menuAfter the Coup
6
China–Myanmar Relations after the 1 February Military Coup
Senior Researcher, Department of Asian Studies, Palacky University Olomouc, Czech Republic
PhD candidate, Department of Political Science, McGill University, Canada
Abstract
Following Myanmar’s 1 February military coup, Beijing remained more cautious than other countries in its response. Protesters accused China of supporting the Myanmar generals and torched Chinese factories and boycotted Chinese products. However, did China actually back the Myanmar military? It would be too simplistic to assume that China favoured a return to military rule in Myanmar. Myanmar, with its many Belt and Road Initiative projects, is important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean; therefore, choosing the appropriate strategy was crucial for a continued relationship. Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup did not favour the military; yet, despite having a reasonable relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi, it did not favour the protest movement either. However, as time has passed, China has edged increasingly closer to recognising the military regime, approving funds for infrastructure projects and donating COVID-19 vaccines. Why has this shift occurred? This chapter argues that, although initially logical and beneficial, appearing neutral ultimately became costly to China’s strategic interests as time passed and that, as a consequence, China began moving to closer cooperation with the military.
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China’s reactions to the coup in Myanmar have been very interesting. While Burma was the first non-Communist country to recognise the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the relationship between Burma/Myanmar and China over the following decades remained nervously friendly, at best, and at times even hostile. The relationship warmed in 1988, and China became the junta’s closest ally after the coup, supporting it economically and diplomatically. With Myanmar’s top-down political transition to quasi-civilian rule from 2010 onwards, relations with China soured due to the cancellation of various Chinese-funded projects and Myanmar’s expansion of its diplomatic profile following reforms and the country’s so-called opening up. Cooperation with China was subsequently revived under the umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) during the Aung San Suu Kyi administration. Then, when the Rohingya crisis broke out and the West criticised the military’s actions, China refused to condemn Myanmar and even supported the Myanmar government. So, given the twists and turns in China’s relationship with Myanmar’s military and democratic forces, the question of how China would react to the 1 February 2021 coup was far from clear-cut.
Myanmar is geopolitically important for China to achieve its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean, to reduce transport time for some of China’s trade and to achieve its long-term two-ocean objective. Choosing the right strategy after the coup was crucial to ensure a continued relationship. Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup did not favour the Myanmar military but, despite having a reasonable relationship with Aung San Suu Kyi, neither did it favour the protest movement. Yet, remaining neutral was not an option in the long term due to political and other costs. This chapter examines how the Chinese government has gradually shifted its response towards the military, assuming that it would play some role in Myanmar’s future. The authors examine exchanges between China and Myanmar in 2021 and early 2022 through process-tracing, analyse the strategic interactions and offer an explanation as to why China changed from a (seemingly) neutral stance immediately after the coup to gradually leaning towards the military in the later months.
The chapter is organised as follows. After the introduction, China’s diplomatic interactions immediately after the coup (including the Chinese media’s take on the coup) and in the later months (including the advancement of each BRI project summed up in an easily comprehensible table) are described. This is followed by an analysis of China’s shifting attitude. Finally, the conclusion sums up the findings of the research.
China’s ambiguous stance towards Myanmar following the coup
The relationship between China and Myanmar was relatively warm during the Aung San Suu Kyi administration, which, among other things, suggests that China had relatively few border security concerns (although the authors acknowledge that many specifics are at play along the Myanmar–China border). The interactions between state officials during this period focused mainly on economics. Just a few weeks before the coup, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited Myanmar, discussing cooperation with Aung San Suu Kyi and President Win Myint and promising COVID-19 assistance (CMoFA 2021). Wang was the first foreign minister invited to visit Myanmar after its general elections in November 2020, confirming the importance attached to Myanmar’s neighbour on the one hand, and China’s support for the National League for Democracy (NLD) government (which won a landslide in the elections) on the other.
Immediately following the coup, Beijing was extremely cautious in its comments as to what had happened in Myanmar. While other countries expressed serious concern and denounced the military’s actions, China merely took note of the situation and turned a blind eye to the military coup (Tiezzi 2021a). Indeed, to avoid ‘picking a side’, China opposed the UN Human Rights Council’s calls for the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, insisting that Myanmar’s ‘internal affair’ should not be interfered with (Cook 2021). When thousands of Myanmar people took to the streets to join peaceful protests and were shot at by the military, various countries and groupings, such as the European Union and G7, issued statements demanding that the military refrain from violence against demonstrators. On 11 February, the United States announced sanctions on the junta leaders and several companies and other countries followed suit, such as Britain and Canada on 18 February and the European Union on 22 March (ANFREL 2021; Reuters 2021c). Countries such as Japan, India and Australia called for the return of democracy in Myanmar. China remained silent (Reuters 2021a).
China’s initial reservations towards the situation in Myanmar are reflected in Chinese media reports. For example, Xinhua, the official Chinese state-run media, referred to the coup as a ‘cabinet reshuffle’ (Xinhua 2021a) in the newspaper’s English-language version. Similar language was adopted by the People’s Daily, the largest state-controlled newspaper in China. On 2 February, the day after the military deposed the NLD government, Xinhua released an article entitled ‘Major Cabinet Reshuffle Announced in Myanmar’ (Xinhua 2021a). The same article was published in Chinese, with a direct translation of ‘cabinet reshuffle’ (政治改组) (Xinhua 2021b). The official website of the People’s Daily contained a similar report, also avoiding the word ‘coup’ (政变). The content and reporting style was consistent in both English and Chinese. As the official state media is directly controlled and monitored by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the tone and reporting directly reflected the government’s attitude, signalling its reluctance to condemn the military takeover. However, while official state media reports downplayed any mention of the violence that occurred in the wake of the coup, Chinese local media outlets, targeting Chinese audiences, were less hesitant. Large newspapers not directly owned by the CCP, such as the Southern Weekly and Beijing News, described the military takeover as a coup. Likewise, a page on Baidu Baike, the Chinese version of Wikipedia, was created under the name ‘2.1 Myanmar Coup’ (Baidu 2021). The difference in tone between the official state media (representing the government’s stance and targeting foreign audiences) and those directed at Chinese citizens reflected China’s dual agenda. Domestically, the long-term objective was to maintain China’s own power; in a sense, reporting on the ‘undemocratic’ misery of foreign nations could be seen as strengthening the government’s legitimacy by increasing the relative satisfaction felt by its citizens towards their own national environment. Internationally, however, the government chose to be more reserved in order to optimise its international leverage.
In Myanmar, the image of China has been severely damaged for a long period of time. During the years of military rule in Burma/Myanmar (1962–2011), China provided economic assistance, cheap loans, trade, investment, and military and diplomatic support in return for access to Myanmar’s natural resources. Myanmar people remember this support as having neglected the voice of the people under suppression. Mistrust of China also runs deep among the armed forces, and reducing dependency on China was one of the key motivations for the Myanmar military to initiate political reforms to the quasi-democratic system in 2011 (Kironska 2020). Although Myanmar’s civilian NLD government cooperated more broadly with the Chinese than its military had done, Chinese projects were still attacked for not creating enough jobs for locals, not treating Myanmar workers the same as Chinese workers and not adhering to environmental standards.
Given this strong anti-Chinese sentiment in Myanmar and Beijing’s lack of a firm stance on the Myanmar coup in the initial weeks, it is not surprising that China was accused of involvement in the coup. Many rumours circulated on the internet—for example, that Chinese airplanes had been seen transporting technical staff to Myanmar to help build a firewall and that Chinese soldiers were present in the streets of Myanmar. Chinese officials denied such rumours, calling them ‘complete nonsense and totally ridiculous’ (Chinanews 2021). The Chinese Ambassador to Myanmar Chen Hai stated that China was ‘not informed in advance of the political change in Myanmar’ and that the situation was not something China wanted to see (EoPRC 2021a). However, Facebook was flooded with posts blaming the Chinese; people in Myanmar began boycotting Chinese products and posting images of what not to buy—for example, big white onions were deemed to have originated in China, and people were encouraged to buy the smaller (local) ones instead. During a protest against China in April, a Chinese flag was burned in Yangon, and pictures were circulated on the internet.
In March 2021, dozens of Chinese-financed factories in Yangon were attacked and some were destroyed by arson. It was not clear how the attacks began, but the Chinese Embassy released a statement saying they were ‘completely nasty’ (EoPRC 2021b). Taiwan’s de facto embassy in Myanmar advised Taiwanese companies operating in the country to fly the island’s flag and hang signs stating they were from Taiwan to avoid being confused with Chinese companies (Reuters 2021d). Chinese officials condemned the perpetrators and urged Myanmar officials to prevent any further violence to ensure the safety of Chinese citizens and Chinese-owned businesses in Myanmar. The coup leader reassured Beijing that his regime would protect foreign-funded enterprises and, a few weeks later, the military tribunal sentenced 28 people to 20 years in prison for the attacks, signalling to China the seriousness of this promise (Reuters 2021b). China’s reaction to the arson—blaming the protesters and only mentioning financial damage without considering the people killed by the junta—and, later, its presence at a military parade to celebrate the annual Armed Forces Day in Naypyidaw on 27 March (along with representatives from seven other countries), angered Myanmar’s pro-democracy movement.
China’s assets in Myanmar were again attacked in the following months. In May 2021, guards at the Mandalay off-take station of the oil and gas pipelines were killed (Irrawaddy 2021b). In June, a bomb exploded at a Chinese clothing factory in Ayeyarwady Region (Irrawaddy 2021a). In January 2022, electricity pylons supplying a China-backed nickel-processing plant in Sagaing Region were blown up by the local People’s Defence Forces, forcing production to halt (Irrawaddy 2022a). China was concerned with its projects from the onset of the coup and requested as early as February 2021 that the military regime tighten security measures, to which the coup leader gave his reassurances.
China’s shift towards an increasingly positive attitude towards the junta
From its initial ambiguity, China moved to officially supporting the efforts of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to assist Myanmar to address the situation, basically using the association as a proxy. China emphasised the principle of noninterference in other countries’ internal affairs and promoted restoring stability ‘the ASEAN way’. Beijing emphasised the ‘three avoidances’: prevent violence (on all sides), prevent foreign influence and prevent intervention by the Security Council (China Daily 2021). This would lessen pressure on the Myanmar military and prevent it from collapsing, which China did not want to see because it expected the military to continue to play a role in Myanmar’s future.
Although it took some time, China also made contact with Myanmar’s shadow government. China is known for its multilayered approach, utilising its government-to-government, party-to-party and people-to-people policies to widen contacts (and leverage). In the past, following this approach, it managed to play the ethnic armed groups in the border region against the central government, securing for itself an official role in Myanmar’s (failed) peace process (Lintner 2021). After a phone call between the Chinese Embassy and a member of the Committee Representing the Pyidaungsu Hluttaw (legislative body in exile, created after the coup) was made public, the NLD was invited to attend an online meeting (as one of four parties from Myanmar and others from South and Southeast Asia) on ‘Political Parties’ Cooperation in Joint Pursuit of Economic Development’ organised by the CCP, a party-to-party platform, in September 2021. At the same time in the international arena, China helped broker an agreement to block the Myanmar junta from addressing the United Nations General Assembly, thereby delaying efforts by the junta to push the United Nations to recognise it as Myanmar’s legitimate representative.
With all this balancing, China still edged increasingly closer to recognising Myanmar’s military regime, having previously avoided explicitly picking a side. As time passed and the likelihood of the NLD government returning to power diminished, it became more geopolitically beneficial for China to embrace friendly relations with the newly established military regime. After the junta leader and his foreign minister met the Chinese ambassador, the embassy’s Facebook statement identified the senior general as the ‘Leader of Myanmar’ (CEM 2021). Chinese state-run media followed suit. China’s lean towards the military junta was confirmed in June 2021 when the junta was invited to the third BRI meeting (held online), the special ASEAN–China Foreign Ministers meeting in Chongqing (where the junta’s foreign minister, Wunna Maung Lwin, had a one-on-one informal session with the Chinese foreign minister) and the Mekong-Lancang Cooperation meeting with other foreign ministers from the Mekong region (Tiezzi 2021b). At the last-mentioned meeting, the bloc approved 22 projects to be implemented in Myanmar, for which more than USD6 million was to be transferred from the Chinese government to the Myanmar military (Strangio 2021). China’s special envoy for Asia, Sun Guoxiang, also travelled to Myanmar twice (in August and November 2021) to meet with top military leaders and lobby support for the junta’s attendance at the China–ASEAN leaders’ summit in November; however, ASEAN decided to exclude the military regime from the leaders’ summit (Frontier Myanmar 2021). China also assisted the junta with the delivery of COVID-19 vaccines, including donating some of them.
In 2022, this trend in the development of China–Myanmar relations persisted; although Myanmar’s military continued facing domestic resistance and struggled to consolidate its power, Beijing grew closer to the military regime. In April, China’s ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai, held meetings with the Union Election Commission to discuss the planned elections, as did India’s ambassador (Irrawaddy 2022b). That month, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi met with his junta counterpart, Wunna Maung Lwin, in Anhui province, China, where he promised to continue China’s COVID-19 support and encouraged the development of deeper relations by pushing forward the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor and other landmark projects (CMoFA 2022). Wang reiterated China’s support of ‘the ASEAN way’ in resolving the conflict in Myanmar and ‘working with Myanmar constructively’.
Myanmar civil society reacted to the strengthening of relations between the two states with an open letter to Xi Jinping warning that Chinese projects in Myanmar could be targeted if China continued to cooperate with the junta. The authors of the letter, written on behalf of 558 Myanmar organisations, claimed that China’s engagement with the junta was legitimising the military regime in the country (Progressive Voice 2022).
China’s strategy in terms of its engagement with Myanmar is driven by its geopolitical and strategic interests in Myanmar. As Myanmar represents a close neighbour, involving a number of important BRI projects and providing important geopolitical access in the Asia-Pacific, China has a strong interest in remaining relatively friendly with the country. The junta, for its part, is eager to advance the previously agreed and commenced projects in the country, as it is again becoming internationally isolated. The junta ousted all civilian government members of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor Joint Committee and replaced them with their own appointees as it pushed ahead with plans to implement Chinese projects that were part of the BRI. Table 6.1 presents a comprehensive list of, and updates on, the BRI projects in Myanmar following the coup.
Table 6.1: Projects under the BRI’s 1,700-kilometre-long China–Myanmar Economic Corridor
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She Gas and Oil Pipelines The 771-kilometre-long gas and oil pipelines, implemented by the China National Petroleum Corporation and Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, have run from Myanmar’s Rakhine State to China’s Yunnan Province since 2013 (gas) and 2014 (oil). With an annual transport capacity of 22 million tons of oil and 12 billion cubic metres of gas, the pipelines currently run at a quarter gas capacity and half oil capacity. They constitute less than 10 per cent of all piped gas imports to China and about 2 per cent of all oil imports to China. Development after the coup Officials from both countries held an emergency meeting in February 2022, at which Chinese officials urged the military regime to tighten security measures for the pipelines, a request first made in September the previous year. In February 2022, a take-off station of the pipelines was damaged as a result of attacks from a local resistance group. |
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Shwe Natural Gas This project consists of several offshore gas fields in the Bay of Bengal (discovered in 2004) and is being developed by a consortium of six companies from Myanmar (Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise), China, Korea and India. Production began in 2013 after the completion of the first of three phases. Development after the coup POSCO DAEWOO Corporation, the project operator, is currently undertaking the second and third phases of development. The first gas from phase two is expected in the second quarter of 2022. |
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Kyaukphyu Special Economic Zone (SEZ) The project gives China direct access to the Indian Ocean. A framework agreement for its development by China’s state-run CITIC Group was signed in 2018. During Xi Jinping’s official visit to Myanmar in 2020, China and Myanmar agreed to push forward with the project. Development after the coup Preparations have been made to seize 250 acres of land in the proposed area, and the SEZ management committee has been reorganised. In August 2021, the military regime invited bids to provide legal services to the SEZ and Deep Sea Port projects. In September 2021, CITIC announced that a consortium had signed with another Chinese company to conduct consultancy services and a preliminary field investigation. In October 2022, a gas-fired power plant was opened by the Chinese ambassador to Myanmar, Chen Hai. |
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Kyaukphyu Deep Sea Port This project, approved to continue in 2020, is being built by CITIC Group in Myanmar’s Rakhine State. It is part of the Kyaukphyu SEZ, 105 kilometres from the Sittwe Port in Rakhine State, a deepwater port constructed by India in 2016. It provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean and the Bay of Bengal, where India is developing a new naval base for nuclear submarines and ships (Project Varsha). Development after the coup In August 2021, the military regime invited bids to provide legal services to the Deep Sea Port and SEZ projects. In September, an agreement to conduct preliminary field investigation work for the project was signed. |
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Myitsone Dam The dam project (a cascade of seven dams) in the state of Kachin was being implemented by the state-owned China Power Investment Corporation and the Myanmar conglomerate Asia World and was allegedly designed to supply 90 per cent of its electricity to China. President Thein Sein suspended the project in September 2011, after widespread opposition. Development after the coup In February 2021, the junta announced the resumption of an unnamed hydropower project, but the Myitsone Dam project remains suspended. |
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Letpadaung Copper Mine The mine is located in the Sagaing Region and, since 2011, has been operated by Wanbao Mining (a subsidiary of NORINCO, a Chinese state-owned conglomerate with interests in arms manufacturing and mining) in partnership with the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings. The Myanmar government receives 51 per cent of shares from royalties and income tax. It began shipping copper in 2016. Since 2012, locals have been protesting against the project. Development after the coup In February 2021, the mine stopped operations after thousands of employees joined the Civil Disobedience Movement (some operations continued to run staffed by Chinese labourers); however, it has since resumed operation. In April 2022, the military promised to deploy troops to protect the mine after several attacks. |
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Three border economic cooperation zones The three border economic cooperation zones are located in Muse (Shan State), Chin Shwe Haw (Shan State, part of the Kokang Self-Administered Zone; this gateway provides the shortest route from Kunming to Kyaukphyu) and Kanpiketi (Kachin State). Development after the coup The junta reorganised the three working committees of the cross-border economic cooperation zones:
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Kunming–Muse–Mandalay–Kyaukphyu/Yangon railway and road The project aims to run from Kunming to Mandalay and from there to Kyaukphyu and Yangon. Construction began in 2011 but has been delayed due to fighting between the Myanmar military and ethnic armed groups. The Kunming–Kyaukpyu railway and pipeline constitute one of the most critical veins of the BRI, as it provides China with access to the Indian Ocean. Development after the coup On the Chinese side, a new rail line was opened in August 2021 stretching from Chengdu to Lincang (opposite Chin Shwe Haw). On the Myanmar side, there was no development other than a feasibility study. The first trial of the China–Myanmar corridor took place with a cargo of 60 containers being sent by road from Yangon to Chin Shwe Haw, then by train from Lincang to Chengdu. |
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New Yangon city This project, on the west bank of the Yangon River and occupying a proposed 20,000-acre area, is led by the Yangon Region Government and the China Communication Construction Company. In January 2021, Xi Jinping referred to the project as one of the three pillars of the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor. The project is controversial because of its flood-prone location and because of corruption allegations against the China Communication Construction Company. Development after the coup In March 2021, the military regime held a meeting with officials playing vital roles in the implementation of the project. Officials have been instructed to finalise the land acquisition process to move construction of the project forward. |
Source: Compiled by the authors from various sources.
Explaining China’s shifting attitude
To analyse and understand this shifting attitude towards Myanmar’s military since the coup, we take the lens of China as a strategic player and examine its economic and political interests both domestically and internationally when engaging with the junta. It is important to note that, as Chinese diplomatic exchanges have traditionally been with those holding power, the coup has placed the Myanmar military in the ruling position and, thus, as the main player. Although China’s relations with other actors—the shadow government, the NLD and ethnic armed groups—have also been important in the wake of the coup, analysing Beijing’s move towards Myanmar’s military may provide some insight into the possible future direction of China–Myanmar relations.
Following its rapid economic expansion at the turn of the century, China now presents itself as an important global player, capable of influencing, and seeking to influence, the global norm (Chhabra et al. 2020). Especially since Xi took power in 2012, economic and political influence has been prominent in the Chinese agenda, with the BRI arguably the first step in China’s grand strategy (Clarke 2017, 71–9). The BRI constitutes an important part of China’s interests, both economically and politically. The expansion and successful completion of BRI projects will help China to become a global norm shaper, attracting more countries to engage with it. The success of the BRI is likely to have an even more important symbolic meaning, especially in light of rising competition from the West, such as the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment (PGII), a G7 initiative aiming to provide investment to developing countries. China’s BRI projects also provide effective economic leverage and can be used as coercive tools in socialising countries to behave in ways that favour Chinese interests.
The BRI projects also provide certain leverages to Myanmar. As shown in the previous section, Myanmar is a host to many infrastructure and energy projects. Due to its geographic proximity to China, Myanmar is home to an important section of the belt and road, connecting directly to inner China. In other words, significant parts of the belt and road could not be completed without Myanmar. In this case, a strategic decision that accelerates ongoing projects or one that leads to additional economic engagements could establish further economic and political ties and build a good reputation for the BRI and further Chinese engagement globally. However, a decision that leads to the cancellation of projects or even more stagnation could incur a reputational cost and could potentially have a spillover effect on other recipients, leading them to reject BRI projects in their countries.
The BRI is certainly not the only factor influencing China. Maintaining a certain international reputation is important for China—although this has been variable in recent years. As a member of numerous international bodies, China needs to consider the reaction of the international community when making decisions. It is in China’s interest to maintain a favourable image among countries in which it holds a strategic interest, even though some may not align with it ideologically, especially in the Asia-Pacific region. A good and well-maintained reputation can bring additional economic exchanges and help to avoid economic sanctions or trade wars caused by disagreements or hostile public opinions in democratic countries. In the case of Myanmar, ASEAN’s opinion is particularly relevant to China. Given the negative attitude of most ASEAN countries towards the coup, China needed to consider the potential downturn of some established relations should it show support for the coup.
Military interests, or security concerns, are arguably the most important of China’s strategic interests, as they directly affect the regime’s survival. Military interests include both short-term border security as well as long-term geopolitical risks. The Chinese government has historically used nationalism (often arising from territorial concerns and disputes) to enforce its legitimacy and minimising security risks remains a priority for internal stability (Downs & Saunders 1998). Such concerns are especially salient in interactions with neighbouring states (e.g. Myanmar), as geographical proximity can pose immediate threats to border security, including a possible refugee crisis. China, with its strict refugee policy, is neither well equipped nor particularly willing to handle a large inflow of refugees. Further, it has its own security problems (e.g. separatist movements troubling the CCP), making the additional cost of a neighbouring refugee crisis too high.
Comparing the perceived outcomes of the above interests for each possible position China could take helps to explain its shifting attitude towards the Myanmar military. There are three possible stances or attitudes China could adopt: positive, neutral or negative. In the early period immediately following the coup, the attitude of the military, its willingness to work with Beijing and the likelihood of its survival were relatively unknown. Officially endorsing the Myanmar military could have resulted in BRI projects moving (faster) forward if the military was willing to work with Beijing. However, the coup attracted considerable international attention, and openly supporting the military could have damaged China’s international reputation, thus increasing the risk of its relations with the West, and possibly also ASEAN countries, turning negative. Therefore, in the immediate wake of the coup, China’s open support of the military could have brought more cost than benefit.
Public condemnation of the regime would also have yielded a negative result, as it would have alienated the military, causing China to lose one of its important allies in the region. A damaged relationship with the Myanmar military may have resulted in less effort being expended to maintain the China–Myanmar border, leading to possible conflicts and unwanted refugees. Moreover, such action could have resulted in the cancellation of many ongoing BRI projects, incurring both economic and reputational costs to China. Consequently, given the level of uncertainty immediately following the coup, taking a definite position of either support for, or condemnation of, the military posed a high risk of negative effects on Chinese interests. Thus, China chose to appear neutral, as this approach was less likely to induce a negative downturn in its relations with Myanmar. This helps to explain the Chinese government’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the Myanmar military, including its reluctance to call what occurred a ‘coup’ while also avoiding statements that would declare the junta a ‘government’.
As the months went by, however, the situation changed. International attention diminished and with it the risk to China’s reputation, as well as the risk of international sanctions being imposed on China. In fact, holding a seemingly neutral position posed its own risks, including loss of reputation, as it made China appear indecisive. When it became clear that China’s apparent neutrality could not be maintained long term, the government was forced to take a position. By then it had become clear that the junta was willing to cooperate with Beijing. As the Myanmar military gradually took decisive control over economic and infrastructure projects across the country (thus increasing its leverage over China), it became clear that holding a positive attitude towards the military could lead to potential economic gains through moving BRI projects forward and deepening political ties with the military. As the alternative—adopting a negative attitude towards the military and/or continuing to appear neutral—would most likely have had negative effects on Chinese interests and incurred other costs, it made sense for China to adopt a more positive and friendly stance towards the military. This helps to explain China’s shifting attitude in the later months of the crisis.
Conclusion
Beijing’s initially ambiguous attitude towards the coup neither favoured the Myanmar military nor the protest movement headed by the shadow government. As time passed, China edged increasingly closer towards recognising Myanmar’s military regime. This chapter has outlined the major exchanges between China and Myanmar following the February 2021 coup and documented Beijing’s shifting attitude, in which it first attempted to appear neutral and gradually became more friendly towards the military. Analysing China’s strategic interests in relation to Myanmar, the authors found that China’s initial hesitation stemmed largely from the possibility of a decline in economic and political power and security issues. In the beginning, when criticism of the military was widely circulating, open support for the military would have damaged China’s reputation, increased the risk of possible international sanctions and prompted a decline in China’s global political power. Conversely, China’s open condemnation of the regime could also have negatively impacted its balance of power and incurred a security risk. Thus, appearing neutral was the option most likely to best serve China’s strategic interests.
In the months following the coup, the situation changed. As international attention on the Myanmar crisis lessened, the risk to China’s reputation and threat of possible sanctions decreased. At the risk of being seen as an indecisive international actor, China decided to take a more affirmative and supportive stance. The following statement from the 13th National People’s Congress of China illustrates China’s position: ‘No matter how the situation evolves, China will not waver in its commitment to advancing China–Myanmar relations and will not change the course of promoting friendship and cooperation’ (Xinhua 2021c). One should not forget that Myanmar is geopolitically important to China in terms of its commitment to advancing its BRI projects and two-ocean strategy.
Although China has traditionally been cautious and avoided direct conflict when dealing with Western countries, the time of cautious diplomatic exchange seems to be over. China’s soft power and reputational power is now limited in the West. Consequently, in the future, China is likely to be more direct—even bold—in its condemnation of other countries. Its recent open alignment with bodies such as the Taliban indicates that Beijing is less and less concerned about its reputation in the West. As a result, when dealing with China, Western countries will need to understand that China is likely to be more assertive and, to a certain extent, more extreme.
When dealing with Myanmar, countries such as Australia need to be aware that, as time goes by, China is likely to be a stronger ally to the Myanmar military. Further, China is unlikely to contribute to, and will probably oppose, any moves by international actors to engage with the Myanmar shadow government.
Funding
This work was supported by the European Regional Development Fund, ‘Sinophone Borderlands—Interaction at the Edges’, CZ.02.1.01/0.0/0.0/16_019/0000791.
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Xinhua. 2021c. ‘Chinese FM Raises Three-Point Proposal on Myanmar Situation’. Xinhuanet, 7 March. www.xinhuanet.com/english/2021-03/07/c_139792049.htm
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