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Myanmar’s Higher Education Sector Post-Coup: Fracturing a Fragile System

Charlotte Galloway

Honorary Associate Professor, College of Arts and Social Sciences, The Australian National University

Abstract

The military coup has had a significant negative impact on human security in Myanmar. While the future remains uncertain, the effect of the coup on higher education (HE) and higher education institutions is more predictable, as history looks to repeat itself. Since February 2021, universities have been in stasis. Staff and student numbers have drastically declined and foreign engagement and capacity building has ceased. The consequences of another lost generation on Myanmar’s future prosperity are dire. Without homegrown expertise there will, by necessity, be reliance on external actors to achieve any economic and social development. Global political responses to the coup suggest that, in the short to medium term, international linkages may favour nations friendly to Myanmar, which may further impact regional security. The consequences of the coup on international students from Myanmar is also unknown, as students either return to Myanmar or stay abroad, the latter path further eroding Myanmar’s knowledge-based capacities. This chapter considers the impact of recent events on Myanmar’s HE system and likely future scenarios. The role of the international donor community is also discussed for if (or when) re-engagement with Myanmar starts to occur.

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Myanmar’s capability to achieve sustainable economic or social improvement requires a well-educated population. Recognising the need for capacity building in this field, prior to the military coup of 1 February 2021, Myanmar’s education system was undergoing extensive reform and the outlook was positive. Yet, even in the pre-coup world, there was still a predicted lag of 20 years before Myanmar would see the full benefit of a generation of students who had experienced a modernised education system from primary through to tertiary level. It was anticipated that international donors would continue to support capacity building across the education sector, enabling Myanmar’s ambition to have a population well equipped to engage with global workforce trends.

The coup has completely disrupted the progress made within the higher education (HE) sector over the last decade since Myanmar transitioned to quasi-democratic rule. However, even before the coup, human security and Myanmar’s polarising political divides were an issue for HE reform. According to the United Nations’ framework for human security, the HE sector should provide an environment whereby people—students and staff—can undertake their study and work free from fear and free from want (UNTFHS 2016). Myanmar has not shown any ability to deliver such an environment since the first military coup in 1962. With a keen connection between higher education institutions (HEIs), political activism and anti-government insurgency, the HE sector became politicised and has been closely controlled by the central administration for nearly 60 years. This has resulted in a brittle HE system that cannot be responsive to changing needs or innovation.

With the State Administration Council (SAC)—the military junta—in control of Myanmar’s administration, the likely scenario for the post-coup HE environment is not positive (Galloway 2021). Superimposed on fundamental structural problems inhibiting sectoral reform is a central administration with dubious legitimacy to enact legislative change or implement new policies. In addition, there are the intractable issues of Myanmar’s military leaders’ lack of trust in institutional engagement with foreign democracies and their inability to accept even the mildest criticism of their own policy positions from their own people. With these issues in mind, this chapter considers the impact of the coup on the HE sector, Australian aid responses and the likely implications of future foreign engagement.

Background

Myanmar’s HE sector has always held a fraught position within the country’s social and political systems, as universities are viewed as sites for political activism by the central administration (Hellman-Rajanayagam 2020, 251–3). HEIs flourished briefly in the post-independence era (1948–62); however, the university sector was quickly targeted by the first military regime after the 1962 coup. HEIs were centralised, curricula nationalised, foreign academics expelled and autonomy removed. The decline in education standards in Myanmar was dramatic—from being regional leaders in literacy, Myanmar’s education system became one of the weakest (Han Tin 2008; Lall 2008; Hayden & Martin 2013; Lee et al. 2020). Combined with multiple government-directed closures from 1988 to the early 2000s, several generations were lost to academic study, and continuity of education reform and capacity building was impossible.

In the 1990s, facing intense international pressure over the turmoil of the 1988 uprisings, the failure to accept the results of the 1990 election and the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the military junta opened engagement with the international community. In 2001, the junta enacted a 30-year education plan (2001–02 FY to 2030–31 FY) to raise standards across all levels of the education system. A decade later, evidence suggested that the plan’s effectiveness was minimal. From 2000 to 2011, public expenditure on HE as a percentage of total education spending fell from roughly 28 per cent to 19 per cent, among the lowest in the world (UNESCO 2014). Myanmar was turning out the lowest numbers of masters and PhD students in Asia, apart from Timor-Leste (UNESCO 2014, 30). The number of masters and PhD graduates per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011 was also the lowest in the region.

Since 2011, international donor assistance has supported capacity building in Myanmar’s education sector, seen as critical for Myanmar’s future social development. Numerous independent sector reports were produced, including an Asian Development Bank study (ADB 2013) and a report by the Institute of International Education (IIE 2013). In 2012, the Ministry of Education (MoE) commenced a comprehensive education sector review with support from international donor partners. This led to the endorsement of a National Education Strategic Plan 1—NESP1 (2016–21)—by the National League for Democracy (NLD) government in 2016. The overarching goal was: ‘Improved teaching and learning, vocational education and training, research and innovation leading to measurable improvements in student achievement in all schools and educational institutions’ (MoE 2016, 10).

Such ambitions attest to a commitment to bring Myanmar’s education system into the modern era. However, key problem areas, including centralised administration, lack of autonomy, mandatory teacher transfers, dilapidated infrastructure and dated curricula, have been very slow to change. When COVID-19 became a global pandemic, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) assisted the MoE to develop an education recovery plan. The plan stated: ‘If not properly addressed at the national level, the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to have a long-lasting negative impact on the education sector in Myanmar’ (MoE 2020, 7). Identified risks highlighted the unpreparedness of the HE system to manage disruptions. Education quality was expected to decline and rates of inclusion to drop as access to online teaching was not available equally either geographically or financially. The document noted that COVID-19 response plans provided the MoE with the opportunity to fast-track some reforms, such as how examinations were held, revising the national curriculum and training staff in new pedagogical approaches (MoE 2020, 68).

Universities closed in March 2020 and, while there was a limited reopening later that year, many students had already returned to their hometowns ahead of nationwide lockdowns aimed at reducing the spread of COVID-19. Strategies for remote learning developed quite rapidly, particularly in urban centres. It was expected that the National Education Strategic Plan 2—NESP2 (2021–30)—would be ready for ministerial discussion in 2021 following the swearing-in of the new NLD government. The ambitions for HE in the NESP2 were high. The component pillars focused on developing curricula and competencies for the twenty-first century, pre-service teacher training, quality assurance and administrative reforms, and research capabilities. International collaborations would be enhanced through mutual recognition pathways for students, research scholar exchanges and industry partnerships. Then the military coup occurred.

The higher education system and the coup

The military coup provoked a rapid response from the HE sector. Student and staff protests against the junta’s actions were followed by campus closures as the junta acted to quell public displays of discontent. Most international engagement had already transitioned to remote contact and the coup’s timing meant that few foreigners were present to directly observe what was happening within the HE system. As the junta’s position has stabilised, few firsthand accounts have been forthcoming. Internet restrictions and fear of reprisals for speaking out have inhibited our full understanding of the state of the sector. However, considering popular news reporting and the junta’s past and present actions, some clear indicators have emerged.

Following their initial closure post-coup, universities were officially reopened to final-year students in May 2021, but attendance was very low. In January 2022, masters and third-year students were able to return, but news reports indicated that student turnout was still low. According to a Dagon University student union member: ‘The Spring Revolution is almost two years and everything is getting harder and harder for some parents and students. However, the most students continue to boycott the military’s slave education’ (Mizzima 2022a). Myanmar’s universities reopened to undergraduates on 12 May 2022, but there has been very little official reporting of student or staff numbers. At Hinthada Technological University, Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) supporters reported that only 67 students enrolled compared to a pre-coup number of over 1,000. Staff numbers have almost halved (Mizzima 2022b). The absence of official comment suggests that this trend is repeated across the country. For returning students, the nature and quality of the education they receive will be questionable, as Myanmar’s HE sector is in a weakened state post-coup due to internal factors and the withdrawal of international support. There is no indication that the SAC has any appetite for progressing HE reform. Indeed, early signals indicate that the former junta’s education plan (2001–31) will be a model for Myanmar’s future education policy.

Many of Myanmar’s youth and academic staff participated in the CDM. Estimates suggest that 13,000–19,500 staff were suspended in May 2021, out of a total academic workforce of around 28,000 (Naw Say Phaw Waa 2021). Staff had until November 2021 to confirm their opposition to the CDM and return to work. It is unclear how many have since returned. Some retired or resigned, others died from COVID-19. Many applied for overseas scholarships. Returning staff face possible reprisals from CDM supporters who may view their decision to return as akin to support for the SAC; they may also face reprisals from the junta, with lecturers expressing fears of being closely watched when they resume teaching. For some, the decision will be financial—the decision to return to their university post may simply be one of providing for their family.

The junta has been quick to arrest anti-coup student and academic protesters and fast-track their trials. In December 2021, Yangon University Student Union committee member Aung Phone Maw was sentenced to three years hard labour, the maximum sentence for violating Section 505a of the Penal Code, despite what was reported as a lack of evidence (Esther J 2021). That week, another Yangon University student, Ko Aung Bone Kyaw, died in military custody (Irrawaddy 2021). With this sad pattern continuing, many students will stay away from university, preferring to forego their education rather than study under a SAC regime. The impact of their decision is obvious—personal loss and a loss of capacity to support Myanmar’s future development needs.

Even with universities now open, not all are in a position to function. With civil unrest and armed conflict persisting, a percentage of staff and students will be isolated from HE education opportunities—firm statistics are not available. The future impact of this will further enhance social imbalances between ethnic groups and minorities. Without a full cohort of teaching staff, there will be an inevitable decrease in teaching quality. This was an issue prior to the coup with student numbers increasing but staff numbers remaining relatively stagnant. The withdrawal of international donors, the suspension of international partnerships and memorandums of understanding, and the absence of key senior academics who were actively engaged in the reform processes will see HE flounder and revert to pre-2011 teaching models.

The importance of education is not lost on the younger generations. In the wake of the coup, groups have established alternative HE options to enable learning outside of official systems. Support from international donors and educational institutions for these initiatives has been forthcoming and is gaining momentum. Enrolments have been encouraging. On the surface, these alternative education options may sustain engagement with HE and the international academic community. At the time of writing in mid-2022, there were four main HE entities aiming to provide education for students who did not wish to return to universities under junta control, or simply wanted to have an alternative way of continuing their studies.

The Virtual Federal University (VFU) owes its existence to student union members (Tharaphi Than 2021). It receives support from the International Institute for Asian Studies ‘Humanities Across Borders’ program, while linkages and support from other international organisations continue to evolve. Course materials are curated by international experts and online learning modules are available. Fees for courses can be waived according to need.

In June 2021, the NUG announced initiatives to support HE (NUG 2021; Nilar Aung Myint 2021) through a new body called Federal University (not connected to the VFU). Online lectures and seminars were posted on YouTube and Facebook; however, activity has slowed and there is no coordinated tertiary program running at present.

The initial enthusiasm for these alternative forms of education appears to have waned. The reality of developing and delivering online materials in Burmese is logistically challenging and resource intensive. While it is possible to replicate existing university curricula for many disciplines and deliver the material remotely, as many universities worldwide have done during the COVID-19 pandemic, there are real risks for those who associate directly with NUG activities, since the NUG is now considered a terrorist organisation by the SAC.

Spring University Myanmar (SUM) was established in May 2021 by local and foreign-educated Myanmar academics and offers a range of courses, with more being developed based on demand (SUM 2021). Students usually pay a fee for each course, which typically lasts for six weeks. SUM aims to pay its staff, many of whom are university academics who were sacked for participating in the CDM or resigned. Others are private sector experts. International donor funding has been received to develop models for the delivery of course materials when internet access is poor or restricted. SUM is expanding and enrolments are increasing.

The Yangon-based Parami Institute had a strong reputation for delivering continuing education courses prior to the coup. With close connections to Bard College, New York, the institute established Parami University in 2020. However, Parami University closed after the coup and its activities transferred back to Parami Institute. The institute is now working with the Open Society University Network to deliver courses to Myanmar students who have fled to Thailand, or who are in ethnic-controlled areas (Becker 2022).

These initiatives face numerous hurdles. First is the broad issue of accreditation. In the short term, it is expected there will be motivation for study. Certificates of completion are being issued by most of these entities, however, in the longer term there will be some expectation that the courses will be recognised as bona fide programs of study. This will be a challenge, but not an impossible one. Options include accreditation by a recognised international body that will take some responsibility for the oversight of quality control. Such accreditation will require evidence of appropriate teaching and learning outcomes and this will take time. Short-course and micro-credential certificates from reputable tertiary organisations are also viable possibilities. If optimism is given to a return to democratic rule in the medium term, the NUG may be able to accredit courses based on Myanmar’s existing education accreditation standards. This may give some confidence to participants who would have expectations of their studies being recognised by a future democratically elected non-military government.

Another barrier to alternative education is reliable internet access for students and teachers. Each entity is set up to deliver programs remotely. Now, with the SAC shutting access to non-approved websites and increasing data costs, alternative course delivery methods must be devised. While possible, this requires intensive reworking of course materials and strategies to deliver materials in-country. A final issue is personal safety. There is no indication yet of the SAC targeting students who are studying with these organisations. However, it is possible that participants will be seen as CDM supporters by the junta and therefore risk arrest.

Another alternative to resuming state-run studies is enrolment in accredited and independent HEIs (Kyaw Moe Tun 2021). A number of private universities have gained accreditation in recent years and, currently, there is no barrier to their activities during junta rule—unless they are deregistered by the MoE. However, these are fee-paying organisations and relatively small in scale and number (the National Education Policy Commission registered 12 private HEIs in 2019) and it will take time to upscale course delivery and capacity. There are also many ways that private HE operations can be curtailed through bureaucratic edict, including the deregistration of teaching staff.

The junta and higher education

The SAC has recently turned its attention to the university sector and the rhetoric is not promising. Plans for NESP2 have been shelved. The absence of international partners and loss of skilled academic staff makes it impossible to sustain any of the gains of the past decade. However, it can be argued that deep change in the sector has continually been undermined by the central administration. The former junta’s education plan has never been fully dismantled and is ready to be reactivated.

Both the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), led by former general Thein Sein, and the NLD party, led by Aung San Suu Kyi, promoted education reform as a priority. However, even with international actors involved in evaluating and strategising capacity building pathways, the end goals were repeatedly inhibited by political issues. During the USDP’s term from 2011 to 2015, education reform was complicated by a lack of cooperation with the major minority party, the NLD. A National Education Bill was submitted to parliament in July 2014, but President Thein Sein did not endorse it, instead favouring continuation of the 30-year military junta’s plan (Wa Lone 2014). Twenty-five amendments were proposed and 19 were eventually accepted. According to dissenters, it was a divisive Bill that continued a path of centralised education control, no autonomy for universities, ongoing restrictions to student union activities and the continued exclusion of ethnic language instruction (Wa Lone 2014; Thu Zar 2014; Lall 2021, 58–85). In retrospect, this can be read as a signal that there was no widespread acceptance of the reform agenda, particularly among the military-backed USDP. Given the pervasive presence of military and former military personnel throughout the central administration, it must be considered that there were deliberate efforts to slow down change implementation.

The SAC has not released an education plan. However, the former junta’s 2001–31 plan is likely to play a significant role in any new policy. Prior to the 2010 election, a ‘Special Four-Year Education Development Plan’ defined 21 programs to be implemented by HE sub-sectors, focusing on five core areas: promotion of quality education, introduction of information and communication technology in education, advancement of research, development of a lifelong learning society and enhancement of international collaborations (MoE 2012). By 2012, the plan had expanded to 36 programs, with a sixth core area added, namely ‘preservation of national identity and national values’ (MoE 2012).

After 15 years, the plan had resulted in no meaningful improvements in the education sector. Recent official communications herald a full return to the centralised control of education. On 15 January 2022, Min Aung Hlaing’s speech at Dawei University was the lead article for the Global New Light of Myanmar, the official government English-language news publication. It asserted the need for every university to keep ‘abreast of the international community’, but no indication was given as to how this would occur, especially given the current state of sanctions (GNLM 2022a, 3). Min Aung Hlaing is quoted as saying that ‘the government is fulfilling the needs of uplifting the education sector’ (GNLM 2022a, 3). This is simply untrue, as there is no capacity in Myanmar to achieve such goals. It is also incompatible with recent junta-imposed draconian changes that restrict internet access, and a recent law making virtual private networks illegal (Irrawaddy 2022). Reports from people who have visited the University of Yangon indicate that it was like a return to the past. Only a handful of graduate students were present and, when seen taking photos, a guard appeared and told them it was prohibited to take photos in the compound. Such restrictions have fallen back into place easily, and apparently without protest (Jurist 2022).

In April 2022, the SAC minister for education, Dr Nyunt Pe, spoke with faculty at Myitkyina Education Degree College and:

urged them not only to teach literacy to aspiring students, but also to educate them to be disciplined, patriotic and polite, only then can teachers trained by the degree colleges educate students to be disciplined, polite and patriotic. (GNLM 2022b, 3)

Such pronouncements indicate a return to the past, with a centralised nationalist approach to education that is in direct opposition to the recommendations of the previous decade’s reports and education plans (Callahan 2022).

Other recent press releases forcefully discredit NLD members, CDM supporters and teachers who have refused to return to work under the SAC. Of concern is the language used that clearly threatens anyone who opposes the SAC:

The security forces will take extraordinary measures to ensure the safety of teachers who are making efforts in the academic sector for the next generations in order to promote the education qualifications. The people should keep security awareness and cooperate with the security members in community peace and peaceful learning of children. (GNLM 2022c, 7)

Matriculation exams were held on 1 April 2022. The GNLM featured images of students attending examination centres and reported high numbers attending. This seems to have been an attempt to paint a picture of normality ahead of the reopening of universities on 12 May. Sadly for the education sector, the rhetoric only supports the continuation of systematic teaching methods. The junta’s plans to increase the use of the internet and wi-fi further undermines the SAC’s credibility as, at the time of writing, electricity supply was even more irregular, access to internet sites was becoming more restricted and inflation was soaring, putting the costs of laptops and tablets out of reach for most.

What does the future hold for Myanmar’s higher education system?

As the coup continues, and with no resolution in sight, governments and international agencies are contemplating what re-engagement with Myanmar may mean. With many foreign governments boycotting direct funding to the junta, assistance for education will have to be directed through non-government organisations (NGOs). This is problematic, as the SAC is monitoring all NGO activity and has clamped down on many civil society organisations (Chapter 15, this volume; HRW 2021; Liu 2021). How effective NGOs can be in this environment is unclear. Prior to the coup, many governments were heavily invested in supporting Myanmar’s education sector reform, including the United Kingdom, the European Union, Canada, Australia and the United States. As the Australian Government considers whether, how and when to engage with the SAC, the dilemmas it faces, as well as its responses, are typical. Australia’s ‘Aid Investment Plan 2015–2020’ for Myanmar placed education as ‘the flagship of Australia’s aid program’ (DFAT 2015). A team led by Australian experts, known as the Myanmar Quality Improvement Program or MyEqip, and local staff worked directly with the MoE to manage the implementation of Myanmar’s NESP1 and to support the drafting of NESP2. However, MyEqip was suspended after the coup and closed in June 2021.

In 2020, Australia shifted its development assistance to respond to the needs presented by COVID-19 (Australian Government 2020). Since the coup, Australia’s assistance to Myanmar has pivoted again:

to meet the immediate needs of the country’s most vulnerable people, including the poor and ethnic minorities. We have redirected development assistance away from regime entities and do not provide funding directly to the regime. To ensure our support benefits the people who need it most, we work through trusted non-government partners including multilateral and non-government organisations. Our program will remain under close review and be flexible to respond to the evolving situation to best meet the needs of affected populations. (DFAT n.d.)

Any country that has a policy of non-engagement with the junta, or will not provide direct funding to the SAC, will effectively end capacity building opportunities in the HE sector. Since the coup, Australian Government–endorsed statements have aligned with international partners in recognising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ role in engaging with the junta. Australia has also endorsed the remarks of the United Nations General Assembly condemning human rights abuses in Myanmar, including the arbitrary detention of Myanmar nationals and foreigners.

Non-engagement policies have negatively affected Myanmar students studying internationally. Many are on foreign government scholarships and some are Myanmar government employees. Their position is difficult. Providing support for these students is challenging for foreign governments who may face internal criticism for supporting Myanmar public officials. So far, most students have shown solidarity and have taken the opportunity of being abroad to speak out against the military. But even this poses risks. In July 2021, it was reported that Myanmar students receiving Australian Government scholarships were given a letter from the Myanmar ambassador to Australia saying that they must declare their non-involvement with the CDM and state their support for the new government. Students were also warned of possible prosecution under Myanmar law if they were involved in any activities that were deemed anti-government or incited others (Dziedzic 2021). As reported in the press, students felt intimidated, with many concerned for the wellbeing of their families in Myanmar should they not comply. Individual universities have lobbied their own administrations for fee waivers and scholarship extensions with varying degrees of success. Meanwhile, the formal government response has been lacklustre. It was not until May 2021 that the Australian Government announced that visa extensions would be granted to existing students. However, recently graduated students could not automatically extend their visas. They were advised of their options and the official information encouraged the use of a migration agent to facilitate applications—at their own expense (Australian Government 2021; Gibbs 2021).

Since the coup, student groups have been quick to organise. The Myanmar Students’ Association Australia became a registered charity in February 2021, an act that requires governmental approval (MSAA 2021). Registering organisations that are fundraising for humanitarian purposes is one way that governments can help international students support HE without direct involvement. Yet, without doubt, the activities of association members are being monitored and students are at risk (Wells, Breen & Décobert 2022). The SAC have tools to punish those who oppose them, even while abroad. This includes intimidation of family members in Myanmar and laying charges against Myanmar students and academics abroad and sentencing them in absentia. Some student activists have had their passports cancelled; others have had their passport renewals refused. Such tactics have also been used against members of the NUG (Handley 2022; Strangio 2022).

One avenue for continuing support for Myanmar’s future HE system is through state party–funded scholarships. The Australia Awards, an Australian Government–funded university scholarship program, supports emerging leaders from developing countries primarily in the Indo-Pacific region and is continuing to accept applications from Myanmar citizens (Australia Awards n.d.). Myanmar applicants who are not serving military personnel can apply. However, also ineligible are those convicted of, or under investigation for, criminal activities—this may exclude many Myanmar citizens who have been convicted by the junta of supporting the CDM. Thus, the program has been criticised for educating applicants sponsored by the Myanmar government; however, this attitude ignores the principles of academic freedom and the benefits of international networks. A policy strategy could see governments direct scholarship funds to an independent organisation to administer. USAID’s Lincoln Scholarship Program for Myanmar graduates focuses on further study in areas of need. Unfortunately, the 2022 guidelines stated that eligible applicants had to be residing in Myanmar, excluding those who have had to leave (USAID 2022a). How readily the SAC will approve student travel abroad is one of many unknowns.

Individual foreign academics may choose to re-engage with Myanmar on the basis of academic collaboration without borders. Barriers to this will include institutional and government restrictions. If the situation continues long term, the SAC may turn to ‘friendly’ nations for HE support and collaboration, most likely China and Russia. Should the models of these countries be adopted in Myanmar, HE will irrevocably shift away from its foundation of academic autonomy. Current geopolitics suggest that such a move would further isolate Myanmar from the rest of the world, resulting in significant regional and international effects. A destabilising factor in this scenario is the vast number of alumni from foreign institutions who have returned to Myanmar in recent years to participate in the country’s development. Their motivation or ability to contribute to the collective disruption of the central administration, similar to the undermining tactics of the military during the previous government’s rule, is unknown.

Should the situation with the junta ease, international aid could become conditional on continuing the implementation of the NESP1, which had been endorsed by the elected government. In this scenario, those who criticise any perceived support for the junta could be mollified. While Australia and other nations have maintained their distance and redirected funds without clear plans for future HE sector support, by mid-2022 some governments had taken targeted action. For example, the US government, through USAID, and the European Commission (EC) announced projects to support Myanmar’s HE and technical and vocational education and training (TVET) sectors. These actions, which indicate an unwillingness to defer further engagement in the education sector, recognise the significance of maintaining access to education. In May 2022, USAID called for information to inform ‘designing a new activity to increase access to inclusive higher education opportunities for youth in Myanmar’ (USAID 2022b). The project will likely complement existing basic education support. The EC grant announced in June 2022 seeks ‘to improve access to quality technical and vocational training, non-formal education and employment opportunities for youth in targeted communities in ethnic and crisis-affected border areas, including Rakhine’ (EC 2022). It calls for in-country and external partners, though there will be difficulties in managing any projects. For example, local NGO partners must be registered. As noted, NGO activity is closely monitored and projects will be scrutinised by the SAC.

Alternatives to state-based universities would help fast-track reforms, allowing students to quickly engage with international educational models. This requires strong donor assistance to fill gaps in infrastructure, and to coordinate internationally recognised accreditation of study programs. International support for HE would be well directed towards preparing models for this option that could be implemented quickly. Funding international study for Myanmar students who have fled the country, and supporting employment opportunities in sectors relevant to Myanmar’s development, would be an effective investment by donors. Should the situation change and the junta be ousted, a cohort of Myanmar graduates with international work experience could return to Myanmar and contribute to rebuilding the country. If there is no real change, the world will still benefit from having more young people educated.

Conclusion

With now over two years of interrupted education due to COVID-19 and the military coup, Myanmar’s ability to be self-sustaining for their own HE research and development needs has been further hampered. It is difficult to see how the HE system can recover, then grow, in the medium term. Should some form of recognition be given to the junta after any future elections, tentative re-engagement by existing partners may be possible. However, there is no expectation that HE reform will be a government priority. With a decimated economy, much-needed infrastructure plans for the sector will be further delayed. There will be no curriculum reform and Myanmar’s HE standards will fall further behind those of regional and global counterparts. Any aspirations for improved teaching will be quashed, as the environment to foster quality and creative teaching will be non-existent. There is no capacity within Myanmar to develop the HE system without international expertise. Yet, international sanctions may affect academics who wish to return to Myanmar and continue pre-coup teaching and research projects; they may find themselves prohibited from doing so by their own governments. For Australian academics, any re-engagement with Myanmar will require clearance under the Foreign Relations Act 2020. The absence of senior staff will also further exacerbate recovery in the HE sector. Many had benefited from foreign training, and their knowledge will be lost to the system.

Alternative education systems offer the potential to keep students engaged with learning. The international community can, and is, developing strategies to facilitate remote study. But in an environment of ‘if you are not with us you are against us’ there is the ever-present risk that participants will be deemed anti-state and suffer adverse consequences. This should not, however, deter such endeavours. There are still students and academics who are in areas outside of the junta’s control, and some who are out of the country, who can benefit from these learning opportunities. Much more could be done by the international university community. Even if a fraction of the world’s universities provided a fee waiver and living allowance for a single Myanmar student, significant demand would be met. From a strategic perspective, if foreign governments did the same, they would be shoring up Myanmar’s future—surely a worthwhile investment.

While much attention has been given to students, there can be no future for HE if the academics who have left the system are not supported. For the younger generation of academics who had begun to experience foreign teaching methods, either through study overseas or directly from international visiting faculty to Myanmar, being part of a junta-controlled education system is not an option. Many have declared their support for the CDM and are blacklisted by the MoE. Their opportunity to return to academia is remote, especially given the most recent pronouncements in the GNLM. On 1 June 2022, the following appeared:

Provisions of the national education law are being reviewed to amend something if necessary, not to mix education with politics. Students can learn political science at the university but they are not allowed to mix education with politics. If they wish to engage in politics, they need to join the political field. (GNLM 2022d)

There is no place for democratic debate under the current regime. This follows on from the recent dissolution of student unions, which have been replaced by student associations (Frontier Myanmar 2022b).

The ongoing education of university academics could be undertaken through international organisations such as Advance HE, formerly known as the Higher Education Academy. This would help academic staff keep abreast of contemporary teaching methods and approaches, and participate in international networks.

With the recent return to school and reopening of universities, Myanmar’s youth are faced with a real conflict. On 24 January 2022, Frontier Myanmar published an article on the dilemmas faced by parents and students wishing to undertake their university entrance exams. Those who choose to do so fear a lifetime label of having taken exams under the junta (Frontier Myanmar 2022a). Yet how long do they put their studies on hold?

The outlook for HE in Myanmar is bleak. New relationships will need to be built between foreign agencies and donors, and the MoE. Given the events of the last decade, it will likely take at least three to five years for relationships to be re-established. However, donors will be cautious before committing resources at the levels seen in the 2016–20 period.

Should the junta remain in power, there is every indication that attempts at foreign engagement in the HE sector by governments critical of the regime will be viewed with suspicion, and potentially couched as foreign interference. Current global geopolitical shifts could work for or against the junta, depending on who aligns with whom. The role of third-party donor agencies will become more important as governments distance themselves from providing development aid to the SAC. Earlier plans for university autonomy and curriculum reform can only advance if HEIs are authorised to implement them—an unlikely prospect. The more likely outcome is the complete stasis of the HE system, causing Myanmar to fall even further behind in this development indicator. Yet, given the very real need to increase workforce skills, particularly in science and technology, one scenario could see the junta align itself with a foreign ally, in a way that may weaken Myanmar’s independence and further erode human security. It is not yet known which foreign governments may decide to endorse the junta’s administration. As this becomes clearer the threats to national and regional security will be more apparent. Regardless of the options that arise or the outcomes, the unpleasant certainty is that the aspirations of yet another generation of Myanmar students and academics will be thwarted by political upheaval.

References

ADB (Asian Development Bank). 2013. Myanmar Comprehensive Education Sector Review Phase 1: Rapid Assessment: Technical Annex on the Higher Education Subsector. Manila: ADB. www.adb.org/projects/documents/cesr-p1-rapid-assessment-annex-higher-education-subsector-tacr

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