Landslide
1
Landslide: The 2025 Australian federal election
Marian Sawer, Jill Sheppard and John Warhurst
Abstract
This chapter introduces the themes of the 2025 federal election campaign, the main campaign events and the dramatis personae. It notes the changing demography of the electorate and the need for parties to take their campaigns to different social media platforms to pursue the votes of Millennials and Generation Z. The ‘Trump effect’ is examined as is related campaigning around ‘Australian values’. The chapter covers regulatory issues including those arising from the new importance to the campaign of social media influencers. It finishes with an overview of the three parts of the book: Part 1 on the campaign and context, Part 2 on the actors and Part 3 on the results.
Keywords: campaign themes; Trump effect; demographic change; social media; regulatory issues
On election night, 3 May 2025, commentators found it difficult to believe the results. While Labor had been gaining in the polls and seemed likely to retain at least minority government, no-one anticipated the landslide that occurred. Labor had won a higher proportion of seats than at any time since their wartime victory in 1943.
Table 1.1 Federal election timetable, 2025
|
Date |
Event |
|---|---|
|
28 March |
Prime Minister calls the election |
|
31 March |
Writs issued for the House of Representatives and half-Senate elections |
|
7 April |
Close of rolls |
|
10 April |
Close of nominations |
|
22 April |
Early voting begins |
|
3 May |
Election day |
|
13 May |
The new Albanese ministry sworn in |
|
12 June |
Return of writs |
Source: The authors.
How did this happen? The authors in our book explore what contributed to this result, the nature of party and third-party campaigns, the changing demography of the electorate and external factors including the ‘Trump effect’. The main cast of characters—apart from US President Donald Trump—is introduced in Table 1.2.
Table 1.2 2025 federal election: Dramatis personae
|
Australian Labor Party |
|
|
Anthony Albanese |
Prime Minister |
|
Jim Chalmers |
Treasurer |
|
Jason Clare |
Election spokesperson |
|
Senator Katy Gallagher |
Election spokesperson |
|
Paul Erickson |
National Secretary |
|
Liberal Party |
|
|
Peter Dutton |
Opposition Leader |
|
Senator Jane Hume |
Shadow Minister for Finance and the Public Service |
|
Senator James Paterson |
Election spokesperson |
|
Andrew Hirst |
Federal Director |
|
Topham Guerin |
Liberal Party advertising agency |
|
Nationals |
|
|
David Littleproud |
Leader |
|
Senator Bridget McKenzie |
Senate Leader |
|
Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price |
Shadow Minister for Indigenous Affairs and Government Efficiency |
|
Greens |
|
|
Adam Bandt |
Leader |
|
Senator Larissa Waters |
Deputy Leader |
|
Stephen Bates |
MP for Brisbane |
|
Max Chandler-Mather |
MP for Griffith |
|
Independents and minor parties |
|
|
Monique Ryan |
Community Independent MP |
|
Zoe Daniel |
Community Independent MP |
|
Dai Le |
Independent MP |
|
Senator Jacqui Lambie |
Leader, Jacqui Lambie Network |
|
Senator Pauline Hanson |
Leader, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation |
|
Clive Palmer |
Billionaire funder, Trumpet of Patriots |
|
Others |
|
|
Sandra Bourke |
Advance spokesperson |
|
Sally McManus |
Secretary, Australian Council of Trade Unions |
|
Peta Credlin |
Sky News presenter |
|
Gina Rinehart |
Mining billionaire |
Source: The authors.
While there was a landslide of seats, we must point to the disproportionality of the result. Labor gained 35 per cent of the primary vote for the House of Representatives but 63 per cent of the seats. Such disproportionality is characteristic of Westminster electoral systems based on single-member constituencies. In the 2024 UK general election, for example, the Labour Party won 34 per cent of the vote and 63 per cent of the seats in the House of Commons.
In Australia, the preferential system at least ensures that seats are won by those with majority support in the seat, even if this majority is only achieved through the distribution of preferences. Labor won 55 per cent of the ‘two-party-preferred’ vote, meaning it won more preferences as well as more primary votes than the Coalition. In 2025, the trend that we observed in 2022—the shift away from Australia’s traditional two-party system—continued. While in 1980 more than 90 per cent of the primary vote was for the major parties, by 2025, this had shrunk to about two-thirds and the vote for minor parties and Independents reached a record high.
The era of life-long party loyalties was coming to an end, along with the dominance of baby boomers in the electorate. The baby boomers (born between 1946 and 1964), were outnumbered in 2025 by Millennials (born 1981–96) and Gen Z (born 1997–2012). These new generations related to politics in a different way from the baby boomers, and Gen Z in particular received news through social media rather than newspapers or online news websites. Gen Z spent most time on social media—apparently almost four and a half hours a day. Those pursuing their votes had to do so through social media, including Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and TikTok. The enormous followings of social media ‘influencers’ meant that being interviewed on their podcasts could be of great value to political leaders; the Coalition, however, appears to have been particularly unsuccessful in its social media strategy and in winning votes from Gen Z.
Apart from the new political importance of Millennials and Gen Z (see Chowdhury 2025), other demographic shifts influenced the campaign. More than 30 per cent of the population was born overseas, with the most important source country continuing to be the United Kingdom but the next largest numbers coming from India and China. Labor engaged a multicultural marketing agency in its attempt to reach out to these communities. However, celebrating Bengali New Year on its Facebook page (15 April) had mixed responses, including: ‘This is exactly why no true blue Aussies are voting for Labor.’
The Coalition had difficulty trying to attract back Chinese Australians’ votes lost in 2022 while also presenting itself as stronger than the government on standing up to China. At the same time, Labor was challenged by new efforts to mobilise Muslim voters over the war in Gaza and the future of Palestine, while Jewish voters were mobilised over a rise in anti-Semitism. This new involvement of Muslim and Jewish communities in the campaign overshadowed religious communities mobilised politically in the past, such as the much larger Catholic community.
Another outstanding feature of the 2025 election was the ‘Trump effect’. While Opposition leader Peter Dutton (Table 1.2) was at first keen to be associated with Trump and his successful campaign for the US presidency, this association quickly became a liability as Trump pursued policies harmful to Australia such as the tariffs announced on 2 April (‘Liberation Day’). The labelling of Dutton as ‘Temu-Trump’ went viral on social media after Greens MP Stephen Bates used the term in Question Time the day before the election was called.
The Coalition continued to enjoy the backing of the Murdoch media including Sky News Australia. All News Corp mastheads endorsed a Coalition government except the Adelaide Advertiser, which endorsed majority government by either major party. However, populist attacks on the ‘wokeness’ of Labor, the Greens and Community Independents (generally known as Teals)—whether by the Murdoch media or the well-financed digital campaign organisation Advance—appeared to have little traction beyond the conservative base.
In this introductory chapter, we highlight key themes of the 2025 federal election campaign, look briefly at the ‘Trump effect’ and then outline new regulatory issues. We finish with a brief overview of the structure of the book and its place in the federal election series.
Election themes
Campaigning began well before the Prime Minister finally called the 2025 election. Labor’s campaign could be dated to 3 November 2024, when it announced that if re-elected its first piece of legislation would cut student loan debt by 20 per cent, benefiting three million Australians ‘doing it tough’, particularly Millennials and Gen Z, who had become the largest voting bloc since the previous election. In January 2025, Anthony Albanese visited Queensland for the announcement of major funding for improvement of the Bruce Highway.
Meanwhile, the Coalition re-engaged New Zealand–based advertising agency Topham Guerin and, on 8 January 2025, launched its campaign message: ‘Let’s get Australia back on track.’ Topham Guerin had earlier helped the New Zealand National Party win government with the slogan ‘Get our country back on track’.
At the same time, Opposition leader Dutton echoed several of the themes of Trump’s successful campaign for the US presidency, attacking government waste and Canberra-based public servants, and telling Sydney radio station 2GB that the Albanese government was ‘more interested in pronouns and a $500 million Voice campaign’ than the cost of living. After Trump’s inauguration on 20 January and his executive order of that day establishing the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), the Coalition appointed Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price as Shadow Minister for Government Efficiency.
The formal 2025 election campaign began on Friday, 28 March, when the Prime Minister called on the Governor-General at Government House (Table 1.1). Treasurer Jim Chalmers had delivered the Budget on Tuesday, 25 March and Dutton gave his budget reply speech on Thursday, 27 March.
The trip to Government House was later than originally planned (Evans 2025) after Tropical Cyclone Alfred delayed an earlier election. During the cyclone emergency, Albanese appeared business-like alongside Queensland Liberal National Party (LNP) Premier, David Crisafulli.
Chalmers’ well-received ‘cost-of-living’ budget included a small income tax cut that the Opposition decided to oppose. Chalmers otherwise emphasised support for Medicare, housing and defence spending, and gave every taxpayer $300 towards their energy bill—just weeks before the Reserve Bank of Australia cut interest rates for the first time in three years, although Trump’s tariff plans threatened to increase global economic uncertainty.
Dutton’s reply was more a pre-election speech than an alternative budget. New housing policies, such as tax concessions on interest repayments for the first five years, were a major ingredient. He also promised an east coast gas reservation scheme and a reduction in public service numbers of 41,000, claiming to save $7 billion per year once operational. His vote sweetener, which became a centrepiece of his campaign, was a proposal to halve the fuel excise for 12 months. Dutton only made passing reference to his existing promise to build seven government-funded nuclear power stations. The speech also accused the Prime Minister of being weak in relation to crime and anti-Semitism.
Economists were unenthusiastic about both speeches, wanting restraint rather than a ‘spendathon’ given the growing size of the national debt. Yet, the parties were matching each other’s spending promises.
Some matters were off the table between the major parties despite wider community concern. These included the huge commitment to the AUKUS (Australia, United Kingdom, United States) defence agreement, miserly treatment of the unemployed, cautious policies on border protection and refugees, regulation of gambling advertising and general commitment to net-zero emissions by 2050. The defeat of the October 2023 Voice referendum cast a shadow over Indigenous policies, as did the recent big Coalition victories in the Northern Territory and Queensland elections. Likewise, both major parties refused to condemn Israel’s actions in the Middle East, despite international and local pressure. Each of these policies was left to others to advocate, including the Greens and community protest groups.
A close election was anticipated, with a general expectation of either a Labor or a Coalition minority government. This perception impacted party strategies. The Liberals warned against a ‘Labor–Green–Teal extremist minority government’. Labor was pressed on a possible minority government supported by the Greens, and the Teal Independents were pressed on whom they would support. Labor emphasised that its goal was majority government even when that seemed unlikely. The Greens saw such a minority government as an opportunity for progressive policies and described their role as ‘keeping Dutton out’.
As in 2022, it was an interrupted campaign. The two-week pre-polling period began on Tuesday, 22 April, while the campaign encompassed two weeks of school holidays, the Easter holiday from Friday, 18 April to Monday, 21 April and Anzac Day on Friday, 25 April. Subsequently, the unexpected death of Pope Francis on Easter Monday forced another pause in campaigning.
The campaign was punctuated by a record four televised debates between the two major-party leaders and numerous debates between ministers and shadow ministers. The leaders’ debates were uneventful and relatively even, with the Prime Minister a nose in front (Mills 2025). Neither leader made a major error. The official campaign spokespeople were Jason Clare MP and Senator Katy Gallagher for Labor and Senator James Paterson for the Coalition. The official Labor and Coalition launches came late in the campaign—within an hour of each other on Sunday, 13 April in Perth and Western Sydney, respectively. The Greens finally officially launched their campaign, in Melbourne, on the final Sunday before the election, 30 April (Table 1.3).
Table 1.3 Key campaign events, 2025
|
Date |
Event |
|---|---|
|
3 November 2024 |
Launch in Adelaide of Labor’s election commitment to 20 per cent reduction in student loan debt |
|
12 January 2025 |
Soft launch in Melbourne of ‘Let’s get Australia back on track: The priorities of a Dutton Coalition government’ |
|
7 March 2025 |
Tropical Cyclone Alfred makes landfall, delays election announcement |
|
28 March 2025 |
Election called |
|
2 April 2025 |
Announcement of global tariffs on US imports (‘Liberation Day’) |
|
7 April 2025 |
Peter Dutton says Coalition’s work-from-home policy was ‘a mistake’ |
|
8 April 2025 |
First leaders’ debate, Sky News |
|
13 April 2025 |
Labor campaign launch in Perth; Coalition launch in Sydney |
|
16 April 2025 |
Second leaders’ debate, ABC TV |
|
22 April 2025 |
Third leaders’ debate, Nine Network |
|
27 April 2025 |
Fourth leaders’ debate, Seven Network |
|
30 April 2025 |
Greens campaign launch in Melbourne; Albanese speech to National Press Club |
Source: The authors.
The party leaders and their spokespeople were the major figures during the campaign. Each leader travelled widely. Albanese provocatively—but, as it turned out, realistically—campaigned in Dutton’s own electorate of Dickson. He campaigned hard on health and his signature flourish became waving his green Medicare card. He also criticised Dutton for not campaigning in the electorates in which the Coalition’s proposed nuclear power stations were to be located. Dutton’s signature campaign gesture was to fill up at a petrol station to emphasise his proposed cut to the fuel excise. Neither leader visited Indigenous communities.
The Liberals called on all their former prime ministers for campaign assistance, especially John Howard. Albanese campaigned with popular Labor State premiers, especially Peter Malinauskas in South Australia. He seemed to avoid Victorian Premier Jacinta Allen because of her apparent unpopularity in what was predicted to be a difficult State for Labor to defend seats. Noticeably quiet figures included shadow defence minister Andrew Hastie, whose policies were not launched until the second last week, and minister for the environment Tanya Plibersek, overseeing a sensitive area for the government. The Nationals did not call on out-of-favour former leader Barnaby Joyce.
The Liberal Party lost several candidates during the campaign to revelations of historical gaffes and the Greens candidate for Franklin in Tasmania withdrew after it was discovered he had New Zealand citizenship.
The leaders’ campaign interactions were generally polite despite personal attacks. Liberal advertising made a deliberate attempt to soften Dutton’s ‘hard-man’ image. When his father suffered a heart attack just before the first leaders’ debate, Albanese was gracious, but Dutton chose not to withdraw. The politeness appeared not to extend to the campaign trail itself, however. Social division around the Israel–Gaza war formed a large part of the breakdown of civility. Other incidents included theft of corflutes and personal abuse.
Several policy themes were at the core of major-party disagreements: competing cost-of-living measures (who could offer bigger bribes), different approaches to cutting immigration (who could cut more heavily), energy policy including the nuclear option and gas reservation (the clearest difference) and competing housing policies (alternative approaches).
Labor’s slogan was ‘Building Australia’s future’. Its campaign was led by a stronger performance by Albanese than he managed in 2022, while Chalmers also featured more heavily. It was a tightly scripted and focused campaign, which grew in confidence as the polls improved for the government and victory seemed highly likely. As time went on, the government was able to feast on Opposition mistakes and contradictions. By the time Albanese addressed the National Press Club in the final week, his relaxed confidence was obvious.
The Liberals emphasised their strong leadership, an immediate 50 per cent cut to the fuel excise, spending cuts including to the federal public service and national security. It promised to cut fuel emission regulations, describing them as ‘Albo’s ute tax’. Its campaign ally, the advocacy group Advance, campaigned against the ‘ute tax’ on Facebook and YouTube from 2024, describing it as ‘slugging Aussies in the regions and suburbs with more expensive cars while inner city elites get cheaper Teslas’. In an extensive digital campaign, Advance described the government and its leader as ‘weak, woke, and sending us broke’.
Ultimately, the Liberals’ campaign organisation undermined its prospects: lack of detail, overkill, confusion, backflips and apologies, and poor timing. The nuclear policy, led by shadow minister for energy Ted O’Brien, was weakened by lack of detail on cost and the timing of implementation. The overkill included Trump-like attacks on diversity, equity and inclusion (DEI) policies and labelling of ‘hate media’, with the ABC and the Guardian singled out. The confusion was related to the meaning and implementation of its public service cuts policy. The main backflip involved Senator Jane Hume’s extremely unpopular ‘work-from-home’ policy, which led to excruciating apologies by Dutton and other ministers. The poor timing included the late release of Hastie’s increased defence spending policy (which also lacked detail).
The Nationals’ campaign was largely out of sight in the cities. It was happy with nuclear energy, claiming the policy as its own. The party opposed renewable energy and supported road user charges for electric vehicles on grounds of rural–urban equity.
The Greens campaigned to ‘Keep Dutton out’, with leader Adam Bandt featured in podcasts with well-known influencers including Abbie Chatfield. Substantive policies included rental price freezes, removing negative gearing and free school lunches. Late in the campaign Bandt toted a human-sized toothbrush to promote his free dental care policies.
The widespread Community Independents campaigns were local and community-focused and hard to summarise other than by a general emphasis on accountability and transparency. This time they lacked the target provided in 2022 by unpopular Liberal leader Scott Morrison.
An exchange of preferences between the Coalition and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation (PHON), abandoning previous Coalition practice of putting One Nation last or at least below Labor, caused a damaging perception that the Coalition was moving further to the right. Clive Palmer’s new Trumpet of Patriots party sent millions of SMS text messages and advertised extravagantly in the mass media to little effect.
By the end of the campaign, the verdict was clear. The government had successfully defended its right to carry on for a second term, while the Opposition had failed to demonstrate that it was ready to govern.
The Trump factor
Three leaders are fighting out this campaign and only one of them is definitely not Trump.
—Niki Savva on Insiders, ABC TV, 6 April 2025
The shadow of Trump was such an important part of the 2025 campaign that one seasoned observer labelled it ‘Australia’s Trump election’ (Megalogenis 2025). The delay caused by Tropical Cyclone Alfred helped maximise the Trump effect. In the first two weeks of the campaign, which included ‘Liberation Day’, Trump was featuring in 13 per cent of front-page stories. Initially the Coalition had tried to depict itself as closer to Trump and hence able to obtain a better deal on the tariffs he was threatening. The Coalition also identified with several themes of the successful Trump campaign, including opposition to ‘woke’ government waste such as DEI programs, as well as support for nuclear energy and fossil fuels.
However, Trump’s erratic behaviour in relation to the war in Ukraine and announcement of sweeping and seemingly arbitrary tariffs on trading partners including Australia meant that the Trump factor became a liability rather than an asset. Already by 4 March the negative association of Dutton with Trump was evident in tropes such as ‘Donald Dutton’ seen in comments on the Liberal Party’s Facebook page.
The Coalition then sought to distance itself from Trump but not always successfully. Some of its donors, such as mining billionaire Gina Rinehart, continued to call for Australia to follow Trump (Burton 2025). And the Coalition itself returned to Trump-like populist themes at the end of the campaign, attacking Welcome to Country ceremonies and suggesting Labor was in thrall to ‘activist elites’. The zigzags of the Coalition’s association with Trump are summarised in Table 1.4.
Table 1.4 The shadow of Trump, 2024–2025
|
Date |
Event |
|---|---|
|
9 November 2024 |
The Weekend Australian reports that the Coalition is soliciting advice on messaging and advertising from Trump campaign strategists. |
|
11 November 2024 |
Mining billionaire Gina Rinehart calls on the Liberal Party to ‘watch and learn’ from Donald Trump’s successful 2024 election campaign. |
|
20 January 2025 |
Trump sworn in as US President, issues executive orders establishing Department of Government Efficiency and ending DEI programs and remote work for all federal employees. |
|
25 January 2025 |
Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price appointed Shadow Minister for Government Efficiency. |
|
6 February 2025 |
Opposition leader Peter Dutton praises Donald Trump as ‘shrewd’, ‘reasonable’ and ‘a big thinker and deal maker’. |
|
19 February 2025 |
Billionaire Clive Palmer announces his Trump-inspired Trumpet of Patriots party, vowing to ‘make Australia great again’. |
|
3 March 2025 |
Senator Jane Hume announces a Coalition government would end work-from-home arrangements for federal public servants. |
|
27 March 2025 |
Greens MP Stephen Bates calls Dutton ‘Temu-Trump’ in Question Time. |
|
31 March 2025 |
Dutton says DEI does nothing to improve the lives of everyday Australians and he will cut back the public service. |
|
2 April 2025 |
Trump announces sweeping tariffs, including on Australia. |
|
3 April 2025 |
Dutton says that he could successfully negotiate tariff exemptions for Australia. |
|
7 April 2025 |
Dutton says work-from-home policy a mistake. |
|
12 April 2025 |
Senator Jacinta Nampijinpa Price vows to ‘make Australia great again’ at campaign event. |
|
16 April 2025 |
Dutton asked at the second leaders’ debate whether he trusts Donald Trump, responds: ‘I don’t know the president; I’ve not met him.’ |
|
21 April 2025 |
The Australian’s political editor Simon Benson reports that Donald Trump has crafted ‘a diabolical situation’ for Peter Dutton. |
|
23 April 2025 |
Canadian Conservative Party Opposition leader Pierre Poilievre publishes platform commitment to end ‘woke’ ideology in the public service and in funding for university research. |
|
28 April 2025 |
Trump repeats threat to make Canada the fifty-first State of the United States. Canadian Conservative Party loses election and Poilievre loses seat. |
|
3 May 2025 |
Anthony Albanese wins re-election in a landslide of seats. Opposition leader Peter Dutton loses his seat. |
|
3 May 2025 |
National Party Senate leader Bridget McKenzie says the ‘Trump factor’ played a significant role in Coalition’s defeat. |
Source: Compiled by Kurt Sengul and Marian Sawer.
Meanwhile, Labor was careful to avoid appearing directly antagonistic to Trump while at the same time wary of seeming too ‘soft’ on him—a difficult balancing act. It portrayed itself as standing up for Australian values instead of borrowing from America. For example, when the Coalition announced its intention of ending work from home (WFH), Minister for Finance and the Public Service Katy Gallagher claimed that most of the Coalition’s policy platform was ‘stolen from the United States’. Labor also put increasing emphasis on resisting ‘Americanisation’ of Australia’s health system and industrial relations and described the imposition of tariffs on Australia as ‘not the act of a friend’.
The negative association of Dutton with Trump became a feature of the campaign, as seen in the Victorian Trades Hall Council’s ‘Donald Dutton’ image posted on Facebook (Plate 1.1). A TikTok post by Greens MP Stephen Bates calling Dutton ‘Temu-Trump’ attracted more than two million views.

Plate 1.1 ‘Protect Australia from Donald Dutton’ poster
Source: Victorian Trades Hall Council.
The Coalition’s opponents were so successful at identifying Dutton with Trump that senior Coalition figures, including Nationals Senate leader Senator Bridget McKenzie, blamed the Trump effect for the election landslide (9News 2025). As Simon Jackman observes in Chapter 19, the election narrative shifted from the handling of the cost-of-living crisis to assessments as to which leader would be less like Trump.
Clive Palmer’s Trumpet of Patriots party also suffered from its association with Trump, despite spending $60 million on campaign advertisements. And in the last week of the campaign, the Canadian election provided a similar warning. The Conservative Party of Canada, committing to end ‘woke’ ideology in the public service and research funding, lost its election and, as in Australia, the Opposition Leader lost his seat.
Regulatory issues
Two new regulatory and administrative challenges characterised the Australian election: political commentary among online influencers and a long and uniquely complex vote count. Other challenges—such as expectations of convenience voting, candidate defections and party registration requests, electoral misinformation and disinformation and donation disclosures—were the same as in previous years, but no less acute. Reforms to political funding and disclosure passed the parliament in January 2025 for implementation in July 2026, making this the last (for now) federal election with unlimited donations and expenditure.
Electoral matter and authorisations
On the back of the 2024 US presidential election in which Trump conducted 14 (often hours-long) interviews with different podcasters, Australian leaders and candidates sought to leverage local content creators’ significant audiences in 2025. On paper, this was standard politicking, akin to giving a sit-down interview with a newspaper or television reporter. In such cases, electoral authorisations are not required, as the purpose (and funding source) of the interview is clear to most audiences.
Less common is politicians sharing those interviews via their own social media accounts. In February and March 2025, both Albanese and Bandt appeared on Abbie Chatfield’s podcast It’s a Lot at Chatfield’s request. As unpaid and voluntary, the interviews did not require electoral authorisation (for example, ‘Authorised by A. Chatfield, Sydney’) as per the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918. When the leaders reposted the interviews on their own campaign accounts, with authorisations, questions emerged (in Senate estimates hearings and the media) about the content creators’ responsibilities under the Act. The advice of the Australian Electoral Commission (AEC) to both parties and creators was that, although the original podcast did not require authorisation due to the voluntary and unpaid nature of the interview, if creators ‘are in doubt, authorise’.
Independent candidates also pushed against the bounds of the Electoral Act on several occasions. Member for Wentworth Allegra Spender paid content creators to endorse her without appropriate electoral authorisation and Monique Ryan, Independent member for Kooyong, equivocated on ABC TV’s Insiders program about whether paid content should require authorisation (the AEC confirmed that it must, as per the Act).
Several Teal candidates benefited from Gazette News, a digital newspaper ostensibly created in June 2024 and covering eastern Melbourne, Sydney’s North Shore, the mid-north coast of New South Wales, Gippsland and western Victoria. All these regions centred on electorates where Climate 200–backed candidates were challenging Liberal incumbents, and the newspaper’s founder had disclosed previous donations to Independent Senator David Pocock and Climate 200. While the AEC found that Gazette News constituted actual news content and not electoral matter, and so did not require authorisation, the ability for third-party actors to quickly and cheaply create news outlets portends an increasingly blurred line between news and electoral matter.
Anonymous opponents of Spender’s campaign in Wentworth also found themselves on the wrong side of the Electoral Act: 47,000 unauthorised flyers were distributed across the electorate, with the AEC identifying the publisher privately but not publicly. Spender criticised the AEC for not releasing the person’s identity—a rare example of public disagreement between high-profile candidates and the commission.
Clive Palmer’s Trumpet of Patriots did not breach the Act but did test voters’ patience with daily spam texts on issues ranging from free university education to limiting immigration. With the introduction of donation and expenditure caps before the next election, and Palmer indicating that his political ambitions have now waned, voters can expect fewer unsolicited texts in future.
Complex vote counts
The AEC’s other major challenge for this election came after 3 May: no Australian election has seen so many ‘maverick seats’ nor so many non-traditional contests (see also Ben Raue’s Chapter 17, this volume). Before each federal election, the AEC (very discreetly) nominates which two candidates they expect will be in the final round of counting after preference distribution. This allows returning officers to start estimating preference flows on election night itself; this is the kind of forward projection that allows TV analysts to ‘call’ seats with only 10 per cent of all votes counted. In total, 22 seats had to restart their estimated preference counts on election night as initial primary vote counts revealed that the nominated two candidates appeared to be incorrect. This does not change final vote counts, but it certainly makes election night and the following days much more difficult for AEC staff and scrutineers (and candidates!).
The continued rise in primary votes for non–major-party candidates has also led to more complex preference distributions. In Calwell—where Independents collectively received 40 per cent of primary votes—the AEC could not estimate preference distributions until they had finished counting every primary vote. Preference distributions only began on 20 May—17 days after the election. At that point, there was still no clear winner in Bradfield and Goldstein had only just produced an apparent winner (with the caveat that the result could change once the final preference distribution was complete).
Large numbers of candidates, combined with comparatively low rates of English literacy, led to record high rates of informal voting throughout Western Sydney and some parts of Melbourne. The national informal vote rate was 5.6 per cent—in line with recent elections. The seats of Watson and Werriwa saw informal vote rates of 17 per cent—up significantly (7 and 6 percentage points, respectively) from 2022. Of the 21 seats with the most informal votes, 20 were in New South Wales.
Redistributions during the Forty-Seventh Parliament
Between the 2022 and 2025 elections, the parliament lost the seats of North Sydney and Higgins and gained a new Western Australian seat in Bullwinkel. These changes abolished one Independent-held seat, one Labor-held seat and created one notionally Labor seat. Boundary changes shifted Menzies to marginally Labor-held and Bennelong to marginally Liberal-held.
While the redistributions had little electoral effect, they produced additional headaches for the AEC. Traditionally, the AEC has been able to estimate new electoral margins after a redistribution based on polling place results from the previous election—for example, if a polling place in the suburb of Blackburn produced a 54–46 per cent two-party-preferred result for Labor in 2022, we can generally assume that the polling place would produce similar results even when boundaries mean it sits inside a new electorate. It is much more difficult to estimate these new margins if the previous election’s results include a successful Independent or if a viable Independent candidate is standing in the new electorate. While the AEC’s estimated margins are not necessary to the electoral process and have little impact on commentary or outcomes, it is another sign of the changing electoral landscape.
Early voting and the National Rugby League ‘Magic Round’
As in 2022, in 2025, the early voting period was two weeks and the number of voters not waiting until election day continued to grow. On every day of early voting, turnout eclipsed the equivalent day in 2022, culminating in one million votes cast on Friday, 2 May. By election day, 37.5 per cent of those eligible had already voted. Combined with postal votes (which fell slightly after the Covid-19–era highs of 2022), more than 56 per cent of voters cast their vote before or outside election day proper. This creates additional strain on the AEC’s temporary workforce and it is reasonable to suspect that the commission, major parties, minor parties and Independents will unite in seeking shorter pre-poll periods in future elections.
An external factor did not help matters: the National Rugby League’s ‘Magic Round’ in Brisbane from 1 to 4 May enticed more than 150,000 voters into the city on election day. The AEC encouraged fans to vote before travelling and put in place additional capacity at Brisbane polling places on election day.
Reforms to the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918
Although the Albanese government successfully reformed the Electoral Act in January 2025, major changes to the political finance regime (including donation and expenditure caps, lowered threshold for disclosures and seven-day timelines) will not be in place until the 2028 federal election. Other elements of the January 2025 legislation did impact this election—namely, prohibition of unauthorised filming inside a polling place and additional provision of convenience voting for people with a disability and their carers. Despite advocacy from some civil society groups, the provision to remove voters of ‘unsound mind’ from the electoral roll to prevent voter fraud was not removed, but the language was updated to modern standards.
Overview of the book
Landslide is the nineteenth in the series of federal election studies, which originated in 1987 and has been supported by the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia since 1996. The series has evolved over time, along with the changing nature of federal elections: the erosion of the two-party system and the shift to digital campaigning. Authorship has also evolved to keep pace with techniques required by the new electoral landscape. Established scholars team up with early career researchers at home with the digital domain where so much campaigning now takes place.
The first part of the book has chapters comparing the campaign strategies of the major parties, the way the campaigns were reported in print and digital media and campaign commentary through memes, videos and cartoons. Podcasts with social media influencers were a new campaign tool in 2025 and parties also engaged in more humorous and satirical messaging on social media platforms such as TikTok and Instagram. Negative advertising appeared under the rubric of accounts such as ‘Dutton cuts, you pay’, ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ and ‘Teals revealed’.
The media chapter provides extensive evidence of how, in 2025, political actors had to navigate both legacy media (print, radio, television) and digital media platforms. The chapter analyses front-page stories as well as the issues prioritised in both traditional and digital media. Crucially, it measures online audience engagement with different topics and how the communication logic of social media influencers compounds the personalisation of politics.
The re-entry of religion into Australian electoral politics also features in Part 1, with new players and issues arising from the war in Gaza. Emotions ran high in some Sydney and Melbourne electorates, leading to unaccustomed incivility at polling places.
Another chapter analyses the familiar subject of political leadership in newer terms of competing models of protective masculinity: the ‘strongman’ who would keep Australia safe contrasted with a leader emphasising kindness and inclusion (‘weak and woke’, according to the Opposition). Also on a gender theme is a chapter contrasting the record number of women and Australians from diverse backgrounds elected to parliament with the failure of the Coalition to address gender issues, to their electoral detriment.
The populist discourse associated with the defeat of the Voice referendum in 2023 and with Donald Trump’s successful presidential campaign played an interesting role in the 2025 election. The main vectors of this discourse are looked at here: the Murdoch media including Sky News, the digital campaigning organisation Advance, the minor parties Trumpet of Patriots and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and, intermittently, the Coalition.
The first part of the book ends with the management of disinformation by the AEC. Before the election there was considerable apprehension that its integrity might be threatened by artificial intelligence (AI)—in particular, by foreign actors. Fortunately, this threat did not materialise and the preventative work undertaken by the AEC continued to be widely admired.
Despite fears about the role AI might play in spreading disinformation, its main contribution was in repurposing popular culture content. The sharing and posting of memes remained a staple form of participation by citizen and partisan actors in 2025. And, as usual, the election book has a rich sample of visual material from the campaign.
The second part of the book discusses the campaign from the perspective of the four major political parties—Labor, Liberals, Nationals and Greens—together with the Community Independents (also known as Teals), other Independents and minor parties, and third-party organisations. Despite the exogenous factors such as Donald Trump, the landslide result for the Labor government can be primarily attributed to three interconnected endogenous factors: institutional learning from the 2019 defeat, the new Labor government’s cautious, incremental record and its disciplined campaign strategy. The government followed a range of targeted, labourist strategies that served it well in difficult economic times.
The failure of the Liberals’ campaign was also a factor. The Liberals went backwards again and suffered a disastrous election result, including the defeat of their leader, Peter Dutton. Their campaign demonstrated the party’s lack of a coherent policy agenda and a failure to effectively prosecute its individual policies, including its ‘big picture’ policy proposals for nuclear and gas energy.
The Nationals were more successful than their Coalition partners, losing just a single seat in each of the House of Representatives and the Senate. Their electoral steadiness did not enable the Coalition to return to office, however, and raised bigger questions, such as their representativeness of rural and regional Australia and whether the party has reached a ceiling through which they are unable to break.
The Greens entered the campaign with significant ambitions. Their subnational performance had been solid since the 2022 election. Their campaign is evaluated here in relation to institutional context, interparty dynamics, policy consistency, narrative framing and organisational execution. The chapter explores the interaction between the party and ideologically adjacent, left-leaning Community Independents and the challenge of turning national support into local success.
The 2025 vote was an electoral test for the Community Independents Movement, in the absence of some of the key issues of 2022 such as anti-Morrison sentiment and a focus on climate change. The Community Independent campaigns were shaped by the specific dynamics of the electorates in which they were standing, making it difficult to present an overall summary. This chapter discusses the performance of incumbent MPs, repeat challengers and newcomers, and speculates about the future impact of movement fatigue and new campaign spending limits.
Other Independents included apostates from the major parties, established Independents and newer entrants, including pro-Palestinian Muslim candidates supported by Muslim community groups. Minor parties included Pauline Hanson’s One Nation, which campaigned on immigration while not mentioning Trump and tried to soften Hanson’s right-wing image. Clive Palmer’s new Trumpet of Patriots party was big-spending and openly pro-Trump. Smaller minor parties represented lifestyle issues, local concerns and various ideological positions, mostly left-wing.
There was extensive digital campaigning by third-sector organisations, with Advance on the right and the Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU) on the left standing out. Despite progressive media outlets concentrating on Advance, it is argued here that the ACTU emerged as the dominant third-sector organisation, with its theme of ‘Don’t risk Dutton’. Other third-sector organisations active in the campaign included pro-nuclear and anti-nuclear organisations and bodies opposing the Greens and the Teals.
The final part of the book discusses how Australians voted on 3 May: from opinion polling throughout the campaign to analyses of the House and Senate results and of the sociodemographic factors, campaign dynamics and policy issues that shaped voters’ decisions.
Major polling companies all correctly predicted the winner in 2025, but drastically underestimated Labor’s two-party-preferred vote share. Despite continued growth in the number of published polls, including multilevel regression post-stratification (MRP) polls, there was little variation in results, both over the course of the campaign and between different companies. This might have reflected ‘herding’ among pollsters—one of the main criticisms of incorrect predictions at the 2019 election—but also possibly shared pessimism that Labor was really that far ahead. The Liberal Party’s contracted pollster, Freshwater Strategy, was among the most pessimistic and was subsequently blamed for the Coalition’s obliviousness to voter sentiment. Systemic errors in underestimating Labor’s vote will likely be forgotten with time due to the overall ‘correct’ prediction but the polling industry’s challenges, particularly with a more fragmented party system, will continue to mount.
That fragmentation was obscured by one of the great landslide wins in Australian elections: Labor won 94 seats in the House of Representatives, the Coalition won 43, Independents won 10, the Greens one, Katter’s Australian Party (Bob Katter) one and Centre Alliance (Rebekha Sharkie) one. The result was clear early on election night (ABC chief election analyst Antony Green’s last on air), although counting in individual seats continued for a full month post election.
The result was the most disproportionate outcome in an Australian federal election since 1943 and the advent of the current (mostly) two-party system. Labor won 34.6 per cent of the national primary vote and 63 per cent of seats in the House of Representatives. The result was simultaneously the party’s best in terms of seat share in the modern period and its fourth worst in terms of primary vote. The Coalition’s result was bleak all round: its worst primary vote share and its fourth worst seat share.
More than one-third of voters chose minor-party or Independent candidates in the House. While the Greens’ primary vote was stable from 2022, the party lost three seats. The rest of the crossbench grew only by one seat in the House, despite a swing of 2.7 percentage points (and total vote share of 21.4 per cent). In total, 20 house seats changed hands, with 16 of those shifting from the Coalition to Labor (including Bennelong, which was notionally a Liberal-held seat after redistributions).
The large minor-party and Independent vote paid dividends in the Senate: the Greens retained all their seats, David Pocock was re-elected with an 18 per cent primary-vote swing, Jacqui Lambie was re-elected for her fourth term and One Nation gained two new senators. The Coalition was decimated, with 18 senators seeking re-election and only 13 winning. Labor gained three of the Coalition’s Senate seats and One Nation the other two. One Nation appears to have benefited from its preference deal with the Coalition: the minor party received preferences from surplus Coalition votes that in previous years would have been exhausted. Additionally, by helping to normalise One Nation via the preference deal, the Coalition might have lost voters to the more conservative, less mainstream minor party.
Survey data on voters’ decision-making suggest that the Coalition’s focus on ‘culture war’ issues was damaging on both the right and the left. Although Dutton arguably scored a mid-term win with the defeat of the government’s Voice referendum, Voice supporters who had previously supported the Coalition defected to Labor in large numbers. Labor successfully activated dissatisfaction with the Liberals’ leadership and platform among moderate ex-Liberal voters. On the flipside, One Nation performed remarkably well and gained two Senate seats, leaving the Coalition stranded in between.
References
9News. 2025. ‘Is the “Trump factor” to blame for election result?’ YouTube, 3 May.
Burton, Melanie. 2025. ‘Trump style governance? Australia’s richest says yes, voters seem to disagree.’ Reuters, 1 May. www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/australias-richest-person-says-she-wants-trump-like-reforms-election-nears-2025-05-01/.
Chowdhury, Intifar. 2025. ‘This election young people held the most political power. Here’s how they voted.’ The Conversation, 16 May. theconversation.com/this-election-young-people-held-the-most-political-power-heres-how-they-voted-255769. doi.org/10.64628/AA.d5tncntqj.
Evans, Jake. 2025. ‘Prime Minister leaves door open to calling election in days after Tropical Cyclone Alfred.’ ABC News, 6 March. www.abc.net.au/news/2025-03-06/albanese-prime-minister-call-election-cyclone-alfred/105013996.
Megalogenis, George. 2025. ‘Australia’s Trump election.’ The Monthly, April. www.themonthly.com.au/issue/2025/april/george-megalogenis/australia-s-trump-election.
Mills, Stephen. 2025. ‘In an election that played out on social media as much as TV, do leaders’ debates still matter?’ The Conversation, 7 May. theconversation.com/in-an-election-that-played-out-on-social-media-as-much-as-tv-do-leaders-debates-still-matter-255771. doi.org/10.64628/AA.h9usda39j.
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