Landslide
7
How the media reported: From headline to hashtag
Andrea Carson, Finley Watson and Justin Phillips
Abstract
This chapter analyses media coverage of the 2025 Australian federal election, focusing on how traditional and digital platforms framed the campaign. It examines challenges faced by Prime Minister Anthony Albanese—poor polling, economic strain, floods in Queensland and Trump’s tariff wars—and their mediation in public discourse. Drawing on agenda-setting theory and mixed methods, manual and computational, it explores strategic communication tactics and the influence of social media influencers and short-form video platforms such as TikTok and YouTube. While highlighting the fragmentation of the media environment, the chapter challenges claims that the mainstream media has lost agenda-setting power, showing instead its continued influence—especially on digital platforms. By comparing the agenda-setting power of legacy media with the speed and reach of digital platforms, it reveals the hybrid media ecosystem that adept campaigners must understand if they are to be effective at reaching voters through their political communications.
Keywords: agenda-setting; social media; influencers; hybrid media; brain rot
As the Forty-Seventh Parliament of Australia was coming to an end, Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was looking like the political underdog. Polling numbers for the Labor leader and his party were dismal. In January 2025, polls suggested the party was at least 2 percentage points behind the Coalition on a two-party-preferred (2PP) tally (Jackman 2025).
Australians were also doing it tough amid a housing crisis and cost-of-living pressures, with many households bearing the strain of 13 consecutive interest rate hikes. Labor’s polling hit its lowest point just before the Reserve Bank of Australia reversed its direction and cut interest rates, on 18 February 2025 (Jackman 2025).
By 8 March, Tropical Cyclone Alfred had struck South-East Queensland, giving the government media airtime to speak about the perils of climate change—a vexed issue for the Coalition, with a long history of policy turmoil for the party. The natural disaster enabled the embattled Albanese government to shape the public narrative and show its responsiveness, quickly getting aid to flood victims; what followed was a steady rise in polling support.
The floods also delayed any planned election date announcement and forced the government to deliver a national budget that might have been postponed if the election were earlier. The allocation of $785.7 billion was an opportunity not to be missed by Treasurer Jim Chalmers to directly target voters feeling cost-of-living pressures and to reinforce key government messages: interest rates were coming down, unemployment was low and inflation had been tamed. Labor’s polling numbers continued to rise, hitting an election-winning 51 per cent 2PP by the day the election was called on 28 March (Jackman 2025). It was a promising start for a government that had begun the year poorly according to the pundits and polls.
Then, international mayhem struck. Within days of the election writs being issued, US President Donald Trump upended global stability with his so-called ‘Liberation Day’, launching a tariff war that targeted ‘friends and foes’ alike. Albanese described it as ‘not the act of a friend’, appearing calm and resolute as stock markets around the world crashed. Trump’s tariff fiasco posed a dilemma for Opposition leader Peter Dutton: would he be seen as too closely aligned with Trumpian ideas at a time when the US President appeared to be unpopular with Australians (Australia Institute 2025)?
Dutton had already embraced an Elon Musk–inspired war on government spending, promising his own version of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), led by Jacinta Nampijinpa Price—the public face of the 2023 Voice referendum ‘No’ campaign—with extensive public service cuts if the Coalition won office. As this chapter will show, these issues set the scene for a bumpy five-week media campaign that was interrupted by Easter, school holidays and Anzac Day, and truncated by early voting. Most Australians opted to pre-poll, with many casting ballots before all policies were released,1 intensifying the challenge for campaigners to grab the public’s attention in a vast, fragmented media environment.
Background
Australia’s contemporary media landscape, like that of most advanced democracies, is highly fragmented and best characterised as hybrid, encompassing both traditional (television, radio, print) and digital media platforms (Chadwick 2017). The 2025 Australian federal election campaign was further evidence of how politicians, candidates, political parties and third-party campaigners must navigate this complex environment, combining free ‘earned’ and paid political communications to reach as many voters as possible with their messages.
Campaigners’ goals are both to persuade undecided voters and to mobilise supporters. To do this, adept political actors use a mix of real-time media (social media, live radio and TV) and scheduled media (newspapers, TV and radio news bulletins, podcasts) to convey their policies to diverse audiences. They combine the affordances of interactivity and immediacy that characterise the digital sphere (Karlsson and Strömbäck 2010) with the agenda-setting power of legacy media (Langer and Gruber 2020). To neglect one platform, such as TikTok, can mean specific cohorts who gravitate to that platform, like Gen Z first-time voters, miss key messages. Modern election campaigns are, by necessity, diverse, requiring a range of communication and digital skills to reach voters in a multimodal communication environment.
Agenda-setting scholarship is well developed and refers to the relationship between media coverage and what audiences perceive as important. McCombs and Shaw’s (1972: 177) seminal study of the 1968 US presidential election famously identified a ‘near perfect correlation’ between front-page news and key voter concerns. While some argue that the traditional media’s agenda-setting power is diminishing in the digital age with reference to this election result (Predavec et al. 2025), this chapter contends that mainstream media continues to play an important role in election campaign coverage across media spheres.
We analyse traditional and digital media election coverage to pinpoint which issues political actors and professional gatekeepers prioritised and, crucially, audience engagement on social media leading up to the 3 May election. We agree in part with Predavec et al. (2025) that, notwithstanding News Corp Australia’s extensive holdings and audience reach across print, radio and television, the Murdoch-owned outlet’s influence in shifting voter support towards the conservative cause—through favourable coverage of Opposition leader Peter Dutton—appears limited. However, as will be shown, this does not capture the full story of the mainstream media’s influence.
Another key finding of the chapter is that the centre-right Liberal–Nationals Coalition combined traditional and digital media in innovative ways, investing heavily in social media strategies such as memes, artificial intelligence (AI) and emotional appeals rooted in fear and negativity. However, as Chapter 8 of this volume observes, this emphasis on style—through AI-driven content, slogans such as Dutton’s ‘Let’s get Australia back on track’ and attacks (such as ‘hate media’)—highlights the campaign’s lack of policy depth and dependence on negative messaging. Labor’s approach presented a contrast in style and substance. Benefiting from the early release and reiteration of their cost-of-living education (for example, HECS debt relief and free TAFE) and health–focused policy agenda, underpinned by the pre-election budget, the incumbent’s messaging appeared more consistent and disciplined. This was especially important as a record number of Australians voted before the end of the five-week campaign.
This chapter examines these divergent messaging strategies, scrutinising their intended targets and methods of dissemination. Echoing findings from the 2023 Indigenous Voice to Parliament referendum, we find that key messages circulate across both online and offline platforms to show intermedia agenda-setting between old and new media, revealing a symbiotic relationship (Carson et al. 2025; Meraz 2011). While we do not make causal claims about the election outcome in relation to campaign effects, we critically examine how and where political actors and media outlets prioritise their efforts with the purpose of shaping public discourse.
We use qualitative and quantitative methods, both manual and computational, and a range of data sources to scrutinise key facets of Australia’s media ecosystem during the election. We begin our analysis focusing on the front-page press coverage of Australia’s 13 major daily newspapers to identify the stories that editors deemed most important and to compare news coverage across the country. We shift to examine Facebook users’ engagement with mainstream election stories on that platform, offering insights into how audiences interact with political coverage online. We then turn to older digital platforms (YouTube) and the next generation (TikTok) to explore the rise of social media influencers, comparing the political actors and narratives that gained traction. We conclude with a discussion about what this multi-platform analysis of the five-week campaign reveals about the strategic decisions of major parties and the choices of news editors that shaped the election discourse.
Mainstream media: Front-page analysis
Newspaper front pages feature the stories that editors and journalists—acting as professional gatekeepers—believe will most engage readers (Boydstun 2013). We tracked the frequency, focus and tone of press coverage. Following previous Australian (Carson and Jackman 2023; Carson and Zion 2019; Carson and McNair 2018) and international (Kahn and Kenney 2002) studies, we coded front pages for the presence of election stories, the topic of the lead story and its tone: neutral, positive or negative. Election coverage was more inconsistent than in previous campaigns, partly due to major global news events such as the death of Pope Francis on 21 April 2025 and extensive reporting on Trump’s ‘Liberation Day’, which diverted front-page media attention from the election. Mainstream outlets published 424 front pages over the 36-day campaign, with 273 or 64 per cent of these including at least one election story.2 This represented a slight decrease in front-page coverage, from 68 per cent in 2022 and 69 per cent in 2019.3 As alluded to, what was unusual in 2025 were the number of page-one stories featuring international issues. In the first two weeks of the campaign, 13 per cent of front-page headlines were about Trump, showing his outsized role in public discourse during the Australian election.

Figure 7.1 Fluctuations in election coverage on front pages during the campaign
Note: N = 273 stories; COL = cost of living.
Source: Compiled by authors using front-page coverage of 13 daily mastheads.
Unlike previous elections, front-page election coverage peaked in week two and then declined over the next two weeks before a rally in the final week (see Figure 7.1). This mid-campaign drop may reflect disruptions from school holidays and non-election events. The death of Pope Francis on 21 April and Anzac Day (25 April) captured a large proportion of front-page attention over this period. Election coverage lifted in week five, coinciding with the opening of early voting (in week four), along with a flurry of late policy announcements from the major parties. Coverage was also spread more evenly across different mastheads in 2025 than previously, with Perth’s West Australian for the first time providing the most stories, followed closely by national broadsheet the Australian and the Melbourne-based Age (see Figure 7.2). But, as in past elections, the Hobart Mercury and NT News featured fewer front-page election stories.

Figure 7.2 Number of front-page election stories by masthead and publisher
Notes: N = 424 front pages; election coverage n = 273 election stories; AFR = Australian Financial Review; SMH = The Sydney Morning Herald.
Source: Compiled by authors analysing front-page newspaper data.
Media-commissioned polling was among the most prominent of front-page topics, as expected, as it allows the press to shape the news agenda with ‘exclusive’ content. These poll-based stories consistently favoured Labor and highlighted perceived Coalition missteps. Economic issues dominated overall coverage, followed by related concerns such as the cost of living, national security and campaign process stories.
However, these topics showed high agenda volatility (McCombs and Zhu 1995), with coverage largely contextual or explanatory journalism (Fink and Schudson 2013). Rather than reinforcing clear party ‘issue ownership’ (Konstantinidis 2008), reporting focused on the shifting dimensions of each issue. For instance, the unexpected announcement of major tax concessions at the party campaign launches was met with an almost universal press cynicism concerning the likely economic consequences. The Sydney Morning Herald’s headline argued ‘They treat us like mugs’ (14 April 2025), while the Australian suggested that the policies threatened defence spending (15 April 2025).
Stories about President Trump were another key aspect of this volatility, with much front-page coverage given to the ‘Trump effect’ in the campaign. This term defined not only the economic uncertainty caused by a global tariff policy, but also broader concerns about how prospective prime ministers would manage Australia’s international relations. This ‘Trump effect’ proved to be an issue for the Coalition, as coverage emphasised an unfavourable likeness between Peter Dutton’s proposed ministry of government efficiency and the recently instituted US DOGE (Butler 2025). Then shadow minister for Indigenous Australians and for government efficiency, Jacinta Nampijinpa Price, contributed to such comparisons, with calls to ‘make Australia great again’ the day before the Coalition party launch. The Sydney Morning Herald questioned whether there was a ‘MAGA problem for Libs?’ (13 April 2025), while the Age wrote: ‘Opposition Leader Peter Dutton has tried to distance himself from Donald Trump, only to stand next to Jacinta Nampijinpa Price yesterday, as she vowed to “make Australia great again”’ (13 April 2025).
It was the first of several Coalition miscalculations that shaped page-one coverage. Within a week, Dutton reversed a key public service efficiency policy on work-from-home (WFH) arrangements, after it was criticised as unpopular and disproportionately affecting women. This decision alone made up 4 per cent of total front-page stories, including 11 of the 18 ‘Dutton’ stories in Figure 7.3. It preceded Dutton’s reversal on tax concessions for electric vehicles and a gaffe involving false claims that the Indonesian President was considering Russia’s use of a Papuan airbase.

Figure 7.3 Prevalence of front-page election topics in the daily press
Notes: N = 424; election coverage n = 273.
Source: Authors’ analysis of front-page newspaper data.
The remainder of campaign coverage followed similarly, with a fragmented agenda comprising both temporarily salient policy proposals, particularly regarding tax cuts and defence spending, and gaffes. Anthony Albanese falling from a stage at a campaign event and denying it (despite being caught on camera) made headlines as did the Sydney ‘corflute war’ and, more seriously, an alleged terror plot perpetrated by a 16-year-old student against Dutton. Meanwhile, front-page coverage of Independents was noticeably lower (about half that of the 2022 election) despite a record number serving in the Forty-Seventh Australian Parliament. Headlines did, however, typically speculate about the possibility of a minority government in the final stages of the campaign, making up 3 per cent of front-page coverage.
Partisan sentiment
Like in previous campaigns, front-page stories adopted a mostly neutral tone in coverage (Carson and Jackman 2023), although, as expected, when sentiment was expressed, it was mostly negative, particularly towards Labor (see Figure 7.3). Media tycoon Kerry Stokes, owner of Seven West Media, Australia’s largest diversified media business, which includes the West Australian, contributed to this negativity—as did News Corp’s the Australian, owned by Rupert Murdoch. Each published more than double the number of negative Labor stories compared with other outlets. The West Australian was consistently critical of Albanese’s personality, headlining an ‘awkward moment’ with former environment minister Tanya Plibersek (15 April 2025), his ‘confidence turning to arrogance’ (16 April 2025) and his fall off a stage (25 April 2025).
News Corp’s and the West Australian’s front pages were similarly critical of Labor following speculation about a future Voice to Parliament in the last week of the campaign (see Chapter 4, this volume). The Daily Telegraph, the Herald Sun and the West Australian ran headlines suggesting Labor’s campaign had been ‘thrown into chaos’ by the revealing of a ‘secret plan’ (1 May 2025).
These headlines represented a broader agenda shift to culture war issues, particularly following the neo-Nazi–led heckling of a Welcome to Country (WTC) ceremony at the Anzac Day dawn service in Melbourne. This event prompted Dutton to assert that, while he disavowed the incident, WTC ceremonies should not be part of Anzac Day services. He reaffirmed this position during the final leaders’ debate, televised on Stokes’s Seven Network, suggesting WTC ceremonies were ‘overdone’ (Dick 2025). We return to how this issue tracked on social media shortly.

Figure 7.4 Comparison of negative major-party stories across election front pages
Note: N = 92.
Source: Data collected and coded by the authors in accordance with previous studies (Kahn and Kenney 2002).

Figure 7.5 Tone of front-page election stories by masthead
Note: N = 273.
Source: Front-page data collected and coded by the authors.
Overall, negative coverage of Labor had increased slightly from 2022, equalling the 2019 campaign at 18 per cent of front-page stories. Sentiment split in accordance with ownership—giving insight into Australian media polarity—as News Corp newspapers covered the Coalition more positively, while stories from Nine (formerly Fairfax) were more favourable to Labor. The Guardian was just as often critical of the Coalition as it was neutral (see Figures 7.4 and 7.5). As displayed in Figure 7.4, negative coverage of the Coalition spiked on 7 April. This was due to both Dutton’s WFH policy reversal and the dis-endorsement of a Liberal candidate over controversial comments to exclude women from combat roles in the Australian Defence Force. Daily negative coverage of the ALP peaked on 28 March and 29 April with criticism of Labor’s contribution to the cost-of-living crisis, its ‘campaign of fear’ in likening Dutton to Trump (Australian, 28 March 2025) and allegedly risking Australia’s AAA credit rating.
Social media
Political campaigners seek to build audiences on social media so they can effectively bypass traditional media gatekeepers and speak directly to voters. Building on the success of their 2023 Voice to Parliament referendum campaigns, Australia’s political leaders, parties and third-party campaigners such as right-wing lobby group Advance (see Chapters 4 and 16, this volume) have developed their digital infrastructure by amassing followers and ‘likes’ across the major platforms to target specific voter groups. Broadly, this digital infrastructure includes X (formerly Twitter), to reach the political commentariat; Facebook, for voters over 35 years of age; Instagram, for voters under 35; and TikTok, for 18–24-year-olds (Carson et al. 2025). But, as the 2025 election result indicates, likes, followers and audience reach on social media platforms do not necessarily equate to election victory.
Take, for example, the success of the Liberal Party in infiltrating the online space. It hired Sean Topham and Ben Guerin (see Chapter 8, this volume), two Millennials known for their sharp social media strategies in political campaigns. Their approach uses humour and emotionally charged content to provoke feelings such as anger, pride and fear. In 2025, they experimented with AI content and coopted popular culture into their political messaging. For instance, several videos featured elements of ‘Italian brain rot’ (see Katz 2025). At face value, the Liberal Party (‘liberalaus’) had great success in building a youthful online following, with 15.7 million views on TikTok posts during the campaign, although it fell short of Labor’s (‘australianlabor’) 19.4 million TikTok views over that period. Nonetheless, it was an important group to reach given that, combined, Gen Z and Millennials were the largest voting bloc (Chowdhury 2025).
A diverse range of digital strategies was used to reach voters on social media. One common technique was the dual use of partisan hashtags (for example, #alp and #liberals) to broaden visibility across ideological divides. Candidates used AI tools to redub scenes from popular culture, such as the Liberals’ use of the movie The Grinch, to mock opponents. They also produced generative AI clips with exaggerated imagery (for example, aliens, fighter jets) to promote policies such as their proposed cut to the fuel excise.
Gaming culture was also appropriated for political outreach. Greens Senator Nick McKim used Fortnite to attract young male voters (88 per cent of players are men aged 18–35), while Labor used Zelda-themed content to attract younger voters. Politicians repurposed mainstream media appearances—for instance, the Greens’ Max Chandler-Mather’s segments on ABC TV’s Q&A became short-form content for TikTok and Instagram. Debate footage was similarly cut into engaging clips for social platforms.
Social media is, however, a double-edged sword for campaigners; it can amplify traditional media reportage of gaffes and to large online audiences. For example, Dutton’s failure to guess the price of eggs at the fourth leaders’ debate was shared on TikTok by the Seven Network and repurposed by others, generating 4.3 million views in the final week of the campaign. Ironically, despite declining free-to-air TV audiences and falling TV viewership for election debates, reproducing segments online attracts very large secondary audiences.
Podcasts are another medium to reach non-traditional audiences, as seen with politicians’ appearances on podcasts such as influencer Abbie Chatfield’s show, It’s A Lot. YouTube also remains a key site for traditional media reposts and independent creators, including influencers such as friendlyjordies’ election commentary. Finally, peer-to-peer networks such as WhatsApp are employed by campaigners and mainstream media to reach specific voter groups, offering more intimate forms of political communication.
The news media has also recognised the power of colonising the online sphere. Front-page print stories are reposted on social media to increase audience reach. To understand how political news from mainstream media is shared on Facebook, the next section uses computational methods to address this question.
News stories on Facebook
We assessed political news engagement by analysing nearly 40,000 Facebook posts from Australia’s top 25 news producers during the five-week election campaign. We show that domestic politics made up only 10 per cent of user engagement, even amid an intense campaign (Figure 7.6). Rather, topics such as court cases, human interest and entertainment were what featured prominently. Still, campaign-specific instances did overlap with larger topics such as economic coverage and President Trump’s tariffs.
As expected, there were clear election campaign topics, which we categorised more broadly under the (domestic) politics theme in Figure 7.6. These election topics ranged widely, including Albanese’s and Dutton’s campaign stops, their debates, voting procedure and polling, Teal politics, the Coalition, a potential hung parliament and media advertisements about upcoming campaign coverage. Still, this collectively represents a small proportion of the overall modelled media data, indicating that campaign politics commands only minor attention from news media (and audiences), at least on Facebook.
As the wealth of game-framing literature suggests, some of this coverage fixated on the horserace aspect of the election campaign, typically using newly released poll data as evidence of who was ahead or behind. For example: ‘Labor has secured an early lead in the election race … according to the latest Newspoll’, with ‘[f]resh polling [that] has shown the damage done by Peter Dutton’s shaky start’, or post-debate undecided-voter analysis anointing candidate performance as something that might ‘swing the election’. Leaders aside, frontbenchers on the verge of losing seats received similar game-framing attention, as did previous electorate strongholds now experiencing tough battles. Framing the election campaign in terms of carefully considered strategy (for example, Aalberg et al. 2012) was also apparent, with policy ‘backflips’ framed as ‘designed to reboot the Opposition Leader’s campaign [to] win back female voters’.

Figure 7.6 Top news topics and audience interaction with mainstream media outlets’ content on Facebook
Notes: N = 38,787 posts from 25 Australian news publishers; Interactions represent the percentage of total likes, reactions, shares and comments each topic received as reported by MCL. Size is represented as a percentage of all topics. Percentages do not include noise, meaning they will not sum to 100 per cent.
Source: The authors via Meta Content Library.
Finally, Figure 7.6 also shows the interactions each topic received, which appear roughly equivalent to the size of each cluster. The figure therefore shows not only what these news media outlets considered important, but also what the users themselves valued. In other words, online content that generates more likes, reactions, shares and comments partially reflects what audiences find important, unlike content that is met with apathy. Put another way, if audiences were so deeply engaged with the election campaign, we might expect to see more interactions that reflected such interest. Instead, much like coverage of the campaign itself, online interactions tend to indicate that politics only commands a minority of public interest.
Facebook comments on Welcome to Country news posts
Given the prominence of WTC in the final week of the campaign, we map Facebook stories about it. Between 22 April and 2 May, 101 WTC news stories were published on Facebook by the 25 major news organisations, generating more than 55,000 public comments and a surge of emotional responses, both supportive and critical. As Chapter 4 of this volume notes, Advance was also ramping up its attacks on WTC with multiple ads at this time.
This public outpouring supports claims that Dutton’s attack on WTC was an opportunistic one aimed at leveraging Voice to Parliament negative sentiment. It echoed the divisive rhetoric he and figures such as Price and Advance effectively employed during the 2023 Voice to Parliament referendum to shift the issue agenda using a divisive framing strategy (Phillips et al. 2024).
Notably, the stories attracted nearly 15,000 ‘ha ha’ reactions—a troll-like emoji often used to mock supporters or signal political disagreement; in this case, supporters of WTC (Phillips 2024). Public comments using the emoji included inflammatory lines like: ‘If it’s not white it’s not right 🤣, 😂’ (25 April 2025). Many echoed Voice-era tensions, using emotionally charged language to pit military veterans against Indigenous Australians: ‘Yep wrong place, the sacrifices made by the veterans & families past and present to be welcome [sic] to Country is totally wrong on Anzac Day’ (26 April 2025).
This was despite RSL Victoria explicitly rejecting such a framing, with RSL president Dr Robert Webster noting that ‘the spontaneous applause from the 50,000-strong crowd attending the service drowned out those who disrupted’ (RSL Victoria 2025). Some Facebook users also rejected the divisive framing: ‘Both my grandfathers fought in WW2, they would be so happy for a welcome to country!’ (25 April 2025).
In the campaign’s final days, Dutton returned to Trump-style rhetoric and negative campaigning exploiting the WTC issue, which intensified social media debate. But as Chapter 19 of this volume suggests, the failure to shift the election result highlights the limits of using a single-issue referendum—especially one that did not neatly cleave along party lines—as a guide for campaigning in a federal election context.
TikTok and YouTube
TikTok and YouTube were key election news sources, used by more than one-third of Australians (Park et al. 2024). This increases to 55 per cent for Gen Z (1997–2012) users, leading some scholars to suggest the rise of ‘TikTok elections’ is a key feature of Australian politics (Grantham 2024). We queried YouTube and TikTok application programming interfaces (APIs) to track key accounts and topics during the election using custom tools (Rieder 2015; Teather 2024).
While commentators highlighted that political influencers were prominent voices on these platforms (Hurcomb 2025), we find that mainstream content still dominated. While Figure 7.7 shows top influencers on TikTok consistently outperforming major parties in terms of viewership, Figure 7.8 shows that these influencers were in turn consistently exceeded by mainstream outlets in terms of viewership.
Influencer content still shaped coverage on the platform, though rarely by drawing attention to specific issues. Greens-aligned influencers such as Hannah Ferguson and Holly MacAlpine directed users to claims that a Coalition government would cut the minimum wage and access to childcare. In return, Liberal member Freya Leach emphasised the failure of the Voice referendum and rising power costs under Labor. More commonly, influencers tended to exaggerate existing campaign dynamics, offering direct opportunities for the leaders to express themselves in informal settings (Watson 2025). For example, clips from a ‘pub chat’ interview between Ethan Marrell aka ‘Ozzy Man’ and Albanese garnered close to 1.5 million views, compared with a short reaction to the Seven Network’s coverage of Liberal campaigning that garnered more than 150,000 views.
Influencers gained traction by framing the election as personal drama using their own media style. Chatfield, for example, drew nearly a million views critiquing Olympian-turned-influencer Sam Fricker, while MacAlpine and Leach successfully engaged with Liberal campaign tactics during their ‘Influencers Debate’ on SBS’s The Feed.

Figure 7.7 Comparison of total TikTok video views between top influencers and political party accounts
Note: N = 1,067 TikTok posts.
Source: Data collected through an unofficial researcher-developed TikTok API (Teather 2024) and analysed by the authors.

Figure 7.8 Comparison of total TikTok video views between top influencers and selected mainstream media accounts
Note: N = 1,567 TikTok posts.
Source: Data collected through an unofficial researcher-developed TikTok API (Teather 2024) and analysed by the authors.
YouTube coverage differed from that on TikTok, with the former platform affording longer productions, less algorithmic curation and catering to a male-dominated audience (Park et al. 2024). Here, several influencers, including Jordan Shanks-Markovina aka friendlyjordies, produced extended, issue-specific content that delivered large audiences. Friendlyjordies’ 29 videos on topics such as housing, Dutton and the Greens drew nearly six million views during the campaign.
Further, influencers including YouTuber Konrad Benjamin, Australian correspondent for the far-right Rebel News network Avi Yemini and former deputy prime minister-turned-podcaster John Anderson also attracted a combined six million views (see Figure 7.9). These productions tended to feature extended discussions of specific policies, covering housing, gas royalties, renewable energy costs and immigration, averaging between three and 15 minutes.
This combination of YouTube vernacular content (Burgess and Green 2018), featuring video essays, vox-pops and podcast excerpts, was consistently more successful than the soft influencer–leader interactions seen on TikTok. For instance, Fricker’s interviews with Dutton, Clive Palmer and cabinet minister Chris Bowen garnered just 12,000 of a total of 5.6 million views across the campaign. Ozzy Man’s interview with Albanese similarly had a view count fewer than one-third of that on TikTok, despite a total viewership of more than 16 million.
Overall, on YouTube as on TikTok, the mainstream media still dominates this attention economy, as illustrated in Figure 7.10. While publishers such as News Corp observe a declining print readership, their digital productions are increasingly a key facet of the hybrid media system. Sky News productions alone generated 107 million YouTube views, while News.com.au had a larger total audience than Ozzy Man and that of 9News was close to double again.

Figure 7.9 Comparison of total daily YouTube views between selected top Australian influencers and ABC News
Note: N = 1,577 YouTube posts.
Source: Data collected through researcher-developed tools (Rieder 2015) and analysed by the authors.

Figure 7.10 Comparison of total daily YouTube views between 27 Australian influencers and podcasters, mainstream media, alternative media and political party accounts
Note: N = 11,642 YouTube posts from 27 accounts; MSM = mainstream media.
Source: Data collected through researcher-developed tools (Rieder 2015) and analysed by the authors.
Conclusion
The 2025 federal election coverage reveals a complex interplay between mainstream and social media. While some argue that favourable conservative press coverage had little impact on the election, suggesting a decline in the influence of traditional media, we contend that it remains difficult to pinpoint the media’s exact influence on election outcomes. As our data show, claims that the mainstream media no longer matters in election campaigns seem premature. The legacy media effectively expanded its reach beyond traditional forms and, in fact, dominated 2025 election coverage on digital platforms such as YouTube, TikTok and Facebook and private spaces such as WhatsApp. Facebook data also confirm previous research showing that, despite the large volume of election coverage, politics makes up a small portion of news consumers’ overall media consumption (Carson and Jackman 2023).
While we cannot make causal claims about how the campaigns deliver outcomes, we can highlight the role that the media plays in issue agenda-setting and framing of the election. Broadly speaking, the mainstream media plays a complicit role in reinforcing a narrow issue agenda—dominating front pages and broadcast bulletins with coverage aligned to the major parties’ priorities and horserace journalism focused on polling data and who is ahead. Also noticeable was minimal front-page attention to critical policy areas such as the National Disability Insurance Scheme, climate change, domestic violence against women and the concerns of regional and rural Australians. While scholarship on agenda-setting and framing has evolved for the digital age, the media’s narrow attention to a handful of policies reinforces Bernard Cohen’s 1963 insight on media influence: ‘The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about’ (p. 13).
Initially trailing in the polls, Albanese’s Labor Party capitalised on media opportunities arising from Cyclone Alfred, a well-timed Reserve Bank interest rate cut and Trump’s tariff chaos, using these events to frame the election and set the agenda in its favour, positioning its leadership as both reliable and stable. In contrast, Peter Dutton’s Coalition struggled to maintain narrative cohesion. The external shock of the US President’s renewed tariff war had complicated their messaging, forcing difficult decisions about alignment with Trump’s unpopular policies in Australia. Their emphasis on public service cuts and forcing workers back to the office backfired, leading to policy walk-backs and subsequent negative media coverage outside the conservative press. Dutton’s return to negative campaigning—mirroring tactics that proved effective during the 2023 Voice referendum and focusing on WTC ceremonies and ‘hate media’—garnered widespread attention across traditional and digital platforms but appears to have ultimately failed to sway most voters.
Social media, particularly TikTok and YouTube, emerged as a key site of political engagement during this campaign, with influencers, memes and emotional appeals reaching large audiences in real time. The Liberal Party’s playful use of generative AI and affective messaging showed the tactical possibilities of digital media in campaigning, though, like its traditional media counterparts, this attention yielded limited electoral benefit, with Dutton losing his own seat—the first Opposition Leader to do so. Remarkably, Dutton was the first of two political leaders to fall at this election. Despite promotion by influencers such as Chatfield and others, Greens’ leader Adam Bandt was unable to save his own seat of Melbourne.
Labor’s campaign, by contrast, was marked by greater message discipline with its focus on the cost of living, housing and health. Early policy announcements about HECS debt relief in late 2024 and tax cuts in the March 2025 Budget before the official campaign ensured early voters had time to encounter ALP positions before filling out their ballots. Labor’s pre-campaign policy releases reflected former Liberal prime minister John Howard’s (2006) warning that political messaging must be re-enforced over time, captured in his vivid phrase: ‘You can’t fatten the pig on market day.’ Labor’s clear focus on core policies amid international instability gave voters a reason to stick with the status quo. The data in this chapter illustrate how legacy and digital media interact in both competitive and complementary ways. Together with the major parties’ differing approaches to messaging, it reveals the fragmented and fiercely contested nature of campaigning in Australia’s complex hybrid media system where a perceived underdog can produce a landslide election win.
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1 For example, the Coalition’s $21-billion defence policy was released after early voting began, just 10 days before election day (Glover 2025).
2 This count now includes the Guardian’s static Monday–Friday digital front page, collected from ‘FrontPages.com’, to ensure consistency in data collection.
3 The Guardian was not included in these prior studies, though the overall decrease in coverage remains accurate across the subsequent mastheads.
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