15

The Aftermath: Policy Responses to Myanmar’s Political and Humanitarian Crises

Monique Skidmore

Professor, Alfred Deakin Institute, Deakin University, Australia

Anthony Ware

Associate Professor, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, Deakin University, Australia

In the immediate wake of the 2021 coup, the world witnessed the depressingly familiar modus operandi of the Myanmar military. Promises made to restore a constitutional democracy through a ‘reformed’ Union Electoral Commission were made alongside those of a return to the status quo once corruption was rooted out by the saviour of the Union, the military. The shock was palpable to the generation of children and young adults who could only dimly remember a time of fear and repression before the ‘transitional’ period to democracy that began with national elections in 2011 and the release of Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest. There was shock, too, among development organisations and governments that had believed that Myanmar was on an upward and linear trajectory to a democratic future, despite occasional setbacks and a gruellingly slow pace of reform. Many governments and organisations assumed that the Myanmar military, entrenched in the country as its dominant institution and intricately tied up in its economy, would somehow be won over by sheer passion and a sense of inevitability and agree to amend the constitution, removing its central role in the political and economic life of the country, as the military had done in Indonesia.

There was never any evidence for these assumptions. The last 60 years of Myanmar’s history clearly show a trajectory of ongoing authoritarian rule in which the strategic use of political violence and widespread repression of basic rights have been regularly adopted by the generals, their cronies and families to allow them to limp along in power, even if they are despised.

Like in previous widespread pro-democracy protests (notably in 1988), a new generation of young people have been radicalised and taken up arms against the junta. Millions of civilians have been displaced, and hundreds of thousands have fled the country. And, as in previous purges, in 2022 the regime sought to rollout a military campaign to eliminate resistance to its rule and to break the nexus between the existing armed organisations and the newly formed People’s Defence Forces (PDFs).

But this is not 1988 and much has changed in the world since the previous uprisings. Indeed, much has changed even since the attempted Saffron Revolution in 2008. As the contributors to this volume demonstrate, the roles of foreign companies, neighbouring countries, foreign governments, regional and political groups, aid organisations and disruptive technologies in the resistance to the reimposition of military rule, renewed civil war and ensuing emergency humanitarian crisis are different to any of the previous crises. The most important changes are local and regional, with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) changing its narrative of noninterference in Myanmar and with the Myanmar people being more able to organise themselves to resist the imposition of military rule after having had a decade of relative freedom of association.

As the chapters of the volume illustrate, the political landscape has forever changed in Myanmar. The National Unity Government (NUG) is a significant evolution beyond the old National League for Democracy, with broader inclusivity, new policies and a new generation of leaders. Whatever happens now, significant change has been wrought. Likewise, formation of the Civil Disobedience Movement, then the PDFs, has added to the minority organisations and their armed wings, changing the status quo and power of the people to fight authoritarianism and oppression. Again, whatever happens next, these changes will impact the political landscape in Myanmar for generations.

Similarly, we see fundamental changes forced upon the delivery of development and humanitarian aid to Myanmar. For decades, aid donors and agencies have focused on development and tried to strengthen the capacity of state institutions; that is no longer desirable or possible. They have long preferred to fund multilateral organisations and international agencies, because of their capacity for large-scale projects and compliance with international accountability criterion, usually only bringing in local organisations as implementing partners or as part of consortia; most of those large programs have now been curtailed, and local groups are doing the most effective work. Aid donors and agencies have long considered development and humanitarian aid separately, formulating different policies and insisting on the neutrality of humanitarian aid. But now, local non-government organisations are delivering humanitarian aid and all local civil society activity is inherently political—even while meeting humanitarian need.

The opening up of Myanmar’s communications sector over the past decade, in particular the widespread adoption of mobile phones and rapid internet uptake, has made it much easier to communicate, plan and mobilise civil society. This facilitated not only the Civil Disobedience Movement and PDFs, but also the mobilisation of humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable, such as internally displaced persons, in an agile response by dispersed local civil society groups. Myanmar civil society has changed. International principles no longer seem to apply. Instead, the changes demand that the global aid architecture significantly revamp its policy and practice.

Insights about the likely direction of the conflict and its key actors

Farrelly (Chapter 2) notes that, in Naypyidaw, the expectation remains that the international community will become increasingly exhausted with Myanmar’s tragic situation and, together with the related inability of ASEAN to build a more proactive policy position, the post-coup government will have sufficient time to consolidate its rule. Kironska and Jiang (Chapter 6) add that China is already moving from a position of ambiguous neutrality to support for, and engagement with, the military—a move the generals are no doubt banking on.

If, as it is looking likely, the coup is further consolidated, the country’s democratic activists are likely to face years, even decades, of dismay and punishment. Atrocities will continue and the space for resistance will become tighter and tighter. Simpson and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue that the situation in Myanmar will get worse before it gets better, and that international justice mechanisms will have little if any ability to hold the generals to account. There are no quick fixes, no international processes or mechanisms to force change. The heavy burdens of forced displacement, poverty, food shortages and unemployment, along with the collapse of the healthcare and education systems, as well as the pressure of COVID-19, will continue unabated for the foreseeable future; not to mention climate change, which is already disrupting the monsoon, causing droughts, reducing agricultural returns, and threatening severe catastrophe at any moment.

Echoing Simpson and McIntyre’s concerns, McCarthy and Saw Moo (Chapter 11) conclude that, in the medium term, the deepening of societal reliance on non-state social actors both to survive and resist dictatorship should compel strategic thinking about how a future civilian government can better address the precarity faced by ordinary people, and put to rest the legacies of inequality bequeathed by past and current periods of dictatorship. Farrelly proposes a frightening possible scenario in which centrifugal forces ultimately unravel claims to a single union in Myanmar. Some areas and leaders would be better placed to take advantage of the comprehensive failure of the central authorities to maintain the current order; this vision of state collapse and fragmentation paints a dire warning of one possible outcome of the current chaos.

Ware and Laoutides (Chapter 9) as well as Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win (Chapter 10) argue that we can already see this occurring in Arakan State. They conclude that the Arakanese community is steadily moving towards the claim of territorial autonomy by invoking historical narratives and the use of armed force. The state- and nation-building work of the Arakan Army since the coup has certainly consolidated their power and strengthened their claim of autonomy, and they have declared that they will take their claim of sovereignty outside the Union if there is no room for them within the Union. Similar centrifugal forces will surely pull on other ethnic minority organisations unless the NUG are seen to succeed in the near to medium term. In Bamar-majority areas of central Myanmar, the possibility of ongoing discontent and conflict is very real, especially given the mixed population patterns across most areas of Myanmar. Any process of partition on the basis of ethnicity would create messy and probably violent upheavals.

Amid the scramble for control, communications have become critical, with new possibilities for informing communities of impending military actions opening up with the uptake of mobile phones, VPNs and encrypted social media channels. Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win (Chapter 10) remind readers of the violence that has also been fuelled through the social media propaganda promulgated by the Myanmar military and ultra-nationalist groups against the Rohingya. They warn the international community of the need for ongoing vigilance against technology companies enabling violent hate speech and fabricated stories circulating in Myanmar. But, as Jadyn, Skidmore and Medail (Chapter 3) note, at the same time, new communication technology has enabled new ways of mobilising and supporting the resistance, including crowdfunding and digital financing. This inflow of money and arms is having results on the ground, and the PDFs are far better equipped in 2022 than they were in 2021. Nonetheless, Jadyn, Skidmore and Medail caution against drawing overly optimistic conclusions from the internet-savvy youth regarding Myanmar’s resistance to the junta. They suggest that, although cyberspace currently offers a way to even the stakes on the ground, techno-totalitarianism in Myanmar may eventually look like it does in China. New cyber-surveillance technologies purchased by the junta will result in more measures designed to deny Burmese citizens access to the cyber-world as the junta learns to navigate and create their own cyber-sphere.

The contributors to this volume have provided insights that have policy implications for foreign governments, both neighbours and those further afield. Detailed analysis, drawing out implications and recommendations, are provided in each chapter. The following section summarises just a few of the key implications and policy recommendations from the analysis.

Implications for governments

Farrelly (Chapter 2) reminds governments of the importance of ASEAN, once again, as a primary international link between Myanmar and its regional neighbours. Moe Thuzar (Chapter 7) believes ASEAN’s ability to find solutions to the current dilemma in Myanmar is limited by its own structural flaws and diminished capacity to persuade the Myanmar military; however, ASEAN is changing its narrative of noninterference. The Myanmar crisis presents yet another reminder that ASEAN and its member states need to determine the value and import of ASEAN membership, as well as the importance of implementing the mentality of ASEAN centrality. Arguing that ASEAN should lead a coalition of UN and other dialogue parties, Moe Thuzar points to the consultative meeting held on 6 May 2022 as a first step. She notes that hopes for individual ASEAN members’ engagement with the NUG currently centre on supporting the NUG’s humanitarian assistance efforts via local community networks and channels, including in ethnic-controlled areas.

The role and ability of China to protect the Myanmar regime from the effects of international pressure, sanctions and embargoes is not straightforward, as considerable anti-China sentiment has been evident in the response to the coup by the Myanmar population. The potential of Myanmar to become a collapsed state, the potential involvement of China, Russia and North Korea in Myanmar’s development, and the enormous resources required to rebuild Myanmar as a nascent democratic state if the junta steps back, are all scenarios that will require Myanmar to be a higher political and aid priority than it has been since the coup.

Coppel (Chapter 4) reminds Western nations of the limited effectiveness of sanctions during previous eras of military dictatorship in Myanmar, and points to their inability to distinguish between hurting the regime’s upper echelons and the most vulnerable of the population. He argues that foreign activist organisations need to think beyond the standard action playbook focused on large Western corporations and devise Myanmar-focused strategies—that is, strategies that directly assist agents and conditions for change in Myanmar. It is the businesses, organisations and people who remain, not those that have left, that will ultimately influence change in Myanmar.

Galloway (Chapter 14) focuses on the education system as one sector among many that has been upended by the coup, and one that will require not just significant rebuilding but also fundamental reform. International sanctions may have adverse impacts here; for example, they might prevent academics from returning to Myanmar to continue pre-coup teaching or from resuming research projects that could potentially be viewed by the regime as foreign interference. She also notes the new security environment in Australia, pointing to complications for educational institutions and researchers re-engaging with Myanmar who require clearance under the Foreign Relations Act 2020.

Simpson and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue that the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ policy offers the best guide to the levers available for the international community to influence and pressure the military regime. They also argue that Australia should join other nations as in intervenor in the International Court of Justice genocide case, even though the jurisdiction of international courts remains limited. However, they conclude that foreign governments recognising the NUG may, in the long term, be the most effective option for holding the generals to account, because the NUG has committed to joining the Rome Statute, which would give the International Criminal Court jurisdiction in Myanmar.

Kironska and Jiang (Chapter 6) argue that China’s new assertiveness in its foreign policy, as well as its geostrategic two-ocean objectives, comprise new areas of analysis that complicate the traditional view of China’s peaceful rise to power. They conclude that, when dealing with China, Western countries need to understand that there has been a change in behaviour and that China is likely to be more assertive and, possibly, more extreme. Further, when dealing with Myanmar, they argue that countries such as Australia need to be aware that China is likely to become a stronger ally to the Tatmadaw as time goes by. China is unlikely to contribute to, and will possibly oppose, any moves by international actors to engage with the Myanmar shadow government.

Insights for donors

The companies, institutions and foreign investors that committed resources during Myanmar’s brief liberalisation period are unlikely to return with substantial investments in the short or medium term, according to Farrelly (Chapter 2). However, material support can be given to the NUG. Simpson and McIntyre (Chapter 5) argue that the US could release the USD1 billion of assets frozen by the Federal Reserve to the NUG as a major show of concrete support for the country and its elected representatives.

More contentiously, Simpson and McIntyre argue that, if the international community and donors want to do things differently to try to end the cycle of violence and repression, it would be justifiable to support the anti-junta PDFs that have emerged, often in conjunction with existing ethnic minority militias, to militarily challenge the Tatmadaw. While many governments are hesitant to arm or support non-state militias, arguing that non-violent methods should be employed, Myanmar’s military has shown throughout history that it has no qualms about ruthlessly and brutally crushing non-violent opposition movements. The alignment of the PDFs with a multi-party, unified shadow government, recently elected in a landslide, and the international war crimes cases being pursued against the junta’s military leaders, perhaps makes this case very different to other cases. While the conflicts and crises in Myanmar are only likely to be resolved by groups within the country, Simpson and McIntyre conclude that international aid and diplomatic support may well provide the opposition movement with the resources, resolve and recognition it needs to force a negotiated settlement.

To this end, and almost as contentiously, Décobert (Chapter 12) calls for the funding and provision of emergency aid to be directed primarily to local-level systems and organisations, and for any preconditions of ‘normative neutrality’ to cease. This would be a major change to the ‘business as usual’ approach to aid to Myanmar—and one that many would argue is long overdue. It is simply not possible in the current environment for international agencies to work in-country. Décobert argues that, in practical terms, and given the escalating humanitarian needs in Myanmar, international donors and aid agencies must increase their support to civil society organisations and local non-government organisations, which have the expertise, local legitimacy and systems to offer alternatives to top-down aid and internationally driven aid practices. She concludes that these types of approaches are necessary, not only to channel assistance to civilian populations in need of aid but also to help lay the foundations for longer-term democratisation, development and peace in Myanmar. Décobert is clear that, in a context in which normative neutrality can do very real harm, international humanitarian engagement should be guided by an overarching solidarity-focused approach, and international donors and aid agencies must ensure that their programs do not end up legitimising, emboldening or enabling the military regime, but, rather, support the agency and autonomy of the Myanmar people.

Aung Naing and Wells (Chapter 13) draw the same broad conclusions and policy directions as Décobert, urging donors to end any allegiance to the concept that providing humanitarian aid can be a neutral or apolitical act, and that a single unitary and reproducible model of society can be implemented from above. They argue strongly that if civil society organisations and local non-government organisations are adapting their modus operandi to deliver humanitarian aid that embeds political resistance, then international donors should follow suit. Issues such as accountability frameworks being rigidly structured around financial audits rather than operational information should also be addressed. Aung Naing and Wells believe that it behoves the international donor community to consider its own capacity to adapt to the needs of local organisations, and to support the creation of multiple, alternative spaces of citizenry from which a new state, or states, can emerge.

The education sector provides a good illustration of the needs and opportunities for donors, many equally applicable to other sectors. Galloway (Chapter 14) notes that new relationships will need to be built between foreign agencies and donors, and that the relationship with the Myanmar Ministry of Education will need to be redefined. Given the events of the last decade, it will likely take three to five years for these relationships to be re-established. However, donors will be cautious before committing resources at the levels seen in the 2016–20 period. On a more positive note, Galloway argues that much more could be done by the global university community for international students from Myanmar. Even if a fraction of the world’s universities provided fee waivers and living allowances for some Myanmar students, significant demands would be met. From a strategic perspective, if foreign governments did the same, they would be shoring up Myanmar’s future.

Insights for the aid sector

Similar to the insights discussed above for donors, the most effective way for multilateral and international non-government organisations to provide aid is via closer partnerships with local organisations. Such aid should be provided in innovative ways that enhance the autonomy and decision-making agency of local organisations. As Décobert (Chapter 12) and Aung Naing and Wells (Chapter 13) point out, local responses to the humanitarian crisis demonstrate both the strength and effectiveness of locally driven aid in Myanmar and the capacity of the sector to deliver. Décobert argues for a version of localisation that is not only about local actors working in their own communities but also about those actors having the genuine autonomy and agency to shape their own programs. Aung Naing and Wells highlight the strength of responses by traditional parahita welfare groups as well as civil society organisations and local non-government organisations. There is substantial evidence of not only continued but also expanded operations by a myriad of loosely formed voluntary organisations, whereas the operations of larger, international NGOs and local NGOs have largely stalled. Voluntary associations of all descriptions are providing food aid, medical care, education and refugee assistance to the hundreds of thousands of people displaced and harmed since the coup. Both Décobert and Aung Naing and Wells argue for more empowering partnerships with these organisations (i.e. partnerships that hand over greater decision-making power and operational control) as well as recognising and explicitly supporting them in their rejection of expectations that aid should be apolitical. For those on the ground, aid is a deeply political issue; their support for others is an act of resistance (not just compassion), not so much in direct opposition to the state but as a substitute for, and rebuke of, an absent or illegitimate state. To deliver that aid with passion and motivation, they demand that the inequalities and injustices perpetrated by top-down international aid systems and partnerships be overturned. Further, they demand the autonomy and agency to shape their own programs, responses and futures. For that, multilateral and international non-government organisations must reverse the current power inequalities in aid partnerships.

There is an opportunity here to significantly strengthen the role and capacity of civil society and its international linkages and partnerships. But there is also a danger. McCarthy and Saw Moo (Chapter 11) demonstrate how the local, charitable, civil society sector has been simultaneously disciplined and strategically coopted by State Administration Council officials to help manage both the pandemic and the humanitarian crisis created by the coup. McCarthy and Saw Moo see the non-state, charitable sector as being in a difficult position with regard to state demands for their neutrality. Most continue in defiance of such demands, using aid as an act of resistance, but international bodies need to be aware of these pressures on local organisations and the significant risks they face in their work. Contesting such space requires extraordinary levels of adaptive capacity.

Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win (Chapter 10) likewise call for more aid to be channelled directly to civil society groups in Rakhine State for work among both the Rakhine and Rohingya communities. Further, they highlight the need to empower those groups. This is not just a new way of providing aid locally, but is a means of keeping both communities connected to the ongoing situation throughout the country. Like others in this volume, Ye Min Zaw and Tay Zar Myo Win argue for the ability of aid provision to empower civil society groups. Like Galloway (Chapter 14), they make a case for scholarships for youth from Arakanese and Rakhine communities. And, like Moe Thuzar (Chapter 7), they urge ongoing community support for integrated social cohesion and community-level, livelihood-based economic activities and peace-building programs across Rakhine State.

The future

As Farrelly (Chapter 2) notes in this volume, no matter which potential scenario eventuates, Myanmar will spend many years lagging behind its neighbours. It is clear now that the military is settling in and will not contemplate any gestures towards ‘dialogue’ or replacing the constitution until it is satisfied that its political control is unassailable. These new threats come from the battlefield, where, once again, the military junta is fighting itself into a standstill; other threats are economic, with the military needing to ensure it has enough money through the sale of oil and gas to fund its rule. Unless the NUG and PDFs can pull off an unlikely and overwhelming victory over the military forces, or other leadership dramatically emerges and leads the Myanmar military in a new direction, or some other unforeseen event occurs, the military are likely to remain intransient and bloody-minded.

Politically, the military are determined to neutralise the threat of Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy by ensuring the organisation no longer exists and its leader languishes in prison. It is likewise trying to limit the power of the NUG and undoubtedly has the NUG high on its list. On the international stage, the military must fend off ASEAN’s occasional demands for dialogue, and, in this respect, must neutralise the NUG’s political lobbying to be recognised as the legitimate government of Myanmar. And it must increase its control of cyberspace to limit both the funding of opposition through digital financing and the coordination of resistance.

The diehard pragmatists will, of course, argue that the Myanmar people should resign themselves to ongoing servitude to their brutal military in order to decrease the number of deaths due to conflict. Conversely, at the other end of the political spectrum, some will as passionately argue for the arming of the PDFs by the international community. Both ends of the spectrum see peace as an end that justifies the means.

We believe that the reimposition of military rule through the brutal coup of February 2021 will only come to an end when enough of the population rises up against their rulers. Most likely, this will require the provocation of internal changes within the military itself. Aung San Suu Kyi once paraphrased Joseph de Maistre by saying that the people get the government they deserve, but no-one deserves this longstanding and brutish regime. In the years that come, the international community must not forget the brave people of Myanmar. Coppel (Chapter 4) argues that regime collapse is not a strategic goal if it results in, once again, the immiseration of the population. It is clear, however, that governments, multilateral agencies, development and humanitarian organisations, and democracy and human rights activists must join with the resistance movement in new ways to ensure that this period of military rule is shorter than all those that have preceded it. As Décobert (Chapter 12) notes, this is a time of opportunity: the contributors to this volume have shown many potential pathways by which purposeful and principled policy and collaboration can occur.