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Localisation, Good Humanitarianism and Solidarity-Based Approaches to Aid in Myanmar

Anne Décobert

Lecturer in Development Studies, Faculty of Arts, University of Melbourne

Abstract

Responses to the multifaceted humanitarian emergency precipitated by Myanmar’s 2021 military coup demonstrate the effectiveness of localised aid. Yet localisation is not just about aid effectiveness, but about humanitarian autonomy, rights and justice. In Myanmar’s Spring Revolution, we are seeing not just ongoing resistance against the military regime, but also growing resistance against unequal and unjust international aid systems. Recognising the political and moral imperative of localisation has implications for debates over the nature of, and principles that should shape, international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar. In Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crises, community-based and civil society actors are striving not only to help their communities but also to shape their country’s future—and they are calling for solidarity from international actors. In a context in which normative neutrality can do harm, defining ‘good humanitarianism’ as promoting local agency and autonomy provides a moral compass for international actors to navigate complex political and ethical dilemmas.

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The 2021 military coup in Myanmar has triggered immense suffering across the country, with civilian populations impacted by escalating violence and displacement, an evolving civil war on multiple fronts, an economic and food security crisis, and a public health emergency within which the junta has weaponised COVID-19. The resulting multifaceted humanitarian emergency cannot be understood in isolation from Myanmar’s protracted history of structural violence, injustice and conflict. Against the backdrop of a political crisis triggered by the coup but which has its roots in this long history, civil resistance movements across the country have continued to reject a violent and illegitimate regime. At the same time, in response to the current situation of volatile, concurrent and overlapping crises spanning the country, and within a context of shrinking humanitarian space, community-based and civil society actors have mobilised to provide critical assistance to their communities, demonstrating the strength and effectiveness of locally driven aid. National and local-level actors are now also calling for changes to international aid systems and practices, through their advocacy and everyday work demonstrating that localisation is not just about aid effectiveness but also—and more importantly—about humanitarian autonomy and justice.

In Myanmar’s Spring Revolution,¹ we are seeing not just ongoing resistance against the overt violence of the military regime, but also growing resistance against what Bethia Burgess describes as the ‘quiet violence’ of unequal international aid and governance systems that perpetuate neo-colonial power relations (Burgess, forthcoming). In this context, debates about the localisation and decolonisation of aid are, at a deeper level, debates about rights, autonomy and justice. For members of Myanmar civil society, these are debates about who has the right and the authority to define the future of their country, and about their need to be recognised as equals by international counterparts. Localisation, as Hugo Slim demonstrates, is then ‘about realising political rights and making humanitarian citizenship, and should be recognised as politically necessary’ (Slim 2021).

In Myanmar today, debates about localisation are also often linked to deeply political questions over the nature of, and principles that should shape, international humanitarian engagement. Here again, issues of rights and justice are key, as community-based and civil society actors in Myanmar call for solidarity from international donors and aid agencies in a context in which, as one international aid worker acknowledged, ‘there is a clear right and wrong here’ (Interview, February 2022). While recognising that there are no simple answers to what remain difficult questions, I argue that, in a context in which normative neutrality can do harm, it is necessary to define ‘good humanitarianism’ as humanitarianism that promotes the autonomy and agency of local populations (Slim 2015).

This chapter is part of a broader, ongoing research project on opportunities and challenges for the localisation and decolonisation of aid in Myanmar’s complex emergency. To explore debates on the localisation and decolonisation of aid, and their links to questions of international engagement and solidarity, I draw specifically here on 18 targeted semi-structured interviews with representatives of community-based organisations (CBOs), civil society organisations (CSOs), non-government organisations (NGOs), international NGOs (INGOs), donor agencies and the National Unity Government (NUG), as well as multiple, more informal discussions with community, national and international-level actors involved in humanitarian responses in Myanmar. I also draw on public documentation and discussions, as well as my work for over a decade as a consultant and researcher working on aid systems in Myanmar—work that has notably enabled me to take part in past and current debates about aid programs, localisation and the principles that should shape international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar. All individual sources and identifying details have been anonymised to protect the security and confidentiality of those involved. Organisations have been named only in cases where the activities described are already published or openly discussed in the public domain.

In the following sections, I discuss opportunities for the localisation and decolonisation of aid in Myanmar’s complex emergency, highlighting the need to move beyond ‘localisation by default’ and towards long-term and sustained changes to the status quo of unequal and unjust international aid systems. I demonstrate that, for members of civil society and community-based organisations in Myanmar, localisation is not just a technical issue but a political and moral imperative: it is about the need to be recognised as agents of their own destiny. I then turn to ongoing debates about international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar, reassessing these debates through the lens of localisation as a political and moral imperative. Ultimately, and while these debates have no simple answers, I argue that reframing ‘good humanitarianism’ can provide a moral compass to guide decision-making and much-needed reforms in aid systems and practices.

COVID-19 and the coup: From ‘default localisation’ to sustainable change

We have very little [international] aid, but we are not going to plead and go down on our knees anymore … One of the slogans of this revolution is that we only have ourselves, to be much more self-reliant and less inclined to depend on outsiders. That means less inclined to be colonised. (CSO leader, Myanmar, interview, February 2022)

In Myanmar, aid practitioners and analysts had previously highlighted the strength of locally led emergency responses, which can be far more timely, effective, relevant and sustainable than those by international actors (e.g. L2GP n.d.; Walsh 2020). Yet, the COVID-19 pandemic and 2021 coup have together drawn increased attention to the importance of localised responses to humanitarian emergencies, and to the relationship between localisation and questions of humanitarian autonomy and emancipatory justice.

The COVID-19 pandemic meant that, to a large extent, as an international aid agency representative in Myanmar conceded in an interview in February 2022, ‘the international community went into paralysis’. As a consequence of COVID-19, international agencies were forced to bring many expatriate workers back to their home countries, to make staff work more remotely and to suspend many operations on the ground. A civil society leader in Myanmar, frustrated with the reactions of international agencies, put it more bluntly when he said: ‘The international aid community withdrew into their cocoons’ (Interview, February 2022). Throughout 2020, as they grappled with COVID-19 restrictions, as well as their own occupational health and safety policies and other bureaucratic regulations, many international agencies that continued to support aid programs in Myanmar became increasingly dependent on working with and through local and national systems and organisations. Meanwhile, civil society actors as well as community-level and national-level organisations in Myanmar continued to work on the ground, serving their communities and providing essential services (for a detailed analysis of COVID-19 pandemic responses, see Chapter 11, this volume). Of course, similar trends have been noted throughout the world, the pandemic restricting international agencies’ operations and providing a temporary window of opportunity for greater localisation (Barbelet, Bryant & Spencer 2021; Roche & Tarpey 2020; Ullah, Khan & Wijewickrama 2021).

In Myanmar, the impacts of the pandemic were then compounded by the military coup, impeding any return to business as usual by international aid agencies—for now at least. After the military seized power on 1 February 2021, and as Myanmar grappled with an escalating political and humanitarian crisis, community-level and civil society actors throughout the country mobilised their networks and devised creative solutions to channel vital assistance to affected communities. Responses to Myanmar’s now multi-pronged complex emergency have, in turn, showcased the effectiveness of locally driven aid, as well as the bravery and resilience of local actors who have continued to assist their communities, despite huge risks to their own lives and security.

These locally led responses drew upon existing social networks and community-level systems—including self-help groups, CSOs, CBOs and religious groups. Some groups—particularly those in historically contested border areas or in areas of the Delta that were devastated by Cyclone Nargis in 2008—already had significant experience in emergency response. Others, such as those in Myanmar’s historically more stable Dry Zone, were often previously involved in social and development work but had little emergency response experience; they learnt as they went, as a CSO member explained during a webinar by the Myanmar Local Humanitarian Network (MLHN) in January 2022 (MLHN 2022b). Others still were formed over the past year or two, comprising affected community members who exercised their own agency in mobilising resources and assisting their communities in highly localised, piecemeal and effective ways, without formal mechanisms or external support. At the same time, national-level NGOs in Myanmar ramped up their support for community-level and civil society networks in different parts of the country, and longstanding cross-border aid organisations worked to meet increasing humanitarian needs in border areas under mixed administration or ethnic armed organisation control.

Meanwhile, since the coup, escalating conflict and displacement, soaring humanitarian needs, ever more restricted humanitarian access and COVID-19 have continued to increase international agencies’ reliance on national and local organisations and networks. Some international aid agencies that previously relied purely on models of direct implementation for their work in Myanmar were forced to shift towards indirect implementation, working with and through local and national partner agencies. As an INGO worker put it: ‘It’s been default localisation, because the international actors can’t reach the populations that they want to’ (Interview, December 2021). For actors on the ground in Myanmar, this is not just a time of crisis, but also one of opportunity. As one civil society leader explained:

There is a high opportunity for us to show others the capacity of the local. And also, this is a very good time that international also recognises the power of the local—this is a kind of blessing in disguise. (Interview, February 2022)

The current ‘default localisation’ in Myanmar has showcased the feasibility, effectiveness and benefits of locally led aid approaches. As civil society and community-based actors across Myanmar have continued to lead humanitarian responses, they have also become increasingly connected and organised, sharing knowledge, experience and resources through networks that have developed within and across different states and regions, and calling for changes to international aid systems and practices. In early 2022, multiple regional networks, CSOs, CBOs and national NGOs came together to form the MLHN, which ‘aims to render humanitarian assistance more strategic and coordinated in reaching the most vulnerable and far-fetched areas, while pushing the localisation agenda at the heart’ (MLHN 2022a, 2). In a position paper on localisation published in January 2022, the MLHN, along with local intermediary actors, other humanitarian networks and 25 CSOs in Myanmar, called for institutional, systemic and behavioural changes by donors and international aid agencies. They asked for international actors to ‘take into account the current power imbalance of existing internationalised humanitarian aid architecture and mov[e] towards a real equitable and equal partnership’ (MLHN 2022a, 2).

At the same time, there has been increasing recognition within international donor and aid agency circles that the international aid architecture itself has inhibited a timely and effective response to the volatile, concurrent, overlapping and protracted humanitarian crises currently spanning the country. Meanwhile, frustration with the inadequacy of international responses and with ongoing challenges created by overly rigid, bureaucratic and top-down systems has led many to call out what one civil society leader in Myanmar called the ‘chronic ailments’ of international aid systems (Interview, February 2022).

As a result of these dynamics, actors on the ground in Myanmar are now increasingly calling on international donors and aid agencies to abide by commitments made in the 2016 Grand Bargain,² by putting more funding and decision-making power into the hands of local and national responders (IASC n.d.). They are also demanding reforms to overly rigid and top-down international funding mechanisms and compliance requirements—‘those tools and systems that we have in place that create barriers, that create hierarchy’, as one international aid worker described them (Interview, February 2022). Refusing to be treated as unequals in an international system of humanitarian governance³ that has to date largely failed their people, civil society and community-based actors throughout Myanmar are, therefore, now uniting in a groundswell of support for the localisation and decolonisation of aid (MLHN 2022a).

In the current situation in Myanmar, this groundswell of increasingly loud and organised voices from community-based and civil society actors who are calling for change arguably presents a conjunctural moment for a more radical localisation and decolonisation of aid systems and practices. Indeed, in a situation where the shortcomings of international systems are only too apparent and where international donors and aid agencies have been forced into greater localisation by default, community-based and civil society actors themselves are now attempting to use the window of opportunity presented by the pandemic and complex emergency in Myanmar to define the terms and shape of localisation. This is in striking contrast to much of the international work on localisation to date, which, as Maha Shuayb (2022) laments, is all too often top-down, internationally driven and imposed on local actors and contexts, instead of being defined by those on the ground.

At the same time, and while the current situation in Myanmar has fostered some noteworthy evolutions through ‘default localisation’, there is a real need for international agencies and donors to commit to more radical, long-term and sustainable change. In a possible future scenario in which Myanmar’s complex emergency is at least less acute (if not fully resolved), it would be hugely detrimental for international agencies to roll back to more internationally driven approaches. So while, in the current context in Myanmar, greater localisation is no longer really a choice for international actors, locally led aid programs must become a sustained reality. For this to happen, international actors cannot hide behind the idea of ‘crisis’ in Myanmar. This is not just because the label ‘crisis’ can deflect from the reality of long-term and deep-rooted political and systemic problems that need to be addressed in order to achieve lasting peace in Myanmar, but also because there is a tendency for international actors to maintain that times of crisis make it impossible to rethink existing systems and ways of functioning (Slim 2021; Interviews with international aid agency representatives, February 2022). Additionally, recognising the need for real and sustained change implies moving beyond seeing localisation as a technical advantage and towards recognising localisation as a political and moral imperative.

Localisation as a political and moral imperative

Within and beyond Myanmar, the need to localise aid systems and practices––to reorient the playing field by giving local and national actors more direct funding, support and decision-making power––is commonly justified in relation to operational effectiveness (Barbelet et al. 2021; IFRC 2018). With local actors and organisations being deeply embedded in crisis-affected contexts and communities, they can respond and address local needs more rapidly and effectively. But localisation is not just about aid effectiveness. As Hugo Slim (2021) argues, localisation is about realising political rights and defining humanitarian citizenship, with those affected by crises, their local organisations and their leaders driving decisions about humanitarian responses that will shape the long-term future of their communities.

Contemporary systems of humanitarian governance remain top-down and internationally biased. Despite commitments made in the Grand Bargain, most international humanitarian aid is still transferred to international organisations, with only small percentages of overall aid budgets going directly to national and local agencies (Slim 2021). This international trend is replicated in Myanmar, where members of civil society and community-based organisations are increasingly demanding that more funding be transferred directly to local and national responders (MLHN 2022a). At the same time, and as lamented by many aid workers in Myanmar, buzzwords like ‘participation’ and ‘partnership’ still too often obscure a reality where those affected by crises are reduced to objects of top-down and externally driven interventions, and where national, sub-national and community-level organisations become subcontractors implementing programs that they have not defined—programs that will, moreover, have profound and lasting effects on social and political dynamics in their societies.

This is not to say that there have not been notable attempts to implement Grand Bargain commitments in Myanmar. Even before the coup, some international agencies had initiated extensive programs aimed at promoting localisation. The Humanitarian Assistance and Resilience Programme Facility (HARP-F), for example, was established in 2016 to deliver the United Kingdom’s commitments under the Grand Bargain and, specifically, to advance localisation. Through its work before and since the coup, HARP-F demonstrated how international agencies can (and indeed should) adopt a more peripheral and supportive role in humanitarian responses, absorbing much of the bureaucratic and financial management work associated with international donor funding, while giving local and national agencies the independence and flexibility to design, manage and deliver aid programs in their areas. HARP-F has also documented successes and challenges in its work with local and national partner agencies in Myanmar, as well as highlighting the types of institutional and systemic changes required to enable greater localisation (HARP-F n.d.-a).

Moreover, in Myanmar’s conflict-affected border areas, systems of remote partnerships had for decades enabled international donors to support local aid agencies in ways that gave considerable decision-making power and operational independence to these local agencies. Remote partnerships entail a division of labour between the local organisation, which manages aid programs and their delivery, and the international partner organisation, which channels back-donor funding and deals with much of the more bureaucratic aspects of aid work. During a public webinar organised in August 2021 by HARP-F on localisation and remote partnerships in Myanmar, a representative of The Border Consortium—an INGO that has supported aid programs for decades in Myanmar’s border areas by working with local agencies through remote partnerships systems—described this model as ‘disruptive programming’ (HARP-F n.d.-b). Remote partnerships can disrupt power imbalances since they allow for greater local leadership though decentralised and flexible approaches that are adapted to local needs. In this model, INGOs like The Border Consortium act as intermediaries, taking on much of the donor-facing aspects of aid work and managing upwards by attempting to push back against overly onerous donor compliance and other requirements that can cripple local agencies.

However, and despite all the efforts that have gone into localisation to date in Myanmar, the international aid architecture itself continues to impede changes to the status quo. For one, the rigid and bureaucratic systems of many international donors and aid agencies ‘conceptually privilege and prioritise their own knowledge and expertise, often imposing Western-centric structures on contexts for which they are ill suited’ (Walsh 2020). Moreover, as an INGO worker in Myanmar explained:

It’s not in the interest of the great proportion of the aid industry—localisation isn’t in their own interests. Of course, there’s going to be a lot of resistance to it! (Interview, December 2021)

Combined with institutional inertia and the disincentivising practices of many international agencies themselves, vested interests in the status quo produce a tendency towards minor tweaking of aid programs instead of real shifts in power relations—something documented well beyond the Myanmar context (e.g. Ayobi et al. 2017). Localisation is then all too often reduced to international agencies employing a few additional local staff, engaging in a few additional and often largely tokenistic consultations with local communities, or in other ways talking the talk without really walking the walk of change.

Overall, contemporary international aid systems and practices therefore still perpetuate systemic inequalities between international actors and their counterparts in Myanmar. These inequalities become visible notably in the differential pay structures, benefits and levels of protection accorded to international and local or national aid workers; or in the ongoing dominance of international actors in positions accorded greater decision-making power, mobility and agency. There remains, as one civil society leader in Myanmar noted, a ‘core asymmetry’ that ‘includes incomes and perks and all the allowances that come with working with that [humanitarian system]’ (Interview, February 2022). At a deeper level, these realities reveal systems of humanitarian governance to be fundamentally paradoxical, uniting a politics of solidarity with a politics of inequality, a relation of assistance with a relation of domination (Fassin 2012, 3). Humanitarian governance, then, not only accords value to bare life, in Giorgio Agamben’s terms, but also accords different ontological values and unequal levels of agency to different human lives (Agamben 1998; Fassin 2012).

The unequal status quo in contemporary international aid systems and practices ultimately results, Hugo Slim (2021) maintains, in ‘imposing a system of social welfare in [people’s] societies which excludes them from its design, and prevents them from building their own social contracts and humanitarian institutions’—in turn breaching people’s fundamental rights to what Slim describes as ‘humanitarian self-determination’ and to be treated as international equals. Genuine localisation, entailing changes to the status quo of unequal power relations, is then a political and moral imperative, not just a technical advantage. And this is precisely what members of Myanmar civil society and community-based organisations are demonstrating through their work and advocacy.

Today, much of the discussion about localisation among international agencies operating in Myanmar continues to be focused on more ‘technical’ issues—or at least technical-seeming issues, since many of these have significant political and ethical ramifications. There is, therefore, much focus on issues such as the ‘absorption capacity’ of local and national agencies, funding streams and modalities, and what are seen by international actors as potential financial risks and compliance issues posed by channelling increased international support to local and national responders. But for members of national, community-based and civil society organisations in Myanmar, the debate about localisation is inextricably linked with political questions about who has the right and authority to define the future of their country. As the leader of a national NGO in Myanmar stated:

I think localisation, in a political sense, is another space where locals are able to voice against in this very, very unjust humanitarian architecture. When we look at the humanitarian architecture, it is very much an internationalised system … The thing about the self-determination means [the affected community] need to look at what they want to be in the future, about their country, about their community, about their society. Sometimes that might not be exactly the same as the international expectation, but we need to recognise the self-determination. (Interview, February 2022)

Recognising the reality of, and need to remedy, ongoing inequalities and injustices in international systems of humanitarian governance is the first step towards realising the type of genuine and sustained changes that actors on the ground in Myanmar are demanding. It also implies that, as the same national NGO leader in Myanmar explained of international actors: ‘Maybe some of your privilege you may need to share—without sharing your privilege, as far as you talk, localisation is impossible’ (Interview, February 2022).

Additionally, achieving genuine and lasting localisation means respecting and building systems, institutions and organisations that not only save lives and reduce human suffering, but also enhance the autonomy and agency of the very people impacted by crises. As Charlotte Dany highlights, localisation becomes a means by which ‘humanitarian aid may help to achieve common goals among equals and thus to integrate a more solidarity-focused approach’—an approach historically at odds with the unequal nature of international systems of humanitarian governance (Dany 2021; Fassin 2012). Further:

To make humanitarian aid a real tool for expressing global solidarity, one would have to regard the recipients of aid as equals and strengthen their agency, as well as that of local and grassroots organisations in the most affected areas. (Dany 2021)

Framing localisation in these ways, then, has important ramifications in relation to debates about how to deliver international aid within a complex emergency like Myanmar’s, where international humanitarian engagement can have significant ethical and political consequences.

Localisation and debates about humanitarian engagement and solidarity in Myanmar

In Myanmar today, debates about localisation are often interlinked with questions over the nature of, and principles that should shape, international humanitarian engagement—with solidarity-based approaches challenging the type of normative neutrality long claimed to be the ‘litmus test of humanitarianism’ (Décobert 2016, 232). While acknowledging that there is no simple, one-size-fits-all solution to these debates, recognising the political and moral necessity of localisation and reframing ‘good humanitarianism’ provides a much-needed moral compass for navigating complex political and ethical dilemmas.

As mentioned above, it is essential to understand Myanmar’s multi-pronged humanitarian emergency in relation to longstanding structural violence, injustices and conflict. Within the more acute emergency situation precipitated by the coup, a civil resistance movement is legitimately opposing an illegitimate and abusive military regime bent on terrorising local populations to retain power. As well as denying the democratic will of the people, the State Administrative Council (SAC) and Myanmar armed forces have continued to commit widespread and systematic abuses and attacks against civilian populations, which amount to crimes against humanity (OHCHR 2021). The junta has also restricted humanitarian operations, blocking the delivery of aid, deliberately destroying food and medical supplies, diverting aid away from its intended recipients, and attacking and even killing aid workers—acts that constitute violations of international humanitarian law.

Within this context, members of civil society and community-based organisations are calling for solidarity from international donors and aid agencies. Overwhelmingly, community-level and civil society actors continue to reject the SAC and denounce the suffering it is driving, and they are asking international actors to support them in their struggle for democracy and human rights. ‘We cannot pretend we are neutral, we are not’, one civil society leader stated (Interview, February 2022). Through their work, civil society and community-based actors are trying not just to assist civilians in need of aid, but also to define the future of their country. In so doing, they are asserting their agency as humanitarian citizens with the right and authority to shape their own humanitarian institutions and social contracts. And they perceive attempts at neutrality by international agencies as potentially doing real harm, particularly if—by not taking a stand or by having their aid politicised by the military regime—international actors end up legitimising, emboldening and enabling those behind the coup (Décobert 2021; Khin Ohmar 2021; Progressive Voice 2021). As one national NGO leader in Myanmar explained:

Sometimes, you know, international humanitarian organisations, they are too narrow with the international so-called principles. If you are on that principle, you are with them. If you are not there, well … so, I think we need to go beyond that now … We need solidarity. We are struggling, we are facing a lot of challenges, we need their understanding, empathy, and also the solidarity. (Interview, February 2022)

In the classic International Committee of the Red Cross definition, neutrality means ‘not tak[ing] sides in hostilities or engag[ing] at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature’ (Haug 1996). It is worth noting that the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations in Disaster Relief does not explicitly refer to neutrality, but instead focuses on the humanitarian imperative (reducing suffering) and impartiality (non-discrimination; see ICRC 1994). Nevertheless, and despite a long history of divisions over the viability of neutrality as a guiding principle for humanitarianism in complex emergencies, many international aid agencies still maintain that it is essential to humanitarian action (Décobert 2016; Fassin 2012; Redfield 2011). Moreover, international actors can be reluctant to support local and national agencies if they are not politically neutral, with the principle of neutrality then acting as a potential barrier to localisation. Yet, as Hugo Slim (2020) highlights, ‘neutral humanitarian action is one version of humanitarianism—not the only version’, and it is not absolutely necessary to be neutral to be a good humanitarian.

A commitment to localisation implies that international actors should engage with, listen to and respect civil society and governance systems that are deemed legitimate by the Myanmar people themselves. Moreover, in a context like Myanmar’s complex emergency, where normative neutrality becomes morally questionable and can do very real harm, it logically implies adopting a solidarity-based approach. An international aid agency representative currently working in Myanmar mused:

What civil society in Myanmar wants to do is overthrow the military. That’s what they want to do and so if we really want to localise, if we really want to support these local organisations, we would take a line that says: we will support you in doing that because that is what you want … I think, objectively, you could say the question of neutrality is irrelevant and if our role is really just to support people that are in need, these are mechanisms to be able to do that. That’s the solidarity approach. (Interview, February 2022)

In their private capacities, many representatives of international donor and aid agencies support a solidarity-based approach—after all, to repeat the words of an international aid agency representative, there is ‘a clear right and wrong here’. However, at the same time, international agencies that are still working officially inside Myanmar are having to balance calls for solidarity with the geopolitical agendas of their back-donors, and with concerns about protecting staff and programs on the ground. The same international aid agency representative who had voiced their personal support for a solidarity-based approach went on to explain that:

The question is: given these restraints, what can we do to support in solidarity, without putting our people at risk or without putting the whole organisation at risk? I think it’s a difficult line because, as long as we have an organisational presence in Myanmar, as long as we have staff in Myanmar, it’s going to be really tough to take a really overt position on some of these issues … I think that’s where we do need to differentiate, or we need to take a differentiated approach. (Interview, February 2022)

In contexts where normative neutrality may not be possible or may in fact do harm, it is important to rethink the principles shaping international humanitarian engagement and action. In Humanitarian Ethics, Hugo Slim (2015, 2) defines ‘good humanitarian work’ as work that:

enables a person or a community to remain the subject of their lives, not objects in the lives and purposes of others. Good humanitarian action makes people its goal but does not objectify them as ‘beneficiaries’ or commodify them as ‘recipients’ of aid. On the contrary, good humanitarian aid and protection increase people’s autonomy and agency as human beings. The best humanitarian action is that which respects people and works with them to prevent suffering, repair harm, and enable them to come through their suffering and flourish.

This reframing of principles to guide humanitarian action and engagement can then allow for differentiated but still ‘good humanitarian’ approaches in a context like Myanmar. Some of these approaches can—and indeed should—align explicitly with what Thomas Weiss calls a ‘solidarist’ approach, ‘employing humanitarian action within a political strategy on behalf of victims’ (Weiss 1999, 5). Others can be less explicitly political or aligned but should still respect the wishes of the Myanmar people and be founded on a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as increasing people’s autonomy and agency as human beings.

Since the 2021 coup in Myanmar, international agencies have adopted different types of approaches to the provision of aid. Some international agencies have taken an explicitly solidarist stance, refusing to engage in any way with the SAC, and instead supporting humanitarian and human rights efforts from outside the country. To date, these types of explicitly solidarist approaches to international aid in Myanmar have generally entailed working with and through CBOs and CSOs operating inside Myanmar—including, but not limited, to longstanding cross-border aid organisations. Given escalating humanitarian needs in Myanmar, international donors and aid agencies must provide increased support to these local-level systems and organisations, which have ‘the expertise, local legitimacy, and vision to offer an alternative to traditional aid distribution practices’ (Khin Ohmar 2021). These types of approaches are necessary, not only to channel assistance to civilian populations in need of aid but also to help lay the foundations for longer-term democratisation, development and peace in Myanmar.

At the same time, a solidarist approach can extend to engaging with the NUG’s Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management. The NUG is currently channelling humanitarian aid to displaced populations, Civil Disobedience Movement participants and others in need by working with and through local networks and groups in different areas of the country. To date, however, very few international agencies have funded humanitarian aid through the NUG. International donor and aid agency representatives often cite concerns about the NUG’s links with the People’s Defence Forces and its support for armed resistance against the SAC—although of course, geopolitical concerns also play into the reluctance of some back-donor countries to be seen as supporting the NUG.

If recent responses by Western donor countries to the crisis in Ukraine show us anything, it is that international actors can and do at times support ‘resistance humanitarianism’ (Slim 2022). Such an approach is morally justified in contexts where the type of neutrality fostered by the Red Cross movement becomes unfeasible and where aid becomes a way to support legitimate local resistance and resilience against military violence and oppression. Of course, political interests and not just moral questions will inevitably continue to influence international actors’ decisions about how to engage in Myanmar. But international humanitarian engagement with the NUG is justified from a solidarist perspective and any such engagement should be done in ways that support localised responses, that follow a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as increasing the Myanmar people’s autonomy and agency, and that include systems to ensure that aid is used for humanitarian purposes and does no harm.

While some international agencies have rejected any kind of engagement with the SAC, others have maintained an official presence inside Myanmar, trying to access populations in need of aid by negotiating with the regime. Oftentimes, international agencies working in this manner have also been discretely ramping up support to civil society and community-based organisations that are, in various ways, opposing and are, therefore, targeted (or potentially targeted) by the military regime, with this very solidarist aspect of their work needing to remain below the radar. Of course, this approach is likely to become increasingly difficult as the junta further restricts humanitarian space and puts more pressure on international and local agencies to register and report on their activities—with the 2022 Registration of Associations Law creating a highly restrictive regulatory framework and anticipated to have wideranging negative impacts for NGO and CSO operations in Myanmar.

International donors and agencies maintaining communication channels with the military regime should use their position to push for increased humanitarian access and protection, as well as respect for international humanitarian law. Any kind of negotiation with the SAC, however limited, also requires honest, careful and ongoing assessment of the political risks and impacts of these activities. This means that international agencies operating officially inside Myanmar must not be blinded by what one long-time aid worker described as ‘their self-preservation and their sense of their worth’ (Interview, February 2022), which can lead to doing more harm than good—for example, if any good done in provided aid with restricted levels of access to populations in need is outweighed by the harm done through paying taxes to or in any way legitimising the SAC.

In short, given the nature of Myanmar’s political and humanitarian crises, and the demands of the Myanmar people themselves, international humanitarian engagement should ultimately be guided by an overarching focus on solidarity. There can be a division of labour between international actors and agencies (or sometimes even between different branches of the same agency), with diverse but still ‘good humanitarian’ approaches taking place at the same time. Some of these approaches can be more explicitly aligned with, and supportive of, groups and organisations opposing the military junta. Other approaches may not be so explicitly opposed to the military regime and may instead maintain limited communication channels for the purposes of humanitarian diplomacy, while at the same time supporting civil society and community-based actors in less overt ways from inside the country. However, if they do adopt the latter approach, international donors and aid agencies must genuinely ensure that their aid programs do not end up legitimising, emboldening and enabling those behind the coup and ongoing systematic human rights abuses in Myanmar. And, whatever their approach, international donors and aid agencies must abide by a definition of ‘good humanitarianism’ as supporting the agency and autonomy of Myanmar’s people.

Conclusion

Responses to the humanitarian emergency triggered by Myanmar’s 2021 military coup demonstrate the strength and effectiveness of locally driven aid. Yet localisation is not just a technical advantage but a political and moral imperative. In Myanmar today, there remains a tendency for debates about localisation to depoliticise what is—for those on the ground—a deeply political issue, inextricably linked with systemic inequalities and injustices. So whereas, as one civil society leader put it, ‘it is a power issue’, many in international aid circles still emphasise effectiveness-related costs and benefits of localisation, focus on more technical advantages and barriers, and seem reluctant to acknowledge their own positions within unequal structures that they then often unintentionally perpetuate.

What is needed today in Myanmar is recognition of the inequalities and injustices that are reproduced by top-down international aid systems, and of the need for systemic changes through approaches that not only place local actors at the forefront of crisis response, but also realise a more emancipatory vision of localisation. Localisation is then not only about local actors helping their own communities. It is about these actors having the autonomy and agency to shape their own futures. Recognising the political and moral imperative of localisation is essential to start addressing one of the most problematic contradictions of contemporary systems of humanitarian governance—systems within which all human lives are supposed to be equally valuable, but that (re)produce inequalities between different human lives (Fassin 2012; Slim 2021).

In Myanmar today, there is a need to capitalise on and also move beyond the current ‘default localisation’, and for international donors and aid agencies to commit to long-term and sustainable changes to international aid systems and practices. Localisation in Myanmar ‘should not be turning local actors into more cogs in the wheels of the international aid system’, one aid worker emphasised. ‘It’s about respecting and understanding how local society responds to crisis, responds to issues’ (Interview, February 2022). Approaches to localisation then need to go beyond simply recognising and working with national and local organisations that already have the types of systems in place that make it relatively easy for international agencies to engage with and support them. Genuine localisation in Myanmar also needs to recognise and enable the agency of the diverse local communities affected by crises, and their different leaders, systems and networks. The current political and humanitarian emergency in Myanmar is a time of opportunity in this respect—a time when international actors are being forced to recognise the strength of community-level responses, and to listen to civil society actors who are demanding changes to the status quo.

In practical terms, and given the escalating humanitarian needs in Myanmar, international donors and aid agencies must increase support to local-level systems and organisations that have the expertise, local legitimacy and systems to offer an alternative to top-down and internationally driven aid practices. These types of approaches are necessary, not only to channel assistance to civilian populations in need of aid, but also to help lay the foundations for longer-term democratisation, development and peace in Myanmar. At the same time, international donors and aid agencies must provide funding more directly to local and national responders—including multi-year core funding, which allows local and national actors to strengthen their systems and agencies in sustainable ways—and work to reduce overly rigid and burdensome reporting, financial and other bureaucratic and compliance requirements that continue to impede greater localisation.

In relation to ongoing debates over the nature of, and principles that should shape, international humanitarian engagement in Myanmar’s complex emergency, international donors and aid agencies need to recognise that they have choices to make and that these choices will have important political and ethical ramifications. In a context in which normative neutrality can do very real harm, international humanitarian engagement should be guided by an overarching solidarity-focused approach. This is consistent with a commitment to genuine localisation and with the need for international actors to engage with, listen to and respect civil society and governance systems deemed legitimate by the Myanmar people themselves. While in practical terms, this may involve a range of different types of approaches—some more explicitly solidarist than others—ultimately international donors and aid agencies must ensure that their programs do not end up legitimising and enabling the military regime, but that they instead support the agency and autonomy of the Myanmar people.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to extend thanks to all the individuals who participated in interviews as part of this research, and to the three representatives of local and international aid agencies who provided feedback and comments on an earlier draft of this chapter. These individuals are not named for confidentiality reasons, but their input was invaluable in shaping the analysis and arguments presented in this chapter.

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