in later chapters—but we are left with a dawning impression of hostile relationships between parliamentary actors, the influence of traditions and beliefs on parliamentary effectiveness and an ethos centred on parliamentary supremacy over the executive.

The UK Parliament has a long history of punctuated management reform that has the appearance of a planned, if glacier-like, approach, with a series of reviews recommending improved management processes, leadership and structures. Reform in the Australian Parliament has focused on the restructuring of departments to reduce duplication and increase efficiency, fostering a history of rhetorically based resistance and internal hostility to change that belies the extent of administrative reform resulting from a legislative framework that mirrors that of the wider Australian Public Service. There appears to be little difference in either parliament, however, in the perception by parliamentary actors that parliamentary administration is unique and, by implication, unsuited to wider public management reforms. Having established the historical context for administrative reform, I will analyse in the next chapter management issues in a more contemporary context, as well as the events that have contributed to continuing public dissatisfaction and internal discord.

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