Travails for Australian trade: Edward Selby Little in Shanghai, 1921–23

James Cotton

This essay reviews the brief and unhappy, but still portentous, career of Edward Selby Little, Australian trade commissioner in Shanghai, 1921–23. A promising appointee, Little was, in part, victim of the ad hoc and personal nature of the policy experiments of Prime Minister W. M. Hughes in his final years. Hughes failed to consult the business constituency and filled the position on his own initiative, offending potential clients and raising charges of personal caprice and favouritism. Little’s greatest obstacle, however, proved to be the machinations of his fellow countrymen. British officialdom in China was offended by an individual who wished both to give the Chinese the respect owing to them in their own country while also exercising a role for Australia independent of imperial oversight. Despite the acknowledgement given to Hughes in the scholarly literature for his ability to chart an autonomous path for the foreign relations of the Commonwealth, there were clear limitations to the exercise of his initiative.¹

The Australian Trade Commissioner Service

Of the many schemes promoted by Hughes in his later years, the Australian Trade Commissioner Service was especially far-sighted. Although Hughes neglected to seek the cooperation of potentially interested parties, and though it lacked consistent bureaucratic support, it included the appointment of representatives overseas and marked an important beginning in Australia’s trade diplomacy.

The origins of the first system of trade representatives lay in Australia’s wartime experience. With the outbreak of war in 1914 and the consequent dislocation of Australian trade, frantic efforts were made to secure shipping, especially for primary products and ores, while also locating and accessing alternative overseas markets for certain industrial goods. The knowledge, connections and lobbying of Australian agents at suitable places abroad would, it was anticipated, facilitate these tasks.

A proposal by the British government in 1917 to place the resources of the British Trade Commissioner Service at the disposal of any interested dominion seems to have prompted Australia to consider whether it should form its own commercial service.² The comptroller-general minuted that a reply should ‘await decision on the question of Australian Trade representation which is now under consideration of the Government’—a proposal that received ministerial approval.³ In June 1917, Department of Trade and Customs (DTC) Secretary and Comptroller-General Stephen Mills produced a lengthy, 21-page memorandum prompted by the British suggestion—and also by the offer of the New South Wales government that its own trade representation be transferred to the Commonwealth—outlining the essentials of such a scheme.

Mills began from first principles: ‘the object of trade representation abroad is the creation, maintenance or extension of markets for the sale of Australian goods’. Whereas for Australian trade the other dominions were easily accessible, emerging trade partners such as Japan and Russia would require specialist knowledge—with language competence as a prerequisite—if useful trade work could be done there. While there was potential for cooperation with British trade agents, there was nevertheless the problem that, for some commodities, Britain could be a competitor and the officials concerned thus might be required to pursue conflicting objectives. Mills therefore argued that Australia required its own trade service:

I am strongly of opinion that results of the highest value can be obtained only by a system of direct representation of the Commonwealth in some of the countries with which Australian trade is principally conducted, or countries in which it is desirable to obtain a footing.⁴

This cadre of representatives required a ‘Bureau of Trade Information’ in Australia charged with circulating information on markets, commodities and regulations gleaned by the commissioners abroad. Mills had before him the example of Canada—seen at that time as ‘the senior dominion’ and, in many respects, a setter of precedents. A trade commissioner service had been established under the auspices of Ottawa’s Department of Trade and Commerce and staff from this department were extensively deployed overseas by 1914.⁵

The draft by Mills is annotated with the date 28 June 1917. However, the final text noted that, following its appearance, Senator Bakhap⁶ gained the assent of the Senate for a motion recommending the appointment, with imperial approval, of a ‘High Commissioner for Australia … accredited to the United States Government at Washington’.⁷ Thomas Bakhap, a representative of Tasmania and an erstwhile supporter of Hughes, had long been a proponent of autonomous Australian diplomacy and was particularly well known for his knowledge of China. After considerable debate, this motion was passed on 9 August 1917.⁸ Though there was no immediate outcome of Bakhap’s motion, the thorough and practically oriented paper by Mills proved influential and was referred to repeatedly in subsequent discussions of the proposal.

In February 1918, Jens Jensen, minister for trade and customs, evidently used Mills’s study as the basis for a discussion of the trade commissioner question in Cabinet.⁹ In early 1918, the government established the Federal Bureau of Commerce and Industry (FBCI)—Mills was an ex-officio member—and also the Commonwealth Board of Trade (CBOT),¹⁰ both intended in part to stimulate a greater national overseas trade effort. In fulfilling that objective, both urged the formation of a trade commissioner service. While there seems to have been a widely held view that the time was appropriate to take this step, no formal agreement to do so was taken, most probably because Hughes was absent in London (and later at the peace conference in Paris) and he was determined to leave his stamp on every major government decision while remaining most reluctant to delegate to his colleagues. Nevertheless, in characteristic fashion, Hughes took the progress of trade commissioner appointments directly into his own hands.

Hughes made his second wartime visit to London travelling by way of North America. Investigating the many commercial arrangements the Commonwealth had made in the United States (particularly with respect to shipping and the sale of ores), he was evidently appalled at the casual fashion with which Australian interests were handled by British authorities in New York and resolved that the nation should have its own representation there.¹¹ The result was the appointment in September 1918 of Henry Yule Braddon, an executive with Dalgety & Co. and a prominent business figure and financier, as Australian commissioner in New York. It had been the original intention to provide Braddon with a broad commission—including serving as the ‘recognised link of communication’ between Australia and the United States¹²—but Sir Ronald Munro Ferguson, then governor-general, intervened to ensure that he be designated ‘trade commissioner’ to reinforce the impression among Americans that his role was strictly confined to matters of commerce.¹³

To this point, the Commonwealth’s approach to the establishment of overseas trade representation was ad hoc, and it remained so. On 28 February 1921, a CBOT minute noted that:

The Government … intends to take an early opportunity to ask Parliament for authority to establish a Trade Commissioner Service which will be linked up with the Bureau of Commerce and Industry.¹⁴

Despite further work by the CBOT and FBCI through 1921, no such parliamentary authority for a trade service as such was enacted, consistent with the number of initiatives by Hughes that were stillborn.¹⁵

Hughes once again adopted a personal approach with his next trade appointment, made without consultation beyond the circle of his closest associates. Whereas Braddon was a senior business and financial figure, the individual chosen for a hastily conceived position in China, Edward Selby Little, possessed exceptional qualifications.

Edward Selby Little

E. S. Little was born at Winterborne Kingston, Dorset, on 17 September 1864 into a family of pious, non-conformist, prosperous farmers.¹⁶ He attended Wesleyan College in Taunton, Somerset, and then, in 1882, Peterhouse College at the University of Cambridge. Little did not complete his degree, having at the beginning of his final year experienced a religious calling as the result of a lecture visit by American evangelicals. Determined on the role of a China missionary, but feeling unable to join the British mission that was linked to the Anglican Church, he became a member of the American Methodist Episcopal Church. After studying for the ministry in California, he was ordained in New York. Returning to Britain, he married Caroline Amelia Bate, who had been a tutor to his younger siblings, leaving with his new wife for China in 1886. He was posted to Kiukiang (Jiujiang), a ‘treaty port’ on the Yangzi River in Kiangsi (Jiangxi) Province. It was there that he successfully mastered the language and his two children were born.

After 10 years of arduous but rewarding missionary service, Little grew frustrated with the American organisers of the mission in China, whose management seemed too remote from their charges. After home leave, and as a result of an adventitious meeting in 1899 with one of their travelling management, Little joined Brunner Mond and Co. (the predecessor to Imperial Chemical Industries) to become their representative in the Far East with an office in Shanghai. His duties entailed extensive travel—he was made a fellow of the Royal Geographic Society for a journey from Yunnan to Beijing of which he made a photographic record—and he was successful in establishing the company as a major source of imports of chemical compounds and preparations.

An active member of the Shanghai Municipal Council, Little formed many close associations with members of the emerging republican elite, also making the acquaintance of two prominent Australians in China, G. E. Morrison, correspondent for the Times, and A. E. Wearne, of Reuters. In the 1911 revolution that disestablished the Chinese Empire, Little was instrumental in bringing together the warring leaderships of the disparate forces that displaced the Qing dynasty, their delegates meeting in Shanghai in his own house (where he was hosting Tang Shaoyi, later first prime minister of the Republic of China). Other intermediaries were involved, including Morrison and local British diplomats such as Consul-General Sir Everard Fraser.¹⁷ As later accounts agree, civil war was thus averted.

Little’s appointment

On his way to New Zealand (where he had purchased land and was later to retire) in January 1921, Little was delayed in Sydney by a seaman’s dispute. He took the opportunity to visit Melbourne where, having been provided with an introduction from Wearne, he met E. L. Piesse of the Prime Minister’s Department, then endeavouring to establish his ‘Pacific Branch’ as the nation’s foreign affairs office. Piesse was undoubtedly impressed with his considerable China expertise and business experience. He then met prominent business figure and CBOT board member Herbert Brookes (later Australian commissioner-general in New York) with whom he seems to have developed a strong rapport;¹⁸ Brookes then introduced him to Minister for Trade and Customs Walter Massy-Greene.

On 20 January, with Brookes as intermediary, Little met Prime Minister Hughes. Evidently, despite their obvious differences of personal style, Hughes and Little were mutually impressed. In response to a request from the prime minister, Little prepared a memorandum on the promotion of Australian trade with China, recommending in part the appointment of a resident trade commissioner.¹⁹ Hughes then pressed Little to accept such a position. There is no indication of why Hughes determined that the matter was urgent—beyond the adventitious appearance of Little in Australia—though China had been one of the various locations that had been considered by the government for a trade commission, including by the Cabinet in March 1919.²⁰ After some negotiations on terms and conditions, on 7 March 1921 Little accepted the appointment for a period of 12 months, with the possibility of extension by parliament.²¹ Little’s official appointment papers were issued by Governor-General Lord Forster, under letters patent. Under the Constitution of Australia, the governor-general was exercising his vice-regal prerogative to appoint an official to undertake specific duties for the Commonwealth in a foreign country. After an intensive study of trade conditions across the Australian states, Little embarked for China from Brisbane in early May.

The Australian government sought British Foreign Office assistance to notify the Chinese authorities of Little’s official role, at which point Little’s travails began. The British minister at Beijing referred the governor-general’s request to notify the Chinese government of Little’s appointment to London, marking the beginning of a consistent campaign by British authorities to obstruct Little’s work, as discussed below.²²

Little in Shanghai

Despite his frustration with British officialdom, Little worked with great dedication. Being familiar with Chinese conditions, he looked far into the future and was aware that success in the China market required a sustained effort over a period of years. In a letter to the prime minister, he outlined the activities of Canadian, American and Japanese competitors who all maintained trade representation in China, and suggested that, in imitation, a next step should be to employ ‘young trained educated men’ in the government at home who, in time, would have the expertise to staff an expanded service abroad. He also paid tribute to the support provided by the staff of the FBCI and especially its director, Stirling Taylor: ‘better servants of the Government could not be found anywhere’.²³

Until June 1923, Little composed 23 trade bulletins devoted to information regarding the market in China (and also Hong Kong) for a large range of commodities, abundantly illustrated with comprehensive statistics and details of business regulations and practices.²⁴ In his twentieth bulletin, for example, having reviewed the trend of China’s imports between 1919 and 1921, he considered in detail the specific commodities for which products of Australian origin were to be expected but were lacking or present only in trivial amounts. These included cotton and wool items, copper, fodder, dried fruit, fresh fruit, cheese and hides. Only in respect of imports of butter did Australian produce command a significant market share, and flour imports, which had once been considerable, were then insignificant.²⁵

What obstacles lay in the way of Australian exports? Little’s reports contained examples of where, in many concrete and documented instances, Australian imported goods did not measure up, whether in quality, packing, weight or consistency, with what was expected and required in the marketplace. In an extensive report submitted in 1922, Little pointed out that many Chinese importers had experienced such problems when dealing with Australian commodities. Accordingly, he had the difficult but necessary duty ‘to convince Australian suppliers that they must study the conditions of these Far Eastern markets so as to inform themselves of their requirements’. Further, he needed to:

convince them of the necessity of forwarding goods that can be accepted upon their arrival and immediately passed into consumption without giving occasion for ever recurring complaints. A reference to the records in the office of the Director of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, Melbourne, will abundantly prove the existence of these defects. They are by no means yet removed. The Commissioner’s work will be constantly hampered until these disabilities disappear.²⁶

Maintaining a stock of samples in his premises at the NKK Building in Shanghai (latterly a fashionable restaurant), Little attempted to make their character and quality widely known through advertisements and personal contacts.

Little also observed that the absence of Australian commercial houses or banks in China led to difficulties in financing trade, compounded by unique Australian trading requirements that were unfamiliar or unknown in China. He also complained of the fact that whereas all of Australia’s competitors maintained direct shipping services to China, there were no Australian ships in China’s ports. This complaint had been made earlier in the century and for similar reasons—namely, the cost, delay and damage inherent in trans-shipment. For a brief period before World War I, there had been two trade commissioners from Australia resident in Shanghai: Benjamin Levien representing Victoria and Frederic Jones representing Queensland. They had worked to secure the state subventions necessary for direct shipping from Australia. Both were dockside when the first Eastern and Australian line vessel, Empire, arrived in Shanghai in December 1908.²⁷ This arrangement was suspended in 1916 as a result of the disruptions caused by the continuing hostilities.

Little under censure

Little was appointed without any engagement with commercial interests, and the post had not been advertised, so it is little wonder that his activities were the subject of some antipathy. Some newspapers, in particular the Age, derided the appointment of trade commissioners as a waste of public money and continued their adverse coverage despite reasoned attempts at rebuttal by Stirling Taylor of the FBCI.²⁸ Similarly, some chambers of commerce were critical of the entire notion of a trade commissioner service. As the Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of Australia asserted in a letter to the prime minister in November 1922: ‘no good purpose is served by the creation of Foreign Trade Commissioners, and the cost of the retention of these officers is not justified by the results’.²⁹

As it transpired, Little’s tenure would be cut short, not as a direct result of such criticism, but, rather, as a consequence of the machinations of the British diplomatic machine aided by disloyalty from within Little’s own office. For reasons unclear, the clerk he had hired as an assistant—an Australian, Arthur Lake Crommelin (an ex-serviceman evidently washed up on the China shore and in ‘desperate need of funds’³⁰)—had determined, almost from the beginning of his service, to ruin Little and spread charges of serious financial malfeasance, some of which found their way into Australian newspapers.

Crommelin was born in Albury in May 1881 and served in the British Army during World War I. How he found his way to China is not currently known, but it is recorded that he died in South Africa in 1945.³¹ In his endeavour to damage Little’s reputation, he was aided by a former typist from Little’s office.³² An informal investigation by a visitor to China from Australia, Major Isidor Isaacson (instigated following—as will be shown—encouragement from British officialdom), was conducted in a singularly prejudiced fashion with the result that an offended Little offered his resignation. However, the Australian government, finding Isaacson to have exceeded his instructions, informed Little that he should remain, and determined that a further inquiry into the conduct of the office should be initiated. Senator Bakhap, who spoke Cantonese and some Chinese, was chosen for the role and visited China in March–April 1922. On a mission also to produce a report for the government on trading possibilities in China, he spoke to Crommelin and Little, interviewed in their presence a number of individuals whom the former had claimed would endorse his charges, and pursued his own enquiries.

For his part, Little prepared a report for Bakhap detailing the many impediments to trade with China that still had to be overcome. His first task, he stated, had been:

to induce Australian suppliers to understand that they must send goods to the China market which, by their own intrinsic merits as to quality and appearance will enable them to stand comparison with similar merchandise from other countries with whom they are in unceasing competition.

Little observed that this task was ‘neither an interesting [nor] pleasant one’. From this remark it may be inferred that he was aware that he had made enemies among the mercantile community who were unwilling to accept his strictures, despite his good intentions.³³

After a thorough study, Bakhap found that ‘the charges were pressed by Crommelin with such violence of language and in such a way that Little was in effect accused of being a villain’. Bakhap concluded that:

The evidence and circumstances disclosed nothing to justify such a characterization of your Trade Commissioner. There is nothing whatever in the way of support of the many charges brought against Little, to justify the blasting of his reputation established during thirty or forty years residence in China at the instance of a man and woman who both are recent arrivals to this country and who can have at most only a superficial acquaintance with its conditions and the duties which have to be carried out by the Trade Commissioner.³⁴

This is where events stood when the CBOT met to consider Bakhap’s report, and it might have been expected that Little would then have been left to discharge his duties for the length of his contract.³⁵ The fact that this was not the outcome can only be explained with reference to the backstory of the Foreign Office’s China hands, as first noted by Don Fitch. Grasping the difficulties inherent in Australia adopting a distinct national trading posture in China at this juncture requires detailed explanation.

Little’s mission meets British obstruction

In July 1921, the British colonial secretary, Winston Churchill, had written to Hughes to convey a ‘hint’ that, after receiving reports on Little’s character from Foreign Office officials in China, the trade commissioner’s activities should be strictly confined to commercial matters, as his conduct might otherwise be a cause of embarrassment.³⁶ What lay behind this communication—which had evidently and wisely been ignored—was nothing less than a campaign of professional denigration, the malevolence of which eventually surfaced in the opinions of Little recorded by Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon as well as by Churchill.

There is abundant evidence to show that, from the outset, Sir Beilby Alston, British minister to China in Beijing, and Harry Halton Fox, British commercial counsellor in Shanghai, as well as their colleagues in London, were determined to take steps to frustrate and obstruct Little, and, if possible, have him removed. This interpretation of the record cannot be disputed. At the same time, it would seem that Little was a character of high moral principle who, sure of his own rectitude, lacked flexibility in dealing with the British official class (though his relations with the Chinese seemed excellent) and perhaps also with his subordinates. It should be recalled that, at this time, British authorities had renewed their offer to provide access for Australian commercial houses and merchants to British trade representatives abroad. At the time, some Australians had presciently suggested that Australia’s national interest would not necessarily coincide or align with British commercial and other interests.

What is striking in the unusually copious documentation of this case is the venom of the Foreign Office’s marginalia. Little was described as ‘always thrusting himself forward and making trouble busying himself with other people’s affairs’. He was said to have ‘a penchant for political intrigue’ and to be ‘a thoroughly bad egg’. Indeed, it was remarked that all such ‘colonial app[ointment]ts lead to trouble’. The Bakhap inquiry was condemned as ‘a whitewash’, the outcome representing ‘another instance of Australian incompetence’. This was of no matter, however, for even if the trade commissioner post remained, ‘give Little enough rope and he will hang himself’. Such ‘private’ and ‘confidential’ communications containing damning assessments of Little passed between individuals via the diplomatic bag. The writers knew that unless they could bring pressure to bear on the Australian government, their options were limited. They seemed particularly resentful that Little enjoyed close personal relations with members of China’s new republican leadership. As Miles Lampson minuted in June 1921:

I am afraid we lack the means of curbing Mr. Little’s political activities and we can only hope that, if [he] does not reform, he may give us an opening of persuading the Australian Government to recall him, but that must be left for the present.³⁷

The first form of obstruction was prevarication. The governor-general communicated directly to Alston his request for Little’s introduction to the Chinese authorities; he also notified the British Colonial Office. Initially Alston did not take this step, justifying his manoeuvre by the claim that he ‘could find no precedent’ for such action and requesting further instructions from London. He also warned, in ‘very confidential’ remarks, that Little had suggested that his brief for the Australian government extended beyond matters of trade, and, given his ‘passion for political intrigue’, Alston had therefore:

warned Mr. Little that I cannot admit of any advice on political matters … being conveyed officially to [the] Commonwealth Government through any channel other than that of His Majesty’s Government.³⁸

Meanwhile, in Beijing, Little confronted a further problem in Alston’s refusal to accept the designation of his office that he had adopted in his printed material.³⁹ Without ever supplying the Chinese written characters in question, this issue generated further correspondence, Alston suggesting to his London colleagues that the terms chosen were too exalted for a trade envoy.

When the Colonial Office sought further information, Alston’s London colleagues ensured that their reportage on Little and his background contained negative remarks that implied he was unsuited to the position.⁴⁰ The suggestion that he was using an inappropriate title was also repeated.

In none of these accounts was there so much as a mention of any of Little’s good works in China: his 13 years as a missionary followed by a very successful commercial career on behalf of a major British firm was evidently not worthy of notice. Alston may have been jealous of Little’s superior knowledge and experience of China; he was certainly displeased that Little enjoyed many contacts with Chinese republican figures, referring to his dealings with them as ‘intrigue’. Taking the imperial point of view (which many contemporary British observers could see was then clearly of waning applicability), Alston was scandalised by Little’s insistence that he himself, as the British minister, be required to notify the Chinese authorities that Little would be taking up his duties as trade commissioner. Alston and his colleagues regarded such steps as a threat to the British prerogatives of extra-territoriality, which essentially qualified and compromised Chinese sovereignty.⁴¹ Little, by contrast, wished to accord the Chinese authorities respect and consideration in their own country. As Miles Lampson later minuted (though his remarks on consular appointments were not strictly relevant):

It was Mr Little … who suggested to the Australian Government that his appointment should be notified to the Chinese Government, a complete breach of precedent: H.M. Consular officers in China receive no exequaturs from the Chinese Government and no notification of their appointments or of those of H.M. Commercial Diplomatic Officers is made to that Government by H.M. Minister.⁴²

By obfuscation, Alston and the Foreign Office delayed official notification of Little’s appointment for over five months, only performing their duty at the insistence of the Colonial Office, prompted by repeated reminders from the governor-general. The agreement to Little’s title (in Chinese rendering) took even longer to resolve, Alston still adamant in March 1922 that he should determine what Chinese language title Little could legitimately employ. If Alston in Beijing regarded Little’s appearance as a challenge to the accustomed Foreign Office hierarchy, Fox in Shanghai regarded it as a slight to the British trade service.

Upon the appearance of Little, Fox expressed his resentment that the Australian authorities would wish to appoint their own trade officials rather than attach ‘junior’ officers to the existing British Commercial Intelligence Service. According to his account, he had offered the same advice to the Canadians but they had not followed it, with Fox now enjoying only a distant relationship with their current representative, Dr Ross, who ‘is far more at home with the Americans than he is with us’.⁴³ In London, Newton minuted that this appointment is ‘of a kind which will in the long run prove embarrassing and even endanger imperial unity’.⁴⁴ In retrospect, it needs to be underlined that such officials were so jealous of their prerogatives that a single Cambridge-educated and impeccably mannered Englishman could be seen as a threat to the British Empire.

From the initiation of their acquaintance, then, Fox was looking for an opportunity to undermine Little and his position. Just such an opportunity presented itself when Crommelin came to British officials in Shanghai with his charges of corruption and malfeasance.

British officialdom and reviews of Little’s tenure

Having approached Sir Everard Fraser and also Fox, Crommelin disclosed in detail his case against Little. The substance of his charges were conveyed by Fox in a letter to S. D. B. McGregor, British senior trade commissioner in Melbourne. The letter stated, inter alia, that ‘there is a sufficiency of truth in it to warrant the Australian Government in instituting a searching enquiry into Little’s position and recent activities’. Fox further suggested that the minister might ask Alston for his assessment.⁴⁵ McGregor had shared this information with DTC Minister Arthur Rodgers, who had, as a result, instituted the inquiry by Isaacson (who was undertaking a private visit to China). The latter had been given a copy of Fox’s communication and, once in Shanghai, had made contact with Crommelin and seems to have accepted his account of Little’s activities. Rather than seek Little’s side of the story, he had confronted him both with Crommelin’s charges and (extraordinarily) a copy of Fox’s letter. Little was livid that a British official had been responsible for spreading what he regarded as false and libellous accounts of his conduct, and dispatched an excoriating communication to Fox, which then generated heated though ultimately unfruitful exchanges.

Isaacson later made contact with Alston in Beijing. This provided an opportunity for the British officials to distance the Foreign Office from Crommelin’s insinuation that he had had its assistance in preparing his charges and transmitting them to Melbourne. As has been noted, both Fraser and Fox were privy to Crommelin’s allegations. Alston did his ingenuous best to deflect criticism of their clearly compromising conduct:

I observe that Captain Crommelin describes his report as having been drawn up after consultation with the British Consul General, but in transmitting a copy for my information Sir E. Fraser mentions that his name has been used entirely without authority and that he has called Captain Crommelin’s attention to this point. Both the Consul General and this Legation have carefully refrained from associating themselves, in any way with Captain Crommelin’s charges against Mr Little, and for this reason I have thought it advisable to take no official cognisance of them, but merely to communicate the facts to you informally for your own personal information.⁴⁶

Nonetheless, all the information disclosed by Isaacson was conveyed to London. In a lengthy account, Alston expressed the opinion that most of Crommelin’s charges could be considered ‘proven’, including:

That Mr Little made frequent and long journeys to Peking and other places, where he interested himself in political and personal matters which had no connection with Australian Trade in China, and that his house in Shanghai, where at one time he did all his work, was a rendezvous for all kinds of Chinese political plotters and agitators.⁴⁷

Alston supplied no particulars on these alleged activities. Notably, travel to other centres was an official activity for which Little had gained approval at the outset.

Nor did the animus of the British officials only relate to Little. Regarding Bakhap, Fox informed Alston that, unlike Isaacson, Bakhap had ‘completely ignored the British Authorities in this place’.⁴⁸ However, as Bakhap stated in his report:

As I notified you, the British Consul, Sir Everard Fraser, died three days before my arrival. I sent a letter to the Acting Consul asking him to tender my condolences to Lady Fraser.⁴⁹

It is also clear that there was British obstruction of Little’s official work. As Fitch observes, Little, as the only Australian official in Shanghai, was sometimes approached by tourists and prospective immigrants. Therefore, he had taken on the task of assisting them, including forwarding to the passport authorities at the British Consul-General’s office notification of their intended travel in order for them to be issued with the appropriate visa.⁵⁰ With the appearance of Sidney Barton (who had previously held the position of Alston’s Chinese secretary in Peking) as consul-general in Shanghai, this procedure was rejected, Barton insisting that any such request should come direct from the authorities in Australia. As Little was to observe, Barton’s attitude on this matter was reflective of his repugnance at any suggestion of Australian diplomacy, trade or otherwise:

He is the man who has clearly expressed himself to me as opposed to any Dominion’s representative here except in some obscure unofficial capacity. He seems to be determined there shall be no official in China from any part of the Empire except from the United Kingdom and through the old-established channels.⁵¹

In a sorry outcome that reflected very poorly upon bureaucratic and political processes in Australia, and demonstrated the very constricted horizons of some commercial interests, Little’s official role was terminated by Cabinet on 18 July 1923, and he was instructed to wind-up the affairs of his office within three months. His contribution to Australia’s infant trade diplomacy was then subject to a savage parliamentary attack, the minister’s foreknowledge of the likelihood of which had probably precipitated his dismissal. Hitherto the traducing of Little’s reputation under parliamentary and ministerial privilege has been represented partly as a result of his alleged failings, but mainly as a consequence of the commercial rivalries that had originally motivated criticism of his appointment by prominent press commentators and business interests.⁵² However, the crucial determinant was the hostility of British officials who had no scruple in intervening to prejudice Australian reviews, albeit maladroit, of Little’s activities.

The further airing of Crommelin’s baseless charges and the government’s failure to offer a defence of his reputation offended and outraged Little.⁵³ The minister, Austin Chapman, had received by cable a summary of Bakhap’s findings as early as 17 April. In the debate, rather than make a direct and necessarily exonerating reference to this final report, Chapman made the misleading remark that ‘a responsible member of the Senate (Senator Bakhap) investigated matters, and the only thing he said about Mr. Little was that he had been indiscreet’. He thereby conflated Bakhap’s published trade report (which contained a final paragraph on Little’s activities, which nevertheless offered a positive assessment) with his report for the minister on his investigation of Little of which parliamentarians were unaware. Instead, Chapman offered the dark remark that ‘the state of things … existing in the East is very unsatisfactory’,⁵⁴ thus hinting that he had other information but defending his right to withhold it. In summing up, James Scullin found Chapman evasive and his explanation for Little’s dismissal vacuous. He pointed out that Little had been dismissed on the basis, it would appear, of information not disclosed to parliament, which set a sorry precedent. Events might have taken a different course if Bakhap had been able to make a personal intervention, but he was not in a position to do so. Having fallen ill in China, he died in August 1923.

In response to Little’s entreaties, the government took shelter behind the argument that, as parliament had not appropriated monies for his office for any period beyond his initial contract of 12 months, it was unable to extend it, which implied that his employment by the Commonwealth had not been valid after 7 March 1922. Little’s subsequent attempts to restore his reputation were in vain. After much correspondence, he published a full ‘Defence Bulletin’ in October 1923, followed by ‘A Personal Appeal to Parliamentarians’.⁵⁵

Planning a visit in late 1927 to Australia en route to New Zealand, Little sought, with the help of Massy-Greene, to interview Prime Minister Stanley Bruce.⁵⁶ Insistent that there had been no adverse reflection on his character or abilities, Bruce was adamant that no official statement, compensation or other steps were appropriate.⁵⁷ Little was still pursuing redress for his grievances in 1930⁵⁸ and later, during the Lyons government. By this time, Little had built a retirement establishment for himself in Kerikeri, New Zealand, though he returned to Shanghai for a visit almost annually. Transiting Sydney, he must often have reflected upon the personal consequences of his chance Australian sojourn of 1921. He died in New Zealand in February 1939.

Conclusion

Little, as a linguist with years of experience in China and many connections to the business world, was almost uniquely equipped to serve in the Shanghai post. His many trade reports dispatched to Melbourne demonstrated that he had made a close study of commercial opportunities for Australian commodities in local markets and was well aware of the many impediments to enlarging Australian trade engagement with China. Not only were some Australian products defective or poorly presented, but also Australian commodities could not be shipped direct to China and Australian banks were unable to conduct unmediated transactions with financial institutions in Shanghai. Although he might have been prepared for some resistance on the part of British authorities to the exercise of his role, he had clearly underestimated the capacity of Foreign Office personnel to undermine his personal reputation. He was also unlucky in that he had lost the patronage of the only figure of real consequence when Hughes lost the prime ministership as a result of the elections of December 1922. It was not until 1935 that the Commonwealth government attempted again to appoint a trade official to Shanghai, a post that evolved to become of great significance for Australia’s Asian trade.

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1. 1 W. J. Hudson, Billy Hughes in Paris. The Birth of Australian Diplomacy (Melbourne: Nelson/AIIA, 1978); Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes (Sydney: Hale and Iremonger, 1983).

2. 2 Long to Munro Ferguson, 24 July 1917, National Archives of Australia (NAA): A458, D510/1.

3. 3 Minute by Mills, 5 October 1917, NAA: A458, D510/1. At this time, the government had been considering the appointment of trade representatives at Batavia and Manila, though, in the event, no decision was made. Shepherd to Steward, 16 August 1916; Long to Munro-Ferguson, 13 February 1917, NAA: A2219, EXTERNAL RELATIONS VOLUME 8. On the early history of the Australian trade service, see Alan Robert Taysom, The History of the Australian Trade Commissioner Service, vols 1–5 (Canberra: Department of Trade, 1983, National Library of Australia [NLA]: unpublished manuscript); Boris Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade: A History of the Australian Trade Commissioner’s Service (Canberra: Austrade/Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2008).

4. 4 Memorandum by Mills, ‘Trade Representation of the Commonwealth Abroad’, 28 June 1917, NAA: A598, E1922/5975.

5. 5 O. Mary Hill, Canada’s Salesman to the World. The Department of Trade and Commerce, 1892–1939 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1977).

6. 6 Hilary Rubinstein, ‘Bakhap, Thomas Jerome Kingston (1866–1923)’, The Biographical Dictionary of the Australian Senate, vol. 1, 1901–1929 (Carlton South: Melbourne University Press, 2000), 252–6.

7. 7 Memorandum by Mills, ‘Trade Representation of the Commonwealth Abroad’, 16.

8. 8 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, Senate, no. 30, 26 July 1917, 502–11; no. 32, 9 August 1917, 902–11.

9. 9 Jensen to Russell, 25 February 1918, NAA: A598, E1922/5975.

10. 10 Gazette no 59, 26 April 1918, 876.

11. 11 Hughes to Watt, 3 June 1918, NAA: CP360/9, BUNDLE 1/NN.

12. 12 Braddon to Watt, 23 August 1918, NAA: A2, 1919/446.

13. 13 Munro-Ferguson to Colonial Office, Secret ‘P’ Despatch, 1 May 1919, The National Archives, UK (TNA): CO 418/176; Munro-Ferguson to C.O., Secret ‘P’ Despatch, 15 December 1919, TNA: CO 418/178.

14. 14 CBOT Minute, 28 February 1921, NAA: A458, D510/1.

15. 15 CBOT Minute, 23 May 1921, NAA: A457, AD306/6; Memorandum by Oakley, 25 August 1921, ‘Trade Representation Abroad’, NAA: A458, D510/1; Memorandum by Taylor to secretary, Prime Minister’s Department, 16 November 1921, attachment, ‘Trade Representation of the Commonwealth Abroad’ (17 March 1919), NAA: A458, D510/1.

16. 16 This study owes a considerable debt to the pioneering biographical study by Don Fitch, The Immortal Part. The Story of Edward Little, Australia’s First Trade Commissioner in China (Melbourne: Arcadia, 2001).

17. 17 ‘Founder of Kuling’ [Obituary], North China Daily News, 4 February 1939, 11; Fitch, The Immortal Part, 57–69; ‘Recognition of the Role of Edward Selby Little in Events Leading to the Establishment of the First Chinese Republic in 1912’, TNA: FCO 21/2186.

18. 18 ‘Mr Herbert Brookes stated that he knew Mr. Little very well … Mr Brookes considered that the Government had secured the services of a very capable man.’ CBOT Minutes, 23 November 1922, NAA: CP703/6, 7.

19. 19 Little to Hughes, 21 January 1921, NAA: A458, E510/2.

20. 20 Cabinet submission, ‘Trade Representation of the Commonwealth Abroad’, 17 March 1919, NAA: A458, D510/1.

21. 21 Regarding Little’s appointment, see NAA: A458, E510/2; M. Ruth Megaw, ‘White Diplomacy and Yellow Gold: The Appointment of Australia’s First Governmental Representative in China’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 62, no. 1 (1976): 57–64; Schedvin, Emissaries of Trade, 27–33.

22. 22 Alston to Forster, 10 June 1921, NAA: A458, E510/2.

23. 23 Little to Hughes, 22 November 1922, NAA: A457, V306/3.

24. 24 NAA: A457, V306/3; NAA: A457, W306/3.

25. 25 Bulletin no. 20, ‘China Australia Trade 1920–1921’, NLA: ‘Australian Trade Commissioner Service in China’, Nf 382.0994 LIT.

26. 26 ‘Australian–Chinese Trade’, Spring 1922, NLA: ‘Australian Trade Commissioner Service in China’, Nf 382.0994 LIT. Many of the same observations on the shortcomings of Australia’s export trade to Asia were made by Egbert Sheaf, Little’s colleague based in Singapore. See James Cotton, ‘E.T. Sheaf, Australian “Trade Commissioner in the East”, 1922–25’, History Australia 15, no. 2 (2018): 271–88, doi.org/10.1080/14490854.2018.1439250.

27. 27 James Cotton, ‘The Elusive Reginald Benjamin Levien: Victoria’s Commercial Agent in Asia, Fraudster, Recidivist’, Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 106, no. 1 (2020): 7–28; James Cotton, ‘“We Are Nearer the East than the Other States”: Frederic Jones of Queensland, the First Official from Australia in Shanghai’, Queensland Review 27, no. 1 (2020): 39–59, doi.org/10.1017/qre.2020.3.

28. 28 Taylor to Age, 9 November 1921, NAA: A458, E510/2; Fitch, The Immortal Part, 116–22.

29. 29 Associated Chamber of Manufacturers of Australia to Hughes, 16 November 1922, NAA: A598, E1922/5975.

30. 30 Little, ‘Defence Bulletin’, October 1923, 4.

31. 31 This information derives from a family source, see ‘Welcome to the Crommelin Family Website’, accessed 13 March 2025, www.crommelin.org. See also the records of the Imperial War Museums, accessed 13 March 2025, www.iwm.org.uk. Fitch, who could find no information about Crommelin, is in error in referring to him as ‘Luke Crommelin’, as does Schedvin.

32. 32 This person was evidently ‘Miss M. McKinney’ who had once worked at the Department of Defence. The reason for her presence in Shanghai is not known as other details of her biography are elusive. See Whitton to Prime Minister’s Department, 20 October 1921, NAA: A457, 1/328/1.

33. 33 Little, ‘Work of the Australian Trade Commissioner in China’, [n.d., c. May 1922], NAA: A457, V306/3.

34. 34 ‘Report to Minister Rodgers’, Little Papers, NLA: Nf 382.0994 LIT. See also Trade between the Commonwealth and China (Melbourne: Albert J. Mullett, 1922).

35. 35 CBOT Minutes, 23 November 1922, NAA: CP703/6, 7.

36. 36 Churchill to Hughes, 8 July 1921, TNA: CO 418/214.

37. 37 Minute by Lampson, 21 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

38. 38 Alston to Curzon, 11 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

39. 39 Little to Alston, 18 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

40. 40 See, for example, Wellesley to Read, 3 December 1921 (and enclosures), TNA: FO 371/6656.

41. 41 On the role of such assumptions on the part of British officialdom in China, see Oliver Yule Smith, ‘The Problem of China and the British Official Mind, 1922–1984’ (PhD thesis, King’s College, 2023).

42. 42 Minute by Lampson, 3 January 1922, TNA: FO 371/6656.

43. 43 Fox to Peking Legation (Brett), 8 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

44. 44 Minute by Newton, 17 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

45. 45 Fox to McGregor, 23 September 1921, TNA: FO 371/8021.

46. 46 Alston to Wellesley, 28 September 1921, TNA: FO 371/6656.

47. 47 Alston to Curzon, 22 March 1922, TNA: FO 371/8021.

48. 48 Fox to Alston, 26 June 1922, TNA: FO 371/8021.

49. 49 ‘Report to Minister Rodgers’, Little Papers, NLA: Nf 382.0994 LIT.

50. 50 Fitch, The Immortal Part, 208–9.

51. 51 Little to Rodgers, 25 November 1922, NAA: A598, E1923/42.

52. 52 David Walker, Anxious Nation: Australia and the Rise of Asia 1850–1939 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1999), 196–202.

53. 53 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 30, 24 July 1923, 1461–75.

54. 54 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, no. 30, 24 July 1923, 1471, also 1472.

55. 55 ‘Defence Bulletin’, Little to members of parliament, 1 February 1924, NAA: A458, E510/2.

56. 56 Little to Massy-Greene, 25 August 1927; Massy-Greene to Bruce, 5 October 1927, NAA: A458, E510/2.

57. 57 Bruce to Little, 16 November 1927, NAA: A458, E510/2.

58. 58 Forde to Scullin, 27 March 1930, NAA: A458, E510/2.