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Gender and Politics Reimagined

12

Towards a Self-Limiting Movement? Feminist advocacy in times of political uncertainty

Ruby Y.S. Lai

The women’s movement in Hong Kong—an affluent financial centre in Asia and a former colony of Britain, which returned to China’s control in 1997—has a long history. In the past century, the territory has witnessed substantive progress in women’s rights across political, economic and sociocultural domains. For example, gender mainstreaming—a form of political and policy practice that aims to advance gender equality by reforming all mainstream policy areas (Walby 2005: 453–54; for a critique of gender mainstreaming, see Caglar 2013)—was institutionalised within the government’s bureaucratic structure as a priority and was considered a cross-sector consensus that was affirmed by the government, commercial sector, civil society and the general public (Cheung and Holroyd 2009). As antidiscrimination legislation1 and institutions have been put in place to combat gender discrimination in various arenas, women’s access to higher education has continued to surpass men’s in recent years (Census and Statistics Department 2022); and the gender attitudes held by the young and the educated have become more liberal overall (EOC 2009). This progress in gender equality is also reflected in various global indexes. In 2021, Hong Kong ranked fourth in the Human Development Index and scored a 0.976 in the Gender Development Index, which was higher than the score of developed countries such as Australia, the Netherlands and Japan (UNDP 2022).

Nevertheless, the goal of gender equality is far from fulfilled. In 2020, women in Hong Kong, excluding foreign domestic workers, still had a lower labour force participation rate (49.6 per cent) than men (66.2 per cent); in 2021, women were earning 15 per cent less than men, and only 14.2 per cent of all listed companies’ directors in Hong Kong were women. In the political arena, women made up only 30.3 per cent (1,843) of the 6,088 non-official members serving on public sector advisory and statutory bodies in 2020, and the number of male directorate officers was higher than the number of women; last, sexual violence and harassment are still common threats predominantly faced by women (ACSVAW 2022; EOC 2021). In recent years, new challenges have emerged and hampered feminist advocacy, particularly in the non–state-affiliated feminist movement. These challenges, including the emergence of right-leaning nativism, the expansion of authoritarian governance and aggravating socioeconomic inequalities, have threatened not only the work but also the survival of progressive feminist activism in the city.

There is hardly a well-defined classification of women’s and feminist movements in Hong Kong. In the early days of colonial history, participants of women’s movements ranged from missionaries, expatriates, foreign politicians and Chinese elites to local Chinese women who formed concerned groups or organisations with religious or political affiliations (Hoe 1991; Wong 2000). In the postwar era, local women founded groups that sought to advance women’s rights and wellbeing through social and institutional reforms. Since the 1950s, Hong Kong has witnessed the development of women’s and feminist movements varying across the political spectrum. At one end, there is the pro-China or state government–affiliated faction; at the other end is the prodemocracy or progressive feminist faction, and there are also politically neutral concerned groups that promote gender equality and women’s empowerment (Lee 2000; Lim 2015; Wong 2000). This chapter focuses primarily on the non–state-affiliated progressive feminist movement.

I have been a keen observer of feminist movements in Hong Kong as a journalist and a sociologist, who has researched and written widely about gender issues in the past decade. Historically, academia and the media have been important sites for feminist scholars and journalists to proactively advocate feminist agendas and confront patriarchal culture by various means, such as action research, policy studies, investigative reporting and collaboration with concerned groups (Chan 2002; Chan and Wong 2004; Cheung 1989; Kong 2018; Kong et al. 2015; Lai et al. 1997; Luqiu 2022). Following this tradition, I see myself at the intersection of academia, journalism and the feminist movement. This standpoint enables my access to in-depth knowledge of the developmental trajectories of feminist activism and allows me to retain a relatively independent position to reflect on the movement’s internal dissonances and constraints. My past research on Hong Kong and Chinese society also equips me with the necessary knowledge to analyse the emergent challenges faced by feminists from within the opposition camp and the political regimes corresponding to the sociopolitical and economic transfigurations of the territory since the 2010s (Choi and Lai 2021; Choi et al. 2020; Lai 2021, 2023). Rather than providing a systematic historical account of the full spectrum of feminist or women’s movements in Hong Kong, my objective is specific: to highlight and elucidate the most pressing challenges faced by progressive feminist activism in post-handover Hong Kong.

Sharing a drastically different fate from the pro-China faction within the women’s movement (see Fischler 2003; Lee 2000; Lim 2010), non–state-affiliated feminist activism has established itself as one of the indispensable parts of civil society since the colonial era (Chiu and Lui 2000). For years, the movement has played a pivotal role in fostering the democratisation of the city (Choi and Cheung 2012; Lee 2000; Lim 2010, 2015). Despite tensions, it has been a close ally of the pan-democracy camp,2 which strives for universal suffrage and social reforms through negotiation and other peaceful means and has dominated the city’s political opposition and civil society since the 1980s (Cho et al. 2020; Ma 2007). After the handover, the territory witnessed the development of new political pursuits and activism. First, in the 2000s, was the emergence of the progressive left, which advocated for social justice and the preservation of grassroots communities and local heritage, posing direct challenges to the city’s neoliberal governance through contentious actions (Chen and Szeto 2015). In the 2010s, the sociopolitical tensions created by rapid regional integration between China and Hong Kong, as well as the Chinese Government’s increased political interventions, provided the circumstances for the rise of the right-leaning nativist3 movement. Claiming itself to be rooted in the interests of local Hong Kong citizens, the movement demanded the expulsion of mainland Chinese immigrants and demarcation between China and Hong Kong through militant tactics (Choi et al. 2020; Veg 2017; Lam and Cooper 2018). The discord in ideologies and movement tactics led to unresolvable hostility and divided the opposition camp: the liberal and progressive left was heavily criticised by the nativists as a failure, while the moderates also condemned the xenophobic agenda and violent actions of the nativists (Lee 2020). Due to its ideological proximity to and historical alliance with the liberal progressive left, the feminist movement in Hong Kong inevitably faced intensified confrontations and criticisms from the nativists (Choi et al. 2020; Ho and Li 2021). In the aftermath of the 2019 anti–Extradition Bill protests, progressive feminists faced unprecedented challenges under democratic backsliding—a process in which the state eliminated all kinds of political institutions that sustain a democracy (Bermeo 2016; Lee and Chan 2022). Against this backdrop, this chapter intends to unravel the challenges, contributing insights into the strategies and repositioning of feminist activism in the context of social movement abeyance and political reconfiguration.

This chapter begins with a summary of the background of the women’s and feminist movements in Hong Kong. It then delineates the sector’s development and identifies the structural challenges that threaten the sustainability of the non–state-affiliated progressive feminist movement. After that, the chapter critically examines the idea of a self-limiting movement as an epistemological and political strategy and discusses its applications in the context of Hong Kong feminist advocacy. It concludes by drawing inspiration from the strategies of resistance used by activists from different localities in response to local and global challenges to gender equality.

A concise history of feminist advocacy in Hong Kong

Because Hong Kong was a colony of Britain for more than 100 years, the colonial legacy was ingrained in virtually every aspect of society. The history of colonisation also structured the formation and development of the city’s women’s movement. In the early days of colonisation, the British controlled almost all forms of political power, while the Chinese, except for the elites, were positioned as inferior (Carroll 2007). Chinese women, especially at the grassroots, were invisible in the eyes of the colonial government. This negligence was reflected in the coloniser’s condoning of the trading of maids (mui tsai in Cantonese) even after the enforcement of the Slavery Abolition Act in 1833, which abolished slavery in most British colonies (see Sinn 1994). A Western-inspired women’s movement slowly emerged in the late nineteenth century. In the earliest stage of the colony’s women’s movement, local British feminists and women’s groups in the United Kingdom played a vital role in campaigning for social reforms, such as the abolition of child labour, licensed prostitution and the mui tsai system (Hoe 1991; Wong 2000). Between the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese women began to mobilise themselves and organise women’s groups, some of them affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party and the Nationalist Party of the Republic of China, which focused on social reforms and promoted nationalistic agendas (see Wong 2000).

Between the 1950s and 1980s, Hong Kong society rapidly industrialised and transformed into a business and financial centre for Asia. This economic take-off set the stage for the development of the burgeoning women’s movement. Challenging the patriarchal economic and sociocultural structures, the movement put forward diverse agendas to advance the interests of women in various domains, including marriage reform,4 equal pay for equal work, legalisation of abortion,5 maternity policy, a ‘war on rape’ and sexual violence, and land inheritance rights for women6 (Cheung and Holroyd 2009; Lee 2000). Apart from the diversification of agendas, these were the founding concerns of various prominent pressure groups and NGOs, such as the Hong Kong Council of Women (HKCW),7 the Association for the Advancement of Feminism,8 the Hong Kong Women Christian Council9 and the Hong Kong Women Workers’ Association.10 Choi (2012) describes a process of localisation of the women’s movement in terms of agenda setting and the composition of participants. Many of the campaigns focused on the rights of local women—in particular, the working class and the grassroots—and sought to counteract the patriarchal structure that systematically marginalised women. Likewise, most of the members of the newly founded NGOs and pressure groups were local Chinese women, many of whom were educated workers, university students, social workers or community organisers determined to promote social justice and gender equality.

As Lee (2000) observed, this period also reflected a discursive shift from the advancement of women’s interests and protection, such as the equal pay agenda or the ‘war on rape’ campaign, to advocacy of gender equality and women’s rights in all arenas. This shift validated the collective identity and subjectivity of women and affirmed their status as independent citizens in society, rather than dependants or victims of crime who needed protection (Lee 2000). Nevertheless, subtle ideological dissonances were ingrained within the movement, particularly between the elites and the grassroots. For example, the HKCW, which comprised female elites, was hesitant to identify with feminist standpoints on various issues, such as the ‘war on rape’ in the 1980s, which reinforced women’s victim identity, as it demanded more community services but refused to directly confront conservative patriarchal ideologies (Cho et al. 2020; Lim 2015). Meanwhile, political factors started to become a source of division within the women’s movement. The founding of the Hong Kong Federation of Women in 1981 signified the beginning of the divide between the pro–Communist China women’s organisations and the independent feminist NGOs and pressure groups. In contrast to the prodemocracy stance of the independent feminist groups, the pro-China women’s groups concentrated on service delivery and opposed demands for greater political rights (Fischler 2003; Lee 2000; Lim 2015). This political divide thus created long-lasting tensions and competition among different factions within the women’s movement.

The local feminist movement gradually expanded from the 1990s and took a ‘sexual and cultural turn’ (Choi 2012), which some scholars have described as a ‘paradigm shift’ (Wong and Choi 2015). This shift signified an evolution from the reformative approach that problematised the class and patriarchal structures of society to a radical approach that affirmed women’s sexual autonomy and recognised diverse gender identities. For instance, three prominent NGOs—Action for Reach Out (AFRO),11 Ziteng12 and Midnight Blue13—were founded in the early 1990s and the 2000s to fight for sex workers’ rights. Their agendas, such as the legalisation of sex work, often raised controversy within the movement. Nevertheless, the liberal discourses around sexual issues popularised by their campaigns laid the foundation for demands for greater sexual rights and autonomy and created discursive opportunities that defied conservatism in the public sphere. Meanwhile, the LGBTQI+ movement began to take the stage. NGOs and pressure groups including Queer Sisters,14 Rainbow of Hong Kong15 and Women Coalition of HKSAR (Hong Kong Special Administrative Region)16 put forward agendas for antidiscrimination legislation, the legalisation of same-sex marriage and protection of the human rights of sexual minorities, who had long suffered stigmatisation and invisibility in the territory. These new campaigns challenged the heterosexism inherent in Hong Kong society and prompted many feminist groups to reflect on their gender beliefs, thus broadening feminist ideologies and formulating a more inclusive agenda (Cho et al. 2020; Choi 2012).

In the meantime, there was also continuation and progression of the conventional feminist movement. This included the demand for equal opportunities for women, especially in tackling problems of the glass ceiling and precarious employment; the persistent concerns about equal pay and minimum wage protection; the setting up of women-led cooperatives to achieve economic autonomy; the promotion of a universal retirement protection scheme; and successive campaigns against sexual violence, such as the founding of the Association Concerning Sexual Violence Against Women (ACSVAW) in 1997, which concentrated on combating sexual violence, paving the way for the #MeToo movement in 2017 (Lai 2021). In addition, feminists opened new political and sociocultural spaces for the exploration of intersectional agendas. For example, the application of eco-feminist principles to organising women in grassroots communities has empowered women by realising environmental justice, economic autonomy and gender equality at the community level. Feminists also turned their attention to ethnic-minority women, such as South Asian migrants and foreign domestic helpers, widening their scope of concern. More importantly, to try to build a coalition among various feminist groups and consolidate solidarity, the Hong Kong Women’s Coalition on Equal Opportunities (WCOEO) was founded in 1996 as a joint task force to connect women’s groups and monitor the government’s efforts in advancing gender equality.

In sum, three features can be observed from the development of the progressive feminist movement in Hong Kong. First, the movement is a decentralised effort with diverse agendas, organisations and tactics (Lim 2010). The coalition and connections between feminist organisations appear to be loose and issue-based, which allows flexibility for NGOs and pressure groups to focus on their own work. Yet, the lack of coordination also results in ideological or strategic discord and potential competition among groups with similar agendas. Second, the feminist movement maintains a position relatively independent from the state and political parties (Cho et al. 2020). As pointed out by feminist scholars, there has been an enduring tension between feminists and other social movement activists since the colonial era (Lee 2000; Lim 2015). Some prodemocracy supporters have even questioned the significance of the women’s movement in the struggle for democratisation (Cho et al. 2020). Nevertheless, feminists are aware of the need to ally with other activists and politicians in achieving their goals—as reflected in the strategy of ‘collaborating with a distance’—to lobby potential allies in civil society and the media to build ad hoc alliances and aggregating political influences that empower them to negotiate with the government (Wong 2000; Wong and Choi 2015). One example is the model of collaboration between the government, civil society and the media in the movement against sexual violence (Lai 2021). Last, as a colonial inheritance, the feminist movement in Hong Kong has sustained various forms of international affiliation, such as participating in transnational organisations. For example, one of the missions of the WCOEO is to prepare shadow reports and attend meetings organised by the United Nations to inquire into the application of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which was extended to Hong Kong in 1996 (see Kapai 2013). This three-pronged framework demonstrates the historical specificities of Hong Kong’s feminist movement, but it also resonates with the women’s movement in other Asian societies, particularly those with a colonial legacy (Roces and Edwards 2010).

Internal divisions and external challenges in the post-handover feminist movement

Since the 1990s, the gender equality agenda has been deemed socially acceptable and a ‘politically correct’ project that can not only improve women’s wellbeing but also foster the modernisation of Hong Kong society. Even though some feminist perspectives, in particular those related to sexual rights and autonomy, may be controversial, these views can still be tolerated and even accepted by the public—a credit to the years of campaigning and awareness-building by the coalition of NGOs, scholars and the liberal media (Ho and Tsang 2012). Nevertheless, since the 2010s, the non–state-affiliated feminist movement has faced a new wave of challenges and risks. Whereas some of these originated from the internal shortcomings of the movement, others emerged within civil society and the political system along with the rapidly changing sociopolitical environment and were reinforced by the revival of a patriarchal ideology inherited from China’s Confucian heritage and popularised by the global rise of the far right (Choi et al. 2020).

Awareness hierarchy within the feminist movement

Although decades of the women’s movement have achieved substantive advancement of women’s political, economic and social status, the benefits of gender equality are stratified. Those who have benefited the most are local, relatively young, educated, middle to upper-class women, while new immigrants, racial and ethnic minorities, older and less-educated working-class women may not receive the same privileges. As Lee (2000) pointed out, the women’s movement in the pre-handover era was divided along class lines and class has continued to demarcate boundaries within the movement, which often are reflected in the activists’ differing orientations and interests.

As described in the previous section, some feminist scholars observed a ‘paradigm shift’ in activism after the 1990s, in which considerable attention was gradually diverted from interest-based issues founded on macro-structural critiques of gender and class oppression to identity and sexual politics that promoted gender fluidity and sexual liberation (Choi 2012; Wong and Choi 2015). This emergent agenda expanded a new arena of feminist advocacy and generated transformative initiatives in the city. For example, the establishment of Zi Teng and AFRO not only advanced the rights of sex workers but also opened discursive space for the cultivation of more liberal sexual attitudes and the affirmation of sexual autonomy, particularly for women (Choi and Lai 2021). With the shift of attention, the 1990s also saw feminists’ growing awareness of and sympathy for the LGBTQI+ community and, later, the two movements formed a strong coalition in their advocacy for issues such as antidiscrimination legislation and same-sex marriage, challenging heteronormativity and multifaceted heterosexism (King 2001; Kong et al. 2015).

Although the emphasis on sexual autonomy has recognised the subjectivities of women and sexual minorities and opened new forms of resistance, it has also drawn attention away from more ‘conventional’ concerns, many of which are associated with class and economic inequalities, such as the feminisation of poverty, the gender wage gap, women’s underemployment and the gendered division of labour in the domestic arena. The sidelining of structural critiques of gender and class inequalities within the movement and in public discussion has led to an uneven hierarchy of focus. Advocacy for gender fluidity and sexual autonomy led by educated, middle-class feminists, who happen to possess greater discursive power and capital, was criticised by some feminists as being out of touch given the everyday oppression suffered by grassroots and working-class women (Cho et al. 2020; Choi 2012; Wong and Choi 2015). This shortcoming led to the limited support and resources invested in the consolidation and expansion of the efforts to organise grassroots women and reinforced the class division within the progressive feminist movement. Worse still, the lack of persistent criticism of the macro-structural oppression of women in the public discursive arena allows the circulation of a false assumption that gender equality has been satisfactorily achieved in Hong Kong. This misrepresentation thus incubates and legitimates the anti-feminist discourses that have undermined and denigrated feminism since the rise of right-leaning nativism in the territory in the 2010s (Choi et al. 2020).

Rise of anti-feminist sentiment

The 2010s saw the emergence of anti-feminist sentiment, particularly from right-leaning nativists as well as the wider public. To understand the rise of this trend of misogyny, one must examine it with respect to the developmental trajectory of the democratic movement in Hong Kong during the previous two decades. Since the July 1 Rally in 2003,17 there have been successive mass demonstrations and issue-based participatory actions18 that signified the growth of political participation across social positions and an increased awareness of social justice, democracy and local identity and heritage (Chen and Szeto 2015; Ku 2016; Ma and Cheng 2019; Veg 2017). It was believed that underscoring the emergence of this activism were the exacerbation of socioeconomic inequality, the government’s inability to mitigate its repercussions (Cheng 2014) and the rapid integration with China that adversely affected Hongkongers’ everyday lives and the city’s political autonomy (Lee 2020; Ma and Cheng 2019). Despite successive attempts by civil society, progress in democratic and social reform stagnated. This gradually led to the division of the moderate and the radical factions within the movement. Whereas the moderate liberals and progressive left uphold democratic principles and electoral politics, the nativists—or localists—advocate prioritising the interests of Hong Kong citizens and promote an anti-China agenda through militant tactics (Lee 2020; Choi et al. 2020; Veg 2017). The moderates’ conventional activism was heavily criticised and rejected by the nativists, who used the derogatory term ‘leftard’ to mock the progressive left and liberals for their stubborn embrace of inclusion and universal values regardless of the harsh political reality (Lee 2020).

The nativists’ resentment of the left also spilled over to feminists. The non–state-affiliated feminist movement has been close to the liberal and left-leaning activists since the early stages of the social movement development in the 1970s (Lee 2000; Chiu and Lui 2000). Despite conflict and scepticism, feminists have often joined forces with or lobbied support from the prodemocracy political parties and other pressure groups to advocate for their agendas and issues. Ideologically, both feminists and left-leaning liberals have adhered to the principles of equality and justice, which brought them closer in political orientation. This proximity to the moderates in terms of ideology and tactics led the nativists to view feminist activism as part of the progressive left, which should be condemned and dismissed. In addition, the unresolvable ideological divide between the nativists and the feminists, particularly on the issue of female immigrants from mainland China, fuelled the nativists’ hostility towards feminists. The xenophobic discourse upheld by the nativists, which regarded female immigrants as spies or ‘vaginas’ sent by the Chinese party-state to recolonise Hong Kong (Choi and Lai 2022; Choi et al. 2020), contrasted with the feminist standpoint supporting the rights of vulnerable women.

The hostility of the nativists gave rise to two distinctive yet related forms of threat to feminism in Hong Kong. The first is the widespread tactic of claiming the irrelevance of gender (Choi et al. 2020), which is used to legitimise gender bias and misogynist nativist ideologies. In a study of male and female nativists’ narratives and their perceptions of gender equality, my co-authors Choi and Pang and I found that gender irrelevance is accomplished through

the misrepresentation of structural gender inequalities; the individualisation, naturalisation, and universalisation of gender inequalities and biases; the claim of sexual symmetry in gender biases; the development of the twin discourses of feminine privilege and male disadvantage; the compartmentalisation of gender biases; and the belief that gender equality is of secondary importance. (Choi et al. 2020: 492)

This proved to be an effective tactic to justify overt gender discrimination and sexist rhetoric because some of the female interviewees, despite having some degree of feminist awareness, still put up with the blatant misogyny within the nativist movement for the sake of their political pursuits.

The second threat is soft repression inflicted by nativist supporters on feminists, particularly on social media. Feminist sociologist Myra Ferree (2004) initially developed the concept of ‘soft repression’ to depict the ‘mobilisation of nonviolent means to silence or eradicate oppositional ideas’ by the regime in situations in which the state has not eradicated all the civil society institutions. This form of repression operates on three levels—ridicule, stigma and silencing—which interact with one another, often in highly informal ways, to dismiss and suppress ideas and identities that support ‘cognitive liberation’ or ‘oppositional consciousness’ in the public arena (Ferree 2004). Here, I apply this concept to delineate the nativist strategy of repressing feminist ideas and subjectivities in the public sphere. The fierce criticism and gender trolling by nativist supporters have been rampant on social media since the popularisation of the nativist movement. Feminists were called ‘feminist dicks’ (neui kyun nan in Cantonese) and were frequently stigmatised as hypocrites who manipulated the ideals of gender equality to advance their own interests and gain moral capital. These soft repressions, initially practised by nativists, spread into the public arena through social media and eventually appeared in day-to-day political and non-political conversations. In addition, anti-feminist commentators and key opinion leaders often prompted the silence of feminists by asking, ‘Where are the feminist dicks?’ Through questioning the views and actions of feminists on issues directly or vaguely related to their agenda, these anti-feminist commentators sought to expose the alleged self-centredness and moral flaws of feminists. In contrast to gender irrelevance tactics, these types of soft repression are actively, often aggressively, inflicted with the intent of demoralising, coercing, suppressing and marginalising feminist standpoints and identities. This can not only silence pro-feminist opinions in public discussion, but also dissuade people from aligning with feminism. The soft repression of feminists reached a peak during the #MeToo movement, when a huge backlash occurred against women and feminists who spoke up against sexual violence, becoming another ideological and emotional discord between the two blocks (Cho et al. 2020; Lai 2021).

The seemingly unbridgeable divide between the nativists and the feminists was temporarily narrowed during the 2019 Anti–Extradition Bill Movement. The #ProtestToo campaign, which was led by various feminist groups to demonstrate against political sexual violence inflicted by the Hong Kong Police, brought the age-long enemies together on the same line. It was seen as the ‘grand reconciliation’ between the right and feminists, and some even hoped for coalition-building between the two rivals, but others were sceptical of the genuineness of the nativists’ support of the feminist agenda (Ho 2022; Lai 2021; Pang 2020). The hope for reconciliation has not yet been fulfilled and a revival of anti-feminist sentiment briefly appeared in the aftermath of the 2019 protests in the perpetuation of gender irrelevance tactics and soft repression in public and online discussions.

Diminishing of political space under democratic backsliding

It is believed that the political space in Hong Kong is quickly diminishing since the 2019 protests. Shortly after the movement, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee unanimously approved the National Security Law (NSL), on 30 June 2020, which took effect on the same day. Although scholars are still investigating the impact of the strengthening of China’s national security and the implementation of the NSL on Hong Kong’s rule of law and its status as a liberal enclave (Chan and de Londras 2020; Fu and Hor 2022), in reality, civil society has been profoundly reshaped by the new law. For example, the prosecution of prominent opposition leaders and activists, the dismantling of NGOs and pressure groups, the arrest of journalists and the forced closure of prodemocracy and citizen media outlets—all reflected the sweeping impact of the NSL (Lee and Chan 2022; Lo 2021). In addition, the 2021 electoral reform eliminated the opposition’s influence in formal political institutions and consolidated the control of the party-state, the city-state and the pro-establishment camp (Davis 2022). Moreover, demonstrations and protests were heavily curbed by Covid-19 prevention policies, and the repression of contentious politics continues even after the relaxation of the pandemic restrictions.

Facing such a sharp decline in democratic institutions, the conventional tactics used by feminists, such as coalition-building and demonstrations, may no longer be effective or feasible. First, a considerable number of civil society leaders, activists, organisers and scholars, including feminists, have been arrested or have emigrated overseas, diminishing the numbers of many NGOs and pressure groups. In addition, coalition-building has become difficult because of the elimination of the opposition inside and outside the political system. The closure of liberal and independent media outlets led to the shrinking of space for public deliberation. The disappearance of former allies in different domains heavily undermined the strength and impact of feminist advocacy, hampering attempts to promote a progressive agenda. More importantly, the NSL created enormous uncertainty and political pressure on non–state-affiliated NGOs and pressure groups, including feminist groups, as they constantly struggle with risk calculation during their everyday operations and practise self-censorship to avoid violating the comprehensive yet vaguely defined law. For example, the NSL prohibits any acts of secession, subversion, terrorist activities or collusion with a foreign country or external elements to endanger national security. What is the exact definition of ‘collusion with a foreign country’? Would using grants from international foundations—which is an established practice and an important source of funding for many NGOs in Hong Kong—be classified as ‘collusion with a foreign country’? Activist groups know that red lines have been drawn, but many have no idea where exactly the lines are and what actions might be interpreted as crossing those lines, which are constantly being redrawn. This ambiguity and uncertainty generate fear that has crippled the advocacy work of not only feminist activists but also the remaining civic pressure groups.

Is self-limitation an answer? Feminist activism under political uncertainty

In the face of the repressive political reality, some activists and citizens have lamented the complete dismantling of civil society, while others imagine a future with a self-limiting movement by returning to the pressure group politics of the 1960s (see Chiu and Lui 2000). The notion of self-limitation originated from the Polish Solidarity Movement during the 1980s (Staniszkis 1984). It refers to a nonconfrontational method of approaching the authorities to achieve a ‘revolution without blood, barricades, and violence through regaining the dignity of the people and the initiation of radical social change through a self-conscious coalition between the working class and intellectuals’ (Grabowska 2012: 393). In practice, this approach was sustained by two political strategies. The first was the revitalisation of civil society through a strengthening of political consciousness across social classes, and the second involved the ‘new evolutionism’ (Arato 2000: 48) that prioritised reform and compromise with the ruling class (Grabowska 2012). Although it was deemed a pragmatic tactic to contain political risk under authoritarian rule and retain the strength of civic groups, Polish sociologist Staniszkis (1984) also described the self-limiting revolution as a period of ‘painful, zigzag development’ for the opposition, wherein the radical wave of protest and class war was crammed into a ‘trade union formula’ in which status-oriented policy always overwhelmed interest-oriented policy. Worse still, self-limitation perpetuates a culture of silence among activists, who may strategically or through fear avoid visibility because of political coercion (Staniszkis 1984).

What are the insights from the self-limiting movement for the feminist movement in Hong Kong under the recent democratic decline? Although self-limitation is certainly a way for feminist groups to play safe, how much should they limit themselves, and in what domains? Should self-limitation be deployed to moderate state–pressure group relations, to strategise movement tactics or to reposition and reframe their agendas? Would a self-limiting strategy undermine the core feminist principles and deviate the movement from its original promise and progressive essence?

As Grabowska (2012) noted, self-limitation is done not merely to compromise with state power but also to establish a self-conscious coalition across social classes. While Grabowska’s proposition emphasises class identity and the transgression of class boundaries to cultivate collective resilience, scholars of intersectionality go beyond the class structure and problematise multi-structural inequalities (Collins 1990; Crenshaw 1989) and call for an intersectional collective resistance that synergises activism among diverse social groups. Capitalising on the theory of intersectionality, I propose a strategy of intersectional specialisation to complement the tactics of self-limitation. This strategy encourages feminist groups to adopt the intersectional framework to transform their existing agendas of concern and increase the degree of specialisation in their areas of interest.

Despite the shrinkage of a considerable part of civil society and the rejection of prodemocracy demands after successive political reforms since 2020, feminist agendas—including anti–sexual violence, equal rights and opportunities and sexual and reproductive health care—have been institutionalised and remain politically acceptable and legitimate in the city-state, which has retained valuable spaces for activists to manoeuvre in an increasingly repressive environment. The intersectional specialisation approach has two objectives. First, by intersectionalising existing agendas, it helps incubate new perspectives to reframe conventional agendas, diversify sources of support and secure potential allies in other sectors. By adhering to the past tactic of building situated coalitions, feminists could maintain a certain degree of independence in the political realm and at the same time share information, develop complementary strategies and muster resources inside and outside activists’ circles. One example is to promote cultural sensitivity and address the experiences of ethnic and racial minorities in the movement against sexual violence. Second, increasing the specialisation of feminist campaigns—which could be achieved by professionalising research and service provision, consolidating organisational efforts in communities and member networks and maintaining persistent and opportune public engagements—could help develop the niche status and improve the bargaining power of feminist pressure groups in the public sphere, especially in policymaking and public education.

Nevertheless, these combined strategies may not resolve all concerns and could even lead to repercussions for the feminist movement. The first unresolvable challenge is the state–activist relationship. Feminist groups have been working with the government for years to advance policies and service provisions in many domains, such as anti–sexual violence legislation and legal reforms,19 labour policies and the safety and protection of sex workers. Although there are practical needs for the continuation of these collaborations, how would these interactions between the government and pressure groups change after a political transition? Would non–state-affiliated feminist NGOs and pressure groups be completely replaced in policymaking with pro-China women’s groups under a system that prioritises political loyalty over professionalism? Should feminist organisations resist or strategically accept cooptation when lobbying for policy reform?

This puzzle of state–feminist relations is inseparable from the second concern, which is the relationship between feminists and the fragmented civil society in the aftermath of the 2019 protests. Although many NGOs were dismantled and activists fled, there has been an emergence of local and overseas groups and individual initiatives to sustain the opposition forces. Some of these opinion leaders and groups, however, inherited the anti-leftist and anti-feminist sentiments from the former nativist movement. Against this backdrop, how should feminist groups navigate between different political factions within the opposition and among prodemocracy supporters? If self-limitation and compromise with the government are perceived as complicit acts by the prodemocracy block, it will certainly undermine support for the progressive feminist movement and appear to legitimate the persistent misogyny and sexism ingrained in the opposition. Last, neither self-limitation nor intersectional specialisation will effectively moderate the risks of establishing or maintaining international connections under the NSL. However, severing international ties would accelerate the subsumption of Hong Kong under the geopolitics of China’s relations with the world, isolating the city from the global feminist movement.

Solidarity beyond borders: Feminist collectives and informal resistance

These seemingly unresolvable challenges prompt us to seek insights from feminist movements in other places, one of which is the feminist struggle in mainland China. Between the 2000s and the early 2010s, there was a substantive growth in feminist activism on the mainland. However, the movement was disrupted by the crackdown on civil society in 2015 as prominent feminist activists were detained and many feminist and LGBTQI+ groups were disbanded (Wang 2022; Zheng 2015). Despite repression, scholars have identified various tactics deployed by activists and political agents to advance feminism in China’s limited political space. One is coalition-based gender lobbying, in which political actors within and outside the formal political apparatus mobilise for women’s interests that represent unified societal demands and build coalitions of state agency allies to substantiate these interests (Jiang and Zhou 2022). Another tactic is differential coalescing (Wang 2022), by which activists create new spaces and establish cross-sectoral coalitions among actors with different ideologies of social change to garner resources and advocate for their agenda. Although both approaches reflect ‘institutionally anchored ways of thinking’ (Ferree 2003) that may constrain the diversity of feminist pursuits (Jiang and Zhou 2022), they also illustrate that, by contextualising movement claims corresponding to the political and discursive opportunity structures, activists can advance feminist agendas and even substantiate women’s interests within politically acceptable boundaries (Ferree 2003). These strategies offer insights for Hong Kong’s feminists to rethink their relationship with the local and central governments in the face of increased direct control from the Chinese party-state.

Across the globe, feminist activism among marginalised groups who have little political power also offers valuable inspiration to feminist struggles under multifaceted constraints. In Chapter 13 of this volume, Diprose and her colleagues identify the significance of the ‘webs of interdependence and solidarity’ in the activism of marginalised women in rural Indonesia and depict how informal collective actions could foster women’s empowerment and promote female leadership at the community level. As James Scott (1990) suggested, resistance can manifest in everyday practices and hidden narratives. In tandem with this, self-limitation does not necessarily mean the disappearance of resistance; it may imply the informalisation of resistance and the politicising of everyday life, which can occur in the domain of intimate relationships, economic life and the composition of self-identity. For example, economic cooperatives managed by migrant mothers living in subdivided units20 in deprived neighbourhoods can generate subjective experiences of empowerment and counteract economic exploitation and, in turn, lead to changes in family power dynamics. Such informal resistance can also substantiate feminist ideas in the individual, relational, economic and sociocultural domains; rebut the tactics of gender irrelevance and soft repression; and consolidate a progressive ideological standpoint that stands in contrast to state conservatism. These everyday practices, though highly localised, also resonate with the lived experiences of women and other marginalised groups across societies and cultures. The practice of informal resistance with global awareness may incubate a global feminist collective by retaining existing formal international networks and weaving informal ties that help cultivate ‘sequestered social sites’ (Scott 1990: 20) that facilitate the exchange of progressive ideas across localities and nurture collective resilience.

To conclude, I have no intention of setting out a grand proposal for feminist activism in Hong Kong in the NSL era, nor will I attempt to motivate or incite concrete actions, both individual and collective, to challenge the existing political order. The aim of this chapter is modest. I have unravelled the legacies inherited from the earlier phases of feminism, to exemplify the present challenges faced by feminists and to suggest possible ways to revitalise the movement’s legacies as valuable resources in re-strategising the approach to feminist advocacy in an uncertain future.

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  1. 1 This legislation refers to the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance. The statutory body, the Equal Opportunities Commission (EOC), was founded in 1996 to enforce the antidiscrimination ordinances.

  2. 2 The pan-democracy camp, also known as the prodemocracy camp, was constituted by the liberal and left-leaning political parties and groups, such as the Democratic Party, Civic Party, League of Social Democrats and Labour Party.

  3. 3 The nativists are often called localists, while both are referred to as bún tóu pāai in Cantonese. The two terms are used interchangeably. For a more nuanced classification, see Lam (2018).

  4. 4 The campaign, which was active between the 1940s and the 1970s, sought to abolish concubinage and legalise monogamous marriage. In 1971, monogamous marriage was finally recognised as the only legal marriage form.

  5. 5 Abortion was legalised in Hong Kong in 1981.

  6. 6 This campaign was mostly concerned with women’s equal rights to inherit land in the New Territories, which were regarded as the rural part of Hong Kong.

  7. 7 Founded in 1947.

  8. 8 Founded in 1984.

  9. 9 Founded in 1987.

  10. 10 Founded in 1989.

  11. 11 Founded in 1993.

  12. 12 Founded in 1996.

  13. 13 Founded in 2006, it focuses on the rights of male sex workers.

  14. 14 Founded in 1995, it is mostly concerned with the rights of queer women in Hong Kong.

  15. 15 Founded in 1998, it is a non-profit gay community group that advocates for the rights of sexual minorities in Hong Kong.

  16. 16 Founded in 2003, the coalition works for the advancement of gay women’s rights in the territory.

  17. 17 The July 1 Rally was the first mass demonstration after 1997. It was triggered by citizens’ discontent with the government’s mishandling of the economic crisis and the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and opposition to the passing of Article 23 of the Basic Law, which stipulates that the Hong Kong Government ‘shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organizations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organizations or bodies’. The proposed legislation sparked intense controversy as human rights groups and prodemocracy political parties considered the article a threat to the city’s civil and human rights (Ma 2005).

  18. 18 Examples include protests against the demolition of the Star Ferry Pier and the Queen’s Pier in 2006 and 2007 (Ku 2016); the campaign against high-speed rail transport in 2008–09; the 2012 Anti–National Education Movement; and the 2014 Umbrella Movement (Ma and Cheng 2019).

  19. 19 One example is the review of substantive sexual offences conducted between 2012 and 2019. Feminist groups actively participated in the consultations initiated by the Law Reform Commission’s Review of Sexual Offences Subcommittee.

  20. 20 A housing unit subdivided from a larger domestic quarter, usually tiny and substandard, with a median floor area of about 11 square metres.


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