Landslide
3
Strategy and leadership in the Labor and Liberal campaigns
Abstract
This chapter compares the campaign strategies of the Labor and Liberal parties, considering whether the result of the 2025 federal election can be attributed to campaign effects. The political context leading into the election shaped the development of the parties’ strategies as they attempted to adapt to the fragmented political landscape. Overseeing these efforts were teams of campaign professionals and firms. While Labor assembled an experienced team to run the campaign, the Liberal campaign proved less well coordinated. This asymmetry was reflected in the strength of the parties’ campaign strategies and narratives. Digital advertising continued to grow, but the 2025 election marked a substantial shift in the strategic use of new mediums, as Albanese and Dutton embraced influencers and podcasts. Ultimately, we argue, the election result demonstrated the ongoing professionalisation of campaigning in an increasingly fragmented landscape and the effect these efforts have when a strong campaign meets a weak one.
Keywords: election campaigning; campaign strategy; campaign effects; Liberal Party; Labor Party
In the final days of the campaign, Peter Dutton argued that the election would be ‘a referendum, not about the election campaign, but about the last three years of government’ (Cassidy and Dhanji 2025). In most elections, he may have been right, but in 2025, the campaigns appeared decisive as voters shifted in the early months of the year. This chapter addresses a central question: to what extent can the result of the 2025 federal election be attributed to campaign effects? Drawing on digital advertising data, media coverage and discussions with those within the campaigns’ respective organisations, this chapter analyses the campaign strategies and how they may have contributed to the election result.
Campaigns aim to influence the issues about which voters think, provide them with information on new topics and, most ambitiously, shape how voters view these political problems and their potential solutions, persuading them to the parties’ perspective (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2006: 186). Despite the importance parties and campaign professionals place on these efforts, whether campaigns have an impact on the outcomes of elections is often dismissed in favour of macro or contextual explanations. Many contend that campaigns have little or no effect, particularly on the voter persuasion required in Australian election campaigns. Campaign effects are difficult to demonstrate, but for those who argue that campaigns can shape outcomes, they are credited with informing voters, shaping their understanding of the issues, influencing their engagement with political news, mobilising or demobilising their participation and impacting their trust in political institutions—all of which may ultimately influence their vote (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2006: 13).
However, campaign effects may be fleeting, reinforcing rather than swaying votes and neutralising the other’s influence. They should be most influential when a weak campaign meets a strong one in an election with many undecided voters—a succinct summary of the 2025 election. The asymmetry between the Labor and Liberal campaigns was a rare event in contemporary professionalised campaigning. Through analysing these campaigns, this chapter considers to what extent the election result can or should be attributed to campaign effects.
Political context
The government appeared to be at a disadvantage in the leadup to the 2025 federal election. Following the unsuccessful Voice referendum in 2023, the Albanese government was defined by consistently declining poll results (Beaumont 2025). Globally, voters had been punishing incumbents and rallying behind populist figures. Dutton had dabbled in positioning himself as an Australian Trump-lite, appointing Jacinta Nampijinpa Price to the portfolio of ‘Government Efficiency’—equivalent to the US Department of Government Efficiency headed by Elon Musk (see Chapter 4, this volume; Cassidy and Jervis-Bardy 2025). Under Dutton’s leadership, the Opposition had effectively framed the government as ineffectual and unfocused. This characterisation was aided by the broader economic context: inflation had led to successive interest rate hikes by the Reserve Bank of Australia, ratcheting up the cost of living; the price of housing hit new highs, substantially impacting renters and mortgage holders, and day-to-day expenses such as groceries and bills had risen steeply. Labor’s technocratic approach to addressing these issues did little to boost its popularity.
Before the official start of the campaign, YouGov polling in February predicted a minority government (Shepherd 2025). The loudness of the ensuing discussion compelled the major-party leaders to address with which Independents or minor parties they would be willing to negotiate in the event of a hung parliament (Coorey 2025). The major parties’ popularity has declined over decades and the 2022 federal election marked a watershed. The dealignment of voters and declining party loyalties were noted in both the ALP and the Liberal 2022 federal election review summaries—made public for the first time in more than a decade.
Both parties faced a more complex political landscape, with shrinking and unstable voter bases in what were once safe seats. The Greens threatened Labor in Victorian seats such as Wills and Macnamara, while highly organised and well-supported Independent campaigns presented a challenge to the Coalition across both rural and urban electorates. In response, the Liberal Party planned a pivot to the suburbs but faced an uphill battle to reach a majority. Labor split its efforts between battling the Liberals for marginal suburban seats and reclaiming urban Brisbane seats from the Greens. The electorate itself had also changed and the dominant voting bloc (47 per cent) of voters are either Millennials or Gen Z (Chowdhury 2025). These younger voters were more likely to be unaligned and to show an interest in minor-party or Independent candidates. As a product of this fragmentation and dealignment, it appeared unlikely that either Labor or the Coalition would be able to form a majority.
This was the backdrop to the major parties’ planning for the federal election campaign. By 12 March, Labor was ready to launch the campaign officially, but Cyclone Alfred and the fear of repeating Scott Morrison’s tone-deaf response to natural disasters delayed matters. Dutton’s absence from his own electorate in Queensland as it faced Cyclone Alfred was deeply unpopular. The delay meant that the Albanese government had to submit a final budget before the campaign, presenting some promises in advance of the campaign proper. Later that week, Albanese’s planned trip to the Governor-General to start the campaign was leaked to the media during Dutton’s budget reply speech, effectively wiping it from the media coverage.
Labor used the additional two weeks to fine-tune their strategy. The result was a well-organised and tightly run campaign, although derided as boring by some. Conversely, gaffes, apologies and a revolving door of policy ideas would mark the ensuing Coalition campaign.
Campaign organisation and leadership
Labor campaign organisation
The Labor campaign exemplifies the electoral success that can accompany a well-organised, disciplined and experienced campaign. As in the 2022 election, the Labor Party’s campaign headquarters was in Surry Hills, an inner-city suburb of Sydney. National secretary and campaign strategist Paul Erickson again served as national director of Labor’s 2025 campaign, overseeing an assemblage of returning figures and agencies.
Like the 2022 election, in 2025, assistant national secretary Jennifer Light led a team within Labor producing tailored advertising for targeted electorates while Dee Madigan returned as creative lead of Labor’s advertising strategy through her agency, Campaign Edge. The Moss Group was engaged again specifically for advertising in Western Australia, while GroupM’s Mindshare and Sparro by Brainlabs were brought in to handle offline and digital media, respectively. The use of three agencies was unprecedented and, although Erickson (2025) noted the ‘risk of overcomplication’, their work was carefully delineated and coordinated. Member for Blaxland Jason Clare and ACT Senator Katy Gallagher reprised their 2022 roles as campaign spokespeople, tasked with holding regular press briefings and other public-facing responsibilities.
There were also new additions to Labor’s campaign resourcing and strategy, in line with recommendations from Labor’s 2022 election review. For example, the review recommended that Labor should ‘consider increasing the central investment in CALD [culturally and linguistically diverse] engagement during the formal election campaign period’ (Combet and Oshalem 2022: 11). In 2025, Labor partnered with Sydney multicultural marketing agency Diverse Communications to assist with engaging strategically with multicultural communities nationwide.
The review also acknowledged the growing electoral threat posed by the Greens and the development of three-cornered contests. In response, it recommended that Labor ‘should actively contest the policy and political positions advocated by the Greens and dedicate resources for this purpose’ (Combet and Oshalem 2022: 9). Therefore, for the first time, Labor’s secretariat engaged with advertising recruitment agency Shannon Company, which worked alongside a team within the party secretariat to target the Greens (Mizen 2025a).
Liberal campaign organisation
The Liberal Party campaign was populated by both familiar, experienced faces and newer consultancies. Ultimately, its efforts were poorly coordinated across the assemblage of consultancies and campaigners. Andrew Hirst returned as Liberal Party director, overseeing his third consecutive federal campaign. The party set up shop in the Western Sydney suburb of Parramatta—a change from 2022’s Brisbane campaign headquarters and indicative of changes in the key battleground States in 2025 (Bourke 2025). The party assembled similarly well-experienced consultants, re-enlisting advertising agency ‘kwpx’ and media-buying outfit Atomic 212º (Hickman 2025). The Liberals again secured the services of Topham Guerin, a digital consultancy firm with experience across successful centre-right campaigns in Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
Similarly, Senator James Paterson reprised his role as Liberal campaign spokesperson. Notably, Paterson was visible across major mainstream broadcasters on shows Dutton appeared to avoid, such as the Today Show, Sunrise and ABC Radio National. With Paterson selling the Liberal message through these avenues, Dutton instead focused his media appearances on Sky News and sympathetic talkback radio stations such as 2GB, referring to the ABC and the Guardian as the ‘hate media’ at a Liberal Party rally.
Other associations were new, and tumultuous. Following strategy and polling firm Crosby Textor’s involvement in the ‘Yes’ campaign during the Voice referendum, the Liberal Party broke ties with the firm it had engaged in every election since 2002 (Galloway 2023). Instead, Freshwater Strategy was hired by the party to run polling and focus groups during the campaign. Freshwater was founded in 2022 by Michael Turner, the Liberal Party’s chief pollster at Crosby Textor in the 2019 and 2022 federal election campaigns (Turner 2025a). In the wake of the Liberals’ loss, this decision was described by some as ‘disastrous’. The quality of polling was maligned by party insiders (Nilsson 2025) and Turner responded with an explanation in the Australian Financial Review (Turner 2025b). Dutton’s insistence that he was polling well in the final weeks of the campaign, including in his own seat of Dickson, and the apparent surprise at the scale of Labor’s victory were blamed on the quality of polling (see Chapter 11, this volume).
Despite the experience within the national campaign assemblage, many decisions appeared to come directly from the less-experienced team around Dutton. Heading this team was former politician Jamie Briggs, returning to politics nine years after his departure (Galloway 2024). His return was not without controversy and, while experienced, Briggs had a chequered record of campaign success, famously losing his own seat of Mayo to Rebekha Sharkie in 2016 (Maiden 2025a).
Strategy and leadership
Successive election analyses have highlighted the growing importance and prominence of party leaders in Australian election campaigns—often referred to as the personalisation of politics (Gauja 2015). The 2025 campaigns sought to frame their leader in a positive light, while disparaging their opponent. For the Liberal Party, the effort to rebrand Peter Dutton began long before the election campaign, from the moment he assumed leadership of the party. However, the potential for a minority government necessitated careful narrative work to make Dutton and the Liberals appealing not only to Liberal voters but also to Independents and their constituencies.
Dutton was reintroduced to the electorate as misunderstood by voters who had only seen the hard-man side before. However, the strong, tough health and home affairs minister who made cuts and enforced strict border security was difficult to reconcile with the humanised, softer image they were attempting to portray (see Chapter 2, this volume). Other cabinet figures were largely sidelined, reinforcing the centrality of Dutton’s persona to the party’s electoral strategy. This was also complicated by Dutton’s earlier experimentations with aligning himself with Trump. By the time the campaign began, association with Trump was viewed as politically toxic. Dutton later attempted to distance himself from support for Trumpian politics, but with limited success.
In stark contrast to the Liberals, Labor consolidated Anthony Albanese’s image as a stable and responsible national leader, drawing on longstanding Labor traditions of egalitarianism and fairness. Albanese was portrayed as the custodian of Medicare and a respectable global citizen. This portrayal of the Prime Minister as a trustworthy figure offering secure and steady governance aligned with a campaign narrative centred on continuing the economic and social agendas begun in Labor’s first term in office.
Labor also successfully framed Peter Dutton’s role as party leader as a risk to Australian values and its economic future. While events on the world stage such as Trump’s tariffs were influential, campaigns play a role in directing attention and informing voter interpretations (Jacobson 2015: 34). In this case, Labor used the Liberals’ plans to significantly reduce the public service to paint Dutton as ‘Trump-lite’ or ‘Temu-Trump’—a term coined by Greens MP Stephen Bates (see Chapters 1 and 8, this volume) but adopted and amplified by the ALP—to try to undermine trust in the Liberals, particularly within inner-city electorates. This portrayal contributed to a larger Labor narrative of risk management, casting Dutton as a threat to public institutions such as Medicare. In fact, one of Labor’s key slogans, ‘Don’t risk Dutton’, not only sought to raise concern among the electorate about a return to radical conservatism but also invoked Labor’s traditions of investing in social services such as health care to consolidate its moral and political authority and legitimacy. This theme dominated the party’s advertising, discussed below. Similar Liberal attempts to define Albanese as untrustworthy, weak and a poor performer did not seem to stick in the same way, lacking the narrative consistency and policy alignment of Labor’s argument.
In terms of policy narratives, in the months before the election was announced, the Liberals pursued a small-target ‘me too’ strategy, matching Labor’s election commitments in areas such as health care, attempting to neutralise any division. However, this strategy allowed Labor to frame the main issues of the campaign. The issue ownership literature suggests the role of campaigns is to set the agenda, placing the issue areas that are favourable to their party at the top of voters’ minds when voting. In Australia, this has meant the ALP focuses its messaging on areas of perceived strength, such as health and education.
However, the Liberal Party’s ‘me too’ period did not extend to all policy areas. The party did not support Labor’s flagship education commitment of a 20 per cent reduction in student Higher Education Contribution Scheme (HECS) debts or fee-free TAFE (technical and further education) commitments. Most surprisingly, the Liberals also opposed Labor’s plan to lower income taxes. This stance appeared to contradict the Liberal Party’s focus on lower taxes, and the justification for opposing them did not resonate with voters or some within the party, who publicly regretted this choice after the election (see Chapter 11, this volume).
Policy inconsistencies became increasingly evident throughout the Liberal campaign. Dutton floated a series of what Albanese derided as ‘thought bubbles’ and backtracked on policy announcements, such as the plan to end work-from-home arrangements for public servants. Despite the Coalition having a nuclear energy policy for nearly a year, the campaign period featured very little discussion of nuclear and a greater focus on gas policies. Dutton visited only one proposed nuclear site on his campaign trail, signalling a lack of consideration and commitment to the proposal itself.
Policy announcements also seemed inconsistent and disorganised. Accounts from party elites and grassroots members after the election suggested that announced policies were conceived on the campaign trail, while developed proposals were left on the shelf (Kehoe 2025; Maiden 2025b). The disjointed coordination between Dutton’s team and the campaign headquarters contributed to these issues. The impacts of a poorly managed campaign appeared to overshadow Dutton’s efforts to promote other key policies, such as the plan to halve the fuel excise. The fuel tax was the cornerstone of Dutton’s campaign in the month leading up to the May election. Despite visiting 17 petrol stations throughout the campaign, there was insufficient time to convince the electorate that this cost-of-living relief measure would outweigh those Labor had already proposed and campaigned for over several months. Ultimately, Dutton failed to persuade voters of his party’s economic merits.
In sharp contrast, Labor’ s key policy commitments were a tightly planned continuation of priorities established between 2022 and 2025. Commitments in health, education and tax reform were built on measures already initiated, indicating a well thought out and achievable two-term strategy, with developed economic costings and reasonable policy offerings. For example, Labor’ s promise to wipe 20 per cent off student HECS loans was both popular and made sense to voters, given that during its first term in government, it had already removed $3 billion worth of student debt.
Presenting a policy agenda that aligned with its tradition and track record in government, Labor gained control of the broader narrative by positioning itself as a ready and responsible government in contrast to an opportunistic and policy-light Opposition. Labor successfully portrayed the Liberals’ campaign policies as lacking vision and substance, highlighting underdeveloped policy platforms, the absence of costings for major proposals and Dutton’s history of cuts to social services as health minister. The Liberals’ lack of policy announcements, coupled with the underdeveloped ‘thought bubble’ policies, suggested a poorly prepared campaign that was intended to neutralise the government’s advantages rather than articulate a robust alternative vision. A small-target strategy may have worked if the positive polling from 2024 had held, but as the popularity of Dutton and the Liberal Party waned throughout the campaign, the strategy meant the absence of a substantive alternative. The result was that the Labor Party effectively set the 2025 campaign agenda, while the Liberal Party strove to respond as the tide changed.
Resource allocation
One of the most limited resources in any political campaign is the time of the party leader. In 2025, it was more limited than ever, truncated by Easter and Anzac Day public holidays. Analysing which candidates the leaders visited, the settings they favoured and the policies announced on the campaign trail gives insights into the strategies and narratives in use.
Labor entered the election with 78 electorates to retain, while the Coalition needed to gain 20 seats nationally. This encouraged an aggressive strategy for the Liberals that focused their polling and efforts on seats they hoped to win, perhaps to the detriment of retaining marginal seats. The contest was fiercest in metropolitan Melbourne, Western Sydney and inner Brisbane, where each party sought to regain ground lost in the 2022 federal election. The Liberal Party focused their Victorian efforts in Aston, Chisholm, Kooyong and Goldstein, while Labor sought to regain Brisbane and Griffith from the Greens and to win marginal seats such as Leichhardt from the Liberal National Party of Queensland (LNP). The larger task for the Labor Party, however, was to retain its existing majority. Ultimately, Labor was successful and, in addition to swings across the country, the party retained every seat it already held (Table 3.1). The Liberal Party had its best result in Victoria (net neutral), but lost ground in every other State.
Table 3.1 Electorates held and gained in 2025
|
Labor |
Coalition |
|||
|---|---|---|---|---|
|
State/Territory |
Held |
Result |
Held |
Result |
|
NSW |
25 |
28 (+3) |
16 |
12 (–4), 6 Lib., 6 Nats |
|
Vic. |
25 |
27 (+2) |
9 |
9, 6 Lib., 3 Nats |
|
Qld |
5 |
12 (+7) |
21 |
16 (–5), LNP |
|
WA |
10 |
11 (+1) |
5 |
4 (–1), Lib. |
|
SA |
6 |
7 (+1) |
3 |
2 (–1), Lib. |
|
Tas. |
2 |
4 (+2) |
2 |
0 (–2) |
|
NT |
2 |
2 |
– |
– |
|
ACT |
3 |
3 |
– |
– |
|
Total |
78 |
94 (+16) |
56 |
43 |
Source: Compiled by authors using AEC data.
Although the election was not formally called until 28 March, the Labor campaign kicked off early, fuelling the sense that the election was likely to be called sooner rather than later. From 6 to 10 January, Albanese toured electorates across northern Queensland, the Northern Territory and Western Australia. Rather than focusing efforts on strategically important areas, this first foray tested Albanese’s form and readiness for the campaign. It triggered a similar early effort from the Liberal Party. Peter Dutton and Senator Michaelia Cash were on the ground in the key Victorian seats of Aston, Chisholm and Kooyong the following week, setting the scene for the campaign to come, in which Victoria would be a key battleground. At the first rally of the campaign in Melbourne on 12 January, Dutton launched the party’s campaign slogan: ‘Let’s get Australia back on track’—borrowed directly from the successful 2023 New Zealand National Party’s campaign (see Chapter 1, this volume; Manch 2025).
From 1 January to polling day, Dutton and Albanese travelled constantly and were visiting multiple States every day by the final weeks of the campaign. Albanese started the campaign proper on the offensive in Dickson and was most often found in targeted seats such as Leichhardt and Bullwinkel. His campaign visits typically aligned with key policies, and community health centres were the preferred backdrop for Albanese’s photo shoots and local funding announcements. Albanese was also frequently found sitting at the kitchen table in voters’ homes or in settings that emphasised his leadership and incumbency, showcasing his responses to disasters or productive relationships with State governments. Reflecting the Liberals’ incoherent policy offerings, aside from service stations, Dutton’s campaign events signalled few strong themes and locations ranged from vineyards to brickworks. Once the campaign proper was under way, Dutton was notably absent from inner metropolitan seats now held by Independents. Instead, figures such as Senator Jane Hume represented the Liberal Party in these key electorates.
Alongside these scheduled electorate visits, campaigns are punctuated by high-profile media events such as leaders’ debates and campaign launches. Four debates were held at this election and, while they compounded the personalisation of the campaign, none was decisive. Launches rally the party base and are a key moment in the election campaign, attracting significant attention and media coverage. It was, therefore, unfortunate that both major parties held theirs on 13 April with what amounted to the same policy offering. The Labor launch was held in Perth, while the Liberal Party’s event was hosted in south-western Sydney. All living former Liberal prime ministers, apart from Malcolm Turnbull, were present at the Liberal Party launch. Coupled with a video feature introducing Dutton, the impression was one of presidentialised succession.
While the Liberal Party foregrounded past glory, Labor’s line-up focused on the present, with a packed front bench in attendance. Popular WA Premier Roger Cook was the warm-up act and Julia Gillard alone represented previous leaders, seated between prominent Labor women ministers Katy Gallagher and Penny Wong. As he had with Dutton’s budget reply, Albanese stole the media attention from Dutton, giving his campaign launch speech one hour after Dutton’s (Rawling et al. 2025). The speeches themselves addressed their respective policy commitments and campaign narratives: Albanese spoke about continuing the work started in his first term, focusing on health and framing Dutton as a threat to Medicare, while Dutton blamed sustained cost-of-living pressures on the incumbent Labor government.
In Australian elections, launches usually occur late in the campaign due to a longstanding convention that, before the official launch, staff and ministerial travel expenses to and from campaign headquarters are covered by parliamentary allowances rather than party funds (Sawer and Maley 2020). These events are typically used as a point of focus leading into polling day, as parties direct disengaged voters’ attention to key policies or new announcements. In 2025, both parties launched early, as campaigns continue to adapt to the increase in early voting. The parties used their launches to champion their pitch to first homebuyers, with policies that appeared remarkably similar at first glance.
Digital ads
Spending on digital advertising has grown across successive elections, reaching into the millions by 2025. Between 28 March and polling day, Labor’s Meta accounts spent more than $3 million, while the Liberal Party’s official accounts came in at just over $2 million for the same period (Figure 3.1). The disparity was mirrored in Google advertising spending and was largest in the final two weeks of the campaign, when Labor spending peaked. Overall, Labor showed a stronger commitment to digital advertising across platforms as a key part of their electoral strategy, in both scale and coordination (Table 3.2).
Table 3.2 Top 10 political advertisers on Google Ads, 1 January – 3 May 2025
|
Advertiser |
Sum of spending (A$) |
|---|---|
|
Labor Party |
10,711,200 |
|
Trumpet of Patriots |
8,934,900 |
|
Liberal Party |
7,795,650 |
|
ACTU |
1,188,300 |
|
Greens |
1,002,750 |
|
The Nationals |
374,250 |
|
Advance Australia Ltd |
319,500 |
|
Australian Taxpayers’ Alliance Pty Ltd |
277,350 |
|
Nixs Run Pty Ltd (Nicolette Boele) |
220,350 |
|
Climate 200 |
211,950 |
Source: Compiled by authors using Google Ads data.
Both parties broadly focused their efforts on the eastern States. The Liberal Party came closer to matching Labor’s efforts in Victoria, New South Wales and Western Australia than in the other States, suggesting a comparatively stronger effort in these areas as they struggled to make up ground lost to Independents in 2022. Liberal Party advertisements were also more likely to be disseminated via the accounts of the constituent State parties than the more coordinated national Labor effort.
While party accounts made up a significant proportion of the overall spending, individual candidates also committed substantial resources to their campaigns, with Coalition candidates Jacinta Nampijinpa Price and Dan Tehan the biggest spenders of the campaign (Figure 3.2). Incumbents were more likely to spend big on digital advertising, indicating a defensive strategy from candidates’ own accounts.

Figure 3.1 Labor and Liberal Meta advertising spending, 28 March – 3 May 2025
Source: Compiled by authors using Meta Ad Library data.

Figure 3.2 Meta advertising spending by individual major-party politicians’ accounts, 28 March – 3 May 2025
Source: Compiled by authors using Meta Ad Library data.
Advertising themes aligned with the narratives and strategies employed across the campaigns. Labor’s ads were numerous, but the messages were focused, homing in on Dutton’s cuts, while centring on their own policy successes and future offerings. In response, the Liberals attempted to humanise Dutton while also maintaining the impression of him as a strong leader in contrast to the ‘weak’ Albanese. Liberal advertisements were unsurprisingly light in terms of policy offerings, focusing instead on the negative, such as those blaming the cost-of-living crisis on the Albanese government. Overall, the party’s messages were numerous and inconsistent. The Liberal Party embraced artificial intelligence (AI) to spruik their fuel excise cut, putting out the first and second fully AI-generated political advertisements in Australia, developed by Topham Guerin (9News 2024; Kirk 2025).
Negative advertisements, while considered effective, are found to be unpopular with voters, leading to the hypothesised backlash effect where voters may instead punish the party putting out such ads (Dowling and Wichowsky 2015). By disseminating their attack ads through third-party accounts, each with their own messages, targeted audiences and preferred platforms, the major parties distanced themselves from any potential fallout.
From Labor, ‘Dutton cuts, you pay’ and ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ paid negative ads targeted the Opposition Leader, while the Liberal campaign instead targeted Community Independents through accounts such as ‘Teals Revealed’. These were also targeted based on geography and voter demographics. ‘Don’t risk Dutton’ was primarily aimed at women in Victoria as Labor sought to capitalise on Dutton’s perceived women problem.
Influencers, TikTok and podcasts
AI-generated ads and third-party accounts were not the only ways in which the 2025 election demonstrated a further shift towards a radically different media environment (see Chapter 7, this volume). With growing news avoidance, the collapse of traditional media audiences and the loss of incidental exposure to political content, reaching voters requires new strategies. In response, parties have been attempting to engage with new social media platforms and strategies to expand visibility and connect with a fragmented electorate.
The increased use of TikTok by both major parties in 2025 demonstrates the growing importance of short-form social media videos as a ‘serious campaign strategy’ (Grantham 2025). Parties have engaged in creating more humorous and satirical messaging to promote policies, criticise their opponents and appeal to users of platforms such as TikTok and Instagram (Oates and Chowdhury 2025; Grantham 2024). As parties recognised the ability of influencers to shape political narratives, build trust and influence opinion, influencers played a more significant role in the 2025 election than ever before.
With a federal budget taking place just days before the election campaign was due to formally begin, the Labor government invited social media influencers and online political commentators to attend the pre-budget media lockup, which traditionally included only journalists and mainstream media outlets (Mizen 2025b). Once the campaign was under way, Labor invited social media influencers to cover their election campaign. For the first time, Canberra press gallery members were no longer the only group allowed to join the travelling media pack following Anthony Albanese on the campaign trail.
The second innovation was the use of podcasts throughout the election. MPs and political candidates turned to this medium to connect with younger audiences who are less likely to encounter campaign messages and framing through traditional media channels such as television and radio. There was also a noticeable gendered element to podcast engagement, with Albanese appearing on podcasts with predominantly female audiences, while Dutton targeted podcasts with a greater male listenership (see Chapter 6, this volume). Podcasts hosted by social media influencers provided a platform for long-form informal conversations that were free from the usual journalistic ethical practices and standards of neutrality and balance.
However, this trend has also prompted scrutiny. In response to a query from Liberal Senator Jane Hume regarding the extent to which a podcast host who shares the ideological leanings of the party or candidate is in breach of political advertising laws, the AEC clarified that such appearances do not breach political advertising laws, as long as the politicians or their parties make no payment for participation (AEC 2025).
By investing in and adapting to emerging digital media platforms, major parties not only extended their reach in a fragmented media environment but also reshaped how political messages are consumed. While these tactics were effective in engaging new and younger audiences, they also contributed to an increased blurring of boundaries between journalism, advocacy and entertainment, signalling a new phase in the evolution of political campaigning.
Conclusion
The major parties were tasked with strengthening party identity and voter confidence within a volatile electoral landscape and an expected minority government. While the economic and international context were important, the strength of the Labor campaign and the weakness of the Liberal campaign contributed to the outcome in 2025. Both parties attempted to frame their leaders in a positive light and their opponents in a negative one during the campaign.
Labor’s campaign was well run by an experienced team, who built a well-organised and tightly coordinated effort that played to the party’s strengths. Messaging and timing were tightly coordinated between key campaign figures and aligned across mediums. As a result, the party effectively weathered international events and methodically prosecuted the need for stable, steady leadership. The inconsistent messaging and gaffes from the Liberal Party allowed Labor to set the agenda, leading to a campaign that was fought on issues such as health. Labor effectively cemented the electorate’s understanding of Dutton as a hard man and a risky proposition. Finally, the Liberal Party overextended, aggressively pursuing suburban seats with few policy offerings in a strategy that did not adapt to the changing political landscape.
Campaign effects are considered strongest when a weak campaign faces a strong one (Farrell and Schmitt-Beck 2006). This was exemplified in the 2025 federal election. Optimistically interpreted, this election result could be seen as an argument in favour of policy substance. More cynically, we suggest it indicates the continuing professionalisation of Australian campaigns and the influence that a well-run campaign can have in the right circumstances.
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