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China’s carbon emissions trend after the pandemic

David I. Stern

Is China on a path to peak its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions soon, as it has pledged under the Paris Agreement? In this chapter, I compare carbon emissions and energy production trends in 2019 and 2023. The former year represents typical conditions before the Covid-19 pandemic, while the latter is the first period after China removed most Covid-19 related restrictions, in December 2022. Carbon emissions increased by 8 per cent over this period, while emissions from the power sector, where decarbonisation efforts might be expected to be first focused, increased by 18 per cent. Though renewable energy production has increased significantly, the production of fossil fuels continues to grow strongly. Coal production in 2023 was 26 per cent higher than in 2019—a compound rate of 6 per cent per annum. Despite heavy rainfall and sluggish economic activity, there were similar trends in the first nine months of 2024. Therefore, there is little sign of ‘growing back greener’. Going forward, the changing geopolitical environment could further impede China’s emissions peaking.

Climate change remains one of the most pressing global issues. During the pandemic, the decrease in GHG emissions was seen by many as a chance for rapid progress towards a low-carbon economy. For instance, Chen et al. (2022) predicted that Chinese emissions would peak between 2021 and 2026 at a level between 11.7 and 13.1 gigatonnes, with more than 80 per cent probability, and Lui (2022) wrote that China is ‘set to significantly overachieve [on] the targets it promised internationally for 2030, with emissions peaking by 2025’. However, as I will show, China’s carbon emissions, and especially those from the power sector, continue to grow strongly, raising concerns about China achieving its climate commitments. Furthermore, the sluggish post-pandemic economic recovery and rising energy security concerns amid a changing geopolitical landscape mean that China may struggle to reach its ambitious targets (Ahmed 2023).

China is the world’s second-largest economy and both the largest consumer of energy and the largest emitter of carbon dioxide. Its energy consumption amounts to about one-quarter of the global total. Thus, China has a critical role to play in global efforts to combat climate change. Since 2005, China has seen its primary energy demand surge by 47 per cent, and this trajectory is expected to continue with an additional increase of about 30 per cent between 2020 and 2040.¹ Fossil fuels remain dominant among China’s primary energy sources, accounting for in excess of 80 per cent of energy use, while also being responsible for most of the country’s carbon emissions.

Like many other countries, China is also facing the adverse impacts of climate change (Lu et al. 2022): there has been a rise in the occurrence of extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, heatwaves and sandstorms within the country. The economic cost of such events has significantly increased recently (Dai et al. 2015). Because Chinese emissions form a larger share of the global total than those of any other country and the climate damage it could suffer might also be greater in total value than that of any other country (Tol 2019), China has a greater incentive than any other nation to pursue net-zero emissions.

This chapter aims to understand China’s new carbon emissions and energy production trajectories since the pandemic by comparing the trends for both between 2019 and 2023. The former period represents typical conditions before the Covid-19 pandemic, while the latter is the first year after China removed most pandemic restrictions, in December 2022. The research shows that carbon emissions have increased substantially over this period and China is now following a more carbon-intensive path than recent research suggested. It seems less likely that China will peak emissions before 2030. While research has addressed changes in Chinese carbon emissions during the pandemic (for example, Li et al. 2023), the post-pandemic trend had not been investigated before the work of Ahmed and Stern (2023). This chapter updates their research and finds that, adjusting for circumstances, similar trends continued into the first nine months of 2024.

Analysis

I collected data on daily Chinese carbon emissions from Carbon Monitor (Liu et al. 2020). The box plots in Figure 8.1 show the variation in daily emissions over the first eight months of each of the two selected years. The lowest daily emission levels occur during the Chinese New Year period. There is very little variation in daily transport emissions. I test whether there is a statistically significant change in emissions between the two periods by estimating a separate regression equation with just a constant for each of 2019 and 2023 using seemingly unrelated regressions and then computing the difference in regression coefficients between the two equations and its standard error. I estimate this two-equation system for total emissions and for emissions from each sector using Newey–West autocorrelation robust standard errors with 14 lags (Newey and West 1987). Total emissions rose 2.24 million tonnes a day or 8 per cent (standard error = 0.30 million tonnes, p = 0.000) between the two periods. The increase in mean daily emissions from the power sector was also highly statistically significant, totalling 2.21 million tonnes or 18 per cent (0.20, 0.000) between the two periods. There was a statistically significant but small decrease in emissions from the transport sector, of –0.03 million tonnes or –1 per cent (0.013, 0.010). On the other hand, there were no statistically significant changes in emissions from the other two sectors: industry (0.08 million tonnes, 1 per cent, 0.19, 0.67) and residential (–0.02, –1 per cent, 0.05, 0.67). Monthly and annual Chinese energy production data used in the following discussion are from the National Bureau of Statistics of China.²

Figure 8.1: Chinese carbon dioxide emissions in 2019 and 2023

Notes: Daily carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel and cement production. Each pair of box plots shows daily data for 2019 emissions on the left and 2023 on the right. Reside. = residential sector; Transp. = transportation sector.

Source: Carbon Monitor (carbonmonitor.org/).

Figure 8.2: Energy sources of Chinese electricity production in 2019 and 2023 (terawatt hours)

Note: The figure shows monthly means for each year.

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (data.stats.gov.cn/english/).

The shares of solar and wind in total power generation increased from 1.6 per cent and 5.0 per cent, respectively, in 2019, to 3.2 per cent and 9.0 per cent, respectively, in 2023. Figure 8.2 shows that though electricity production from wind and solar grew substantially over the four years, so did electricity generation from fossil fuels. Average monthly thermal power generation increased 91 terawatt hours or 21 per cent between 2019 and 2023, while generation from new renewables increased 51 terawatt hours or 130 per cent. Nuclear generation increased by 24 per cent, while hydropower fell by 1 per cent. As a result, the share of thermal power in total generation only decreased from 72.2 per cent in 2019 to 70.1 per cent in 2023. So, it is not surprising that, with most of the increase in electricity output coming from fossil fuels, the sector’s emissions increased substantially.

Production of energy in general and fossil fuels in particular also continued to increase. Figure 8.3 shows that coal production grew consistently over this period, as shown by the fitted exponential trend. Coal production in 2023 was 26 per cent higher than in 2019—a compound growth rate of 6 per cent per annum. For the first time since 2007, the share of coal in China’s total energy consumption increased, from 56 per cent in 2021 to 56.2 per cent in 2022.

Figure 8.3: Monthly coal production in China, 2017–23

Notes: Values for January and February are identical as only a total for both months is provided in the source. A fitted exponential trend is shown.

Source: National Bureau of Statistics of China (data.stats.gov.cn/english/).

At the time of writing, nine months of data were available for 2024. Comparing these first nine months with the corresponding period in 2023, we can evaluate whether similar trends have persisted into 2024. According to Carbon Monitor, emissions fell 0.6 per cent in 2024 compared with 2023. Emissions from power generation rose by 1.6 per cent, with smaller increases in transport (0.7 per cent) and residential (0.8 per cent) emissions offset by a 4 per cent fall in industrial emissions. Does this mean that Chinese emissions are peaking?

Electricity output increased by 6.3 per cent between the first nine months of 2023 and 2024. The increase was supplied by roughly equal increases in thermal power, hydropower and the new renewables. The increase in hydropower is weather related. With less rainfall there would have been a more significant increase in thermal power.

Coal production was up only 0.7 per cent on 2023. In the first few months of the year, coal production was lower than in the previous year but by October it was running at 6 per cent above the level of 2023. This is identical to the compound trend between 2017 and 2023.

In conclusion, the fall in emissions in the first nine months of 2024 is probably partly due to the increase in hydroelectric output and slow economic activity. It probably does not yet constitute a sustainable peak in emissions.

Discussion

There could be catchup growth as well as economic stimulus as the economy comes out of the pandemic period of slow growth, though, as of the date of writing, news reports suggest a slow recovery exacerbated by a real estate bust. Previous research has found mixed results regarding the behaviour of carbon emissions after recessions. Burke et al. (2015) found that globally over the five decades from 1961 to 2010 emissions tended to grow more slowly relative to GDP following recessions than after economic expansions became established. Similarly, Bersalli et al. (2023) found that 26 of the 28 countries that had so far peaked their carbon dioxide emissions did so just before or during a recession. However, emissions grew strongly in 2010 following the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) mainly because energy intensity rose (Jotzo et al. 2012).

China suffers from energy insecurity as it consumes much more oil and coal than it produces. China also has the most to gain from reducing carbon emissions. Tol (2019: 188–89) estimates that around half the global benefits from climate mitigation accrue to China and, as the largest emitter, a given percentage of reduction in emissions in China translates to more avoided carbon than anywhere else. For these reasons, we might expect China to be a leader on climate action among developing countries. In the past, China has set seemingly ambitious climate mitigation goals, though these were not very strict compared with business as usual (Stern and Jotzo 2010). Under the Paris Agreement, China has pledged to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and reach net-zero emissions by 2060. However, after the energy crisis of 2022 and increased tensions between China and the West, China may have less incentive to continue to invest in the development and manufacture of renewable energy technologies (Goldthau and Tagliapietra 2022). Furthermore, the increasing political tensions between the United States and China are reducing the potential for cooperation on climate policy. For example, at the UN Climate Conference COP27 in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, in November 2022, China did not join a pledge to curb methane emissions and refused to provide financial support as part of the Loss and Damage Fund. This stance and the data we have presented in this chapter cast some doubt on China following through on its previous pledges and certainly on peaking emissions in 2025.

Conclusion

To examine whether China is on a path to peak carbon emissions by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060 under the Paris Agreement, we compared China’s carbon emissions and energy production trajectories between 2019 and 2023, defined as pre-pandemic and post-pandemic periods, respectively. I found that China’s total emissions rose by 8 per cent, mainly due to an increase of 18 per cent in power sector emissions. The production of coal grew at a compound annual rate of 6 per cent. Moreover, we note that the share of coal in China’s total energy production increased for the first time since 2007, from 56 per cent in 2021 to 56.2 per cent in 2022. Though emissions fell in the first nine months of 2024 relative to the same period in 2023, this was due to the slow pace of economic activity and wet weather that resulted in a big increase in hydropower generation.

Our new findings contrast with the research of Le Quéré et al. (2021: 197), who argued that ‘the pervasive disruptions from the COVID-19 pandemic have radically altered the trajectory of global CO₂ emissions’. Emissions fell sharply globally because of the curtailment of passenger transport during the pandemic (Jiang and Stern 2023), but Le Quéré et al. (2021) believed there was a window of opportunity to continue the slowing of emissions growth that they had seen since 2015. Similarly, Chen et al. (2022) predicted that Chinese emissions would peak between 2021 and 2026 at a level between 11.7 and 13.1 gigatonnes, with more than 80 per cent probability, and Lui (2022) wrote that China is ‘set to significantly overachieve [on] the targets it promised internationally for 2030, with emissions peaking by 2025’. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that China may find it challenging to achieve these targets within that time frame.

Acknowledgements

I thank Khalid Ahmed for his work on the original paper (Ahmed and Stern 2023), which contributed to this updated work.

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1. 1 See ‘China’ at the Climate Action Tracker website: climateactiontracker.org/countries/china/policies-action/.

2. 2 See monthly and annual energy data (data.stats.gov.cn/english/easyquery.htm).