8

A public management approach to parliamentary administration

The management of parliament: A reckoning

Despite ongoing attempts to strengthen governance arrangements in the UK Parliament, they do not yet enshrine a collective responsibility for ensuring parliamentary effectiveness, and the House of Commons and House of Lords commissions do not yet, in practice, provide an effective authorising environment or a source of advocacy and support. There remains an excessive concern—which is particularly evident in the House of Lords—with precedent, process and preservation, a prioritisation of rules, traditions and conventions and a preference for observing social niceties while avoiding difficult decisions. To some, the parliament remains determined to ‘reclaim parliament for the parliamentarians’.¹ The lack of collective responsibility is institutionalised in the Australian Parliament, with the separation of procedural and management departments making it easier to find someone to blame when things appear to go wrong.² It has resisted adopting a whole-of-parliament governance structure with greater input from members. Although the UK Parliament has greater independence in its funding appropriations, neither parliament seems able to inspire public confidence in the benefits of securing funds for legitimate parliamentary purposes, including members’ support, public engagement and the maintenance and preservation of parliamentary buildings, reflecting a deficit in institutional representation and claim-making (Norton 2017; Judge and Leston-Bandeira 2018).

Both parliaments have accorded a lower priority to the concept of ‘management’ than to ‘procedural’ functions. In one sense this is understandable, and self-fulfilling, when management is seen only as providing routine and ancillary support services rather than as pursuing the effectiveness and sustainability of parliamentary democracy, as envisaged in this book. This narrow view of management militates against taking a strategic and innovative approach to parliamentary management and embeds traditions of guardianship and preservation and a culture of exception and insularity. Institutional divisions and multiple roles, stakeholders and relationships have contributed to different beliefs, practices and priorities for parliamentary actors, heightening tensions among them. The media sees parliament as a trophy organisation, often leading to excessive criticism, which in turn fuels public disengagement. High levels of scrutiny, including from MPs, of the institution’s administration, while often justified, are rarely accompanied by advocacy and/or support.

Procedural and cultural change are slow; parliamentary actors have been reluctant to change rituals and behaviours to meet changing societal expectations. While public engagement has enjoyed increasing levels of attention, opinions differ as to how and where engagement initiatives are directed and whether the intended audience is listening. Members’ constituency roles are becoming more demanding and, as we have seen in the UK Parliament, increasingly unsafe, leading to further questions about their future. Encompassing all these dilemmas is the too-difficult box—a symbol of short-term thinking and avoidance. Arguably, the ongoing challenge of balancing the goals of efficiency, effectiveness and meeting public expectations has become parliament’s ‘wicked problem’ (Rittel and Webber 1973).

The tendency for the public (and some practitioners in studies of democracy) to conflate perceptions of the parliamentary institution with government and politicians generally in itself is a sign that parliaments are less relevant than their place in their respective constitutions would imply. If trust in democracy is low, as the evidence I have cited would suggest, parliament is less likely to be able to effectively pursue its role in providing a forum for deliberation and the sharing of ideas, thus contributing to enhanced public policy. Without agency and innovation by parliamentary actors, parliament is in danger of being overlooked, sidelined or marginalised. An institution that heralds its independence and political importance is in danger of ceding to others its capacity for action.

Parliamentary administration and public management: The same or different?

Like all public organisations, parliaments have been forced to respond to waves of management reform requiring a shift from bureaucratic and entrenched rules-based practices towards efficiency, adaptability and results-led performance requiring external expertise. Operational management skills, including in the fields of human resources and financial management, have been emphasised and designated ‘professionals’ in these fields have been recruited to both parliaments at the same time as longstanding parliamentary officials have been encouraged to forsake ‘amateurish’ approaches. But public management has not remained static.³ Newer approaches to public management have emerged in intersecting and overlapping streams (Lindquist and Wanna 2011). Their objectives have included creating public value, achieving greater collaboration with internal and external stakeholders and encouraging active participation by citizens in the democratic process. Like parliament, all public organisations have become ever more complex, facing increasing demands and requiring new skill sets to manage them. Issues including relevance, organisational culture, public engagement, collaboration, relationship-building and citizen participation affect all public and many private organisations. Shortly, I will relate these public management approaches to aspects of parliamentary management; before doing so, it is necessary to examine the oft-cited claim that parliament is unique. If the ‘uniqueness’ of parliamentary administration continues to be overemphasised, it is unlikely parliamentary actors will be attracted to wider concepts of public management.

Table 8.1 Perceived similarities and differences between parliament and other public organisations

Feature	Characteristics
Similarities
Accountability, governance	Leadership, generalists can be effective if context is understood, same decision parameters, different operating environment.
Capacity to change, internal and external review	Differences overplayed but ‘guild’ or ‘club’ approach makes change difficult;4 change frustratingly slow, parliament has not kept pace. Comparisons with other institutions included the royal family, the English Football League, National Health Service, local government, hospitals and universities.5
Operational management	No difference in non-member-facing roles, but can be too much political meddling.
Differences
More stakeholders, complex relationships	Need to support members, including in constituencies as well as public; no control over demand; accountable to whole nation—an ‘abstract collective’.6
Historical, traditional, constitutional	Historical legacy, custodial relationship, need for independent funding; exclusive cognisance; status conscious, hierarchical; devotion to institution, impartiality, specialised knowledge.
Locus of authority, decision-making	No binary relationship or single authority as in government; self-regulating; no single agenda, each member equal.
Political context, divisions, interests	Different dramatis personae; some administrators ‘don’t get it’,7 capacity to interpret political context required; administrators can work across divides if they have political capital but evidence of a lack of trust.
Media and public scrutiny, sensitivity	Media scrutiny, very public; tensions between houses; risk of exposure; lack of visibility, conflation with government.

Most of the parliamentary actors who participated in my research, from across the spectrum in both parliaments, acknowledged the similarities between their own institution and all public organisations in terms of their common requirements, including good governance, accountability, professionalism and expertise. When interviewed, their principal focus was on operational management—‘administration is administration’, parliament is ‘not fundamentally different’ or ‘not completely different’⁸—and several also cited capacity for change and a need for continuing internal and external review. Many actors noted that differences could be overplayed, that parliaments like to think they are unique when they have more in common with other organisations. Differences can be perceived as a protection and independence can be taken advantage of. In Table 8.1, I analyse responses to interview questions about the differences and similarities between parliament and other public organisations.

Most parliamentary actors, whether members, managers, clerks or observers, cited differences as well as similarities between parliament and other public organisations. An important distinction, however, is the way these differences were interpreted. To some interviewees, they reinforced the ‘uniqueness’ or ‘independence’ of the parliament. To many others, they represented public management challenges common to other public organisations within their own contexts; all organisations are different to some extent. The following quotations, taken from a range of parliamentary actors, support the argument that differences should not be barriers to effective public management reform within parliament. In fact, these views are indicative of a willingness to entertain it:

[T]here are plenty of people with their own issues out there. They may not be quite the same because of the member angle but it’s not as if they are all uniform elsewhere—they are also different.⁹

I’m not sure that I would buy into the differences … In many ways, there is nothing that we do that is completely unique and different from any other organisation. I think those who argue that it is tend to use that as a blanket reason for not learning from outside … One of our weaknesses is that we don’t learn enough from what happens in the real world. To a certain extent, we exchange with other Commonwealth parliaments and things but there is a reluctance to look at simple and best HR [human resources] practices in the public sector and to learn from them.¹⁰

I am much more [inclined] towards the line of similarities than differences. In the end, we are all human beings. We all behave, we all project, we all have our own inadequacies, we all like warm fuzzies, we don’t like cold pricklies, and I don’t think that’s any different from anywhere else other than the fact that we have allegiance to parties.¹¹

[T]oo often everyone says, ‘Oh, it’s completely different.’ Actually, quite a lot of it is not completely different. There are not enough people inside the railings with experience outside the railings because there’s a perception in here that it’s so different that nobody could make the crossing. Having said that, some of the differences are startling, along the lines of how MPs operate or don’t operate, the lack of organised activities, the fact that everyone is so individually distinct.¹²

It may be unique in a sense, but I don’t know that it is the only kind of bureaucracy that is unique. I think all bureaucracies probably are unique in their own way, which does not detract from the proposition that they’re also alike in a lot of ways.¹³

[I]n some ways the differences are perhaps not so great. Ninety-five per cent of my career was in the parliamentary service, but I know that the federal sphere is also characterised by a lot of very dedicated people in lots of executive departments who have great cultures of professional expertise and pride in all sorts of areas … Parliament is a special service, but there are lots of other services that are also characterised by a lot of idealism, professionalism and long-term traditions of neutral service.¹⁴

Acknowledgement of the many similarities between parliament and other public organisations, and an appreciation of the extent or context of perceived differences, affords an opportunity to look outwards from the parliamentary environment and learn from public management as well as parliamentary practice and scholarship.

A final point on ‘uniqueness’: my research has illustrated an inherent conflict in traditional beliefs around the concept of parliamentary ‘independence’ (or exclusive cognisance) and a parliament’s capacity to meet societal expectations. I present five examples of this conflict: first, as in the aversive constitutionalism argument of Flinders et al. (2018a), the independence argument can be used to thwart reform to protect individual and political interests (we have seen evidence in earlier chapters of this occurring in the Australian Parliament). Such a use is not directed towards meeting Crick’s (1968) or Reid and Forrest’s (1989) test of parliament as a broker of ideas and deliberation with the assumed outcome of a better-informed and engaged public. Second, when the independence concept is considered in the scrutiny or investigative context, its use tends to encourage adversarial or pejorative perceptions of the ‘we need to keep the bastards honest’ type,¹⁵ rather than collaborative or constructive outcomes. It does little to encourage public confidence.¹⁶

Third, advocates for the independence of presiding officers from their political parties typically mean to free incumbents from the constraints of political affiliation and allow them to always act impartially; however, this may be unachievable. When an independent Speaker exercises authority over a parliament’s proceedings, their actions are not always considered impartial¹⁷ and may even be seen as an abuse of their independence (see Chapter 7). Fourth, the constant call for the Australian Parliament to take control of its own finances in line with the somewhat misplaced doctrine of the separation of powers within Australia’s ‘Washminster’ system is, to some, another myth to be dispelled. Fifth, the traditional belief that parliament is ‘unique’ could in fact bolster an inherent tendency for parliamentary actors to prefer not to rely on external influences, including those that could help to improve parliament’s effectiveness. The concept of independence may militate against effective parliamentary administration when it is used to signify exclusion, rather than inclusion. However, when used in the context of authorised and legitimate agency directed to the interests of the parliament rather than party allegiance, it could engender a greater appreciation of public management concepts.

Parliamentary administration in a public management framework

In calling for a rethinking by parliamentary actors of the concept of parliamentary administration, I am not suggesting that adopting a specific public management approach will provide an ideal model for parliaments. Although my research has highlighted many similarities between managing parliaments and public organisations generally, fundamental differences include the lack of a single authority, with no one wholly in charge, relentless public scrutiny and the seething tensions among members, officials and parliamentary observers about what an effective parliament really looks like—tensions that are exacerbated by the nature of the political contest in which the parliamentary institution is steeped. Nonetheless, a key challenge for managers in both parliaments, in an era of declining public trust, is how to place a greater focus on projecting and sustaining parliament into the future while also understanding, if not always preserving, the traditions of the past. This task would seem to require a greater reliance by all parliamentary actors on strategic and collaborative public management skills and expertise, practised across intra and interorganisational boundaries. A further challenge lies in engaging members more constructively and strategically in managing their parliaments, rather than simply criticising management activities or avoiding responsibility altogether, particularly when many do not see themselves as sharing a public management role. This would require both officials and members in key administrative roles, particularly the presiding officers, to exercise ‘situated agency’ working sensitively within the political/administrative zone.

A third management challenge is how to develop collaborative mechanisms with potential external contributors, and this is where the potential for broader democratic reform becomes apparent. This goes to my third purpose in writing this book and highlights the role parliament’s managers can play in strengthening parliament’s reputation and relevance, thus enhancing its capacity to engage with the public in the ‘national conversation’ on crucial policy issues (Leslie and Mohr 2021). This is not a novel suggestion; if anything, it is a reaffirmation of the views of revered parliamentary advocates, including Jennings and Crick.

This book has not set out to provide a comprehensive analysis of public management theory.¹⁸ It is necessary, however, to provide some explanation of its various phases to support the book’s contention that an appreciation of public management approaches by parliamentary actors would be beneficial. In the sections below, I outline some characteristics of public management that have a demonstrated or potential relevance to parliamentary management.

‘Old’ public administration

The evolution of public organisations from public administration to newer theories of public management is well researched (see Albrow 1970; Bourgon 2011; Lindquist and Wanna 2011; Christensen 2012; Bryson et al. 2014; Osborne et al. 2015; Esmark 2016), and I am in danger here of oversimplifying numerous and varied explanations. Nonetheless, I can draw from Albrow’s (1970) critiques of Weber’s rational bureaucracy to identify characteristics that have also typified the forms and structures of traditional parliamentary administration. These characteristics included lifelong salaried professional jobs, fixed career structures requiring specialised knowledge and the formation of social classes, assisted by higher education. Lifelong tenure, a fixed salary and inalienable pension rights in a Weberian bureaucracy presupposed that civil servants (or parliamentary officials) were shielded from undue political pressure and corruption and would refrain from acting out of personal interest (Christensen 2012). Structures were impersonal and hierarchical with clearly specified functions; officers were selected based on a professional qualification. Career promotion was typically governed by seniority. In common with other organisations, public administrators also had a symbolic function, as characterised by Mintzberg (1973) and Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).

Less positive features of bureaucracy included age and security, a stifling of administrative vitality and managerial creativity, an overdevotion to precedent, lack of initiative, procrastination, duplication of effort and departmentalism, inability to learn from errors, self-interested use of rules to preserve the status quo and uneven distribution of power (Albrow 1970). Early literature on the roles of parliamentary officials (Rydz 1979; Reid and Forrest 1989) concurred with this perspective, and the self-interest element of parliamentary service is also reflected in discussions with parliamentary actors.

‘New’ public management

New public management (NPM) is customarily associated with neoliberal ideas of reinventing government so that it works better and costs less (Osborne and Gaebler 1993) or perceptions that bureaucracy is broken and needs fixing (Savoie 2006). It has numerous characterisations: competition and incentives (Dunleavy et al. 2006); a focus on outputs and outcomes rather than processes; more measurement and increased accountability; flatter structures and decentralised responsibility, allowing and encouraging management discretion; market-like strategies; the use of contracts; and an emphasis on service quality and customers (Pollitt 2003; Rainey 2012; de Vries and Nemec 2013; Esmark 2016). It has seen a shift in values towards efficiency and professional public sector management (Hood 1991; Pollitt 2003; Savoie 2006), leading to a more managerial and open senior leadership for whom roles have changed from those of traditional public administration to a greater emphasis on business planning and corporate governance principles.¹⁹ Advice is contestable and political leaders have experienced heightened demands for performance and greater public expectations (Halligan 2012). Claims that NPM has achieved the holy grail of better performance outcomes are not universal (Moynihan 2012) and the same may be said about parliamentary administration (Barrett 1999; Aldons 2001a; Duncan 2004; Verrier 2008). But de Vries and Nemec (2013) claim that NPM is still alive and kicking even though its ideas may have been translated into different tools. While the ideologues of minimal intrusion by the state and privatisation of services are less dominant, the emphasis on internal efficiency remains, albeit with a renewed emphasis on improved effectiveness and good governance, and this appears to be the case also in the two parliaments.

Bevir and Rhodes (2003) questioned the whole conceptualisation of NPM as a ‘global paradigm’ and argued against an institutionalised approach to its analysis. They preferred an interpretative approach to public management reform focusing on historical traditions and individual agency, based on actors’ beliefs, actions and practices, and this is the approach taken in this book. The influence of NPM on parliamentary administration appears to have brought a strong focus on structural efficiency, performance management and accountability, particularly in Australia, but with less emphasis on ‘the market’ and competition, although several services in the Australian Parliament—particularly facilities management, catering and parliamentary reporting—have been subjected over time to outbreaks of outsourcing.

Public value and associated post-NPM ‘paradigms’

Moore’s (1995) seminal work on public value introduced a new way of thinking about how public managers should think and act, and it is worth spending a little time exploring the concept here. It was apparently ‘seized on’ by public managers as a way of rediscovering themselves after the ‘predations of new public management’ (Rhodes and Wanna 2007: 407; see also O’Flynn 2007). (Moore’s 2013 publication capitalised on the popularity of the public value concept and responded to criticisms relating to its measurement: Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2009; Alford and Hughes 2008; Alford and O’Flynn 2009; Williams and Shearer 2011.) In one of a series of workshops facilitated by the Australia and New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG) in 2016 (which I attended), Moore told managers he wanted them to engage intellectually with their public management roles, that they had a duty and obligation to think long term and look beyond the narrow and sometimes bureaucratic nature of those roles. As well as thinking of a system in terms of its efficiency, they should be looking to improve it to create new benefits for the direct recipients of the service, policy or regulation as well as the recipients of the greater social outcomes. According to Moore’s thinking, if citizens are willing to pay for services with no immediate or tangible benefit for themselves, public managers need to make sure they are not wasting their money, but rather are maximising the value of the public good and providing transparency, fairness and justice. In parliamentary terms, this is a dilemma in itself: citizens are unwilling to pay too much for ‘democracy’ when the concept is strongly equated with the interests of politicians, as continuing expenses and entitlements ‘scandals’ in both parliaments have demonstrated.²⁰

Moore saw his public value model working in public organisations of all kinds (although it is unlikely he was thinking specifically of parliamentary administration). Nor did he confine his definition of ‘public manager’ to unelected officials. He instead urged all public officials, including those elected to their roles, to carefully consider the opportunities for creating value and to account for the spending of public authority (or consent) as a cost to be borne against the intrusion of the state. At the risk of accusations of conceptual stretching, it is not difficult to argue in the same way for a balance between what citizens might perceive as intrusion—a parliament urging citizens to play a more informed, energetic and responsible role in the democratic system (the view of Jennings [1941])—against the resources required to achieve greater public engagement and deliberation. Indeed, Horner and Hutton (2010) promote the efficacy of public value concepts in tackling the democratic deficit (see also Horner et al. 2006).

The public value concept has many critics,²¹ but we can apply three broad tests to it (and its usefulness in the parliamentary context): it must create something substantively valuable, be legitimate and politically sustainable and be operationally and administratively sustainable (Alford and O’Flynn 2009). These tests also equate with Lynn’s (2012) dimensions of responsible public management, which must be constitutionally authorised, performed skilfully and efficiently and reflect the values of a wider society. To Bryson et al. (2015), public value management is a way of moving philosophically, theoretically and practically beyond older public interest debates towards public value governance across multiple sectors and stakeholders and involving multiple conflicting and contentious value judgements (see also Stoker 2006a; Talbot 2008; Bryson et al. 2014).²²

In making a connection between Moore’s public value and parliamentary administration, I do not ignore criticism of its perceived emphasis on managerialism. A pragmatic approach is required that is consistent with the important (institutionalised) values at stake (Alford and Hughes 2008), but that also reflects a long-recognised need for organisations to acquire and use resources in a way that responds to the prevailing social context (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).²³ And while some critics have outlined drawbacks for public managers in adopting the public value concept, including its implications for accountability and legitimacy (Rhodes and Wanna 2007, 2009; Gains and Stoker 2009), there is no broadly settled view about the real or desirable relationship between the political and administrative realms. The normal functioning of government requires public managers to engage with politics in various ways to create what they see as value for the public, with most seeing their interface with politicians as entering a zone—sometimes called the purple zone—rather than crossing a line between the administrative and political realms (Shergold 1997; Hartley et al. 2015; Alford, Hartley et al. 2017). Value conflict appears to be inherent in contemporary political and administrative life in liberal societies (Wagenaar 1999, 2014). Within parliaments, conflict between administration and politics is also a fact of life.

The ‘pragmatic’, ‘non-ideological’ or ‘whatever works’ approach to public value has contributed to a continuing scholarly discussion on ‘new’ governance relationships within the public realm (Alford and Hughes 2008; Coats and Passmore 2008). Bevir et al. (2003) argue that public governance changes emerge not solely from traditions and practices but also from the way these are interpreted by actors over time, emphasising the role of agency over institutional path-dependency. Stoker (2006a) argues that public value management is best situated in the systems of dialogue and exchange that characterise networked governance, relying for its motivation on successful relationships rather than rules or incentives. Osborne’s (2010: 9–10) new public governance pointed to fragmentation and uncertainty as key features of twenty-first-century public management requiring a focus on ‘the organisation within its environment’ and the negotiation of values, meaning and relationships. Edwards (2002: 60) predicted that the public sector in Australia would need a different set of structures, principles and values to support collaborative arrangements within government and with external partners and citizens, while Flinders (2002) discussed attempts in the United Kingdom to foster a greater degree of interorganisational cooperation in its ‘joined-up government’ program. All these approaches suggest a new governance ‘paradigm’ with traditional hierarchical approaches becoming decentred and relational. Bryson et al. (2014, 2015) describe ‘public value governance’ as a new movement that responds to the challenges of a ‘networked, multi-sector, no one-wholly-in-charge world’ in which ‘democratic values’ beyond efficiency and effectiveness are prominent. We can make a connection between the evolving paradigms of NPM, public value management and new public governance to the dilemmas of parliamentary administration explored in earlier chapters while also taking account of related criticism. Parliamentary actors also need to avoid ‘the public service reform syndrome in which reform succeeds reform, with no time for the intended changes to take place, no evaluation, and no clear evidence of either success or failure’ (Rhodes 2016: 638) and, as evidenced by the recent harsh reviews of workplace culture, they should not ignore issues of entrenched power and marginalisation (Dahl and Soss 2014).

On collaboration and co-production

Finally, I conflate two more evolving concepts of public management: collaboration and co-production. Collaborative public management was described by McGuire (2006: 33) as ‘a process of facilitating and operating in multi-organisational arrangements in order to remedy problems that cannot be solved by single organizations’. It is not a fresh approach but one that has been occurring for decades with the realisation that wicked problems cannot be addressed through traditional bureaucracies (McGuire 2006; see also Rittel and Webber 1973; Head and Alford 2015). Similar definitions encompassing ‘boundaries’, ‘civic spheres’, ‘public purposes’, ‘public problems’, ‘collective forums’ and ‘consensus-oriented decision-making’, all of which formally distinguish collaboration from simple interaction and transactional relationships, are offered by Ansell and Gash (2008), O’Leary and Bingham (2009), Agranoff (2012), Emerson et al. (2012), Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) and Scott and Thomas (2017). Indeed, to Agranoff, management itself means collaboration. If parliaments are deemed to be ‘single organisations’, it is still difficult to determine where the boundaries lie (or should lie) between different organisational environments: members and their constituents; members and officials; governments and oppositions; clerks and managers; the Senate and the House of Representatives; the House of Lords and the House of Commons.

McGuire (2006) also argues that many of the skills required for successful collaboration—communication, strategic planning and management within existing rules and structures—are just as important in traditional hierarchical organisations; it is to the behaviour of public managers that he turned in distinguishing effective network management from the traditional command and control of a hierarchy. Scott and Thomas (2017) offered insights into why and how public managers (and potentially parliamentary administrators) might choose to use collaborative tools, while Sullivan et al. (2012) related leadership and collaboration to situated agency to explain why actors in the same context might form different interpretations of collaboration.

A broader and widely accepted view of collaboration involves the representation of key groups and joint problem-solving between agencies and concerned citizens (Reilly 1998; Connick and Innes 2003; Aschhoff 2018). Specifically, Emerson et al. (2012) suggested that collaborative arrangements could be used to inform participatory governance and civic engagement. Indeed, in terms of policymaking, parliamentary committees regularly call for evidence from key interest groups who contribute to consensus decision-making. A basis for collaboration is already in place and could be expanded; we saw in Chapter 8 the example of the citizens’ assembly on adult social care in the United Kingdom (Betts and Wollaston 2018).²⁴ The UK Parliament’s Liaison Committee inquiry into the effectiveness and influence of the select committee system was discussed in the previous chapter; it also flagged the possibility of more joint working and greater accountability to the electorate.²⁵ Using the already well-established forums of committees would seem an ideal way to build the parliament’s citizen-centred collaborative capacity, as well as its organisational collaborative capacity to work across party lines (Aschhoff 2018).

Posited positive effects of collaboration that are relevant to the parliamentary context—particularly in terms of strengthening parliament’s reputation and relevance and enhancing its capacity to engage with the public—include the claim that collaboration can operate in contrast to adversarial policymaking and enhance an organisation’s legitimacy by including relevant stakeholders in public decision-making (Innes and Booher 1999; Lynn 2006; Ansell and Gash 2008, 2018; Hill and Lynn 2009; Torfing 2019). Crosby et al. (2017: 665) provide normative insights into the need for public managers to be better prepared for a ‘new public governance paradigm’ that involves collaborative innovation and public value creation, as opposed to a sole focus on responding to political needs and priorities and budgetary and media-fuelled accountability pressures in ‘contemporary monitory democracies’ (see also Keane 2010 on democracy and media).

The characteristics required for collaboration to succeed include strong structural relationships, clear objectives, shared commitment, mutual respect, and trust and governance mechanisms with decision-making authority, agreed rules and accountability. Good collaborators will exhibit bridging, mobilising, persuasive and adaptive skills and collaborative intelligence (Butcher et al. 2019). Bartelings et al. (2017) found that contemporary management activities still fell within the 10 traditional managerial roles identified by Mintzberg (1973) in his seminal study on managerial work: figurehead, liaison, leader, monitor, disseminator, spokesperson, entrepreneur, disturbance handler, resource allocator and negotiator. But they added a new role, orchestration, which emphasises the interorganisational aspects of management while focusing on the individual manager rather than the networks usually associated with collaboration. Whereas Mintzberg described the manager above all as a leader, Bartelings et al. defined the role as a spokesperson—an observation that resonates with the governance dilemmas considered earlier. Despite warnings about the pitfalls of collaboration from both sceptical questioners and outright detractors,²⁶ the potential exists for more collaborative approaches within public and parliamentary administration. Indeed, the emphasis on collaboration within the two parliaments’ planning and reporting documents would suggest it has now become a byword for effective outcomes.

The foundational idea for the co-production of public services was that citizens could participate in producing public services and not just consuming them (Ostrom and Ostrom 1977, cited in Alford 2014). By extending this concept to the delivery of democracy, one could argue it is not far removed from Crick’s (1968) view that parliament’s most important function is to act as a broker of ideas and information so the electorate can sit in judgement. This view places as much emphasis on the role of parliamentary administrators in shaping and meeting public expectations as it does on supporting governance and management structures and practices. After all, the very act of placing an ‘informed’ vote (Jennings 1941)—or even voting at all in the case of the United Kingdom—would seem to require more urgently than ever the willing and informed involvement of citizens.

Support for co-production is extensive, including from those who see it as restoring trust in government (or parliament, by extension) in contrast to the distrust expressed by the compliance and control mechanisms of NPM (Kettl 2006; Van de Walle 2010; Fledderus et al. 2014). Empirical research by Thomsen and Jakobsen (2015) found that programs more extensive than simply sending out information might be required to encourage citizen co-production. Alford (2016) claims citizens value the institutions that enable them to discern what is valuable, including by facilitating public deliberation; and, increasingly, external organisations and scholars are calling for greater participation via citizens’ juries, deliberative polls or ‘mini-publics’, claiming that contemporary representative democracy is ineffectual and an ‘elitist and technocratic approach will not wash’ (Breckon et al. 2019: 4; see also Flinders et al. 2020). Levy (2019) has suggested that deliberative or informed referendums could harness the populist trend in a more useful and benign direction.²⁷ Nabatchi et al. (2017) provided a sophisticated analysis of the public administration and services management implications for co-production and its variant forms and participants, arguing for a broad definition of the concept to maintain its generalisability and ensure its usefulness²⁸ (see also Osborne and Strokosch 2013). Again, the concept has its detractors. To Osborne et al. (2016) and Nabatchi et al. (2017), the concept of co-production remains ‘woolly’ or ‘muddled’ and, despite its normative appeal, the evidence base for its application is weak (see also Williams et al. 2016; Dewey et al. 2018). But we can turn to recent advocacy by a group of 15 distinguished scholars, drawing on Ostrom, for a positive approach to the theoretical study of public administration (Douglas et al. 2021). This requires ‘a dedicated effort in learning how to learn from “what works” in public policy’ (Douglas et al. 2021: 4), rather than a concentration on examining failures, negative performance, scandals and crises, which certainly reflects the path of administrative reform in parliaments.

From the above account, we can see similarities in the evolution of parliamentary and public management in the United Kingdom and Australia, starting with the classic public administration model, distinguished by respect for the rule of law and the separation of politics/administration; requiring merit, anonymity and political neutrality; being efficient, accountable, rules-based, stable and impartial; and allowing minimal discretion. Changes in public management approaches from the 1980s towards new neoliberal hybrid models of cooperation between public organisations and citizens; a focus on performance, efficiency, productivity and competition, greater use of ICT and enhanced public engagement and participation have driven administrative reform in both parliaments, with tangible results. These similarities were acknowledged by interviewees, when they were asked to compare parliament with public organisations, particularly in relation to accountability, operational management, the need for internal and external review, leadership and capacity for change, although some saw the pace of change within parliament as frustratingly slow (see Table 8.1). To others, parliament’s historical and constitutional legacies enshrine characteristics of custodianship, independence, hierarchy, status and specialised knowledge, exacerbating the tensions that exist between the ‘classic’ parliamentary administrator and those who see themselves as generalist public managers.

It is in the ‘newer’ public management approaches where we can see both the explanatory and the normative potential for viewing parliamentary administration through a public management lens. This is where the argument that parliament is ‘unique’ and ‘independent’, and that its members and officials are somehow absolved from any responsibility to learn from well-researched and widely advocated public management approaches (or even to see themselves as public managers), is weak. Of course, parliaments face specific challenges in seeking to behave like other public organisations or to adapt for parliamentary purposes the theoretical management approaches advocated by academics, and these have been acknowledged throughout this book. Even if we set aside historical and constitutional factors, parliamentary actors still must address multiple stakeholders and complex relationships, diffused authority and decision-making, divisive political interests and relentless media and public scrutiny. But arguably, these additional challenges make it even more important for parliamentary actors to see themselves as public managers, to engage proactively with stakeholders (and each other) in the collective public interest, to seek new models of collaborative governance and alternative methods of service delivery and to encourage citizen and community engagement with democratic ideals.

Table 8.2 depicts how public management approaches, characteristics and skills can be related to key parliamentary functions.

Table 8.2 Relating public management approaches to parliament

Principal roles	Actors	Functions/forums	Issues	Management approaches/characteristics/skills	Outcomes/success criteria
Scrutiny/oversight	Presiding officers Members Clerks Researchers Parliamentary Budget Office	Parliamentary debates Question time Standing committees Select committees Estimates committees Procedure committees Research outputs	Executive control: Resourcing, financial and programming Individual and collective agency	Old public administration: Respect for rules/hierarchy; separation of politics and administration; efficiency, accountability, impartiality; ‘craft’; political astuteness. New public management: Performance, efficiency, discretion, citizen-centric, business and strategic planning.	Efficient, effective and impartial scrutiny and oversight mechanisms. Adequate resourcing and programming. Efficient, effective and accountable public/parliamentary administration. Citizen knowledge and engagement.
Governing/legislating	Presiding officers Ministers Members Clerks	Parliamentary debates Question time Standing committees Select committees Public bill committees Procedure committees	Executive control: Resourcing, financial and programming Individual and collective agency	Old public administration: As above. New public management: As above.	‘Order, decency and regularity’ (Evans 2014) Efficient, effective and accountable public/parliamentary administration. Legislation and policy impact.
Deliberation/public engagement Policy development Parliamentary support and development	Presiding officers Ministers Members Clerks Officials Public External organisations	Parliamentary debates Standing committees Select committees Collaborative spaces, for example, citizens’ assemblies, mini-publics	Authority and advocacy Public participation Policy impact	Old public administration: As above. New public management: As above. Public value/governance: Strategic leadership; legitimate authority/advocacy, feasibility and value; dialogue and exchange, negotiation, ‘orchestration’; prioritising relationships over rules and incentives; transparency, fairness, justice; collective social outcomes; legitimate authority, feasibility and value. Collaboration: Facilitation, tackling intractable problems, interorganisational; non-adversarial; consensus-building. Co-production: Citizen efficacy, engagement and participation.	As above. As above. Reduced democratic deficit. Increased trust in parliament and other political institutions. Public input to policy/parliamentary development, collaboration with external organisations. Reforms to workplace culture, representation, electoral systems, how parliament works. Efficient and effective support for parliamentary management.
		Procedure committees Governance and domestic committees Collaborative spaces	External and member participation Authority and advocacy Strategic planning
Assumptions: Political partisanship, media and public scrutiny, budget limitations, public disengagement.
Risks: Perceived lack of impartiality arising from agency, public scepticism, cynicism, lack of political judgement, defining public interest/benefits, conflicting actor motivations, dominant traditional cultures.

A practical approach to parliamentary administration

My research has suggested that MPs with governance responsibilities could provide greater input, support and advocacy to decisions relating to the running of parliament, including its engagement with the public. Beyond that, a recognition of their public management roles would also strengthen their ability to form a strategic agenda for garnering greater parliamentary influence in wider democratic reform. Turning to practical solutions, and notwithstanding earlier comments rejecting a ‘one best way’ approach to organisational design, in the case of the Australian Parliament, an ability to balance the competing interests of multiple actors in parliamentary administration could be enhanced by an overarching governance structure—a parliament commission—which had a degree of political independence and whose decisions were publicly accessible. Such a body, designed along the lines of the House of Commons and House of Lords commissions, but more radically structured to operate across both houses, would, ideally, engage external members and provide not just assurance but also strategic advice and assistance towards restoring and strengthening the public perception of parliamentary effectiveness. In terms of efficiency, there is no reason the two existing appropriation and administration committees could not meet simultaneously (as envisaged in their respective governing Standing Orders, but not, apparently, currently practised). Their chairs—ex officio, the Speaker and the President of the Senate—could represent each house’s interests on the commission and issues of priority funding could be addressed. These could include the maintenance, promotion and repurposing of the parliamentary building during the remainder of its 200-year life to avoid the pitfalls of decades, if not centuries, of neglect, as evidenced in the Palace of Westminster (see Baxter 2015), as well as seeking additional funding for intra-organisational collaborative innovation on citizen engagement.

A formal governance structure would help to provide legitimacy and authorisation for strategic, politically independent and decisive action on the management of the Australian Parliament. As with any other committee, its advice should be public even if its deliberations are conducted privately. It would give presiding officers and other parliamentary actors the authority to work more effectively in the purple zone between the administrative and the political, acting in the interests of the parliament while cognisant of the interests of their parties. Indeed, such a body may also have leverage in promoting party-based reform to meet societal expectations, such as addressing poor behaviour and effectively representing women and minority groups in the parliament. (As I emphasise in the Epilogue to this book, the consequences of not acting in this way have now been made remarkably clear in the Jenkins report on the independent review into Commonwealth parliamentary workplaces; AHRC 2021).

While a parliamentary commission’s decisions would be open to scrutiny by the SFPALC in as much as they related to the Senate itself, the Speaker and members of the House of Representatives would not be answerable to that committee; on the other hand, greater transparency in decision-making could make estimates hearings more constructive and attract fewer ‘shouty’ media episodes (Wroe 2019), provided members refrained from political point-scoring. Of greater importance still, such a body would be in a position as a whole to argue for effective funding, including by departments preparing persuasive business cases and working in concert—an outcome that would mitigate any attempts by the Department of Finance to play off each department against the other (Reid and Forrest 1989). And in relation to a proposal that the Australian Public Service Commissioner should be head of the Public Service (Podger 2018), there is no reason the Parliamentary Service Commissioner should not be a prominent figure on a proposed parliament commission, particularly if that position became a separate appointment, not merely an additional role for the Public Service Commissioner. This ‘important’ role would then not need to be played ‘intermittently’ (Parliamentary Service Commissioner 2018). At present, the existing position of joint Parliamentary Service Commissioner/Public Service Commissioner seems to serve little parliamentary purpose, other than to save parliament the cost of funding it.²⁹

There will be objections to this proposal. First, the potential promise of a formalised governance structure and a more unified parliamentary service would inevitably be viewed in the Australian Parliament against the spectre of awakening previous proposals for a single parliamentary department (Reid and Forrest 1989; James 1996; NCA 1996; Malcolmson 1999). An alternative approach would be to view a formalised whole-of-parliament governance structure as an opportunity for the parliament to refocus its administration and harness its own efficiencies and reputational gains pre-emptively rather than await external intervention. The independence of the clerks and the Parliamentary Librarian is enshrined in the Parliamentary Service Act 1999, effectively mitigating past concerns, and the clerks I interviewed (in both parliaments) were not always unwelcoming of the transfer of non-procedural administrative functions to managers, leaving them with more time to exercise their procedural expertise.

Second, the effectiveness of the UK Parliament’s formalised governance structures, on which this proposal is based, continue to be widely criticised, both internally and externally (see, in particular, Cox 2018; Ellenbogen 2019; Leslie and Mohr 2021). Indeed, it appears that since the departure of Speaker Bercow, the force and intent of the governance changes to the House of Commons have been wound back (House of Commons 2021). Members of the House of Commons Commission are also considered to be remote from members and not focused on withdrawing or adjusting services in the interests of efficiency.³⁰ The commission’s proposal to abolish the Restoration and Renewal Sponsor Body, supported by the House of Lords Commission, provides strong evidence of political micromanagement and a threat to the success of the previously agreed program (House of Commons Public Accounts Committee 2022). It would be simplistic and defeatist, however, to point to these perceived failures as a reason to not introduce or persist with a structure designed to bring better governance or look to ways of improving it, as difficult as that may prove.

The House of Lords Commission and its members have supported moves to address what is arguably its most pressing management reform in terms of its public standing, that of its size and constitution (Lord Speaker 2017, 2018). Before the 2019 general election, the House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee (HCPACAC 2019) was hearing differing views on the administrative role of the Speaker and the future role of the House of Commons Commission.³¹ No doubt, the Covid-19 pandemic has resulted in the deferral of many important initiatives. Leaders in the UK Parliament may have to redouble their efforts to engage their own members and encourage their officials in restoring public trust and confidence. In Norton’s (2017: 201) terms, they need ‘to come [back] out of the bunker, guns firing’.³² In particular, they need to address not just the structures and processes of effective management but also the skills (HCPACAC 2019; Leslie and Mohr 2021; Jenkins 2021). Proposals to strengthen management capacity should be seen as an opportunity for effective administrative reform. The mechanisms are already in place for collaborative management structures that could help to reduce intra-organisational rivalries, maintain or improve hard-won resources for effective scrutiny and ensure transparent and timely decision-making. A more effectively managed parliament would no doubt also contribute to restoring public confidence.

Returning to the book’s third purpose, the case for less ‘independent’ and defensive thinking can be seen, too, in the context of calls in both countries for wider changes to the way democracy is practised.³³ Parliament should not relinquish any opportunity to re-establish itself as the major player in the democratic space. Both parliaments, through their members and officials, could advocate more effectively to meet the societal challenges they face in collaboration with other democratic institutions. A notable feature of this research has been the discovery of the symbiotic relationships between the UK Parliament and external organisations including the Hansard Society, the UCL Constitution Unit and the Institute for Government, as well as the increasing academic interest in parliamentary administration. Again, I draw attention to the conclusions of the House of Commons Liaison Committee (HCLC 2019) in this regard and the obvious role of each parliament’s committee systems as forums for collaboration and deliberation (Hendriks et al. 2019; Hendriks and Kay 2019).

Both parliaments could also capitalise on moves towards greater citizen engagement and participation in public information and discourse.³⁴ This would call for an extension of outreach and engagement activities and greater cross-sector collaboration to involve both the public and other democratic organisations in restoring trust and confidence in parliament. Again, mechanisms already exist within the committee system; the obvious candidates are the respective procedure committees and those involving electoral or constitutional change. Some would argue these committees are already on task, but greater public involvement could be garnered, including through citizens’ assembly–type arrangements. At the very least, greater public participation could lead to new ways to tackle issues in either parliament’s too-difficult box—such as electoral reform, parliamentary support and entitlements for members, House of Lords and Senate reform, the eligibility and representativeness of parliamentary candidates, strategic maintenance and renewal of parliamentary buildings and restoring public trust—by experimenting with forms of public discussion in collaboration with other organisations before, rather than after, the next crisis emerges.

Conclusion: Relating public management approaches to parliamentary administration

A major purpose of this book has been to demonstrate the complex management requirements of all parliament’s roles and the dilemmas arising from the traditional beliefs and practices of its actors. Perhaps I should have stopped there in my defence of parliament and my explanation of why it is hard to manage. But after highlighting throughout this book a culture of avoidance within parliamentary management, I could not simply leave all these issues in the too-difficult box. Instead, I have put forward public management approaches that might offer an appropriate balance between specialist expertise and management skills and help to establish and embed new beliefs, practices and traditions.

While parliamentary management may never have been a typical example of ‘old public administration’, it has displayed many of its characteristics. We have seen management reforms occur in both parliaments over several decades, principally in response to calls for greater efficiency, transparency, accountability and responsiveness. These could be classified as NPM reforms, and many of them relate to the more routine (although still important) aspects of operational management. More elusive, however, have been the strategic cultural and behavioural reforms designed to reduce perceptions of incompetence, self-interest, inertia or unrepresentativeness and to win ongoing support and approval for parliamentary democracy while parliament continues to fulfil its primary purposes. The problem is not new; the question of parliament’s public standing has been raised through the decades. I have demonstrated that most members are not actively engaged in advocating for institutional reform, either administrative or procedural; in some instances, they are excessively critical; standards of behaviour do not always meet public expectations; and traditional parliamentary administrators are reluctant to cross the political–administrative line into the purple zone—at least publicly. It is important here to reiterate that the actions of parliamentary actors depend heavily on their beliefs about what constitutes effective parliamentary management and that these beliefs are closely tied to their political values and individual conceptions of the public interest. Again, I acknowledge the influence of Bevir and Rhodes (2003, 2006) in this regard. However, also drawing on Bevir and Rhodes, we do not have to accept that the attitudes and practices of parliamentary actors must remain fixed. In the current environment of public distrust and disengagement, we need to look for new ways of energising parliaments, on the one hand, in resolving their internal dilemmas and, in the process, making them more responsive to societal needs.

I have also sought to demonstrate that the problems of both determining and providing public value while seeking public consensus are common to both the public/civil services and parliamentary services and there appears to be little to gain in continuing to proclaim that parliament is ‘unique’ as a defence against reform. On the contrary, parliament’s willingness to seek out ways of making the institution more representative of society as a whole, to collaborate with other actors in the public network to gain the resources it needs, to maintain the highest ethical standards, to work more closely with citizens in representing their collective aspirations and enhancing their efficacy and even to ‘co-produce’ an effective parliamentary democracy may be the keys to its ongoing relevance.

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