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Landslide

5

Religion: Christians, Muslims and Jews

John Warhurst

Abstract

Religion once again played a role in this election, though this time with a new twist. The unfinished business of 2022 was balancing anti-discrimination for minorities and freedom of religion for faith communities. This chapter addresses the campaign interventions of representatives of three faith communities: Catholics, Muslims and Jews. The study of the extensive Catholic campaign reveals a complex community with a variety of aspirations and demands for the major parties, ranging from self-interest to social justice.

The second and third cases of the smaller Muslim and Jewish communities begin mid-term with the October 2023 Hamas attack on Israel. The domestic reactions to the subsequent war dominated Australian electoral politics for the next 18 months. Both diverse communities tried to hold the parties and Independent candidates to account. The target seats were held by Labor, the Greens or the Teals. Religion-based campaigning was one factor, though the electoral impact did not match the intensity of the social division.

Keywords: religion; Catholics; Jews; Muslims; campaigning

The interaction of religion with politics takes many forms—mostly Christian—during Australian election campaigns. In recent federal elections, it included John Howard and Kevin Rudd offering competing interpretations of their faith to the evangelical Australian Christian Lobby (ACL) in 2007, the conservative Catholic Tony Abbott battling the atheist Julia Gillard in 2010, the prominence of Scott Morrison’s personal Pentecostal faith in the ‘miracle’ election of 2019 and the advocacy role of the ACL in 2022 (Warhurst 2010, 2012; Vromen and Rutledge-Prior 2023).

This interaction takes place in a secular society in which Christianity is the largest religious group. But the numbers of those with no religious affiliation are growing, as are other religious groups. Table 5.1 shows this. The 2021 Census reported that Christians were almost 44 per cent of the population and, among Christians, the largest denomination was Catholic (20 per cent). Those reporting ‘no religion’ were just under 39 per cent. Other religious groups were much smaller. Islam made up 3.2 per cent, Hinduism 2.7 per cent and Buddhism 2.4 per cent. Judaism was even smaller.

Table 5.1 Religious affiliation in Australia, 2021 Census

Religion

Percentage of national population reporting affiliation

Christianity

43.9

No religion

38.9

Islam

3.2

Hinduism

2.7

Buddhism

2.4

Judaism

0.4

Source: ABS (2022).

There is considerable variation in religious affiliation, including no religion, across Australia. Therefore, the politics of religion shows marked geographical variation. Each electorate has its distinct religious composition (see Table 5.2). Almost always those with ‘no religion’ are among the two largest sections by ‘religion’ of each electorate. But in some electorates, including Blaxland and Calwell, ‘no religion’ fell below 14 per cent (Table 5.2).

Table 5.2 Religious composition of selected House of Representatives electorates

Electorate

Sitting MP

Religious affiliation

Blaxland

Jason Clare (ALP)

Islam, 29.2%

Catholic, 19.2%

No religion, 13.4%

Buddhism, 8.2%

Calwell

Retiring ALP member

Catholic, 26.6%

Islam, 23.8%

No religion, 13.9%

Hinduism, 5.9%

Goldstein

Zoe Daniel (Ind.)

No religion, 34.8%

Catholic, 21%

Anglican, 11.7%

Judaism, 6.8%

Kooyong

Monique Ryan (Ind.)

No religion, 40.6%

Catholic, 20.2%

Anglican, 15.1%

Judaism, 5.3%

Uniting Church, 5.1%

Macnamara

Josh Burns (ALP)

No religion, 45.2%

Catholic, 15.2%

Judaism, 9.9%

Anglican, 5.0%

Watson

Tony Burke (ALP)

Islam, 23.4%

Catholic, 23.4%

No religion, 15.6%

Eastern Orthodox, 8.1%

Wentworth

Allegra Spender (Ind.)

No religion, 33.0%

Catholic, 20.1%

Judaism, 12.5%

Anglican, 10.6%

Wills

Peter Khalil (ALP)

No religion, 39.7%

Catholic, 23.5%

Islam, 10.3%

Eastern Orthodox, 6.1%

Source: ABS (2022).

Religious affiliation also interacts with the political party system in different ways. The bulk of the religiously affiliated Christian community operates within the mainstream, the Labor Party and the Coalition. Some are also active on the left within the most secular of all parties, the Greens, while a small number feature among the parties of the general right, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation and the United Australia Party/Trumpet of Patriots, and the religious right, Family First and Australian Christians. The ultra-conservative Plymouth Brethren made a late entry into this election by campaigning for the Liberal Party at Sydney polling booths (Maddison and Sakkal 2025).

The 2025 election once again involved religion and politics, but it had significant new elements involving other faiths. The unfinished ‘religion and politics’ business from the previous federal election in 2022 was the matter of religious discrimination (Grattan 2022). Prime minister Scott Morrison was unable to achieve parliamentary reconciliation between the competing claims of faith-based schools and minority groups such as LGBTQIA+ students and teachers. Several Liberal MPs crossed the floor and the legislation was withdrawn after months of wrangling. The faith-based claims were largely prosecuted by Christian organisations, such as Christian Schools, Catholic leaders and the ACL, but there were non-Christian supporters, too.

The new Prime Minister, Anthony Albanese, promised to resolve the stand-off but was unable to do so. He could not achieve bipartisanship with the Coalition and refused to proceed without it, claiming that it would be too divisive. It would also be difficult and probably unproductive. This disappointed both sides (Warhurst 2024).

This issue was highly contested and very public during the first half of Labor’s term. Although it did not disappear entirely, after the Israel–Hamas Gaza conflict began in October 2023, it was almost completely overshadowed despite News Corp’s support. Instead, news was dominated by events in Gaza, political party responses, pro-Palestinian protests, anti-Israel and anti-Semitic violence, Australian positioning at the United Nations on Middle East votes, Palestinian and Jewish advocacy, State and federal parliamentary legislation curtailing vilification and hate speech and protecting religious worship properties, while addressing social division and protecting freedom of speech.

The emphasis turned to the specific social and political roles of the Jewish and Muslim communities. By mid-2024, the freedom of religion legislation was ‘dead in the water’, to the regret of the ‘faith lobby’. Others, like the Greens, equality groups, Jewish groups and the LGBTQIA+ community regretted the Labor government’s abandonment of anti-vilification legislation (for example, Grattan 2024; Lewis 2024a, 2024b; Chrysanthos 2024). CathNews reported: ‘Broken election promise sparks community anger’ (14 August 2024). By the time of the 2025 election, small conservative political parties such as Family First and Australian Christians, neither of which was successful, were the only ones strenuously advocating for such freedom of religion.

The personal faith of the two major-party leaders was originally thought to not be an election issue, though it was noted that both identified as Catholic (Cook 2025; Wimmer 2025). But from the time of Pope Francis’s death on Easter Monday, it may have advantaged Albanese, ‘who in recent years has strongly re-embraced his Catholic faith’ (Tillett and Read 2025).

The premise behind the attention given to religion and elections is that religious identity claims matter when voters determine their vote and that such voters take their lead from their religious groups and leaders. If religious communities are divided, their adherents are less politically important because they cancel each other out. The historical idea of the ‘Catholic vote’, for instance, depended on the community following church leadership and speaking with ‘one voice’. It also presumed that the community was large enough to make a difference.

Some of these assumptions no longer apply to the Catholic community: it is smaller, less cohesive and less inclined to support its own leadership. Whether these assumptions still applied to the much smaller Muslim and Jewish communities was moot. Was there a potential ‘Jewish’ and/or ‘Muslim’ vote?

Evolution of social division

The social and political division in Australia following the attack on Israel by Hamas on 7 October 2023, and the military response of the Israeli Government, became the context for the dramatic evolution of religion and electoral politics. The governmental and legislative responses involved the Albanese government and various State governments. The broader political framework drew in all the political parties and many existing faith groups and generated new actors. Religion and politics grew from a somewhat boutique issue to a whole-of-community mass panic.

Table 5.3 Key moments in Jewish–Muslim social division in Australia, post 7 October 2023

Event

Date

Hamas attacks Israel

October 2023

Anti-Semitic attacks

October 2023

Pro-Palestinian rallies

October 2023

Government ministers Ed Husic and Anne Aly defend protesters

October 2023

ABC cancels contract of journalist Antoinette Lattouf

December 2023

Senator Fatima Payman defects from Labor

July 2024

PM Albanese condemns ‘faith-based’ parties

July 2024

Muslim Independents announce campaigns

July 2024

Albanese appoints anti-Semitism envoy

July 2024

Albanese appoints anti-Islamophobia envoy

September 2024

Firebombing of Adass Synagogue in Melbourne

December 2024

State bans on protests at places of worship

December 2024

New State hate speech legislation

February 2025

United Nations votes on Middle East issues

Various

Attacks on MPs’ electorate offices

Various

Eightieth anniversary of liberation of Auschwitz

January 2025

Independent Allegra Spender’s motion on hate crimes legislation

February 2025

Alleged Dural ‘caravan’ terrorist plot

February 2025

Opposition leader Peter Dutton’s budget reply speech refers to anti-Semitism

March 2025

Dutton attacks Greens as ‘anti-Semitic’

April 2025

Source: Compiled by author.

Table 5.3 identifies some key moments in Jewish–Muslim social division in Australia after 7 October 2023. Initially, large pro-Palestinian protests, especially outside the Opera House in Sydney, became controversial amid allegations of anti-Semitic chants. Governments, under media pressure, rushed to respond. Cracks appeared within Labor ranks at State and national levels. Ed Husic, Labor minister and member for Chifley in Western Sydney, spoke for his Palestinian constituents while maintaining cabinet solidarity, alleging that they were being ‘collectively punished for Hamas’s barbarism’. He was supported by fellow Muslim minister Anne Aly. Liberal deputy leader Sussan Ley accused Husic of ‘freelancing on foreign policy’ (Basford Canales and Karp 2023).

When new Western Australian Labor Senator Fatima Payman defected from the Labor Party in July 2024 over the Palestinian issue, Albanese warned against the emergence of another ‘faith-based’ political party (Sakkal 2024). In the same month, Albanese appointed a new government anti-Semitism envoy, Jillian Segal, and, in September, an anti-Islamophobia envoy.

So-called hate speech legislation, extending existing offences, began to be discussed in the federal parliament. The same divisions in the community quickly arose and harked back to the earlier deadlock over religious discrimination/freedom. Generally, conservative faith groups warned of dangers to freedom of speech from strong anti-hate laws. These included the ACL, Christian Schools and the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference. The ACL saw the potential for ‘viewpoint suppression on ideological grounds’ (Karp 2024). On the other hand, according to CathNews (the official Catholic media hub), ‘Greens, LGBT, equality groups and Jewish groups have criticised the bill for abandoning the Government’s commitment to outlaw vilification’ (21 November 2024).

A similar story was unfolding at the State level with anti-vilification legislation in New South Wales and Victoria (Le Grand 2024). Victorian attempts to lower the acceptable ‘hate’ threshold led Melbourne Catholic Archbishop Peter Comensoli to warn that a lower threshold ‘could erode freedom of religious expression’.

In early December 2024, the Adass Israel Synagogue in Ripponlea in south-eastern Melbourne was firebombed. Widespread criticism of Albanese for being anti-Israel, including by the Israeli Government, followed. The anti-Semitism envoy called for stronger national leadership. The Opposition Leader, building on his consistent narrative, condemned Albanese as ‘weak’ and attacked the local federal Labor MP Josh Burns, who is Jewish, for having ‘lost his voice’. The churches joined in condemnation of the attack (CathNews, 9 December 2024; 11 December 2024). The Prime Minister responded: ‘To attack a synagogue is an act of anti-Semitism. It’s attacking the right that all Australians should have to practise their faith in peace and security.’

The attack on the synagogue generated further moves by the three largest States to ban protests at places of worship (CathNews, 10 December 2024). Albanese, who was in Perth, was criticised for taking four days to visit the Melbourne synagogue. There was further anti-Israel and anti-Jewish violence in Sydney. Some voices called for calm and greater balance (Hamilton 2024). Church leaders backed tough new laws, but then clergy abuse survivors objected to bans on protests outside places of worship (Knaus and Rachwani 2024).

In January 2025, the eightieth anniversary of the liberation of the Auschwitz Nazi concentration camp in Poland was commemorated, with Australia represented by the Foreign Minister Penny Wong and Attorney-General Mark Dreyfus. The Opposition declared that Wong’s attendance was inappropriate because of Australia’s stance at the United Nations on the issue of Israel–Gaza–Palestine (7.30, ABC TV, 27 January). Speaking from Poland, Dreyfus called politicisation of anti-Semitism ‘grotesque’ (Harris 2025). The Opposition Leader, after Nazi demonstrations in Adelaide, equated those on the extreme right and white supremacists with the Greens as purveyors of ‘hate speech’.

February 2025 was a frantic month. There were federal and State legislative manoeuvrings, anti-Semitic attacks, arrests by police, terror warnings from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), a Sky News anti-Semitism summit, the parliamentary gagging of Dreyfus, allegedly anti-Semitic NSW nurses, a Venice Biennale controversy over the dropping of the Australian representative and the continuing legal case against former ABC journalist Antoinette Lattouf.

The Australian Federation of Islamic Councils called attention to double standards (Canberra Times, 18 February 2025). The NSW Parliament passed ‘hate speech’ laws, but Faith NSW called the legislation flawed and the Rabbi of the Great Synagogue in Sydney asked for LGBTQIA+ people to be included (Maddison 2025). Creative Australia dropped Khaled Sabsabi as the Australian representative at the Venice Biennale amid controversy over some of his previous artwork (Papastergiadis 2025; SMH 2025a). Adding to discord within the arts community, Judith Chand, chair of the Sydney Writers Festival, resigned.

At the federal level, community sensitivities were such that 12 April, Passover, was ruled out as insensitive for an election date. Community Independent member for Wentworth Allegra Spender played an active role in parliamentary discussions, called on the government to defund the UN Relief and Works Agency and threatened to sue her Liberal opponent for alleging that the Spender team placed a campaign poster over an Israeli image (Chrysanthos et al. 2025). Both candidates later appeared at an election forum hosted by the Executive Council of Australian Jewry and the NSW Board of Deputies (Buckley 2025).

The Opposition Leader promised free trade with Israel and the European Union, reiterating his earlier promise of a referendum on citizenship and anti-Semitism. With an election in the air, Dutton’s budget reply speech on 27 March included several items that focused on electorally sensitive anti-Semitism.

Election campaign controversies

Commentary now focused more directly on the possible role of the Muslim and Jewish communities in the election. Often this development was decried as contributing to unwanted social division.

The Sydney Morning Herald editorialised, for instance, that:

The fading divide between religion and politics in Australia’s outer suburbs is a new, confusing and corrosive development in Australian politics. Politicians courting the votes of Muslim communities in Sydney and Melbourne have encountered a bewildering range of responses, including threats of violence. Identity-based tribalism invaded the opening days of the election campaign with an attack on both Labor and Coalition stances on the Israel–Hamas conflict. (SMH 2025b; emphasis added)

The campaigning proceeded on the untested assumption adopted by some commentators that such faith-based tribalism would indeed have an electoral impact. The ABC’s Jacob Greber, for instance, concluded that the Community Independents might be electoral victims:

Labor has found itself squeezed between the outrage of pro-Palestinian Australians wanting stronger condemnation of Israel’s government and local Jewish communities suffering antisemitism …

Inner-city Teal or community independents are equally challenged, especially with MPs like Zoe Daniel, Monique Ryan in Melbourne and Allegra Spender in Sydney defending electorates with large Jewish populations. It’s almost conventional wisdom among analysts that fears about antisemitism will send a wave of Teal voters back to the Liberal Party, even though Peter Dutton is more socially conservative than many voters in these seats. (Greber 2025; emphasis added)

The Christian advocate the Reverend Tim Costello assumed an unlikely unity within both faith communities:

For the first time in living memory Australia’s Jewish and Muslim communities will largely vote as blocs based on Australian foreign policy. (Costello 2025; emphasis added)

I think the Coalition have absolutely doubled down and now have pocketed every Australian Jewish vote in this next election and that means the Prime Minister is sort of a meat in the sandwich, flailing at both. (Hawley 2025; emphasis added)

There were, however, some early doubters of the likely negative impact of the Muslim vote on Labor (Henderson 2024). The Sydney Institute’s Gerard Henderson had claimed in August 2024 that it was ‘most unlikely’ that an Independent Muslim candidate would defeat a Labor MP.

Mid-campaign, political scientist Murray Goot approached the question through an analysis of recent polls, including YouGov (Goot 2025; see also Chapter 20, this volume). He suggested that:

[while] the government’s policy on the war in Gaza is likely to be of concern to the large number of Muslim voters in Labor seats in Melbourne (Calwell especially) and Sydney (Watson and Blaxland especially) and to Jewish voters in Labor seats, especially in the Melbourne seat of Macnamara) [ultimately, these voters would have little impact].

According to YouGov, though not the Freshwater poll, these Labor seats would not change hands, nor would the Teal seats. Goot concluded: ‘On these figures, neither Muslim nor Jewish voters will even come close to changing the outcomes.’

Nevertheless, the issue continued to attract campaign attention among Muslims and Jews as well as the major parties and Independent candidates. Bagshaw and Olaya (2025) discussed four ‘Muslim’ seats in Sydney, concentrating on the two main ‘Muslim’ Independents, Ziad Basyouny in Watson and Ahmed Ouf in Blaxland, while Dumas (2025) canvassed multiple electorates in which ‘Muslims aim to exert new political power at the election’.

Unauthorised flyers alleged that Labor’s Tony Burke in Watson was ‘a racist’ and a banner claimed he supported ‘genocide’ (McSweeney 2025). The Stand4Palestine group called on mosques to not host politicians who supported Israel, and some visits immediately became controversial (Duffin 2025). Local Muslim leader Jamal Rifi defended Burke and Labor. He later launched ‘Friends of Tony Burke’. Attendance at mosques by politicians became an issue in Melbourne and Sydney during the Eid al-Fitr festival at the end of Ramadan (Truu 2025). The local Greens campaign against Labor MP Peter Khalil in Wills used extreme language, linking him with the ‘Zionist lobby’ and claiming that he was ‘complicit in war crimes’ (Durkin and McCubbing 2025). Earlier, Greens Senator Mehreen Faruqi had alleged Labor was ‘complicit’ in genocide (Olbrycht-Palmer and Wang 2024).

In Melbourne, former Liberal MP Tim Wilson hoped that angry Jewish voters would help him regain Goldstein from Community Independent MP Zoe Daniel (Knott 2025). Meanwhile, an official Jewish forum in Macnamara engendered controversy within the Jewish community by banning the Greens candidate on the grounds that the party had ‘intentionally fuelled antisemitism’ (in the words of Jewish leader Jeremy Liebler) (Belot and Kolovos 2025). The Zionist Federation of Australia and the Executive Council of Australian Jewry lobbied the Prime Minister and the Opposition Leader to preference each other above the Greens.

In Sydney, prominent Community Independent candidate Nicolette Boele (Bradfield) apologised at a Jewish-organised event for an anti-Semitic social media post in 2022 (Sydney Morning Herald, 24 April 2025). In Wentworth, 47,000 copies of an anonymous 12-page pamphlet, titled ‘Allegra Spender exposed’, were distributed, alleging that the Community Independent MP was weak on anti-Semitism (Guardian, 22 April 2025). The Opposition Leader ramped up his rhetoric against the Greens, describing the party as an ‘antisemitic, Jew-hating party’ (Canberra Times, 28 April 2025).

The Catholic voice and vote

The Christian case study is of the extensive Catholic community. The Catholic community is the best example of a large Christian faith successfully integrated into the political debate. A plethora of official and unofficial Catholic groups intervened during the election campaign (for general background, see Warhurst 2008). These advocacy efforts included the traditional statement from the Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (ACBC 2025), a more extensive Catholic Religious Australia statement and contributions from major agencies such as the National Catholic Education Commission (NCEC), Catholic Social Services Australia and Catholic Health Australia. Some local dioceses played an electoral role, as did lay groups such as the St Vincent de Paul Society (known as Vinnies).

Each of these groups had a potential audience and the networks to try to reach them: dioceses, parishes, schools, hospitals, Centacare agencies and Vinnies’ conferences. Yet, in many cases, it is a diminishing audience and, in some cases, ageing. Catholic school communities were the biggest and most likely receptors of church messages though the lines of communication through school principals to parents and staff were long, contentious and unreliable.

The type of Catholic interventions varied between many different perspectives and techniques. There was the ‘social justice’ church and the ‘professional’ church—sometimes overlapping.

Some interventions were examples of hard-nosed and hard-hitting modern lobbying techniques that essentially advised Catholics whom to vote for and whom to avoid. The NCEC, representing the powerful Catholic education interest, supported the two major parties, while strongly criticising the Greens. In other statements, the NCEC and its affiliates and associates leant towards the Coalition’s ‘anti-woke’ agenda. Its five priorities were funding certainty, support for faith-based schools, sector neutrality, addressing disadvantage and early childhood education.

Conversely, the St Vincent de Paul Society’s policy scorecard strongly supported the Greens and partially supported the Labor government, while finding little or no merit in the Coalition Opposition. Its four priorities were supporting a safety net for all Australians, housing security across the country, meeting the needs of First Nations peoples and rising to the refugee challenge. Vinnies also offered a webinar and supported the ‘Say yes to refugees’ theme of the Palm Sunday rallies held during the election campaign.

Muslim and Jewish faith voices

The domestic Australian aftermath of October 2023 switched attention from Christian voters to the smaller Muslim and Jewish communities (about 800,000 and 120,000 people, respectively; see Table 5.1). ‘Religion’ in the election became ‘ethno-religion’.

These two Australia-wide ethnic communities shared the same political limitations as the larger Catholic community with quite diverse voices, sometimes based on contradictory values. Unlike Catholics and other Christians, however, they were concentrated in a small number of electorates, mostly in Sydney and Melbourne, where the number of Muslims and Jews is a substantial proportion of the voting population (see Table 5.2). This may have been just high enough to make a difference.

These ‘Muslim’ electorates, as discussed in the media, included the Labor-held, largely working-class seats of Blaxland and Watson in Western Sydney and Calwell and Wills in Melbourne. The two Sydney seats were targeted by Independent candidates with backing from Muslim advocacy groups. The two Melbourne seats were ones that the Greens hoped to win from Labor (Kolovos 2025).

The ‘Jewish’ electorates included the relatively marginal middle-class seats of Wentworth in Sydney and Kooyong and Goldstein in Melbourne held by Community Independents elected in 2022. These were the ‘Jewish’ targets. Labor-held Macnamara in Melbourne also had a large Jewish population.

The Muslim voice and vote

The second case study is the Muslim community. The generally working-class Muslim community has traditionally been ethnically fragmented and politically disorganised. Despite some national organisations, it lacked recognised national leaders—contributing to less political effectiveness. Muslim voters in the past largely supported the Labor Party. Sitting Labor MPs were being challenged by pro-Palestine Muslim Independents, supported by various groups including Muslim Votes Matter (MVM) (Krayem 2025) and The Muslim Vote (see also Chapter 15, this volume).

MVM also generally allocated preferences to the Greens over both Labor and Liberal candidates. It handed out how-to-vote cards in targeted electorates (campaigning in 32 seats) and offered online advice in others. It believed that in certain electorates an ‘organised, informed and principled’ Muslim vote could be ‘decisive’ but outlined larger goals beyond the election. It also saw the campaign not as ‘religious’ but as ‘a political one grounded in ethics’. Its national spokesperson Ghaith Krayem (2025) argued:

MVM is not simply about voter turnout or civic engagement. It is about carving out a place for our voice in the political discourse of this country—asserting that we exist not only as objects of commentary, but as agents of influence …

MVM is not an election campaign—it is the foundation of a long-term strategy to platform Muslim voices and demands in Australian political life.

The Australian Palestine Advocacy Network (APAN) distributed an election scorecard on ‘how the major parties have responded to Israel’s genocide in Gaza during the past 18 months’ (APAN 2025). On the answers to 12 questions, the Greens ranked first, ahead of Labor, with the Liberal Party trailing far behind. Stand4Palestine called on mosques to not host politicians who had supported Israel. The minor Australia’s Voice party, led by Senator Payman, also campaigned for Independents and Greens against Labor.

The driving force behind these campaigns was Muslim anger that the government was insufficiently supportive of the Palestinian cause. Other issues were secondary. MVM recognised that the Muslim community also supported the rights of its faith-based schools to determine the hiring of staff. This put them at odds with Greens policy, but the difference was accommodated through consultation and the promise by Greens leader Adam Bandt of his party’s respect for conflicting rights on matters of freedom of religion (Belot 2025).

Muslim voters had established party allegiances and tended in the past to support Labor in working-class electorates, though in the 2017 same-sex marriage plebiscite and in 2023 in the Voice referendum—notably, in Western Sydney—they appeared to express a different view. Ministers Husic and Aly were advocating within the government. Yet, some Muslim voters may have been ready for change. In both the 2024 UK and the 2024 US elections, there was some evidence that Muslim voters were mobilised to desert their traditional Labour and Democrat allegiances.

The Jewish voice and vote

The equally complex third case study is the even smaller Jewish community. Historically, it was pro-Labor, but in recent years shifted to being pro-Coalition (Walker 2024; see also Patrick 2025). It contained many groups highly critical of the Albanese Labor government for being insufficiently pro-Israel, both domestically in not tackling anti-Semitism strongly enough and through its even-handed voting in the United Nations. These groups include the established peak organisations, often known colloquially as the ‘Jewish lobby’ or ‘Israel lobby’, which were well resourced, highly professional and well organised with an established profile (Lyons 2019; Gawenda 2023; see, in general, Mendes and Brahm Levy 2004).

Such older groups included the advocacy-oriented Australian Israel & Jewish Affairs Council (AIJAC, founded in 1997), the major umbrella group, the Executive Council of Australian Jewry (ECAJ, founded in 1944), the Zionist Federation of Australia and the Anti-Defamation Commission. All were active pro-Israel campaigners and generated a profusion of pro-Israel articles in the mainstream media. There were other anti-government Jewish groups, too.

An informal group known as ‘Lawyers for Israel’ allegedly criticised the ABC over the hiring of journalist Antoinette Lattouf in December 2023 (APAN 2024). In Macnamara, another new group, called J-United, was active (Kolovos 2025).

A new and alternative more pro-Palestinian view was represented by another, more ‘progressive’ body, the Jewish Council of Australia, which supported the government’s position; it emerged mid-term in February 2024 to offer a fresh voice opposed to both anti-Semitism and Israel’s conduct (Dumas 2024). Jewish Labor MPs, including Dreyfus and the member for Macnamara, Josh Burns, also defended the government against Jewish criticism.

Jewish groups also clashed with Climate 200, the main funder of Community Independents, alleging it contained anti-Semitic elements (Adno 2025). AIJAC executive director Colin Rubenstein asserted that Community Independent MPs, ‘especially those in electorates with large Jewish communities’, should ‘distance themselves’ from Climate 200 and its leader, Simon Holmes à Court. This stance was taken up in Wentworth by Allegra Spender’s Liberal opponent.

Intra-community tensions were notably intense within the Jewish community. At its initiation, the new Jewish Council declared that it was ‘ashamed that some Jewish organisations had been lobbying to refuse entry to people seeking safety’ from Gaza (Jewish Council of Australia 2024). It labelled ECAJ as a ‘right-wing Zionist group’. In turn, ECAJ described the Jewish Council as ‘far left’ and ridiculed it as a ‘micro-group’.

Conclusion

Religious voices affirmed group identity and supported democratic participation as well as addressing party choice. It was the last, however, which attracted more media attention. Yet, often the faith voices deliberately steered clear of party choice. Catholic voters were divided, and this probably applied to the Muslim and Jewish voters, too.

Christianity, the majority faith, has diverse representation in the Australian polity. Traditional centrist and progressive denominations such as the Anglican and Uniting churches were now matched by the ACL, the activist evangelical lobby group, and by the influence of the growing Pentecostal community, as well as the small far-right Christian parties.

The Catholic community, the largest Christian denomination, probably spoke with too many different voices to be effective. While not explicitly disagreeing with one another in public, they certainly demonstrated their political differences vividly through their scorecards rating the parties. This method often failed to adequately consider minor parties, Community Independents and Independents, despite their increasing prevalence and attractiveness to voters.

Christians shared the stage with Muslims and Jews. The Israel–Hamas Gaza confrontation elevated the latter to new prominence. The faith groups generally represented an ‘older style’ of campaigning, often conducted in and around places of worship, including churches, mosques and synagogues, as well as in newspapers and community forums and meetings.

Journalist David Crowe (2025) concluded that the Greens’ campaigning on Gaza was one factor in its loss of seats (see also Chapter 13, this volume). The Jewish vote appears to have been one factor in the comeback by the Liberal Party in the Melbourne electorate of Goldstein (Hayman and Nethery 2025; see also Chapter 14, this volume). Several of the Muslim Independents produced solid performances by finishing second against leading Labor figures in Western Sydney (see also Chapter 15, this volume).

After the election many ‘religious’ threads were kept alive. Catholic voters probably joined the general swing towards the government. Its leadership was glad to protect education funding. The unfinished war in Gaza meant that both the Muslim and the Jewish communities continued to advocate their concerns to the government.

Dreyfus and Husic, Jewish and Muslim, respectively, were both dropped from the new Labor ministry in a factional carve-up (to the dismay of Labor loyalist Jamal Rifi in the case of Husic). New Liberal leader, Sussan Ley, reiterated in her first media conference the Opposition’s claim that the government was anti-Jewish. Jewish community leader Alex Rychin (ECAJ) celebrated the defeat of Greens leader Adam Bandt. Both the faith groups and Equality Australia quickly returned religious discrimination legislation to the table for the new parliamentary term.

References

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Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS). 2022. ‘Religious Affiliation in Australia: Exploration of the changes in reported religion in the 2021 Census.’ Media release, 4 July. Canberra: Australian Bureau of Statistics. www.abs.gov.au/articles/religious-affiliation-australia.

Australian Catholic Bishops Conference (ACBC). 2025. ‘Called to bring hope in the year of jubilee.’ Election statement. Canberra: Australian Catholic Bishops Conference. www.catholic.au/s/article/Election-Statement-2025.

Australian Palestinian Advocacy Network (APAN). 2024. ‘Pro-Israel lobby influence over ABC threatens journalistic ethics, independence.’ Media release, 27 January. Canberra: Australian Palestinian Advocacy Network. apan.org.au/media_release/pro-israel-lobby-influence-over-abc-threatens-journalistic-ethics/.

APAN. 2025. ‘Vote with Palestine.’ Pearls and Irritations, 25 April. johnmenadue.com/post/2025/04/vote-with-palestine/.

Bagshaw, Eryk, and Kayla Olaya. 2025. ‘Hostile and deeply divided: In south-west Sydney, it’s an election campaign like never before.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 20 April. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/hostile-and-deeply-divided-in-south-west-sydney-it-s-an-election-campaign-like-never-before-20250408-p5lq2l.html.

Basford Canales, Sarah, and Paul Karp. 2023. ‘Albanese government accused of “deep division” and “confusion” over Israel–Hamas conflict stance.’ The Guardian, 19 October. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2023/oct/19/albanese-government-accused-of-deep-division-and-confusion-over-israel-hamas-conflict-stance.

Belot, Henry. 2025. ‘Muslim advocacy group to preference Greens above Labor in some seats despite disagreement on religious freedom.’ The Guardian, 16 April. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/16/muslim-advocacy-group-to-preference-greens-above-labor-in-some-seats-despite-disagreement-on-religious-freedom.

Belot, Henry, and Benita Kolovos. 2025. ‘Jewish leaders unhappy at decision to block Greens candidate from Melbourne community forum.’ The Guardian, 5 April. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/05/jewish-leaders-unhappy-at-decision-to-block-greens-candidate-from-melbourne-community-forum-ntwnfb.

Buckley, Penry. 2025. ‘Handshake, strong words: First public face-off for Spender and Knox after legal threat.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 April. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/handshake-strong-words-first-public-face-off-for-spender-and-knox-after-legal-threat-20250406-p5lpki.html.

CathNews. 2024a. ‘Melbourne Archdiocese condemns firebomb attack on synagogue.’ CathNews, 9 December. cathnews.com/2024/12/09/melbourne-archdiocese-condemns-firebomb-attack-on-synagogue/.

CathNews. 2024b. ‘Catholic Religious Australia condemns arson attack on synagogue.’ CathNews, 11 December. cathnews.com/2024/12/11/catholic-religious-australia-condemns-arson-attack-on-synagogue/.

Chrysanthos, Natassia. 2024. ‘“Injustices ignored”: LGBTQ and faith groups fume at PM’s broken promise.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 13 August. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/injustices-ignored-lgbtq-and-faith-groups-fume-at-pm-s-broken-promise-20240813-p5k1zp.html.

Chrysanthos, Natassia, Olivia Ireland, and Matthew Knott. 2025. ‘Teal MP Allegra Spender threatens to sue challenger over “disgraceful accusation”.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 March. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/teal-mp-allegra-spender-threatens-to-sue-challenger-over-disgraceful-accusation-20250307-p5lhof.html.

Cook, Michael. 2025. ‘This is going to be a unique contest between two Catholics.’ Catholic Weekly, 7 April. catholicweekly.com.au/unusual-dynamics-at-play-in-federal-election/.

Costello, Tim. 2025. ‘Antisemitism and Islamophobia are not the only things rupturing our communities.’ 17 January. Sydney: Centre for Public Christianity. [First published, The Sydney Morning Herald, 15 January]. publicchristianity.org/article/antisemitism-and-islamophobia-are-not-the-only-things-rupturing-our-communities/.

Crowe, David. 2025. ‘The Greens bet on Gaza, now they may have lost the House.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 7 May. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/the-greens-bet-on-gaza-and-may-have-lost-the-house-20250507-p5lxen.html.

Duffin, Perry. 2025. ‘“Interrupt, disrupt, expose”: Plan to drive MPs from Sydney’s mosques.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 30 March. www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/interrupt-disrupt-expose-plan-to-drive-mps-from-sydney-s-mosques-20250330-p5lnmp.html.

Dumas, Daisy. 2024. ‘A fresh Jewish voice: The new Australian group opposing antisemitism—and Israel’s conduct.’ The Guardian, 1 April. www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/01/progressive-australian-jews-opposing-antisemitism-israel-gaza-war.

Dumas, Daisy. 2025. ‘Sick of being ignored: Galvanised by Gaza, Australian Muslims aim to exert new political power at the election.’ The Guardian, 24 April. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/24/sick-of-being-ignored-galvanised-by-gaza-australian-muslims-aim-to-exert-new-political-power-at-the-election.

Durkin, Patrick, and Gus McCubbing. 2025. ‘The Melbourne seats where Israel–Gaza has become ugly campaign fight.’ Australian Financial Review, 1 May. www.afr.com/politics/federal/the-melbourne-seats-where-israel-gaza-has-become-ugly-campaign-fight-20250429-p5lv3p.

Gawenda, Michael. 2023. ‘Truths and myths about Australia’s “Israel lobby”.’ The Jewish Independent, 6 October, [Updated 19 March 2024]. thejewishindependent.com.au/michael-gawenda-truths-and-myths-about-australias-israel-lobby.

Goot, Murray. 2025. ‘Which are the polls to watch?’ Inside Story, 14 April. insidestory.org.au/which-are-the-polls-to-watch/.

Grattan, Michelle. 2022. ‘With the sex and religious discrimination bills, Scott Morrison made three foolish assumptions.’ ABC News, 11 February. www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-11/religious-discrimination-bill-morrison-backfired/100820422.

Grattan, Michelle. 2024. ‘Hate speech moves fan fire.’ Canberra Times, 1 June.

Greber, Jacob. 2025. ‘Donald Trump and Middle East chaos have up-ended Australia’s politics in a way not seen “since the Vietnam War”.’ ABC News, 9 February. www.abc.net.au/news/2025-02-09/trump-gaza-foreign-issues-upend-politics-as-usual/104909980.

Hamilton, Andrew. 2024. ‘The horror of synagogue burning.’ Eureka Street, 12 December. www.eurekastreet.com.au/article/the-horror-of-synagogue-burning.

Harris, Rob. 2025. ‘Dreyfus calls out left and right in antisemitism fight.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 28 January.

Hawley, Samantha. 2025. ‘How politicians are failing on anti-Semitism.’ [Interview with Tim Costello]. ABC News Daily, 23 January. www.abc.net.au/listen/programs/abc-news-daily/how-politicians-are-failing-on-anti-semitism/104847682.

Hayman, Phoebe, and Amy Nethery. 2025. ‘Liberal Party reclaims Goldstein—How Tim Wilson turned back the Teal tidal wave.’ The Conversation, 12 May. theconversation.com/liberal-party-reclaims-goldstein-how-tim-wilson-turned-back-the-teal-tidal-wave-256201. doi.org/10.64628/AA.jexaqf5nt.

Henderson, Gerard. 2024. ‘Preference system no help to “divisive” Muslim candidates.’ The Australian, 17 August. www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe/news/1/?sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170_a_GGL&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Finquirer%2Fpreference-system-no-help-to-divisive-muslim-candidates%2Fnews-story%2Fd36fce4b378ec4de71ff8c9f09e7253a&memtype=anonymous&mode=premium&v21=GROUPA-Segment-1-NOSCORE&V21spcbehaviour=append.

Jewish Council of Australia. 2024. ‘Jewish Council of Australia urges the Australian government to reject racism against Palestinian people fleeing persecution in Gaza.’ Media release, 27 February. Sydney: Jewish Council of Australia. www.jewishcouncil.com.au/2024/02/reject-racism-against-palestinian-fleeing-persecution-gaza.

Karp, Paul. 2024. ‘Labor’s “thought crime” hate speech laws will turn nation into “police state”, Australian Christian Lobby says.’ The Guardian, 21 November. www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/21/labors-thought-hate-speech-laws-will-turn-nation-into-police-state-australian-christian-lobby-says-ntwnfb.

Knaus, Christopher, and Mostafa Rachwani. 2024. ‘Clergy abuse survivors hit out at moves to ban protests outside Australian places of worship.’ The Guardian, 13 December. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2024/dec/13/clergy-abuse-survivors-hit-out-at-moves-to-ban-protests-outside-australian-places-of-worship.

Knott, Matthew. 2025. ‘The numbers game.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March.

Kolovos, Benita. 2025. ‘Israel–Gaza war looms large over Labor’s hold on Melbourne seats of Macnamara and Wills.’ The Guardian, 14 April. www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2025/apr/14/israel-gaza-war-looms-large-over-labors-hold-on-melbourne-seats-of-macnamara-and-wills.

Krayem, Ghaith. 2025. ‘From margins to movement: Why Muslim votes matter.’ [Blog]. Pearls and Irritations, 14 April. johnmenadue.com/post/2025/04/from-margins-to-movement-why-muslim-votes-matter/.

Le Grand, Chip. 2024. ‘Allan government faces showdown with faith groups over hate laws.’ The Age, 18 November. www.theage.com.au/politics/victoria/allan-government-faces-showdown-with-faith-groups-over-hate-laws-20241115-p5kqz2.html.

Lewis, Rosie. 2024a. ‘“We’re fast losing faith”, community groups warn Anthony Albanese.’ The Australian, 4 July. www.theaustralian.com.au/subscribe/news/1/?sourceCode=TAWEB_WRE170_a_GGL&dest=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.theaustralian.com.au%2Fnation%2Fpolitics%2Fwere-fast-losing-faith-community-groups-warn-anthony-albanese%2Fnews-story%2Fa2ab0d596e2d9a2ff0b97d3b5a35c2ca&memtype=anonymous&mode=premium&v21=GROUPA-Segment-1-NOSCORE&V21spcbehaviour=append.

Lewis, Rosie. 2024b. ‘Redraft laws “with input from faiths”.’ The Australian, 15 July. www.theaustralian.com.au/nation/politics/redraft-religious-discrimination-laws-with-input-from-faiths-says-michaelia-cash/news-story/4ea3c21ad5e462b8b129b8fa43772a61.

Lyons, John. 2019. Balcony over Jerusalem. Sydney: HarperCollins.

Maddison, Max. 2025. ‘Hate speech laws pushed through.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 19 February.

Maddison, Max, and Paul Sakkal. 2025. ‘Exclusive Brethren made nearly a million calls for the Liberal Party.’ The Age, 14 May. www.theage.com.au/politics/federal/exclusive-brethren-made-nearly-a-million-calls-for-the-liberal-party-20250508-p5lxml.html.

McSweeney, Jessica. 2025. ‘Unauthorised flyers label Burke a racist.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 29 March.

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Olbrycht-Palmer, Joseph, and Jessica Wang. 2024. ‘Greens senator accuses Labor of “complicity” in “genocide” in Gaza.’ The Australian, 8 October. www.theaustralian.com.au/breaking-news/greens-senator-accuses-labor-of-complicity-in-genocide-in-gaza/news-story/1761198c0b3f32dad219aa52c6cbfe61.

Papastergiadis, Nikos. 2025. ‘This is the most shameful act of political intervention in the arts that I have seen.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February. www.smh.com.au/national/this-is-the-most-shameful-act-of-political-intervention-in-the-arts-that-i-have-seen-20250217-p5lcrj.html.

Patrick, Aaron. 2025. ‘The inside story of how Labor destroyed its deep ties with Australia’s Jewish community in just 18 months.’ The Nightly, 20 March. thenightly.com.au/politics/australia/how-prime-minister-anthony-albanese-and-penny-wong-lost-the-australian-jewish-community-c-17945032.

Sakkal, Paul. 2024. ‘PM warns against faith-based political movements as Payman hints at next move.’ The Sydney Morning Herald, 6 July. www.smh.com.au/politics/federal/pm-warns-against-faith-based-political-movements-as-payman-hints-at-next-move-20240705-p5jrc0.html.

Sydney Morning Herald (SMH). 2025a. ‘Venice Biennale backflip could turn pride into embarrassment.’ [Editorial], The Sydney Morning Herald, 17 February. www.smh.com.au/national/nsw/venice-biennale-backflip-could-turn-pride-into-embarrassment-20250217-p5lcpy.html.

Sydney Morning Herald (SMH). 2025b. ‘The separation of the political and the tribal.’ [Editorial], The Sydney Morning Herald, 2 April.

Tillett, Andrew, and Michael Read. 2025. ‘Papal pause comes at worst time for Dutton.’ Australian Financial Review, 22 April. www.afr.com/politics/federal/papal-pause-comes-at-worst-time-for-dutton-20250422-p5ltax.

Truu, Maani. 2025. ‘Leaders missing from Eid events, as split over politicians at prayers becomes heated.’ ABC News, 6 April. www.abc.net.au/news/2025-04-06/muslim-community-split-over-politicians-at-prayers/105122024.

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Warhurst, John. 2024. ‘The Greens, the Church and freedom of religion.’ Eureka Street, 1 May. www.eurekastreet.com.au/the-greens-the-church-and-freedom-of-religion.

Wimmer, A.C. 2025. ‘Australia election features rare contest between Catholic candidates.’ CNA (Catholic News Agency), 11 April. www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/263235/faith-at-the-ballot-australia-s-election-sees-rare-contest-between-catholic-candidates.


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